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Constructions of Tacana Indigeneity: 
Regionalism, Race and Indigenous Politics in Amazonian Bolivia

Esther Lopez Pila

Thesis submitted for the
Doctor of Philosophy in Social Anthropology
University of Sussex
January 2014
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature

Esther Lopez Pila
University of Sussex

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Thesis submitted for the Doctor of Philosophy in Social Anthropology

Constructions of Tacana Indigeneity: Regionalism, Race and Indigenous Politics in Amazonian Bolivia

Summary

This dissertation is based on eighteen months of field work in Amazonian Bolivia, and situated in the discourse around the construction of indigenous identity in a neoliberal state. It focusses on a lowland people and their historical and contemporary relationship to the state which is aligned to the contemporary indigenous movement. It does this through an ethnographic and historical study of Tacana people, members of an indigenous group who originate in the tropical piedmont of the Bolivian Andes. A central focus of the work is on the relationships which Tacana people have built with different ethnic, social and political groups in their territory. This focus helps to elucidate the overarching issue at the centre of the thesis: the tensions between the Tacana and other indigenous groups, namely highland Aymara and Quechua who have migrated into the region (colonos).

The relationship between Tacana and colonos has become increasingly conflictive since the advent of Bolivia's first indigenous president, Evo Morales, which emphasizes its origins in Bolivia’s strong highland-lowland regionalism. This thesis therefore also examines the strong regionalist sentiments found in Bolivia, as expressed in the contrasting concepts of camba (lowland) and colla (highland) which are themselves further tied to more recent efforts to forge local identities, such as an Amazonian identity. The thesis shows how these efforts, which transgress local, historical and racial boundaries, entail an implicit criticism by lowland populations of the government in the Andes. A related point is that constructions of race and mestizaje have developed differently in the highlands and lowlands. Through a close analysis of such racial relationships the thesis shows how lowland groups such as the Tacana more readily align with lowland mestizo people than with other indigenous groups, especially those who originate in the highlands. Democratization processes and neoliberal policy changes have created spaces for tensions to take shape here and become clearer by discussions around identity, heritage and belonging, brought up by the indigenous movement and heavily informed by NGOs.
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Throughout this research I have benefitted from the library at the University of Sussex, the British Library in London, the Ibero-Amerikanisches Insitut in Berlin as also from the Museo Nacional de Etnografia y Folklore (MUSEF) in La Paz and the library in Trinidad (department of Beni).
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### Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADN</td>
<td>Acción Democrática Nacionalista (National Democratic Action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCOB</td>
<td>Apoyo para el Campesino-Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (Support for the Peasant-Indigenous of Eastern Bolivia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARAR</td>
<td>Acción Revolucionaria Amazonica de Riberalta (Revolutionary Amazonian Action of Riberalta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Conservation International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDOP</td>
<td>Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMTA</td>
<td>Consejo Indígena de las Mujeres Tacana (Tacana Women’s Indigenous Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIPEA</td>
<td>La Capitanía Indígena del Pueblo Ese Eja de la Amazonía (Organisation of Indigenous Leaders of the Ese Eja People of the Amazon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIPTA</td>
<td>Consejo Indígena del Pueblo Tacana (Tacana Indigenous Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COICA</td>
<td>Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica (Coordination of the Indigenous Organisations of the Amazonian Basin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDEPAZ</td>
<td>Corporación Desarrollo para La Paz Del Piedemonte Oriental (Cooperation for the Development of the La Paz Piedmont)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAMAQ</td>
<td>Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPIB</td>
<td>Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the Beni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRTM</td>
<td>Consejo Regional Tsimané-Moseten (Tsimané-Mosetén Indigenous Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSUTCB</td>
<td>Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Confederation of the Union of Peasant Workers of Bolivia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DED</td>
<td>Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (German Development Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMEIR</td>
<td>Equipos Móviles de Educación Integral Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FECAR</td>
<td>La Federación Especial de Colonizadores Agropecuarios de Rurrenabaque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAL</td>
<td>Intergracion Amazonica Libertaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDH</td>
<td>Índice de Desarrollo Humano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INE</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INRA</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>Movimiento de Renovacion Amazonica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Movimiento al Socialismo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>Movimiento Revolucionario Nacionalista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OITA</td>
<td>Organización Indígena Tacana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTB</td>
<td>Organización Territorial de Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASO</td>
<td>Poder Amazónico Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POA</td>
<td>Plan Operativo Anual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>Plan de Desarrollo Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERNAP</td>
<td>Servicio Nacional de Áreas Protegidas</td>
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SAN-TCO  
*Saneamiento y Titulación en Régimen Especial para los de Tierras Comunitarias de Origen*  
(Special Indemnification of Original Communal Lands)

TCO  
*Tierras Comunitarias de Origen*  
(Communal Native Land)

WCS  
Wildlife Conservation Society
Image 2: Map of Bolivia with approximate region of study enlarged and circled. Accessed 10.10.2013
Introduction - Indigeneity in Contemporary Bolivia

This thesis addresses the contextualization of indigeneity as it is constructed and employed in Bolivia with regard to members of an Amazonian lowland group, the Tacana people. In July and August 1990, Tacana were among the indigenous people from the Bolivian lowlands who marched to the highland capital of La Paz to demand rights to indigenous land tenure which would guarantee them access to local resources. Unusual for a Bolivian event, the march made international headlines and can today be understood as a turning point in the relationship between the Bolivian nation-state and its indigenous populations (Postero 2007; Yashar 2005; Van Cott 2005). Over 80 current indigenous land tenures (TCOs1) resulted from the 1994 land reforms which were themselves spurred by the 1990 march. In 2005 Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales, typically referred to as ‘Evo’, was voted into office by an indigenous majority and a sympathetic mestizo (racially and culturally mixed) middle-class. In line with the ethnic renaissance underway in Latin America, he propagated a pro-indigenous policy which returned land to the landless and granted them rights to natural resources.

In late 2011, just over twenty years after that initial protest, another important indigenous protest march was made from the Bolivian lowlands to the Andes. In what was dubbed the TIPNIS2 march, indigenous lowlanders were protesting against a highway which was to be built by the government through their territory and a national nature reserve. Discussions on social media platforms such as Facebook mistook the conflict behind the TIPNIS march as being between the traditional colonial antagonists: the rich whites and mestizos, and indigenous groups, perhaps due to the impression that there was strong indigenous solidarity in Bolivia. In fact it was between indigenous groups themselves, specifically Aymara/Quechua highland migrants (termed colonos) and lowland groups from the Bolivian Amazon. The reference to ‘colonos’ may have contributed to the confusion, for in Bolivia, in contrast to other Latin American countries, the term colono always refers to indigenous highland migrants of Aymara/Quechua descent and never to white, mestizo or lowland indigenous peoples who have migrated. In Bolivia, colono has long been a racial category

1 Tierra Comunitaria de Origen – TCO
2 Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure – The Indigenous Territory and National Park Isiboro Secure is home to the Yuracaré People. It is located in the south of the department of Beni and northern part of Cochabamba, also known as the Yungas.
and ‘colonos are always highland indians’ who migrate for labour, and there are no migrant colonos, who are not highland indians’ (Barragan 2011).

The colonos in favour of the TIPNIS highway launched a counter-march and the two indigenous groups clashed in the Amazonian town of Yucumu. The police, who were accused of siding with the government and the colonos, fired tear-gas as lowland protestors fled into the forest. One child died and three men were hospitalized and the United Nations (UN) commission openly criticized President Morales as his national popularity plummeted. Meanwhile Morales, who makes a point of collaborating harmoniously with both representative highland and lowland indigenous organizations, thereby strategically linking himself to the indigenous movement, continued as normal his routine and reprimanded the lowland marchers for having brought children and the elderly on such an arduous undertaking. The march opposing the highway was led by the indigenous lowland umbrella organization CIDOP (La Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia), whose current president, Adolfo Chavez, is a Tacana from Tumupasa. Youths from the Tacana comunidad of Tumupasa, a key site in this research, could be spotted at the march with placards expressing their support for TIPNIS and opposition to the highway (see Image 3).

Image 3: Tumupasa Youths at the TIPNIS March arriving in the Andes (October 2011)

33 As others before me, I choose to the term ‘indian’ in the lower case, stressing with this that they are not national but ethnic and regional terms (Wade 1997:121; also Canessa 2013). See also usage of terms in chapter 1.


5 See for example media coverage: http://www.aininoticias.org/2011/09/presidente-indigena-se-burla-de-indigenas-marchistas-acusa-a-nnuu-de-apoyarlos/
The 2011 indigenous march, like that of 1990, marks a turning point in indigenous politics in Bolivia. For while the 1990 march demonstrated indigenous solidarity and strength in numbers, the 2011 TIPNIS march questioned these, demonstrating that the indigenous peoples of Bolivia are not a monolithic group and that Evo Morales does not represent them all. What, then, is happening in this state which, in late 2009, officially became ‘plurinational’ in recognition of all indigenous peoples? Why was the indigenous president, who travelled to UN meetings to defend the sacredness of the coca leaf and the importance of ‘Pachamama’ (Mother Earth), not standing beside his indigenous population, and why was a significant part of that population not standing by him? Questions such as these lie at the heart of this thesis and are situated within the constructions of indigeneity and indigenous identities in Bolivia.

Tacana people, the focus of this study, do not find themselves represented by the indigeneity created by Morales and his MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo - Movement towards Socialism) government, which is situated in the Andes (see chapter 5). This does not mean that Tacana people don’t have representative organizations which are active in the contemporary indigenous movement (e.g. CIPTA – Consejo Indigena del Pueblo Tacana – The Indigenous Council of Tacana People) and have not made use of indigenous land-tenure projects (TCOs) themselves (see chapter 7). It also does not mean that they do not consider themselves members of other socio-political groups in the Bolivian nation-state, such as the lowland ‘identity’ of camba (see chapter 3 & 4), a collective self-identification which is deeply embedded in Bolivia’s conflictive highland-lowland regionalism (see chapter 3 & 5). Nevertheless, ‘indigeneity’ as presented in the politics of Morales’ MAS party, and in part also by the indigenous movement, is rejected by those Tacana people studied here, who neither belong to the strong indigenous highland majority (Aymara & Quechua people) which brought Morales into power, nor figure among the few Tacana representatives active in the formal indigenous movement (see chapter 7). This thesis demonstrates how Tacana people situate themselves within key issues in Bolivia, which in turn highlights how their own sense of self and their indigeneity becomes constructed within the political and historical landscape of Bolivia.

The main focus of this research is on Tacana people; however, this thesis is not an ethnography of the Tacana people. Rather it is a discussion of historical and contemporary indigenous identity construction and the broader issues of race and regionalism in Bolivia, of which the Tacana people offer a primary example. It is an anthropological inquiry into different tensions
between different socio-racial groups, whose main focus is on the Tacana people and who in Bolivia, represent an indigenous group. This introduction lays out the theoretical concepts and contemporary political issues that underpin and surround this study. While Chapter 1 will focus more closely on the particular Tacana people studied here, the paragraph below provides a brief introduction to the Tacana people in the Bolivian context.

Tacana people have their origin in the foothills of the tropical Andes in the northern part of Bolivia between the Madre de Dios River and northern part of the Tuichi (Métraux 1942), in today’s

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6 Since increasing involvement with the indigenous movement and coordination with NGOs, (e.g. The Wildlife Conservation Society), ‘Tacana’ is being spelled ‘Takana’ in pamphlets and other grey material. This is in line with the original linguistic spelling. This process of switching from a ‘c’ to a ‘k’ was underway during
departments of La Paz and Beni (see image 2 & 4). Tacana people of this study are based in the surrounding tropical area of the town Rurrenabaque located on the shores of the Beni River (see images 4 & 10). The Beni is part of the basin of the Amazon River further north. Tacana people typically reside in comunidades which house between three and 60 families, and have second homesteads in the surrounding municipal towns of Rurrenabaque, San Buenaventura and Ixiamas. The most recent Bolivian census (2013) numbered Tacana people at 11,173. Besides fishing and hunting, Tacana people at the centre of this study practice swidden horticulture, with men seasonally migrating to work in the local lumber, rubber and, more recently, tourist industries. Linguistically Tacana people are part of the Takanan-language family but today most are monolingual Spanish speakers (see chapter 1). The intention of this research is not to represent ‘the Tacana people’, and all aspects of their society and culture. This study acknowledges that there are many different kinds of Tacana people, of whom some only barely feel comfortable at being labelled ‘Tacana’, while others, especially given the recent indigenous politics have come to fully embrace their ethnic identity. Though there may be Tacana people who follow ‘an old way of life,’ as one of my informants put it, the people studied for this research were very careful to set themselves apart from these ‘more traditional’ Tacana, who ‘still use tutumas to drink from’ (i.e. as opposed to mugs or glasses). Rather they see themselves as ‘civilized’ and first and foremost as Bolivian, though at the poor end of national society (‘somos gente pobre’), as demonstrated by expressions such as ‘being of humble origin’ (‘somos gente humilde’) (see also Albro 2010, 2001); and then as camba (lowlanders), indicating that in any case they consider themselves as ‘belonging’ to the Bolivian nation-state. They do not, however, tie this sense of belonging to ideas of legal ‘citizenship’ (e.g. Lazar & Nuijten 2013; Postero 2007), which would imply an active claim to rights (Isin 2009), which the Tacana people in this study do not conceive of themselves as having.

---

7 There is also a large Tacana population in the department of Pando, largely as a result of the rubber boom during which many were brought, or migrated here, to work.
8 Comunidades is the Bolivian term used for indigenous villages as more closely examined in the following chapter.
9 National statistics from 2000 put Tacana people at 5,000 while the newest census from 2013 quotes the Tacana population at 11,173.
10 Main crops include maize, yucca, banana, sugar cane, peanuts and rice
11 A type of calabash which can be hollowed out
12 Quote from one of my main informants, Berta, from the comunidad Carmen Florida.
Central Themes and Contributions

Focusing on Amazonian lowland indigenous Tacana people, this thesis studies how the construction and continued reproduction of Tacana identity can be seen in relation to the social and political processes of the nation-state. The thesis thus contributes to ongoing debates around the construction of indigenous identities in Bolivia as well as in the wider Latin American and global context. Since the arrival of the Spanish in what is today the Bolivian Amazon, through the consolidation of the Bolivian nation-state and the most recent ethnic renaissance, Tacana identity has been continuously shaped, not only by Tacana people but also by the socio-political processes that have flowed from the construction of the Bolivian state. Tacana people both contribute to and are shaped by these processes, but importantly are never mere vessels. This thesis takes up issues in the context of indigenous identity construction which, though central in Bolivia, have largely been absent from the literature.

Image 5: Map of Bolivia - Though 60% of Bolivia is made up by lowlands, it is considered an Andean country. (Source: http://www.explorebolivia.com/our-country/map-of-bolivia/)

Although the lowlands comprise the largest part of Bolivia (see image 5 above), socio-political processes are spearheaded by developments in the Andes, the historical seat of political power. In line with this, much scholarship on Bolivia has been the study of Andeanism, with focus on cultural orders such as the ayllu (Andean community) (Weismantel 2006; Starn, Harris; Nugent et al. 1994). Considering that Bolivia is an ‘Andean state’ (e.g. Orlove 1993; Klein 1992) with an
Aymara (i.e. highland) president, the relation to the state of Amazonian groups such as the Tacana raises particularly interesting questions. To what extent are they and have they been a part of the construction of indigenous identity in Bolivia since the ethnic renaissance of the late 1980s? What are the central socio-historical factors in their case? Social science literature has concentrated on the different ways in which the Bolivian state establishes indigeneity, and it has been identified as Andean-centric (Greene 2009, 2006; Toranzo Roca 2008). This opens the debate on ‘representation’ and ‘who speaks for whom’ (Greene 2006), something for which indigenous ‘authenticity’ must be created in order to then be claimed (Lucero 2006; Jackson & Warren 2001). With the adoption of linguistic concepts based on an Andean cosmology and philosophy, which heavily focus on ideas of ‘protecting nature’, the pro-indigenous Morales government has focussed on ‘decolonizing’ the country, and making Bolivia an ‘indigenous state’.

**Indigeneity and Indigenous Identity**

As Greene (2009) has observed, the term and concept ‘indigeneity’ have come to be ‘so overgeneralized and so abstracted that they become essentially indefinable, indeed, sublime’ (34). As with the term ‘culture’ (Kuper 1999), it has come to mean everything and nothing. Though on one level ‘indigeneity’ is a hyper-real, essentialized form of being which exists largely in the context of modernity and a ‘strategic essentialism’ (Greene 2009: 35; Warren & Jackson 2002; Ramos 1998) it remains a useful tool to demonstrate multiple layers of parallel meanings which pertain to indigenous peoples. Significant for this research is that in Bolivia, indigenous peoples are treated as a monolithic group, and to subsequently analyse how this affects Tacana people as an indigenous group and as individuals.

Amazonian Bolivians and particularly Tacana people, though affected by the current state-building processes and though having contributed to it, have remained largely ‘invisible’ both historically but also in their oppositions to its new politics. This research takes a relatively atypical ‘angle’ on Bolivia the Andean state. It does not ‘remain’ in the Andes to study the Andes and its people, but rather follows a gaze from the Amazon up to the Andes. It considers predominantly Tacana people’s view which intends to make sense of the politics of ‘indigeneity’ represented and constructed here. This thesis thus explores indigeneity not as focused on political mobilizations as for example the Landless Peasants Movement (MST) and resulting policy in the Andes (Fabricant 2012), which are important contributions, but rather explores how lowland people react to such mobilizations in which they only indirectly participate, yet which affect them fully.
It has been argued (Greene 2009, 2006) that literature on indigenous groups in ‘Andean states’ and their specific link and role in the nation-state and in nation-state construction has been focussed mainly on Andean peoples (e.g. Canessa 2012, 2006b, 2005a; Pape 2009; Lucero 2008; Spedding 2008; Larson 2003, 1995; de la Cadena 2000; Weismantel 2001; etc.), and much less on the Bolivian lowlands, which in turn also predominantly focusses on Bolivia’s Eastern lowlands, the so-called Oriente (e.g. Weber 2013, 2012; Postero 2013, 2007; Sarreal 2013, 2009; Fabricant 2012, 2009; Bogado 2010; Gustafson 2009; Roca 2008; Boschetti & Peña 2008; Fifer 1972, 1970). Native groups of the Amazon who live in ‘Andean states’, in the literature have been treated as less ‘significant’ and ‘impactful’ on nation-state processes (Lucero 2006:35; also Greene 2009, 2006; Klein 1992). This has become reflected on literature focussing on Bolivia and the nation-state, but also on theories and models of the social sciences which intend to ‘understand’ Amazonian peoples (Greene 2009).

This may very well be an influence which goes back to the reign of the Incas. In colonial times the highland elite made a cult around the Inca nobles of Alto Peru (today Bolivia and Peru), a phenomenon which Greene terms the “Inca legacy” (ibid: 67). This ‘attitude’ permeated a multitude of levels. Not only that of the elite of Alto Peru, but it continued to influence future generations. Including the way history became written, not least influencing the discipline of Anthropology (ibid). At the same time Amazonianist authors have increasingly set literatures on the history and socio-historical reality of people of in the Amazon with regard to the new indigenous politics which emerged especially from the 1990s onwards13 (e.g. Van Valen 2013; Dudley 2011, 2009; Alexiades 2009; Greene 2009; Wenzel 2008; Bathurst 2005; Peluso 2005; Alexiades & Peluso 2005; Castillo Altamirano & eds. 2003; Garcia Altamirano 2003; Cusurichi Palacios 2003; Herrera Sarmiento 2003a, 2003b; Balza 2001; Lehm 1999; Castillo 1988; et al), an aspect which is further elaborated in chapter one.

Looking at indigeneity and avoiding essentialism means focusing on how it becomes constructed and reiterated in regard to specific historical conceptions and politics. A principal actor in the topic around indigenous identity is the global indigenous movement of indigenous peoples as represented at the United Nation forums. Importantly as observed by Niezen (2009), “the international movement of indigenous peoples (demonstrates) part of a transformation in the politics of culture, (...) in which the ability of the nation-state to be principal object of cultural

13 Taking the 1990 Bolivian indigenous march from the lowlands to the highlands as a starting point.
attachments and the sole custodian of constitutional rights and duties is being brought into question” (30). This has become especially interesting in the case of Bolivia which since 2006 has an indigenous president and whose government has aimed to make the ‘switch’ from being the colonial oppressor of indigenous peoples (i.e. a mestizo state), to being ‘on the same side’ and an ‘indigenous state’. The voting-in of Evo Morales (2006) brought indigeneity on to a whole new political level (Albro 2006) and the MAS (Movement towards Socialism) government, once in office announced its goal of ‘decolonizing’ Bolivia – a plan which became anchored in the 2009 constitution.\(^\text{14}\)

To borrow from Gotkowitz (2011), “indigenous identity is dynamic and multifaceted: it may be rural, urban, or transnational; proletarian, peasant, or professional; monolingual, bilingual or trilingual” (34; also Greene 2009; de la Cadena & Starn 2007). This view is quite a change to when the term first became declared a legal category to be utilized for achieving collective human rights reforms (Niezen 2003:11; also Bowen 2000) from which subsequently emerged international indigenous movements representing a “global network of those who share a consistent sense of self, a common sense of timeless and fragility, and complimentary aspirations of self-determination” (Niezen 2009:9). Indigenous identity is a process which constantly changes and reinvents itself and in this course, claiming an indigenous identity has provided vulnerable groups with the possibility of liberating themselves from an oppressing nation-state and international contexts which promote a new kind of capitalism (e.g. del Valle Escalante 2009; Escobar 2008; Postero 2007; Martinez Novo 2005; Brysk 2000; Niezen 2003; Postero and Zamosc 2004; Sieder 2002; Nash 2001).

The concept of ‘indigeneity’ arguably yields its strength from an implied ‘collectiveness’: the solidarity of ‘many’ into ‘one’ (Niezen 2010, 2009). Unlike ‘ethnicity’ which is individual, “‘indigenous identity is necessarily based in the collective (Niezen 2003:10). A collective transnational ‘indigenous identity’ which has been “developed largely in response to oppression, usually at the hands of the state” (ibid: 10). Groups and indigenous social movements in Bolivia have increasingly utilized ‘indigeneity’ to achieve specific rights and resources. Thus, the Andean indigenous group, Movimiento Sin Tierra (Landless peasants Movement - MST), has come to form a strong social

\(^{14}\) Although efforts leading to ‘decolonization’ were put into action previous to the 2009 constitution, it was also anchored here as stated in Article 9.1., referring to the aims of the Bolivian state to “Construct a just and harmonious society, founded in decolonization, without discrimination, exploitation and with social justice in order to consolidate the plurinational identities.” (República de Bolivia 2009) (Translation and emphasis mine).
movement based around land ownership and land redistribution. Placing himself closer to interests of indigenous groups, Evo Morales has adopted their tactics in his own policy-making (Fabricant 2012). Interestingly, as demonstrated in this thesis, Tacana people of this study, employ their new ‘indigenous identity’ to work against an ‘indigenous solidarity’, as a “collective agent of reform” (McIntosch, Bowen, Rosengren 2002: 23), for which it was defined in context of the United Nations and the Forum of Indigenous Issues (2002) (see chapter 5).

Who defines ‘Indigenous’? – The Permitted Indian and the Ecological Indian

The role of states in constructing indigenous identity may lead one to ask along what lines this ‘indigeneity’ is being shaped. Who defines ‘indigenous’ and ‘indigeneity’? Indeed, while indigenous movements emerged as a positive force in the strengthening of democratic processes in Latin America, the fact they have become heavily defined through national and international policy must not be ignored (see Canessa 2007; Postero 2007; Martinez-Novó 2006; Yashar 2005; Van Cott 2005; Sieder 2002). Focusing on the role of states, the construction of ‘the indian’ in the course of neoliberal reforms throughout Latin America has encouraged a prototype indian subject, a ‘permitted indian’ (indio permitido). He/she fits the neoliberal model (Hale 2002, 2005) and complies with ‘the core of neoliberalism’s cultural project … (which aims for) the creation of subjects who govern themselves in accordance with the logic of globalized capitalism’ (Hale 2004:269; also Hale & Millaman 2005, 2002; Lee Van Cott 2000; Assies et al. 2000). The indio permitido is both a term and subject, a ‘negotiated space with prerogatives’ (Hale & Millaman 2005:284) which has clear limits within this neoliberal system, which, if disregarded, would render him/her ineligible for the privileges otherwise granted. Leaders of indigenous movements, and pro-indigenous state representatives, not least Bolivia’s president, have adopted or inherited (or both) this neoliberal creation of the ‘permitted indian’. Indeed, as will be demonstrated (especially chapters 7 & 8), it can be argued that the Tacana people studied here can only participate in the realms of the indigenous movement if they fit and act the role of the ‘permitted indian’, which some people will find easier than others, depending on such aspects as their gender and social class.

Academic studies have gradually moved beyond the construct of indigenous peoples according to the romantic notions of the Western Enlightenment to demonstrate the complexities involved in the formation of indigenous histories which in the process of history also become ‘invented’ (see Zimmerer 2013; Niezen 2009, 2003). Meanwhile, Latin American governments, in a move of ‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak 1999), still play on post-colonial representations of the
indian, casting him/her in the role of ‘noble savage’, ‘ecological indian’ and ‘egalitarian hunter’ (ibid; Niezen 2003; Conklin & Graham 1995). These nostalgic and romantic notions provoke a greater and more immediate political impact. In this image, indigenous peoples are especially linked to their natural surroundings which ‘they can better protect’ than non-indigenous peoples. This is an image which has helped them achieve land rights and tenures. Environmental issues have become central to Bolivian social movements of which the TIPNIS March and the MSN (Movimiento Sin Tierra) are sound examples. These movements are viewed as spaces in which indigenous actors both demonstrate their agency and put indigeneity ‘in action’. They exhibit a ‘collective voice’ which signals a clear contrast to the historical silencing of indigenous peoples under the colonial order (Howard 2010). The fact that indigenous peoples are using ‘their own’ voice, indicates that the ‘subaltern’ (Spivak 1993) majority in Bolivia is no longer oppressed but has risen to power (Howard 2010).

The image of the ‘ecological indian’ has gained a strong footing through, in particular, conservationist Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) which work closely with Latin American countries. Rights related to a healthy environment and access to land have been included in constitutional changes in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia (Canessa 2012; Gudynas 2011). The environment features prominently in politics here, having been adopted in line with multicultural neoliberal governance, in which actors and non-state institutions proactively take on the role of the state and perpetuate its policy (Hale 2002). NGOs working with indigenous groups have greatly encouraged relationships which link land policy to identity and livelihood and to the struggle to more agency (e.g. Latta & Wittman 2012; Nuijten & Lorenzo 2009; Postero 2007; Yashar 2005). In so doing, they encourage a form of ‘environmental governance’ (Zimmerer 2013: 2; Latta & Wittman 2012; Lemos & Agrawal 2006), which refers to “political interventions of environment-related knowledges, institutions, etc. ... (in which key is) the different political economic relationships that institutions embody and how these relationships shape identities, actions, and outcomes” (Lemos & Agrawal 2006:2). Indigenous peoples are attributed a close tie with spiritual beings often linked to ancestral forces tied to the Earth. In Bolivia this has attributed them with credibility in their fight for water and gas rights (Dangl 2007), both natural

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15 It should be noted that while the 2001 census put the indigenous population at 62% in Bolivia the most recent 2012 census, done after this research had ended, indicates that the indigenous population dropped by 18% and with this is in a minority. The recent census has, however, also been criticized as faulty on the basis that indigenous comunidades difficult to reach were not included (personal communication).
resources which in light of neoliberal politics were being privatized to international companies. Thus, though indigeneity has at its root an injustice, it is also constructed to hold an authenticity exclusive to native peoples and which may give them a political vantage point for achieving rights and resources.

Following the politics of Evo’s plurinationalism creates the impression that the MAS government is expanding the ‘permitted Indian’ concept, to do away with boundaries meant to construct a permitted type of Indian, towards one “articulat(ing) local ideas of peoplehood on the one hand, with regional or nationwide ideas about citizenship on the other” (Bowen 2000:14). Plurinationalism, a central theme in Bolivia, indicates harmonious living together of different peoples (pueblos). Through such policy the government signals that it is (becoming) an ‘indigenous state’ for more than just one indigenous peoples, indicating “explicit support for robust indigenous rights and forms of indigenous … ‘autonomy’” (Gustafson & Fabricant 2011:2; Gustafson 2009). However, has Evo really done away with a ‘permitted Indian’ in course of ‘decolonization’, as anchored in the 2009 constitution, to make room for ‘every kind of indian’? Especially chapter 7 looks more closely at this question.

‘Decolonization’ has been interpreted to indicate reversing the ‘colonial order’ (Howard 2010) by the implementation of certain infrastructure, the provision of schooling, etc. as well an ideological process of ‘decolonizing the mind’ (ibid; Rivera 2011; Ticona Alejo 2011; Monasterios 2007). Decolonizing is necessarily linked to a construction or reconstruction of ‘indigeneity’ and various literature have focused on the processes involved here (e.g. Zimmerer 2013; Postero 2013, 2010, 2006; Weber 2012; Grisaffi 2010; Niezen 2009, 2004, 2003; Canessa 2007, 2006; Albro 2006, 2005; Jackson & Warren 2005; Kuper 2003).

In order to ‘decolonize’, it first became important for the government to change its own role, and to begin to adjust and ‘see’ (Scott 1998) and ‘speak’ (Zimmerer 2013; Chess et al. 2005) like an indigenous state. This is done by adopting certain indigenous concepts into the state’s rhetoric. An active usage of certain terms signal a being en par with ‘indigenous’ concepts by which the very “shifts in the use of language (...) constitute the very process of change of which they are part” (Howard 2010). Utilizing these, the government “speaks like an indigenous state” (Zimmerer 2013:2; also Chess et al. 2005) and with these President Evo Morales demonstrates his promised politics of ‘decolonization’. This is continuously being done by incorporating symbols of indigeneity into everyday politics and long-term policies. However, might it rather be that the language and
imagery used to ‘speak’ like an indigenous state, foremost reconfirms the archetypal Andean Indian represented through Andean cosmology and symbols (Albro 2010; Greene 2009; Crabtree & Whitehead 2008)?

**Representation: Bolivian Indigeneity in Andean Concepts**

The definition of ‘the indian’ as Andean is no novelty; indeed it can be traced from pre-colonial times to the writing of the Bolivian constitution of 2009. The Incas saw the peoples of the lowlands, whom they associated with ‘water’, as lesser to those in the Andes who were associated with the sun (Greene 2009, 2006). Taking this into consideration, the indian in the new colonial Bolivian republic (1825) was hegemonically Andean. As anthropologist, Orlove (2002, 1993) observers, geography played an important role in giving order in the new Colonies of Alto Peru. In the time of state formations, a “crucial link was ... established between indianness and highlands: The Indians became the people of the highlands, the highlands the place of the Indians (...) and the indians directly absorbed the quality of the environment in which they lived,” (1993: 325) with their skin colour and personalities being likened to the brown and barren environment of the highlands. Indians were thus not defined along a certain *casta* (caste) but alongside a *region*. As a result the Amazonian indians became altogether invisible (ibid). Thus, Morales has not completely broken with the past: his government has utilized concepts align to an Andean cosmology in order to decolonize the country and become an indigenous state. He has taken the representation of the indian as constructed during the Enlightenment, colonialism and also neo-liberalism, not only building on the indian as Andean but also entering into a contradictory condition of ‘indigenous rights’, where the right to be different is synthesized through the Western Enlightenment formula based on equal, humanistic, and individual rights (Hokowhitu 2011:266 quoting Niezen 2009).

Central Andean concepts have been key to demonstrating ‘indigeneity’ in Bolivia’s nation-state politics but also in the indigenous movement; these are implemented both visually and linguistically (Zimmerer 2013; Howard 2010; Chess et al. 2005; et al). As with most concepts these are malleable and open to interpretation and manipulation (Burman 2011). To give one example, a central visual symbol utilized as an indigenous identity marker by the Morales government is the wiphala flag. The wiphala is a symbol of Andean cultures shared across country borders. The government has installed the rainbow-colored Andean banner as the second official national flag next to the Bolivian tricolored one. It has also become integrated into Bolivia’s police uniform, sewn into one badge with the tricolored national flag. Other visual markers include the usage of the
pollera (the Andean multi-layered skirt) by representatives in the Morale’s government and the representatives of the Constituent Assembly in 2010. Evo, too, has integrated Andean cloth woven in traditional patterns into his suit-jacket and shirt which he wears during official representations.

Perhaps more potent still is the adoption into state rhetoric of Andean linguistic concepts which are based on entire philosophies. These include chacha warmi, a system of reciprocity based on the male and female gender roles (Maclean 2013; Burman 2011; Choque Quispe & Mendizabal 2010); and the environmental philosophies of Pachamama (Mother Earth) and Vivir Bien (Living Well, translated from the Quechua expression of kawasay or allin kawasay or the Aymara sumaq qamaña (Salgado 2010; Albó 2009). To embrace such philosophies and make them more tangible Evo Morales may travel to Tiwanaku to celebrate the solstice and the Aymara New Year; or send state ministers to provinces to participate in Aymara New Year rituals (Canessa 2005). Certain indigenous concepts, particularly Vivir Bien, have been preserved in the constitutions of Ecuador (in 2008) and Bolivia (in 2009), made unanimous for the indigenous peoples of Latin America, Bolivia’s included, and used to refer to human rights and a collective well-being (Zimmerer 2013, 2012).

Principal among the linguistic concepts utilized in the construction of indigeneity are those applied to emphasize the special relationship with, and preservation of, the environment, which has been especially advocated and encouraged by NGOs. The idea of protecting the environment is framed by central Andean cosmology, in which the concepts of Pachamama and Vivir Bien are key. Both concepts were constructed in Andean colonial societies, most likely with a strong Inca influence (Zimmerer 2013, 2012; Mannheim 1991), and have become ‘enshrined as a conceptual centrepiece of ascendant indigenous movements and endogenous development’ (ibid 2012: 601; also Escobar 2010; Salgado 2010). Policies which embody the path to ‘good living’ (Vivir Bien) include social initiatives financed by a share of a direct tax on hydrocarbons (the IDH - impuesto directo a los hidrocarburos) introduced by the Morales administration (see also chapter 5). This tax finances programmes such as the Juancito Pinto16 (2006), which provides annual payments towards books and clothing to each registered school child; Juana Azurduy17 (2008), an annual payment to each

16 Annually 28 US$  
17 Annually 29 US$
pregnant woman to cover natal care; and Renta Dignidad (2008) a minimum pension for all registered old age citizens\(^\text{18}\).

While Indigenous self-representation and international bodies such as the UN Work Group have been used to demonstrate that indigenous peoples now have a ‘voice’ on political platforms (Muehlenbach 2001; Ewen 1994) it still “raises the question of who is speaking for whom” (Greene 2004: 211). The question of ‘representation’ is important for better understanding the complexities involved in the constructions of indigeneity in Bolivia as well as the relationship indigenous people are developing today towards the state. The issue of representation and ‘being represented by’ is not original in the history of indigenous peoples. Traditionally, however, this refers to a relationship based in race in which the white colonizer represents and speaks for the non-white colonized. Issues around contemporary representation and mediation as raised by indigenous mobilization and the international indigenous movements have been central to current anthropology (Greene 2006).

In early colonial administrations of Spanish America indirect rule was the typical form for keeping control over the natives and the role of native kurakas was crucial for the Spanish administration in the Andes to control the Incas (Greene 2004 citing Rasnake 1988; Stern 1982; Comaroff & Comaroff 1991: 255; Wolf 1956). During the colonial period indians were legally considered minors and were represented by a designated mestizo in any official transactions (Guerrero 1994). As is the essence of chapter 7, mestizos in Tacana comunidades formerly held leading political positions (Corregidor) in which they played a type of mediator between the natives and the nation-state. This form of representation by state-designated mestizos has been labeled ventriloquism by Guerrero, and became a cultural aspect ingrained in Andean and Latin American culture beyond a legal domain\(^\text{19}\) (Martinez Novo 2013: 6). It was later utilized to justify the position of indigenistas who spoke for indigenous peoples. In Ecuador, and arguably in other Latin American countries, ventriloquism was only abandoned with the rise of indigenous movements in which indigenous peoples began representing themselves (ibid).

There are a number of important representations of indigeneity officialised by the Morales government by which Tacana people of this study do not feel represented. This begins with symbols such as the nation-wide adoption of the Wiphala banner. The Wiphala before its official installation

\(^{18}\) Per individual this amounts to 340 US$ annually and it has been criticized as merely functioning as a supplement rather than being enough to live on.

\(^{19}\) Indigenous peoples received the vote in Bolivia in 1952
was regarded much like a regional symbol for the highlands and Andes. During important events, the lowlanders (mestizos and indigenous peoples) hoisted the lowlander’s green-white flag, symbol for unending resources and freedom, next to the Bolivian tricolored one, in symbol of the lowlands and the cambas. Cambas is the term used for all lowlanders and has more recently been utilized to express identity factors (see chapters 3 & 4).

**Authenticity: The Right to Represent**

Morales follows a ‘highland politics’. He ties his form of governing to Andean philosophies and social movements instigated in the highlands predominantly by Andean indigenous peoples and social movements. ‘Authenticity’ here is key. In order to claim a right to ‘represent’ indigenous people, Evo must create his ‘authenticity’. One way to establish authenticity is by number (Lucero 2006), as by number of supporters and participants. Evo demonstrates his authenticity through such numbers found in the multitude of supporters who demonstrate in favour of his policies or even his person. He reciprocates this by aligning himself to social movements signalling that he is working and governing ‘with’ and ‘for’ indigenous people. This is a concept of solidarity which was expressed in his slogan cried when first voted president: “we are all presidents” – a notion which echoes an Aymara concept of governing (Grisaffi 2013; Lucero 2010).

Who is ‘most’ indian becomes determined by practices and discourses which designate certain subjects as more authentic and politically more influential than others (Lucero 2006; Jackson & Warren 2003). Signifiers such as language, dress, and other symbols expressing ‘tradition’ and ‘culture’ demonstrate who is authentically indigenous. In Bolivia ‘authenticity’ is represented by indigenous groups, organizations and social movements. Morales utilizes social movements such as the Landless Peasant Movement (MST) to ‘mobiliz(e) cultural forms, narratives, and performances, to legitimize reforms’ (Fabricant 2012:27; also Aguirre & Cooper 2010); demonstrate that he works together with indigenous groups and movements, and give his person more ‘indigenous authenticity’. He has also used indigenous social movements as a guide for identifying the issues which are pertinent to the indigenous population of Bolivia and used these in policy-making. This has included land redistribution measures taken up with the MST in the mid-1990s (Fabricant 2012; Albó 2003), as well as the nationalisation of hydrocarbons and the issues circling around the Gas and Water Wars which become attributed to the indigenous collective right based of usos y costumbres (traditions and customs) (Gustafson & Fabricant 2011; Dangl 2007; Albro 2005; Olivera & Lewis 2004; Albó 2003). These are predominantly based in Andean concepts, indeed it is only
recently begun to be taken up by the literature that “the MAS project is deeply imprinted by Andean scholarship and discourse” (Gustafson & Fabricant 2012:10; also Postero 2010).

For some time now intellectuals, non-intellectuals, indigenous groups and social movements, predominantly from the lowland regions of Bolivia, have all made harsh critiques of Morales’ Andean-centrism. The reception of these critiques has entered the debate around ‘who gets to speak for whom’ and ‘representation’ in which ‘authenticity’ has become a tool of measurement. An article by the Argentinian journalist Pablo Stefanoni, for many years director of the newspaper Le Monde Diplomatique-Bolivia, set off a ripple of reactions in the Bolivian press. He scathingly labelled Morales’ Androcentrisms as romanticized ‘Pachamamismo’ (Stefanoni 2010a, 2010b) and criticized Western intellectual institutions for being blinded and fooled by the strategic essentialism which ‘decolonization’ served to cloak. The president’s projects, he claimed, were warmly approved far from Bolivian reality in the ‘workshops of NGOs, in the calm of (USA’s) Duke University … (or in the courses at) at the FLACSO (institute), Ecuador’ (Stefanoni 2010a). The MAS’s predominant integration of Andean cultural beliefs into Bolivian politics has come under particular scrutiny with the recent surge of the so-called ‘Camba Movement’, a pro-lowland initiative. This white-supremacist lowland movement initiated in Santa Cruz (Centellas 2010; Fabricant 2009) can only be fully understood in the context of Bolivia’s lowland-highland regionalism, which is central to this thesis.

Highland-lowland Regionalism

Indigeneity, a useful term in achieving political goals, needs to be customized and contextualized in order to be representative (Canessa 2012; Greene 2009; Niezen 2003). This thesis contextualizes Tacana indigeneity in the Bolivian nation state. The political terrain in which a people is located, as shaped by history, region, class and religion, plays a central role in the construction of their indigeneity (Lucero 2008), and constitutes a changing landscape which continuously ‘opens up spaces for particular types of cultural expression’ (Canessa 2012: 4). Current literature situates Bolivia’s highland-lowland regionalism as a predominantly economic tension (e.g. Fabricant 2012,

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20 The issue of ‘representativity’ is equally controversial within the social-science disciplines in which anthropologists ‘represent’ indigenous groups. Certain depictions have led to wider-scale animosities, such as the (1999) critical reading of Guatemalan Rigoberta Menchu’s account by David Stoll, a non-indigenous, non-Guatemalan man (Greene 2004); or most recently the violent representations (2013) of the Yanomamô of Venezuela by US anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon, which earned him the label ‘the most controversial anthropologist’ (Eakin 2013) in the New York Times.

21 Translation my own.
2009; Centellas 2010; Peña 2010; Roca 2008; Soruco, Plata & Medeiros 2008; Boschetti & Peña 2008; Gustafson 2006; Stearman 1985; Gill 1987; Painter 1988), and one which is entangled in historic socio-racial issues between the traditional white/mestizo elite and poor indigenous peoples (Gustafson 2010; Valdivia 2010). This thesis begins to redress the imbalance by bringing in perspectives by specifically lowland indigenous group, Tacana people, and how they situate themselves within this tension.

When talking of the lowlands in Bolivia talk is also of the Media Luna (half moon), named for the shape which the lowland departments form (see image 6 above). Alterantely the lowlands are also called El Oriente (the East), and this includes the Amazonian region, though it in fact lies to the north of the country. The fact that it is included in the overarching term El Oriente, demonstrates Santa Cruz’ principal representative role in the lowlands as also in regionalism (for more see chapter 3 & 4). Central to regionalism is the historical fact that state departments upon country formation (1825) had more power than the Bolivian government as a whole (Roca 2008). To date most publications on regionalism have focused on its economic aspect represented by a white/mestizo Santa Cruz elite as in line with the high media representation of President Morale’s first term. This media attention was largely spent on responding to the mobilization of mestizo groups from Santa
Cruz propagating more state autonomy, demanding a larger share of the tax revenues of the natural resources in ‘their’ department and protesting the policy which dictated that they be stripped of some of their land (Kirshner 2010; Kohl & Bresnahan 2010; Healy 1983). With the development and introduction of neoliberal multiculturalism the regional highland-lowland divide has been aggravated, and in light of this, the literature has almost exclusively attributed regionalism to an exacerbation of the classic indigenous-mestizo conflict.

Indigenous mobilization is considered a positive if unexpected result of neoliberal multicultural reforms (Hale 2002). In this regard, McNeish (2008), points out that “a curious irony ... of multiculturalism (is that) ... one of the groups that has been most successful in manipulating its politics into a movement for autonomy is predominantly white and elite (...) the self-proclaimed ‘Camba Nation’ (...). The cambas have mastered the rhetoric of historical disadvantage, ethnic difference and cultural self-determination to defend their interest in benefiting from the exploitation of local hydrocarbon resources and fostering a booming economy in the region” (McNeish 2008: 47; Lowrey 2006). The development of the Camba Movement and the Camba Nation represented by a traditional white oligarchy in the eastern lowlands have come to be known for their efforts to maintain the economic and social foot-hold “lend(ing) support to the idea of sub-state models of regional governance, a neo-neoliberal strategy for localizing and maintaining market-oriented resources extraction in articulation with transnational capital” (Gustafson & Fabricant 2011: 10; Gustafson & Fabricant 2012; Regalsky 2010; Escobar 2008; Gustafson 2006).

More recently with aspirations for departmental autonomy by Bolivia’s eastern lowland states, in attempts to gain a greater grasp over the revenues of natural resources located in their department (e.g. Bebbington & Bebbington 2010; Pacheco 2004; Gustafson 2009). Here, for example, in line with discussions on the privatization of hydrocarbons, the department of Tarija “became the epicentre of national political struggles over political autonomy for lowland regions at odds with the Morales administration” (Bebbington & Bebbington 2010:14; Kohl & Bresnahan 2010). However, as is central to this research, regionalism was not borne out of recent conflicts, but has rather resurfaced in reaction to land and resource redistribution policies passed by the government of president Evo Morales (see chapter 5). In the debate around regionalism indigenous voices, especially are ‘missing’, an aspect this research counters.

Only very recently have authors begun to engage with the complexity of highland-lowland regionalism, recognizing that it goes “beyond an elite-driven response to the Morales programme”
(Kohl & Bresnahan 2010:13; Kirshner 2010; Roca 2008) and beyond topics pertaining to Bolivia’s natural resources. Significant is the recognition of the catch-all character of the rallying cry for autonomy, and that it is understood and interpreted very differently in the various regions and also according to class and ethnic positions (Kirshner 2010). While in Santa Cruz some falsely understand that this would mean needing passports to travel between state departments (ibid), people of Rurrenabaque, department of Beni, see autonomy as a long-awaited measure to finally have more influence on the social and political development of one’s immediate surroundings which historically have been managed from the Andes and with overt disregard to the wishes and needs of the local population - be they mestizo or indigenous (see chapter 5).

To dismiss all critique of Evo Morales’ Andean-centrism as simply anti-indigenous, would be demonstrating a short-sightedness of regionalism (see chapters 3 & 4) but also of the magnitude of Andeanism in Bolivia’s national identity (Roca 2008). It can be argued that in his politics, Evo is continuing the ongoing project of shaping Bolivia as Andean, catering to what Greene has coined the “Inca slot”. Here the nobility around the Incas is celebrated as was adopted by Spanish creoles and elites after colonization.22 This becomes demonstrated by Morales’ government alignment with the contemporary indigenous movement which are defined through eco-conservationist politics23, then importing these to the Andes, to then insert them with Andean concepts linked to the environment (e.g. Vivir Bien, Pachamama as discussed earlier). For, while it is true that the ‘camba pride’ rhetoric is appropriated by a rich Cruzeño elite to disguise their efforts to gain economic power and maintain their class advantage (Gustafson 2008), this critique does not look at the context of camba-ness on a larger level, namely how it can be that poor indigenous people as the Tacana proudly identify as camba (see chapter 4). The limited focus on regionalism in the literature leaves one with the impression that lowland groups do not hold a position in their own right. In light of the currently strong ethnic renaissance, not examining the alliances forged in lowland regions between the mestizos and the local indigenous groups (see chapter 5) may bring up the uncomfortable suspicion that indigenous peoples are associating with the ‘wrong’ people: not the

22 Although Greene has his focus on Peru, the construction of a cult around the noble Incas is a project which began when Bolivia was not consolidated (1825), impulsed by the creole elite of Alto Peru (see Greene 2006).

23 The current indigenous movement born in the lowlands demonstrates strong parallels to Peru’s indigenous lowland movement initiated by Pan-Amazonian organisation, COICA (Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica) of which the Tacana organisation, CIPTA, is a member. COICA became ‘eco-tainted’ when it invited a wide range of environmental NGOs to sign the ‘Iquitos Declaration’ in 1990 (Greene 2006:343).
indigenous president, representing the indigenous peoples of Bolivia, but with the right-wing mestizos, infamous for anti-indigenous sentiments.

The amount of credibility attributed to critiques of Evo’s form of ‘indigenous governing’ and his representations greatly depend on ‘who’ is bringing them forth. Thus, critiques brought forth by Tacana people are likely to be received more readily and viewed as more ‘authentic’, because they are coming from an indigenous group, than critique which comes from an Argentinian-born mestizo who lives in Bolivia, or a white-supremacists group from Santa Cruz such as Nación Camba. This was certainly the case for the TIPNIS protest, the example with which this thesis opens, and which received wide press coverage and credibility precisely for the fact that indigenous peoples were criticizing the indigenous president. The TIPNIS march was initially exclusively made up of indigenous lowland groups (headed by CIDOP). Literature which lays out contradictions in Evo’s pro-indigenous politics tied to an Andean cosmology and environmental governance (e.g. Zimmerer 2013; Kohl & Farthing 2012; Aguirre & Cooper 2010) though important, have yet to be sufficiently tied to lowland peoples’ reaction and agency, particularly in the case of Amazonian indigenous groups. This research contributes to bridging this gap.

Evo propagates an Andean philosophy and indigenous values in his environmental governance, and the environment was central in his summit on climate change in Cochabamba in 201024 (e.g. Postero 2010). Morales projects Andean cosmology on to the Amazon region, without taking into consideration that peoples who originate from the region may have a distinct beliefs regarding the forest. It has been argued that in propagating environmental sensitivity in the name of Andean indigenous values such as Earth Mother and Living Well, in a region in which indigenous people rebuke his politics, Evo is engaging in reterritorialization (Zimmerer 2013). Flooding is frequent in the tropical foothills of the Andes in northern Bolivia. Evo highlights these areas at United Nation Summits on climate change25, using the climate change disasters to criticize the Global North. Yet his national programmes on exploiting the environment and international rhetoric of protecting Pachamama, stand in contradiction (e.g. Postero 2013). The MAS government plans to expand Bolivia’s mining sectors (Kohl & Farthing 2012), and to continue the projects of hydroelectric dams

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24 The World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth (WPCC-RME) was held in Cochabamba between the 19th and 22nd of April 2010. Over 30,000 people, NGOs and other types of organizations from 135 countries participated.

near Cochabamba and the Amazonian north near Rurrenabaque and at the border of Brazil (Zimmerer 2013; Postero 2013; Aguirre & Cooper 2010) - measures which Amazonian Indigenous groups such as Tacana people and their representative organisation, CIPTA, strongly oppose26. Amazonian groups such as the Tsimané, Moseten and Tacana peoples, do not see themselves represented by the politics of President Morales and welcome outside interventions (NGOs and REDD27 scheme advocates) to help them protect their forests and land tenures (TCOs) from exploitation by the government (see also chapter 6)28.

Indigenous groups’ working relationships with NGOs can be seen as a product of ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ (Hale 2005, 2002), where ‘disadvantaged cultural groups’ (ibid 2005), apply their ‘new collective cultural rights’ to engage with the decentralized parts of the economy, in this case ‘the climate’. NGOs29 also pay salaries and draft management plans for indigenous land-tenures, features which are usually the responsibility of states. President Morales reacts to this NGO-influence by criticizing TIPNIS March leaders who are from lowland organisations such as CIPTA and CIDOP to having been ‘bought’ by Western NGOs, calling them “lideres ONGistas” (NGO-sympathizing leaders). These criticisms imply that he is up against the old colonial imperialist enemy (mainly the USA via its aid institution, USAID) which, like a wolf in sheep’s clothing, functions through indigenous organizations.30 This attitude, importantly, allows him to question the credibility of lowland indigenous organizations.

