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Accountability and Clientelism in Dominant Party Politics:
The Case of a Constituency Development Fund in Tanzania

Machiko Tsubura

Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Development Studies

University of Sussex

January 2014
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature: ........................................
SUMMARY

This thesis examines the shifting nature of accountability and clientelism in dominant party politics in Tanzania through the analysis of the introduction of a Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in 2009. A CDF is a distinctive mechanism that channels a specific portion of the government budget to the constituencies of Members of Parliament (MPs) to finance local small-scale development projects which are primarily selected by MPs. While existing studies argue that the control of resources is essential for dominant parties to maintain their power in politics, the adoption of a type of CDF in Tanzania poses a puzzle; why did the dominant ruling party of Tanzania accept a CDF that would give the legislature financial autonomy and might weaken the party’s power over MPs?

Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses, the thesis demonstrates that a CDF proposal was moved forward as part of the reform to strengthen the legislature, and the ruling party accepted it to re-establish party coherence and gain public support in preparation for the general elections in 2010, after it was plagued by the revelation of corruption scandals involving party leaders and intraparty competition. The thesis has also found that a CDF was adopted when clientelistic voters were increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of MPs and some MPs had begun providing financial assistance to voters systematically. With a formal project-selection and monitoring mechanism in place, the Tanzanian CDF has more potential to restrict the prevalence of clientelistic accountability than the provision of private or club goods by MPs based on private resources. The Tanzanian case demonstrates that CDFs can potentially mitigate the influence of clientelism in the accountability relationship between MPs and voters in developing countries.
Acknowledgements

Over the last four years of my doctoral research, I have received tremendous support from a number of people and institutions in the United Kingdom, Tanzania, Kenya and Japan. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors, Andrés Mejía Acosta and David K. Leonard, for their unwavering support and incisive guidance at every stage of my doctoral study. I was fortunate to have a third supervisor, Shandana Khan Mohmand. I appreciate her helpful advice in the last stage of writing this thesis.

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<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPT-Maendeleo</td>
<td>African Progressive Party of Tanzania-<em>Maendeleo</em> (<em>‘Development’</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP</td>
<td>Afro-Shirazi Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDC</td>
<td>Bumbuli Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAG</td>
<td>Comptroller and Auditor General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td><em>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</em> (<em>‘Party of Revolution’</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC Committee</td>
<td>Constituencies Development Catalyst Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCF</td>
<td>Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF (general)</td>
<td>Constituency Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF (in Kenya)</td>
<td>Constituencies Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF (in Philippines)</td>
<td>Countrywide Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF (in Zambia)</td>
<td>Constituency Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td><em>Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo</em> (<em>‘Party of Democracy and Development’</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DACF</td>
<td>District Assembly Common Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCE</td>
<td>District Chief Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDTP</td>
<td>Deepening Democracy in Tanzania Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSF</td>
<td>direct state funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>First Past The Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBS</td>
<td>General Budget Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHC</td>
<td>Ghana Cedis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWG</td>
<td>Governance Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBP</td>
<td>International Budget Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ksh</td>
<td>Kenya shilling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAAC</td>
<td>Local Authorities Accounts Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>LATF</td>
<td>Local Authority Transfer Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGCDG</td>
<td>Local Government Capital Development Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGRP</td>
<td>Local Government Reform Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSP</td>
<td>Legislatures Support Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKUKUTA</td>
<td><em>Mpango wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umaskini Tanzania</em> (<em>‘National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty Tanzania’</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multi-party Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNA</td>
<td>Member of the National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Member of the Provincial Assemblies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLADS</td>
<td>Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NARC  National Rainbow Coalition
NCCR-Mageuzi National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi (‘Reform’)
NDC  National Democratic Congress
NEC  National Executive Committee
NGO  non-governmental organisation
PAC  Public Accounts Committee
PADF Priority Development Assistance Fund
PML  Pakistan Muslim League
PMO-RALG Prime Minister’s Office, Regional Administration and Local Government
PNU  Party of National Unity
PPP  Pakistan People’s Party
POAC  Parastatal Organization Accounts Committee
PWP-I People’s Works Programme-I
RC  Regional Commissioner
REPOA Research on Poverty Alleviation
Rs  rupees
SUNY/CID State University of New York in Albany, Center for International Development
TAA  Tanganyika African Association
TANU  Tanganyika African Nationalist Union
TANESCO Tanzania Electric Supply Company
Tsh  Tanzania shilling
UDP  United Democratic Party
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
ZMK  Zambian Kwacha