The fact that specifically lowland indigenous organisation are Evo’s main indigenous critics (and in turn come under fire from him), is not a demonstration of random inter-indigenous conflict, but highlights the far reaching impact of regionalism. One essential factor in regionalism which greatly influences the tensions, lies in the constructions of race which were distinct in the highlands and in the lowlands (chapter 4). In America, first colonialist constructions of race were based in ideas of

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26 Personal communication with the President at the time (Celin Quenevo) of the Tacana organization, Consejo del Pueblo Tacana (CIPTA). The Bala Dam project was already topical in 2003 but had been dismissed by the Bolivian government of the time. It was taken up again by President Evo Morales.

27 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD)

28 Personal communication with leaders from the Consejo Regional Tsimané-Moseten (CRTM) based in Rurrenabaque.

29 Conservationists NGOs as the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) have paid the salaries of indigenous leaders and park rangers of the national parks as the Madidi and Pilon Lajas which they support. They are also funders of important projects within the land-tenures.

30 In consequence, President Evo Morales expelled USAID and all its funding from Bolivia in 2013.
purity and lineage tied to religion (de La Cadena 2000; Stepan 1991; Mörner 1967) while in modern times being indian is almost exclusively defined by one’s low socioeconomic status (Martinez Cobo 1987; Friedlander 1975). Most literature pertaining to race-mixing and mestizaje in South America and specifically Bolivia focus on the Andes (e.g. Gutierrez Brockington 2006; Larson 2004; de la Cadena 2000).

In the Andes during colonial times, being Indian was often tied to a romantic notion of the noble Incas (Greene 2009; 2007), while in other parts of America, especially Central America, the idea of ‘watering down’ the pure Indian ‘race’ and mixing it with white blood would produce a robust mestizo hybrid, a belief which made race-mixing attractive and desirable (Hale 2002; Gould 1998). This is significant in context of Bolivia’s strong regionalism, for the lowlands identified more with neighboring lowland countries and their socio-economic politics. Due to how the Amazon was ‘left on its own’ by the government in the highlands, racial relations between Indians and whites developed differently than in the highlands. This difference can be seen reflected today, arguably also in the ‘identities’ of camba (lowland) and colla (highland) (see chapter 4).

It can be argued that in reaction to a specifically indigenous president, intent on representing the indigenous peoples of Bolivia as a monolithic group, differences between indigenous groups have become all the more visible, as individual (lowland) groups protest his politics. This thesis lays out some of these protests (Chapter 5). Amazonian groups have come to wider attention in Bolivia much like in Peru, where President Toledo’s promotion of pro-indigenous policies and dialogue, pulled indigeneity onto a new national level (Greene 2009). A central difference being that Evo, is accepted as being more authentically indigenous than Toledo, which in turn attributes him more credibility for linking himself with the indigenous movement. Lowland groups have become visible in Bolivia as a result of the tensions and conflicts which stand in contradiction to Evo’s politics but which are simultaneously a result of neo-liberalism. NGOs collaborate closely with lowland indigenous organisations in their objection to plans for building dams in the Amazon, for example. With the help of NGOs lowland indigenous organisations challenge Andean indigeneity to being the national indigeneity, contributing to the dismantling of Bolivia as an Andean project.
Chapter Set-Up

The thesis begins, in Chapter One, with a discussion of my own journey with Tacana people, the contexts in which I worked with them and the methodology used as well as a clarification of the terms and labels used. In light of my comments above on the importance of context, the thesis then moves on to provide a historical background of Tacana people in Bolivia. This includes the history of their missionization and a discussion of the structure under which Tacana peoples were grouped together according to their language roots. This throws up the problematic of the reality of ethnogenesis. An issue which becomes relevant today in the context of indigenous politics and indigeneity, where distinguishing between different indigenous groups is key in the distribution of land-tenure. Another key aspect in Tacana history is that it has been continuously set in relation to the Andes, a situation which has heavily influenced their trajectory in the nation-state. At the same time, early documentations counter Tacana peoples’ established image as ‘docile’, an image congruent with the context of traditional Amazonian studies set predominantly in ‘cultural ecology’ and ‘environmental determinism’. Early anthropological work on Tacana people focussed especially on synthesizing their cosmology and less on their situation as a people part of a nation-state, as is of focus in this thesis. At the same time, Tacana cosmology is still be found today in the landscape and natural phenomenon typical of the area, though it does not take on the same significance to Tacana people of this study as it might have in the past.

Continuing with the theme of geography and ‘belonging’, chapter two begins by focusing on concepts of ‘space’ and ‘belonging’, and how these are utilized in the nation-state to aid in the creation of socio-racial categories. This becomes demonstrated in the descriptions of the physical sites used in this research. These include one municipal town (Rurrenabaque) and three Tacana comunidades (Carmen Florida, Tumupasa, Buena Vista). Geographical space is closely tied to a Tacana sense of collective identity. This is reflected in the expressions and terms which Tacana people utilize when referring to themselves as a group. These expressions are tied to physical settlement (the comunidad) but also to the larger image of their people as set in the historical context of the Andean nation-state. This spacial identification is tied to being poor, Bolivian, from the country-side (el campo) and humble (humilde).

The geographical context which has significantly shaped Tacana indigeneity is heavily based in their living in the Amazon, and these make up a significant part of Bolivia’s lowlands. Chapter three focuses on the emergence of Bolivia’s historic highland-lowland regionalism. This conflictive
regionalism created the regional identities of camba and colla, which more recently especially are experiencing popularity. Significant here is the form of relationships which racial groups (indians, whites, mestizos, etc.) developed towards one another in the highlands, the lowlands and in different sections of the lowlands. Though all lowlanders are camba, lowlanders distinguish between different kinds of cambas in accord to race, class and lowland region.

As is of focus in chapter four, distinctive factors and not least blood-relations bound Tacana closely to local mestizos. Among other things, this provided the recent incentive for the creation of an Amazon ‘identity’. This Amazonian identity is part of Tacana people’s indigeneity. While the state regards the efforts to create an Amazonian identity as part of a lowland secessionist impulse, Tacana people, on the other hand, identify with this effort and see it as one in which their heritage is re-evaluated positively. By identifying as lowlanders (camba) and specifically Amazonian cambas, Tacana historically situate themselves against the highlanders (collas). This includes the government (MAS party) situated in the Andes and which is pro-indigenous. An anti-highland positioning initially seems counter-productive considering Evo’s pro-indigenous politics.

Chapter five demonstrates that the changing political landscape has opened up spaces in which indigenous groups utilize their ‘indigeneity’ as a political tool. This can be seen in the local politics of the municipality of Rurrenabaque. Tacana representatives in Rurrenabaque utilize their ‘indigeneity’, to annunciate a regional camba affiliation. They do so in applying it against highland colonos. They engage with their indigenous identity as defined within the boundaries of the indigenous movement (see Brightman 2008), but outside of this context. In this they demonstrate an indigenous opposition to the indigenous movement, highlighting that it is not a monolithic unified movement. The indigenous movement has become associated with the pro-indigenous MAS government. At the same time, Tacana people are also strong actors within its politics via the Tacana organisations, CIPTA, and the lowland indigenous umbrella organisation CIDOB. Yet, as tensions over land-allocation intensify, Tacana indigeneity as represented locally in comunidades, is increasingly positioned in relation to colonos and with suspicion towards the government. This may stand at odds with how Tacana leaders in indigenous organisations associate with the government. This in turn raises the questions as to Tacana people’s involvement with Bolivia’s indigenous movement.

How Tacana people relate to the indigenous movement is affected by their historical social-class standing within their comunidad. Chapter six, focusses on the construction and impact of social
class within a Tacana comunidad. This is an aspect which the politics around the most recent indigenous movement continues to ‘overlook’. Efforts to become involved with the indigenous lowland movement in the late 1980s were initiated members of elite families of Tumupasa. The issue of social class in a Tacana comunidad is closely tied to race and mestizaje (race mixing). Significant for Tacana people’s trajectory in Bolivia, race and beliefs around race-mixing (or mestizaje), were constructed differently in the Amazon than in the Andes. Some Tacana people of this study share a blood-link with their former patrones (land-owners) for whom they worked as peons.

Chapter seven turns to focus more directly on Tacana people’s involvement with the indigenous movement- Tacana representatives play no insignificant role in Bolivia’s indigenous movement. Importantly, this time-period marks a shift in power on the political landscape of Bolivia. This greatly impacts Tacana people’s self-perception and how they will now situate themselves in Bolivia. While previously in the comunidad a white blood-link (mestizaje) was essential for ‘belonging’ to the nation-state system (as corregidor\textsuperscript{31}, teacher, etc.), henceforth people’s ‘indian-ness’ (ethnicity) becomes the key link for access to central resources (land, lumber, etc.).

Coming back to the limitations which the construction of the ‘permitted indian’ entails, chapter eight focusses on women Tacana leaders. Tacana indigeneity, reinforced within the boundaries of indigenous land-tenures and management plans, is constructed along guide-lines which are reflected, among other things, in gender-relations and the regulation of gender behaviour. Tacana women underlie more stringent ‘regulations’ when moving within the realms of the indigenous movement (e.g. as leaders) than men. At the same time, women from elite families underlie less stringent regulation than women from non-elite families. Constructed as essential for the reinforcement of Tacana tradition and values, these values are in fact measures for reinforcing existing and new power constellations as introduced with the context of the indigenous movement. As a result, Tacana women of this study seek platforms outside of the indigenous movement to achieve their goals.

\textsuperscript{31} The corregidor is the leader and political representative of a comunidad – see chapter 6.
Chapter 1 - Locating Tacana People in the Amazon

Methodology

I came to know Tacana people when I worked as an aid worker in 2003 with the national German aid organisation, Deutscher Entwicklungs Dienst (DED)\(^ {32}\). The DED (today GIZ\(^ {33}\)) dispatches aid workers to work locally with vulnerable social groups. Here I worked with the national Tacana organizations CIPTA and CIMTA until 2006 in context of their consolidation of a five-year land-tenure (Tierra Comunitaria de Origen - TCO) management plan. The Tacana of the department of La Paz put in their claim for land-tenure (TCO) in 1997 on behalf of 20 comunidades\(^ {34}\) and received it in 2002. During my time with the DED I lived in the municipal town of Rurrenabaque as well as in the comunidad\(^ {35}\) of Tumupasa. Having come at a time in which the TCO had just been consolidated and the first five year management plan (WCS & CIPTA 2002) was being executed, I came to experience the dichotomy between the political representation of Tacana people by NGOs (as the Wildlife Conservation Society) and Tacana leaders in the indigenous movement and the actual life in the comunidades. The largest impact this time had on me was the realization that although the Tacana people now had legal representation that aimed to bring about a higher standard of living, many Tacana people did not ‘feel’ a change or many did not speak of the change positively. There were many complaints that funds were being redirected into personal pockets and much suspicion about the new Tacana leaders\(^ {36}\).

Working and living for a number of years in these contexts I was eager to understand more about Tacana people separate from the international aid context. I realized that the international aid arena often did not have the structure necessary to ‘listen’ to Tacana people it was working with. Even if the intension of the professionals who worked with Tacana people were very apt and willing people, they were caught up in the system and rules of the NGO they worked for and had little

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\(^{32}\) Deutscher Entwicklungsdiensst - German Development Agency

\(^{33}\) Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – German Agency for International Cooperation

\(^{34}\) In all 621 families and 2,849 inhabitants (see WCS Webpage http://www.wcsbolivia.org/en-us/globalinitiatives/territorialmanagement/tacanaindigenouspeople.aspx)

\(^{35}\) I utilize the Spanish term comunidad when speaking of the physical indigenous communities/villages thus adopting the original terminology and way of referencing which the Tacana and Bolivians at large use. This term derives back to the way comunidades were consolidated, for they are not a traditionally Tacana structure who rather lived semi-nomadically, but one which came about in the process of missionization.

\(^{36}\) The role of leaders is examined in more detail in Chapter 7.
influence on changing things ‘on the ground’ (i.e. in the comunidad with the Tacana people). This is something I experienced as well and found very frustrating. It is the main reason I decided to pursue study on Tacana people and gain an understanding of their context apart from development which was so tightly tied to achieving certain agendas and management plans. I wanted to get to know Tacana people for what they were and all the implications involved.

This research is based on 17 months of multi-sited research conducted between August 2008 and December 2009. At this time I chose my central field-sites aware of the charged politics surrounding the formal indigenous movement which I had experienced especially in the comunidad Tumupasa during my time as an aid worker a few years earlier. When I returned to Bolivia in late 2008 to launch on field-research I took care to remain independent of any NGO affiliation and a direct affiliation with the national Tacana organisation, CIPTA, so as to remain as neutral as possible when interacting with comunidad members. Wanting to enter a TCO to do research has become a complex undertaking as Tacana organisations (mainly CIPTA) assess the research proposal and often in what appears to be random and unjustified turn it down especially if the “contraparte” (a collaborative return service) is not lucrative enough. The contraparte can be anything from teaching English classes, to a laptop. Especially for individual researchers with no strong financial backing these requirements become impossible to carry out. Though it is only right that Tacana people have an influence over the research in their area, there is also much internal disagreement within the realms of the TCO as to who makes this decision and comunidades have complained that a researcher they would have welcomed had been turned away by CIPTA without them being informed. The political structure of an overbearing authority (CIPTA) who takes on decisions for comunidades which they traditionally made themselves, is still foreign.

While my field-work was done in Tacana comunidades and surrounding municipalities of Rurrenabaque and San Buenaventura as also to some extent Ixiamas. All these places are in the departments of La Paz (province Iturralde) and Beni (province Ballivián). Research was also conducted in the cities and towns of Riberalta, Trinidad, Sucre, Cochabamba, El Alto and La Paz, where in all I spent five months doing research at the archives, libraries, NGOs, ministries and interviewing people here. It must be noted that I took care to maintain the anonymity of my friends and informants, and have changed all their names in the text, except in the instances in which they are being interviewed as professional experts or as national political leaders or figures. I have also
anonymized some places as a restaurants and at times even comunidades when in connection with a specific event and person which could possibly negatively affect them.

Two weeks of archival work was also spent in the smaller town of Trinidad, the capital of the department of Beni, which has an extensive collection on documents, maps and books on the Beni area and which is run by an enthusiastic retired history teacher. In La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba I spent time with representatives of the indigenous movement, government officials and NGO workers, working in one area or other pertaining to the Amazon or indigenous groups as biologists, linguists, anthropologists, sociologists and feminists activists as well-known, Julietta Paredes, who tried to involve Tacana women into a feminist movement. Specifically, I interviewed people from bilateral aid organisations who have worked with the Tacana people as the German GTZ (für Technische Zusammenarbeit) and DED based in La Paz, as also government organisations as INRA (Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria) responsible for land-rights and distribution issues in Bolivia. In Santa Cruz I interviewed, Jürgen Riester, the founder of APCOP (Apoyo para el Campesino-Indígena del Oriente Boliviano) who was involved in the start-up of lowland indigenous groups’ organizing legally. I conducted both semi-structured interviews as also casual conversations to acquire information on what they do and how they organize their every-day (Faubion & Marcus 2009; Bernard 2002). To aid me in this endeavour I resorted to either jotting down notes on paper as I spoke to people or afterwards; depending on the situation I would tape record interviews. The latter was especially the case with NGO workers and government officials and more rarely Tacana people in comunidades. I also tape recorded thorough conversations with my main informants, all of which were women, and with whom I conducted life histories. This usually entailed setting up specific meeting times in the evening after the given person had finished the day’s load of work and for them was also a way to kick-back and relax and reminisce about their life.

Conversations and interviews were accompanied by participant observation to perceive the difference between what people said they did and what the actually did. People often claimed participation or engagement with certain practices, which they in fact did not participate in but obviously identified with. This was the case for participation in the monthly comunidad meetings in which all adults are obligated to take part. People told me that they attend every month, when in reality many skipped these meetings regularly.

While I gathered information with Tacana people, I also interacted with Tsimané, Moseten, Ese-Eja people as well as highland migrants (colonos) of Quechua/Aymara affiliation in both Tacana
comunidades where they lived and outlying municipalities as of Rurrenabaque and San Buenaventura. I participated in numerous monthly meetings in various Tacana comunidades, and bigger general municipal meetings of Rurrenabaque and San Buenaventura. I interviewed the mayors and staff of the municipality, the mayor of Rurrenabaque to the secretary who was in charge of the photo-copying machine and the daughter of a main Tacana informant. I conversed with the mestizo population in Rurrenabaque who are very proud of their Japanese, German or Swiss heritage and happily unpacked old photographs of themselves as former mayors. I participated in local festivities which included a number of Miss Contests, town anniversary festivals, Easter processions, and Carnivals but also in private fiestas in people’s home’s as Easter vigils and children’s birthdays.

Tacana people who did not associate with the indigenous movement or who did not work in NGO contexts were the most difficult to approach. They would assume that I was studying ‘the Tacana’, as the new indigenous movement had introduced or was some kind of NGO representative looking to implement ‘projects’ in their comunidad to improve their lives. In this context I was often waved away from a household compound by women associating me with this new era of ‘helping indigenous people’ and who cooking or washing laundry would call clarifying, “there is no one here” (no hay nadie!) and then a bit more desperate “my son is working in the fields” (mi hijo esta en el chaco) and finally “el Corregidor” (the comunidad representative). They are the people who gave me blank looks when approached with terms such as "culture" and "language", until I adjusted my wording to "raíces" (roots) and "dialecto" (dialect), terms which referred back to pre-land reform (1952) times.

The Usage of Terms and Labels

Before turning to past studies of Tacana people, something should be said about the usage of terms labels in this thesis. Labels are power signifiers of ‘identity’ for they become utilized to demonstrate a ‘way of being’, and a shared history. While the word ‘indian’ resonates with a history of injustice, the term ‘indigenous’ indicates the arrival of a new time, it represents a cleansed of discrimination era, and an effort to put ‘indian’ to the past and welcome something better. Critics have pointed out that adopting new terms to replace former baggage-laden ones, is running the risk of ignoring old power relations which are still intact (Canessa 2012; Weismantel 2001). Indeed, ‘indigenous’ is almost history-free in contrast to ‘indian’ and it is precisely for its unsettling connotations that intellectuals choose to maintain the usage of the term ‘indian’ in their work (e.g.
Throughout this thesis I choose to primarily utilize the rather professional term ‘indigenous’, adopted especially in the context of the indigenous movement, precisely because the term is what has given indians a new position in Bolivian society. It is with ‘indigenous’ on their tongues that researchers and NGO representatives now approach Tacana comunidades, asking about their ‘traditions’ and ‘culture and importantly their opinion. In this, they avoid ‘indian’ which would be an insult to the Tacana people. If at all, it is because of ‘indigenous’ that being ‘indian’ is suddenly ok and because of ‘indigenous’ that Tacana are ‘visible’ and can participate in local politics. However, Tacana people would not typically refer to themselves as indigenous outside of a professional context, as the indigenous movement. Thus, in line with the new political development of being indigenous, I predominantly utilize the term ‘indigenous’ when referring to native peoples and as others before me, I write the word ‘indian’ as also white, mestizo camba and colia, in the lower case, stressing with this that they are not national but ethnic and regional terms (Wade 1997:121; also Canessa 2012).

The Tacana People of this Study – History, Location and Contexts

This study is not intended as a complete ‘ethnography of the Tacana people’, in part because of the relative heterogeneity of Tacana people, but also because the primary interest of this research is specifically Tacana people’s interactions with the nation-state and indigenous politics. There are two main Tacana communities in Bolivia, one in the departments of La Paz and Beni and the other in the department of Pando. From my limited experience of Pando Tacana people (Bathurst 2005) it was clear that the community there differs considerably to the one in which I worked in the La Paz and Beni, especially because of its divergent trajectories in context of the the rubber industries (ibid, see below).

The Tacana people of concentration live in the departments of La Paz and Beni. All of them have homesteads in Tacana comunidades and some in addition second homesteads in the town of Rurrenabauqe. Many Tacana comunidades of La Paz and Beni are members of indigenous land-tenures (TCOs). A central one is the TCO Tacana I, which is located in the province of Iturralde in La Paz, surrounded by the Madidi National Park. In 1997 the national Tacana organisation, CIPTA, which at the time represented 20 Tacana comunidades (621 families and 2,849 inhabitants) supported by
the NGO WCS\textsuperscript{37}, submitted a land claim to INRA\textsuperscript{38} to title in all 389,303 ha of land of which 39,430 ha overlap with the Madidi. \textsuperscript{39} The claim was successful in 2001. Since then some Tacana comunidades have left the TCO while others have joined. Overall it is difficult to say exactly how many Tacana comunidades exist in the vicinity of Iturralde, as some are registered by the municipality while others are not. Depending on their exact location they either pertain to the municipality or San Buenaventura or Ixiamas. In all, however, there are perhaps around 30 Tacana comunidades in Iturralde of which most fall under the legal jurisdiction of the TCO Tacana I, and in addition under the legal jurisdiction of either San Buenaventura or Ixiamas.

The situation is different across the Beni River in La Paz, province Ballivián which holds the municipality of Rurrenabaque and which also belongs to this study’s focus (see image 10). In this area there are 6 Tacana comunidades which are part of the municipality of Rurrenabaque. While all of them legally lie under the jurisdiction of the Rurrenabaque, only three of these are also members of an indigenous land tenure, namely the TCO Tsimané/Moseten. The fact that they are part of this TCO is due purely to logistic reasons, as they are located within the territory which was claimed by the Tsimané/Moseten organisation, CRTM\textsuperscript{40} (see also chapter 2). The TCO Tsimané/Moseten is composed of 22 comunidades and received its legal title in 1997.

It should be stressed that even within the area that I worked the people from the comunidad Carmen Florida (Beni) differ considerably from people in Tumupasa (La Paz) even as many individuals are connected through kinship. In fact, even Tacana people from the same comunidad will differ significantly from one another, as in line with their social-class, gender, etc. situations. For this reason I find it difficult to present my work as an exhaustive ethnography of Tacana culture. Further, given the relative limitations of space within the thesis it is not my intention to present a holistic view of all aspects of society and culture, instead I have chosen particular issues to focus on and elucidate, namely the construction of indigenous identity and Tacana people’s relation to the Bolivian nation state.

The contemporary Tacana people, numbering 11,173\textsuperscript{5} according to the most recent national

\textsuperscript{37} Wildlife Conservation Society
\textsuperscript{38} Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria – National Insititut of Agrarian Reform
\textsuperscript{40} Consejo Regional Tsimané/Moseten – Regional Council oft he Tsimané/Mosten
statistics, belong to the Tacanan (also spelled Takanan) language family, which is sometimes also linked to the Panoan, was first classified by Créqui-Montfort & Rivet (1921-22, vol. 13: 91-100). It consists of the five languages which despite sharing a language-root were and to a large part still are, treated as separate groups: Cavineña (or Kavineña), Tacana Proper (or Takana), Ese Eja (also called Chama), Araona and Reyesano (Guillaume 2008; Aikhenvald & Dixon 1999: 364; Métraux 1942). The original territory of Tacana-speaking groups as was classified in accord with the Tacanan language-root is in the continuous region between the Aquiry and Madre de Dios Rivers to the north (between 67 and 68 35’ W. long) including its tributaries, the Tambopata and Heath Rivers to the west, and the Beni River (between 12 to 15 S. lat.) to and tributaries to the east, and the Madidi and Tuichi Rivers to the south (Métraux 1942:30) (see image 4).

The Tacana-proper speaking people, specifically, inhabited the area “north of the Tuichi River, a tributary of the Beni River” (Métraux 1942:32), which is a tropical foot-hill area of the Andes. Early colonial documents (ibid; Armentia 1887) mention that the name Tacana-proper was a one applied to a great number of “tribes” and “sub-tribes” which inhabited the area. To demonstrate the great variety, these included the Babyana, Beyuma, Buda, Cahoco, Camaya, Camaray, Capa, Capanary, Capu, Chiluvo, Chumu, Cuesi, Curupi, Dejabai, Ecuary, Eno, Girý, Guagima, Habuvi, Hamapu, Huary, Huarymodo, ino, Isebene, Jicho, Machuvi, Manipo, Mapumary, Marani, Marakani, Maru, Masatibu, Mayupi, Moyana, Odoary, Sabatini, Sara, Tade, Taranu, Toromona, Tuama, Tuno, Uaui, Uranico, Yuma, Yubamano, Pamaino, Yabapura, Pasaramona, Uchupiamona, Saparuna, Siliama, Ydiama. A survey from the early twentieth century reveals that there was a very strong Andean influence among peoples from this region, as can be taken from some of the names of the groups listed. Thus Sarapuna in Aymara literally means ‘the people of the Inca’ and the Marcáni means ‘the people of the Marka’ which is a type of Aymara community (Vallvé 2010: 329; Saignes 1985: 21-26).

Situated strategically in the tropical foothills marking the entrance to the Amazon from the Andes, Tacana-speaking peoples established themselves in the pre-Hispanic era as go-betweens, linking highland and lowland cultures and enhancing trade activity in the regions (Vallvé 2010; Steward 1963). This situation was not unique to Tacana-speaking people, being one they shared with a number of groups occupying the region such as the Leco peoples from the piedmont of Apolobamba further west (Dudley 2011, 2009). The specific ethnic composition in the area at this time is described by accounts of early Spanish explorers. These generically labelled the different
ethnic groups of the foothills of the Andes as chuncho tribes in the Area of the Chunchos, expressions which were later adopted by the Spanish (Vallvé 2010; Steward 1948; Métraux 1948). Nineteenth and 20th century travel writers and explorers mention Inca ruins and archetypal Inca roads leading from the eastern Andes of what is now Peru, towards what was to become the Franciscan mission town Apolobamba (now Apolo). These then led into the foothills and Tacana territory, past the former mission of Ixiamas towards the plains of today’s department of Beni (Bibra 2007; Renard Casevitz, Sainges, & Taylor, 1988; Sainges 1985n; Evans 1903). Tacana people mention these paths today, especially those between the former mission comunidades of San José de Uchupiomonas, Ixiamas and Tumupasa, which have survived to the present. Tacana peoples’ relationships with the Inca are interesting in that they pose the earliest highland-lowland region relationship documented, and it has been pointed out that the ambivalently negative attitude of the Andes towards the Amazon is one which the Spanish adopted from the Incas (Greene 2009, 2006). Jungle dwellers were regarded as lesser by the Inca, who were sun-worshippers. The lowlanders were associated with water (Vallvé 2010; Greene 2006).

Spanish explorers, such as Juan Alvarez Maldonado, first descended into the foothills of the Alto Peruvian Amazon region in the 1500s to find the treasure of Paititi41, which to this day remains undiscovered? Many failed attempts were made to enter the tropical foothills of the “Tacana Nation” (Ballesteros 1899) from different points: south from the Madre de Dios River, east from the Valleys of Apolobamba, and lastly north from the town of Cochabamba in the south-east of La Paz (Sainges 1985; Steward 1963). In addition to looking for gold, explorers established white settlements, and organized an Indian labour force. The failure of this endeavour is demonstrated by, among other things, the four settlements in the province of the Toromona, (Baez, Avila, Achidona, Vierso and Nuevo Salamanca) which, although established successfully, were short lived because of rebellion by Tacana peoples’-(Chávez Suárez 1944; Castillo 1988). By initially forging alliances with the Spanish some Tacana people looked to fulfil their own agendas of conquering neighbouring enemy peoples. Thus, although initially Tacana groups formed peaceful alliances with Spanish captains in order to aid them in discovering the treasure of Paititi and in return receive help in war against enemy groups, it was at some point agreed between Tacana groups that the Spanish were not to be trusted. Indeed, Spanish military men actively sought to ruin each other’s credibility

41 alternatively called Maldonado, El Dorado, Mojo, Sevilla de Oro, Gran Pará, Beni, and the Kingdom of Omaguas and Paititi
among the Indians in the pursuit of political motives which would aid their relationship to the Spanish Crown, Captain Gomez de Tordoya, for example, setting himself against Alvarez Maldonado, purposely mistreated the locals in order to ruin the peaceful relations which Maldonado had laboriously established to aid collaboration (Castillo 1988). In 1551 Tacana groups organized an alliance headed by the Araona Ecue (chief of war), Taramo and mobilized the “Tacana Nation”, setting it against Maldonado’s expeditionaries. By 1568 the Tacana peoples’ collaboration had won the confrontation (ibid). These wars, in combination with detrimental diseases introduced by the Europeans, eventually led to a break-down of friendly relations between the Spanish and the peoples of “Tacana Nation”.

The Tacana people of this study are located in the department of La Paz and Beni in comunidades around the Town of Rurrenabaque as mentioned above (see image 10). Their parents and grandparents originated mainly from the historical comunidades of Tumupasa and San José de Uchupiromonas, both of which were mission comunidades. Some of their grandparents, however, also migrated into the lowlands and settled in Tacana comunidades from the town Apolo which holds a large Quechua-speaking community. Apolo is located in the highlands on the other side of what today is the Madidi National Park and is the historic entry route from the highlands into the lowlands. Indeed, the Tacana people of this study cohabit the region with a number of other ethnic groups besides mestizos. While the following chapter elaborates on the three comunidades and town which are of focus of this study, something should be said here about the different groups which cohabit the immediate and proximate vicinity of Tacana people of this study, as these different groups influence each other and bring up important aspects about the construction of ethnicity and indigeneity. This becomes especially relevant today with contemporary indigenous politics.

Socio-ethnic groups which today share or neighbour the Tacana territory in the province of Ballivián and around the town of Rurrenabaque include the Tsiman- Mosetén peoples, who have a TCO in the immediate vicinity (see images 3a, 3c). The Tsiman (or Chimán) (numbered at 6,464) and Mosetén (numbered at 1,989) are distinct peoples but related in that they share the Mosetenen language (Sakel 2007, 2004) and a TCO in the territory around Rurrenabaque.

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42 INRA 2012
43 INRA 2012
Mosetenen is a small language family which is sometimes also described as an isolate (ibid)\(^\text{44}\). By this definition, the Tsiman/ Mosetén are not related to the Tacana people. The TCO Tsiman/Mosetén is located across the Beni River from the Tacana I TCO and has its central headquarters in Rurrenabaque, as represented by the Regional Council of the Tsimané/Moseten (Consejo Regional Tsiman/ Mosetén - CRTM) founded in 1997. It overlaps a protected area, the Pilón Lajas Biosphere Reserve (400,000 hectares) formed in 1992 (see also Chumacero 2009). Many Tsiman and Mosetén people do not speak Spanish and I was told that this was especially the case for the Tsiman. Of all the local indigenous people in and around Rurrenabaque, the Tacana people are considered the most “adapted”. According to CIPTA, all Tacana people speak Spanish and only a handful know Tacana (see also chapter 6). In my research I only came across one person who spoke Tacana.

Besides the Tsiman/Mosetén, the third local indigenous group which frequents Rurrenabaque and lives in the area is the Ese Eja (see also Alexiades and Peluso 2003). According to statistics the Ese Eja in Bolivia amount to 695\(^\text{45}\) people. They are related to Tacana people by the Takanan language root. While Tacana people know them as an ancestral enemy which used to raid their comunidades, there is no such animosity between the two groups today (see also below). The Leco people are also quite familiar to Tacana people but live further from Rurrenabaque. National statistics (INRA 2012) puts the number of Lecos in Bolivia at 9,006. They have their origin in the area around Apolo, at the intersection between the Andes and the Amazon and the entrance to today’s National Madidi Park (Dudley 2011). I was told that the Lecos were the “Vikings of the Rio Beni” and used to be famous for their skill at travelling the dangerous rapids of the Beni and its tributaries on balsa-rafts (also Métraux 1948). “You used to always know who the Lecos were,” I was told one afternoon by Roberto from Carmen Florida; “they had this thing with their skin – manchas (skin pigmentation). The more manchas, the more beautiful a woman. One day a youth was crying because the girl he liked had left him and he said: ‘oh, she had such beautiful manchitas!’” Upon asking Roberto if this was something genetic he shook his head: “No! It was a beauty thing. They drank something, or ate something which gave them the manchas...who knows.”

\(^\text{44}\) “Mosetén (Mosetenan) is spoken by approximately 800 people in the foothills of the Bolivian Andes” (Sakel 2007:25).

\(^\text{45}\) INRA 2012
Further indigenous groups who share the region around Rurrenabaque, are the so-called colonos: the highland migrants of Aymara and Quechua descent who typically construct their comunidades by the main road (la carretera). This is why colonos are also called “people of the carretera” (see image 10). Some colonos also live in Tacana comunidades (chapter 2). Another group which originates in the region is the Araona people, also related by language root to the Tacana, though I personally only met one Araona during the course of my research, in Rurrenabaque. He told me, that the Araona people who live in and around Rurrenabaque today generally say that they are Tacana, as this group is better known. So, typically, do the Reyesano people, who are also part of the Takanan language family (see also Guillaume 2008). During my research I met one Reyesano woman who lived in Carmen Florida. (Reyes is a former mission town to the north of Rurrenabaque. The fact that different ethnic groups share one area and even cohabit in comunidades has been attributed new importance with the rise of contemporary indigenous politics. Within this context, inter-ethnic connections of Amazonian peoples and the implications of these are being re-assessed.

*Amazonian Studies and Contemporary Indigenous Politics*

Julian Steward’s influential volume three South American Handbook (1948c:883-899), builds and consolidates the theoretical framework of ‘cultural ecology’, attractive to Western Amazonian anthropologists at this time and generally known as the “standard model” (Viveiros de Castro 1996:180). This model significantly contributed to shaping Western representation of Amazonian peoples. Explanations on the socio-political organizing of indigenous groups in the Amazon are based in the adaption to the local ecology and “environmental determinism” (Roosevelt 1991: 134). Inadvertently, this “reduc(ed) complex cultural phenomena (of Amazonian peoples) to environmental variables” (Erikson 2011: 14; also Roosevelt 1991). These become utilized in indigenous politics today, by indigenous organisations themselves and fit the Enlightenment model of the romantic ‘nobel savage’ who is close to nature.

An ‘ecological view’ of Amazonian peoples, at least in academic settings, only changed at the end of the 1990s. This was largely a result of archaeological projects in Amazonia which demonstrated a complex culture via ecological artefacts such as ‘dark earth’ (Kawa and Oyuela-Caycedo 2011; Lehmann and Kern 2003) or man-made flood-dams (Balée and Erickson 2006). This research, and more which has come since (Eriksen 2011; Alexiades 2009; Dudley 2009), proves that rather than being shaped by their environments, native peoples tended to shape the environment
to fit their goals. Meanwhile, Tacana people and non-indigenous inhabitants of the Bolivian Amazon partly use these ‘upgraded’ versions of written history to help establish a positive heritage for themselves (see chapter 5).

The body of literature on Amazonian peoples is receiving new meaning and prominence at a time in which it is difficult not to set it in relation to these new indigenous politics represented by powerful national and international indigenous umbrella organisations. In setting them in the context of current indigenous politics, they not only receive new significance but also help shape indigenous politics. If omitted, the subsequent voids would support the impression of the homogenous Western-style Enlightenment Indian subject, the prototype Indian which the neoliberal model has created and requires (see also chapter 7). Amazonianist literature provides important ethnographies of Amazonian peoples which lay out their distinctive ways-of-being within the context of their immediate surroundings. Many Amazonian peoples are similar in how they organize space and construct their cosmology.

Studies situated around typical Amazonian institutions continue to provide relevant contributions and these institutions, in line with the study of Levi-Strauss (1969), continue to be important tools for understanding the construction of ‘community’. As Viveiros de Castro (1996) notes, since the publication of the immense Handbook of South American Indian (Steward 1948) anthropological Amazonianist literature has benefitted from approaches which he divides into three styles of synthesis: “the political economy of control” (leading authors Terence Turner and Peter Riviere); the “moral economy of intimacy” (led by Joanna Overing); and lastly “the symbolic economy of alterity” (led by Bruce Albert). All these approaches focus on the interpretation of the everyday life in a culture found in processes such as that of symbolic exchange (war, cannibalism, hunting shamanism, funerary rites) (Viveiros de Castro 1969:190; Oakdale 2007). These approaches have helped lay out and understand the socio-cosmological regimes of the Amazon in “the construction(s) of collective identities” (Rosengren 2003:221) and community.

Though the contemporary Tacana of this study do not demonstrate such tendencies, previous studies of Tacana people demonstrate forms of organizing and constructing community which show similarities to Amazonian groups in an approximate vicinity. This is very roughly from the Madre de Dios basin to the north of today’s Bolivian departments of Beni and La Paz, to the Beni River further south in the department of La Paz. Without going into the details of different groups
which originate here, the significant point is that they often have a similar history of sustenance economies, of exploiting the forest and rivers for game and fish, and practicing horticulture; as well as a similar manner of organizing their surroundings and constructing community (eg Dudley 2011, 2009; Alexiades and Peluso 2003; Moore 2003; Shepard & 2003; Smith Bisso 2003). Tacana people made up a part of this.

**Tacana People in Amazonian Research**

The most recent anthropological studies on Tacana people is situated at a time in which the contemporary indigenous movements were gaining a foot-hold in Bolivia (Wentzel 2009, 1989; Bathurst 2005; Herrera 2005, 2003, 2002; Wentzel) and focuses predominantly on the Tacana community which resides in the department of Pando, specifically people of the *comunidad* of Santa Rosa. These Tacana people settled here as a result of migration during their enslavement in the rubber industry in the late 1800s and lasted with varying intensity until the crash of the rubber industry in the late 1980s (Bathurst 2005:50). In accord their historical trajectory differs somewhat to the Tacana people of Iturralde who were not incorporated into the rubber market as intensely (Bathurst 2005, Herrera 2003, 2002).

The most extensive anthropological study on Tacana people in the 20th century is situated in the tradition of Amazonian studies and was conducted by the German anthropologist Karin Hissink, with the accompaniment and help of her sketcher and life-companion, Albert Hahn, who provided the drawings which accompany the two central Hissink volumes46 (Hissink and Hahn 1984, 1962 1961). One might say that Hissink’s studies were conducted in the era (1930s – 1950s) when the bulk of Tacana peoples’ missionization had taken its course. Tacana people she lived with and studied were one in a string of generations which had already associated with post-mission comunidades, these being a concept introduced by Spanish missionaries (see chapter 2). Hissink’s work focusses on the people in the former mission comunidad of Tumupasa and to a lesser extent Ixiamas. Indeed, Hissink’s ground-breaking work is not a representation of ‘the Tacana’, but a monograph on Tacana-speaking peoples of different ethnic groups who became grouped together in these two mission comunidades

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46 To date Hissink’s first volume (1961) has not been translated into another language from German. The second Hissink volume on Tacana people (1984) was translated into Spanish in 2000, in the framework of the Tacana land-tenure management plan and with the main objective being to generate an income for CIMTA.
Hissink created what is probably the most extensive literature on Tacana people, elaborating on a number of native institutions among Tacana people which Amazonian groups typically share. These are based on communication and kinship (Anderson 1991), as can be created by common beliefs expressed through myths (Peluso 2003; Killick 2007) and which have at their base the construction of community. Hissink and Hahn resided in the comunidad of Tumupasa for a number of months at a time47. Hissink divides her research of Tacana cosmology into different native institutions, situating Tacana people within the cult of semi-nomadic hunter and gatherer societies. She engages with the socio-cosmological order (Viveiros de Castro 1996) and synthesis of Tacana life ordering myths as they reveal and pertain to central Tacana institutions typical to Amazonian societies (death, birth, shamanism, kinship relations) and as in line with anthropological discourses over kinship (Lévi-Strauss 1969; Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940). Dividing the myths into reoccurring themes, Hissink brings out how spirits, animals and humans share minds (see Turner 2009) focusing especially on “the development and order of the present world, gods and godlike beings, spirits of the wild and the bush, spirits, animals, animals and Man, plant and Man, object and Man, contests, disputes, historical traditions, traditions which have been superimposed since Columbus and history” (Hissink and Hahn 1961: X). She demonstrates how Tacana people conceive a hybrid relationship between the entities of humans, animals, landscape, weather phenomena and celestial bodies, and tie them to historical contexts such as the time of the Inca Empire (Hissink and Hahn 1961).

Thus, as these past studies show, Tacana people demonstrate Amazonianist tendencies towards a belief in a hybrid world, which is very similar to that of groups of their language root with whom they shared, and still share, a geographical area. One such group is the Ese Eja. Indeed, in more recent studies, Peluso (2003) synthesizes Ese Eja institutions and myths by laying out the relationships and interactions between Ese Eja people from the frontier region of the department of Pando and spirits which often take the shape of central animals. She demonstrates that Ese Eja people live in a hybrid world, one part represented by the Ese Eja community and the other existing in spiritual form. Shamans act as go-betweens to mediate between the two worlds. As with Tacana myths concerning the anaconda and the south wind, certain animals and natural forces are central

47 The couple lived with the Tacana of Alto Beni in the department of La Paz, province Iturralde, between the 1930’s and 50’s, residing in the former mission comunidad Tumupasa and to some extent Iximas. When I was in Tumupasa doing research, the Hissink couple was still well remembered and some of my informants are the by now elderly grandchildren of people with whom the Hissink couple interacted.
in these worlds. Peluso focusses especially on ideas of alterity as the basis for Ese Eja identity construction (also Lepri 2006). This includes an engagement with creating new traditions in the context of already existing structures such as kinship, agriculture, naming etc. Of central importance here is the creation of identity as primarily based in the distinction between one’s own group (eg Ese Eja) and the Other, in this case the white person. These positionings and re-positionings of a group come to define a collective personhood which can be recognized as being the sum of the group’s culture.

Something which significantly distinguishes the Tacana people of this study from Ese Eja people who are (at least linguistically) related to Tacana people as an ethnic group, is that Ese Eja people continue to demonstrate an extensive engagement with Amazonian natives’ cosmological institutions, (see Peluso 2003; Lepri 2003). Although Hissink found traces of this engagement among the Tacana, as did the German anthropologist Sondra Wentzel, to a lesser extent, in the late 1980s, when I arrived as an aid-worker in 2003, I found that Tacana people of Tumupasa and surrounding comunidades showed no strong associations with typical Amazonian institutions, though some aspects have survived. Rather, the everyday for Tacana people of this study was much more geared towards actively positioning themselves in relation to, and engaging in a relationship with, local political institutions such as the municipality and, more remotely, the indigenous movement, in efforts to generate a cash income for themselves or engage with socio-political networking which could lead one’s family members to generating an income in the future.

Yet there is still also present an understanding and naturalness of certain relationships which are typical Amazonianist, in which Tacana people demonstrated a context of animism (Costa and Fausto 2010) as mirrored in their myths. These only became overt very subtly in the way Tacana people talked about and related to their surroundings, usually very off-handedly: “oh no, I never go fishing in this spot since the anaconda surfaced and floated.” After time I came to understand that not just any anaconda was meant, but the deity which is simultaneously the Beni River itself, as well as a gigantic anaconda which reigns here and is never sighted, but heard by the sound it makes when it floats. Indeed, upon close observation, the municipal town of Rurrenabaque where many Tacana people reside reveals the presence of a very vibrant Tacana cosmological world (also Gareca Arzabe 2007).

_Tacana Cosmology in Geography - Rurrenabaque Holds up the Sky_
Rurrenabaque, with about 15,000 inhabitants, is a historic jungle town situated on the banks of the Beni River in today’s department of Beni, Ballivián province and is loosely considered a mestizo town as discussed in the following chapter. However, human activity here dates back to before the arrival of the Spanish. Ceramic shards and rock tools recently excavated support the thesis that the region has been inhabited long before the arrival of the Spanish (Tyuleneva 2008).

Rurrenabaque is located at the foot of two sacred mountains - the Matuci (Tacana word for ‘Hill with a Gorge’) and the Cerro Brujo (Witch Mountain) which mark the start of the Andes to the west, and the flat wetlands (llanos) to the east. Local inhabitants will easily tell you that Rurrenabaque derives its Tacana name from two principal streams which formerly marked the borders of the town, although today they run through its centre. One of these is the Enabaque while the other is the Susse (see also Gamez Mendez 2002). A principal deity in Tacana cosmology is the great Beni River48 on whose banks Rurrenabaque and numerous Tacana comunidades are situated.

48 The Beni River is 67.030 metres long and an average of 274 metres wide with an average temperature of 29 degrees Celsius (Gamez Mendez 2002). Its most important tributaries are the Madre de Dios River to the north of Rurrenabaque and the Tuichi River to the South of Rurrenabaque.
As the largest representative body of water in the region which has continuously been important in transportation, it takes a central role in many Tacana myths (see Hissink and Hahn 1961). ‘Beni’ in the Tacana language means ‘south’ or, more specifically, as I have been told, ‘south wind’. The south wind, also called the ‘sur’ in Spanish, is a famous cold front which enters the region especially in June and July from the coast of Chile and induces a sharp drop in temperature of up to 20 degrees. Thus, the Beni River is named after the famous ‘sur’, one of the principal deities of Tacana myths (ibid). An elderly Tacana man in Rurrenabaque, whose mother had been Araona (of the Tacana language family) and whose two sons now run a tourist agency, told me that the principal local deity is the great anaconda (in the Tacana language bacua), which lives in the Beni River and simultaneously is the Beni River.

The great anaconda holds up the sky, except for when it rains which is when it descends into the Beni River, its home. The anaconda devours people which it sucks down with whirl-pools – famous in the region. The fact that the bodies never reappear is the indicator for the fact that they have been devoured. Non-indigenous explanations have attributed the fact that bodies really do not reappear after drowning to the numerous underwater caves which line the mountains, the same ones which are said to be the cause of the strong whirl-pools. After a rain shower the great anaconda is briefly seen as it ascends back into the sky. It is a rainbow. Rainbows are a bad omen. One day standing in front of the kitchen compound in a Tacana comunidad I was visiting near Riberalta, up north from Rurrenabaque, talking with Charo who lived here, about the need of a fence to keep the domestic pigs from wandering into the vicinity, we were told by her husband that a rainbow had appeared in the sky. To my surprise everything became quite hectic as people seemed to know what to do. Children were called into the house, and before I knew it the adults had gathered onto the porch and the men lit up cigarettes. I was encouraged to do the same. The rainbow, I was now to learn, “takes away” weak individuals; children especially. To ward off the bad spirit, tobacco smoke is blown in to the air. I had heard of a similar application of tobacco smoke when a shaman intoxicated with the hallucinogenant vine ayahuasca, is visited by evil spirits.

‘Suse’ is the Tacana language signifies ‘duck’ (of which originally there were supposed to have been many in the region) and the original Tacana pronunciation and spelling of Rurrenabaque is in fact Sussenaibacua, which entails the words ‘duck’ and ‘anaconda’. More precisely in accord with the Tacana language it is spelled S’us’e Enabaki (Quenevo Cartagena & Alcoba García 2009). There is a strong subterranean river named Susse, which flows through Rurrenabaque and
subterraneanly out of the sacred Macuti Mountain, into the Beni River. It is the interplay of the Beni and Susse River which creates the tumulus water and subsequent whirlpools during the rainy season, when the Beni River swells.

The subterranean Susse River, in turn, derives its name from the fact that it flows into the Beni at the point where a large boulder ‘sits’ in the river where it debouches from the Macuti mountain. When the river is high the boulder appears to be swimming on top of the water, like a duck. Furthermore, I was told that the boulder has the shape of a gigantic duck and spent months trying to discern one in its smooth contours until Alejandro, from Carmen Florida, casually pointed out one day that many years ago the rock was overturned. The duck was upside down. But when it was still the right way up and had looked like a proper duck, it had mimicked sounds of warning - “peep, peep, peep” - on the arrival of: the surazo, or sur which, according to early ethnographic writing (Nordenskiöld 1924), is a famous inducer of illness and death among jungle inhabitants, since they did not have much bodily protection from the cold. All this might lead one to deduce that the name of the town of Rurrenabaque is an indicator of the local and powerful Tacana deities which reside here: the south wind and the great anaconda.

Close to the duck-boulder, on the other side of the Beni River, there is another famous boulder which holds historic petroglyphs, already pointed out by early anthropologists (e.g. Hissink 1961). They depict a large snake (anaconda) and two sun-like symbols which mimic whirlpools (see image 8 below). It is believed that these carvings are ancient markers for the water-level, to indicate the navigability of the river here during the rainy season. Whirlpools in this location are said to have sucked down even huge rafts loaded with lumber in the 1980’s, when logging was at a high-point. More recently the petroglyphs have become a historical relic which people in Rurrenabaque will mention with pride, when talking about early historic importance of the region and the presence of former advanced civilizations.
These contexts demonstrate Tacana people’s historic connection to the geographical area. At the same time, Tacana people of this study do not consciously recognize these contexts as a history in any collective ‘Tacana’ sense; to them it is simply ‘the’ history and ‘the’ context of the area. In contrast, the mestizo inhabitants of Rurrenabaque do not attribute the obviously ancient and tangible relics of the past to the Tacana (or other native peoples) of the area. In fact, talking to mestizo Rurreños, and as mirrored in the local literature (see eg Gamez Mendez 2002) reference is made to seemingly anonymous “ancient civilizations” which must have lived here in earlier times. Upon suggesting that these must be the ancestors of the Tacana peoples, I encountered obvious unease, and was told, among other things, “well no, perhaps not the Tacana. Perhaps the Incas, they were very intelligent.”

Amazonian groups not only share similar tendencies to organize their world and create community, they also have in common historical mile-stones events which altered their way of life. They have in common the history of colonization by the Spaniards. From here followed missionization and the enslavement into different economies as quinine, lumber, Brazil nut and most significantly rubber, which lead to a new form of migration, resettlement and ethnogenesis (Valen 2013; Vallvé 2010; Bathurst 2005). In context of these industries, displacements from one
territory to another further enhanced the separation and re-grouping of different peoples (e.g. Valen 2013; Greene 2011; Alexiades 2009; Dudley 2011; Garcia Altamirano 2003; Huertas Castillo & Altamirano 2003; Gow 2001, 1991). Some of these aspect which they have in common, affect how they situate themselves in the context of today’s indigenous politics and how indigenous politics affect them. A principal topic here is that of the reality of ethnogenesis, which was enhanced in the missionization of Amazonian groups and again with their relocation in to the barracas\textsuperscript{49} of the rubber industry in the late 1800s. Significant for this research and the Tacana people of Iturralde especially, is their early history of missionization set the grounds for how they are situated in indigenous politics of Bolivia today.

Migration, Missionization and Ethnogenesis of Tacana Groups

The Missions of Apolobamba

After the arrival of the Spanish, Tacana-speaking groups were recruited into Franciscan missions in the 1600s. The seven Missions of Apolobamba were Concepción de Cobendo, Santa Ana, San Miguel de Muchanes, San Antonio de Tumupasa, San José de Uchupiamonas, Nuestra Señora Del Carmen de Ixiamas and Jesus de Cavinias (Hissink and Hahn 1961; Métraux 1942; Armentia 1905). The name ‘the missions of Apolobamba’ denotes the vast region in which the missions were established - directly north of the Bolivian Andes, in their tropical foothills, a region which was alternatively called Caupolicán. Adding to the complexity of the territorial battles of the first Spanish infiltration of the 1530s was the great competition between the two main religious congregations (Jesuits and Franciscans) who ultimately gained the right from the Spanish Crown to establish themselves in the Amazon region of what is today Bolivia. The Beni River became the dividing line: the Franciscans worked west and north of it, and the Jesuits took control of the region east and south of what is today Mojos and the Chiquitanía (Hissink 1961; Bandelier 1907).