Swahili Words

_Bunge_  Parliament
_Bunge lenye meno_  Parliament with teeth
_chakachua_  adulterate
_harambee_  let us pull together, community fundraising
_kura za maoni_  opinion poll, primary election
_mafisadi_  corrupt people
_Mwongozo_  CCM party guidelines
_posho_  allowance(s)
_ruksa_  permission, do your own thing
_ruzuku_  subsidies
_shehe_  Muslim leader
_shehia_  government administrative unit in Zanzibar
_takrima_  African traditional hospitality
_ujamaa_  familyhood, socialism
Preface

Between 2005 and 2008, I worked at the Embassy of Japan in Tanzania as an economic cooperation advisor and attended the Governance Working Group (GWG), an aid coordination group of over 18 bilateral and multilateral development agencies providing assistance to Tanzania. With the new aid modalities, namely general budget support and basket funds, donors were increasingly influential in the decision-making and implementation of development policies in Tanzania. Various governance reforms were financially and technically supported by donors, and the GWG was established to foster good governance by ‘strengthen[ing] the effectiveness and efficiency of development assistance through joint policy dialogue, analysis and support to the Government of Tanzania’ (Development Partners Group in Tanzania).

The GWG monthly meetings were held in the Umoja House, a landmark complex building situated in the centre of Dar es Salaam, where four major European donors – the United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands and European Commission – have their country officers together. As the Japanese Embassy was not far from the Umoja House, I sometimes walked from my office to attend the GWG meetings there. It was only about a fifteen-minute walk, but was enough for me to remember that I was in Dar es Salaam, with a dazzling sunshine, my heels sinking into the unpaved streets and receiving friendly greetings by a man who occasionally washed my car. Every time I entered the Umoja House, the building of modern western design with a vaulted ceiling and fully air-conditioned rooms and corridors first gave me relief and then made me almost forget that I was in Tanzania.

In 2007, one agenda came to the fore at the GWG. It was a proposal to introduce a Constituency Development Fund (CDF) by the Tanzanian government. The members of the GWG were against the proposal as it would adversely affect governance of the country, and they expressed their concerns to the Tanzanian government on various occasions. Tanzanian civil society organisations joined forces and took various advocacy actions to stop the adoption of the fund. Yet, Tanzanian policymakers did not give in to the pressure. Donors’ frustration in their efforts to thwart the introduction of a CDF reminded me of the phrase ‘veranda’ politics in Africa (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 136; Kelsall 2002), a metaphor suggesting that the formal policy space in ‘air-conditioned rooms’ is only superficial and the actual decision-making takes place in the informal political domain of ‘verandas’. It seemed to me that a CDF was discussed
within a circle of Tanzanian politicians on a ‘veranda’, which neither donors nor civil society organisations were part of. I became interested in how and why Tanzanian politicians were pursuing the CDF agenda against the strong pressure and how it would affect the political process in the country. After completing my assignment at the embassy in 2008, I started to investigate the policymaking process of a CDF and its relationship with politics in Tanzania, not as a donor representative but as an academic researcher. In the midst of my enquiry, the CDF Act was passed into law in August 2009 and the fund was launched several months before the general elections in 2010.
Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1. Aim and Scope

A Constituency Development Fund (CDF) is a government budget allocation mechanism that channels a specific portion of the national budget to the constituencies of MPs to finance local small-scale development projects such as the construction of school facilities, health clinics and water supply systems (International Budget Partnership 2010; Keefer and Khemani 2009a; Policy Forum 2009). There are currently some 15 developing countries worldwide where CDFs are implemented. A CDF is a distinctive mechanism in that MPs are vested with a degree of authority in the selection of projects, a function that can be considered as a new form of constituency service by MPs. As such, a CDF is not merely a means of transferring public funds from central to local governments, but a strategic tool for a redistributive game by politicians in electoral politics; MPs use the funds to respond to the development needs of their constituencies, cultivate their personal votes and enhance their chances of re-election (Baskin 2010b; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; Cox and McCubbins 1986).

CDFs have been implemented in different parts of the developing world for years. For example, a CDF-like mechanism existed in Uganda as early as 1969 (Chambers 1974: 97). In the Philippines, the use of national funds by politicians for the projects in their constituencies dates back to 1930 by imitating ‘pork barrel’ politics in the United States of America, which became the basis for the design of a CDF launched in the country in 1989 (Nograles and Lagman 2008). Papua New Guinea introduced a CDF in 1984, and eventually, CDFs became a common government budget allocation mechanism mainly in Asia and Africa (Table 1.1). Over three-quarters of the countries where CDFs are implemented are commonwealth countries and all the countries listed in Table 1.1 use the First Past The Post (FPTP) electoral system which exhibits the importance of CDFs for candidate-centred electoral politics.

---

1 See, for example, Baskin (2010a) and Keefer and Khemani (2009b) on pork barrel politics. CDFs resemble ‘earmarks’ or ‘member items’, congressional budget allocations to the projects requested by legislators, in the United States of America. Yet, CDFs and American earmarks are different in that the former allocates set amounts of public funds to all the constituencies of MPs, while the latter is employed on a case-by-case basis.

2 The fund was abolished in Papua New Guinea in 1995 due to mounted criticism by local students and the World Bank on the lack of an accountability mechanism (Connell 1997: 278).

3 See, for example, Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis (2005) for electoral systems. Papua New Guinea changed
Table 1.1 Countries Where CDFs Are Implemented

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year starting the operation</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name of CDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1969/70 Uganda               | ● Rural Development Programme  
|                              | ● Constituency Development Fund |
| FY2005/06 Papua New Guinea   | ● Electoral Development Fund  |
| 1984–1995 Solomon Islands    | ● Rural Constituency Development Fund  
|                              | ● Special Discretionary Fund  
|                              | ● Millennium Constituency Development Fund and Constituency Micro Fund  |
| 1985 Pakistan                | ● Five-point programme  
|                              | ● Tameer-e-Pakistan Programme, later Khushal Pakistan Programme-I  |
| 1989 Philippines             | ● Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund  
|                              | ● Countrywide Development Fund, later Priority Development Assistance Fund  |
| 1990 Philippines             | ● MPs’ share in the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF), HIPC Funds and GEducation Funds  
|                              | ● Constituency Development Fund (to replace MPs’ share in the DACF)  |
| 1993 India                   | ● Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme  |
| 1994 Ghana                   | ● Constituency Development Fund  |
| 2000 Zambia                  | ● Constituency Development Fund  |
| 2003 Kenya                   | ● Constituency Development Fund  |
| FY2006/07 Malawi             | ● Constituency Development Fund  |
| FY2008/09 Jamaica            | ● Constituency Development Fund  |
| 2008 South Sudan             | ● Constituency Development Fund  |
| 2009–2012 Bhutan             | ● Constituency Development Grant  |
| 2009 Tanzania                | ● Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund  |
| 2010 Zimbabwe                | ● Constituency Development Fund  |


the electoral system from FPTP to Alternative Vote after their CDF was abolished (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005: 50). Pakistan and the Philippines use a combination of FPTP and List Proportional Representation, but 80% of MPs are elected in the FPTP system in both countries.
CDFs are a controversial mechanism as they directly involve MPs in the utilisation of public resources. A major concern has been raised by scholars, civil society organisations (CSOs) and Western donors that CDFs erode the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of the government, an arrangement that secures checks and balances in democracies (Murray 2011; van Zyl 2010). In democratic systems, legislatures are mandated to make policies through the formulation of legislations and to oversee executives, while executives implement such policies to deliver public services to citizens. The critics of CDFs argue that the CDF approach blurs the boundaries of these distinct functions of the government branches by involving MPs in the execution of development projects.

On the other hand, CDFs have potentially positive effects on electoral democracy in developing countries. Given that many MPs in developing countries provide financial assistance to poor voters in their constituencies, which is conducive to the prevalence of clientelism, CDFs, if designed and implemented in transparent and accountable ways, have the potential to mitigate the influence of political finance on electoral competition and level the electoral playing field. In addition, in view of public finance management, CDFs may have a ring-fencing effect; by setting aside a small portion of public funds for MPs, the remaining development budgets of local governments may be protected from being abused by politicians or political parties for electoral purposes.