Ethnic groups living alongside the Tuichi, Beni and Madidi Rivers and its tributaries, the Tambota and Heath Rivers, were recruited for the missions of Apolobamba (Steward 1963). All the missions moved their locations at various times due to epidemics such as measles, or fires which destroyed the settlements. This explains the variety in foundation dates in different sources (see for

\textsuperscript{49} so-called rubber barracas which were concessions of forest contracted for rubber extraction onto which rubber-tappers where relocated.
example Cardus 1886\textsuperscript{50}). With the rise of the rubber boom at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, in particular, for lowland peoples an affiliation with missions was the greatest guarantor against being enslaved by so-called engancheros – head-hunters who specialized in raiding indian villages for young men who would be sold to the rubber industry (Nordenskiöld, 1924). Affiliation with a mission meant that indians were baptized. Baptism, in turn, attributed to them a soul, which was important in that it distinguished them from animals. Slave-hunters did not have the same leeway to raid indigenous peoples who were baptized and affiliated with a mission.

Tacana missions were composed of more than one group of recruited native peoples. Tumupasa and Ixiamas housed various Tacana-speaking peoples who were then labelled according to ‘their’ mission (eg Tumupasa indians). Hissink stresses that due to the distance between Tacana missions, the socio-cultural development of Tacana people differed from one to another. She demonstrates this by comparing myths collected in Tumupasa and Ixiamas (Hissink 1961), with myths collected by the anthropologist Erland Nordenskiöld, who principally studied Tacana people from the Cavinias mission, located at the lower end of the Madidi River (1924, 1922). Indeed, the Tacana ‘culture’ which developed in Tumupasa differs significantly to that of Tacana groups in other missions and other regions, such as Pando where there is a large Tacana settlement (see Bathurst 2005; Herrera 2003, Herrera et al 2002).

Around, the time that the Bolivian nation-state was formed in 1825, Franciscan Friar, Nicolás Armentia, Bishop of La Paz, was assigned to overseeing the missions of the Eastern Andean area (called Caupolicán and/or Apolobamba). His documentations on Tacana peoples have been a central source for anthropologists (see Armentia 1887, 1902, 1905). He speaks of the “Tacana Nation” giving an idea of the vastness of the landscape and different groups involved: “(t)he Tacana nation is subdivided into various tribes, some of these wild and the other reduced in missions”\textsuperscript{51} (Armentia 1902:3). Importantly, Armentia elaborates sympathetically on Tacana-speaking groups. His writings provide an important background to the relationships between native groups in proximate vicinity of each other, as well as their reaction to white outsiders, and efforts to missionize the different

\textsuperscript{50}The seven missions of Apolobamba when Friar Cardus sought them out likened their date of establishment to the date in which they had resettled in their current location. These, with their newest dates, are Concepcion de Cobendo (1842), Santa Ana (1815), San Miguel de Muchanes (1804), San Antonio de Tumupasa, San José de Uchupiamonas (1854), Nuestra Señora del Carmen de Ixiamas and Jesus de Cavinias (Cardus 1886:159).

\textsuperscript{51} “La nacion Tacana se subdivide en varias tribus, las unas silvestres y las otras reducidas en Misiones.” Translation from the original Spanish my own.
Tacana-speaking groups. Armentia also documented what was probably the first comprehensive compilation of Tacana dictionary.

The vastness of the Tacana-speaking area, and also the multitude of different ethnic groups it contained, is reflected in the words of Sixto Ballesteros, political representative of the department of La Paz and the secretary general of the Geographic Society in the late 1800s. In a speech of 1899, he declared that ‘Tacana’ had been endorsed as the mission language for the Missions of Apolobamba in Caupolicán (today department of La Paz)\(^\text{52}\).

(From all the dialects which are spoken in the different tribes which populate the vast region situated between the rivers of Guanay, Beni, Madre de Dios and Madera, there are Tacana words which pertained and still pertain, without question, to the general language, \textit{nationalized} (emphasis original) and thus well known in the vast and wonderful region which covers the Amazon. For this, in our opinion, it was Tacana which was spoken in the great Nation of the glades and woods, and which gave consistency and unity to the race, which spread out with time to different climates, tribes and latitudes. Another proof we have of the unity of the Tacana race is the perfect identity which exists among the inscriptions and hieroglyphs found in the rocks of their mountains and rivers; inscriptions which Humboldt also encountered in his travels in Orinoco. (Ballesteros 1899: 65)\(^\text{53}\)

[Translation my own.]

As documented by Armentia (1887), certain groups and individuals were willing to be recruited into missions, but it was equally frequent that others from the same native group refused mission life. These were subsequently documented as \textit{barbaros} (savages). Documents thus disregard their distinct ethnic affiliation they are simply ‘savages’. Though some peaceful trading went on, these ‘savages’ were greatly feared for their raids and attacks by both missionized indians and white/mestizo travellers in the region (Armentia 1887). Significantly, documents may speak of Tumupasa indians and \textit{barbaros}, and be referring to members of the same people, the former being associated with a mission and the latter not. In this way, Tacana-speaking groups became re-divided

\(^{52}\) For a map of Caupolicán-Apolobamba see Image 4
\(^{53}\) “Así en todos los dialectos que se habla en las diversas tribus que pueblan la vasta región comprendida entre los ríos del Guanay, el Beni, Madre de Dios y Madera, hay palabras tacanas, que han pertenecido y pertenecen sin duda al idioma general, \textit{nacionalizado} y conocido entonces en la vasta y maravillosa región que abarca el Amazonas. Por esto, a nuestro juicio, fue el Tacana, el idioma oficial y popular al mismo tiempo, que se hablaba en la gran Nación de las florestas y los bosques, y que prestanda consistencia a la unidad de la raza, distribuida con el tiempo, en distintos climas, tribus y latitudes. Otra de las pruebas que tenemos a favor de la unidad de la raza Tacana, es la perfecta identidad que hay entre las inscripciones y que aparecen en las rocas de sus montañas y sus ríos; inscripciones que también encontró Humboldt, en sus viajes por el Orinoco” (Ballesteros 1899:65).
into ‘mission’ and ‘non-mission’ Indians. Missionization divided people belonging to the same group (Tacana and ‘savages’) and unified different native peoples into one living space (the mission). Missionization thus greatly affected ethnogenesis.

Image 9: Excerpt from a map of Bolivia (1931) depicting the area Caupolicán / Apolobamba with notation of local indigenous groups (Vivien Schrader St. Martin, Source: David Rumseys Map Collection).

This is a situation which Tacana people share with peoples in their closer proximity, such as the Leco people, whose language is Rik’a, a linguistic isolate (Montaño Aragón 1987, 1989), live at the intersection of the Andes and the Amazon, which is the piedmont region of Apolo (Dudley 2011). In a slow and continually interrupted process, Leco and other native peoples in the vicinity were recruited into the mission of Apolo (1615) which eventually became the centre of the expansive Missions of Apolobamba (ibid). This mission context enhanced ethnogenesis between different groups, creating the new ethnic category of the Apolistas (ibid). In the Mission of Apolobamba Quechua was officialised as a mission language. Missionization of different groups in the area of Apolobamba and Caupolicán functioned in a similar manner as with Tacana peoples, pulling together related and non-related groups and ‘making’ them one group

54 In early literature also mentioned together with the Aguachile people (Dudley 2011)
passed on from one generation to the next for an advance in cash or goods, which are typically overpriced and can never be paid off. This debt can be

Spanish disappeared together became missions remained situations a hacienda comunidades de peonage. People who took on the role of peons, a situation which continued until the land reform (1953) (see chapter 6). The Tacana people who remained in Iturralde were thus better able to retain a way of life tied to customs developed in the missions than were those who were resettled in Pando (Vallvé 2010). Tacana people in Pando became part of the new wave of ethnogenesis which came from Amazonian peoples being grouped together on rubber barracas. Regrouping meant of a great number of indigenous groups disappeared and “by the end of the rubber boom, most of Bolivia’s rubber areas were considered Spanish-speaking and mestizo” (ibid:22).

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55 A cash or goods-advancement system which covers up a form of slavery. A person pledges his/her work for an advance in cash or goods, which are typically overpriced and can never be paid off. This debt can be passed on from one generation to the next.
The situation of Bolivian Amazonian *siringueros* has been compared to that of Brazilian Amazonian *siringueros* of whom many were also indigenous groups who, having been placed together in *barracas*, emerged as part of the *caboclo* culture, a form of *mestizaje* exclusive to Brazil (Nugent 1993). *Cabocos* are persons of Amazonian indigenous and European descent\(^56\). Bolivian rubber-tappers had more in common with their neighbours in Brazil than with their own compatriots in the Andes, even adopting Brazilian language and custom, and frequently crossing the border back and forth (Vallvé 2010; Cleary 1998; Weinstein 1985). It is probable that Tacana people who were resettled in the north underwent a quicker and stronger process of ‘acculturation’ to a more general national *mestizo* culture (Vallvé 2010). The Tacana people in Pando thus entirely lost the sense of ethnic affiliation which remained a distinctive feature of the Tacana people of Iturralde. While Tacana rubber-workers worked exclusively for the rubber industry (Bathurst 2005), Tacana people who remained in Iturralde were able to cultivate produce on the *chacos* which they could retain for their own consumption as well as working for a *patrón*. The act of cultivating the *chaco* was tied to a certain Tacana ‘culture’ and routines (Hissink and Hahn 1961) which were lost in the *barracas* of the rubber industry. Bathurst (2005) notes that Tacana people in Pando were only able to regain some independent use of their time and labour with the collapse of the rubber industry in the mid-1980s, at which time the local economy switched to the collection of the Brazil nut. As this work was seasonal, the rest of the year could be spent on cultivating private fields which allowed some independence from a *patrón* (ibid).

This split between the Tacana communities is reflected in the indigenous political organization of the late 1980s, when the Tacana community in Pando established a separate indigenous organization (OITA\(^57\)) from the one in Iturralde (CIPTA\(^58\)) (Wentzel 2009; Bathurst 2005; Herrera 2003a). The late 1980s produced a type of sudden “irruption” (Wentzel 2009; Herrera 2003) of Tacana political organizing on the basis of ethnicity, in line with the pro-indigenous political climate of the time (see chapter 7). Tied to these overarching politics, Amazonianists have increasingly begun to assess Amazonian groups in context of nation-state politics and policies.

\(^{56}\) The word *caboclo* probably comes from the Tupi language (*kaa’boc*) and literally means a person with copper-coloured skin (Nugent 1993).
\(^{57}\) *Organización Indígena Tacana*
\(^{58}\) *Consejo Indígena del Pueblo Tacana*
Indigenous Politics and its Incompatibility with the Reality of Amazonian Groups

Recent literature on Amazonian peoples includes important critical observations as to how new pro-indigenous policy either limits indigenous people’s possibilities, or contributes to the falsification of their history, especially where this is tied to their geographical region of origin. Thus, though it seems contradictory, pro-indigenous state policy retrospectively perpetuates a faulty representation and image of a native group’s history. Nowhere is this more apparent than in matter of landscape management and the domestication of nature. Central to the politics around indigeneity is the theory that indigenous people are in harmony with nature and ‘protect’ it. This is in line with the ecological rhetoric about the importance of the conservation of a ‘pristine forest’. However, rather than being controlled by and ‘in harmony’ with nature, studies have proven that indigenous groups continuously changed and domesticated their environment in accordance with their needs (Eriksen 2011; Denevan 2011, 1992, 1966; Lehman and Kern 2003). This has significant implications in the context of indigenous politics, especially to conservationist NGOs which heavily support indigenous groups so that they may sustainably manage their surroundings. Strictly speaking, this means the image created around the ecological indian which they help to establish would need to be revised (see chapter 7). It is also central to the TCO system which gives the impression that lowland groups and indigenous groups more widely were static (Dudley 2009; Alexiades 2009; Balza Alarcon 2001). The whole concept of indigenous land-tenure disregards the intense migration patterns and histories which actually took place (Alexiades 2009) and which are central to contemporary Tacana people’s history.

As indigenous politics emerged in the 1980s and 90s, national indigenous organizations were established by distinct groups, but also by different members of the same indigenous group. The Tacana community in Pando created a distinct national Tacana organisation, the Tacana Indigenous Organization (OITA - Organizacion Indigena Tacana) (ibid), from the Tacana community in La Paz (Iturralde province) from which CIPTA evolved. While Peruvian anthropologist Enrique Herrera Sarmiento (2003, 2002) notes that the Santa Rosa comunidad in Pando was one of the first comunidades to be registered as Tacana and ‘indigenous’, and become part of the Bolivian indigenous lowland movement, German anthropologist Sondra Wentzel (2009) claims the same for people from the Tumupasa comunidad (see also chapter 7). Indeed, this confusion, which at first suggests lack of organization, communication and professionalism among indigenous groups, is in fact an accurate historical reflection of indigenous groups’ history in the Amazon region: they were
not static, but underwent continuous migration and thus a constant process of ethnogenesis. ‘Old’ groups split into new ones, or merged with existing ones. Furthermore, the Tacana community at large became divided between those which were engaged in the rubber economy up north (Pando) and those which remained in Iturralde (La Paz). Rather than suggesting the disorganization of indigenous groups, the Western style system of land-tenure exposes the artificiality of ‘organizing’ the Amazonian groups of one vast region into neat and tidy distinct groups (Alexiades 2009; Balza 2001).

To be part of the nation-state project and receive territory, indigenous individuals need to affiliate with one single ethnic group in order then, as a group, to start defining what is ‘specific’ them in terms of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘indigeneity’. This is usually done with the establishment of a land-tenure management plan, together with an NGO which oversees the project. This process squarely fits into the neo-liberal model. It involves a number of indigenous and non-indigenous actors (NGOs etc) and is customized to neoliberal nation-state dimensions. It situates Tacana indigeneity in nation-state terms so that it may function within its socio-political system. This may, in fact, have only remotely to do with the on-the-ground reality of how Tacana people are living (see eg chapter 8), but it is in this process that ‘indigeneity’ is re-constructed and customized for each group (see chapter 8). In fact, as Tacana people pointed out, while one parent may be Tacana, the other may be of a different ethnic group, such as Araona or Leco, or even mestizo (see chapter 6). The formation of indigenous organizations and the requirement to be aligned to one single ethnic group have left little room for the reality of the ethnogenesis which has been ongoing for centuries.

Tensions are bound to arise in this artificial model which sets boundaries between one people’s ‘indigeneity’ and the next, making indigeneity less fluid than it is and was in reality. In this situation, different groups may lay claim to land-tenure on the same territory, which at some point in history they co-inhabited, or perhaps even inhabited as one group. Today this results in a political tug-of-war in which the best organized indigenous group has the best chance of attaining the most territory. As required by the neoliberal model, the ‘strongest group’ is the one which receives most support from outside bodies such as NGOs and other Western political actors. There is presently tension over land claims between national Tacana and Ese Eja organizations, where proving geographical heritage and place of origin is of prominent importance.59 There is dispute over Tacana

59 While the indigenous organizations are in conflict over land claims, this does not mean that the majority of the ordinary TCO members are in any way necessarily involved.
land (TCO Tacana II) in the department of Pando, which CIPTA acquired in 2006. Yet the Ese Eja ‘Organisation of Indigenous Leaders of the Ese Eja People of the Amazon’ (la Capitanía Indígena del Pueblo Ese Eja de la Amazonía - CIPEA) now claims this location, asserting that it constitutes the heart of Ese Eja ancestral territory (Alexiades, and Monje Machuqi 2009). Indeed, many Tacana people live in Pando due to resettlement as a result of migration during the rubber boom (see Vallvé 2010; Bathurst 2005). The fact that the Tacana, via CIPTA, have successfully acquired two TCOs is a demonstration of their strength in the contemporary indigenous movement (see also chapter 7).

Tacana people’s strong political representation within the contemporary indigenous movement distinguishes them from other indigenous groups who cohabit or border their territory. One might ask why it is that they were able to become such strong members of the indigenous movement in Bolivia (see also chapter 7). Understanding the construction of indigeneity in Bolivia reveals that the resources offered by pro-indigenous policies can only be accessed by those willing to play the role of the ‘permitted indian’. As this chapter demonstrates, Tacana people of Iturralde are the product of the early nation-state. They have been formed by missions which regrouped and moulded them into a new ethnic group; one which accepted and came to perpetuate the comunidad as the model of organizing living space (see chapter 2) and one which learned Spanish, eventually refraining altogether from speaking Tacana. Indeed, Tacana people of Iturralde in comparison to other local indigenous groups seem to have had a continuously close association with mestizos from surrounding towns, as they have with the whites and mestizos within their own comunidades (see chapter 6). The continual desire of Tacana people to ‘modernize’ their comunidades (see chapters 6 and 7) was what initially brought them into contact with indigenous movements.

While this chapter has focused on how I came to know Tacana people, and on situating Tacana people in the Amazon and in Amazonian studies by drawing on past research, the following chapter asks how Tacana people of today see themselves. The answer is intricately tied to their geographical location and residence in the comunidad and municipal town. In the following chapter, I lay out the sites of research (three comunidades and one town) like snap-shot views of the wider area of study. Physical location demonstrates how Tacana people understand ‘being Tacana’ today as shaped by Tacana people’s history in an Andean-oriented state.
Chapter 2 - Where Tacana People Locate Themselves

Decentralization and neo-liberal politics in Bolivia have facilitated the reaching of the Amazon from the capital in the highlands. Lumber companies have created new roads, making way for a new surge of small-scale migrants (colonos), but also for social scientists, government and NGO affiliates, highland indigenous and mestizo migrants looking for land. Decentralization processes, a part of neo-liberal politics, and specifically the LPP of 1995, permitted lumber companies to access the Amazon region. The LPP also gave remote areas more political decision-making power and granted indigenous comunidades TCOs. This in turn made it possible for indigenous people from indigenous comunidades to participate on the municipal councils as specifically ‘indigenous’ representatives. The list goes on. These developments and turns of events are what makes ‘picking out’ the ‘Tacana people’ from ‘the others’ so complex; or, at any rate, reveals the complexity which has, in reality, always existed. Tacana people are no longer (and arguably never were) from one geographical location, the Tacana comunidades in the Bolivian Amazon. Tacana people are also found residing in towns such as Rurrenabaque, and in cities as La Paz or even Barcelona, Spain where they work and from where they send remittances to Bolivia every month. Their place of residence and the work they do only in part defines them and their racial category (indigenous, mestizo, white) (also Barragán 2011). In Barcelona, Tacana people may be poor Bolivian immigrant domestic workers, while in La Paz they are university students, the offspring of wealthy indigenous leaders.

In Bolivia the popular and political view of the Amazonian indian has always been from the highlands to the lowlands. Although Bolivia is considered Andean, the lowlands make up 60% of its territory (see image 5). The fact that the state constructs it to being Andean has had no little impact on Tacana people, as it means ‘being made and actively making oneself Andean’ (67). To be part of the country, one had to construct oneself through Andean processes. This is a situation shared by many Amazonian groups who live in an ‘Andean country’, such as the Aguaruna people of Amazonian Peru (Greene 2009).

A part of establishing oneself within this system as an Amazonian people was to ‘take on’ and even help ‘develop’ the self-image of the ‘less noble’ indian people; to accept the role of the weakened and the docile, in contrast to the descendants of the proud and noble ‘Inca Nation’ (Greene 2009). Indeed, in an act of governmentality (Foucault et al 1991) Tacana people have
actively taken on the role of the ‘passive’ and ‘lesser’ Indian peoples in contrast to those of the Andes. Tacana people have embraced the ‘invisible’ (Amazonian lowland) and ‘unimportant’ role they have been attributed in Bolivian history. This becomes demonstrated in their terms for self-referral – poor (pobre), peasant (campesino) and especially ‘humble’ (humilde).

**Settlement and Identity: ‘Being’ Tacana**

Tacana people of this study tie ‘being Tacana’ to specific abstract factors which cannot be attained by simply asking them ‘what is Tacana?’; but which become apparent in expressions and stories which distinguish an ‘us’ from a ‘them’. These are closely linked to geographical surroundings and familiar settlements. Though ‘being Tacana’ is not tied to one geography and location, speaking to Tacana people of this study reveals that ‘location’ plays a central point of reference in the creation of a sense of self which is distinctly Tacana. Location is utilized to establish boundaries for unity with others who are ‘like us’. The idea of a shared geography (Bolivia), a shared area (the Amazon) and a shared location (the comunidad) for a given period of time sums up ‘community’.

Geographical settlements, assigned certain nomenclature (comunidad, pueblo, ciudad), held distinctive roles in the process of Spanish colonization, which continued after independence from Spain (Orlove 1993). These were based on administrative functions (ibid). Like a spider’s web, the different settlements knit together the nation-state – the fragility of the web increasing the greater the distance was between a settlement and the Andes, and the deeper it was located in the Amazon. This settlement-based administrative mechanism was a way to order the new Latin American nations. Importantly, this included the organisation of the indians and ‘(t)he spatialization of the Indian became a way to speak safely of race in an era of citizenship’ (ibid:328; also Barragán 2011; Cadena 2000). In these constellations comunidades are sites of the indians and pueblos are places for and of mestizos. In Rurrenabaque in particular, the underlying attitude is clearly perceptible that while mestizos ‘pertain’ to the town, local indigenous people ‘pertain’ to comunidades.

The image of the indigenous as the care-taker of the forest, around which the modern eco-ethnic movement has organized itself (Greene 2006), underscores this construct. This situation also becomes especially interesting in light of the trend in the Amazon region for an increased

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60 The comunidad would be the equivalent of a village, a pueblo a small town and a ciudad a city.
‘indigenous urbanization’ (Alexiades and Peluso 2005), in which traditionally highly mobile Amazonian societies (ibid, also Alexiades 2009), such as the Ese Eja in the department of Pando, have become ‘increasingly sedentary, largely as a result of the broader social and political changes that have resulted from the penetration of a market economy into the region’ (Alexiades & Peluso 2005:8). As also for Tacana people, this includes missionization in the first half of the twentieth century and the subsequent establishments of comunidades based on the mission model, both of which required and persuaded inhabitants to perpetuate and maintain links with the market and nation state (ibid). However, because ‘indigenous urbanization’ is not congruent with the colonial logistics of how the nation is divided spatially, indigenous people in urban settings such as the Ese Eja people in Puerto Maldonado, or the Tacana people in Rurrenabaque, have become invisible as specifically indigenous people.

Tacana people will most often refer to a comunidad as a place to where they are ‘from’, or, if they were not born here but in a town, I have heard the explanation “I was born here (in town) but my mother is from Tumupasa”. Though Tacana people will refer to a certain comunidad as their birth-place and where they grew up, it is very likely that they move to other comunidades in the course of their lives, and equally likely that they may have second homesteads in a nearby municipal town. Different geographical locations take on different roles in each person’s life. While the comunidad may be where the field (chaco) is located, the town may be where one resides during the week together with one’s children and partner. To adequately understand Tacana people and gain a realistic impression of Tacana life, I moved between geographical places, much as Tacana people of this study do, visiting comunidades and municipal towns for different occasions and goals.

Focussing on ‘space’ provides a sound demonstration of the influence which ‘colonial geography’ (Orlove 1993) has had on Tacana people’s sense of self. This chapter provides brief descriptions of the four main settlements of this research to provide snapshot views of the physical sites of Tacana interaction. These include three Tacana comunidades (Tumupasa, Buena Vista & Carmen Florida) and one municipal town (Rurrenabaque) which are important to Tacana people and their history for different reasons. A Tacana collective self (identity) becomes demonstrated in certain expressions of self-referral which are elaborated in the second half of the chapter, and which reveal how much Tacana people have come to embody the image of the lowland Amazonian as docile in contrast to (and perhaps precisely to contrast) the highlanders. Although indian uprisings are considered a feature of the highlanders, for example, early documentation reveals Tacana-
speaking people’s uprisings and successful wars against Spanish infiltrators (Castillo 1988b) which belie the passive and complacent role allotted them in the history of Spanish colonization.
Image 10: Map of central area of study locating Rurrenabaque, Buena Vista and Carmen Florida (Tumupasa is not included and lies further north of Buen Vista)
The Town of Rurrenabaque

Picking up from the last chapter, I continue with the *pueblo* Rurrenabaque, moving from its significance in Tacana cosmology to a brief description not only of its foundation and inhabitants, but its role for Tacana people and in the creation of the socio-racial categories of the Bolivian nation-state.

The town of Rurrenabaque (typically called ‘Rurre’ among inhabitants) is home to about 15,000 inhabitants and situated in the tropical foothills which gradually slope westwards into the Andes. Rurrenabaque and San Buenaventura are the main local municipalities and towns in the region and are situated opposite each other on the shores of the Beni River (see image 10). The Beni River marks the political divide between the two *pueblos*; to its east begin the vast plains and swamps of the historic region of Mojos, today the department of Beni. Thus, San Buenaventura lies in the department of La Paz, in the province of Iturralde; and Rurrenabaque lies in the department of Beni, in the province of Ballivián.

It is significant to the history of both Rurre and San Buenaventura (San Buena to its inhabitants) that upon Spanish colonization the Jesuits were granted jurisdiction over the territory east of the Beni River while the Franciscans received jurisdiction of the territory to its west. Subsequently, San Buenaventura was founded by the Franciscans while Rurrenabaque was a Jesuit foundation. Older inhabitants of Rurre will acknowledge, not without nostalgia, the Jesuits’ introduction of cattle into the great plains of the department of Beni (formerly Mojos), and do not shy away from calling it the area’s ‘golden age’ (Gamez Mendez 2002:25; also Van Valen 2013). Many *mestizo* inhabitants of Rurre are small-scale cattle ranchers, farmers and merchants of local produce such as Brazil nuts. Formerly, many were the *patrónes* of the surrounding land which Tacana people worked as peons (see also Chapter 5). Today Rurre lives mainly off the flourishing tourist industry.

There are disagreements over the official foundation of Rurrenabaque. Written sources lean heavily on the oral testimonies of elderly *mestizos* whose family members were among its first non-indigenous settlers. Sources cite the first foundation as having been in 1706 by the Jesuit priest Padre José Vincente Duran, who held this area within his duties and adopted the indigenous name of Sucenabaque (original spelling of today’s Rurrenabaque), and registered the town in 1720 (ibid:39). A better-known foundation date among the people of Rurre is February 2nd 1844, when...
Manuel Mendez Abrego, on the occasion of the immigration of a handful of white/mestizo settlers, gave it the name ‘Cruz’ (Cross) (ibid:38). Indeed, to date Rurrenabaque annually celebrates its patron (Christian protector) and foundation festival on 2nd February (see image 11). On March 31st, 1862 Rurrenabaque’s foundation was made official by governmental authorization and it was acknowledged as a town of the province of Caupolicán.

Both San Buenaventura and Rurrenabaque were settled by white and mestizo farmers, and merchants of European and Asian descent, who came here predominantly in the last century. At the turn of the twentieth century Rurrenabaque was a place to let the cattle rest and fatten as boats made their passage from Bolivia’s eastern lowlands or the highlands towards Pando on the Beni River. During the rubber booms of the late 19th century and mid 1980s cattle and other foodstuffs were sent downriver to feed those working in the industry. Since the early 1980s Rurrenabaque has become a growing international tourist destination to which backpackers travel to launch on jungle and pampa tours. Rurrenabaque was made famous internationally by a bestselling Israeli book title (Ghinsberg 1985). Since its first publication in the 1980s in Israel, the book has spurred young Israeli adults in particular to travel to Rurre after their military service, and seek adventure.

Besides the Tacana people, and to a lesser extent other local indigenous peoples (mentioned in chapter one) and the mestizos, there is a third principal group which makes up a
central part of Rurrenabaque: the colonos or indigenous highland migrants. For Tacana people, the colonos are the ‘better off’ indigenous, a sentiment shared by the town. While the local Ese Eja are considered the poorest indigenous group in Rurre, the highland colonos are viewed as the wealthiest. Their involvement with local markets and ability to control the rise and fall in local prices contributes to this. Tacana people, especially those who participate in its weekly market such as those from Carmen Florida, come into contact with colonos as principal buyers of their produce which they then re-sell in the market-hall of Rurrenabaque (see image 12 below). The colonos are the small-scale and, to an extent, large-scale merchants of Rurrenabaque. The wealthiest families in town are rumoured to be not mestizos, as one would assume, but colonos.

Image 12: Tacana from nearby comunidades sell plantains to colonos at the beach of Rurrenabaque. (2005)

Colonos control the main turnover of merchandise in town and are the principal group to order and receive merchandise coming down from the highlands of La Paz. Transport between the highlands and the lowlands is often managed by family members; an uncle or a brother-in-law will own one of the many trucks which make their way from the Andes to the Amazonian north, bringing in goods. This includes everything from gasoline and refrigerators to second-hand clothing and chewing gum. The colonos also tend to buy produce directly from the surrounding comunidades, not bothering to wait until the next Sunday market: “bring me all of your bananas, here to the shore on Wednesday. I will buy them.” Indeed, the shops which line the main roads in Rurrenabaque are mostly colla (i.e. highlander) and there is a certain colla style which distinguishes these from the local camba (i.e. lowlander) style. This includes the Andean music which blasts from the stereos and the fact that the collas are considered ‘stingy’ (see chapter 3).

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61 The terms colla and colono are used interchangeably in Rurrenabaque and among Tacana people.
The roles which *pueblos* play in the creation of racial categories is aptly characterized in a small publication (1958) by the local *mestizo* school-teacher, Arminda Herrera de Antelo in which she lauds Rurrenabaque.\(^{62}\) Her publication asserts that the town strives to be a ‘civilized’ and ‘modern’ settlement within the Bolivian nation. It depicts Indians dwelling in the town as poor, wretched, even crazy souls living as outcasts on the muddy shore. Here, Indian in of itself stands in contrast to urban life. However, those Indians who invest true effort in living and being part of the town ‘shed’ their ‘Indianess’. Herrera de Antelo ‘excuses’ the fact that 50% of Rurrenabaque’s inhabitants are, in fact, Tacana people with the assertion that all of them speak Spanish and are quick to ‘acculturate and adapt to the manners of the common Bolivian person’ \(^{63}\)(16) (emphasis mine).

Herrera de Antelo’s attitude chimes with the mid- to late 20\(^{th}\) century state ideology of *mestizaje*, more popular at the time in Central America than in the Andes. She writes:

> only about half a dozen elderly (Tacana) women dress in the old way. They use a *tipoy* (a type of long shirt with decorations of ribbons and ruffles), have their hair in long braids adorned with colorful ribbons (...) and perfumed with flower fragrances. (...) As opposed to them, however, the younger generation takes part in the common Bolivian life (*la vida nacional*) and one hears the Tacana dialect less and less. \(^{64}\)(ibid: 16-17).

In writing this de Herrera de Antelo acknowledges that to be ‘Bolivian’ (i.e. a nation-state citizen) does not entail being white or even having a white blood link, as in line with required by early eugenics (see chapter 6) but is possible through the adoption of certain non-native behaviours and customs.

Tacana *comunarios* (people from *comunidades*) view Rurrenabaque as both a place which connects them with the wider Bolivia and a dangerous place of ‘degeneration’ – much as European cities were viewed during industrialization: a place to drink away hard-earned money and buy over-priced goods, and one where teenage children and husbands go, not to return for days on end. It is a place which provokes ‘laziness’ (*flojera*) and the leaving of *comunidad*-responsibilities to those who stay behind; a place where one is sucked into a sparse yet blinding night-life of karaoke bars,

\(^{62}\) The author, a sociologist and schoolteacher, was a central leading female figure in Rurrenabaque and today is remembered as a heroine for her engagement and efforts to ‘modernize’ the town. One of her highlights was bringing about the community-effort construction of the central water supply, which, while underway, was even made into a movie (‘*La Vertiente*’ 1958).

\(^{63}\) Translation from Spanish my own.

\(^{64}\) Translation from Spanish my own.
dancing and drinking. In all, however, Rurrenabaque is also an important place of interaction; a crossroads to which people will travel from their comunidad to sell goods at the market, but also to offer their manual labour, buy certain products, meet municipal officials or set off on larger trips via buses and airplanes.

**Tacana Comunidades – Infrastructure and Organisation and Activities**

Image 13: A school-house (right) and meeting house with solar panel (left), in front the foot-ball field (Carmen Florida 2009)

While this research focused on three comunidades especially, most Tacana comunidades have in common basic infrastructure and routines which are considered ‘typical’ of comunidades. These include tangible infrastructures as well as routines such as festivities aligned to Catholic saints. The comunidad – a village-like structure in which the basic infrastructure usually amounts to a meeting-house, a church, a football field and a schoolhouse – was introduced at the time of Spanish missionization in the 1700s. Even though comunidades were not ‘native’ to Tacana people, however, they have through the centuries become ‘native’ and for some time have been regarded as a representation of ‘indigeneity’ by the state and other political arenas (see chapter 7). Here again geography creates identity and people who move to settle in a comunidad are considered ‘indigenous’, and statistically will count as ‘indigenous’, unless they are church affiliates, schoolteachers or medical personnel.
A comunidad, whether ‘originally’ Tacana or not gave and today still gives the inhabitants a sense of togetherness which goes beyond actual residence. As Tacana people were heavily missionized, and the descendants of Tacana people of this study are mainly descendants of the missions of San José de Uchupiomonas and Tumupasa, they are Catholics. Mission life was organized around Catholic celebration of different saints, year round (Hissink and Hahn 1984). However, importantly, although Tacana people were aligned with a mission they did not necessarily live year-round within its boundaries. Instead, families often lived at a considerable distance from the comunidad of Tumupasa, for example, where they had a central homestead. These families only returned to participate in the Christian festivities instigated by the church affiliates living as in Tumupasa and – ideally, from the perspective of the priest - on Sundays to attend church service (see Wentzel 1989; Hissink and Hahn 1984). Until recently it was also not uncommon for a single family to settle on the banks of a river, where there is an abundance of land and enough space for a field and a garden, and to let domestic animals roam. As one informant, Berta, aptly put it, placing the situation in the current problematic context of land rights, which includes indigenous land tenures, private property and national parks:

before there was land all over! It was worthless and no one wanted it. It was there for anyone. If you needed more land to cultivate, you just moved a bit downriver and set up your field there, your house. It is different now. There is no more land. Before, you just moved anywhere….you with your family. Just you and your family on the banks of the river.

Tacana people from the comunidades are mainly subsistence farmers. Most families live off the yield of their chacos (fields), which lie outside of the comunidad. A chaco can be between one and five hectares in size, with parts of it lying fallow. Main crops also depend somewhat on the location of the chaco and the quality of earth\textsuperscript{65}. Another important factor in the production of crops is whether the comunidad is close to the towns of Rurrenabaque or San Buenaventura where it can sell produce. However, as a loose rule typical crops include rice, plantains, yucca, peanuts (if there is a sandy shore) and sugar-cane. In smaller gardens by the household compounds papaya, aji (capsicum baccatum), coffee and coca bushes and other small vegetables are planted or sown. An important part of the diet are the palms and fruit trees which bear coconuts, dates, cocoa, oranges,

\textsuperscript{65} For a detailed discussion on Tacana chaco organization and selection, as also types of soil see Wentzel 1989: 158.
mandarins, lemons, limas, pacay (*Inga feuilleei*), avocado, copazu and cherimoya, to name a few of the principal ones.

It should be stressed that coca leaves are an important product for Tacana people and each family will have a number of coca leaf bushes around their living area. Chewing coca for its stimulating effects, aids in the work of hard physical labor. For its nutritional value it is also used for illnesses. The practice of chewing coca after lunch, as a way to relax, or in the evening after a hard days of work, is something Tacana people identify with strongly. This is similar to another custom, that of drinking *chicha* – a fermented brew based on maize or yucca. Chicha has a significant symbolic value in the lives of Tacana people. A festivity is no real festivity without *chicha*.

To Tacana people, *chicha* is the common alcoholic beverage and of all who live in the country side. ‘Understanding’ (*saber*) how to drink chicha means one understands life in the country side but also that one is ‘poor’ (see elaboration below). I was able to experience this when I invited Sandra from Carmen Florida to a fiesta I was having in Rurrenabaque and asked her if she could not make *chicha* for the event. While I thought my idea was good, I soon saw that the request embarrassed her. Showing up at my party in town at which a mix of people would be, many not from a *comunidad*, bringing *chicha* would expose her as ‘indigenous’. It would expose her class-standing and make clear that she was ‘from the country side’. She had been regarding my fiesta as an opportunity to mix in with other social-classes and drink beer, perhaps even wine. These beverages symbolized a more urban life-style connected to a different socio-racial class. Indeed, sugar cane liquor, beer and to a much lesser extent wine (in this order) are considered more lucrative alcoholic beverages to people in the area. One cannot make them at home (except maybe sugar cane liquor) and especially beer needs to be cold, which involves owning a refrigerator, an object difficult to get a hold of and impossible to keep in a *comunidad* without electricity. Quickly realizing Sandra’s unease we both laughed at my ridiculous request and settled that Sandra would contribute ‘*pan de arroz*’ (bread made of rice), which she was infamous for and which she also often sold at the town’s Sunday market.
In addition to farming and collecting fruit, Tacana people in comunidades also keep domestic animals, most typically chicken, ducks, pigs and, for some protection and to aid in hunting, dogs. Cattle and horses, are by far the most desirable domestic animals to have, and are a symbol of status. Tacana people also fish, and hunt which, however, is today predominantly considered as a leisure activity, because the outcome is uncertain, or at least more so than that of farming. Hunting has also become more uncertain in the past 20 years as there are less animals due to over-hunting. Popular meats to hunt include that of the spider and howler monkies, tapir, ant-eater, armadillo, capybara and caiman. Being in the position to eat meat is a clear sign of ‘doing well’ and status.

Since as long as Tacana people of this study can remember they have also seasonally migrated to one of the large industries of the region: quinine, rubber, lumber, Brazil nuts. It is predominantly young single men who migrate although married women (and their children) may accompany them to serve as cooks. People may also typically hire out their labour at a daily or half-daily rate which at the time of research was about 40 Bolivianos (7 Dollars). This can include people from the same comunidad, though more typical would be being hired by better situated people in the towns of Rurrenabaque and San Buenaventura, when they need help harvesting their fields or any unskilled labour to be done. The tourist industry in Rurrenabaque and surrounding
comunidades, and the realms of the indigenous movement have offered more recent possibilities of occupation. This last platform has brought Tacana people into contact with the international aid arena and provided possibilities for short- or long-term income (see chapter 7 & 8).

Tacana comunidades are still roughly modelled around the Franciscan mission model described above in which houses and household compounds were grouped together as they were in Europe. A household compound is typically composed of one or more sleeping houses and a cooking-house. Cooking-houses usually hold a hearth, which is an elevated wooden platform packed with clay and on which stones are placed around the borders (see image 16 below).

Image 16: Lunch in Carmen Florida, as cooked on a typical elevated cooking hearth of stones (2010)

Houses in Tacana comunidades traditionally used charo (a type of bamboo) for the walls and a woven ensemble of the jatata palm-leaf for the roof. Inside, houses were not divided by walls, but left as one large space, although this has begun to change as people divide the space into rooms with wooden planks. Before wooden planks were introduced by the lumber industry and the more recent availability of brick, better-off families used to construct the walls of their houses with a mixture of charo and clay which, when dried in the sun, would be white-washed. Today the jatata-roofs are giving way to corrugated iron sheets, which, though insect- and rodent-resistant as opposed to jatata, capture the heat.
While the aspects described above are a very general model of a Tacana comunidad, obviously each comunidad differs somewhat from the next, depending on its foundation date, history and location.

The Comunidad Carmen Florida

Carmen Florida, the comunidad in which I mainly resided, was officially established (i.e. registered by the municipality) in the 1940s shortly before the land reform of 1953. It is located about forty minutes upriver by boat from Rurrenabaque. This proximity made the comunidad especially interesting, as its inhabitants closely relate to the municipal town, thus providing a clear example of how Tacana people interact and relate to local politics. Carmen Florida emerged from the typical situation of one family living along the banks of a river to make use of its fertile land for farming. If enough families shared an area, the group might opt to create a comunidad and baptize the settlement after a biblical saint to assure its protection, following the tradition of mission settlements. The principal founders of Carmen Florida had come from the former Tacana mission comunidad San José de Uchupiomonas but also from the Apolo towards the Andes. Though among Tacana people Apolo is considered a Quechua town, studies show that it is home to a large community of Leco people and was the centre of Leco missions which, as with the Tacana people, regrouped different peoples an in this course creating a new ethnic catagory (Dudley 2011, 2009).

The historic main route leading from the highlands into the lowlands starts in Apolo and leads through San José de Uchupiomonas and on to Ixiamas and Tumupasa, from where travellers could continue to San Buenaventura and lastly Rurrenabaque. The Apolo route is said to predate Inca times, with Inca stone paths and ruins still intact. Upon asking inhabitants of Carmen Florida why their grandfathers had come to settle here, the reply was usually an unenthused shrug: “why not, it’s pretty here! There was so much land! So my father stayed. Found a wife. It’s very pretty here!” Indeed, I heard a number of times that men from Apolo had come to the Amazonian lowlands to look for wives.
Today Carmen Florida is made up of 37 families of predominantly Tacana and Quechua decent and comes under the administrative jurisdiction of the municipality of Rurrenabaque. As typical of smaller comunidades in particular, its inhabitants rotate in their responsibility to keep communal areas free of brush and tall grass, cutting it away with the machete. While principal families such as the Cubes and Colques have private land titles, other families must fall back on communal TCO land to make their fields. The fact the comunidad encompasses both private and communal land causes tensions among the inhabitants, an issue addressed in chapter 8. As opposed to the typical comunidad set-up in which houses are clustered together by the church, school and obligatory football field, the inhabitants of Carmen Florida have set up their homes by their fields and stretched out along the Beni River. Walking from one end to the comunidad to the other easily takes over two hours. Inhabitants choose their field on the shores of the Beni River, where frequent inundations loosen and replenish the soil. Soil further inland, in contrast, is hard and packed and needs to lie fallow for seven years in order to replenish. Thus, despite living in the same comunidad, the inhabitants of Carmen Florida rarely see each other during the week, as household compounds are widespread and all are busy working on the fields, gathering the produce for the Sunday market in Rurrenabaque.

Carmen Florida was founded by two families, the Cubos and the Colques, who still live there today and who, in addition to having claim to the land-tenure (TCO), also own private land-titles.
Berta Cubo’s father was the founder of the comunidad. He had travelled into the region from San José de Uchupiromonas, a former Tacana mission located by the Tuichi River.

He himself was born and raised in the early mission comunidad of San José de Uchupiromonas from where he travelled downriver by boat, settling close to San Buenaventura until he finally stayed in what was to become Carmen Florida.

He was a merchant, a very respected man! He travelled to San Buenaventura and Rurrenabaque to sell local products. Sugar cane was very popular. When we would come in our boats loaded with the sugar cane product (chancaca) people used to wade out into the river to be the first to buy. People were crazy for sugar cane and there was always a shortage! My father was a very strict man! He would give whasca (leather whip) to all of us (children). We had to work hard, rise early in the morning at 2 a.m. to start working the trapiche (sugar mill). My father was a well-respected man in all this area and everyone knew him!

Before the Sunday market people from the comunidad may take their boats out to remoter shores on the river and harvest the fruit trees and palms found here, then sell the goods at market and generate more income. The Sunday market in Rurrenabaque is central to the weekly routine. Each family has a fixed spot where they set up chairs and sometimes a table, to set out vegetables, fruits (e.g. banana, papaya, avocado, cucumbers, oranges, pacay, ají) derivatives of sugar cane (chankaka) and more seldom dried meat (charque) and fish. People of Carmen Florida come to Rurrenabaque not only to sell what their fields yield but also to find employment, most typically in the flourishing tourist industry. Here they rent out their services as cooks in restaurants or as guides in the jungle and pampa, or in the larger infrastructure as motor-bike taxi drivers, or labourers in housing construction or the saw-mill industry.

Many people from Carmen Florida have over the past years attained land in Rurrenabaque and built a house here. Thus, a whole section of Rurrenabaque is inhabited by people from Carmen Florida, forming a sort of Carmen Florida neighbourhood. This situation is typical, as other outlying comunidades, too, have bought land in Rurrenabaque from the municipality and live together in houses to form one neighbourhood. In this manner Tacana people are both members of an indigenous comunidad and inhabitants of the municipal town.

Carmen Florida is registered as a Tacana comunidad. However, some inhabitants are in fact Quechua. Though Carmen Florida is a Tacana comunidad, importantly it is not part of the TCO Tacana as are Tumupasa and Buena Vista. The TCO Tacana lies exclusively in the department of La
Paz, which begins across the river where the comunidades Vila Alcira and San Miguel are located. For logistical reasons Carmen Florida became part of the TCO Tsimané/Mosetén in the department of Beni. The TCO Tsimané/Mosetén is interlinked with the national bio-reserve Pilon Lajas, established here in 1995. The inhabitants of Carmen Florida do not have a strong affiliation with ‘their’ TCO Tsimané/Mosetén due to the vast cultural differences which include a language barrier.

For this reason, the comunidad falls back on the nearby municipal authorities in Rurrenabaque when looking to help with conflicts between comunidad members or natural disasters as inundations. Carmen Florida, being so close to Rurrenabaque, has always been able to take advantage of its infrastructure and this has given the members of Carmen Florida the sense that they are more ‘modern’ and ‘mestizo’, and less ‘ethnic’ than other comunidades located further from municipal towns. ‘We are not very Tacana anymore,’ Alejandro Cubo said apologetically to me when I told him that I would like to stay in the comunidad to learn about Tacana people. He pointed to the comunidad San Miguel, part of the TCO Tacana and located on the other side of the Beni River in the department of La Paz: ‘the Tacana are over there, across the river. Or if you want to meet Tacana, ask CIPTA in Tumupasa. Here in Carmen Florida we are not Tacana anymore.’

The Comunidad Tumupasa

Tumupasa is one of the oldest surviving Tacana comunidades to have made up one of the seven Missions of Apolobamba established in the early 1700s. It was originally established in 1713 on the site of a failed white settlement on one of the tributaries of the Tuichi River (Chávez Suárez
1944) from where it twice moved due to the outbreak of disease and fires (ibid). Today it is nestled closer to the Beni River, at the bottom of a sacred mountain marked by the whiteness of its rock, which plays a prominent role in Tacana myths as documented by Hissink and Hahn (1961). Indeed, the Tacana word ‘Tumupasa’ means ‘white rock’. The Tacana people of this research are predominantly descendants of those who associated with two of the Franciscan missions of Apolobamba, specifically Tumupasa and San José de Uchupiomonas which were both originally located in the region by the Tuichi River.

Tumupasa, being one of the original Tacana comunidades, served as a ‘model’ in the establishment of subsequent non-mission comunidades. Today, Tumupasa is composed of about 900 families and has the infrastructure of a pueblo (small town). It is the main and the representative Tacana comunidad in the region and the seat of the national Tacana organisation, CIPTA. Due to an intense focus from the international development arena, Tumupasa has for some time been experiencing a certain NGO and project ‘fatigue’. During the time I worked with Tacana people and CIPTA between 2003 and 2006 there were more than twenty NGOs and other types of organizations collaborating with the TCO Tacana I, especially Tumupasa itself. When I returned to do research in 2008, there was an expectation that outsiders come to learn about ‘the Tacana’ for a small cash payent.

Tumupasa is not only a registered comunidad indigena but a canton and belongs to the Province of Abel Iturralde in the department of La Paz. Being a canton it has its own mayor in addition to other authorities typical of indigenous comunidades (see chapter 6). The road leading north from the municipal town of San Buenaventura to Ixiamas passes through Tumupasa, which lies half-way between them. This is no coincidence. In the 1980s the inhabitants of Tumupasa contributed substantially towards the construction of this road to tie Tumupasa into the surrounding infrastructure (see chapter 5). Plans have been afoot for years that the road be extended to a major highway and be asphalted, not unlike the TIPNIS project. The highway would lead to the Peruvian border which lies behind Ixiamas and a border-crossing to Peru would be opened. The Tacana organisation CIPTA openly opposes this construction, for building a major road poses new possibilities for illegal loggers and would increase the settlement of colonos.

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66 San José de Uchupiomonas is still located by the Tuichi River today.
67 The last priest, Swiss father Pedro Diego, settled here in 1971 and remained until his death in 2009.
The Comunidad Buena Vista

The third comunidad I frequented repeatedly for this research is Buena Vista. Like Tumupasa, Buena Vista is located in La Paz, in the province of Iturralde, and is located somewhat off the road when travelling from San Buenaventura to Tumupasa. It is close to the shores of the Beni River and was officially founded in the early 1940s. I am told that the settlement itself is much older, however, and was previously called ‘Pueblo Viejo’ (Old Town). Buena Vista is a very large comunidad, comprised of over 100 families and today, along with Tumupasa and unlike Carmen Florida, belongs to the TCO Tacana. Some claim that it was the second Tacana comunidad created after Tumupasa after mission times. Indeed, its social/political set-up is much like that of Tumupasa, being a very close replica of a mission comunidad. Rosa explains.

My father moved to Buena Vista when measles broke out and all the youths in Tumupasa died. Many left and settled in Buena Vista. There was a huge measles epidemic in the 1940s in Tumupasa. It was terrible.

While Tumupasa is a former mission comunidad and Carmen Florida as one which evolved without the impulse of white/mestizo authorities (i.e. patrón or priest), Buena Vista is what people call a patrón comunidad. Buena Vista was established by a white landowner previous to the 1953 land reform, in 1940. Buena Vista’s patrón, looking for peons to work his fields, had come to Tumupasa to encourage people to move to his land and live there. Today descendants of the former patrón still live in the comunidad and are considered Tacana (see chapter 6; see image 21). According to the inhabitants of Buena Vista, the comunidad changed hands (patrónes) a few times before the land reform and at some point belonged to more than one landowner. In the early and mid-1900s Buena Vista played an important role during the area’s rubber boom. Today many people in Buena Vista have family living in the north, in the department of Pando, as a result of out-migration during the rubber boom. Rosa explains.

People from the surrounding comunidades came to Buena Vista where they would be picked up by the boats passing up north to work in rubber. They came here to Buena Vista, as it lay close to the river. This is where the boat stopped and picked them up. Here. The Patrón would be paid to hire out his people to work in the rubber industry.

68 ‘Here, patrón can refer to the owner of a larger business as well as a landowner’.
Geography and Collective Identity in Linguistic Terms

The significance between geographical place and identity is perhaps best demonstrated by a set of expressions used by Tacana people to refer to themselves collectively, each of which hold a history and is tied to ‘place’. A term for self-referral among Tacana people of this study is not typically ‘Tacana’, as one might assume (see also Bathurst 2005; Wentzel 1989). Indeed, the closest term to the word ‘Tacana’ used by Tacana people before the rise of the modern indigenous movement would have been the word ‘Takanista’. However, this term is a direct reference to the language ‘Tacana’. A Takanista is a monolingual Tacana speaker and, importantly, it is a derogatory term (also Wentzel 1989), signalling that someone is ‘backward’ and has not managed to learn Spanish. It belongs to the era (pre-1980s) when Tacana children were punished in school for speaking Tacana instead of Spanish (see also chapter 6) and to a time in which parents preferred their children to learn Spanish exclusively, in order to have a better chance in the future. This strategy seems to have been successful, for all the Tacana people of this study are monolingual Spanish speakers. Today, in line with the land tenure management and pro-indigenous state policy, schools in Tacana comunidades offer bilingual (Spanish-Tacana) education. As observed by anthropologists before me (Bathurst 2005; Wentzel 1989), Tacana people prior to the 1980s the term ‘Tacana’ was exclusively utilized by outsiders as church associates, travellers, etc. Prior to the 1930s, Tacana people were divided into two categories by outsiders, the Takananistas and the ‘civilizados’ (civilized, i.e. ‘adapted’) (Wentzel 1989). Tacana people having a close association with their mission (in the case of Tumupasa) would refer to themselves as “Cristianucuana”, the word mixing Spanish and Tacana to signify a Christianized person (Wentzel 1989).