In sub-Saharan Africa, CDFs have proliferated over the last two decades particularly after gaining prominence following Kenya’s introduction of a CDF in 2003 (Oxford Analytica 2009). When a CDF was adopted in Kenya, it was cautiously but widely welcomed by policymakers, civil society and international donors as a breakthrough in advancing the decentralisation of public funds and enhancing local ownership of development (Kimenyi 2005: 1; Sasaoka 2008: 84–95). However, a number of mismanagement of CDF funds by MPs were reported by the media, and CDFs became controversial not only in Kenya but also in the international discussion on transparency and accountability of public finance in developing countries.

Tanzania is one of the African countries that recently launched a CDF by emulating that of Kenya. The adoption of a CDF in Tanzania poses a puzzle. Similar to the Kenyan CDF, the Tanzanian CDF was designed in the way that the funds would automatically be allocated to all the constituencies of MPs without any requirement of obtaining approval of the executive. This type of CDF is considered to strengthen the
financial autonomy of the legislature from the executive through the allocation of public funds to constituency service by MPs (Bagaka 2010; Barkan and Matiangi 2009: 59; O'Donnell 2003). Why did Tanzania’s dominant ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM: ‘Party of Revolution’) adopt a CDF in 2009 that would strengthen the financial autonomy of the legislature and might weaken its power over its MPs, despite the fact that it had not been faced with serious competition from opposition in Mainland of the country? This is the main puzzle that initially motivated the study. The primary research question of the thesis is: were there any changes in dominant party politics in Tanzania that explain the adoption of a CDF in 2009? Through the examination of the politics behind the introduction of a CDF in Tanzania, the study also seeks to address another question which is more fundamental to the debates on CDFs: how does the introduction of a CDF affect the nature of electoral politics and accountability in Tanzania, in particular the accountability relationship between MPs and voters? Does it promote clientelistic accountability between them? While the Tanzanian CDF is still at an early stage of the implementation and its impacts cannot be assessed empirically, this thesis discusses the potential impacts of the CDF on electoral politics and accountability based on the analysis of the policy process and the current trend of the MP-voter relationship in the country.

1.2. Contribution of the Study

This thesis contributes mainly to the academic discussion on accountability and clientelism in developing countries. Among the various dimensions of accountability, this study focuses primarily on the vertical accountability relationship between MPs and voters which is the core foundation of democratic systems, and to a lesser extent on horizontal accountability between legislatures and executives. The two dimensions of accountability are of particular interest because CDFs are unique mechanisms to empower legislatures and MPs, and they are located at the juncture of the two dimensions of accountability.

Vertical accountability between MPs and voters in developing countries is characterised by the influence of clientelism. Clientelism has been one of the central

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4 The United Republic of Tanzania consists of Mainland and Zanzibar, and this question applies only to Mainland. In Zanzibar, the Civic United Front (CUF), opposition party, has been challenging CCM’s rule since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1992.
characteristics of politics in developing countries where a majority of citizens are poor and tend to be dependent on protection and financial assistance from those who are in higher positions in the society including MPs. In democratic countries where elections are held regularly, politicians are motivated by electoral incentives and often choose to establish their electoral support through clientelistic relationships.

As CDFs are a mechanism for MPs to distribute tangible goods to voters, some scholars view them as an instrument of clientelism. For example, van de Walle (2009) argues that the recent proliferation of CDFs in sub-Saharan Africa illustrates a shift of the locus of political clientelism from the presidency to the legislature in the region (9–10). On the other hand, there are scholars who distinguish CDFs from political clientelism (Lindberg 2010: 120). Indeed, CDFs are closely associated with clientelism, as the funds may serve as a tool for politicians (patrons) to gain support from voters (clients). Yet, in principle, CDFs do not seem to be a typical example of clientelism because they are used mainly for development projects and, unlike conventional clientelistic exchanges, MPs and voters do not have much personal interaction in CDFs.