The People of the Comunidades

When referring to themselves as a group, for example when they need to distinguish themselves from other local socio-racial groups such as mestizos or colonos, Tacana people will typically use the expression ‘the people of the comunidades’ (la gente de las comunidades) or ‘gente de los chacos’ (people of the fields). In contrast, local mestizos will be referred to as ‘people from the town’ (gente del pueblo) (see for example chapter 6). This is the case even if the Tacana person speaking is herself or himself in fact living in a town, such as Rurrenabaque.

Tacana people of this study do not refer to themselves as indian, a term which due to its colonial baggage continues to be an insult. Nor do they refer to themselves as ‘indigenous’, as one would might think today, unless they are part of the formal indigenous movement, or have worked
in this context, for example as Tacana leaders. The term ‘indigenous’ is viewed as an empty and ‘professional term’, reserved for political representations. The tendency to eschew this term has also been observed of other lowland groups, such as the Chiquitanos of eastern Bolivia (Weber 2012). The fact the Tacana people avoid these new terms, made modern with indigenous politics, is telling as to their foreignness and lack of history, in contrast to the term ‘indian’ which has negative connotations, or ‘gente de las comunidades’ which, importantly, directly contrasts ‘indian’. The expression ‘gente de las comunidades’ signals respect and that one recognizes this social group as distinct within its own right and without negative connotations.

Since the 1990s, being ‘gente de las comunidades’ has become tied to ‘being indigenous’ and ‘indigeneity’ via land-tenure policy (TCOs). Living in comunidades Tacana people are granted ‘indigenous status’ which in turn gives them the right to communal ownership of the surrounding land. Tacana people of this study are very aware of the fact that by living in comunidades, they are identifiable as ‘indigenous’, a situation they have only very recently begun to utilize to their benefit (see chapters 6 and 7). TCO-status has made being from the comunidades more attractive, and attributed new value to it. However, importantly, and often overlooked from outside, this does not mean that Tacana people who live in comunidades all identify with the indigenous movement. To many Tacana people, the realms of the indigenous movement and their own indigenous organisations such as CIPTA are an exclusive luxury, even something of a VIP club, to which entry is difficult and only to be attained by ‘connections’. Scholars who have observed similar situations within other indigenous groups have coined these well-connected individuals as ‘the new indigenous elite’ (Soruco Sologuren 2011; Varese 2006; Hale 2006) (see chapter 6).

Yet, to the outsiders of Bolivia Tacana people of this study will proudly claim that they are Bolivian, but a certain type of Bolivian: members of a poor Bolivian group. This membership is not only tied to financial means but to ‘power’ and ‘influence’, and their distinct lack of these. They are also specifically lowland Bolivian – or camba (chapter 4). Tacana people see themselves as sharing a camba history with local mestizos and all lowlanders at large. Important here is that certain camba ‘ways’ of being overlap with Tacana ‘ways’ of being, and these both contrast an Andean way of being and are set in relation to it (see chapter 3). Notably, camba-ness historically incorporates the entire racial spectrum, though on this racial continuum indian is ‘lesser’ than white (Argandoña, et al 2008). Regional identities as such being camba include a ‘racial’ component but are not entirely built on
ethnicity, as is the indigenous movement and indigeneity. Rather they are built on geography (see Orlove 1993).

**Being Humble**

Perhaps the most overt collective identity of Tacana people of this study, and one which is indirectly also tied to geography, is the concept of ‘being humble’ (*humilde*). Being humble is tied to various factors. One is typically ‘humble’ when one lives in the countryside. Being ‘from the countryside’ (*del campo*) and more specifically from the comunidades is associated with being ‘poor’, and also implies a certain backwardness due to the difficulty involved in attaining resources such as education and services. Being ‘from the countryside’ signals that one is excluded from markets which in turn are tied to hard cash, for these are also rare in the countryside, where barter was until recently the main form of exchange and payment.

Tacana people will also utilize ‘being humble’ to contrast themselves with other social groups, such as local mestizo Bolivians who are not as ‘humble’ as Tacana people. Being white/mestizo has a natural affiliation with being ‘better off’. Beyond poverty, ‘humbleness’ incorporates a non-aggressive and complacent manner. Humble people avoid conflict, a trait which more recently, in particular, has been attributed to colonos. Indeed, colonos or collas are considered more ‘aggressive’ and ‘assertive’ and due to this have more ‘power’ and ‘influence’ than Tacana people of this study. Colonos are considered the better-off indigenous, who are better-educated, can read and count and who readily trick Tacana people when buying their products. In Rurrenabaque and Tumupasa in particular, they are usually the merchants.

Tacana people of this study do not emphasize their ethnicity (see also Rosengren 2003), which historically has always been something negative and to be avoided. They emphasize geography (Amazon, comunidad, rural, lowland, etc.). Indirectly this entails occupation, namely farming: ‘*gente de los chacos*, campesinos. The concepts ‘*gente de las comunidades*’ and ‘being humble’ are a self-placement on the socio-economic scale of the nation-state: impoverished. In referring to themselves as ‘humble’, Tacana people may be continuing the policy of the MNR party after 1952, which sought to create a homogenous national middle class (Albro 2001, 2010b; Klein 1892; Stroebele-Gregor et al 1994; Malloy 1970).

The mechanism of measuring someone’s wealth and social class by knowledge of whether they come from an urban or rural background was used on me personally when Tacana people
wanted to find out something about me. One day, for example, a Tacana woman asked “do you have family who live in the country-side?” It took me a moment to recognize that she was trying to understand my social class status: was I poor, rich, middle-class? She had obviously already come to the conclusion that though I might be ‘poor’ in my own country, I was still ‘better-off’ than anyone from the countryside here in Bolivia. Yet, if I had relatives in *el campo*, then there was no doubt that I came from a poor background, whatever this might mean in my country. That this was indeed her assumption was reaffirmed by her subsequent question, asking if in *el campo* in my country we still cooked with wood (*con leña*) or had by now acquired the means to cook with gas. Throughout this entire conversation, she stood firmly next to her own gas stove whose shiny white enamel was in impressive contrast to the surroundings of jungle brush, the red packed clay and four red-bricks it sat on, and the corrugated tin roof under which we and it stood, not to mention the kitchen house build of wood planks and a jatata-roof next to us. For the entire time I was in awe at how she had managed to transport the large Western kitchen gadget out here to Carmen Florida in the jungle. Undoubtedly it must have been transported in a *peque-peque* boat (carved from a single tree trunk) from Rurrenabaque, against the current. She was demonstrating that while she was from ‘el campo’, she was better off than others in the *comunidad*.

Besides signifying poverty, being from *el campo* (specifically *comunidades*) is also associated with certain ways of understanding and knowing (*saber*) which are specifically Tacana. The focus here is on understanding the hardship involved in living in the jungle and ‘knowing’ to value this. It is understood that not all Tacana people ‘know’ how to live in the *comunidades*. Marie-Luz living in Rurrenabaque with her children told me that her daughter, still a toddler, “did not like” (*no le gusta*) staying in the *comunidad* of Carmen Florida, because she did not ‘know’ how to live there.

She prefers to stay in the *pueblo*. In the *comunidad* ...she cries a lot – there are mosquitos, bugs which bite. She does not like it. She doesn’t know (laughs). She does not know how to live there.

Being from *el campo* means one ‘knows’ certain essential things associated with this sort of life. One knows how to drink *chicha* and chew coca leaves; one knows that the standard of living here is higher because it is less hectic, simpler and prettier (*mas bonito*); and one eats a higher quality food (*comida criollo*). It also means that one ‘understands’ how to work (*se sabe trabajar*). Living in *comunidades* signals harsh and difficult physical labour on the fields. Working the land is the only real ‘work’ (*trabajo*) there is and any sort of alternative occupation is not regarded as work. Alejandro from Carmen Florida told me that his son “does not work”. This puzzled me for a while as
I saw him frequently helping out on the field on the weekends and working as a motor-taxi driver during the week in Rurrenabaque. “He has a bad back,” Alejandro explained to me one day, “so I saved and bought him a motorcycle so he could live in Rurrenabaque”.

This chapter has focussed on what it means to be ‘Tacana’ to Tacana people, although they do not themselves label this collective identity as ‘Tacana’. Indeed, picking out or establishing ‘Tacana indigeneity’ from that which is not ‘Tacana’, may be impossible. Tacana people of this study sense a strong affiliation with being cambas and to making up part of Bolivia’s highland-lowland regionalism. To better understand this, the following chapter concentrates on the trajectory of highland-lowland regionalism in Bolivia and situates Tacana people within that context.

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69 The majority of taxis in Rurrenabaque are motorbikes
Chapter 3 - The Crude *Camba* of the Amazon and the Genteel *Camba* of Santa Cruz– Setting the Grounds for Regionalisms

When Rolando, Silvia’s husband, visits his parents and siblings in his birth-place, the Tacana *comunidad* of Villa Alcira, he not only crosses the Beni River - a five-minute journey by boat - but also the line dividing the department of Beni from that of La Paz. To many Tacana this legal boundary has only begun to become significant recently, with the legal formation of indigenous land-tenures (TCOs) and the increasingly charged regional relations between highland and lowland departments under President Evo Morales.

Though it reaches far into the Amazonian lowlands, La Paz is considered a highland department, with the department of Beni being its long-time lowland rival. It is significant that the department of La Paz, houses the seat of government and thus funding for infrastructural and social projects is heavily concentrated here. Importantly for Tacana people, this funding spreads into the rural peripheries and the province of Iturralde, where Tacana people reside and where the TCO Tacana I is located. When Evo Morales fought his first successful presidential election, he won in the department of La Paz but lost on the other side of the Beni River in the department of Beni. Similarly, while President Morales MAS party lost in the municipal elections of Rurrenabaque (which is in the department of Beni), it won a two-minute boat-ride away across the river in San Buenaventura (in the department of La Paz). Given that both towns share the same type of population these voting outcomes demonstrate how political parties cater to vulnerable groups such as Tacana people in *comunidades*, to secure their votes. Economically and politically weak groups, such as indigenous groups, have always been pulled into regional politics and solicited to collaborate with political bodies such as the state, municipalities and, more recently, the platform of the indigenous movement. In Bolivia’s case these voting outcomes are an indicator of highland-lowland regionalism and the stark divide which exists between highland and lowland departments.

This chapter sketches the historical roots of highland-lowland regionalism in Bolivia, which go back to the first Spanish settlements predating the formation of Bolivia as a nation-state in 1825. It highlights key moments in Bolivia’s history which laid the grounds for highland-lowland regionalism. To this end, it first traces Bolivia’s departmental formations, marked by the conflictive power-struggles between the La Paz and Santa Cruz elites; and then the different lowland
departments’ ongoing aspirations for more state autonomy. It then describes how these circumstances have brought about the creation of a distinct lowland ‘identity’ (*camba*), which is rooted in the various constellations and relationships between the different settlers and inhabitants of the lowlands. *Camba*-ness is re-divided in accordance with lowland region (Amazon and Plains), which is linked to class situations. Tacana people have been included in the colonial socio-racial class system in a new way since the Chaco War, which brought about a Bolivian middle-class. In the representation of what it means to be *camba*, the Amazon region takes a back seat in relation to Santa Cruz, which functions as spokesperson. This perpetuates the position which the Amazon has played in the history of Bolivia, as less important and ‘forgotten’.

‘*El Oriente*’ - *Santa Cruz as the Representative of the Bolivian lowlands*

Santa Cruz is often referred to as *El Oriente* (the East) due to its geographical location in relation to La Paz. It is usually taken as representative of all the lowlands, even those not located in the east but in the north, such as Beni, the other Amazonian department of Pando and the province of Iturralde. This allusion demonstrates not only the extent of Santa Cruz’ political and social power but also the traditional disregard for Bolivia’s other lowland departments. However, the historical and social trajectories of Santa Cruz and the Amazon departments vary significantly. They were influenced in particular by the types of white people who settled in the different regions and the relations these built with each other, with indigenous groups and with the state, eventually contributing to the formation of a common regional *camba* identity and particular social classes. While laying out this social history, this chapter will explore the position of local indigenous groups and, in particular, the Tacana whose origins lay in the ‘empty’ Amazon regions. Understanding these social dynamics will lead to an understanding of how and why regionalist animosities are increasingly channelled towards Aymara/Quechua migrants (*colonos*) who settle in the lowlands.

The political and economic focus of the lowlands is usually on the wetlands and prairies (*llanos*) of the Beni region, and thus often disregards people who live in its forested areas. The plains encompass the region’s main economic activity, cattle-ranching, which is traditionally dominated by a strong *mestizo* minority. In the context of regionalism, Santa Cruz and its white/*mestizo* élite is usually taken as representative of all the Bolivian lowlands (e.g. Fabricant and Gustafson 2011; Kirshner 2010; Van Cott 2005 et al). This is particularly the case for the campaign on state autonomy,
brought to the forefront in two referendums in January 2005 and January 2008\(^7^0\) which were initiated by Santa Cruz’ Civic Committee (Assies 2006).

Santa Cruz, as one of the earliest criollo\(^7^1\) settlements in South America, has been one of the main locations for government resettlement programmes throughout the centuries. Resettlement was intense after the 1953 land revolution and specifically in the early 1980s, when groups from the highlands were encouraged by USA-planned and -financed settlement programmes to resettle in the lowlands (Fifer 1982; Painter 1988; Stearman 1985). Santa Cruz’ growing mestizo middle class, in particular, has seen these programmes as government encroachment and imposition of indigenous highland culture on their territory and culture, in an act of colonization and demonstration of power (see Waldmann 2008). Santa Cruz groups speak of ‘internal colonialism’, while treating their own political movement as an ethnic one (Centellas 2010; Soruco, Plata and Medeiros 2008). Though a particular issue at present, Santa Cruz’ modern autonomy movement dates to 2003, when the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee (Comité pro Santa Cruz - CPSC) put forward a manifesto which proposed to ‘reorganize’ the country in line with issues relevant to the Bolivian lowlands (ibid). Since then these groups demanding autonomy (as the CPCS) have staged a series of events and ‘celebrations’ of the region’s own camba and more specifically Cruzeño (Peña Claros 2010) ‘way of being’, looking to set themselves apart from that which is colla (see ibid; Fabricant 2012, 2009). In their demands for autonomy, Cruzeños petition for more control over immigration into their department, more influence on land redistribution measures and more departmental revenue from their natural resources, particularly their gas reserves (Assies 2006).

The debate around autonomy can be traced back to 1825, when Bolivia was formed, and is connected to how Santa Cruz was incorporated into the new state at that date. Though most visible in the call for more autonomy, Santa Cruz is neither the only department to want this, nor necessarily representative of other departments. In the literature on the autonomy debate, the importance of the initial settlement patterns of the different groups and class distinctions between different white/mestizo groups in different lowland areas of Bolivia is widely overlooked (see for example Soruco, Plata, Mendeiros 2008; Painter 1988; Stearman 1985). Differences between the Amazon region and Santa Cruz are rooted in the affiliations which white/mestizo social-class groups

\(^7^0\) Though planned for 4\(^{th}\) May 2008 the referendum was held on 25\(^{th}\) January 2009, after it had been postponed several times due to conflicts.

\(^7^1\) Criollos is the term for people of Spanish decent who were born in Latin America
have had with the natives. The impact of these distinctions gained particular visibility during key historical moments. Such are the rubber boom (beginning with the late 1800s) and the contexts of rubber barracas which shaped a relationship between mestizos and indians unique to the Amazon (Vallve 2010). The Chaco War (1932) which brought about the formation of a middle class; and, more recently, as a result of key decentralization changes as the 1994 Popular Participation Law (LPP – Ley de Participación Popular) which granted rural municipalities democratic political participation which pro-actively included indigenous groups. Historically, economic growth and class-formation did not take the same route in the Amazon region as it did in Santa Cruz or La Paz.

The Establishment of Provinces and Departments in Bolivia

The origin of Bolivia’s highland-lowland regionalism lies in the struggle for power between two politically independent and geographically separate settlements of Spanish/criollo élite groups. While the highlander oligarchy came from a mining élite, the lowland élite were landed gentry who had their base in agriculture and cattle farming, and whose economic fortunes had been reinvigorated by the 19th century rubber boom (Molina et al. 2008; Painter 1988). Many of Bolivia’s state departments already existed as independent provinces and political entities long before the country was created in 1825. This was the case for both Santa Cruz (Santa Cruz de la Sierra), established in 1561, and La Paz (Nuestra Señora de La Paz) established in 154872. Other Bolivian areas which are state departments today were originally the unexplored backlands of these two main departments, which were the country’s political hubs. The Amazonian departments of Pando, Beni and the provinces of northern La Paz were insignificant in the political landscape of Bolivia. Upon the founding of Bolivia as an independent nation, provinces were tailored into state departments and received ‘updated’ foundation dates. In all, this creates the confusing situation of towns and departments having numerous dates of foundation depending on which time-era one is looking at.

Retracing the history of different Bolivian regions is confusing as vast provinces which were established upon arrival of the Spanish, were, after Bolivia was reformed as a nation state, resized with only some parts retaining the original name. The Amazonian part of Bolivia was named Mojos (or Moxos) by the first Spaniards73 and initially included the vast plains between the Amazon and

72 Today Santa Cruz still only celebrates its original date of foundation, February 26, 1561.
73 For an elaboration on possible origins of the term ‘Mojos’, see Chávez Suárez 1944
Pilcomayo Rivers which are today divided between Brazil (Acre State) and Paraguay. Under the Audiencia of Charcas (1559), a political division was made between Mojos and the ‘Land of the Chunchos’ (Van Valen 2013; Vallvé 2010; Machicao Gámez 1990; Chávez Suárez 1944). In 1825, Chunchos came to be known as Apolobamba or Caupolicán (see Ballesteros 1901). Though reduced in size Mojos was initially kept as a region name after 1825 with Santa Cruz as its capital. In 1842, in an effort to undercut Santa Cruz’ political power, Mojos was consolidated into a separate department named Beni. The new department was named after the Beni River which also served as its western boundary with the area of Apolobamba or Caupolicán. Today the term ‘Mojos’ is still used to refer to the Great Plains within the department of Beni.

As part of Bolivia’s regionalist debate, there has been ongoing discussion over whether to re-divide the state departments so that their constituent regions are more closely related in terms of their geography, climate, culture and state of development (Roca 2008). Though the province of Iturralde, which encompasses Tacana territory, is part of the department of La Paz, culturally and historically its people have more in common with the departments of Beni and Pando. The first phase of departmental re-division went hand in hand with the introduction of the highland-lowland conflict shortly after the nation was formed in 1825.

Upon the formation of the Bolivian nation-state there was an official understanding that no department should gain so much power as to vastly overshadow others (Ballesteros 1899b). Yet the regional political élites, faithful to their specific regions, continually sought for territory to be added to their department or, if this was not possible, to stymie the other departments’ own attempts to annex land. Motives needed to be convincingly argued before parliament in which possible private interests, for which the criollo élite was notorious, were omitted in favour of eloquent proclamations of the ‘good of the nation’ (Klein 1969; Ballesteros 1899b). The fate of Caupolicán, home of the ‘Tacana Nation’, was decided during one particular parliamentary session in which the La Paz and Santa Cruz élites struggled to gain power over the region’s rich resources. Sixto

74 Chunchos is a Quechua term coined by the Incas and adopted by the Spaniards. It is a derogatory word for Amazonian peoples; the Amazonian area at the foothills of the Andes was also termed ‘the Nation of the Chunchos’.
75 Also see previous chapter.
76 While Apolobamba refers to the Missions of Apolobamba and is a term introduced by the church authorities who first settled in the region, the name Caupolicán is coined by the state as personified by Simon Bolívar upon the formation of the state in 1825.
77 According to a national census the population of Iturralde in 2007 was 15,000.
Ballesteros, a highland representative and the influential mayor of La Paz, aiming to weaken the reactionary Santa Cruz élite, successfully argued that the region should switch from the jurisdiction of Santa Cruz to that of La Paz. Once this switch became official in 1856, goods from the area came through the capital rather than Santa Cruz (ibid). Today the region is still part of La Paz and forms the province Iturralde.

Although Santa Cruz does not represent the opinion or history of the entire lowland region, most lowland departments want more state autonomy. Across the river from San Buenaventura (La Paz) the inhabitants of Rurrenabaque (Beni), harbour an emotional longing for more state recognition which they believe they would gain from departmental autonomy. Antonio Takussi of Rurrenabaque, whose grandfather immigrated to the Amazon region from Japan at the turn of the century, voices his political stance, revealing an attitude towards the current government that is representative of many inhabitants of the region.

We want to be autonomous. We believe in our customs. For the customs in the life of the west (Bolivian Andes) – La Paz, Potosi... are not like ours. We see life differently. You can’t make a law in La Paz which counts for all the country. For this reason we are fighting... for autonomy. For Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, Tarija, for example. It’s different what they (in the Andes) say, what they eat, their environment, everything. (...) That president who we have now... he does not want autonomy. (...) Autonomy is about federalism. As it is also in Brazil, the United States, Germany – this is how they do it as well. They make their own laws... The government would not lose its powers over the country.\textsuperscript{78}

Antonio’s words uncannily echo the argument uttered more than one hundred years earlier on October 2 1900 by Sixto Ballesteros. Although his aim may have been to keep Caupolicán from falling into the hands of the lowland élite, Ballesteros laid out his arguments on the basis of ‘needs’, as does Antonio years later.

These (Amazonian) regions which are so different from our own (Andean regions) should have laws specific and in accordance with their own nature. It is an axiom of the social sciences that one cannot nor should apply the same rule and the same administration to

\textsuperscript{78} ‘Nosotros queríamos ser autónomos. Nosotros creamos...por nuestra costumbre. Porque la costumbre en la vida del Occidente, o La Paz, o puro Potosí...no es igual a los de nosotros. Nosotros veamos el asunto de la vida diferente. No puede hacerse una ley en La Paz que sea para todo el país. Por eso estamos peleando...por la autonomía. Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, Tarija, por ejemplo. (...) Es distinta lo que dicen, lo que comen, su ambiente, todo. (...) Este presidente que tenemos...no quería autonomía. (...) (Autonomía) Es un asunto de federalismo. Como se maneja Brasil, Estado Unidos, Alemania maneja todo esto también. Hagan sus propias leyes... El gobierno no pierde el poder ante todo el país.’
people and places whose nature and individual and general way of being, is all around different. (Ballesteros 1899b:5)\textsuperscript{79} [My translation]

One might ask what happened between one hundred years ago and now: since 1825, regionalism has continuously increased rather than subsiding. The implementation of a federal government system might have prevented today’s deeply conflictive regionalism and, considering that the state-founders recognized from early on that this type of system would serve Bolivia well, why was it not implemented? Indeed, before the formation of the state, the provinces had signed a pact for the implementation of a federalist system of states making up the Bolivian Republic. But the criollos of Charcas (Potosí) together with Simon Bolívar hindered this and, against the recommendation of the lowland provinces, the state-founders established a centralist form of government (Stearman 1985; Roca 2007). In fact, this decision was taken in the context of regionalist struggles for more control and influenced by the brutal consequences of the federalist-provoked civil war (1812-1814) in New Granada (today’s Colombia) which the state-founders had recently witnessed. They saw it as their duty to overrule the consensus for a federalist system and to implement a centralist one instead, convinced that this was the only ‘secure source of happiness for a lasting peace and social union’ (República de Bolivia 1926:57 quoted in Roca 2007).

The criollo élite of Santa Cruz would never be at rest with this decision. The fact that their region had become part of Bolivia at all took them by surprise. When discussions were underway in the 1800s over the regional annexation of provinces, Santa Cruz sent a delegation to represent the region’s interests to the Audience of Buenos Aires, under whose jurisdiction it had lain since 1778. But when the Assembly of Provinces of Upper Peru met in La Paz in 1825 to form the Bolivian state, it unexpectedly annexed the Mojos region, of which Santa Cruz was the capital, to Bolivia. As this had not been anticipated by Santa Cruz they had not sent a delegation to represent their interests and were thus overruled (Painter 1988; Heath et al 1969; Stearman 1976; Finot 1939). Though now tied to a strong Andean government seat, the Bolivian Amazon had previously had greater affiliation and closer relations with neighbouring countries’ Great Plains and Amazonian regions (Molina et al 2008) a situation which after country formation (1825) became enhanced as during the growth of

\textsuperscript{79} ‘Esas regiones por lo mismo que son distintas el todo de las nuestras, deben tener leyes expresas, adecuadas, peculiares á su naturaleza. Es un axioma de la ciencia política que no puede ni debe aplicarse el mismo régimen, la misma administración á pueblos y lugares cuya índole, cuyo modo de ser individual y colectivamente considerados, son del todo distintos’ (Ballesteros 1899:5)
the rubber market in which “Bolivian rubber workers ... were more in touch with Manaus or Belem than La Paz or Sucre economically, socially, and, to a certain extent, culturally” (Vallve 2010: 25).

Bolivia’s Amazon region, divided at various times into separate departments and then partly again into provinces, has always remained on the fringe of political and economic state integration. Adding to this complexity of divisions and re-divisions is that Bolivian departments, being vast, can easily incorporate different climactic and environmental zones. Thus both the Beni province Vaca Diez and a part of the province of José Ballivián in which Rurrenabaque and many Tacana comunidades are situated are characterised by tropical rainforest. In contrast, most of the rest of the state of Beni is marked by prairies and wetlands. These natural markers influence the central economy of the area, large-scale cattle-ranching. This economy was initiated and nurtured by the Jesuits until their expulsion in 1767 and then revitalized by central élite figures such as the rubber baron Nicolás Suárez and his Casa Suárez in the 1940s, after the heights of the rubber economy were coming to an end (Rojas Ortuste et al 2000; Carvalho Urey 1978).

Nicolas Suárez and his famous rubber empire shaped the Bolivian lowlands and its social-political development and in this context, also regionalism. At the time the “exploitation of indigenous labor ... could be justified as a general trend towards overcoming ‘savagery’ and a step towards civilizing indigenous peoples through work” (Vallve 2010: 23). Even today the rubber-boom and the central role which Suárez played in the resettlement, enslavement and brutal treatment of Amazonian indigenous groups, is still viewed very uncritically in Bolivia. The rubber economy altered the entire ethnic map of Amazonian Bolivia and changed ethnic groups entirely (Valen 2013; Vallvé 2010). For the Tacana community in Bolivia the rubber industry marks the largest turning point in their history after missionization. It split the Tacana community of Iturralde and introduced them into the economy of the state-system (Vallvé 2010; Bathurst 2005; Wentzel 1989). Tacana who were settled into barracas in Pando from La Paz were involved in the rubber industry as rubber-tappers where they served as ‘brazos’ (arms, meaning unskilled labour) alongside other Amazoninan between the late 1800s, until its crash in the mid 1980s (ibid; Bathurst 2006).

Despite this history, today Nicolas Suárez is regarded as an important person in the past development of the region. Streets and buildings are uncritically named after him. From the perspective of those mestizos in Rurrenabaque who feel that the government neglected the Amazon, Suárez, was a private but nevertheless beneficial entrepreneur in the Amazon who looked to buttress his rubber imperium and ‘civilize’ the region (Valen 2013; Vallvé 2010). For this he had
taken on nation-building responsibilities. Suárez financed and set up private armies to defend country borders; he also constructed schools whose curricula emphasised patriotism and hostility towards neighbouring countries such as Brazil and Chile, both of which had taken possession of Bolivian territory (Fifer 1970).

Despite early attempts by the Hispanic to conquer the Amazon region, predominantly in attempts to find the ‘Great Paititi’, an infamous store of Inca gold, the Amazon did not become central to Bolivia. A situation which only changed later with the rise of the rubber boom in the late 1800s. A number of attempts were made by the Spanish and criollo élite to explore and settle in the region (Ballesteros 1899b; Chávez Suárez 1944). Ultimately, however, the Europeans who successfully managed this were not the rich criollo élite but Jesuit and Franciscan clergy.

Non-Indigenous Settlers of the Amazon and Santa Cruz – The Crude Camba vs. the Genteel Camba

The first Europeans to settle in the Amazonian region of Apolobamba (or Caupolicán), today Bolivia’s western Amazon region, were Franciscan friars looking to set up missions. Any attempts by Spanish conquerors to colonize the region had been successfully thwarted by the local indigenous peoples (Ballesteros 1899b). Importantly, settlement of this area stands in contrast to that of the Andes and Santa Cruz. These places had been colonized by wealthy aristocratic gentry from the earliest period of Spanish occupation (Painter 1988). However, the Amazon became settled by a different European social socio-economic class. This had as a consequence that the relationship which was built with indians by the white settlers of the Amazon differed from the relationship which white settlers built with indian groups in Santa Cruz. This is aspect is central in Bolivia’s regionalism and for understanding in what ways the regions developed distinct social relations between its inhabitants.

The first Europeans to settle in the Amazon did not primarily focus on systematic large-scale resource exploitation in the way that those living in the highlands did, with the mining industry and large-scale ranching and farming. Most the white/mestizo Amazon settlers (apart from the clergy) were not the creole elite of Santa Cruz (Zavaleta 2009). They were individuals and small groups who settled among or in close vicinity of native population. They lived in together in settlements as the rubber barracas (Vallvé 2010), indigenous comunidades or small towns, as Rurrenabaque (which did not necessarily have more inhabitants than comunidades). This settlement pattern had significant
influence on how whites/mestizos developed a relationship with local indians (Zavaleta 2009). All of these settlement types – barracas, comunidades and towns – followed a clear racial hierarchy in which white was on top and Indian was on the bottom (also Vallvé 2010:25). Thus relationship between the two geographical ‘groups’ of Santa Cruz and the Amazon developed differently. As a rule the élite of Santa Cruz was an urban group. They governed their estates and business which lay in the country sides not through their direct presence but from afar (Klein 1969)80.

In this way the city represented the place of the upper-class society. In the towns the criollos made up the élite society, the so-called vecinos and gente. These were the members of the social clubs of Santa Cruz, such as the September 24th Club which still exists today81 (Painter 1988). Rubber baron Nicolás Suárez was an exception to this. He lived not in the city but rather in the midst of his rubber empire in ‘Cachuela de Esperanza’, a settlement he founded in the far northern region of Bolivia. However, his family mainly remained in Santa Cruz (Waldmann 2008; Fifer 1972). Important in the development of regional identities which is based in the social relations of the different socio-ethnic groups in one region, the criollos of Santa Cruz exploited the indians with minimum personal contact. ‘Their’ indians worked underground in the mines, or on the huge rubber areas or large estate haciendas controlled by overseers. Their direct interaction with indians was limited to isolated individuals present in their homes as cooks, nannies and gardeners.

In contrast, those who settled in the jungle and wet-lands of Mojos lived alongside indians often also incorporating them into a debt-peonage system of their haciendas (large scale cattle-ranching) (Vallvé 2014). Predominantly Europeans and Asians merchants settled in Rurrenabaque, and European families settled alongside Tacana people in Tumupasa. In comparison to the elite of Santa Cruz and furthermore vulnerable to state policy which dictated land distribution, they were only on a slightly higher economic scale than the Indian peons who worked for them. In the Amazonian settlements of Rurrenabaque and Tumupasa, white/mestizo patrones took Tacana wives, marrying into the comunidad and creating mestizo offspring (see chapter 4). Thus, unlike the by now infamous oligarchy of Santa Cruz and to a much lesser extent that of Beni (Gasca et al 1964), the mestizos in jungle regions such as Rurrenabaque could they count themselves part of the

80 For more on frontier settlement patterns and their impact on the political development of Bolivia see also Fifer (1982)
81 Named for the date September 24 1810, which marks Santa Cruz’ first attempt at independence from Spain.
regional or national oligarchy even if they wished. The white settlers in the Amazon did not make up the part of Bolivia’s *criollo* élite.

Rurrenabaque’s surnames attest to this. There are famous surnames in Bolivia which speak of important and powerful positions in the state (Waldmann 2008). They belong to families who made up the high society of central Bolivian towns such as Cochabamba and Santa Cruz (Soruco et al. 2008). In contrast the surnames of the *mestizos* of Rurrenabaque tell of small-scale merchants, of livelihood-seeking immigrants from Japan, Germany, Switzerland and Turkey who looked for a better life across the ocean shortly before the turn of the 20th century. They settled here to cater to local markets. When the markets changed over time the merchants made adjustments. Rurrenabaque, was originally a river-port which served as a resting place for travellers with goods making their way into the rubber region up north. Accordingly its original name was ‘Puerto Viejo’ (Old Port).

Antonio Takussi’s father settled in Rurrenabaque having come up the Beni River from Riberalta, famous for its large Japanese settlement. He specialized in pig-farming. In the 1960’s his son, Antonio, was to specialize in the trade of animal hides, especially those of the small wild boar (*Jochi*) who roam the jungle in large herds, but also of armadillo, tapir and jaguars. Before Rurrenabaque became *La Perla del Beni* (The Pearl of the Beni) of today, as a washed-out sign at the entrance of town announces in declaration of its touristic significance, it was popular in the 1970s and 80s for holiday-makers from national urban areas looking to enjoy game-hunting and fishing.

The local élite in the municipalities of Rurrenabaque and Ixiamas were not considered to be part of the high *criollo/mestizo* Bolivian society, to which the House of Suárez (Fifer 1973) belonged. Rather their relative power and prestige occurred on a more local level. This sheds light on why many *patrónes* did not leave ‘their’ *comunidades* after the land reform of 1953. They would lose the high status they enjoyed. In the cities they would be one more impoverished *mestizo* among many from the rural lowlands, with the additional stigma of being from the Amazonian hinterlands.

Today’s *Benianos* (people from Beni) have the somewhat negative reputation of being the offspring of the former ranch-help of the haciendas of the more *criollo* *Cruzeños* (people from Santa Cruz). Bolivian Anthopologist, Waldmann, who originates in Santa Cruz, writes:

The Beniano is vain and arrogant. (…) The genteel *camba* has his centre here (in Santa Cruz) and from here he did his business. (…) (The Beniano) is arrogant because they went to the
Beni and from there to Europe. Because in the Beni was the House of Suárez, with which it was easy to find employment (i.e. achieve wealth). (...) Obviously there are those who have money, but their manner has not changed. The Beniano is yellow (i.e. racially mixed). His voice is cruder. (Waldmann 2008:47) [Translation my own]

For all their lives, because they are the children of cattle-ranchers and ranching is a brutal business, their manners are brutish. Since childhood they have been looking after their cattle, so their way of relating is either directly from person to animal or from animal to animal. (Waldmann 2008:47) [Translation my own]

Historically white/mestizo Benianos are looked down upon by Cruzeño society. The deciding factor here is upbringing (educación) which in turn is tied to family roots. Mestizo Benianos have the reputation of being ‘crude country folk’. This is something which the Benianos resent and which can be a topic of evening conversation in Rurrenabaque. The poor lowland mestizos made up the original cambas. Camba is a derivation of a derogatory Guaraní word, first reserved for indian ranch-help and later expanded to include poor mestizo ranch-help (see Waldmann 2008, Assies 2006). The term camba has since been proudly reclaimed by all lowlanders as a cultural category, as elaborated in the next chapter. The inhabitants of Rurrenabaque who today claim a proud camba affiliation, also make up part of Bolivia’s middle class.

A Bolivian Middle Class Emerges – The Chaco War (1932-1935)

The Chaco War (1932-35) played a significant role in the solidification regional patriotism and aggravating animosities between the highlands and lowlands (Rojas Ortuste & Albó 2009). It also helped establish a Bolivian middle class. During the war especially indian and mestizo lives were lost fighting against Paraguay, for it was they who had been sent to by the political oligarchical to wage the war (Klein 1969, Stearman 1985). The main conflict of the war centred on oil concessions which the US Standard Oil Company had under its jurisdiction in Bolivia and over which Paraguay sought to gain control. In reaction the Bolivian oligarchy sent its peasantry and service sector (e.g. teachers, merchants, domestic workers, policemen and other public employees) to its defence. Importantly, in the years prior to the war this sector had been expanding into a mestizo urban middle class, forming a body of votes which supported continuation of the caudillo system. After the war and furious with the ruling élite this emerging middle class began creating their own political platforms and parties (Rojas Ortuste & Albó 2009; Rojas Ortuste 1994; Klein 1969). As was congruent

82 The rule by transitional governments, often military leaders, after the wars of independence in Latin American countries.
to the international political climate many of these movements and parties incorporated a left-wing Marxist rhetoric. The War had brought to the surface the divergence of interest between the middle class and the élite (ibid).

The Chaco War had called attention to the miserable situation of the Indians, to whom many in the new middle class were tied by kinship. Due mainly to the distance, not many Amazonian Indians had been sent to participate in the War (Rojas Ortuste & Albó 2009; Rojas Ortuste 1994). However, just to what extent people from the Amazon were involved is hard to trace, as documentation on peoples’ ethnic affiliation is often limited to the Aymara and Quechua people (ibid). According to Beni historian Pinto Parada (1978), however, criollo/white lowlanders were eager to join the Chaco War and once at the front joined specifically established ‘lowland regiments’. Rubber baron Nicolás Suárez, the central quasi-governmental figure in the northern Amazon region of Territorio Nacional de Colonias (Pinto Parada 1978), formed in 190383, dispatched a number of ‘his’ young rubber collectors, many Tacana, to the Chaco War (Parada 1978). With this action he strategically demonstrated his allegiance to the government which in this time had been leaving him relatively free reign of the region.

His action was also significant in that he collaborated with the central government, demonstrating his allegiance and patriotism to a country which did not attribute much importance to the Amazon, and in doing so turned a cold shoulder to the separatist faction of Santa Cruz. As their town had played a leading role in revolts against the government in the time leading up to the Chaco War, Cruzeños were prohibited from joining lowland regiments or taking up political posts – a security measure taken for fear that Santa Cruz would join forces with Paraguay against Bolivia (Painter 1988 citing Heath et al 1969, Stearman 1976).

Overall, combatants from the Amazon were much welcomed in the war, as they were better able to cope with the tropical climate at the front than were highlanders. The central problem was how to transport the ‘recruits’ from the north to the east of Bolivia, without their tiring, becoming ill or dying before they reached their destination (Pinto Parada 1978). In all its brutality the Chaco War helped to build on the already present regionalist animosities while also, importantly, binding together lowlanders across the racial divide. Indeed, highland/lowland regionalism became waged on the battlefield (Toranzo Roca 2008). As one lowland veteran explained, instead of having one

83 (Camacho 1903)
enemy, they had two: the Paraguayans and the highlanders. Highlanders, bored and disillusioned with the war, made it a sport to defame lowlanders by declaring them spies and shooting them. (Heath et al 1959 quoted in Stearman, 1985).

Significantly for the Tacana people, large- and small-scale patrones who dispatched ‘their’ rubber collectors to the War in return suspended all their debts, freeing them of the enganche\(^{84}\) scheme which bound them to the patrón for life. The patrón of the comunidad Buena Vista, too, sent a number of ‘his’ peons to fight in the War; indeed, most of the Tacana comunidades I visited have their Chaco War stories and veterans. Returning home as war heroes some Tacana people, such as Constantino from Buena Vista, told me that it was then that they were ‘free’. Legally, however, peasants were not immediately ‘free’, being still under the jurisdiction of oppressive land laws. However, the political climate in Bolivia had changed and the way became clear for a politics which took peasants’ rights into consideration. In 1952 the Party (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario – (Revolutionary National Movement, MNR) came to power. The MNR was to introduce a ground-breaking land-reform in favour of the peasants. Its leaders had already influenced legislation on their behalf long before the party was formed, and pushed through indian suffrage and land ownership in 1953 (Klein 1969).

Both the northern Amazonian region and Santa Cruz are traditional MNR supporters. The MNR, as a ‘people’s party’, specifically looked to break up the mining oligarchy (Klein 1969) and this gave it the taint of a pro-lowland party. Its platform was relevant for the inhabitants of the Amazon, home to many indians in peonage but also mestizos of the new middle class. Though years of dictatorship separate the establishment of the MNR from its present political platform many Tacana today still fiercely support this party. Today the MNR is considered a right-wing party and an opposition to President Morales’ left pro-indigenous MNR party.

\(^{84}\) The term used for debt-peonage in the Amazon. This is a cash-advancement system that resulted in a form of slavery and which could be passed on from one generation to the next. See also Coimbra (1946).
The Cruzeño élite supported the newly established MNR, even holding a short revolt in its name right after the Chaco War (Painter 1988 citing Gill 1987, and Heath 1969). In contrast to the Amazonian north, however, the Santa Cruz élite strongly opposed the MNR’s programme for suffrage and land-ownership for the indians which partly led to them disassociating themselves from the party (ibid). After the Chaco War, and in the early 1950s, the right-wing Comité Cívico (Civic Committee) of Santa Cruz emerged and formed the Cruzeños’ most vocal representative group and perpetuating steady continuation of a regionalist divide between La Paz and Santa Cruz but also Santa Cruz and the Amazon. Many of its members later became the supporters of the current right-wing group Nación Camba (Movimiento Nación Camba de Liberación - MNCL) founded in 2001. Today the Nación Camba pledges complete state autonomy, as understood by a secessionist movement. It declares on its website:
It is our aspiration to create our own state, based on our own culture and history. We, the *Nación Camba*, and its instrument the *Movimiento Nacion Cambade* Liberación, will be WHAT WE WANT TO BE and not what OTHERS WANT US TO BE.85 [My translation]

Santa Cruz continuously expanded its anti-highland sentiment, and attributed to it an increasingly racial twist by using the cultural (and thus racial) difference between highland cultures (*colla*) as tied to the Aymara and Quechua people and *camba* (lowland) cultures as a main argument in its platform (see also Waldmann 2008; also chapter 4) (see image 19 above). At the same time representatives of the *Nación Camba* utilize ‘their’ local indigenous groups, such as the Guaraní, into the Cruzeño political cause and identity construction to make the point that their politics are not white-supremacist or racist (Fabricant 2012, 2009; Plata et al 2008).

*The ‘Forgotten’ Amazon in Bolivia Today*

If Santa Cruz was distanced from the centre of power when the state of Bolivia was formed, the image of the Amazon was that it is farther still, in addition to being ‘wild’ and ‘empty’. Indeed, through the years the tropical departments (Beni and Pando) have come to be known as the ‘forgotten departments’ (*los departamentos olvidados*) (Molina, Vargas y Soruco 2008). As mentioned above, from the earliest days of the republic there has been insufficient government representation of the Amazonian region. While the government has never looked to ‘correct’ this and take measures to tie in the north with the central highland economy. It has sought to keep a firm grip on the region’s production outputs, especially during the rubber boom (Osborn 1968; Molina, et al 2008b). Crops and output of the cattle farms in the departments of La Paz and Beni were shipped north to maintain the workers in the rubber regions, making this part of the country self-sustainable while at the same in the hands of private companies, especially rubber barons such as Nicolás Suárez (see also Vallvé 2010). Juanita remembers that ‘before’ (*antes*), all the output from farming, including the region’s cattle, was shipped downriver from Rurrenabaque and San Buenaventura to Pando. Indeed, most of the *patrónes* of the Tacana comunidades obtained their main source of income from providing foodstuffs to the rubber region.

The government’s *laissez-faire* attitude towards the Amazon region experienced its first blow and turning point with the Acre War (1899 – 1903), then again with the loss of 50,000 square kilometres to Peru in 1909 (Molina et al 2008b). Both incidents served to demonstrate the

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government’s indifference towards and negligence of the region. On the other hand, the Acre War was also a key moment for the inhabitants of the region to clarify where their allegiance lay. The Acre War was a secessionist movement. Despite the great importance of the Acre region in the world’s rubber market, the government had not attempted to coordinate with, nor establish solid control over, it and when it did finally set up a taxation house in the 1890s, protest came from both the Bolivian and Brazilian sides, leading to a rebellion that was first indirectly and then overtly supported by Brazil (Klein 1969). Having had a weak military border base, and not standing a chance against Brazilian opposition, Bolivia lost the war (Treaty of Petropolis, 1903).

Interested in re-establishing good ties with Bolivia and in exchange for the 191,000 square kilometres of land it had attained in the Acre region, Brazil granted Bolivia access to navigable waters in the River Paraguay as well as pledging two million pounds to build a railway from Riberalta to the frontier of Brazil at Porto Velho (Fifer 1972; Klein 1969; Fawcett 1910). This infrastructural measure was significant in that it would help lumber-transport bypass the unsurpassable rapids of the Madeira River. While this marked the government’s first significant effort to unite the region with the rest of the country, much to the frustration of the inhabitants the funds were redirected to establishing a railway between the highland and valley regions of Bolivia (ibid). This is still a sore point for lowlanders today. As a long-term consequence of the war, the region was made into a state department, Pando, in 1937. The name is significant in that it explicitly tied this northern region to the national project by being that of a highlander and state figure, President José Manuel Pando (1899 – 1905) (ibid).

With a patriotically romantic tone, Beni writer Rodolfo Pinto Parada (1978) laments governments’ historic indifference to the necessity of tying the jungle to the highlands for quicker and safer access between the regions, to aid in the import and export of goods and also to encourage mestizo migration. Between the 1920s and 1960s there were various failed attempts to provide the region with more roads, and the military was dispatched to clear a pathway through the jungle with machetes (ibid). However, as governments changed, these plans were alternately abandoned and taken up again, the path by then overgrown (ibid). The rapidity with which jungle overgrowth covered paths recently cleared served to stress the impossibility of ‘taming’ the wild area. In line with the idea of remote wilderness, in the second half of the 20th century dictators reasserted the region’s already unfavourable reputation as it banished political prisoners to the jungles of the Beni
thus adding to the image of the region as a ‘green hell’\textsuperscript{86}. In 1973, journalist and political prisoner Vargas Martínez published his memoirs to tell of his miserable time there.

Today, this image of being far and forgotten has been reinforced on several levels in Bolivia. Thus, for example, the order in which the state departments are listed in the media and political platforms tends to begin with La Paz and conclude with Beni and Pando, strengthening the notion that these two departments lie at the farthest end of the country (Molina et al 2008). The construction of the Bolivian north is a white and mestizo one, which takes its starting point from ‘wildness’ which needs to be ‘civilized’. Thus, one might inquire where and what the indigenous position - as represented by the inhabitants of Tacana comunidades – has been in these relationships to the state and to being part of the ‘forgotten’ region.

In the constant shifts of boundaries and renaming of geographical sections, Tacana territory has become divided and re-aligned a number of times, regardless of the opinion and cultural alliance of its original inhabitants. The fact that their territory, the province of Iturralde which is part of La Paz, is politically part of the highlands has had significant implications for the Tacana. Firstly, in the regional conflict their geographical space is politically not a ‘lowland’, yet people from it identify as camba. Never having had a strong political voice or a lowland criollo/mestizo élite who acted as their region’s representatives, as was the case with Santa Cruz, the Tacana have historically been a scarcely visible lowland group in the context of the nation state.

While this chapter has traced nation-building processes and how the markers for highland-lowland regionalism were established through early land and resource disputes, as shaped by the different criollo élites, the following chapter focusses more on Tacana people’s role and influences on these processes. This reveals both their relationship to the state in the highland as also the relationship they developed with local whites and mestizos. Their relationship to local mestizos includes their participation in the building of an Amazonian identity in which relationships between different socio-racial groups play a significant role. The initiative which looks to re-establish the role of the Amazon in the nation state as one which is of equal importance as the Andean region.

\textsuperscript{86} Green Hell is also the title of a book by Julian Duguid (1956) who describes the hardships faced in seeking to penetrate the jungles of the Gran Chaco of Bolivia.
Chapter 4 - Indian Mothers and White Fathers - *Camba* as Kinship in the Amazon

Arriving in the Tacana Cultural Centre in San Buenaventura one afternoon, Juanita, who works here, leads me to a skirt and bikini-top made of dried palm leaves and decorated with red, blue and black local beads. It is on display along with other ‘typical’ Tacana artefacts such as stone hammers and bags into which Tacana deity symbols are woven. It is a typical Tacana dress, she says, which surprises me as it looks rather ‘sexy’ and like a costume of sorts. Indeed, it is what Juanita’s fifteen-year-old daughter wore for the municipal Miss Beauty Contest last week. Among other themes this contest also includes a Miss Tacana (see image 20 below). “She won,” explains Juanita beaming with pride, “my daughter won Miss Tacana of the year.” I take in the information with even more surprise. It was not unusual that the local beauty contests looked to represent a sexy version of local indigenous groups’ traditional dress, with this exoticizing and eroticizing indian-ness momentarily cleansing it of the ‘dirty poverty’ which it has come to represent. It was, however, unusual that an indigenous girl should participate in a beauty contest, as traditionally only daughters from better-off mestizo families entered into these contests, dressing up as ‘indigenous’.

This situation has changed in recent years. Furthermore, the fact that Juanita’s daughter was in fact of Tacana origin did not seem to have any sort of importance or impact on the situation and was perhaps not even known in the context of the contest, whose contestants are typically drawn from the town’s schools. At the same time, the fact that the girl’s Tacana background was ‘not of importance’ in this festivity was also probably no coincidence as it would be in line with the still-present stigma attached to possessing an indian heritage. Though the indigenous people are accepted in towns such as Rurrenabaque, there is still a heightened awareness that there are social-racial differences between people; however in gestures of behavioural etiquette and ‘political correctness’ this is ‘ignored’ in certain contexts. This indicates that, on the one hand, mestizos accept Tacana as neighbours and fellow lowlanders (*cambas*) but that on the other a ‘difference’ (otherness) based on race and class is still acknowledged.
Might this ‘acceptance’ across racial lines point to the success of the initiative towards a common Amazonian identity in which a shared heritage is prominent? This ‘identity’ is heavily based on *camba*-ness. There has been increasing effort by lowland municipalities to establish an Amazonian identity, which is designed not only to stress the unity of lowland peoples, but to upgrade their region’s national and international status from how it has been depicted in the Bolivian media and in Bolivia’s Andean-centric history. Unlike that of the indigenous movement, the Amazon identity incorporates both local *mestizos* and indigenous peoples and has its basis in a ‘shared geography’.

This chapter examines how Tacana people relate to efforts made to establish an ‘Amazonian identity’ and how this identity is linked to a mistrustful relationship with the state. To ‘upgrade’ the Amazon’s reputation a positive local heritage is advocated, and this includes local Indians. Tacana people position themselves positively towards these efforts. Firstly, they consider their heritage to be interconnected with that of local *mestizos* which in turn is closely linked with their *camba* ‘identity’. This ‘way of being’ which Tacana people see themselves as having in common with local *mestizos* but not with highlanders (*collas*), is *en par* with Tacana people’s historical mistrust of the state and party politics. Though the state is now ‘indigenous’ (see chapter one), this mistrust is not unravelled overnight and currently finds expression in suspicion as to the integrity of TCOs. The fact that the state is making a switch from being ‘*mestizo*’ to being ‘indigenous’ is not something
immediately overt to Tacana people, who do not see their ‘indigeneity’ reflected in the politics construed far away in the highlands.

_Upgrading the Image of the Amazon_

The 2003 United Nations (UN) PNUD (_Desarrollo Humano del Norte Amazonico_) report for Bolivia summarizes the principal factors which make the Bolivian Amazon region distinct from other regions. These include all the central aspects which are part of the region’s history such as a weak state presence, the natural environment, the economy, the economic cycle and, lastly, the racial-social stratification and plethora of indigenous peoples who have their home here. Overall it is recognized that the relationship of the lowlanders is simultaneously one with nature, the jungle and the water-ways. Significantly, this is more than the Bolivian government has ever formally admitted or attributed to its jungle section.