Thus, this thesis does not assume that CDFs are an instrument of clientelism. Rather, it takes an inductive approach, first looking at various types of CDFs in Asia and Africa and then examines the Tanzanian CDF in depth before discussing what the Tanzanian CDF means in view of accountability and clientelism. Through this analysis, the thesis seeks to add a new empirical case to the discussions on accountability and clientelism in political science.

While accountability and clientelism are the core area with which this thesis is concerned, it also adds a case to the literature on dominant party politics in developing countries. Tanzania is one of the African countries where one party has maintained its dominant power since independence. There is a volume of studies examining how dominant parties have established and maintained power in Tanzania and other democratic countries. Building on these studies, this thesis presents an example of how a dominant party responds to the weakening of party cohesion. The adoption of a CDF signifies that the party needed to readjust their election strategies to cope with the unexpected influence of factional politics and the risk of losing public support prior to the elections in 2010. The thesis therefore contributes to the discussions on the adaptation and resilience of dominant party systems in democracies.

See Chapter 5 for the literature on dominant party politics in general and in Tanzania.
This thesis also contributes to the growing significance of legislatures and MPs in African politics (Barkan 2008; 2009; Lindberg 2010). With the unique objectives and arrangements of CDFs, this study also provides insights into the discussion on political finance in electoral politics (Casas-Zamora 2008). From policy perspectives, the study is also highly relevant to the good governance agenda promoted by the international community. Major western donors and researchers on aid have recognised the importance of legislatures, accountability mechanisms and political dynamics in promoting good governance in the aid recipient countries (Africa Power and Politics Programme; Barkan 2009; Hudson 2007; Hyden 2010; Hyden and Mmuya 2008; Tsekpo and Hudson 2009). This study draws the attention of donors and researchers on aid to the roles and incentives of MPs in economic and social development of their constituencies and the significance of the management of voter expectations of MPs. Donors and researchers on aid tend to consider constituency service by MPs as trivial to the national policy process in which they are mainly interested. Yet, they constitute a basic fabric of the accountability mechanisms that affects the overall performance of legislatures and the nature of governance in developing countries.

1.3. Research Design

There are various research streams and methods developed in political science that can be applied to the examination of specific political phenomena. Among them, this study is mainly guided by rational choice theory and new institutionalism (Hay 2002; Marsh 2002: 3–7; Mayhew 1974; Norris 1997: 30). Rational choice theorists analyse political phenomena by focusing on actors with the assumption that actors are ‘instrumental, self-serving utility-maximisers’ (Hay 2002: 8). This study shares this assumption and highlights key individuals who are involved in the policy process of a CDF as rational actors. In particular, MPs are viewed as critical players in the process, who are essentially motivated by electoral and career incentives and behave in order to maximise their probability of winning elections and advance their political careers.6

6 There is an ontological question as to whether collective entities such as legislatures, political parties and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are merely the aggregation of individual actors or they have their own ‘organic qualities’ (Hay 2006: 88–89). This thesis assumes that collective entities have organic qualities and treats them as the units of analysis, except for Chapter 6 in which individuals are the units of analysis. Yet, the thesis also highlights individual actors of collective entities who have had distinctive influence on CDF politics or generated meaningful variation within the entities.
This study is also guided by new institutionalism which challenges the simplifying assumption of rational choice theory that actors play decisive roles in politics, and instead emphasises the importance of ‘the mediating role of the institutional contexts in which events occur’ (Hay 2002: 711, italics in original). New institutionalism not only refers to formal institutional settings as was the case in conventional institutionalism, but also encompasses ‘the rules, norms and values’ (Marsh 2002: 6) and highlights ‘history, timing and sequence in explaining political dynamics’ (Hay 2002: 11). Based on this view, this study assumes that the introduction of a CDF is not simply a result of the collective decisions made by rational actors, but the institutional factors, both formal and informal rules and political and social norms, affected the policy process and outcomes. By exploring the interactions between actors and institutions, the study presents a comprehensive picture of the political changes that affected the adoption of a CDF and its potential impact on the nature of electoral politics and accountability in Tanzania.

While there are various case studies on CDFs to illustrate particular aspects of politics in developing countries, there is no single dominant theoretical framework for the analysis of ‘CDF politics’, or the interaction between CDFs and politics. Thus, the study employed inductive and deductive approaches to examine the Tanzanian case by combining different theories and concepts (Hay 2002: 30–31).

The study employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. It relied on qualitative methods to understand the process in which a CDF was adopted and formulated, and applied quantitative methods to the analysis of the MP-voter relationship. For the qualitative analysis, it employed process-tracing methods to look into the policy process of the Tanzanian CDF from several perspectives by connecting key events (George and Bennett 2005). Two rounds of fieldwork were undertaken in Tanzania (from October 2010 to April 2011 and from October 2011 to March 2012) to collect primary data from various sources based on the principle of triangulation to enhance validity and reliability of data (Burnham 2008: 206).

During the fieldwork, open- and semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants including MPs, their personal assistants, members of political parties and officials of Parliament, ministries and district councils, academia, CSOs and donor agencies. I visited the Parliament of Tanzania, commonly known as Bunge in Swahili, in Dodoma five times in November 2010, February, April and November in 2011 and February 2012. Most of the interviews with MPs were held within and outside the
Parliament in Dodoma. Thirty-four MPs were interviewed in total, including two cabinet ministers and four deputy ministers. Of these 34 MPs, 22 were from CCM and 12 from opposition parties; 29 MPs were from Tanzania Mainland and 5 from Zanzibar; 31 male and 3 female. The interviewed MPs were selected by snowball and chain referral sampling methods (Tansey 2007: 770), while long-serving MPs were particularly targeted to hear their views on the changes over time (see Appendix A for the list of interviewees and the selection criteria of MPs).

The analysis was also underpinned by the observation of the interactions between MPs and other actors. I accompanied the visit of Said Mohamed Mtanda, MP for Mchinga (CCM), to his constituency in Lindi Region, which is located in the south-east of the country, in March 2011, and observed his activities and interactions with people including voters, teachers and students in secondary schools, party members, his personal assistant, family members and friends. I interviewed his personal assistant who resides in the constituency and the officials of the Lindi District Council to understand their roles and relationships with MPs. In April 2011 and February 2012, I visited the Singida town in Singida Region, which is located in the central part of the country, and interviewed personal assistants of three MPs who were elected from the region, the officials of the Singida District Council and Municipal Offices and District Councillors, and visited several CDF-funded projects and the projects funded by the MP in the Singida Urban constituency. For archival research, government documents such as legislations, parliamentary hansards, court cases and election reports, local newspapers and the reports published by civil society organisations were collected.

Quantitative analysis is employed in an effort to understand the public perception of the role of MPs by using the Afrobarometer surveys (Chapter 6). I relied on the Afrobarometer surveys because I prioritised collecting information on the CDF policy process and changes in national politics during the fieldwork rather than conducting surveys of voters. Yet, thanks to the cooperation by the Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), local research institute implementing the Afrobarometer surveys, I added several questions on the public perception of MPs to the latest survey in June 2012, which enabled me to conduct regression analyses of the results. This is the first study that added vote margins of the elections and the ranking of MPs’ interventions in Parliament to the Afrobarometer dataset of Tanzania.

This thesis also examines CDFs in other countries to understand the Tanzanian case from comparative perspectives (Chapter 2). This part of the analysis mainly relied
on secondary sources including academic studies and various reports by the media and civil society organisations. Only for the case in Kenya, I collected some primary data in Nairobi in January 2011. This was because the Tanzanian CDF was initially modelled on the Kenyan CDF and thus, the experience in Kenya had an influence on the CDF policy process in Tanzania. During the fieldwork in Nairobi, the data were collected through semi-structured interviews with selected key individuals including the Assistant Minister for State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030 and a former MP who designed the Kenyan CDF (see Appendix A for the list of interviewees in Kenya).

As mentioned in the preface, I was working at the Embassy of Japan in Tanzania when the CDF proposal was discussed in Parliament. Thus, the study is also supplemented by my own observation of the events at that time. During the fieldwork between 2010 and 2012, my previous work experience in the country and command of Swahili facilitated the communication with gatekeepers and interviews with key informants. While the study prioritises the objectivity in data collection and interpretation, it should be noted that my background, affiliation and personality has a certain degree of influence on the findings of the study, particularly on the information obtained through elite interviews.