The construction of an Amazonian identity looks to counter historical, political and social depictions of the region. The ‘Amazonian Project’ is an initiative called into life by the ‘forgotten departments’ of Pando and Beni and is based not only around the idea of a shared geography but also the social relations and central historical dates distinct to this area, as opposed to those from the Andes. As the idea of a distinct identity is also used to back up the call for more state autonomy, the issue is politically charged and some literatures treat the initiative as contrived and based on a ‘false’ ‘invention of traditions’ (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1992). Thus, some Bolivian authors (Molina et al 2008) criticise the ‘forgotten departments’ initiative for an Amazonian identity, regarding it as contrived, with ‘insignificant’ dates being institutionalized and celebrated, such as the adhesions of minor regions to larger regions. Yet lowland municipalities have also promoted indigenous individuals from the Amazon as heroes and role-models. The department of Beni celebrates the indigenous rebel Andrés Guayocho, who led the 1887 uprising in Trinidad against the mistreatment of indians during the rubber-boom era (Soruco Sologuren et al 2008). More recently Beni has also proudly claimed identification with the first major lowland indigenous march in 1990, the March for Territory and Dignity. Here, indian rebellion is depicted as a demonstration of regional effort to which all socio-racial groups can lay claim (Molina et al 2008).

The initiative towards an Amazonian identity has its origin specifically in the lowland municipalities of Trinidad, Cobija, Riberalta and Rurrenabaque which act to represent the vast region around them, their influence extending even beyond the legal limits of their municipalities.
(Molina et al 2008). In so doing Riberalta harks back to the borders of former provinces such as the vast Mojos region or Caupolicán, partly demonstrating a disassociation with the political delineations of municipalities, cantons and departments which occurred precisely so that the Andean government would have greater control over the region (ibid). It was with the introduction of municipalities at the turn of the 20th century that the state drew the Amazon region into its realms (see also Orlove 1993). Eventually the government further divided former provinces, and stationed state-representatives from the highlands there (Molina et al 2008; Roca 2001). These representatives were controversial for not only were they state-appointed rather than locally democratically-elected, but as a rule they were highland officials who, as a form of punishment had been ‘condemned’ to work in the lowlands. Thus, the representative felt no great affinity with his work and the region. Neither were the locals satisfied with having a government representative who did not know or understand the area. This situation reinforced Amazonian people’s distrust of the highland government (Roca 2008). Eventually the Popular Participation Law (LPP) of 1995 attributed greater revenue to municipalities and a new form of political participation was possible (see chapter 5).

Over the past ten years, Amazonians have created organizations meant to draw more attention to their construction of an Amazonian identity, also called the ‘Amazonian Project’. Organizations include the Movimiento de Renovación Amazonica (Movement to Revalidate the Amazon – MAR, Pando), Poder Amazónico Social (Amazonian Social Power - PASO in Trinidad), Intergración Amazónica Libertaria (Amazonian Integration - IAL in Trinidad) and Acción Revolucionaria Amazónica de Riberalta (Revolutionary Amazonian Action of Riberalta - ARAR). Some of these organisations emphasize their socio-racial heterogeneity by electing indigenous and colono leaders alongside local mestizos (Molina et al 2008). These organizations have little success on a political-electoral level, and are frequently criticized by stronger political bodies for trying to divide departmental unity.

The Amazonian Project initiative draws from the media and easily accessible mediums as the internet to help attain information about the region and incorporate this into a positive self-image constructed around ideas of early civilizations on their way to ‘modernity’. This is to contrast the idea of the Amazon as an ‘empty jungle’ populated with a mere few ‘wild savages’. Most recently this effort has included of archaeological information of the region as ceramic shards found in the tropical parts of the departments of Beni and La Paz (Tyuleneva 2008). When speaking to people of
Rurrenabaque (Rurreños) about the history of their region, the significance of dark earths (Kawa & Oyuela-Caycedo 2008; Lehmann et al. 2003), or man-made flood-dams as a historic hydraulic system (Eriksen 2011; Balée and Erickson 2006) is increasingly becoming a popular topic. Rurreños hope, that archaeological artefacts will aid in changing the region’s image as being inferior to the highlands. This also includes the local Amazonian indigenous groups, whose popular image in Bolivia is that of being ‘wilder’ and ‘less civilized’ to those of the Andes (Greene 2009).

In the discussions around regional identity the local indigenous play a central part, for they are the ancestral link to the region. Indigenous people are welcomed to take an active and positive role in the Amazonian Project, an effort which partly draws on the ideas of Indigenismo and a paternalistic romanticization of indian heritage which was especially strong in the early 1920s and 1930s (Torranzo Roca 2008; Klein 1969). In this mestizos can legitimately also stress their distinctness from the indians. For the fact that there may be a blood-link does not mean there is cannot be an unequal socio-racial hierarchy. Identifying the local indigenous group as part of one’s Amazon identity does not signify that all are now equal. On the contrary, as argued by the mayor of Cobija (capital of Pando), what remains of the hierarchy between patrón and peon, makes up a part of the Amazonian identity and can therefore be embraced (Molina et al 2008). While this attitude does not challenge structures of inequality based on race, neither does it attempt to erase or gloss over history.

There is a discussion as to which image of the indian should be utilized to represent Amazonian identity: that prior to, or after, missionization (Molina et al 2008)? The missionized indian as a product of violent colonization would depict a symbol of inequality and brokenness, just the image the Amazon Identity advocators are seeking to avoid. The pre-mission indian is thus more suitable to serve as a positive representation It does not call attention to the ugly situation of the whites/mestizos’ subjugation of the indians and reaffirms the legitimacy of the wild region prior to the formation of the Bolivian nation-state (1825). Using this image would allow the Amazon to claim an equal footing with the highlands, which to date claims that ‘its people’ brought civilization to the ‘empty’ wilderness of the lowlands.

*Tacana People and the ‘Amazonian Project’*

Tacana people welcome the initiative of mestizos looking to establish an identity on common ground; one in which their heritage is pooled. On the one hand, Tacana cultural heritage
is adopted as the cultural heritage of the region and municipality as a whole. This allows them to step away from their history as the enslaved, mistreated lowland indians, and teach their children of a much nobler indian heritage which includes a Tacana hero who fought in the Acre War (Molina et al 2008). In the past fifteen years a handful of mestizo authors and one university project have taken it upon themselves to collect and publish traditional Tacana myths and fables (e.g. Gareca Arzabe 2007; Jemio 2001). Myths based on regional landmarks such as the famous duck represented by a boulder in the Beni River, or the sacred Macuti mountain at whose foot-hills Rurrenabaque lies, have also recently been taken up by the flourishing tourist industry.

In the initiative for a common regional identity, the Tacana see a chance to ‘whiten’ themselves and eventually become mestizos, with an associated rise up the social ladder. Claiming both an Amazonian identity and a common camba-ness across racial boundaries helps to modify social differences based on race. In Rurrenabaque, where Silvia has her second home and her daughters attend school, she looks on approvingly as her sixteen-year-old skips down the hill, having just asked permission to go and visit her non-indigenous school mate, who lives in the ‘proper’ cement and brick house at the bottom of the hill. Being on the council in the municipality of Rurrenabaque places Silvia in an important representative position which is outside the arena of the indigenous movement. In the municipality she is an acknowledged indigenous representative representing both mestizos and indigenous people.

Importantly to Tacana people of this study, in light of the intense politics around indigeneity in Bolivia, is precisely the fact that the Amazonian identity initiative is not based on common ethnicity so much as on a common geography (see also Orlove 1993). Even if each group has differently experienced the history of the region. Tacana people have in the past avoided stressing their ethnicity (i.e. indian-ness), and stressing geography for the establishment of a communal identity is something they feel more comfortable with.

The Amazon identity is closely linked to the camba ‘way of being’. While some authors endorse the history of the camba ‘identity’ (e.g. Waldmann 2008; Toranzo Roca 2008; Roca 2007, 2001), others ‘dismiss’ it as a mere cover-up for right-wing aggression tied to state autonomy/secession, as covered in chapter one (e.g. Fabricant 2009; Molina 2008; Molina et al 2008; Gustafson 2006). In these debates indigenous lowland peoples’ view is not represented. The

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87 See chapter 2
relations of the Tacana to lowland mestizos and the highland state, who share a critical view of pro-indigenous policy, illuminates the role Tacana people have played in the establishment and reinforcement of a camba identity.

*Camba as Kinship – Tacana People and their Mestizo Patrónes*

Geography is the central historical link connecting Tacana people and lowland mestizos, and from which the hostility towards the highlands springs. To the oligarchy of Santa Cruz the lowland mestizo in the Amazon was a mere small-scale brutish camba patrón with jurisdiction over some peons (i.e. indians). However, to Tacana people of Buena Vista, for example, ‘their’ patrón was the highest authority and the path to a political voice. He was the state representative who might or might not abuse them, and who collaborated with the state in dispatching them to rubber collection. Until the 1953 land reform (and in many cases for years after), Tacana people were engaged for their physical labour with little rights to their protection. They could be bought together with the land they lived on. Though they were at the mercy of the patrón, and without wanting to depict this situation as positive, this time-period is not necessarily remembered as unpleasant. It contrasts starkly, for example, with the experience of people from an Aymara highland comunidad near Sorata (Canessa 2009) where the patrón’s violence is bitterly remembered, with graphic details of the physical pains he inflicted (ibid).

Meanwhile, the Tacana distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ patrónes. Bad ones flogged them and exploited them cruelly and excessively for their labour, “like the former mayor of San Buenaventura”, recounts Juanita; “he still lives here now. Peacefully,” she says, nodding towards the direction of his house. “He was very bad. Bad, bad bad. He beat people. As did the owner of Rurrenabaque’s restaurant ‘La Chirimoya’,” and with this she waves her hand across the river towards Rurrenabaque. “He used to make us collect drugs!” Juanita’s voice drops to a grave whisper. “But we did not know. We did not know they were drugs,” she interrupts herself to pause and finally ask me, rubbing thumb and forefinger together, “What is that little leaf called...the one which looks like the camomile one?” “Cannabis?” I ask.

A ‘good’ patrón was one who ‘took care’ of his comunidad. Typically he became family in becoming compadre of different people in one comunidad. Compradazgo, based on the Catholic tradition of godparenthood, is a spiritual kinship tie between an indian parent and a white/mestizo

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88 Name changed to maintain the anonymity of the people involved
god-parent through which indians could come into contact with the state and certain resources (Killick 2008b; Sanjinés 2004). Juanita’s grandparents and great-grandparents feared, respected and befriended the _patrón_ of Buena Vista: he owned the land, the people on it and their labour. To them he was a wealthy authority and honorary family member who could bring them within the realms of hard-to-come-by assets such as an education, metal tools or, as Juanita said approvingly, “a shirt for every school boy and a bundle of second-hand clothing along with a small calf for each family at Christmas.”

As demonstrated simply by the relaxed way in which Juanita points out where the former _patrónes_ live today in Rurrenabaque, it seems that they – whether ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – had little reason to fear their former peons after the land reform. I was surprised to find that there was no trace of vengeance towards former _patrónes_ amongst Tacana people I spoke to. Upon my asking the _corregidor_ of Buena Vista why it was that after the land reform (1953) they had not expelled the _patrón_ from the _comunidad_, he replied, visibly amused by my idea: “here we are humble (_humilde_) people. We are not like that, like the _collas_. They are aggressive. They do things like that (i.e. take revenge). But not here,” and adding that even if violent treatment had taken place in the _comunidades_: “people forget, you know. They forget.”

Importantly, many _patrónes_ in _comunidades_ were family. They not only came to share a symbolic kinship tie as _compadres_ but also a blood-tie. _Patrónes_ would take Tacana wives. Their children were the _mestizos_ who held the political positions in the _comunidad_, stressing their whiteness and denying their indian roots (see also Heckenberger 2004). After the reform they were distinguishable from Tacana people only in that they now became better-off neighbours. In many instances, they still have this position today. In Buena Vista, one of the _patrónes_ continued to live in ‘his’ _comunidad_ together with his Tacana wife and _mestizo_ children. Though originally an outsider, he was part of the _comunidad_ and as Juanita’s mother stated contently, “we always knew that even after the (land) reform, those men...they would all die together”, implying a camaraderie among all the men in the _comunidad._

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90 See chapter seven.
91 Buena Vista has had more than one.
Thus, in contrast to the relation which Tacana people built with the state, the *patrón* was ‘there’. He was present and lived among Tacana people like a Tacana, to eventually become ‘one of them’. Thus, no matter how abusive the *patrón* may have been, he gave guidance and was, as opposed to the Bolivian state, a constant presence. In this sense, Tacana people stand ‘side by side’ with the white/mestizo families who formerly oppressed them, but who are also family and have experienced many changing situations as neighbours and kin. From this point of view, the *colla* constitutes ‘the Other’, while the Amazonian *mestizo* is a fellow *camba*. Interesting here is that *camba* and *colla* are built to contrast each other and though they mirror the other critically, they accept the differences almost neutrally, attributing them to ‘the Other’ a kind of ‘natural difference’.

*Camba’ as a Political Tool

Bolivian lowland identity today has become associated with the term ‘camba’. It is not unusual to see bumper stickers in Santa Cruz expressing lowland pride with the provocative declaration: “I’m *camba*, so what...?” (*Soy camba y que...?*). The fact that being *camba* has been taken up and advocated by the political right, such as the Santa Cruz based *Nación Camba* which is famous for its racial overtones and violence (Fabricant 2012; Kirshner 2010; Centellas 2010a), quickly gives the ‘*camba* way of being’ a right-wing and conservative political taint. Specific *camba* traits have been identified as including certain attitudes and ‘ways of being’, typical festivities such as Women’s Beauty Contests, and, importantly, a distinct vernacular form of speech mixed with
colloquialisms. These aspects have become increasingly more celebrated as identity factors (Roca 2008; Peña Hasbún 2003; Waldmann 2008).

If ‘camba’ derives from a derogatory Guaraní word for Indian ranch-help, colla is from the Quechua word Kollasuyo, which was a highland region of the Inca Empire. The term has recently become more popular, especially in conjunction with ‘camba’. The politics around ‘cula-ness’ stand in the tradition of the political and cultural ideas of Aymara Nation (Nación Aymara) and Inca Nation, as advocated especially in the mid-1980s by the highland organisation Confederation of the Union of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (Central Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia - CSUTCB) and Aymara leader and activist, Felipe Quispe. In 1984 the CSTUCB drafted a bill proposing an agrarian restructuring at a time at which the lowland indigenous organizations was coming into being. Though the bill included the lowland groups it had been drafted with neither their consultation nor representation (CIDOP - Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia, CPB - Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni), and thus did not find much resonance with the lowland organizations (Strobele-Gregor et al 1994). The camba ‘movement’ is mestizo-initiated and indigenous groups have not played a central role, in contrast to the indigenous movement which was initiated by indigenous peoples.

Both terms, colla and camba, lean heavily on an Indian heritage. As described at the start of this chapter, during town festivals mestizo people dress in the traditional clothes of the local indigenous groups and schools put on local indigenous-styled dances. By highlighting their indigenous heritage, municipalities strategically parallel the importance placed on such heritage by President Evo Morales and his MAS government, who put a heavy emphasis on indigenous reconciliation and equality (Fabricant 2012, 2009; Gustafson 2006). In doing so, lowland municipalities and groups like the Nación Camba look to demonstrate that their critique of highland indigenous culture is not an issue of racism and white supremacy. In assuming ‘indigeneity’, municipalities furthermore enter into the ethnic identity debate and the complex issue of autochthony. Here mestizos stress that they, too, are native to the lowland region and because of this ‘oppressed’ by the Andean government.

The Nación Camba, based in Santa Cruz, is backed primarily by white upper and middle class youth, members of the conservative young men’s group, UJC (Unión Juvenil Cruceñista). Yet it has been pointed out (Waldmann 2008) that although the image is one of the white Cruceño oligarchy
as the leading aggressors against a *colono* influx, this is in fact a misrepresentation. The old *Cruzeño* oligarchy, who are today’s owners of the central soy, hydrocarbon and cattle-ranching businesses, in fact *welcome* the *colonos* for their cheap labour and for the retailing of their products. Thus, contrary to popular understandings, it is not the upper class, but instead the *mestizo* working and middle classes who feel the greatest rancour against the *colonos*, as these racial groups meet each other on a similar class level, and directly compete for the same occupational activities.

*La Manera Camba (The Camba Way)*

*Camba* ‘identity’ has become rooted in a variety of concepts and traits in which lowlanders take pride. These in turn are based in ideas around ‘good upbringing’. One of these is a dialect or form of speech which is distinct to the *colla* way of speaking. The people of the lowlands speak with a so-called *camba* accent. This is marked by aspirating the ‘s’ at the end of words, as in the annunciator-word ‘*pues*’, which converts to ‘*puej*’.92 Typical, too, is the usage of the suffixes ‘-ango’ and ‘-ingo’ to express augmentation and diminution: While a highlander might say “*ahorita*” (“*ahora*” – “now” - in diminutive), the lowlander would say “*ahoringa*”.

Tracing the roots of the *camba* form of speech, lowland historian Roca (2007) makes a link to Argentina and, in particular, to Brazil. Significantly, he links the heritage of the lowlands to that of other lowland countries and distinctly *not* to the Andes of Bolivia. While the Brazilian Portuguese in its pronunciation diminishes by applying the ‘h’, the *camba* vernacular usage of Spanish innovates this into a ‘g’. Thus, the Portuguese ‘*casinha*’, diminutive of ‘*casa*’ (house), becomes ‘*casinga*’ among the *cambas*. By linking Brazilian Portuguese and the influence of indigenous languages (e.g. Chiquitanos, Quechua, Guarani etc.) to the *camba* Spanish, Roca also refutes possible connections with the phonetics of Andalusia (Spain), from where the original South American *conquistadores* originated and where the ‘s’ is also typically dropped at the end of a word. Thus, speech-patterns are utilized to demonstrate heritage and ‘belonging’ in the debate around the racial and cultural origins of lowlanders and to their being ‘different’ to Andean peoples.

The *camba* form of speech is embraced with patriotic pride and applied accordingly. The lowlanders consider their manner of speech to be more eloquent and ‘friendlier’ than that of the highlanders. Regional distinctions in speech are also a great source of humour among Bolivians, as

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92 Accordingly, the capital of the lowlands, Santa Cruz, is jokingly yet also fondly referred to as “Santa Puej”, in reference to the lowland habit of frequently utilizing the annunciator word “*pues*” and dropping the ‘s’.
highlanders imitate lowlanders and vice versa. However, for the lowlanders this mimicry is also a sign of the highlanders’ ‘typical’ arrogance. In one example which I observed on the social online platform Facebook, two friends joke with each other ‘camba style’. Here they write in the vernacular *camba* accent, as well as weave in references to regional differences, chiding each other jokingly. Starting out with the implication that Carla should get a proper job, Anita objects to her belligerent ‘highland’ way of expressing herself, by suggesting that she been living in La Paz for too long and the ‘rude’ *colla* manner had rubbed off on her. Anita addresses Carla with the formal ‘*usted*’ as typical in the lowlands as opposed to the highlanders, who tend to use the informal ‘*tu*’ (Roca 2007).

_Anita_: “Eso le hace falta a ujte, un poco de oficio.”
[This is what you lack, a bit of career / work.]
_Carla_: “… estás bravca con el mundo q le paso?… Mucho La Paz voj, no?
[…are you angry at the world, what is with you? Too much La Paz for you, no?]

What becomes expressed in the speech form includes behavioural factors around ‘upbringing’ (*educación*). This makes up a central part of ‘being *camba*’. With a compilation of interviews on the *camba* habitus, Bolivian Anthropologist, Waldmann (2008), groups together a variety of themes described by predominantly middle class *mestizo* Cruzeños as being the essence of *camba*. These stand in relation and contrast to *colla* ‘ways’ and are roughly grouped into hospitality, good manners/upbringing and physical presentation based on gender roles (see also Peña Hasbún 2003; Bergholdt 1999; Pinto Parada 178). Cruzeños see themselves as being humble, open, optimistic and generous. While the (indigenous) *colla* is stingy and ‘hoards’, only sharing with his/her own, the *camba* “never hides his cards in his sleeves” (“*nunca esta con la carta debajo la manga*”) (Waldmann 2008:38; see also Bergholdt 1999 as above). The *camba* is traditional in his/her patriarchal family values while highlanders in turn hold that the *cambas* are macho, much in the sense of the Wild West as depicted in US-American pop culture. It has been noted that the lowlands look towards Miami (USA) for orientation (Assies 2006) and in accord younger generations bestow typically US-American names upon their children, noteworthy in that they are written to be pronounced with an Anglo phonetic (e.g. Kelli, Treisi, Jheimi and Yason). *Cambas* identify with behaviours such as drinking alcohol, womanizing and brawl fights which are all attributed to a man’s virility and *machismo*: “*A camba* has to drink and have his fight. *A camba* has to be with his female”, go dance

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93 Here the word “*hembra*” is utilized - the term for a female animal, evoking a carnal, sexual image.
and wake up with his female. This is the pride of each *camba*[^94] (Waldmann 2008: 38) [My translation].

The female counterpart to *machismo* has been coined *marianismo* - the cult of the Virgin Mary – which represents the self-sacrificing mother figure. This also has its counterpart in the figure of overly sexualized Latina woman and whore (Wade 2009; Stevens & Pescatello 1973). While Bolivians do not use this term, the concept and the typical image of the *camba* woman is one of an exaggerated sexualized femininity as when ‘she paints her nails a fluorescent colour and puts on gold shoes at eleven in the morning’[^95] (ibid:55) [my translation]. Though generally approved of, eroticized appearances might be viewed critically if they are displayed at the ‘wrong’ moment.

The topic around gendered and sexualized bodies is starkly contrasted to highland culture, where on grounds of climactic difference alone, people do not generally make a display of actual skin but remain ‘hidden’ beneath layers of clothing. The body culture and aesthetics of the lowlands is in the tradition of neighbouring countries such as Brazil and Colombia. As suggested by the man’s comment quoted above, stylized gender-role presentation is closely linked with music and dance. A style of music typically played by lowlanders in clubs and bars is the Colombian-originated Cumbia, which is influenced, like the Brazilian samba, by Afro-Caribbean culture, and in particular African slaves. This type of music was associated by colonial society with degenerate blackness which signalled sexual looseness, idleness and lack of discipline (Wade 2009). In the 1920’s and 30s in particular, this ‘jungle music’ was regarded as morally harmful (ibid). The influence of African cultures on those of the Caribbean and Brazil can be seen in the *camba* gender-roles and relationship to the body. The highlands, in contrast, draws most of its indigenous heritage from the Inca Empire.

The *cambas* are proud of their stylized gendered performance which they attribute to their sense of taste and understanding of gender aesthetics. In its most institutionalized form, these become expressed in annual carnivals and parades (*desfiles*) where women sport short sexy costumes (Gustafson 2006, Canessa 2008). Feminine beauty is epitomized in Bolivia’s famous ‘Miss’ contests (female beauty contests), which even the smallest lowland municipality will have in its annual repertoire of celebrations. Beauty contests are such a part of lowland culture that alternative social groups such as the gay, lesbian and transsexual movement have uncritically adopted them

[^94]: “El *Camba* es beber y cada uno esta con su pelada. El *Camba* tiene que estar con su hembrita, irse a bailar y amanecer con la hembra. Eso es el orgullo del *Camba*.”

[^95]: “...se pinta las uñas de colores fosforescentes y usa zapatos doradas a las once de la mañana.”
and hold annual competitions of *Miss Transformista Gay* and *Miss Les-Bolivia*, for which participants bus in from all over the country.

The Santa Cruz professional Beauty Contest contestants group, *Las Magníficas*, is an industrialized form of this feminized body politics (Fabricant 2009; Waldmann 2008). *Las Magníficas* is a Santa Cruz based high-class professional model agency and élite social club. The models from the *Las Magníficas* are hired for key Cruzeño social events such as the annual FEXPOCRUZ (*Feria Exposición de Santa Cruz*, established 1962), a key large-scale fair in which small and big businesses from all over the country present their products (see Gustafson 2007). Here the models adorn the stands much like famous status symbols and charge set prices for their presence as would movie stars and other public figures (Waldmann 2008). As with the girls in the circle of Miss Contestants in the small municipality of Rurrenabaque, *las Magníficas* belong to the élite of the *comunidad*. While formerly it was impossible that daughters of poor families entered these realms, this prohibition has relaxed somewhat: “Until about 30 years ago, the (Cruzeño) queens were always from the top social circles. If she wasn’t a Gutierrez, she wasn’t queen” (interview in Waldmann 2008:81) [translation my own]. In this way today’s élite still function as role models, perpetuating social standards: “the upper class show their girls to you with a festive and beautiful face, as something to which you too can aspire” (interview in Waldmann 2008:81) [My translation]. Being accepted into the ranks of beauty contestants is a ticket to the realms of higher social circles (ibid). Overall, these spectacles look to maintain and reinforce the European style of inequality based on the visual attributes of skin tone, hair and clothing (Gustafson 2006).

Clothing, especially footwear, has always been used as a strong indicator of social class in both Europe and the New World (Presta 2008). Only a decade earlier, the plaza of Santa Cruz, being the central space for public display and class presentation, was ‘divided’ into areas/zones (*zonas*) in accord with the three principal social classes (Waldmann 2008). For the customary Sunday stroll, the outwardmost circle, being closest to the street, was reserved for the upper-class *vecinos* and *gente* of town; the second circle for *mestizo* employees of higher rank such as those who worked in the household of the *criollos*; and the third, in the middle of the square, for the popular classes, the *cambas*. If a promenade moved outside his or her designated ‘area’, which was in accord with

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96 “*Las reinas siempre salían de arriba, hasta hace unos 30 años, de la alta sociedad. Si no era Gutiérrez, no era reina.*”

97 “*La clase alta te las muestra como un rostro festivo y hermoso al que podés aspirar.*”
his/her clothes and especially shoes\textsuperscript{98}, he/she would be reproached for their breach in etiquette with shouts such as “to the second (area)!” (“\textit{a la segundal!”}) or “to the third! (“\textit{a la terceral!”}) (ibid: 56; also Serrate Vaca Diez 1975).

While it is held that the \textit{camba} is a hospitable and generous dreamer, who, though humble, never seriously protests his/her situation, cliché dictates that \textit{colla} are stingy complainers, commonly described as ‘the crying \textit{collas}’ (\textit{collas llorones}) (Waldmann 2008). Accordingly, it is lamented that the \textit{colonos} who migrate to the lowlands are never content with what they have. They are considered overly ambitious earning and saving to buy his taxi, his truck. (…) They come to Santa Cruz to work like ants and achieve their goals. (…) The \textit{colla}, from the smallest rat to the largest go out to sell something even if it’s just newspapers. They always find something to do, even if it’s just selling juice. In contrast (\textit{camba} children) … wait for their father to work for them. (…) (But) the \textit{collas} are made for business\textsuperscript{99} (interviews in Waldmann 2008:42) [Translation my own].

\textit{Of Camba and Colla in Rurrenabaque and Tumupasa}

By claiming the term \textit{camba} for themselves, the élite is linking itself to an indian heritage, thus upgrading the \textit{mestizo} identity (Assies 2006). In this they inadvertently also upgrade indianness in that they position themselves positively in relation to the indians whom they formerly ruled as \textit{patrónes}. Ethnic identity becomes somewhat homogenized (ibid). While class differences are maintained, skin tones become increasingly irrelevant. Every lowlander is \textit{camba}, yet there are different kinds of \textit{cambas} and, as mentioned in the last chapter, this can depend on \textit{regional differences mixed with class situations}. However, it also leans heavily on racial affiliation. \textit{White/mestizo cambas} differ from indigenous \textit{cambas}, even if it is agreed that all \textit{cambas} share similar ‘values’: \textit{la manera camba} (the \textit{camba way}).

\textit{Crossing the racial/ethnic divide insult turns into fondness}. If the indigenous \textit{cambas} are ‘lazy’ (\textit{flojos}), the \textit{mestizo cambas} are ‘easy-going’ and ‘relaxed’ (\textit{tranquilos}) (see also Stearman

\textsuperscript{98} The popular class did not wear shoes; if anything they wore so-called \textit{abarcas} (made of recycled rubber tires) which did not count as proper shoes.

\textsuperscript{99} “…a tener su taxicito, su camioncito. (…) Vienen a trabajar a Santa Cruz como hormigas y llegan a su objetivo. (…) El \textit{colla}, desde el ratoncito hasta el más grande de ellos, sale aunque sea a vender periódicos. Algo tienen que hacer, desde chiquititos ya están vendiendo jugo. En cambio, (los hijos cambas) esperan nomás a que trabaje el padre. (…) Los \textit{collas} son para negociar.”
While the mestizo collas are ‘dedicated’, the indigenous collas are ambitious’ and ‘stubborn’ (terco), while it is agreed that both are ‘hard workers’ (trabajadores). These acknowledged differences are both prejudices and embrace cultural traits which provide a communal sense of identity. They are embraced by each ‘group’, and their enactment become a demonstration of regional affiliation. Taking this further, regional attributes do not only become associated with people, but are also projected onto animals and objects. As I walked down the central road in Tumupasa one day with a Tacana friend, I was barked at by a small dog, which came lunging out at me from a local shop. My friend offhandedly offered “it’s colla” (es colla), waving away the animal’s aggression and self-confidence, which are ‘typical colla’ traits. Coincidentally, the dog did indeed belong to one of the colono families living by the road. In this way the ‘idea’ behind what it means to be colla or camba easily become used as adjectives and it is not unusual to hear someone says “that is very colla” (eso es muy colla). Similarly, one day a mestizo friend from La Paz explained why she did not like working with a specific colleague of hers: “It’s so boring, he is so very Aymara. He doesn’t speak…very, very colla, this boy.”

Rurrenabaque is fiercely proud of its camba affiliation. I was especially able to notice this shortly before the referendum on the new constitution of 2009. During this time many locals wore a green t-shirt, green being the official colour of the lowlands, with the exclamation vota no! printed in large letters upon it (see chapter 5). However, this demonstration of a patria chica (fierce regional affiliation) became questionable when a permanent road was being built around the same time in Rurre. The manual labour hired were not local working-class cambas, such as the Tacana people or local mestizos, which would have aided the flow of municipal spending back into the local community. Instead, no one seemed surprised or affronted at the more expensive effort of bussing down collas, the ‘traditional hard workers’, from La Paz, providing them with room and board and setting them to the task of hammering together stones from the Beni River to produce a proper road.

Similarly in Tumupasa the road around the main plaza was paved in 2009. In the past, the municipality had required that the locals put in a contraparte (own effort) in the form of manual labour, in exchange for the construction material to be provided for whatever measure was being undertaken in a comunidad. For the first time the Tumupaseños had protested this, arguing that in towns or cities no one expected the inhabitants to chip in free labour when roads or buildings were built. They wanted this measure provided without being obliged to ‘do their part’. The municipality
of San Buenaventura, which belongs to Tumupasa, agreed and as a result hired workers from Tumupasa instead, agreeing to pay them. I assumed that Tacana people welcomed this, considering their frequent laments as to a chronic shortage of cash. Before half the road was completed, however, the local Tacana people had abandoned the arduous task. As I was soon to witness, collas were bussed in from the highlands to finish the rest of the road. In the evenings, after a heavy workload, they did not go and mingle with the Tumupaseños, as I thought they would. Instead they retreated to the rooms provided for them and kept to themselves, cooking and laughing. A Tumupasa nun, Roswita, watched them daily from the steps of the old church overlooking the plaza. She was very impressed, and commented to me one evening as the men pouring hot tar: “very hard working, these people,” she paused; “they start early and go on even after night has fallen. Very, very hard working; not like the people here.”

No Tacana people in Tumupasa took offence that Aymara/Quechua had been contracted to do work in their own comunidad which they might have been paid to do. In this they mirrored the camba attribute of being ‘comfortable’, perhaps even a bit ‘lazy’, and reminded me of what Silvia had once told me when complaining about the large groups of colonos coming to the area: “you know how we are...we are comfortable. We have our chicken, our little house, our hammock...we are easy-going (tranquilo). Not like them! The collas! Ambitious! Always looking to earn.” Indeed, the identities of colla and camba do not compete with each other, but represent acknowledged and accepted differences (Bergholdt & Bogantes 1999).

While President Morales emphasizes unity and solidarity among the indigenous peoples of his country, announcing the importance of Pachamama and other indigenous concepts used in his environmental governance, he is just as careful to distinctly avoid addressing highland-lowland regionalism, and the differences typically found between colla and camba ‘ways of being’. This stands in contrast to long-time Aymara leader and indigenous activist Felipe Quispe, who heads the Andean-based Pachakuti Indigenous Movement (PIM) founded in 2000. In his separatist politics, Quispe explicitly states that there are ‘two Bolivias’, by which he does not solely mean the divide between the indigenous and white/mestizos of Bolivia, which is the divide on which he bases much of his politics; but also between the highlands and the lowlands, the cambas and the collas (interview with Quispe by Cúneo 2011; Albro 2005b; Barragán 2009; Albó 2003). Importantly, Quispe thereby acknowledges cultural differences between indigenous groups from different regions in Bolivia in a way that President Morales has not yet done.


_Tacana People’s Mistrust of the State_

Tacana people identify as ‘Bolivian’ and ‘camba’ and with these joint identifications thereby link themselves to the nation state and its historical trajectory. However, this does not mean Tacana people do not also harbour a long-standing mistrust of the state. Their sense of political impotence is far-reaching, as demonstrated by a variety of factors. Most Tacana people of this study do not particularly care one way or another which political party which is in government. I am told that around election times political parties will pay people to vote for them. “Each person would be paid around 25 Bolivianos (ca. three dollars),” explains Juanita. “They come to the comunidad and take down your name on a list”. On another occasion Carlos from Carmen Florida explains to me as we make our way to his field that “all parties are corrupt. Politics is corrupt. This is why I never vote at all.” Importantly, in order to vote one must today be in possession of an identity card (carnet de identidad). As many Tacana do not believe in the integrity of the state and because it costs a day’s worth of labour, many do not have one. Doris, from Carmen Florida, stresses that most people in Carmen Florida do not have an identity card for there are simply too many ‘hurdles’ (tramites) to be overcome. These include trips to the departmental capital, Trinidad, bus fares and fees for the documents themselves.

A birth certificate costs fifty Bolivianos (ca. six dollars) and the identity card itself costs another fifty Bolivianos and many people do not have this money. And then sometimes, after people have paid, they do not get anything at all – nothing ever arrives.

Doris stresses that if a municipal government knows that a certain comunidad will not vote for them, then it may very well be that they will not make an effort for these people to receive their identity cards. If people do not have faith in the political party in power they also refuse to register and attain identity cards. At the same time, an identity card is necessary to receive government benefits, channelled through the municipalities, such as school breakfast for children and the _Bono Juancito Pinto_, a yearly stipend for schoolchildren.

Silvia, from Carmen Florida, explained to me in 2009 that as a municipal councillor for the MNR party in Rurrenabaque, she organized for representatives of the municipality to travel to Carmen Florida, register people free of cost and to provide them identity cards. But people don’t bother. They don’t show up. They don’t understand. And then they come to me when they are ill and say, how do I get a hospital bed, my sister or wife needs to go to
the hospital but I cannot afford it. I say to them, do you have a *carnet*? They do not. But you must be registered with the municipality to receive a hospital bed free of charge.

In the same instance Silvia stresses angrily, “but those *colonos*, they all have *carnets!* Their baby is still in the stomach, but it already has a *carnet!*” insinuating that the *colonos* are quicker to act, better-organized and generally better-off than the local Tacana people. The lack of party-political consciousness which Tacana people of this study demonstrate today contrasts starkly contrasted with the time of the land reform of 1953. This event serves as a milestone in Tacana people’s memory. “Here in Rurrenabaque,” Anita tells me “we vote pink (the colour of the MNR Party)”. Reflecting, Anita treats her MNR party allegiance as something of a family tradition:

I don’t know why. I just always vote for them. My grandfather voted for them. It was always a big deal when they came to the *comunidad* for campaigning. We would hold a big *fiesta* just for them. It’s as if our brains are programmed to just continue voting for the MNR today.

A significant demonstration of mistrust of the higher political level is Tacana people’s suspicion of TCOs. Though the policy behind land-tenure is pro-indigenous, Tacana people question the motives involved. Though not aware of it, with this they are in line with Charles Hale’s (2004) critical assessment of neo-liberal multiculturalism, where NGOs take on state-functions and indigenous areas are formed (and decentralized) so as to allow better control, be it for lumber, oil or, more recently, for carbon credits\(^{100}\). No matter how altruistic, the collaborations sought and concepts introduced by NGOs are embedded in Western ideas.

*Tacana People’s Mistrust of TCOs*

One great advantage of TCO, as I was told by leaders of CIPTA, is that it protects Tacana members from being taken advantage of (*aprovechados*) by politically and financially stronger individuals and institutions as has happened throughout the past. These range from foreign companies looking to buy lumber concessions from Tacana *comunidades* to Bolivians who want to study the region’s botany. Everyone who approaches Tacana *comunidades* inside the TCO needs to approach CIPTA first. “We have had many problems in the past,” Adolfo Chavez told me in 2004,

\(^{100}\) In reference to the UN REDD scheme to counter climate change.
long before he became president of the indigenous umbrella organisation, CIDOP; “so anyone who wants to work with the Tacana needs to go through the CIPTA board first.”

While this precaution is understandable, it may also falsely evoke the images of a seamless internal relationship among the Tacana. Yet, just as Tacana people quickly harbour suspicion towards outsiders, the same applies to fellow Tacana people, especially if these are actors in political systems such as the indigenous movement (CIPTA, CIMTA). These are still political institutions tied to the state. The TCO board of CIPTA, composed of Tacana people from various comunidades, is a state-like entity with whom individuals negotiate over land rights and central issues such as logging, hunting and judiciary issues. Thus, though the TCO does not represent the state, it does link the Tacana people to the state and incorporates them into the national political system.

There is a growing suspicion among Tacana people that the TCO system will not hold. Nico, the corregidor of Buena Vista in 2008, explained how he and his family experienced the formation of the TCO Tacana back in 2000. CIPTA’s president went around to different Tacana comunidades explaining the benefits of communal land ownership in an effort to have comunidades join the TCO. People were encouraged to contribute their documents containing the land titles and, with the help of NGO professionals, these were legally pooled to TCO Tacana territory. Nico shakes his head smiling as he remembers this time period.

I was young and foolish. It was all explained to us in one comunidad meeting and no one really understood what it meant anyway. So we all said yes. It sounded good. But now, years later, I realize it was a mistake. With this we are no better off than before when the land was ours to use but not ours to own! I would not say yes again. Now I know better.

Since the 1953 land reform a number of Tacana people have owned the land they cultivate, and often their plot of land has been worked by family members for generations (obviously excluding the time of the fallow period which is between two and seven years). However, many Tacana individuals have never attained ownership-documentation which states their name. This is a typical situation and when I asked Nico how he would ‘prove’ that the plot of land was really his if it ever came to a dispute he gave the answer many give: “oh, everyone knows it’s mine. It’s always been ours.”

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101 For an elaboration on the TCO Tacana see chapter 5 and 6.
While it has been possible for Tacana people to acquire legal ownership of land since 1953 the hurdles to be overcome to attain documentation are often simply unrealistic. They include having the financial means to travel to the departmental capital and registering the plot of land, payment for a lawyer to draw up the draft of the document and even photocopies. These are concrete obstacles for a people who live predominantly from what they farm and for whom cash is hard to come by. Often the formal procedures to attain documentation are more costly than the land itself. Considering the circumstances, Tacana people typically sell their land by simply selling the original documentation with the former owner’s name – frequently the old-time *patrón* - intact. Should a legal dispute arise, which is not uncommon among siblings of a family, the situation becomes complicated.

The costs involved in the formation of a TCO in Bolivia are tremendous and too high for the state. The neo-liberal model again comes into play. It is not atypical that indigenous groups must secure their own funding to help them in the process of land consolidation. Large conservationist NGOs are happy to offer their services, seeing the possibility of helping a vulnerable social group traditionally exploited by its own government. At the same time, they also recognize the possibility of playing a substantial part in implementing their organizational goal of conserving the environment. NGOs helping indigenous groups often help to draft land-tenure management plans. This means they provide lawyers and other professionals which help Tacana people in *comunidades* – who typically lack even basic educational skills – to legally set down on paper how they will manage their territory in a ‘sustainable’ manner which in this case means that the balance of the natural surroundings is preserved. It is processes such as these in which the ‘permitted indian’ becomes shaped. Without denying that there is room for negotiation, collaboration is only possible when a Tacana organisation (e.g. CIPTA) complies with terms drawn up by the NGO’s.

The process of ‘giving up’ one’s land-title in order to pool to the TCO was made very attractive for Tacana people who often had land-documents in hand, but ones which did not name them as owners. As NGO professionals and Tacana leaders explained to people of the *comunidades*, they would not have to pay one cent or make a single trip in order to attain legal documentation for the land to be put in their name. This marks the key moment to which Nico refers and which many Tacana people ‘misunderstood’. The people in his *comunidad*, he claims, had not fully grasped the implications of what a TCO was. The TCO system was new and the law it followed was equally new. People thought that an NGO had come to help them place the land-titles in *their personal names*,
but instead it was to be in their name *communally* as an ethnic group and then as a *comunidad*. Today Tacana people can be heard commenting, as Nico suggested above, that the TCOs are nothing other than a new government or foreign-led form of controlling the area and controlling the people who live on it. Nico, having had financial luck in the past years, has since bought himself land privately.

Somewhat ironically, predominantly poorer Tacana people - those who never had the financial means to update their documentation or who did not already hold third-party land ownership documents - pooled their land-titles to the communal TCO land. Thus, one can often find that better-off Tacana people have private land-titles while poorer Tacana people must rely solely on communal land. This causes tensions in *comunidades*. At times, those families which rely on communal land can be heard claiming that those with private land-titles should not have the same entitlement to the *comunidad’s* communal land.

This chapter has demonstrated thatTacana people harbour a strong mistrust of the state, and the politics of ‘indigeneity’, which they see as being dominated by the highlanders. As demonstrated in the following chapter, Tacana people’s suspicion of the government continues and even surges as Morales’ pro-indigenous politics are considered ‘pro-colla’, and partial to the indigenous highlanders.
Chapter 5 - “The Colonos come like Termites to take our Land.” - Struggles over Land and ‘Ways of Being’ in an Amazon Municipality

I walked the cobblestoned streets of Rurrenabaque in October 2008, struck by the fact that most people in the town, both rich and poor, sported the same green t-shirts: the symbol for the Media Luna¹⁰² autonomy movement which at that moment was also campaigning against an amended constitution to be voted on by referendum. If passed, this would give considerably greater rights to indigenous groups and redistribute land to landless indigenous people. Most of the t-shirts had the imprint: Vota No! Because central newspapers defined the desire for Media Luna autonomy as a demand by the Santa Cruz oligarchy and élite, I was surprised to find that everyone was wearing the green t-shirt, some of which had Autonomia! printed on them. This went for the mestizo employee of the photocopy shop as much as the Tacana cook at the restaurant next to it. Having only recently arrived to do fieldwork, I wondered why indigenous peoples as well as middle- and working-class white/mestizo Bolivians of Rurrenabaque would be against the proposed change, an attitude which aligned them with the traditional Santa Cruz oligarchies and supported the Cruzeños’ monopolies of land and industry in the lowland regions.

No exception to sporting a green t-shirt was my friend, Tacana informant and Rurrenabeque municipal councillor Silvia Becuma of Carmen Florida. When I visited her, I noticed she had even decorated the entire inside of her wood-board home with green Vota No! posters. At first, I took all this to be a sign of gross miscalculation due to people’s ignorance of the subject. Had Tacana people not understood that the referendum would grant all indigenous people of Bolivia more equality? Did it not occur to them that their position was aligning them with the mestizos, historically members of the patrón-families who had exploited their labour? Surely Tacana people had been ‘brainwashed’ by the local mestizo élite who ran the municipality and administered municipal benefits to their own advantage?

In the media and in academic literature, the role of ‘culture’ in the conflict between colonos and Tacana people has been either completely dismissed or downplayed. However, this denies agency to local indigenous groups and under-represents their role in the highland/lowland conflict

¹⁰² Half Moon – Bolivia’s eastern lowland region
in Bolivia at large. Conflicts over land between indigenous groups demonstrate a necessity for a more precise and differentiated definition of ‘indigenous’; one which takes into account the specific geographical origin of a group, and its cultural distinctness. The indigenous movement has been criticized for the fact that it “takes little or no account of previous or subsequent movements of populations’ (such as that of being lowlander or camba) (...) (and ignores) discrepancies between the daily practices of peoples classified as indigenous and the rhetoric that is used to represent them on the global stage” (Brightman 2008:21). The conflicts and political differences between the distinct social and cultural groups are made tangible in political spaces such as municipalities. As this chapter demonstrates, Rurrenabaque is a stage where inter-ethnic conflict can take shape and cultural differences become legible.

This chapter first demonstrates how changes in municipal policy have opened up new possibilities for Tacana people to practice citizenship, specifically as indigenous people. Small rural municipalities lend themselves to observing interactions between indigenous groups, especially as the mid-1990s neo-liberal reforms (LPP) granted rural municipalities more decision-making power and included provincial sections. This meant that indigenous comunidades, which are typically located around municipal towns, were pulled into the municipal range. The combined with the strengthening of ‘indigenous identity’ politically, has enabled indigenous people to participate in local politics not only as Bolivian citizens in municipalities (municipal councillor, mayor, etc.) but also as openly ‘indigenous’ representatives (Kohl 2003; Medeiros 2001). This aspect of multi-faceted identities makes visible the racial-social affiliation of individual political actors within the municipality in a way which was not previously possible.

After laying out the historical trajectory of municipal policy in Bolivia, this chapter turns to Tacana people’s participation in the municipal planning system, throwing light on the way in which municipality residents are subjected to interpretations of policy by local political representatives. Within the context of the municipality, Tacana representatives actively counter what they see as corruption by colonos, who are taking advantage of municipal funds. The municipal platform allows for a demonstration of the ‘humble manner’ with which Tacana comunidades and individuals participate in municipal politics, and which Tacana people themselves contrast to the more aggressive colono ‘manner’. Through certain issues which have become especially central in the past years, such as land-possession and allocation, Tacana people believe that the MAS project favours highlanders and thus colonos over their own people and all other lowlanders.
Rural Municipalities and the Popular Participation Law (LPP)

The municipality as a representation of mestizo culture and politics sets a stage on which conflicts between highland and lowland cultures unfold. This progression also reveals the distinct relationship held by highland and lowland cultures within the mestizo municipality. For a long time the MNR party, which opposes the MAS was voted into power in Rurrenabaque. Perhaps Tacana people felt ‘morally obliged’ to align themselves with their fellow mestizo lowlanders, as has been suggested by social scientists (Painter 1988) for other cases in the Bolivian lowlands. Painter attributes the alignment of indigenous groups with the socially and politically advantaged mestizo classes to the level of poverty of ‘poor cambas’. He is not completely off the mark, as typically the indigenous people work for the middle- and upper-classes as domestics and hired help in the fields. It is a challenge for anyone to keep up to speed with the rapid changes of policy and decree in Bolivia, particularly in a rural jungle area such as Rurrenabaque, where there is a high rate of illiteracy. Indeed, when I asked Silvia how she had come to learn of the contents of the new constitution, she replied:

The municipality organized a workshop and there we council members read article by article together, and were able to see what the government wants to do. So we organized workshops and through local television we explained to the population what the decree was all about. And for these reasons we are voting ‘no’. 103

It could be argued that the mayor and his MNR-dominated municipality had interpreted the referendum to their own benefit, an interpretation which they then channelled to the rest of the population in Rurrenabaque. I was to find, however, that the reality is more complex.

The formation and history of municipalities in Bolivia differs greatly from region to region and again from case to case (Molina et al 2008a). An understanding of the trajectory of municipal formation, which has come to serve as a voice for political opinion, sheds light on the negative opinions held by many Tacana of the constitution of 2009 and why it is, as Silvia stated, “a bad constitution, in which one is punished with thirty years’ gaol for the slash and burn of one’s own fields.” Or as Nilo from Carmen Florida said, “it states that if you listened to music other than what

103 “hemos tenido un taller por la alcaldía. Y articulo por articulo hemos leído y hemos hecho ver que el gobierno quiere hacer. Hemos hecho talleres, mostrando a la población por la televisión porque lo está...el decreto. Y por eso nosotros votamos por el ‘no’.”
is native to the region, they send you to gaol. This means we will now all have to listen to Tsimané\textsuperscript{104} music!”

Although municipal autonomy through popular (vecino) suffrage was written into the 1938 constitution (Klein 1969; Roca 2008), municipal mayors continued to be appointed by the central government until 1985 (Pacheco 2004) and beyond, as was the case in Rurrenabaque. This had the effect of undermining any local-level opposition to central legislation and allowed the mayor to be replaced should a problem arise. Thus it was desirable for local authorities, which took the form of church authorities, land-owners, and merchants/industrialists (in the rubber, sugar cane, Brazil nut, cattle and lumber industries), to nurture a friendly relationship with the government representative in the departmental capitals. This attitude went not only for small municipalities such as Rurrenabaque, San Buenaventura, and Ixiamas, all of which lie within Tacana territory and are within the vicinities of numerous Tacana comunidades; but also for central Tacana comunidades, each led by a corregidor (in collaboration with the local church representative) elected by the comunidad but appointed only with the approval of the municipal mayor and government-appointed departmental prefect. The prefects were to remain appointed by the central government until 2005 when President Carlos Mesa (2003-2005), in an attempt to climate of departmental anger triggered by measures to privatize water services, issued a decree declaring that departments elect their own prefects (Roca 2008)\textsuperscript{105}.

In an effort to improve the system of municipal government, a new municipal law was passed in 1985, which established prescribed? required? that municipal governments be henceforth elected by the local public and have limited power over a small range of urban services (Pacheco 2004). This this what? election? was unlikely to have included the indian population but rather referred to ‘gente’ (ie white/mestizos) of the municipality. The indians – or campesinos, in accordance with the term applied after the 19523? land reform - were generally assumed to be living in comunidades in the jungle areas outside the towns and were only included in the peripheries of the municipality by the LPP\textsuperscript{106}. As in the case of San Buenaventura and Rurrenabaque,

\textsuperscript{104} The Tsimané are an ethnic group who co-inhabit the area with the Tacana, mestizos and further ethnic groups (see chapter 1).

\textsuperscript{105} As this decree broke with Bolivia’s centralism it was vulnerable to being criticized as being unconstitutional. It was thus declared that this election was a mere recommendation and that the president would ultimately choose the prefect, in accordance with what the vote insinuated (Roca 2008:78).

\textsuperscript{106} Altogether 113 new municipalities were created with the passing of the LPP (Roca 2008).
the mayors came from principal local white/mestizo families of Asian or European descent, who had at some point in the 20th century migrated to the region. Thus, for example, Yerko Nuñez, 2009 mayor of Rurrenabaque in 2009 and re-elected into office in the municipality elections of April 4 2010, comes from a long family line of mayors.