Elite interviewing was a central method on which this study relied in collecting primary data, defined in terms of its unique target groups and characterised by the power relations between interviewers and respondents (Burnham 2008: 231; Herts and Imber 1995; Leech 2002: 663) As some researchers describe it as ‘studying up’ (Pierce 1995: 94), the balance of knowledge and expertise in elite interviews is often in favour of the respondents and thus, it requires a different approach to the interviews (Burnham, 2008: 231). Various techniques on elite interviewing were applied during the fieldwork with some adjustments to the specific contexts of Tanzania and Kenya.

1.4. Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is organised in seven chapters. The remainder of this chapter reviews the
literature on the overarching concepts of the thesis. Chapter 2 compares CDF politics in seven countries in Asia and Africa, namely Pakistan, Philippines, India, Zambia, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania, to understand the similarities and differences across the countries and to locate the Tanzanian case within the global context. The chapter categorises the case countries by the two key dimensions that explain the variation of CDF politics: the power balance between executives and legislatures and regime change. The chapter demonstrates that the adoption of a CDF by the long-serving ruling party that was designed to strengthen the financial autonomy of MPs in Tanzania is a unique case and thus worth examining.

Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 are the analysis of CDF politics in Tanzania. First, Chapter 3 delineates how a CDF was proposed, discussed and introduced in Tanzania with a focus on the actors who were involved in the process and their competing rationales to support or oppose the fund. Chapter 4 examines the introduction of a CDF from the viewpoint of legislative development and discusses how a CDF constituted a reform to strengthen the power and autonomy of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive and the ruling party. Chapter 5 analyses the introduction of a CDF from the perspective of electoral politics and explores how election strategies of the CCM have changed over time. It demonstrates that a CDF was one of the strategies of the CCM to regain its party coherence and public support in preparation for the elections in 2010. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the influence of dominant party politics on the evolution of the legislature and electoral politics and thus, these two chapters present one set of analysis of CDF politics in a dominant party state from two different angles.

Chapter 6 examines the accountability relationship between MPs and voters to explain whether and how the fundraising for constituency service became a burden on MPs, one of the main reasons for the introduction of a CDF in Tanzania. Based on the interviews with MPs and the analysis of the Afrobarometer survey results, the chapter shows the trend that clientelistic voters, who have high expectations of MPs to bring tangible benefits to their constituencies, are likely to be dissatisfied with the performance of MPs and some MPs with fundraising capacity have established mechanisms to provide assistance to voters systematically rather than on an ad-hoc basis to reduce their transaction costs while maintaining their reputation in constituency service. This trend supports that a CDF fitted well with the need of MPs to serve widely for their constituents in a systematic manner.

As a conclusion of the thesis, Chapter 7 makes an argument that the Tanzanian
CDF is a less clientelistic form of constituency service and discusses the implications of the introduction of a CDF to the nature of accountability in the country.

1.5. Literature Review

The remainder of this chapter reviews the literature on the themes that are central to the examination of CDF politics in general and in Tanzania. First, this section provides an overview of the existing studies on CDFs. Second, it reviews the literature on the functions and roles of MPs in democratic systems with a focus on constituency service. Finally, it provides a critical review of the literature on accountability and clientelism, two central concepts for the second research question of this thesis. The studies on dominant party politics will be reviewed in Chapter 5 as part of the discussion on electoral politics in Tanzania.

1.5.1. Existing Studies on CDFs

While CDFs have been used in various parts of the developing world for many years, they started to receive wide attention by scholars and policymakers only recently. There are two groups of studies on CDFs. First, there are comparative studies on CDFs across different regions. The Center for International Development at the State University of New York in Albany (SUNY/CID) and the International Budget Partnership (IBP), an international advocacy initiative led by an American NGO, provide a good collection of research that explain the generic features, variations and controversies of CDFs. The researchers at the SUNY/CID are mainly concerned with transparency and accountability in the fund management and they published a guideline for the management of CDFs in collaboration with the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, while the IBP focuses more on supporting local CSOs in their engagement with the discussion on CDFs (Baskin 2010b; International Budget Partnership 2010; State University of New York 2009; 2011).