In 1994, within the framework of the LPP which aimed at decentralizing Bolivia, municipal governments were again strengthened both in jurisdiction and funding. Local government was awarded 20% of the national budget, each municipality being allocated an amount in proportion to its population. With the backing of these funds, municipalities were made responsible for basic and essential infrastructure such as the construction of schools, health facilities and roads. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of municipal governments was expanded beyond the immediate urban centres to include the territory of provincial sections (Kaimowitz et al 1998). This was an important change for indigenous comunidades located further away from municipal towns and one which in the cases of Carmen Florida, Buena Vista and Tumupasa would become more complex with the implementation of the TCO Tacana and TCO Tsimané-Moseten. With the LPP, the rural populations living in comunidades in the jungle had the right to participate in the new five-year municipality planning system (in the so-called Plan de Desarrollo Municipal – PDM). Their residents were also allowed to stand for public election to the municipal council, which was monitored by a vigilance committee (Comité de Vigilancia), (Kaimowitz et al. 1998, Pacheco 2004). This was an important step towards indigenous citizenship (Postero 2007).

Essential in the bundle of laws making up the LPP was the requirement that indigenous comunidades were to be recognized as legal entities through a so-called personaria jurídica (legal body). With this the comunidad authority, the corregidor, has the legal right to administer and execute comunidad norms (Goldstein 2003). Having a personaria jurídica means becoming an Organización Territorial de Base (OTB) (a grass-roots organisation). Various groups within a municipality can become OTBs if they received their personaria jurídica, for example mothers’ clubs, neighbourhood organizations, indigenous groups or carpenters’ associations. As an OTB the comunidad can annually apply for project-funding to aid in their comunidades’ improvement, by elaborating a so-called Plan Operativo Anual (POA) which must comply with the PDM plans. The sum of these legal changes resulted in indigenous comunidades acquiring legal status, which, in turn, legitimised the indigenous status of their inhabitants. This reinforced the still new concept of Bolivia as a pluri-national state. In
Silvia explains that in the first years after the introduction of the LPP ‘they’ - Carmen Florida and the majority of the municipality - had been “against the law”. Consciously or not, with this she was in agreement with the indigenous and highlanders’ umbrella organisation, Confederation of the Union of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia, CSTUCB) and its initial rejection of the decentralization plan. The CSTUCB had claimed that the policy was yet another manipulative means to take power from indigenous groups. As in many other municipalities in Bolivia, the new policies were not properly understood and thus not fully implemented (Postero 2007; Beneria-Surkin 2004). However, Silvia adds, “later we realized that the Participation Law was a good law”. To disseminate information to the public, prevent corruption and maintain a high standard of transparency of local governments’ spending, the LPP included the introduction of municipal summits (cumbres municipals). Silvia’s change in perspective can be attributed to informative workshops in which she partook. This US-AID funded initiative was specifically aimed at local municipal leaders, and explained how to implement policies and conduct summits. Stepping forward to make use of its legal OTB status, in 2007 Carmen Florida applied to the municipality of Rurrenabaque to construct a well, a communal source of potable water, in the comunidad.

“Evo is not sending down the IDH\textsuperscript{107} funds” – The Municipal Summits as a Political Tool

The municipal summits were first implemented to provide more transparency on the spending of the municipality. Comunidades and organisations send representatives to participate in these summits. Here excel-lists are projected onto a wall, providing information on what has been accomplished in the past year. While providing transparency and re-enforcing a sense of community, these summits are also used by the party in power, the MNR, for political purposes. Importantly, the MNR is an opposition party to Evo’s MAS party against which antagonism is encouraged. Shortly after the new referendum in 2010, the MNR mayor of Rurrenabaque, Yerko Nuñez, was confronted aggressively in a summit by colonos demanding an explanation as to incomplete obras (public projects/works) in the municipality. Colonos are typically considered MAS supporters, while local lowlanders are traditional MNR supporters. The underlying tone was that he

\textsuperscript{107} Impuesto directo a los hidrocarburos – A hydrocarbon tax whose revenues are channelled towards the development of municipalities. By 2011 the revenues from this sector totalled US $2.2 billion, which is more than 50% of state revenues (Kohl and Farthing 2012). The IDH were a result of the Morales government’s new mineral tax implemented in 2006.
had lined his pockets with public money, and was corrupt. Smoothly Yerko turned the focus from himself, calling with angry disappointment:

Yes, this project was not completed! But it is not our fault. For how can we spend money that is not given us? There was no money left to finish the project! We do our best! But the president (Evo Morales) is not sending down the IDH.

I heard continual talk of ‘the IDH’ during my research. When someone talks about the IDH, he or she is always referring to revenues allotted to municipalities from the hydrocarbon tax, redirected by the government. It is common that people directly refer to Morales when they talk, saying “Evo is not sending us the IDH”, evoking the image of the president himself preventing a truckload of money from descending to the Amazon from the Andes. Yerko’s outburst presented an argument which was not novel to any of the participants, and a murmur ran through the crowd. The negative sentiment which had been directed at the mayor was redirected against the government, the MAS party and President Morales. Once again it was confirmed, as Alejandro from Carmen Florida had once explained to me, that the President, “does not love us” (no nos quiere). Alejandro nods and repeats “Evo does not love us, so we don’t love him either” (no nos quiere, entonces tampoco le queremos). The missing IDH funds become one more example of how Morales hinders the development of small lowland municipalities; and the fact that he ‘dislikes’ them as they are lowlanders and do not make up his main voting constituency.

The hard facts around the ‘missing’ IDH, however, are different. In accordance with the 2009 constitution, funds have in fact become lawfully redirected so that municipalities with higher constituencies (above 15,000 inhabitants) receive a larger percentage of them. Rurrenabaque is among the smallest municipalities in Bolivia. Yet even those of its inhabitants who have understood the change in law still see cunning and malice. Daniel, a mestizo of Japanese descent living in Rurrenabaque, tells me:

Of course he (Evo) changed that law! This way his people (Aymara and Quechuas) get all the benefits. The smallest municipalities are here in the lowlands. While the big cities, they are in the highlands. They are La Paz, El Alto and Oruro. Full of collas!

Indeed, the Andean cities of Oruro and El Alto have the highest percentage of Aymara inhabitants in Bolivia. In the presidential election, these places demonstrated the highest percentage of Morales’ supporters. Thus, whether the lawful redirection of funds is fully
comprehended or not, mestizos and indigenous people of the municipality are in consensus: the current government is against them. This is an aspect which further unifies the two racial-social groups against incoming highland colonos and plays into the age-old regional conflict.

*Of ‘Humble’ Tacana People and ‘Cunning’ Colonos*

When I sat in on the municipal summit in Rurrenabaque in 2009, the first thing that struck me was the number of bored faces and mothers languidly fanning their babies’ faces. This was in great contrast to the first municipality summit I had visited in 2004, at which the town hall’s roofed open-air space was packed and there was a buzz of excitement in the air. It seemed that most comunidades had sent a representative to take part. Now, five years later, I seemed to see many more representatives of colono comunidades ‘de la carretera’ (from the main road) – as people said here, because the main road is where the colonos usually settled - than representatives from nearby indigenous comunidades representing Tacana, Moseten, Tsimané, Lecos and Ese-Eja. Everyone focused on the council member at the microphone who was listing what the municipality had spent of the IDH money received from the government and other major donors such as UNICEF and the World Bank. The summit is where the annual POA of each comunidad is explained, and comunidad members can see what other comunidades have applied for, what has already been put into action and what is still awaiting completion.

When the inhabitants of Carmen Florida acquired a water tank in 2009 in accordance with their POA, it was built right next to the schoolhouse and the cede central – the comunidad’s main meeting house. As far as I could gather, they had waited years for the meagre four metre by four metre concrete construction, year after year submitting the request to the municipality. But because ‘Evo was not sending down the IDH’, things had advanced slowly. Now, finally, there was one tap furnishing drinkable water and weekly comunidad meetings were filled with plans on how each family could lay a white plastic pipe to their compound so that they would not have to make the long trek to. Miguel, the new corregidor, soon told me “it’s no good. It leaks.” I saw that he was right as around the tank there was a continuous puddle of water, much to the delight of domestic pigs. Also, “the water pressure,” Marco from Carmen Florida explained to me “is not strong enough and it’s no use to lay down pipes leading to our houses.” Voicing his disdain for the malfunctioning water-tank, Miguel looked to make a point about the municipality of Rurrenabaque and about his fellow comunidad inhabitant, Silvia, who represented indigenous comunidades on the municipal
council. Both, he implied, were useless. Generally, as he told me on other occasions, all politics was useless and this was why he never voted at all.

Miguel’s scepticism of parties, governments and their municipal revenues is not unusual among the Tacana, as discussed in the last chapter. In line with Tacana people’s ‘humble’ manner, neither he nor the comunidad got very upset when the water-tank proved a failure. In fact, I was amazed at their calm and almost nonchalant reaction. No boisterous or immediate protest was launched. Instead, one day, the traditional group of comunidad authorities - the corregidor, the president and the schoolteacher - decided to set out to Rurrenabaque to talk to the mayor and try and improve the situation. It was immediately obvious that their ‘shy’ manner stood in contrast to the colonos’ way of reacting to perceived injustice.

Silvia from Carmen Florida had been voted onto the municipal council for the second year in a row now. She was very proud of this fact. This year she was in charge of the commission Tierra y Territorio (land and territory). Acting within the framework of the law, Silvia sees it as her obligation to protect the municipality, which she simultaneously considers her ancestral territory, from falling into the hands of the ‘wrong’ people. The ‘wrong’ people in this case are highland migrants of Aymara and Quechua descent (colonos).

For weeks she recounted to me in the evenings what complications this work brought with it. But it was “interesting”, for here she was “gaining a lot of experience. I am learning the laws. Most of the people of the comunidades don’t understand the laws.” One of her favourite stories was about how colonos “take advantage” (aprovechan) of the municipality. In doing so, they also take advantage of the local people (la gente del lugar), meaning lowlanders, a situation she wants to hinder. The collas, she explained carefully, always try to get more, to make a profit (ganar). They are ambitious! They help each other. They go to the municipality and ask for land, they buy this land cheaply. But not like we do. We buy it for our family, to build a house….have animals. No. They buy and cut down all the wood! Just for the wood! They always look for profit. But the people of the region, we do not look to make profit. We (Tacana) want to live peacefully and comfortably. We sell a chicken here or a tree-trunk there, but only in order to live peacefully. Comfortably. But how can we do this, if the collas advance on us like termites taking our land and cutting down our trees to sell?”
Sitting on the porch of her house in Rurrenabaque, Silvia recounted to me how groups of colonos who have recently come to the lowlands will show up at the municipality to register their newly-settled comunidades. In this context, Silvia’s work requires her to travel to these newly-settled colono comunidades lying outside Rurrenabaque. It is her job to verify their physical existence. She has come across a number of cases in which colono families have created fake or as they are called, ‘phantom comunidades’ (comunidades fantasmas). I had asked her why they would so do. “To receive the money for schools and health posts” Silvia cried, rubbing thumb and index finger together in the typical gesture signifying ‘money’. To the inhabitants of Rurrenabaque, the fact that colono families create ‘phantom comunidades’ in order to reap municipal benefits (subsidies) reserved for infrastructure such as schools and roads is not a novel phenomenon. With a mixture of pride and anger Silvia recounts an occasion upon which she and her municipal delegation had travelled to the outskirts of the municipal boundaries to verify the existence of the newly established colono comunidad ‘Los Jovenes’, only to find that there was

(...) nothing - only jungle and overgrowth – and a group of collas of all ages waiting to receive us with a huge fiesta. The new comunidad, however, was nowhere to be seen; just a shack somewhere in the middle of a cleared jungle field. The collas had assembled together all of their family and neighbours to help feign being the members of a new comunidad. (...)

They would try and deter us from walking out to the new comunidad (from the road), saying that the path was feo (ugly, ie muddy) and the distance great. But I would insist. I want to see the comunidad, where is it? And then we would walk. We walked for hours and hours through the jungle. Since I am from el campo (the country-side) and a comunidad, I am used to walking and it does not bother me. If I were not from a comunidad I would not have had the training to walk so far and long. Indeed, the others from the delegation who are from el pueblo (ie mestizo) stayed behind. The collas made me walk for hours hoping to tire me out. In the end they showed me a shack for cows in a field and told me this was the sede (meeting house) of the comunidad. But where were the houses? There were none. So I refused to sign their documents. They were very angry. By the end of the month they issued a formal complaint against me (ie so that I would resign or the post would be taken from me). They don’t know the laws! But I know the laws! I know that what I did was right.

In this example, Silvia uses the fact that she has an indigenous identity (for which she uses the expression ‘from the comunidades’) positively, and to strengthen her position. In being indigenous she presents herself as being in a superior position to that of the mestizos (for whom she uses the expression ‘those from the town’) as from here she is able to uncover and recognize the colonos’ ‘deception’ in a way that mestizos cannot. Being indigenous gives her certain abilities
which the mestizos do not have (eg to walk greater distances and not to succumb to the bribe of fiesta, food and drink), and she can employ these abilities to the benefit of all lowlanders. Thus, being indigenous enables her to not only ‘protect’ fellow Tacana people but also lowland mestizos from the intruding and deceitful colonos. This runs counter to the historic power dynamic of the mestizo as former patrón and sole authority, and the indigenous as ‘protector’ of land and territory for both lowland mestizo and Tacana.

In Silvia’s statement lies the claims that Tacana people, by being indigenous to this area, have more integrity and a higher investment in defending the land against ‘intruders’ than do non-indigenous people. The conflict Silvia presents is not between mestizos and indigenous, as one might expect given the colonial politics of land distribution. The conflict lies between Tacana people and colonos, two indigenous groups, the former of whom, as Silvia claims, “advance on us like termites, taking our land and cutting down our trees to sell”. Firstly, this incident demonstrates that ‘indigenous identity’ is becoming increasingly accepted and developed among Tacana people, as a useful political tool but disengaged from the formal indigenous movements of Bolivia. It further demonstrates that Tacana people have a stronger affiliation with a ‘camba’ rather than with an ‘indigenous’ identity.

According to Silvia, the colonos are upfront and bold in what they demand. She remembers that “at the summit meetings the collas yell and cry and make a show if they are denied benefits, they say: Our children need to go to school! The municipality has to build us a school!” and with this Silvia shakes her fist in the air, mimicking the colonos’ behaviour. “On the other hand,” she adds, “the nature of us here in the lowlands is different. We don’t complain,” and she finishes as the Tacana so often do, “somos humilde” (we are humble).

“The Colonos have Become more Aggressive” - The Struggle over Land

Land is an especially sensitive issue, and one which has become topical in the past years. “Before all the new laws,” says Silvia, “land was worthless. There was a lot of it. It did not matter. It was cheap. No one wanted it”. But since the introduction of land tenures, national parks, new municipal laws, attributing territory to municipalities and, not least, changes in laws around lumber, the issue has changed. Land has become hard to come by and the timber industry has become central in and around Rurrenabaque. Criticism of incoming colonos, too, has therefore increased. “The problem is,” says Silvia, “colonos just come in without asking. They are bold. They come and
settle, just like that!” she snaps her fingers. “It’s because that president of theirs (Morales) backs them up. They come here, go into the national parks, go into the TCOs, settle private property – they feel strong, those colonos. They have become more aggressive now!”

Fleshing out what Silvia was referring to, Canela from Buena Vista, a forest-ranger for the Madidi National Park, explained to me on a different occasion that patrolling different sections of the protected area she and her team regularly came across colonos, cutting down trees and clearing large sections of forest in preparation for planting.

“They just show up and start building their comunidades. Sometimes it is months before we are even aware of them. They don’t always want to leave. They argue with us and say: ‘you have so much space here! You don’t need it all to yourselves. Why do you need a TCO with so much space? We need to live somewhere we need to make our fields. We are not leaving!’

Canela shakes her head, “we talk to them. We explain that this is a national park that they cannot just come and live here. Sometimes they listen and sometimes they do not”.

There is no doubt in the minds of the inhabitants of Rurrenabaque that the self-confidence in the form of ‘aggressiveness’ of the colonos has increased with the election of President Evo Morales. It is said that the MAS’ rise to power has bolstered the self-esteem of ‘Evo’s people’ while in 2003 the term ‘colono’ still had a neutral ring, when I returned in 2008 to do research the term was beginning to have a negative connotation. Today, organizations in Rurrenabaque such as The Special Federation of Colono Agriculturists of Rurrenabaque (La Federación Especial de Colonizadores Agropecuarios de Rurrenabaque - FECAR) are looking to change their name, omitting the word ‘colono’. ‘Colono’ is starting to become associated with all the negative traits of the highlands; it is becoming an insult.

Tacana people often give the impression that their troubles can largely be attributed to colonos. Before they began migrating en masse “times were nice”, as Juanita told me as opposed to the government by mala gente (bad people) such as Evo. In the era of President Paz-Estenssorro (1951 - 1956) and at the time of land reform they were ‘heard’ and ‘set free’. Those were lindos tiempos (nice times) when the Tacana comunidad members were “unified and respected each other”. But this mutual respect, according to accounts from Carmen Florida, Buena Vista and Tumupasa, changed first with the coming in of evangelical churches (see chapter one) and now with the increasing influx of colonos.
In fact, however, historically there has always been a steady flow of Aymara/Quechua migrants into the Tacana territory and in modern times the most intense influx came with the construction of a road leading from La Paz to Rurrenabaque and on to Ixiamas in the 1980s. The first highland-migrant comunidades were, if not directly welcome, at any rate tolerated. They did not pose a threat for, as Silvia said, “there was a lot of land”. The same went for individual highland families who settled in the Tacana comunidades of Ixiamas and Tumupasa, which hold a high population of colonos families.

Today problems occurring in a comunidad are commonly attributed to the influence if not the direct presence of colonos. Colonos, it is said, introduce ‘bad habits’ (malas costumbres). As the term ‘colono’ is starting to become an insult, Tacana people such as Silvia will be more indirect when referring to them, saying instead ‘persons from the outside’ (gente de afuera) or ‘people from the main road’ (gente de la carretera). Describing a fellow comunidad member’s bad conduct in illegally cutting down trees which belong to the comunidad, Silvia refers to him as having associated too much with the colonos:

All the Nury (brothers) cut wood…and never ask for (the comunidad’s) permission. And they don’t contribute any benefit to the comunidad. They could at least give something…we don’t have chairs, we don’t have tables for the school. They really are taking advantage (of the comunidad) … they like to do as those from the main road do (como los de la carretera, ie the colonos).108

(...) I became very angry upon learning this and I said (at the monthly comunidad meeting), “the people who come from other places (ie the highlands), the only thing they are good for is to be told what to do! The people originally from here (ie the Tacana people)...we never before had problems. We lived as brothers!”

On another occasion, Anita from Carmen Florida, expressing her frustration and to illustrate the highlander’s arrogance towards the lowland groups, recounts a conflict with a highland market woman, whom she refers to as a cholita for her typical highlander appearance of long braids, and a

108 “Todos los (hermanos) Colques cortaban mader... y no pedian permiso... Y no dan nada a la comunidad. Por lo menos dar un beneficio...no tenemos bancos, no tenemos mesa...silla... en el colegio. Son muy aprovechadores...le gusta hacer como hacen tambien aqui en la carretera. (...)Yo me enoje grave. Yo dije (en la reunion), la gente que vienen de otro lado, solo sirven para ser manado! La gente originaria del lugar...jamás hemos tenido problemas. Hemos vivido como hermanos!” (Field Notes)
long shawl and skirt. The indoor market of Rurrenabaque exclusively houses *colono* women selling produce both from local production and imported from the highlands.

I was so angry. That *cholita* told me that we down here (i.e. Tacana people) would be nothing without them. We depend on them (for the import of products from the highlands). They think we need them?! We have our fields! We live from our fields! I told her, we live from our fields, we don’t need you!

Local inhabitants feel that though there has been a switch in government since Morales’ accession to the presidency, this has only been to the benefit of highland indigenous peoples, who are receiving privileged treatment. This is especially the case in land redistribution issues in which the government supersedes small municipalities, such as Rurrenabaque, which does not back the MAS party and attributes land to landless highlanders without first consulting them Silvia explains:

The *colonos* come sent (by the government) with their land title in hand. Many land titles (have been doled out to the *collas* and they) come directly from La Paz to settle here. The president sends all of them here to the main road and they already have their land-titles. (...) The normal conduct, however, would be to respect the (municipality) laws. If someone wants land, they should have to go to the capital\(^\text{109}\). Or turn to the town hall; negotiate with the town hall, with the authority here, the mayor. And then from this they can proceed (with the transaction on a national level). But not them, no. They brought their navigation devices, ignoring the municipality and do their own thing. This is the kind of abuse the government hands out. And he (Evo Morales) also does this with the TCOs, but since we are only indigenous, he doesn’t care. He will do whatever he wants.\(^\text{110}\)

Somewhat confusingly, Silvia’s statement asserts that because the Tacana people are ‘only indigenous’, the equally indigenous president ‘does what he wants’. In the first instance this logic does not add up. However, what it demonstrates is that Silvia does not count ‘ethnicity’ in the equation of why the MAS project is different from those of all the previous governments. She does not ‘recognize’, that the MAS and Evo Morales specifically follow a ‘de-colonizing’, pro-indigenous

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\(^\text{109}\) The capital of the department of Beni is Trinidad.

\(^\text{110}\) “*Aquí en la carretera* (the only road leading from the Bolivian Andes to the Amazon) *les mandan ya titulado ya.* Artos títulos vienen de La Paz directo, para que (los collas) se asienten aquí. ... *El presidente mandó todos donde la carretera para que estos se sane...y que tengan título.*” ... “*El conducto regular es no atropellando las leyes...si alguien quiere tierra...tienen que irse al departamento. Hacer solicitar a la alcaldía...hacer tramitar por la alcaldía...con la autorización del alcalde. Y luego hacer el procedimiento. Ellos no. Ellos han traído directamente su vía satelital (GPS), desconociendo el municipio...ignorando...y haciendo sus cosas. Esa clase de atropello hace el gobierno. (Y lo hace) con la TCO...pero si somos indígenas...no lo va a importar...va meter lo que él (Evo Morales) quiere.”
course and that this is revolutionary to Bolivia. However, what she does ‘recognize’ is a much more intricate aspect in the context of indigeneity in Bolivia: that there is more than one indigeneity and hers is not the ‘right’ one. In her statement, by using the term ‘indigenous’, she is silently also utilizing the term originario (original). Previous to the rise of the modern indigenous movement, the highlanders regarded themselves as originarios while the lowland Indians were termed ‘indigenous’. The Andean-centric history of Bolivia considered being ‘originario’ as a step up from being ‘indigenous’. Grisaffi (2010), who did research in a mixed colono–comunidad in the valley regions of Bolivia, the Yungas, found this attitude exemplified in the statement of one colono man: that ‘they’ (the colonos) are originarios and not indigenas, different for the fact that they are a bit more ‘civilized’. For when they first arrived, “(m)ost of them (the Yuracare people) ran away into the jungle but some of them had become civilised already. They didn’t want to give up their lands...but we conquered them with alcohol, cigarettes and salt.” (ibid: 426).

Juanita works at the Centro Cultural Tacana located on the other side of the river from Rurrenabaque. As the cultural centre is in a strategic location overlooking the town’s plaza, Juanita can see the buses from La Paz coming into town each evening. From here they continue towards Ixiamas, on the road which leads into the TCO Tacana and to National Madidi Park. Juanita repeats what Silvia had already told me: that colonos are simply allotted land by the government with no coordination with local authorities. However, there is more. “They have land-titles for our land,” she notes calmly. “They have documents which allots them land in the TCO!” I look sceptical, for this would mean the government takes the liberty of allocating TCO land, land over which it does not have jurisdiction. In the end I was never able to see official documents stating that this was the case. But more interesting than whether this was actually true or not was the strong belief and feeling of impotence which Tacana people expressed concerning what had been lawfully attributed to them. It demonstrated the deep-seated mistrust of the government, as covered in the previous chapter, and signalled the old belief that anything the government attributes to them could just as easily be nullified again. However, the difference was that while previously this had been the threat of a ‘mestizo government’, it was now one of an ‘indigenous government’ which simultaneously privileged ‘his people’ (Aymara/Quechuas) to the disadvantage of lowland indigenous groups.

This chapter has demonstrated that the failure to take into account differences between highland and lowland indigenous groups ignores the impact which Andean-centrism has had on Bolivia. This failure also perpetuates the muting of lowland indigenous voices and encourages the
traditional view of them as ‘less civilized’ and marginal. The indigenous movement and the politics around indigeneity in Bolivia constitute a platform which Tacana people are not able adequately to make use of, as they do not feel it represents them. To avoid this, it is vital to understand which Tacana people are involved in the indigenous movement and to recognize that there are different Tacana people, as shaped by class status. This in turn is closely linked to how race has been constructed, which is the focus of the following chapter.
When I returned to visit Tumupasa in 2009 I could not help but be surprised at seeing the same palm-thatched roofs and wood-plank houses I had encountered six years ago.111 These echoed the rather romantic black and white photographs taken by early anthropologist Karin Hissink in the 1950s (see Hissink and Hahn 1961) as well as more recent anthropological descriptions (eg Wentzel 1989). It struck me how slow the situation was in changing, especially after so many years of international aid and more recently the indigenous movement, in which the Tacana were represented by considered to be among the most successful indigenous organizations in Bolivia.112 Was it that people preferred living this way? Taking a closer look around, I saw there was, in fact, some change. A few houses were made of brick and covered with corrugated iron sheets. One might wonder which lucky families had come by the more prestigious type of housing material, and why it seemed that others had been left out of the vast wave of ‘rural development projects’ over the past twenty years.

Some authors argue that claiming an indigenous identity has provided the most vulnerable groups with the possibility of liberating themselves from the nation-state and international contexts which promote a new kind of capitalism (Brysk 2000; Nash 2001; Sieder 2002; Postero and Zamosc, 2004; Postero 2007; Martínez Novo 2006). In a comparison of indigenous movements across Latin America, Brysk (2000) lays out how social movements based around ethnicity have given today’s indigenous people a platform and tools which to negotiate rights and resources independent of national and international markets. While this may be true, the fact remains that fixed definitions of indigeneity have worked to give credence and political power to certain ‘kinds’ of indigenous (Hale 2004; Kuper 2003), namely those which are part of national and international indigenous organizations as opposed to those not involved with these, no matter how native in origin. As might be expected, this causes tensions. Those belonging to the Tacana indigenous organizations, especially if they are active members on the CIPTA board, are typically a sore point with those who

111 Wentzel in her article (2009) makes a similar observation in reference to returning to Tumupasa after having conducted fieldwork there in 1987.
112 In 2004 CIPTA was collaborating with more than twenty national and international funding organisations.
are not involved. They provoke suspicious comments, such as that of Juanita’s sister-in-law, originally from the mission comunidad of Tahua and now living in San Buenaventura:

Money flows into projects and then you don’t see where it goes. It only goes to certain people – to the people working in the NGOs or the leaders of the TCO. Certain people (ie Tacana) profit from NGOs, but most people do not.

If the Bolivian state has failed to adequately establish the differences between indigenous groups, it certainly fails to consider important differences within the same indigenous group. A significant one of these is social class. As demonstrated in this chapter, this failure has led to an inefficient distribution of power and resources among one group and brought about conflicts between different indigenous groups. In collaborations and negotiations for resources, especially in the context of indigenous movements, the indigenous comunidad represents itself and is treated as a homogenous unit, mirroring Enlightenment ideas of traditional egalitarian Amazonian societies. However, as is immediately obvious upon entering Tumupasa, Buena Vista or Carmen Florida, some Tacana are in a more privileged position in the comunidad than others. It has been accepted for generations that there are ‘important’ Tacana families who have traditionally always had, as Juanita from Buena Vista put it, “a bit more”. Among the Tacana, as in Bolivia as a whole, class alignments are rooted in blood linkage which is tied to race and origin. Some Tacana are ‘whiter’ than others. Tacana people increasingly comment, as they begin to understand the political power implied in the indigenous movement, “the president of CIPTA, Emilio, is not really Tacana at all! His father was white! We, we are the real Tacana. Him, he is not really Tacana!” Taking bloodline as a basis and tracing the history of the Tacana since colonization, one might argue that all Tacana are, in fact, mestizos. This is of particular interest in the present context, as Bolivia’s middle-class is increasingly claiming mestizaje. Mestizos in Latin America have played an important hybrid role in colonial society as both the impure deviants and the transmitters of modernism to indians (De La Cadena 2000; Mörner 1967 et al).

This chapter focuses on the comunidad of Tumupasa to observe how mestizaje has been evaluated differently in the lowlands and highlands. This in turn uncovers how mestizaje is linked to today’s indigenous movement and constructions around indigeneity in Bolivia. Key here is how race has become linked to social class. Focusing on the time prior to the surge of ethnic movements, this chapter first reviews the construction of the indian as based on the Andean indigenous, as discussed in more detail in chapter one. It then discusses the role mestizaje has played in Latin America and
more specifically its development in Bolivia, where lowland development needs to be distinguished from that of the highlands.

Tracing the first white settlement in the Amazon and also in Tumupasa demonstrates how colonial policy organized wealth for taxation purposes. In creating racial categories for taxation purposes, policy came to dictate a person’s racial affiliation as aligned with their financial standing and regardless of their ‘biological race’. In the Amazon comunidad, such as Tumupasa, mestizos came to play important mediation roles, between the comunidad and the state. This was enforced by a colonial political system, the so-called cabildos indigenas (indigenous councils) which were a greater guarantee of control over the indians of a comunidad. This system enhanced the perpetuation of an élite, who were as a general rule the white and mestizo families in the comunidad. In Tumupasa and Buena Vista these families still maintain their status although due less to any economic advantage than to their name. They have become significant again today in that they are not only the former political leaders but also the new ones in the indigenous movement: political leadership ‘runs in the family’. They are the people who first collaborated with outside bodies such as NGOs and finally came to engage Tacana people in the indigenous movement. The fact that these families were originally from the non-indigenous sector of Tumupasa reveals much about the debates around the construction of ‘indigeneity’. It also sheds light on the character around which the ‘permitted indian’ (Hale 2004) becomes constructed.

The purpose of this chapter is not to challenge arguments which validate the consolidation of indigenous identity as a successful tool for agency, but to support the argument that Indian-ness, along with other identity features, needs to be considered in particular contexts (Martínez Novo 2006). Tracing the contexts which surround the different constructions of Indian-ness in Bolivia lays bare the mechanisms by which lowland groups remain less visible than highland groups. This in turn allows a clearer understanding of how violent conflicts between highland and lowland indigenous groups are easily overlooked.

The focus here is on a lowland comunidad. As mentioned in chapter one, different categories of lowland comunidades existed, distinguishable by how they were founded (see also Brysk 2000). The earliest types as missions, such as Tumupasa; established by patrones, such as
Buena Vista; or as established by highland colonos along the lines of the ayllu.\textsuperscript{113} Significantly, the mission comunidades incorporated a constellation of hierarchies, creating social classes which were rooted in turn-of-the-century European ideas of eugenics (see Stepan 1991). In these, achieving ‘whiteness’ was most desirable while being ‘indian’ was linked to inferiority. In the latter half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century the mestizos were typically attributed a hybrid role such as that of teacher, who understood and could interact with the indians and could also bring them closer to white culture. However, the lowland mestizo and indian have remained fairly invisible in Bolivia where the representation of the indian is defined around the culture and trajectory of Aymara and Quechua people.

\textit{The Andean Indian as the Status Quo}

The representation of the highland indian culture does not translate to lowland cultures on a number of levels. Lowland cultures did not structure their lives around ayllus but settled in European missions, many of which today have come to be regarded as representations of original indigenous culture. In Bolivia, belonging to an indigenous comunidad is key in ‘measuring’ a person’s indigeneity. This is also represented in Tacana people’s collective identity term, ‘the people of the comunidades’ (la gente de los comunidades).

Although the representative image of the indian has changed in Bolivia in the past decade, the historical archetypal image of the highland indian contributed to shaping racial categories, despite the fact that the modern indigenous movement began in the lowlands. The lowlanders became a focal point for NGOs and in other aid contexts. It was found that access to land and resources could be gained by arguing in terms of origin and ancestry. Although the indigenous movement has brought about a shift in the national representation of the Bolivian indian, the image of the lowland indian is still considered in relation to the representative image of the Andean indian. This dominant image has also determined understandings of mestizaje and the mestizo.

\textit{Mestizaje} has played an ambiguous role in Latin America. It appears that mestizaje symbolized different things in the Andes than in lowland nations (especially Mesoamerica) (see

\textsuperscript{113} The ayllu is a specifically Andean form of indigenous organisation centred on a group of families and communities which come together to administer justice, and carry out communal forms of agricultural production. For an overview of the ayllu system and its historic relation to the mestizo state see for example Rivera Cusicanqui (1992). For a more specific treatment of a highland migrant community in the lowlands and near Tumupasa see Wentzel (1989).
Gotkowitz 2011). In Andean America mestizos were historically assigned a lower place in colonial society than indian (De La Cadena 2000). While the Andean indian was ignorant, naïve and hard-working and the white European was intellectual and civilized, the mestizo was cunning, calculating and corrupted (ibid). Generally mestizaje was a sign of female moral degeneration, a problem linked to incorrect female sexual behaviour such as overt lust (ibid).

Mestizaje typically arose from the indian woman being impregnated by the white man. This pattern raised the issue of ‘social hygiene’ which combined physical and moral elements for the correct sexual behaviour necessary for a healthy, robust society (Stepan 1991; Wade 2009). Issues surrounding the indians and mestizos gained prominence in the context of the Latin American indigenist (indigenista) movement. A predominantly white intellectual movement was developed especially in the 1920s and evolved into different branches of thought up until the 1990s, when popular ideas from this context gradually became replaced and superseded by the indigenous movements. The indigenous movements have largely criticized indigenism as a demonstration of positive racism which does not look to challenge the unequal racial hierarchies, but rather reconfirm them (Coronado 2009; Canessa 2006a; Becker 1995).

Culturally and symbolically, in order for mestizaje become valid it needed to be ‘cleansed’ from its impure, mixed state. This entailed a certain process, which originated in the concept of ‘decency’, a notion which has changed from decade to decade since colonizatio. This concept is rooted in the notion of ‘purity of blood’ relevant to the Christians of the Iberian Peninsula in the 1300s, as opposed to those of Jewish or Muslim descent with whom they shared the territory for seven hundred years (De La Cadena 2000; Wade 2009). Decency became the signifier of validity for indian-ness under the Spanish Crown in the 1500s which accredited indians who converted to Christianity with the status of limpieza de sangre (cleaning of the blood) (Stolcke 1994; Wade 2009). The ‘cleansed’ status never signified equality with the European colonizers, many of who themselves were recent Muslim and Jewish converts to Christianity (Cohen 1969). The inherent concept, however, remained relevant and is important in issues around suffrage and nation-building.

‘Decency’ was the marker which non-whites needed to achieve to be accepted into the realms of colonial society, and eventually form a legitimate middle-class in Bolivia. Initially decency needed to be acquired by individuals through statutes which were issued by the crown or state itself. Later, however, it came to mean a specific lifestyle. This incorporated a formal education,
‘hard work’ and, importantly, cleanliness (De La Cadena 2000). As Mary Douglas (1966) has pointed out, in its essence dirt represents disorder (or chaos) which needs to be put in order to achieve cleanliness. Accordingly, impurity has typically been treated as a feature of subordinate groups and builds on the idea of dirt and contamination. It was believed that an ‘adequate’ education would bring the non-whites into the realms of being gente decente (decent people) which in turn brought them into the realms of being ‘civilized’ and ‘having culture’, and edging closer to whiteness itself.

In Bolivia the representation of the mestizo as a degenerate hybrid began to change after the Chaco War (1932-35). As laid out by Laura Gotkowitz (2008), the 1942 manifesto of the newly-organized MNR party lauded mestizos as a sort of national symbol against colonialism. This attitude was probably adopted from those of lowland countries of Mesoamerica (eg Nicaragua) which considered mestizaje as a healthy hybrid, a mix of indian and European persons which inherits the better of the two blood-lines? (Hale 2002; Gould 1998). At this point in 1942 the MNR strove to incorporate mestizo representation into the government. Significant in this revolutionary gesture is that a distinction was made between ‘mestizo-whites’ and ‘mestizo-indians’, thereby maintaining the racial hierarchy between the intellectual heads of the party and the middle- or working-class mestizos (Gould 1998).

The first MNR government took steps to stand in solidarity with both the indian and mestizo population as demonstrated by the May 1945 Indigenous Congress called by President Gualberto Villarroel. Though this measure was principally taken to gain better control over different sections of the country, it was still the only one of its kind in South America at the time, and perhaps in all of Latin America in that it included a large number of indigenous representatives. The first indigenous congress was in Mexico in 1940, the Inter-American Indigenista Conference (or Pátzcuaro Congress) but, as generally characteristic of the indigenista movements, was predominantly composed of non-indian, well-educated social scientists and government officials motivated by paternalistic interests (Becker 1995). What made the Bolivian congress significant was that indian leaders were directly assigned the responsibility of keeping ‘order and peace’ in their comunidades (Gotkowitz 2008:192). This position of responsibility attributed to indians a form of citizenship, for in their position of authority they represented the state. Significant for Tacana people’s history, the congress gathered together indian leaders mostly from the highlands and the valleys of Bolivia, disregarding the Amazon.
Constructing Mestizaje – Highland and Lowland

In the Andes the mestizo of Quechua/Aymara descent was urban and had left his/her rural comunidad to find work among the working-class and in the market infrastructure of the white city of La Paz (Albó 2008; De La Cadena 2000). Thus, mestizaje became associated with the Andean city (De La Cadena 2000). However, as the representative depiction of indian-ness and mestizaje did not smoothly translate to the Amazon, its role and significance for the Amazon comunidad have remained largely invisible on the national political platform. In the Bolivian Amazon mestizaje was not urban as in the Andes but remained rural; and signified not a degeneration of moral values but an upgrading of the racial standing of the comunidad. This is an attitude much in line with the turn-of-the-20th-century thought on miscegenation which, following eugenicist beliefs, equated blackness with backwardness and whiteness with progress, and envisaged that blacks might upgrade the genetic composition of their race by mixing with whites (Stepan 1991). Indeed, and relevantly in particular for rural areas, after the 1953 land-reform mestizaje became ‘the ideological backdrop of Bolivian national identity’ (Albó 2008:30). Mestizaje linked the Tacana comunidad to civilization and, importantly, the nation-state. The male mestizos of Tumupasa were the comunidad’s role models and ‘hope’ for modernization and a better life to which all would have access. They generally held a privileged position in the comunidad and belonged to its élite. Lowland comunidades’ positive idea of mestizaje is somewhat different to the highland culture’s perception. This difference may also be attributed mainly to how mestizaje is constructed as a unidirectional concept.

Generally mestizaje has been constructed as a fluid hybrid state which by default moves in one direction only. Its starting point lies with indian ‘primitiveness’, which, when in contact with Europeans, by default begins a journey towards ‘modernity’. In this construct, the indian is attributed the role of a passive receptacle of new concepts rather than that of a contributor. The unidirectional nature of this flow is emphasized by the fact that 20th century authors (see Kubler 1952 ) speak of ‘reverting’ and becoming ‘absorbed’ when referring to Europeans settling in and adapting to indian villages. The image is that they are going ‘backwards’ and leaving modernity, with the implication that indian cultures did not produce civilizations equal in status to those produced by the Enlightenment.

The white settlers thus become absorbed into the indistinguishable natural mass of animals, forest, rivers and savages. This in turn evokes the image of ‘chaos’ which, in line with decency, as
discussed above, is ‘dirty’ or impure. This line of colonial logic thus regards white people who become Indian as regressing to a state of impurity and chaos. There exists a silence around the possibility that a plethora of white people have, since the very beginning of Spanish colonization (and perhaps even before\textsuperscript{114}), settled in comunidades and taken on Indian culture, to the extent that no remaining traces of ‘European culture’ are discernible to new white visitors generations later.

This Eurocentric attitude lies at the base of historical misconceptions. A prime example is Holmberg’s (1950) notion that the Siriono, who are native to the Bolivian Mojos area (department of Beni), were a previously ‘uncontacted’ people. He based this assumption on the ‘primitive’ state of living in which he encountered them, regarding this as proof that they had they had previously never been in contact with Europeans. Had that been the case, modernity would have ‘rubbed off’ on them and directed them onto its ‘progressive’ path. In fact, however, later theories showed that the Siriono had not only come into contact with Europeans centuries ago, but it had been this very encounter which caused their cultural decline from a large and proud culture, a more humble and less powerful one. Inherent in the Eurocentric idea that ‘whiteness’ always comes out ‘on top’: European settlers retain their ‘culture’ while Indian ways-of-being ‘give way’ to Enlightenment ideas.

\textit{Economic Situation in the Creation of Race}

Racial categories were coined in Latin America especially to serve in taxation (Albó 2008; Zavaleta Reyres 2008; Toranzo; Roca 2008; Wade 1997; Mörner 1967). In this way white people’s migration into lowland comunidades is meticulously documented in state archives. Significantly for better understanding the constructions around race, the amount of documentation generated, and the period of time it covers, prove the continuous settlement white people in Indian comunidades. The fact that white people were then ‘absorbed’ by comunidades, to use the expression of authors who have made early contributions in the discourses around the constructions of race (eg Kubler 1952, Mörner 1971), also reveals how far racial attribution is linked to economic status, which in turn is linked to policy and legislation. White people were only considered to have been ‘absorbed’ into Indian comunidades if they did not have the financial means to uphold their dominant status and thus ‘stand out’.

\textsuperscript{114} This would be in accord with theories and histories that note that before the arrival of Columbus, European merchants had been trading with peoples in the Americas. See for example Cohen (1969).
In this context, authors also use the terms ‘retrogression’ and ‘reverting’ (Kubler 1952, Mörner 1971) when talking about non-indians\textsuperscript{115} who adapted to indian \textit{comunidad} life. For taxation purposes, groups of people could become ‘white’, ‘indian’ or ‘mestizo’. While in 1796 the province of Huanuco in the Peruvian highlands originally had a \textit{mestizo} majority, owing to its rural setting and the new harsh economic conditions the province “reverted” (Kubler 1952:82) to an indian majority before 1854. Sanz (1985) makes a similar point in reference to Quijos in lowland Peru. In 1754 the governor reports that in a \textit{comunidad} of thirteen \textit{mestizos} and two indian families, “the \textit{mestizos} no longer differ from the indians in colour or other way of life, for despite being a mixture of whites and indians in colour or in way of life, they have retroceded” (ibid:262). A loss of economic status meant becoming indian.

As the Bolivian Amazonian \textit{comunidad} was always remote and far-removed from the nation’s hub, notions on socio-racial structure common in the Andes did not significantly impact the Amazon area. A clear-cut separation between the residential locations of the races was put into law in the early years of colonization (Mörner 1967). This set a precedent for a physical separation of races in cities, which did not exist in the same way in rural \textit{comunidades}. A separation of settlements such as that of white La Paz and its indian twin-city El Alto\textsuperscript{116} benefitted the urban white upper-class: the white élite had the service-sector populations (composed of indians and \textit{mestizos}) within comfortable range, but not as direct neighbours. This sort of segregated settlement policy did not function in the rural areas, allowing more room for indian customs, as polygamy, to dominate.

In pre-colonial Amazonian cultures, it was not unusual for a man to have more than one wife, with polygamy particularly associated with positions of leadership. My informants told me that before the land-reform of 1953 one or two men in Tumupasa had more than one wife. The same went for Buena Vista. “The \textit{padre} tolerated this,” Juanita from Buena Vista explained. He only stepped in if a man took on too many wives, “three or four...more than he could support.” Thus in

\textsuperscript{115} Prior to the 20\textsuperscript{th} century Peru distinguished between racial and social groups with a variety of terms each dedicated to a specific combination of racial and social mixture. For taxation purposes it distinguished predominantly between the indians and the \textit{castas}. The \textit{castas} included whites, Afro-descendants, \textit{mestizos} and races other than indian which belonged to the labour and merchant classes (Kubler 1952).

\textsuperscript{116} The indian sister city of El Alto developed parallel to La Paz, probably in line with the initial colonial policy of separation. The laws enforcing separate residential living spaces were included in the Recopoliación of 1680. (Mörner 1971).
the lowland comunidad the overbearing notion of sexual morality was different to that in the cities of the highlands.

**Tumupasa and the Nation State’s Construction of Racial Affiliation**

The racial construct in the Amazon is such that the white, as the ‘better-situated’, looks down on and ridicules the mestizo while the rural indian, being lowest on the socio-racial scale, looks up to the mestizo. In this construction, from the white person’s perspective, the mestizo is the ‘lesser’ person, and the ‘degenerate mix’, while from the indian’s perspective, the mestizo is the more powerful person. Mestizaje is the first step on the path to becoming white. The very schema of mestizaje is a one-way street leading to ‘whiteness’ and which aims to naturalize its superiority. This has shaped the identity of the Bolivian Amazon. Removed from this schema, the rural lowlands are in fact no more or less indian or mixed-race than the urban areas which are considered whiter than the rural areas.

Tumupasa is a case in point. Established as an indian mission in 1713 on the site of a failed white settlement, white families were at the heart of the comunidad’s very foundation (Chávez Suárez 1944). In late 1886 the clergy José Cardus observed of Tumupasa, ‘it seems the population comprises 260 married couples with a total of 1200 souls which include six or seven white families’ (Cardus 1886: 166). Tumupasa has seen a continuous trickle of white family settlers since its foundation (Wentzel 1989; Cardus 1886). Throughout the centuries in Peru and (today’s) Bolivia, whites and mestizos willingly settled in indian comunidades to exploit indian labour. A priest from Quito wrote cynically of this phenomenon in 1695: “the Spaniard to the most miserable mestizo or indian who dresses himself in such a way as to escape from tribute [land tax] (...) joine(d) the indians and settle(d) down in their villages in order to have them available day and night for any purpose (...)” (Mörner 1971:99 quoting Perez de Tudela y Bueso 1964:331). In the indian mission and patrón comunidades Tumupasa and Buena Vista, the few white families eventually mixed kinship ties with indians, whom they then openly recognized as family.

However, even though there have always been white families in Tumupasa, it has never been considered as anything other than an indian comunidad. This is especially reinforced today in the context of ethnic movements, in which Tumupasa is a leading example of an original indigenous

\[117\] (Translation from original Spanish my own) “Parece la población se compone de 260 matrimonios, con un total de 1200 almas, inclusas seis o siete familias blancas.”
The conclusion can be drawn that white people who lived here and remained, eventually became – in the eyes of the law - Indian. Changes in the law on land-ownership affected racial attribution throughout the centuries, as in the case of the last patron of Buena Vista before the passing of the land reform of 1953. He had taken a Tacana wife and their offspring still live in the comunidad. They are Tacana people. In earlier centuries this manner of ‘absorption’ will have worked similarly.

The Ley de Agraciados (Law of the Fortunes) of 1856\textsuperscript{118} attributed land to new settlers in the lowlands. It can be assumed that these became the patrones of the former white settlers who, if they had lost economic power, had since become ‘Indian’ in the statistics of the government. The 1886 Ley de Tierras Baldias (Law of the Waste Lands) granted Indians the right to own land. However, this law was principally passed as a measure to encourage migration to the Amazon in light of the rapidly growing rubber economy. It was a government measure to control the ‘remote’ (from the perspective of the Andes) Amazon area through taxation (Guiteras Mombiola 2010). Considering Indians’ weak educational and financial standing, it was unlikely that they acquired land-titles. It is more likely that wealthier mestizo and white settlers coming in from other areas acquired land and ‘employed’ the natives as manual labour. Taking these legislative shifts into consideration and combining them with the steady stream of white people who relocated to the lowlands, it can be concluded that the racial mixture of Tumupasa and other Tacana comunidades is no more or less mestizo than that of the larger cities of La Paz and Santa Cruz. Yet the city of Santa Cruz, especially, is considered white because of its descent from the creole Spanish oligarchy (something the inhabitants are also overtly proud of\textsuperscript{119}), while rural areas are generally considered to be more ‘Indian’.

Important here is that the white élite which resided in Indian lowland comunidades was in no way the same type of élite in power as the white criollo oligarchy of Santa Cruz who was altogether a stronger socio-politically and economically (see chapter 3). This had the significant effect that the economically superior oligarchy in the lowlands, and specifically in Santa Cruz, came

\textsuperscript{118} See Carvalho (1978)
\textsuperscript{119} This is represented, for example, in the statement made by the winner of Miss Bolivia 2004, in which she announced “...people that don't know Bolivia very much think that we are all just Indian people from the west side of the country, La Paz (...) I'm from the other side of the country, the east side... we are tall and we are white people and we know English so all that misconception that Bolivia is only an Andean country, it's wrong.”
to *symbolize* the ‘whiteness’ of the region regardless of their actual ‘racial mix’. Their powerful situation overshadowed the white *patrónes* of Buena Vista and elsewhere in the Amazon making the fact that they, too, have a white racial affiliation insignificant alone for the fact they were not of the country’s economic elite. The strong likelihood that the white families who settled in Tumupasa and Buena Vista adapted to Tacana practices and beliefs, contributes to the invisibility of their ‘white’ origins. In Tumupasa *mestizos* would continuously nurture their white blood link, through the maintenance of their status in the civil registry of the *comunidad*. If over the course of a few generations this documentation became destroyed in a fire or similar (fires have been frequent in *comunidades*) then there was no proof of their racial heritage but for the oral history passed down within the *comunidad*.

The fact that Tumupasa today represents an *authentic* indian *comunidad* demonstrates that the concept of *mestizaje* does not entail the concept of white people *becoming indian*. Overall there is a lack of literature on white people (or Europeans) who became indian whatever the process might look like, in contrast to the great body of literature elaborating on the different trajectories necessary for Indians to become *mestizo* and finally white. The underlying presumption here is that while non-whites can achieve ‘decency’ through certain behaviours, those who are ‘white’ from the outset cannot by definition – or only as an exception – ‘revert’ to something they never were in the first place. This assumption, inherent in *mestizaje*, has remained unchanged over the decades. At the same time, to support Bolivia’s independence from Spain, Simon Bolivar’s famous Letter from Jamaica (1815) positively uses and identifies with *mestizaje*, stating “(…) we are (…) neither indian nor European, but a species midway between the legitimate proprietors of this country and the Spanish usurpers (...)” (Mörner 1967:86 citing Lecuna 1956:190).

*The Mestizo Leaders and the Cabildos Indigenas in Tumupasa*

In the construction of indigeneity and in the indigenous lowland *comunidad*, the *mestizo* in Tumupasa came to play an important mediation role between the white person and the indian. In this role s/he reconfirmed the superiority of ‘whiteness’ as equating modernity but also certified the indians’ ability for ‘improvement’. This happened both symbolically through the visual - in becoming lighter-skinned - and politically by taking up authority positions in the *comunidad*. The *mestizo* sons of a white father and Tacana mother who grew up bilingual and attained a higher education served as the go-betweens for Tacana and white European authorities in the *comunidades*. Here being *mestizo* was a path towards upgrading the *comunidad*’s racial and social
standing. The *mestizo’s* presence highlighted that Indian-ness could be improved by education (De La Cadena 2000). Typically only *mestizos* could afford an education, which provided a way out of Indian-ness.

Tacana people of this study define the Tacana *mestizos* as being descendants of whites and Indians. They may use the term *gringada*, especially if the person has retained much of his or her ‘whiteness’, for example by having lived outside the *comunidad* for many years. Thus, Francisco from Buena Vista mentioned that Tumupasa schoolteacher Lucho, born to an Italian father and Tacana mother, was *gringada*. Being *gringada* can roughly be translated as ‘whiteness mixed in with indianness’ in which the Indian aspect remains obvious to *comunidad* members. In rural working-class Bolivia the term *gringo* is reserved for all white foreigners and not only for US citizens, and is not immediately derogatory. *Mestizos* from Tacana *comunidades* are viewed by the inhabitants as ‘belonging’, or even family. However, they are usually literate and economically more successful, with links to the world outside the *comunidad*.

To instil a sense of nationalism and ‘belonging’ to the nation-state, as well as to achieve better control indigenous *comunidades*, the 19th century state collaborated with the church to install the political system of the so-called indigenous councils (*cabildos indígenas*) (García Jordán 2000). The *cabildo indígena* was based around the traditional socio-authority system of the Indian highlander, the *allyu* (ibid) and thus can also be seen as an imposition on Amazonian groups. The *cabildo indígena* was responsible for ensuring that the routines which contributed to holding the *comunidad* together ran smoothly. The indigenous *cabildos* largely mirrored the *cabildo* system of colonial Alto Peru, the political structure of white and *criollo* settler towns. While the Audience of Charcas (1559) represented the Spanish state, the *cabildos* represented the people of the *comunidad* as laid down in the Laws of the Indies (*Leyes de Indias*) (Law of the Indies) by the *Real Ordenanza del Virrey Toledo* (Ordinances of Virrey Toledo) in the late 1500s. This system was to allow for a sense of community while also instilling European law, values and training in the colonial system of political affairs (ibid).

The main positions in the *cabildo indígena* of Tumupasa were filled according to racial and social standing. White and *mestizo* inhabitants held the highest positions. These were the ‘respectable folk’ in the *comunidad*, the so-called *vecinos* and *gente*. The highest possible authority position was that of *corregidor*. Each year in conjunction with the priest or *patrón* two or three
names of possible corregidores would be sent to the mayor of the town under whose jurisdiction the comunidad lay. The rest of the authorities and posts which made up the cabildo indigena were voted upon each year (Wentzel 1989; Hissink & Hahn 1985, 1961). Among their principal responsibilities was the nourishing of a certain order and unity among comunidad members. Thus, for example, it was within the responsibility of local authorities to help organize festivities, which were aligned to Catholic saints’ patrón days (Hissink & Hahn 1961).

Significantly for the link between race and social class, the post of corregidor and other important positions always went to the same families, as was the case also in Rurrenabaque. Here, family affiliation outweighed gender affiliation and women, too, were appointed corregidora. The vecinos and the church representatives generally depended mutually on each another and benefitted from each other’s socio-economic positions. With the land reform in 1953, the comunidades’ race-based social stratification began to break down. The superior status of the élite who had typically identified themselves as ‘white’ and then ‘mestizo’ in the Tumupasa registry became mostly symbolic as their financial status became little better than that of the rest of the comunidad members (see also Wentzel 1989, 2008). Even before this, however, the financial power of the élite had not been significantly higher than that of the majority. Indeed, when Juanita of Buena Vista speaks of some “people having a bit more”, visually this was represented by houses made of a concoction of packed straw and mud which would then be whitewashed, as opposed to walls made of charo. Wealthier compounds typically held more houses than poorer compounds, which had just one sleeping and one kitchen house. Elite families furthermore had more domestic animals such as horses and cattle, and employed other comunidad members in the household and to work in the fields. Thus, when stepping into a Tacana comunidad such as Tumupasa or Buena Vista the untrained eye generally saw rudimentary huts and houses and the overall impression was that of poverty, especially compared to houses in towns and cities.

Despite the land reform, formerly important families, identifiable by their surname, retained an élite status. As mentioned, policy shifts could bring about shifts in an individual’s racial attribution. Having lost their financial superiority which had formerly set them apart from the rest of the comunidad members, mestizos in Tumupasa and Buena Vista could now be easily ‘overlooked’ by the state and regarded as ‘one more indian’. In this way the combination of financial power and geographical location contributed in the shaping of one’s racial identity. However, policies did not necessarily change internal social rankings. By the time of the land reform of 1953, the system of
authority grounded in racial affiliation had become self-perpetuating. Certain families in Tumupasa were and are the established élite.

Today, tracing the racial roots of vecino (or élite) families is a delicate undertaking, and introducing this topic is not easy. Even professionals and NGO workers who have been collaborating with Tacana people long enough to know such details will wave away any inquiries as ‘politically incorrect’. With the rise of the ethnic movements this topic has become charged in a new way. Being indigenous can mean political power. As Juanita once offhandedly said, “today the whole world wants to be indigenous”. Going around inquiring as to a Tacana leader’s blood-links is not exactly getting on people’s good side, and too much interest is regarded with suspicion. The present tension around the topic indicates the extent to which the politics around mestizaje continue to be charged, and the ambiguity around indigeneity. In particular, it suggests Tacana people are less secure in their indigenous identity than they are in their ‘camba’ one. Some individuals, such as Juanita freely explained to me which families hold blood-ties with the former priest of Tumupasa or are descendants of the patrón of Buena Vista. Others, however, such as Italian-Tacana Lucho who has spent much of his adulthood abroad, vehemently denies that anyone in Tumupasa or Buena Vista is the descendant of a patrón. Either way, information on affiliation can be acquired from the comunidad’s civil registry in which people are identified as white/mestizo or indian.

Recognizing the complications posed by racist bureaucrats in attaining land titles after the land reform, initiatives were taken in the 1970s by church groups (and later by NGOs) to help indigenous groups. In 1972 the Maryknoll missionaries initiated the Equipos Móviles de Educación Integral Rural (Mobile Teams for Rural Education - EMEIR) to help establish unions and agricultural cooperatives in Bolivia which focused on issues of land redistribution (Herrera 2005). In the 1980s Father Diego of Tumupasa bought land-titles for Tumupasa families, with the understanding that they would repay him over time. Some people in Buena Vista and Tumupasa were able to obtain their private land-title without the help of the church. Juanita mentions that in Tumupasa and Buena Vista, the traditional élite families, who are among those helped by the priest, today mainly hold private land-titles within TCO territory.
Indigenous Leaders and Projects in Tumupasa - Paving the Way for the Indigenous Movement

One might assume that the 1953 revolution and land-redistribution policy radically altered the socio-political structure in a Tacana comunidad. Indeed, this might have been the case, were the Tacana people, as a group, ‘vengeful’ as opposed to ‘humble’, but it was not. Leadership positions were attributed to the same families. What did change, however, were the types of initiatives taken to continuously ‘improve’ the comunidad. With new initiatives, new committees were formed but the people on these remained largely the same. The central goal of these committees, beyond organizing festivities such as the Easter Procession, was the continuous modernization of Tumupasa.

By creating committees the mestizo families directed the comunidad members towards ‘modernization’, thereby continuously linking Tumupasa to the nation-state. This was important especially as the comunidad lay far from the country’s political hub and had limited possibilities for obtaining current information. Tumupasa’s efforts not to lose contact with municipal and departmental politics can be contrasted to other indian comunidades which lived in complete isolation from their wider surroundings, and were virtually indifferent to an affiliation with the nation-state. Importantly, committee positions also brought political leaders within the range of outside collaborations and short-term employment, a very attractive situation as cash was almost impossible to come by. Being on the board of a committee was central in gaining experience with the outside. To Tacana people this also translated ‘knowing how to travel’ (saber como viajar), which included the confidence to move in the towns and ‘know’ how to interact with people. In this way, being from an élite family could open doors and bring one within the realms of obtaining an understanding of life beyond Tumupasa; of larger political and social situations and, not least, the confidence to interact with NGOs when these began appearing.

The increased outside collaboration of state projects and NGOs perpetuated and naturalized the privileged status of the élites: already having experience led to the gaining of even greater experience. This situation is reconfirmed in the attitude of numerous Tacana people today towards élite families. Upon learning from Juanita that “some families have a bit more” as they had received the help and support of the local priest and/or the patrón, I initially wondered why this seemed to be accepted so uncritically and why it did not arouse more jealousy. But, since élite individuals have had a head-start, they possess social and political knowledge and experience in collaborating and negotiating with NGOs and government representatives. Thus, Tacana people
who have not been in these privileged positions will encourage experienced comunidad inhabitants to take on leadership positions and negotiate with NGOs, in the hope that this will prove fruitful for the comunidad as a whole. It is hoped that they will ‘know how’ (saber como) to collaborate and thus bring ‘projects’ (proyectos) into the comunidad. When I first introduced myself in Carmen Florida at a monthly comunidad meeting, my initiative as an anthropologist was not quite understood. Because I was ‘from the outside’ (de afuera), it was assumed I had come to bring ‘projects’. People from the outside who come to Tacana comunidades around Rurrenabaque are usually NGO workers or other professionals who have come to ‘help’ the comunidad within the framework of the international development arena, more recently specifically geared towards ‘indigenous people’. If one does not bring ‘projects’, one runs the risk of not being welcome and may be asked to leave. Such has been a result of international development.

As a rule, ‘projects’ are efforts to modernize the comunidad and entail different infrastructural measures. To give an idea of the steadiness and continuity of these initiatives, in Tumupasa over the course of the 1960s and 70s they have included a Neighbours Committee (Junta Vecinales), a School Committee (Junto de Auxilio Escolar) and a Road Committee (Junta Caminera). The Road Committee, established in 1976, relied on departmental funding by CORDEPAZ (The Cooperation for the Development of La Paz Piedmont, Corporación Desarrollo para La Paz Del Piedemonte Oriental) and included about 120 km of road which passed through Tumupasa (Wentzel 2009). Then, in the late 1970s and early 80s, the Agrarian Reform Commission (Comision de la Reforma Agraria) was established to dedicate itself to the acquisition of land-titles for Tumupaseños. In the early 1980s efforts to bring potable water to Tumupasa led to the establishment of a Water Committee (Comité de Agua Potable). During this time the church, embodied by the local priest, Padre Diego was the central figure. He led the committees, aiding comunidad members and in this way acted as an intermediary between state and comunidad. It was due to his efforts that 192 individual land-titles in Tumupasa were acquired in the mid 1980’s. When, in the 1980s, CORDEPAZ again collaborated with Tumupasa in the installation of a health post (headed by the Comité de Obras Publicas) and funding suddenly lagged, Padre Diego’s initiative provided the missing sum.

These incidents demonstrate that although the government collaborated with rural (ie indian) populations, the traditional authority, in the form of a church representative, continued to be the reliable and consistent leader. While this was useful for the success and continuity of the
‘projects’, it also served in reconfirming that the traditional comunidad authority was not indigenous but white (priest) or mestizo (mestizo Tacana élite). This implies that non-indigenous people’s involvement is essential for successfully tying the comunidad to the nation-state and subsequently, as will be demonstrated, to the indigenous movement.

Being a former mission comunidad has been to Tumupasa’s advantage as it has fallen within the responsibility of a church congregation. Even in the decades in which there was no direct church representative living in Tumupasa, there was always a designated representative who came for special events, such as christenings. Importantly, in being a mission comunidad, Tumupasa had the European infrastructure which was necessary in processes around gaining land-rights and becoming involved in the indigenous movement, which is the topic of the following chapter. Understanding such aspects is necessary in understanding what the criteria are which the ‘indian’ needs to fulfil in order to be ‘permitted’ (Hale 2004).

While Tumupasa represents a genuine indigenous comunidad in the eyes of the state, this chapter has demonstrated how people in comunidades are constructed as ‘being’ indigenous (and mestizo) along socio-political and economic guidelines as dictated by colonial policy which organized and taxed ‘wealth’. Key in the organisation of indigenous comunidades were the cabildos indígenas which reaffirmed socio-economic and racial categories. Identifying the heterogeneity in an indigenous comunidad helps to understand the mechanism for the distribution of power and resources within it. At present, for the Tacana of this study, this is linked to who is involved in the indigenous movement and who is not.

As demonstrated in the next chapter, mestizo Tacana who formerly emphasized their white blood-link now highlight their indigenous blood-link,) by becoming involved with the ethnic movement. Contrary to the way in which such transformations are now portrayed politically, ideology in fact plays less of a role in Enlightenment-based notions of ‘reclaiming’ a collective ethnic identity than practical concerns around attaining natural resources and upgrading one’s standard of living.
Chapter 7 - Whose Indigeneity, Whose Idea? – Of Land, Lumber, NGOs and Reluctantly Embracing Ethnicity

When walking through the plaza of Tumupasa today one might come across the former schoolteacher, Lucho. A fluent Tacana-speaker who has lived in La Paz for a number of years, he might approach you, content for the chance to talk to a foreigner. Though he hardly knows you, he will engage you in a convincing discussion on the importance of bilingual education and the preservation of Tacana traditions. It immediately becomes clear that Lucho is proud of his Tacana heritage. Soon he will offer you a look at his copy of the Tacana-Spanish dictionary which he helped compile in the early 1990s.

Indeed, Lucho came to be an excellent informant and friend who taught me a lot about the history of Tacana people in Tumupasa. Thus it came as a great surprise when on a different occasion Carlos, the corregidor of Tumupasa, taking a break from harvesting rice and resting in the shade of his house with a bola (wad of coca-leaves) in his cheek, shook his head about my enthusiasm for Lucho. With a smile he remarked, in the typical calm Tacana manner, that yes, Lucho used to be his teacher! In fact, he had been his teacher! But, no, he would never send his son to school with Lucho. Nor would other parents. Indeed, today in Tumupasa he would never receive the position of bilingual educator. Twenty years ago, when a respected authority of the comunidad, Lucho had applied corporal punishment to his students for speaking Tacana in the classroom. Lucho is the son of a Tacana mother and an Italian father.

This chapter focusses on the process by which the Tacana people of Tumupasa began their participation in the politics of the indigenous movement in Bolivia. Understanding this process illuminates the debate as to how indigeneity is introduced and constructed ‘on the ground’. The indigenous movement of the late 1980s is based on claims to TCOs for which inhabitants of indigenous comunidades could apply. To be eligible, members of comunidades had first to successfully register as ‘indigenous’. For this, in turn, all inhabitants had to first ‘agree’ to their being native or indigenous, as becomes explained below. A central issue in this politics of indigenous identity, is looking closely at which stake-holders are involved in its constructions and what each of their motives is. Discerning the stakeholders and their agendas, demonstrates how far ‘being indigenous’ (i.e. being ‘ethnic’ or non-white) is a construction in the framework of the neoliberal
nation-state. NGOs greatly influence this construction. As an effect of decentralization, NGOs are able to play nation-building roles which are normally taken on by the nation-state. This also includes a heavy involvement in the politics around indigeneity which includes working very closely with indigenous groups and contributing to how indigenous identity becomes defined.

In the past, Tacana did not stress – indeed, downplayed – the ‘ethnic’ element of their communal identity, preferring to focus on their shared Amazonian geography, camba identity and the fact that they came ‘from the comunidades’. The shift towards ethnicity is principally a political move to attain resources. For this, Tacana leaders, many of whom many had up to this point self-identified as mestizos, had to shift from stressing their ‘white’ blood link (which was typically from the father, as in the case of Lucho) to their Indian blood link (the mother). Fellow Tumupaseños who were not leaders, meanwhile, needed to be persuaded to follow them in embracing an ethnic identity. This was problematic as, since the outset of the missionization which first introduced them to the nation-state, Tacana people had been continually encouraged to ‘whiten’ themselves. This required actively and continuously moving away from Indian-ness, if necessary with the aid of punishment, as demonstrated in the case of the schoolchildren who spoke Tacana. This decision to emphasize Indian-ness required Tacana leaders to find a process which would allow them to embrace an ethnic identity, not only legally (so as to attain land tenure) but also in the context of their common history and shared experience as a people. This process is of emphasis in this chapter.

To lay out the involvement of Tacana people with the indigenous movement, this chapter begins with lumber and logging in the Bolivian Amazon, which eventually led to Tacana leaders to apply for indigenous land-tenure. As lumber became lucrative, affecting their living space while at the same time ignoring their presence, Tacana leaders in Tumupasa, in line with ‘helping’ to modernize the comunidad, searched for ways to become involved. In the early 1990s, in line with policy reforms, claiming an ethnic identity became a solid tool for laying claim on local resources. The new generation of Tacana leaders, better educated and more confident than their parents, began to engage in direct collaboration with NGOs and national bodies, superseding traditional non-Indian authorities such as the comunidad’s priest. However, inexperience and mistrust made these new collaborations problematic.

The political leaders of Tumupasa decided to follow suit with other indigenous peoples around the country who were establishing indigenous organisation and formed the national Tacana organisation CIPTA to claim land-tenure. The church, a principal representative of Tacana people,
thus made way for a new type of collaboration: an indigenous organisation, CIPTA and predominantly conservationist NGOs. Key to this process was also the geographical location of Tumupasa for it is no coincidence that this process happened specifically here. The collaboration of NGOs inherently contributes to the shaping of Tacana indigenous identity and Tacana leaders, who had up until then discouraged Indian-ness, were now encouraging the comunidad to embrace ethnicity. In this they accepted the aid of NGOs, who organised workshops to lay down a multifaceted management plan for the Tacana land-tenure. This plan was set in a Western-style framework, encouraging Tacana ‘cultural’ attributes in a way which Tacana people had never done. It introduced Tumupaseños to the concept that they ‘have’ traditions and culture and that the sum of these attributed them a new political power.

Ideology as Strategy - What Lumber has to do with the Indigenous Political Organizing

As discussed in the last chapter, in the effort to raise their standard of living and modernize the comunidad, the leaders of Tumupasa were always on the lookout for projects in which the comunidad might become involved. The 1980s in particular saw increased activity in the lumber business in Bolivia as the government was rapidly selling concessions to international industries, as well as national ones based in Santa Cruz. The Amazon area was especially affected. For the industry to come in, however, passages had to be created. For a long time a principal passage had been the water way. I was told that during the peak times of logging, the Beni River had been so densely packed with logs drifting downriver “that one could cross from Rurrenabaque to San Buenaventura simply by jumping from log to log.”

Road construction was also underway. Indeed, shortly prior to the logging-boom, Tumupaseños had helped in the ‘project’ of constructing roads between San Buenaventura and Tumupasa. They had worked without monetary remuneration, instead being paid in food stamps by the government. This type of government exploitation perpetuated the colonial practice of devaluing the manual labour of campesinos and also reinforced the tradition of barter, typical of the area. On a larger scale, this road was part of the government’s migration programme, the so-called March to the North of 1971. By 1986 this programme had led to the migration of around two colonos families to the province of Iturralde (Wentzel 2009). Though the in-migration of colonos is regarded with scorn today, in the 1980s it did not pose a threat.
Instead, what the Tacana were watching, much more closely and with increasing frustration, was how their forest was being carried off over their heads, as lumber truck after lumber truck rumbled from the depths of the jungle, through their comunidad and on to Ixiamas. Between 1979 and 1987 the government had agreed to large-scale deforestation to help ‘develop’ the Amazon region. Soon, however, people came to realize that these efforts were less about national or regional development than they were about satisfying the interests of private companies such as those in Santa Cruz who had obtained concessions of more than 2.9 million hectares of land in northern La Paz and Pando (ibid; CDF 1988).

As the logging of especially mahogany and other trees reached a highpoint, The Tumupaseños either wanted to have stopped or, when it became clear that this would be a lost battle, be included in the benefits it brought. They wanted to have land concessions or, if they could not have these, then be employed in the logging industry (Wentzel 2009). Yet there seemed to be no way to become involved. Disputes over lumber concessions in the 1980s first spurred ideas around indigenous land-tenure, based on granting local people authority over the resources around them. The first initiatives were launched further east, in Santa Cruz. The Guaraní people created the indigenous lowland organisation Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (Central de Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano - CIDOB) in 1982, which initially exclusively represented Guaraní people in the department of Santa Cruz. By 1989, however, CIDOB encouraged the participation of other lowland indigenous groups.

Similarly, shortly before terminating its work in Bolivia in the early 1980s, the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) (Castro & Dolores 1997) had helped in the formation of Chácobo, Ese-Eja and Caviñeno peoples’ indigenous organizations (Astete 2011; Riester 1989). With the help of CIDOB, these established the Regional Ethnic Committee of North-Eastern Bolivia, CRENOB (Comité Regional Étnico NorOeste Boliviano) in 1989. In 1991, CRENOB expanded to include further ethnic groups, such as the Yaminahua, Machineri, Pacahuara and Araon and changed its name to Central Indigenous Organisation for the Amazon Region of Bolivia, CIRABO (Central Indígena de la Región Amazónica de Bolivia) (ibid). The focus on ethnicity was significant in these processes of political organisation (Astete 2011).

Establishing indigenous organizations sub-divided the monolithic campesinos group into distinct groups based on their ethnicity. The focus was no longer on occupation (farmer) as had been
the case since land reform (1953). As a result, the ethnic diversity of the lowland region was highlighted in an entirely new way. Significantly, the highland-lowland divide which causes so much tension today had been able to remain invisible in part because cultural-ethnic distinctions between indigenous groups simply did not exist in any serious political form. ‘Indigenous’ equated simply with *campesino*. Under this definition, *colonos* were *campesinos* from the highlands who settled among *campesinos* from the lowlands. Any conflicts to emerge would be one among *campesinos*, presumably over land, to which each, because they were from one nation-state, *had the same rights*. An argument based on being *native to the region* did not enter into the equation. With the emergence of the indigenous movement, however, ethnic differences had a platform.

The lowland indigenous movement in Bolivia originated with the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity (*Marcha por el Territorio y la Dignidad*) which led from the lowlands to the highlands and was organized by CIDOB (Postero 2007; Yashar 2005). Significantly, this movement was initiated in the lowlands. This was a novel situation in Bolivia. Previously ethnic movements had emerged in the Andes, under highland leaders of Aymara descent (Yashar 2005) such as the political leader Felipe Quispe, who took the Aymara name, El Mallku, which carries meanings attributed to a former indigenous nation, the Aymara Nation. Such initiatives were tied to the Katarismo movement of the 1970s which drew on early 18th century Indian revolts headed by Tupaj Katari (Klein 1969). Though there was a strong ethnic aspect, highland groups did not predominantly use ethnicity as the main basis of their argument for achieving rights. Rather the focus was around occupation, in accord with the political climate of the times. Thus highland indigenous peoples established unions, a central one being the Confederation of the Union of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (*Centra Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* - CSUTCB) in 1979 (Yashar 2005; van Cott 2005; Klein 1982). The CSUTCB was, however, heavily based in the establishment of unions and workers’ groups. Highland Aymara and Quechua actively linked themselves to the colonial structure of the nation while still successfully maintaining fractions of their own socio-cultural form of organization.

It was only with the lowland indigenous movement that a ‘localness’ to a specific geographic location within the nation-state became relevant, and the basis for indigenous land distribution. Initiatives based on indigenous peoples’ rights to land heritage became closely tied to the conservation of living-spaces. In 1990, this paved the way for the conservationist policy, the so-
called ‘Ecological Pause’ (Pausa Ecologica Historica) which instigated the removal of six logging concessions in the lowlands, of which 937,000 hectares alone were the department of Iturralde, where Tacana people of this study reside (Wentzel 2009). CIDOB and its indigenous affiliate groups, in collaboration with NGOs, launched efforts to grant native lowland comunidades the possibility to lay a claim to the territory these concessions had left. An indigenous right had also been reflected in laws drafted by the government’s land-reform institution, National Institute of Agrarian Reform INRA (Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria - INRA) in the late 1980s.

In reaction to pressure from CIDOP member groups, the state passed a Supreme Resolution explicitly declaring native land-tenures pertinent to the country’s social and cultural heritage (Wentzel 2009 see above citing herself 1989). The government of President Sanchez de Lozada established the Secretariat for Indigenous Issues (Subsecretaria de Asuntos Indigenas) and created TCO. In so doing, the government dodged the mounting criticisms claiming that a democratic government was allowing land distribution and logging concessions to private parties, without granting local inhabitants claims to their native land and resources (ibid 2009). It was for strategic rather than ideological reasons that the government had agreed to the creation of TCOs. By sectioning the land and allowing for portions of it to be owned by local groups, the government was better able to go about the politics of neo-liberal decentralization.

The government was not alone in acting strategically in its creation of ‘indigenous rights’, in which the concept of ‘being indigenous’ was granted a new powerful political level. The Tacana people, too, decided to engage strategically with this new concept. In the late 1980s Tacana leaders registered Tumupasa as an ‘indigenous’ comunidad. This stands in contrast to how Andean groups had organized in earlier movements. Previously, Andean indigenous movements in Bolivia had taken care to explicitly avoid basing their struggle on the terminology of ethnicity, so as to have a better chance of achieving their goals. They had framed their politics in the contexts of workers’ rights. Socio-cultural ideology had, however, played a central part in their organizing. In contrast, the strategic move to highlight cultural ideology in the most recent indigenous movement had been on an impulse from non-indian outsiders. International arenas such as the UN and the Forum of Indigenous Peoples created platforms for groups to gain rights on the grounds of ethnicity.

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Tacana people themselves did not initially welcome a strategy based on ethnicity and heritage. They did not initiate political organization as the highlanders had. This is significant when wanting to understand which actors and which factors contribute to the making of Tacana indigeneity and in which aspects highland and lowland indigenous ways of organising differs. Tacana leaders in Tumupasa principally identified as *mestizos* and this is what gave them an advantage in the *comunidad*. They distinctly did not identify as Tacana (see also Wentzel 2009). In the early 1990s they were encouraged to change this attitude by professionals from the global North and the indigenous umbrella organisation CIDOB, itself acting in close collaboration with Western professionals. In order to receive resources, they were to base their struggle on the aspect they had been trying to get away from since missionization: their ethnicity.

Former socio-class issues come to light in the outside impulse which moved political leaders of Tumupasa to accept ‘being indigenous’. Better-off Tacana people (who were leaders), were the first to embrace ethnicity as a political tool. While they had understood the benefits to be gained, they needed to persuade fellow *comunidad* members to follow suit. It was not easy: the first reaction of fellow Tumupaseños was suspicion linked to the belief that the better-off leaders would benefit from this new ‘indigeneity’, while they would remain *pobre como siempre* (poor as always). This attitude partly still prevails today among Tacana people of the *comunidades*. “The indigenous movement,” I have been told on a number of occasions, “is something for those with connections (to the outside and to NGOs).

It is ironic that those who were least ‘indigenous’ in Tumupasa not only readily took on an ‘indigenous identity’, but launched the project to persuade the other, less-privileged and more ‘indigenous’ Tacana to embrace an ‘indigenous identity’. Tacana people, being a ‘humble’ observed these efforts with amusement. I was told that Celin Quenevo, who was later to hold the position of CIPTA president for over ten years, at this time received the nickname *el indigena*. “Oh, here comes *el indigena*, we said when we saw him coming,” I was told by a grinning Lucho one afternoon, as he recounted the beginnings of CIPTA and the Tacana land-tenure to me. The fondness with which he recounts this era is telling of the scepticism people felt towards the new politics at the time. It took much hard work to persuade the majority of *comunidad* members to agree to being ‘indigenous’, in order to then be able to register Tumupasa as ‘indigenous’ and launch on the process of gaining land-tenure.
Importantly, a different version of these beginnings has been given to the outside world, and may very well enter Bolivian history books. An optimistic and uncomplicated attitude towards indigeneity by indigenous groups themselves fits with neoliberal state politics and the construction of the Enlightenment’s happy ‘noble savage’. A recent publication by CIPTA (in collaboration with NGOs), depicts the rejuvenation of Tacana ‘ethnicity’ as a political project which had long been yearned for:

At the outset of 1990, some young Tacana recognized the necessity of organizing the comunidades, to value our traditions, our culture and to defend our territory, which historically we have always occupied (...). A number of us participated in the Indigenous March for Territory and Dignity (Translation mine) (CIPTA 2007:8)\textsuperscript{21}

Not only is this depiction of Tacana people’s involvement with the indigenous movement strangely uncomplicated, as if years of racism had left Tacana ‘values’ and ‘traditions’ untouched, but neither does it mention any collaboration from the outside. Yet this collaboration (ie NGOs, professionals, church affiliates etc.) is key in the shaping of Tacana indigeneity and their becoming involved in the first place. Indeed, the German anthropologist Sondra Wenzel notes her own involvement, having encouraged two representatives from Tumupasa to travel to Cochabamba to participate in a CIDOP meeting in 1987 (Wenzel 2009). It is important to recognize this outside involvement, if only to understand the sudden and extreme volte-face between centuries of avoiding an emphasis on ‘ethnicity’ to swiftly embracing it

Furthermore, while ‘ethnicity’ was now accepted, Tacana people’s principal concerns around becoming ‘modern’ and ‘modernizing’ the comunidad had not altered. It was simply that ethnicity was the better strategy for securing ‘modernization’, which continued to be focused on the acquisition of resources and the improvement of one’s standard of living. There is some irony here, for by definition ‘modernization’ stands in contrast to ‘indigeneity’, which in the neo-liberal state is represented by the romantic Enlightenment language of ‘tradition’ and ‘heritage’ (as demonstrated in the introduction of this thesis).

One might ask how Tacana involvement with the indigenous movement might have looked if the initiative had not come from a Tacana mestizo élite and those vecinos with a secure link to the

\textsuperscript{21}A partir de 1990, algunos jóvenes tacanas vimos la necesidad de organizar mejor a las comunidades, de revalorizar las tradiciones culturales y de defender el territorio que históricamente habíamos ocupado (...). Varios de nosotros participamos en la Marcha Indígena.’ (CIPTA 2007:8).
nation-state (formal education, land ownership etc.). It may very well be that had it not been for Tacana mestizos in Tumupasa, Tacana people would not have become involved with the indigenous movement as quickly as they did and would, instead, have acted more according to the logic, and at the gradual pace, of the Ese Eja who were not ‘organized’ enough to get the process of acquiring land-tenure underway as quickly (see Alexiades, Machuqui & Monje 2009; Lepri 2003). This possibility is supported by statements made by my Tacana informants, such as Juanita from Buena Vista, who explained that the reason Tacana leaders were re-elected, even though they are ‘corrupt’ and have ‘too many privileges’, is that they simply know (saber) how to work in the Western system (see also Rosengren 2003). They therefore possess knowledge which other Tacana people do not have.

The Ese Eja, who do not have a strong indigenous organisation as do the Tacana, became involved with indigenous politics of the state much more gradually (see Lepri 2003) and their initial reluctance to become involved was born of the impulse to avoid a situation which ‘pits indians against non-indians and ... turn(s) them once again into enemies,’ (Lepri 2003:127). Thus, the indigenous movement and ‘indigenous identity’ might be an uncomfortable and foreign project for Tacana people, and in many ways removed from what ‘being Tacana’ means to people of this study. Significantly, however, refraining from navigating the currents of indigenous politics, leads to an increase of the injustice set-off by as this not only ‘pits indians against non-indians’ but can lead to increased tension over territory between indigenous groups (see Alexiades, Machuqui & Monje 2009).

‘Ethnicity’ as a new Political Platform

The ethnic movement provided a platform from which to claim legitimacy and the right to agency which no other context had provided Tacana people for centuries. It gave a context for autonomy in decision-making processes about the comunidad and their lives which had hitherto been mainly defined by outside bodies, looking to see how best to aid ‘poor rural peasants’. In previous years Padre Diego had represented a respected outside authority that had successfully initiated projects. During the 1980s there emerged for the first time a generation of Tacana in Tumupasa who had sufficient formal schooling to provide them with the practical skills and ‘self-esteem’ to engage directly with funding-authorities without an outside go-between. Thus, the élite Tacana families became the principal agents in the switch from church alliance to NGO engagement.
However, the first collaborations failed and it was these failures which later encouraged Tacana leaders to turn to the possibilities offered by the platform around ‘ethnicity’.

Remembering specific incidents of failed collaborations in the early 1990s, Lucho recounts that his cousin and old-time friend of the Buqui family, Pedro had used his position of authority to hinder a large-scale project from a Spanish NGO: a vocational university complex to be established directly in Tumupasa. “Because all the projects were going to the Altiplano they wanted to help us down here,” Lucho explains, but Pedro’s “hunger for money” (el era hambriente por la plata) led to the collapse of the entire project. He and his followers set the precedent that either the management of the project be handed to them and thus taken out of the hands of the NGO worker and her team, or they would not allow the school to be built at all. Lucho states sarcastically that Padre Diego, observing that things were not working out well, did not try and become involved. And they (the vecinos) did not want advisors! Even the president of the state has his advisors!! But they thought themselves wise men and did not want advisors.123

The political leaders explicitly avoided being represented by the traditional outside figure, the church, in the form of Padre Diego. Yet, as Lucho explains, they did not have the expertise and experience to make outside collaborations successful, and had misunderstood how NGOs function:

NGOs don’t receive money to just hand out to everybody... but to build with! (...) I think they just wanted to manage the funds to have a good time with. Happily. Without taking any responsibility.124

The first attempts to collaborate with outside professional organisations failed because of unfamiliarity with bureaucracy and knowledge about how funding organizations function. However, these failed attempts demonstrate an important aspect, namely the desire – at least among the better-situated Tumupaseños - for self-representation, and the need for a platform from which this can be achieved.

Political leaders in the late 1980s were not persuaded by ideology, but rather by the continuing aspiration for modernization and obtaining resources to register their comunidad as

122 “Han escogido Tumupasa porque el altiplano, todo el mundo les ayuda. Hay muchas ONGs, en cambio en esta zona, no.”
123 “El padre vio que las cosas andaban mal entonces se retiró. No querían asesores. Aunque hasta al presidente del estado tiene asesores! Ellos se pensaban sabios y no han querido asesores.”
124 “Los ONGs no reciben plata para repetirlo... sino para hacer obras!” ... “Creo que ellos querían manejar la plata y disfrutarla. Alegremente. Sin tener responsabilidad.”
‘indigenous’, despite the derogatory connotations attached to the term. In 1988 the possibility occurred of a 1,000,000 hectare lumber concession which could be claimed from the Centre of Forest Development (CDF - Centro de Desarrollo Forestal) by ‘indigenous comunidades’ (Wentzel 2009). It was then that the vecinos of Tumupasa recognized that the ethnic movement provided a platform from which to tackle the issue of land rights and resources, and put in a claim for indigeneity

From the Church and Tacana leaders, to CIPTA and NGOs - A Shift in Stake Holders

The Tacana created the indigenous organisation CIPTA in December 1992 to better lay claim to land and resources, signalling a major shift in primary stake-holder - from church to NGO. CIPTA was founded in Tumupasa at a second meeting of its kind, with eight participating Tacana comunidades and supported by the indigenous umbrella organisation Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the Beni (Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni - CPIB), an arm of CIDOB (see also Wentzel 2009). In 1993 CIPTA attained legal status (personaria jurídica).

At the time of its foundation the CIPTA member comunidades included Tumupasa, Napashi (also San Silvestre), Santa Juanita de Maravilla, Buena Vista and Villa Alcira. In 1995 the comunidades of Villa Alcira, Bella Alta, Macahua, Carmen Pecha, San Pedro and Santa Fé joined (ibid). In 1996, Santa Juanita went on to establish the representative ‘Tacana Indigenous Organization’ (Organización Indígena Tacana - OITA) which incorporated thirteen Tacana comunidades of the department of Pando, located by the border with Brazil where many had been Tacana settled during the rubber boom at the late 19th century (Vallvé 2010; Bathurst 2005; Herrera 2003a). These were later part of the TCO Tacana II (2006 with at the time around 350,000 ha).

Being a legal body, CIPTA posed new possibilities for funding entities and NGOs. The legal rubric ‘indigenous people’ had opened up new networking possibilities. Before the widespread formation of Latin American indigenous movements, international aid had been geared towards ‘rural populations’ and ‘peasant comunidades’ - terms which were in accord with the measures taken under the 1953 Agrarian Reforms to eradicate the stigmatized term ‘indio’ (see Postero 2006; Van Cott 2000 et al). With the formation of indigenous organisations, NGOs could enter into contracts directly with indigenous groups. This has the bureaucratic advantage that funding for ‘the indigenous’ could be neatly channelled to ‘indigenous groups’.
By 2004, CIPTA had about twenty different NGOs looking to collaborate with it. It was considered as one of the best-organized indigenous organizations in the country. Whereas previously the political nucleus of Tumupasa had comprised of committees headed typically by élite families accompanied by Padre Diego, the main political nucleus now shifted to CIPTA and its board alongside NGOs. With the formation of the TCO Tacana I (2003 with a title over 388,500 ha) and its management plan, political efforts gradually extended from Tumupasa to other comunidades. Efforts first aimed to bring a basic infrastructural standard to member comunidades such as health facilities electricity, potable water, and a radio communication system with which different comunidades could contact one another.

In the process of land reform, land tenure and indigenous rights, the specific region and indigenous comunidad are essential in shaping the nature of the given land tenure process. Each Bolivian land-tenure is somewhat different from the next. What is central in this process, though often not obvious is the specific comunidad from which the process of acquiring land-tenure is launched, and which then comes to represent the people of the region at large. In the case of the Tacana people of Iturralde, this was Tumupasa. Without Tumupasa there would have been no Tacana ethnic revival movement, or, rather, this would have come about entirely differently. Today Tumupasa is the seat of CIPTA. Hotels have since been built in the rustic comunidad of 1000 families, predominantly by colono families who were the first to recognize a source of profit to be made from the delegates and actors of the indigenous movement, and who bus in to attend central meetings with CIPTA.

The Neo-Liberal State Shapes Indigeneity

In the case of the Tacana people of Iturralde, it was also significant that the state had singled out their geographic area for land reform before they themselves had even submitted their petition. Bolivian Sociologist, Zulema Lehm, who worked on the Tacana land reform for WCS, told me that the state had had in mind a general land-reform process which did not distinguish between the different types of inhabitants nor rely on their collaboration, but focused on reform in terms of ‘public interest’. When the state’s intention became clear, the Tacana in 1997 attempted through

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125 See Estrategia de Desarrollo Sostenible de la TCO Tacana con Base en el Manejo de los Recursos Naturales 2001-2005 (CIPTA and WCS/Bolivia 2002).
126 The so-called CAT-SAN (Land formation integrating the Cadastre - Saneamiento integrado al Catastro)
CIPTA to change the nature of the reform process to a specifically indigenous land-tenure claim\(^\text{127}\). Though the government gave its approval this did not mean that it had the finances to carry out the reform, which was now more costly as it included the participation of the CIPTA member comunidades. This is not an atypical situation as normally in land-reform processes the state relies on funding from the World Bank and other bodies. For this reason WCS agreed to collaborate with the Tacana to attain TCO land.

Significant in this process in the politics of indigeneity is that Tumupasa’s actors were successful precisely because of the comunidad’s mission past. In order to successfully ‘claim’ indigeneity, the petitioning group needs to have some understanding of the state’s bureaucratic system and subsequently not be ‘too’ indian. The same goes for collaboration with NGOs, which work with the same bureaucratic logic. A former mission comunidad, especially, was easy to synchronise with the nation’s Western-style logic and bureaucracy (see also Killick 2008a). At the same time, however, in the eyes of the state Tumupasa represents an indigenous comunidad, demonstrating that.

In 2004, the German aid organisation DED, for whom I was then working, would first revise in how far an ethnic group had the capacity for working with the organizational structure of the DED, before entering into a cooperation with them. This included a certain format for applications for funding, and preparing reports and feedback, for the neo-liberal model is put into action in these instances. The state has attributed responsibilities for certain social groups to foreign and state-independent bodies such as NGOs and bilateral aid organizations. For indigenous groups to successfully work with these organizations they must adapt to the Western bureaucratic routine and become ‘permitted indians’. Thus, while organizations of the global North claim to be aiding indigenous cultures in their rights and in the preservation of their ‘culture’, they first require that indigenous cultures adapt to their form of organization, and ideas of what ‘indigenous’ is, in order to then help them preserve these. Though President Morales claims to decolonize the country (see chapter one), this system has not changed in Bolivia since his election. The state in its structure remains mestizo. If an ethnic group is ‘too’ indigenous, it cannot benefit from the ethnic rights revival programme. One might therefore question how ‘indigenous’ the indigenous rights revival

\(^{127}\) The so-called SAN-TCO (Saneamiento de TCO - Regularization of Indigenous Community Lands)
movement can actually be given that the indigenous movement is modelled to fit with decentralized, neo-liberal governments.

In its construction, indigeneity has become institutionalized and its platform is made up of indigenous organizations which are represented by indigenous leaders. The mere existence of indigenous organizations sets boundaries of inclusion and exclusion not only between different ethnic groups, but also within a group. In the mid-1990s, for example, a World Bank project looking to fund ‘indigenous people’ declared Peru void of indigenous people on the basis of the non-existence of a national indigenous organization (Greene 2009; Lucero 2006; Warren 1999). By aligning indigenous people along a Western system, those indigenous who do not comply with certain definitions come to be seen as non-indigenous. As a result they remain as ‘invisible’ as they before the formation of the indigenous movement in Latin America.

Various stake-holders (the state, NGOs etc.) contribute to the construction of the Tacana identity. Among them are NGOs which directly work with Tacana people (e.g. educating them as to land-rights) and those which help represent them to the outside world, as happens in the flourishing ‘eco-tourism’ industry in and around Rurrenabaque. Many Tacana comunidades have become eagerly involved in the tourist industry. However, as part of their collaboration NGOs also decide how to present Tacana-ness to tourists, something which must comply with a number of criteria for ensuring a sustainable treatment of the environment. In Rurrenabaque there is a strict regulation that tourist agencies are not allowed to let their customers hunt, for example, which was one of the attractions for many years. As a result I have heard young Tacana tourist guides ridicule hunting in front of their customers, which to me sounded completely absurd considering that everyone I knew in Tacana comunidades loved hunting. These are situations in which NGOs reinvent Tacana tradition for their own outside representation of it. This has been observed for other indigenous groups. NGOs working with the Ese Eja also involved with ‘eco-tourism’ (Alexiades & Peluso 2005) equally edit traditional knowledge to then “channel it back to the community as part conservation and cultural revitalization projects, whose goal is to reinvent tradition in ways that downplay aspects considered aesthetically, morally or politically undesirable, or incompatible with modern sustainable land-use planning” (ibid:12).

Indigenous politics provided a context for the leaders of Tumupasa to continue to pursue their interests. This also meant, rather than collaborate with the church, they now turned to work with major international conservationist NGOs. In this course NGOs such as CI and WCS began to
make the transition from being purely nature conservation organizations to including the ‘preservation’ of indigenous cultures. This was no small challenge and included a complex learning process. Tacana leaders are aware that their indigeneity is a platform of negotiation. They are not given a blank slate by aid organizations to fill in ‘what is Tacana’. CIPTA has been in constant negotiation over what NGOs should ‘do’ for them, and what they in return will ‘do’ for these NGOs. In the case of conservationist NGOs such as WCS, this is the agreement to conserve the forest in exchange for funding of infrastructure. This is reflected in the words of Adolfo Chavez, the current president of CIDOB, who is from Tumupasa and who has been involved with CIPTA since its foundation. At the national CIPTA assembly in 2008 he stated to fellow Tacana people:

(...) (A) good co-tenant was found when we began the relationship with (WCS). We were strict; they wanted to study butterflies and meanwhile we didn’t know if we would receive the land-title or not (...) Thus, dear brothers (...) even though land-tenureship was not within their vocation, it was done."

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As the Bolivian state has refrained from setting down specific markers of what constitutes ‘indigenous’, NGOs have had more leeway to influence and define attributes themselves according to their own philosophies. Just as the government realized that granting land-tenures was a mechanism by which to control the jungle area, NGOs also realized that the jungle area was best managed (in this case conserved) by splitting it into areas and collaborating with the native groups to act as caretaker. The Amazonian indian as the natural caretaker of the forest has become central in an indigenous identity and a popular image on the websites of conservationist NGOs has become the Amazonian indian in traditional makeup (e.g. feathers, body-painting, bow and arrow), effective especially to grab media attention and help to facilitate the acquisition of resources.

However, what effect does this have on Tacana people in Tacana comunidades who are not leaders and who do not interact with NGOs or other bodies in international aid contexts? Tacana

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128 “Podríamos decir que se ha encontrado un buen aparcero, cuando nosotros nos conocimos con ellos fuimos duros, ellos querían investigar sobre mariposas en lugares donde no sabíamos si nos iban a titular, (...) entonces hermanos, de esa sencilla amistad que nace cuando no había ningún financiamiento, pese a que no era su vocación hacer seguimiento agrario, lo hizo.” Wentzel 2009:34 citing CIPTA 2008ª (translation my own).

129 As part of the 1994 constitutional reform, clause 171ª pertaining to indigenous identity states, relatively vaguely: “Reconocimiento de derechos de pueblos indígenas: I. Se reconocen, se respetan y protegen en el marco de la ley, los derechos sociales, económicos y culturales de los pueblos indígenas que habitan en el territorio nacional, especialmente los relativos a sus tierras comunitarias de origen, garantizando el uso y aprovechamiento sostenible de los recursos naturales, a su identidad, valores, lenguas, costumbres e instituciones.”
people have become represented as caretakers of the forest, and programmes around preservation have become fixed into their land-tenure management plan. But what is their real take on the matter? Though the Tacana have become tied to nature and the forest, in reality they initially cared very little about the preservation of the jungle. In many instances, the jungle is not something vulnerable to them but, in accord with the wet and dry season, a threatening entity which constantly needs to be tamed. “During the rainy season, the jungle is bad. It is angry. Tricky,” explains Felicitas from Carmen Florida as we make our way to the river with empty buckets and canisters to fill them with potable water. “If you sleep under a jealous tree, it will make you ill. You wake up in the morning and you will be ill. It’s different in the dry season. But in the wet season, few people aren’t afraid of the jungle.”

There is a significant difference in how the Tacana perceive the forest and how it is viewed by the global North. Conservationist issues are a product of the West. Older Tacana generations in particular scoff at this rhetoric. They claim that the Madidi Park is a white elephant preserved for the gringos (US people) who plan to reap any resources which may be found there in the future. This often puts Tacana people like Anita, who works for the park’s maintenance, in a difficult situation. Patrolling the park she will come across former class-mates.

In certain seasons people go and look for gold upriver. It is illegal, but people will use dynamite. They also fish with dynamite. Very popular. They know it is illegal. I have known these people since child-hood. Some hate the (national) park and say it is being controlled by gringos. They do not see what I do as work. Walking around the forest in a uniform. I sit down, talk to them, we joke. They know I have to report them but I don’t want conflict. I warn them, but I do it jokingly.

Anita is very aware of her people’s opinion on park preservation. Fulfilling her work requirements while maintaining a good relationship with fellow Tacana people is a balancing-act. Thus, while Tacana indigeneity is tied to the preservation of their natural surroundings, this is not a rhetoric which Tacana people themselves advocated in the first instance but has become one they have learned and are well-versed in. This does not mean that they do not ‘take care’ of the jungle. But what it means is that this ‘identity factor’ was projected onto them, via concepts and language which are distinctly Western and regardless of they ‘care’ about the jungle or not.

To give a small example, Tacana people believe that every living and non-living thing has an ‘owner’ in the form of a deity. If too many spider monkeys are hunted, then the deity of the spider
monkeys will take revenge, and to prevent this it is wise to refrain from hunting spider monkeys for a given time. This system can be interpreted as being a form of preservation of the equilibrium of forest and fauna. However, this aspect of Tacana culture is *inconsequential* for the collaboration with conservationist NGOs which will, either way, construct the Tacana land-tenure plan in such a way that it is ‘sustainable’ for the natural surroundings. Tacana people are sceptical of the preservation plans surrounding the Madidi Park, as Anita’s friends fishing with dynamite suggest. This fact demonstrates that Tacana beliefs about the relationship between humankind and nature (whatever these might be) have not been understood by NGOS for they have not been adequately made part of their relationship. NGOs will construct Tacana indigenous identity with or without the participation of Tacana people.

*Making Indigenous Leaders*

NGOs working with the Tacana have, whether consciously or not, helped in the naturalization of *a certain kind* of indigeneity by encouraging and discouraging certain behaviours. In this manner NGOs have also *perpetuated* a structure of authority based on race which was present in the *comunidades* upon their arrival and which they took as being authentically Tacana. This ‘indigenous system’ was explained to me by an employee of WCS:

> the Tacana have the tradition of rotating the *comunidad*’s authority among certain important families. The authority typically remains among certain families. This is their tradition and this is something we respect.

Among certain Amazonian peoples, authority may indeed have been handed down from father to son, and was thus exclusive to certain families. However, it is a considerable stretch to make a direct link from this to the Tacana *comunidad* today, which is based on a mission structure where hierarchy was built around eugenics.

Indigenous authority structures are convenient for NGOs, for with these they know directly whom to approach and whom to ‘train’ as leaders. Indigenous leaders are trained in special workshops where they learn the ropes of the Western system: how to write reports, how to speak to *comunidades*, how to understand the funding system etc. When seeking out individuals to ‘train’, NGOs do not make a background check on their ethnicity, or have a checklist as to what constitutes ‘indigenous’ or ‘Tacana’. However, seeking out the ‘purest’ Tacana people would entail seeking among the poorest of the *comunidad*, if one considers how race is constructed historically. NGOs
rather intuitively seek out those with a certain self-confidence, and a certain level of formal education. This tends to exclude Tacana people who have no custom of interacting with ‘outsiders’, and who “cry in shame upon seeing outsiders, because they are so timid, so shy,” as some women were described to me from the comunidad of Tahua. Leaders will rather be those Tacana people who ‘know’ (saber) how to talk to outsiders. In this way, NGOs working with Tacana people have come to perpetuate the leadership tradition which was intact when they arrived. They encouraged leadership skills and positions in the élite families who had represented the comunidad in the years prior to the indigenous movement – people who originally identified as ‘white’ in the comunidad’s civil registry.

The Buqui family, a traditional leadership family of Tumupasa whom I came to know, proves a case for this. The oldest Buqui child became the first president of CIPTA. His siblings followed in his footsteps and during the 1980s and 90s the majority of them took leadership positions, first with church groups and projects in the comunidad and, when the time came, with CIPTA. The first Buqui president of CIPTA in the late 1990s moved on to work for Bolivia’s National Service for Protected Areas (Servicio Nacional de Áreas Protegidas - SERNAP). Two Buqui sisters became involved (CIMTA) which was created parallel to CIPTA, and the older one moved on to be president of the umbrella organisation, CPILAP, between 2002 and 2006. Today she lives in La Paz. As this example demonstrates, former political leaders have continued to play crucial roles for the Tacana comunidad, eventually moving on to becoming central figures in the politics of the indigenous movement.

Although the indigenous revival movement has brought about a shift in power from the emphasising one’s indigenous rather than white blood-link, this does not signify that different people or families initially take on leadership positions replacing the former mestizo authorities, as one might assume. Nor did these vecinos suddenly lose their élite status to become replaced by a new indigenous élite as represented by ‘pure’ Tacana who had no white or mestizo blood. Instead vecino family members resituated themselves. They no longer stressed a mestizo/white heritage but assumed their Tacana ‘side’, re-evaluating and upgrading their ethnicity. Indeed, with the ethnic revival movement, the élite leaders of Tumupasa experienced for the first time an advantage in stressing their ‘Tacana-ness’. There was not necessarily a great shift in power and authority among Tacana people from how it had been before in the comunidad. What had changed, however, was the precedent as to what status now entailed. While it was still tied to ‘race’ and assets of wealth
such as cattle, horses, land and lumber, it now looked favourably upon an indian blood-link over a white one.

Whatever its underlying rationale, the indigenous movement marks a turning point in the construction of Tacana-ness, as the tables were turned in the social hierarchy rooted in race. Previously social identity had been gendered advantageously towards the white blood-link, as represented by the mestizos white father, often a patrón or priest. Now, power has switched to the indigenous blood-line, the indian mother, whose racial status attributes legitimacy for the claiming of a political indigenous identity. Only by embracing indigeneity have Tacana people of Tumupasa been able to achieve land ownership. Ethnicity has become a ‘tool’ and within this context, Tacana people willingly tolerate ‘indigeneity’. But, as discussed in chapter one, amongst each other Tacana people will not use the term ‘indigenous’ or even ‘Tacana’; these are ‘professional’ terms which have become reserved for using with NGOs, or when working with other indigenous organizations. On an everyday basis, the Tacana, in self-referral, will fall back on traditional expressions such as la gente de las comunidades.

This chapter has also demonstrated that at their core, definitions around ethnicity are about inclusion and exclusion (see also Hale 2004; Kuper 2003). This framework of inclusion and exclusion works on a number of levels. By being ‘Tacana’, Tacana people have attained exclusive rights to resources which other non-local ethnic groups, namely the Aymara/Quechua people, do not have, or have differently (for example, as landless indigenous people). In contrast, when indigenous peoples used to be monolithically labelled campesinos, no such distinctions about rights to territory on the basis of one’s heritage could be made. All held equal rights. To complicate the situation, an indigenous group (and again within this group, individual people), needs to be versed in the colonial and Western routines around policy and processes of the state in order to be able to make claim to the rights which ethnicity offers. Elite leaders are in an advantageous position here. They adhere most to Hale’s construct of the ‘permitted indian’.

I further explore the concept of the ‘permitted indian’ in the following chapter. As demonstrated here, the reconstruction of ethnicity has affected gender-roles and expectations around gender-behaviours. Ethnicity has centred on specific female gender behaviours, in which colonial constructs of patriarchal organization are discernable. This raises the question of whether
the indigenous movement provides adequate spaces for women and specifically Tacana women and whether they are able to represent their interests and express their needs.
Chapter 8 - “They don’t want to give us Unmarried Women Land to Work.” –Tacana Women’s Situation within the Politics of Indigeneity

In the comunidad of Buena Vista a wooden contraption of two heavy beams placed on top of one another is carried to the plaza. Children not yet of school-age look on as some men sweat to lift the heavy beams. It is the cebo – a tool for punishment. Spaces have been carved to trap wrists, neck and ankles (see image 22 below). The contraption appears to be based on medieval European stocks, yet it is now officially recognised as a tool of punishment specific to the Tacana culture and is legally applicable in the new communal justice system (justicia communario) (Van Cott 2003). This reprimand is meant for Adela, the first woman corregidora of the comunidad, who is said to have set a bad example. Rumour is that she committed adultery while on a trip representing the national Tacana women’s organisation, CIMTA, and as a result Tacana men are now refusing to let their wives travel to participate in work-shops offered by NGOs. They do not want them to leave the comunidad for fear that they will act “similarly” to Adela.

As well as being a leader in the comunidad, Adela also serves on the board of the Tacana women’s organisation (CIMTA) and is very active in the indigenous movement. It appears that the severity of her punishment is linked to her public role but the situation seems unjust to me and I wonder why the other women of CIMTA do not step in to help Adela. The inequality seems particularly clear, because as my friend Juanita would later tell me:

“Men always do what Adela did. (The president of CIPTA) used to be with another woman though he had a wife, or Eduardo used to give all his earnings from being dirigente (of CIPTA) to his lover instead of his wife and children.” (…) “Men are never punished as hard as women. They are put in the cebo only for a few hours, because they don’t like to be humiliated.”

Ultimately this part of Adela’s punishment was called off, perhaps because she never returned to her comunidad from her day-trip to Rurrenabaque. Eventually she was banned from her comunidad and continued to live in Rurrenabaque for the year, cleaning houses to pay board and rent. I would come across her in the local market buying vegetables. The formerly so proud Adela would wave me over timidly, asking uncertainly: “Have you heard anything? Have the señoras from
CIMTA said anything [i.e. in my defence]? Can you talk to CIPTA?” Adela also lost her role as corregidora of the comunidad as well as her position in CIMTA. Five years later meeting her again in the comunidad she now remains absent from politics and projects.


Adela’s incident serves to highlight principal issues in the construction of indigeneity and demonstrates how definitions around what is ‘authentically’ indigenous are tied to specific ideas of ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ gender-role behaviour in the context of Tacana indigeneity. Picking up from the last chapter, only certain behaviours are permitted within the realms of indigenous politics, while others lead to exclusion. Permitted behaviours are roughly aligned to constructions which are Western and which for this reason fit into the neo-liberal state system. This includes subtle rules which adhere to gender-role behaviour.

In this chapter, I argue, following De la Cadena (1995), that women, being ‘more indian’, have both been cast as the embodiment of ‘indigeneity’ and made responsible for its maintenance.’ (Andolina et al 2009; Radcliffe 2009; Canessa 2005b). Tacana women’s roles are used to demonstrate what Tacana indigeneity is, and what it is not. These roles are aligned remind one of colonial attitudes about women’s subordinate status and fits into the context of Hale’s ‘permitted indian’, also based on colonial and Enlightenment ideas. I argue that Tacana women’s behaviour has
come under greater vigilance with the rise, and now within the contexts, of the indigenous movement.

Women’s movements greatly influenced policy changes which were implemented in development programmes around ‘gender-equity’. The UN Forum articulated that women should be protected from violence, but this is the only mention it makes in regard to gender issues and indigenous politics (Radcliffe 2013). In Bolivia, gender-specific incidents, such as those concerning gender-based violence, has improved with policy reforms passed as part of the LPP of 1995. Overall, however, the development arena has failed to adequately engage with indigenous women’s concerns, as this chapter demonstrates, in focussing on Tacana women’s efforts to improve their standard of living and socio-political position. Different incidents in which Tacana women position themselves on the platform of the indigenous movement demonstrate that in many cases they have more successfully pursued their goals outside it.

This chapter first provides a brief overview of the situations of women in Bolivia and Latin America, as has come to the forefront of public consciousness with women’s movements; and, subsequently, the implementation of gender-equity programs. This overview demonstrates the trajectory of the gender-role issue in Latin America and, specifically, Bolivia. As with other aspects of indigeneity in Bolivia, indigenous women’s gender-roles and treatment have predominantly been framed in the context of the Andes. Gender equality is a central issue in the international aid arena and directly affects Tacana people. The international aid context has significantly shaped Tacana people’s awareness and attitude towards gender issues. NGOs have greatly shaped the representation of ‘the Third World Woman’ while also implementing gender equity policy and aiding the establishment of indigenous women’s organizations such as CIMTA. The efforts of individual Tacana women, if they do not fall into the representative image as encouraged on the platform of the indigenous politics, remain invisible. Again, social class and standing play a significant role in the possibilities and resources which individual women can attain.

**Women’s Movements**

The wider trajectory of women’s movements in Bolivia provides a context for the situation of Tacana women in regard to the indigenous movement. Women’s movements informed policy which was implemented in international development programmes. The manner in which women as a group engaged with their situation on a socio-political level differed considerably in the global
North and Latin America. In Europe and the USA, 19th century women’s rights advocates sought to gain the vote, and to strengthen women’s position by advocating a right not to be defined over their bodies, for these tied them to politics based on their reproductive capacities and role as mothers and nurturers of the family. In contrast, women’s movements in Latin America tactically drew their arguments from just this role as dictated by their female bodies and the capacities tied to this (Milanich 2011). Women were the natural upholders of morals because of their innate maternal instincts. This instinct attributed to them an essential inclination towards justice (Molyneux 2001; Molyneux and Razavi 2002; González-Rivera and Kampwirth eds. 2001).

Because Latin American women’s movements based their main argument on women being the natural nurturer, they posed no threat to either liberal or conservative parties as they did not question the traditional gender-roles in the way in which European feminists had. In the period of dictatorships and political instability women’s role in the socio-political arena was throttled, as was that of other grass-root political action and social movements of the time. When social movements became possible in the post-dictatorship era of the 1980s and 1990s, supporters of women’s movements first worked towards limited rudimentary goals concerning ‘women’ as a monolithic group, which in fact represented the dominant group of white and mestizo upper- and middle-class women.

In Peru and Chile, central forums in which women could engage and organize were the so-called ‘popular eating houses’ (comedores populares or ollas communes) which tied women to a traditional gender-role but also provided the space for organizing and political activism (Molyneux and Razavi 2002). In Bolivia the Mothers’ Clubs (Clubs de Madres) gained the highest profile of any women’s organization. Indeed, every Tacana comunidad has a Mothers’ Club and their presidents are women from élite families who have resilient personalities and strong leadership skills. Women’s organisations such as the Mothers’ Clubs were typically aligned to church initiatives such as child-rearing and, as already apparent in its name, did not look to break down established gender-role norms. Initially, the primary interest in having a Mothers’ Club, explains Juanita, was that members would receive resources such as dried milk and infant clothing channelled to them from CARITAS\(^\text{130}\). No matter how conventional, these platforms provided women with a space for acquiring political skills as well as interacting with different organizations and professionals. In Peru and Chile, this

\(^{130}\) CARITAS is a Catholic social service organization first founded in 1897 and one of the first of its kind.
form of political action was in line with the liberal programmes which welcomed women’s use of public spaces and overt political activism. Conservative church contexts and nationalist party programmes, which generally frowned upon women entering the political arena, could conveniently make use of women’s collectives, in order, for example, to advocate traditional family values (Molyneux 2001).

Initially, issues around race and social class were too intricate and counteractive to be addressed by the women’s movement. Addressing them would have meant destabilizing middle-class women’s lives in such a way that it would jeopardize their time for activism. Feminists in Bolivia were often white/mestizo intellectuals who led privileged lives and were able to engage in activism because of the low-paid female indigenous domestic work they employed and depended on. In the early 1980s, it was crucial that the supporters of a movement adhered to a few clear-cut, rudimentary goals even if this meant that the interests of those dominating the group would be better represented than others (Molyneux 2001:174).

In Latin America, the initial large-scale absence of women in indigenous movements was interrupted by individual female indigenous leaders who have come to be celebrated as heroines, such as Rigoberta Menchú from Guatemala and Silvia Larzarte from Bolivia. However, they were never directly involved in an ethnic movement per se and are an exception rather than a rule (Canessa 2010). It is rare that women were prominent participators in indigenous movements in the way they were in southern Mexico’s Zapatista Movement (Canessa 2010; Hernández Castillo et al 2006; Hernández Castillo 2001).

In her research, Marcia Stephenson (1999) traces the ideology of womanhood in Bolivian culture and how ‘female-ness’ has been constructed by the state. Due to the diversity in ethnic cultures, the Bolivian state sought to homogenize cultural identity which became based on specific representations of gender-roles. Generally, European women, regarded as enlightened, have been regarded as the exemplar of womanhood. ‘History and national narratives are gendered and draw upon representations of role model citizens’ (Radcliffe and Westwood 1996:148). In Bolivia this European ideal stands in binary opposition to the ‘ethnic woman’. As Bolivia is an ‘Andean country’, the latter is represented by the Andean woman with certain identifiable signifiers of Andean style and dress: the pollera and long braided hair (Stephenson 1999). In this way, the indigenous woman is racialized as Aymara or Quechua. She carries the defining factors of ethnicity through her visual style, her language and her role of child-rearer, through which she transmits her ‘ethnic’ culture.
A significant difference between highland and lowland indigenous women is the Andean women’s longstanding history of claiming public space as market women, or operating in other people’s spaces as domestic servants. These roles provide women not only with the chance to leave their immediate domestic environment but also to earn an independent income (Stephenson 1999, Weismantel 2001). The Andean women’s claim to public space and political participation comes from a long tradition of strong unions, made official after the 1952 Bolivian Revolution and behind which façade stood the culturally specific allyus. Tacana women of this study, in contrast, come from a tradition of missionization, which was heavily patriarchal and followed traditional European gender-role traditions. Deviating from these brought punishments which in earlier times only white authorities, the priest and the patrón, could inflict but which were then adopted by indigenous authorities. This included the huasca – the leather whip and the cepo - the pillory-like instrument of humiliation which also awaited Adela for having committed adultery.

**Gender-Roles in the Tacana Mission and Patrón Comunidad**

In the context of today’s ethnic revival movement, women’s participation is encouraged via so-called ‘gender posts’ (positions dedicated to monitoring gender equality), women’s organizations and quotas whereas previously Tacana women in comunidades of this study were rather discouraged from entering the public/political domain of the comunidad. In the 1980s, Nacha’s father, a traditional authority figure in Tumupasa, had approved of his daughter’s becoming involved as a leader with the comunidad’s youth-group organized by the church. “My father partly approved of this because it was with the church,” she explains. However, he did not approve of his daughter entering any wider political realm in the comunidad. “When I became the president of the Mothers’ Club he did not like it, nor did my mother.” In the late 1990’s, with the ethnic revival movement, Nacha became involved with CIMTA of which first her sister and then she herself was president.

While this is an example of élite Tacana women’s political involvement, before the 1990s it was more common that Tacana women influenced political spaces indirectly. Among the Tacana, as often among traditional Amazonian societies (see Killick 2005; Rosengren 1987; Lévi-Strauss, 1967), leaders were granted the privilege of polygamy, and their wives had responsibility for the preparation of meals and drink especially chicha – a brewed and fermented maize or yucca beer, on which their husbands were dependent for their display of sociality. Not being able to provide chicha
would affect a leader’s reputation and in turn one might argue that this gave Tacana wives some substantial power (see Killick 2005; Lehm 1998).

Juanita remembers that when she was a child, wives could not hold central political positions, but could take on the responsibility of their husband’s position while he was absent from the comunidad. When her father was cacique (indigenous leader of the cabildo indígena) of the comunidad and needed to travel, her mother represented him and if necessary “doled out beatings (palizas) hard, sometimes harder than her husband”. Generally, and depending on the relationship between the couple, the husband might take the advice of his wife in comunidad votes and discussions. However, ultimately it was up to the husband to decide how far his wife was his equal partner and it was always within his right to punish her should she disobey him. Anita stresses that when she was a child her grandmother was ‘just one more daughter’ (una hija más) in the house, as everyone feared the severity of her grandfather’s generous usage of the huasaca (leather whip).

**International Development and Gender-Equity Programs**

In the 1980s and 1990s women’s movements across the globe resulted in large-scale implementations of gender-equity programmes, influenced in particular by the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. To improve women’s equality and rights in Bolivia, President de Lozada established the Ministry of Gender, Indigenous People and the Elderly (Ministerio de Genero, Asuntos Indigenas y Generaciones) as part of the LPP package in 1995. At this time, policy was adjusted to encourage gender equity and women’s participation in the public-political domain and, specifically, to protect women from domestic violence. These changes in policy made visible the situation of women in rural areas. In aid efforts, ‘gender’ became synonymous with ‘women’, and programmes focussed on educating and bringing in ‘modern’ (ie European) ideas of gender equality, predominantly to women. In these policy changes, indigenous women - as the more ‘indian’ (De la Cadena 1995) - embodied the nation’s ‘obstacle’ towards modernization while also being ‘victims’. While ‘ethnicity’ came to be perceived as rooted in the past, ‘gender’ signalled modernization in its objective of breaking open and criticising traditional gender roles (Paulson and Calla 2000).

International aid brought an increased number of ‘workshops’ to Tacana women which focused on soft skills such as ‘self-esteem’, ‘leadership’ and the revaluing Tacana ‘traditions’, as weaving bags out of self-spun cotton, for example. Tacana women used to be infamous for their
weaving skills. In their programs Western NGOs inadvertently perpetuate traditional class structures as well as traditional ideas of gender-role norms which have become attributed to “Third World Women”, synonymous for being poor, oppressed, heterosexual, with many children and predominantly ‘abandoned by their husbands’ (Lind 2003; Paulson and Calla 2000; Rivera 1996; Dover and Rappaport 1991, 1996). In relation to gender, development predominantly focusses on issues which are negative: violence, poverty, illness, etc. Thus, though there is a heavy focus on gender role issues, development efforts fail to adequately focus on women’s every day needs and initiatives in the pursuit of their goals and the obstacles they encounter. Post-colonial feminism has criticized this, pointing out that development does not adequately consider the intersectionality of gender, race and class situation, focussing predominantly on indigenous women’s situation as women (Radcliff 2013).

Juanita of Buena Vista stresses how relieved she was when “the situation (around violence towards women) finally changed thanks to the new laws”. I was surprised to realize that she knew about this policy in the first place, and attributed it to her years of engagement CIMTA. She explained

before the law (LPP) and the land reform the father could kill his children. His wife. And nothing would happen. It was his right. In Buena Vista when I was young, a girl became pregnant, she had no husband. Her father became very angry. And he placed her naked into the middle of the plaza. In the sun. In the cepo. The sun was strong! He left her there and she died. Things are different now. But before it was very difficult. A father could stamp on the belly of his daughter if she became pregnant.

Anthropologist Karin Hissink (1961, 1984) similarly observes that, during her research in Tumupasa in the 1950s, if a girl were to became pregnant out of wedlock, a father would turn her out of the house to let her “wander alone with nowhere to go” (ibid 1984:78).

While these situations are quoted by Tacana people today as how ‘things used to be’ and thus regarded as belonging to ‘Tacana tradition’, they strongly mirror orthodox Christian values as would have been introduced in mission life. Today it is not unusual that Tacana girls first become pregnant at the age of fifteen, and without being married. In my research I have not come across any of them being punished for this. Juanita expresses relief at the fact that gender-based violence has been legally prohibited and that men from their comunidades must obey these laws. At the
same time, in a similar type of gender-role based punishment, Adela was threatened with the *cepo*. This raises a number of questions. How far must *comunidades* adhere to national laws? Who has the authority to decide where the line is drawn? Who has the authority to decide what is ‘Tacana tradition’ and how far this ‘tradition’ must be removed from colonial influences in order for it to be ‘authentic’ and ‘indigenous’? Various literature has been dedicated to this question of legal pluralism\(^{131}\) and its impact on gender relations (Sieder & McNeish 2013; Ubink et al 2009; Van Cott 2000). While for indigenous politics ‘the recuperation of customary law is part of a long struggle to reject a ‘neo-colonial’ Latin America’ (Van Cott 2000:211), the predominant criticism is that legal pluralism is not much more than a way for the state to distance itself from the responsibility of administering justice in areas where it has little presence and influence. Indeed, this fits well into the neoliberal model.

Rather than provide an answer to Adela’s situation with the *cepo*, the purpose in discussing this situation is among other things to raise awareness of the complexities involved in reviving ‘cultural traditions’ and the futility of filtering out ‘Tacana’ from ‘non-Tacana’ tradition in order to establish ‘indigeneity’. Because the indigenous movement is based around indigeneity, this indigeneity must be established and for this guidelines must be spelled out. In an effort to raise the participation of women in these processes of ‘re-establishing’ Tacana indigeneity, aid agencies encouraged the foundation of Tacana women’s organizations.

**The National Tacana Women’s Organisation, CIMTA**

Ethnic revival movements in the early 1990s sought to include women in public and political arenas. For the benefit of women’s well-being, as aligned to general human rights issues, policy aimed to alter the gender structure in lowland *comunidades*. In this context CIMTA as founded exclusively for women, as a sub-group to the national Tacana organization, CIPTA. It had been observed that women did not participate when men were present. The creation of CIMTA was aimed at providing women with their own platform so as to bring forth their specific issues. CIMTA also provided NGOs and other aid groups with a point of entry for working with women, which, unlike the Club de Madre, was not associated with the church.

\(^{131}\) ‘Legal pluralism’ is usually associated with colonial rule and refers to the existence of different normative systems within one country (Van Cott 2000).
To my question how the Mothers’ Club and CIMTA differed from one another in Tumupasa, long-time Mother’s Club president Maria replied that “CIMTA only allows Tacana people but the Mother’s Club is for everyone.” Among other things, this means that the second generation colono women in Tumupasa, who also have children who were born and go to school there, do not have the right to resources distributed within the context of CIMTA.

As congruent with the neoliberal model, national organisations have been mainly pushed aside to make room for NGOs from the West which focus on gender-role equality which are called upon to work with the state administrations (Alvarez et al 1998). Thus, for example, the significance of Bolivia’s perhaps most radical feminist grass-roots organisation, Mujeres Creando, has not been identified as valuable in understanding cultural specificities pertaining to Bolivia. Apart from the fact that Mujeres Creando is an Andean group and thus has a better grasp of the situation of Andean women, it is precisely due to the group’s agenda, which evolved in Bolivia’s specific social and political situation, that it could prove useful for the international development arena.

Overall, the new indigenous organizations shifted the power dynamics and structure of Tacana socio-political organization. Previous to indigenous politics, authority structure was based on the localness of the comunidad (and this included colonos or other ethnic groups), the highest authority being the corregidor. Decision-making processes stayed within the comunidad. With the establishment of CIMTA (but more significantly CIPTA), the authority-level became over-reaching. NGOs which played a principal role in the establishment of indigenous organizations all over Bolivia (van Cott 2005; Postero 2006; et al), have had the power to incorporate new institutions into comunidades even if they are in contradiction to local people’s interests and way of life.

Tacana people readily accepted outside collaborations, even if these aimed to radically alter their entire socio-political structure. Maria’s father, a respected vecino in the comunidad who held that the political arena was not a woman’s place, had always been critical of his two daughters’ involvement with political organizations. Considering such strong cultural values, one might question how organizations such as CIMTA managed to spring to life in Tumupasa. Adela was expelled from her post as corregidora not by a communal decision by the members of her comunidad, but by the president of the over-arching Tacana organisation, CIPTA, which was based

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132 “Es que CIMTA solo permite puro Tacanas y el Club de Madre es para todas.”
133 For a summary on the work and philosophy of Mujeres Creando see the summary by Dangl 2007
in Tumupasa. Notably, CIMTA, as the representative Tacana women’s organisation, had no say in the matter.

One might discern strategy in allowing these organizations to be established in the first place. As discussed in the previous chapter, ‘projects’ were generally welcome, even sought-after, in the comunidad. In agreeing to new and even radical institutions, traditional Tacana leaders such as Maria’s father probably hoped that once they had access to resources, these could be ‘redirected’ and appropriated to more accurately reflect their comunidad’s interests and needs. As Adela’s incident proves, organizations such as CIMTA, which seek to change Tacana women’s attitudes to favour Western definitions of gender-equality, are not necessarily successful in doing so.

It has been observed that, overall, policy measures such as the 1995 LPP which encouraged the establishment of women’s organizations such as CIMTA, have proven much less successful than anticipated as people often lack the social and financial capital to successfully understand and administer new laws to their needs (see also Postero 2007). Ironically, organizations promoting gender equity policy which have engaged extensively with Tacana organizations have contributed to the reaffirmation of the traditional role of women. Postero (ibid) observes in line with Foucault’s (1991) theory of governmentality that NGOs working with indigenous groups govern their own conduct in accord with the state’s or the dominating class’ expectations without prompting by the state apparatus. In 2005, working with CIMTA in the context of international development, I tried to encourage Lucilla from Buena Vista to become involved with CIMTA, seeing that she had so much time on her hands and an active interest in local politics. She laughed off my suggestion, exclaiming, “those are all married women with children! I do not fit there.” CIMTA ‘disciplines’ its affiliates in accord with the dominant (white European) class’ rules and with no prompting by any tangible authority, thus helping to re-enforce Hale’s concept of the ‘permitted indian’. This situation becomes particularly apparent around land ownership.

**Land Distribution and Leaving Indigenous Politics – Some Observations**

Land redistribution and ownership, and how it affects women from the global South, has been an issue of comparative studies globally (Radcliffe 2013; Jacobs 2009; Resurreccion 2006). As land distribution and titling have been closely linked to indigenous movements, a recent issue has been to ascertain in how far land titling affects, and can benefit, women. Jacobs (2009) observed that ‘(a)though sometimes benefiting materially, many aspects of land reform have been
detrimental for gender equity. (...) (Central) aspect relate to granting men titles or permits as heads of household’ (ibid:8). This is the case for Tacana women of this study.

Lucilla, from Buena Vista, is a park-ranger in the Madidi National Park. As part of her work she controls the forests, often staying away from the comunidad for weeks on end. One day she came to me very angry, “they have harvested my field! They have taken it off me!” Calming down a bit she complained about the corregidor of Buena Vista, “they don’t want to give me land because I have no children”. Lucilla now in her mid-thirties has neither a husband nor children - an unusual situation for a Tacana woman in the comunidades. “They are very machista in my comunidad,” she continues,

“They don’t want to give women who are not married land to work, because the machistas – of which there are three who are very outspoken, one is now corregidor – say that women cannot and don’t work the land, so why give them land in the first place?! Five hectares are allotted to each person, but he says that single women should only get one hectare, because they cannot work more anyway!”

In the TCO Tacana each member comunidad decides how land is to be divided among its inhabitants. A special division is made between living and land-working space. The amount of field allotted to each adult or family is dependent on its size. Key here is the number of hands able to work the land. At the monthly comunidad meetings inhabitants say if they would like to work a certain section of land, and put in a claim as to how much they would like to ‘receive’ of this communal land. As land must lie fallow for a period up to seven years, new petitions for land are not unusual. The fact that organization around land allotment is left up to each comunidad, it may very well happen that a conservative fraction receives the majority vote on the decision that single women are allotted less land than single men, and if to allot them land at all. In reference to the regulation on land-distribution in Buena Vista, Juanita on a different occasion, commented to me clearly humored: “it seems to be becoming a fashion! Because single women can’t own land in Buena Vista, I now know of two who have gotten married for it!”

Issues around land-allotment and the situation of women also include aspects of social-class. Lucilla is from an elite family in Buena Vista thus one might at first assume that being in an advantageous position, she would not have a problem receiving land. However, being a single woman is of issue here. She is a descendant of one of Buena Vista’s original patrónes; her ailing grandfather is the former patrón’s nephew and still lives in the comunidad. But it is also for this
reason, she tells me, that the comunidad does not want to give her land. There is jealousy and it is said that her grandfather owns so much land privately that he can give her a share to work on. “But that is his land,” she explains “and not mine!” Her case is influenced by the fact that she does not adhere to certain gender conventions, namely that at her age she be married with children with a firm base in the comunidad. She explains that the inhabitants of Buena Vista attribute great value to those people who have children for they send them to the comunidad’s secondary school and contribute to the uphold of the comunidad as a home and living-space. Indirectly Lucilla is being penalized for not being married and not having children.

Ultimately Lucilla left the comunidad in search of a livelihood. She also left the entire realm of indigenous politics, which includes Tacana land-tenure and the projects offered here in connection. For a while she went to live in Cochabamba and finished a diploma in cocoa manufacturing. Later, with the increasing success of the indigenous movement and the consolidation of CIPTA, she tried unsuccessfully to become involved here by applying for the position of secretary to CIPTA. “They did not want me,” she tells me somewhat bitterly, “the president of CIPTA gave the position to his wife”. Working as a park-ranger in the Madidi Park, Lucilla visits her sisters and family in Buena Vista when she is on leave, and up until this incident had used these visits as opportunities to also look after her own agricultural plots. She believes that only a very limited amount of Tacana people benefit from the context of the indigenous movement.

Silvia from Carmen Florida and a schoolteacher by profession, is another example of a Tacana woman who has stepped outside of the realms of indigenous politics to pursue her goals. Now in her late 50s, Silvia is a daughter of a well-respected Tacana leader who was “famous in the region!” as she likes to stress and who was born in the mission comunidad, San José de Uchupiemonas. As with other families in Carmen Florida and other comunidades which are located close to Rurrenabaque, Silvia has a second homestead in town. Silvia has made various attempts to collaborate with NGOs who work with the TCO and the context of indigenous politics. However, Silvia has had most success outside its realms. In 2003 Silvia became involved with the municipality first on the Vigilance Committee and then later when she was voted onto the municipal council (see chapter 6). Thus, though not officially an ‘indigenous leader’, she is a Tacana leader in other local political Bolivian contexts. In her position of council woman she represents her cultural values, thus inadvertently perpetuating what to her is a Tacana way of being.
She has been successful as a Tacana leader although within her comunidad, Carmen Florida, however, Silvia has sharply been criticized for various personality ‘faults’, particularly by the conservative faction. Silvia and Lucilla have important aspects in common which Adela does not share. They both have second homesteads in the nearby towns, and this situation in turn can be attributed to their family’s past socio-economic standing in the comunidad. This has given them the resources to leave the comunidad. With this they have the possibility to avoid social pressure in a context (the comunidad) which is establishing regulations around how ‘Tacana’ men and women should and should not behave. With the revaluation of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘Tacana traditions’, conservative gender-role regulation has experienced a sort of revival and this affects different women differently. Differences are tied to social class (which in turn is tied to race - see chapter 7). Behaviour becomes tied to rewards (eg land) and punishments (eg the cepo). Adela was not able to avoid the social pressure in her comunidad. She did not have the resources nor, having five small children, was in any position to simply move out of the comunidad.

It has been observed (Radcliffe 2012) that indigenous leaders may abuse their position to undermine and regulate women’s behaviour in the name of ‘tradition’. Not only had Adela been confident and outspoken, known for her wit and sharp tongue, but she had for a number of years been an active member of CIMTA. Adela ‘knew how to travel’ (sabe viajar), which was an important attribute among the TCO comunidades and meant that she felt comfortable in moving outside the realms of the rural comunidades; and she was not ‘shy’ (timida) – a traditionally typical attribute of Tacana women. In sum, an effective mechanism which regulates behaviour among Tacana people and which branches out into different treatments for gender-roles, is social pressure. This, in turn, is created by ‘what people say’ about each other. Or, as Tacana people term it, ‘gossip’.

**Gossip: Evading Social Pressures**

A behaviour which is looked upon sternly in Tacana comunidades and in the Tacana way-of-being, is ‘gossip’ (chisme). This is closely tied to ‘minding one’s own business’. From this the jump to being ‘humilde’ (humble), so typical of Tacana people, is not a large one. Gossip and minding one’s own business have become linked to specific gender-role behaviour regulation and the maintenance of certain gender-role power dynamics. In various Amazonian societies ‘gossip’, omitting the negative connotation which the term holds, was traditionally a mechanism of women’s participation in comunidad life and attributed to their specific gender role (Peluso 2003; Chernela 1984). This may have been similar among Tacana people. With Christianization, however, gossip received a definite
negative connotation. Juanita, in the same conversation in which she lauds the ‘new laws’ which seek to protect women from domestic violence, explains that “before the new laws”, it was prohibited to get involved with other women’s abuse situation: “if your neighbour was beating his wife...you had to act like you did not notice anything. You would hear her screaming and your husband would say, if you go and get involved (si te metes) you will get the same from me! The wife was then beaten just like the children, too.”

Maria, a vecino’s daughter from Tumupasa, is well-known for her confident air and ability for public speaking. For many years now Maria has maintained her positions of authority, moving from being leader of the church youth group to being president of the Mothers Club, as well as holding the secretariat of Gender (secretario de Genero) within CIPTA and, lastly, becoming that organization’s vice-president. However, Maria, too, has a fault - un defecto - as I was told by Constantino from Buena Vista. “You see,” Constantino explained to me, “people say that Maria is arrogant. She has a problem with being too arrogant, so they did not want her as CIPTA president”.

In 2006 Maria was elected vice-president of CIPTA. When she told me about this she added with pride that “many people wanted me for president. And I almost became president”. Later I heard from others that she had not gained the position because many did not like the idea of a woman president. Others, like Constantino, said that it was due to her being arrogant. Maria’s arrogance might have prevented a Tacana woman in a less privileged position from attaining public office at all. One might argue that were she not from a strong vecino family, she might not have been able to maintain her positions of authority. Charo, from San José, proves a similar case.

San José is a central Tacana mission comunidad, and Charo is a member of one of the main vecino families within it. She and all her brothers have been corregridores of the comunidad at one point or another. It appears to be an open secret, not only in her comunidad but also far beyond and into the town of Rurrenabaque, that Charo is romantically involved with women. Same-sex relationships are generally frowned upon among the Tacana because, as I was told, “the bible says it’s bad”. When I was able to approach Charo on the subject her attitude was carefree. She was “not bothered with what people think.” It had taken me a long time to be able to meet Charo for, as typical with members of privileged Tacana families, she was often not in her comunidad but rather travelling and staying with family who had homesteads in Rurrenabaque and La Paz. Being able to move about so freely undoubtedly put her in a position to evade social pressures and the
psychological stress of the criticism which being a lesbian would bring with it in a Tacana comunidad. Charo is able to ‘not be bothered by what people think’, as she is able to leave them behind for periods of time whenever she wants.

These incidents involving different Tacana women demonstrate how their social position within the comunidad affects their ability to pursue their interests and represent their ideas. Social class plays a significant role, even if this is no longer tied to a strong economic situation as it was in the past. International development has not focussed sufficiently on the situation of women to be able to recognize such factors. CIMTA has not adequately aided in providing the necessary spaces for Tacana women to inform the indigenous movement of their needs. Instead, development perpetuates an out-dated and conservative image of ‘indian women’, which, echoing as it does the romantic Enlightenment construct, is successful in acquiring funds. What does this say about the indigenous movement and indigeneity on the whole in relation to women?

Among other things, Adela’s situation clearly demonstrates how the power dynamics within the context of indigenous ‘ways-of-being’ have shifted from local comunidad level to an over-reaching TCO/CIPTA level. Individual indigenous behaviour (whatever this may mean) now becomes part of wider-reaching indigenous politics which are directly linked to the nation-state. In reaction to the limited possibilities, Tacana women seek out other contexts, leaving the platform of indigenous politics behind. However, if and when they see opportunities here, they will just as easily ‘return’ and as necessary ‘take on’ an ethnic identity as ‘part of the job’.
Conclusion

This thesis contributes to larger, contemporary discussions of the construction of indigenous identities in Latin America through a consideration of Tacana people, who are members of a particular Amazonian indigenous group. By focussing on Tacana people, I demonstrate how far historical and political processes exclude or include indigenous groups; how indigenous people themselves have contributed to political processes, and what this reveals about the construction of contemporary indigeneity in Latin America more widely.

This research takes as a theoretical guideline the observation that indigeneity needs to be situated in order to have meaning (Canessa 2012, 2007, 2006; Gotkowitz 2011; Greene 2009, 2006; Niezen 2009, 2003; De la Cadena & Starn 2007; Yashar 2005; Rappaport 2005; Warren & Jackson 2002; Ramos 1998 et al). This thesis is therefore careful to show Tacana people within their specific historical and political context: the neoliberal, Andean-centred Bolivian state. Among other things, this project is a response to the observation that neoliberal states in Latin America have built their pro-indigenous politics on a generic ‘non-situated’ indigeneity described as the ‘permitted indian’ by Charles Hale (2004), which “names a sociopolitical category, not the characteristics of anyone in particular” (2).

This thesis also contributes to bridging the gap in information as to how Amazonian groups contribute to and place themselves in nation-building processes of specifically Andean countries for, as has been observed, “central scholarship on Andean nation-states and their attitude and incorporation of indigenous peoples has been predominantly focussed on groups which find their origin in the Andes,” (Greene 209:28, also 2006). More specifically, it focusses on an Amazonian people’s gaze towards the Andes, a position which has shaped their relation to nation-state politics historically and at present. Failing to adequately ‘situate’ the different and distinct indigeneities in a country results in their misrepresentation, or even renders them altogether invisible. With the trend towards multicultural citizenship, so-called ‘Andean’ nations incorporated Amazonian groups into their political agenda in a new way. This research also contributes to an increasing body of Amazonian literature which has moved beyond constructing South American forest-dwellers as members of timeless societies who adapted to their natural surroundings and were corrupted by Spanish colonization (Veber 1998; Viveiros de Castro 1996), and instead places such histories in the
larger contexts and perspectives which they themselves contributed to shaping. Processes such as landscape transformation, trade, migration, ethnogenesis and not least strategies of resistance (eg Van Valen 2013; Dudley 2011, 2009; Alexiades 2009; Alexiades & Peluso 2009; Greene 2009; Wentzel 2008) are all therefore considered.

This conclusion briefly lays out the main processes and contexts which impacted on and shaped contemporary Tacana indigeneity and which have been central to this thesis. One of my first experiences during fieldwork was Tacana people’s angry opposition to President Morales. They projected this dissatisfaction onto how they spoke about colonos, who share the president’s ethnic and geographical heritage. Thus, one of my first encounters with Tacana people left me with a taste of highland-lowland regionalist tensions, which subsequently became a central concern of this thesis. For this reason, when hearing of the TINPIS March which began just as my field-work ended, I was convinced that it would mark a turning-point in Bolivia’s political direction, and the country’s politics of indigeneity. Having heard continual comments from Tacana people, often accompanied by a disgruntled shake of the head or even a fist, about “that Evo”, I was convinced that the TIPNIS March would make their dissatisfaction more widely visible, as indeed it has. I believed TIPNIS to be a manifestation and a coming-together of all the small-scale criticism made of President Morales by indigenous peoples, especially those from the Amazon, at municipal and comunidad level. Surely, I thought, it would now be understood on a wider political level that indigenous peoples in Bolivia could not be treated as a monolithic group, and that the highland-lowland divide between indigenous groups was especially prominent, and part of a larger historical issue. Bolivia’s historic highland-lowland regionalism would, I presumed, now receive the attention it deserved: the march would mark a turning point. Accordingly, I decided to open this thesis with a description of the event today popularly dubbed “the TIPNIS” in Bolivia.

This thesis continues with an examination of the factors on which indigenous identity is based in Bolivia, observing that these are built predominantly on Andean philosophies. In order to align himself to indigeneity and the indigenous movement, and to declare his country an ‘indigenous state’, President Morales has had to establish his ‘having’ indigenous ‘authenticity’. President Morales creates ‘authenticity’ through the incorporation of Andean concepts into everyday politics, which gives him the authority to align himself to indigeneity and the indigenous movement, and subsequently declare his government to have created an indigenous state. Tacana people, however, do not feel represented by the Andean concepts adopted by Morales. Understanding Tacana
people's link to the lowlands and specifically to the Amazon helps demonstrate why they are not sympathetic to highland indigenous colonos who migrate into their area, and how this lack of sympathy in turn reconfirms their affiliation with lowland mestizo people.

Contemporary indigenous politics has at its essence indigenous solidarity and the understanding that indigeneity is a promising tool for achieving rights and resources, and from this angle it is difficult to make sense of the hostilities felt by Tacana people towards colonos. The unsympathetic relationship of one indigenous group to the next can easily be exclusively attributed to inter-indigenous conflict and it might appear that Tacana people have not grasped the positive implications of pro-indigenous politics and policies in Bolivia. Such an assumption would suggest ignorance, whereas in fact other factors are at play. Tacana people of this study would never see their conflictive situation with colonos as one between two indigenous groups, but one between cambas (lowlanders) and collas (highlanders).

To make this clear, this thesis demonstrates that Tacana people do not define themselves in terms of their ethnicity, but rather in terms of geography (see also Orlove 1993), exemplified by their strong self-identification as camba. This identification reflects both their region of origin (Amazon and lowlands) and their typical pattern of settlement, in comunidades. Geographical settlements and the nomenclature attributed to them by Spanish colonization also dictated the inhabitants’ placement on the state’s socio-racial economic scale: people from the comunidades are and always have been, by definition, poor. Tacana are by their own definition ‘humble’ people ‘from the comunidades’. They link themselves less to other local (Leco, Tsimané/Moseten) or remote (Aymara/Quechua) living indigenous groups, as would be expected from the context of indigenous politics, and more to their common history with local mestizos, with whom they share geographical and kinship ties.

Tacana people’s regional identification is based on the relationship they constructed with non-indigenous white/mestizo settlers. Their location in the Amazonian piedmont, as opposed to the Bolivian plains of Santa Cruz, meant a closer affiliation with white/mestizo people than if they had been residing in the eastern plains or the Andes. The white/mestizo cambas lived in comunidades together with their indian peons whereas the Cruzeños had minimal contact with the indians who worked their haciendas. These differing relationships had a significant impact at the time of the Chaco War and the land reform (1953) that would eventually follow. After 1953 people from comunidades were by law no longer peons and were legally, if not in practice, on an equal
footing with the former landowners who had to give a share of their land to the Indians who worked it. Because the construction of race is interlinked with economic status (Albó 2008; Zavaleta Reyles 2008), and racial affiliation came to be defined by colonial infrastructure and settlement patterns in which towns and cities were the place of white people and the rural areas and comunidades the place of the Indians (Albó 2008; Orlove 1993). Former patrones who were white/mestizo and who remained in the comunidad thus became ‘Indian’ in the eyes of the state. This is a situation which has not received much attention in the literature.

This colonial settlement infrastructure has been uncritically adopted today in indigenous politics, and comunidades are considered tokens of indigeneity. Indeed, though the creation of racial categories through policy and taxation has been taken up by authors (eg ibid), it has not been adequately incorporated into the politics of indigeneity in Bolivia. Instead, national bureaucracies reinforce that ethnic affiliations as much more fixed and static than they actually are. The most recent demonstration of this was the 2012 Bolivian census which set out to count the different ethnic groups in Bolivia. There was a popular outcry when it became clear that the rubric ‘mestizo’ was not to be included.134

Another central concern of this thesis is the context of Tacana comunidades, and the impact which the socio-economic class system as based on the model of the mission comunidad has had on who Tacana people are today, especially with regard to indigenous politics. The settlement socio-economic legacy of missionization set up the hierarchical principle that the whiter (through mestizaje) and economically stronger a Tacana person was, the more likely it was for him/her to be given authority and leadership positions within the comunidad. This system was self-perpetuating. Mestizo Tacana authority positions, as the corregidor and the school-teacher (ie the comunidad’s elite) meant constant interaction with the nation-state representatives (church, NGOS, etc) and these thus to become indispensable go-betweens for non-elite Tacana. Sharing kinship ties and comunidades with white and mestizos is a key aspect in contemporary Tacana identity. It explains Tacana people’s strong affiliation with being camba but also their strong role in indigenous politics today. It is this context which lays the grounds for their being able to slip into the role of the ‘permitted Indian’.

134 See for example the following newspaper article http://www.kaosenlared.net/america-latina/item/26232-bolivia-mestizo-cuando-el-censo-se-torna-disenso.html (accessed 20.10.13)
Besides introducing new ways of looking at Bolivia’s highland-lowland regionalism and constructions of race, this thesis has also analysed the role played by different actors involved in the construction of indigenous identities. This analysis exposes the fact that the process by which indigenous rights are achieved is indifferent to indigenous peoples ‘ethnicity’ (whatever this might mean); and that indigenous people can, in fact, derive greater benefit from indigenous politics the more they move away from their ‘indian-ness’.

This contention is demonstrated by an analysis of the grounds on which Tacana people became involved in the indigenous movement; a process that had less to do with reviving or establishing Tacana indigeneity than with finding a tool for attaining resources necessary to achieve modernization. Importantly, placing this situation next to the observation that the hegemonic indian in Bolivia is Andean, a logic conclusion could be that this would not affect Tacana people negatively, for their investment with the politics of ethnicity is purely strategic. Yet, their dissatisfaction with the Andean-centric representation of indigeneity is in fact a case in point of a different aspect, having less to do with that Tacana cosmologies are missing in national representations than with the fact that in the Andean-centric representation they miss a larger, more incorporative Amazonian representation. This would include other socio-racial groups, and be geared towards a wider Amazonian camba-ness, as represented by the green banner of the lowlands, or beauty contestant competitions. Camba-ness transcends ethnic boundaries and Tacana people situate their indigeneity within this wider identity. Such becomes represented in local municipalities as that of Rurrenabaque which also includes a Tacana heritage as is represented in the surrounding landscape.

Furthermore, for Tacana people the move to nationalize Andean philosophies reconfirms a historical mistrust of the (traditionally mestizo) government in the highlands, which ‘forgot’ them during so many centuries of nation-building. Though specific reasons for this mistrust may differ, it is shared by both Tacana people and mestizo lowlanders, binding them together and making up part of their collective camba identity. From this perspective, the MAS government and President Morales are no more or less mestizo or decolonizing than previous governments.

On a different, though related, note, Tacana people benefit from pro-indigenous policies (eg TCOs) although Tacana-ness is not represented at a national level. Tacana-ness may be irrelevant to indigenous politics in Bolivia, but is still being reconstructed. This includes the process of performing a neat separation from other ethnicities (eg Ese Eja, Leco, Tsimané/Moseten and even white/mestizos) in order to clearly distinguish an ‘us’ from ‘them’. As has been demonstrated, this
is not consistent with the reality of Tacana people’s history, raising questions as to who else is constructing this Tacana indigeneity - one which is, moreover, represented by Tacana indigenous leaders on a wider national and international level - and to what end.

Also central to this thesis has been to demonstrate that the construction of indigenous identity in Bolivia is, in many ways, a project which has little to do with how Tacana people see themselves. Indigeneity is a national and international project. A multitude of actors participate in shaping indigeneity in Bolivia. Even if President Morales has tied himself and the MAS government to the indigenous movement, he is still just one actor among many in the political arena of indigeneity. Another central actor, to whom he may stand in contradiction, is the community of NGOs. NGOs have firmly taken up their role in the system of a neoliberal, decentralized state, and wield great influence in sectors over which states alone have traditionally held power. While NGOs partly support President Morales in his pro-indigenous policy endeavours, they do not let his politics influence their own political course. Significantly, this attitude is not exclusively one towards the government of President Morales. It also pertains to indigenous groups. This means that, NGOs will construct Tacana indigeneity, with or without Tacana-ness (their indigenous knowledge), or Tacana people, as best fits their own agendas.

NGOs aid indigenous groups in achieving rights and resources such as land and for this have modelled their strategies on specific ideas of what these rights entail (eg conservation of the environment) and ideas of what and who indigenous people are. This model is reflected in the concept of the ‘permitted indian’, and the more contact an indigenous group has had with nation-state bureaucracies in the past, the easier it will find this role to play. Tacana people are therefore good candidates for indigenous politics. Tacana people of the Andean piedmont are more likely to be successful in the politics of the indigenous movement than those who have had less contact with state bodies and policies. Their political strength in indigenous politics is a situation which not only differentiates Tacana people from other Amazonian groups who are from the same or adjacent regions such as the Ese Eja and the Tsimané/Moseten. It also differentiates certain Tacana people from other Tacana people, such as those who previously might have been labelled ‘Tacanistas’ – monolinguual Tacana speakers – and who have never been in a position in the comunidad to engage with NGOs or other outsiders. These Tacana people are dependent on those often mestizo Tacana people who serve as indigenous leaders for resources and involvement in indigenous politics.
NGOs shape indigeneity, using the people they are working with to reconfirm their central ideas and concepts (eg the necessity for forest conservation). If Tacana people want to benefit from what NGOs have to offer them (eg funding for projects) they will have to negotiate the terms. This not only reconfirms that Tacana people successfully play the role of the ‘permitted indian’, it also means that the community of NGOs has come to identify which indigenous groups fit the type of indigenous they need in order to successfully achieve their goals. In Bolivia it is understood that the Tacana are one of the strongest and most successful Amazonian groups in the indigenous movement. In 2004, CIPTA was working with over twenty NGOs and has a reputation in Bolivia for being ‘NGO compatible’. NGOs actively seek to work with CIPTA so they can tick the ‘indigenous people’ box which their organization’s philosophy might require of them. However CIPTA, too, has realized that NGOs need indigenous groups. I have experienced incidents during which CIPTA’s president rather arrogantly rejects collaborations with NGOs. Once, for example, I overheard him on the telephone in Tumupasa: “no, we are not interested, no. You have no idea, the last NGO was one from Sweden and they offered 30,000 dollars! We have all kinds of NGOs knocking on our door. No, no, no. We are not interested.”

Finally, while some Tacana people successfully fit the role of the ‘permitted indian’, a larger portion do not. These latter are not only those who were never part of the élite Tacana population in their comunidad, but also those who simply do not conform to aspects of the hegemonic indian subject. This subject reconfirms colonial Enlightenment ideals which permeate other aspects of social life such as in the regulation of gender-roles. NGO programmes cater to this by constructing the Third World Woman as a passive, victimized, poor, single mother, unable to help herself. Though the Bolivian government might be angered by the intense involvement of NGOs and their domination of arenas which are traditionally the responsibility of national governments, their attitude is inconsistent. President Morales was so angered by the support which the TIPNIS Protest marchers received from the USA bilateral aid organization, USAID, that he expelled that organization from the country. He does not, however, question what imported ‘gender-equality programmes’ geared towards indigenous women’s empowerment should look like. He could do so, for example, by identifying his own country’s women’s movement (eg as represented by Mujers Creando – Women Creating) and dictating that foreign NGOs must take their lead.

As this process of identity construction continues more Tacana are becoming involved with the platform of the indigenous movement to help expand the definitions of the ‘permitted indian’: if not to make it ‘more Tacana’, then to make it more sensitive to different kinds of people and their contexts. In this process ethnicity becomes ‘upgraded’, even if Tacana people themselves have never emphasized it much in their own identity. Towards the beginning of the late 1990s, the traditional Tacana élite, composed predominantly of the offspring of mestizo families, took on principal positions in the indigenous movement. However, this is beginning to change as people start openly to talk about each other’s blood links (something which usually does not occur in front of outsiders). In this context I have heard statements such as “he is not really Tacana, only his mother was Tacana!” about powerful indigenous representatives. Even more significant to Tacana people of this study is the fact that their heritage (or an edited version of it) is starting to appear on a more public level, for example in the tourist industry which has the effect that they become promoted regionally. This became apparent to me the last time I visited Rurrenabaque to witness its annual festival. New games and competitions had been added. As well as the dance and costumes which represent the navigation of the Beni River on balsa-rafts (image 11), there are now events which include the use of real balsa-rafts in a competitive race from Carmen Florida to Rurrenabaque on the Beni River (see image 1). Other events include competitions such as transporting water taken from the Beni River in a ceramic gourd on one’s head (image 23), pounding rice (image 24) and, not least, bow and arrow shooting (image 25). What was most noticeable was that these were all competitions in which people who live in comunidades have an obvious advantage. No mestizo who has grown up in Rurrenabaque will know how to steer a balsa boat as well as a person from the comunidades and no woman who is not from the comunidades will know how to carry water fetched from the river on her head.

An interesting development is taking place. All the analysis and research of this thesis points to the fact that indigenous identity continues to be a foreign concept to Tacana people, seen largely as one to be assumed at moments of professional performance tied to indigenous politics, much like putting on a suit when going to work. Nonetheless, it has also started to enter Tacana people’s everyday lives. Councillor Silvia, for example, talks about being able to defend her municipality because her Tacana background enables her to walk in the jungle for many hours, transporting ideas which evolved in indigenous politics and appropriating them to her context as she sees fit. Indeed, she is linking the concept of ‘people from the comunidades’ to the contemporary politics of indigeneity, in as much as she is using it on a local political platform to back up her actions. ‘Being
humble’ is receiving a new assertive twist. In ways such as these, the indigenous movement can be seen to have given Tacana people a surge of collective self-confidence born in no small part from their rejection of the new indigenous politics as brought to them from the Andes, and by NGOs. In this way Tacana people continue to contribute to nation-state processes from both within (CIPTA, CIMTA, CIDOP, etc) and outside (eg Rurrenabaque) the contemporary indigenous politics, bringing forth issues important to them.
Image 25: Bow and arrow shooting competition as part of Rurre’s annual festival (2010)
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