The second group of studies on CDFs are political science research. Most of them treat CDFs as examples to illustrate particular aspects of patronage politics or clientelism in the regions or countries of their focus. For example, as mentioned earlier, van de Walle (2009) refers to CDFs to discuss a shifting locus of political clientelism from executives to legislatures in sub-Saharan Africa. Barkan and Matiangi (2009)
concur with this view and argue that the Kenyan CDF illustrates a strengthening of power of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive, as it reduces the need for MPs to ask for funds from the executive (59). Cheeseman (2006) compares CDFs in Kenya and Zambia to explain the contrasting patterns of patronage politics built by the dominant parties in the two countries following the transition to multiparty systems. Kasuya (2009) demonstrates how the Philippine CDF has contributed to strengthening the presidential control over public resources in the country. Keefer and Khemani (2009b) argue that Indian MPs make less effort in utilising CDF funds in the constituencies where voter attachment to political parties is strong. What is common across these studies is the question as to who holds the power over the release and use of CDF funds. Building on these studies, this thesis examines CDF politics in Tanzania with a focus on who gains the power over the funds. This is the first academic study that analyses the policy process of a CDF and its interaction with politics in Tanzania.

1.5.2. Core Functions and the Benefactor Role of MPs in Democracy

As this thesis is mainly concerned with the role of MPs in democracies in developing countries, the basic concepts concerning legislatures and MPs need to be explained. While ‘[t]here is no statutory job description for MPs’ (United Kingdom 2013: 2), legislatures and MPs in democratic systems have four generic functions: representation, lawmaking, oversight and constituency service (Barkan 2009: 6–9; Diamond and Plattner 2010: 33–35). First, MPs are mandated to represent the views of their constituents mainly in Parliament or more broadly ‘mimic the varied and conflicting interests extant in society as a whole’ (Barkan 2009: 7). The second fundamental function of legislatures and MPs is lawmaking: to make public policies by crafting legislations. Third, legislatures and MPs oversee executives to ensure that the policies formulated in legislatures are appropriately implemented by governments. Finally, MPs provide constituency service: to attend to the needs of their constituents by, for example, holding public meetings to hear problems facing communities and individual voters and offer them help to solve the problems (Barkan 2009: 6–7).

8 Representation is also referred to as the overall role of MPs in democracies rather than one of their core functions. For example, Pitkin (1967) discusses the concept of representation as the overall role of MPs by defining it as ‘the making present in some senses of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact’ (9). See also Jewell (1983) and Mukandala and Rubagumya (2004) on representation.
A number of studies on the constituency roles of MPs were undertaken in relation to personal votes and incumbency advantages particularly in American and British politics between the 1970s and the 1990s (Butler and Collins 2001; Fenno 1978; King 1991). American politics was generally considered to be candidate-centred in which MPs and candidates were highly motivated to cultivate personal votes in their constituencies, while British politics is centred on political parties that provided fewer incentives for politicians to focus on gaining personal votes. Yet, the significance of the constituency roles of British MPs was also recognised in the late 1980s and the 1990s, and the number of studies on constituency service has increased (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995; Gaines 1998: 169; Martin 2011: 472; Mezey 2011: 18; Norris 1997).

For example, Norris (1997) discusses four instrumental incentives facing British MPs in calculating the costs and benefits of constituency service. First, MPs are motivated by electoral incentives to use constituency service to maintain their personal votes in elections (30). Second, similar to electoral incentives, MPs are also motivated by selectoral incentives and serve for the party members to gain votes in the primaries and be nominated by the parties for candidacy. Third, MPs have career incentives which ‘have to be understood in terms of the structure of opportunities facing members, and the costs of time invested in constituency service compared with other parliamentary activities’ (Norris 1997: 32). This is because successful constituency service helps MPs retain their seats, yet it is insufficient to advance their political careers. Thus, MPs who have other commitments in the government or political parties and those who are highly motivated to advance their political careers need to reduce the transaction costs for constituency service to save time for parliamentary or party activities. Finally, apart from these incentives, MPs provide constituency service due to psychological rewards and their role orientations (Norris 1997: 32). These incentives can be applied to the behaviour of MPs in other democratic countries especially where the FPTP system is used.

Norton (1994) identified seven constituency roles of British MPs. For example, the role of safety valve allows citizens to express their views on public policies to MPs. Local dignitary is the role by which MPs are invited to various local events in their constituencies. The one most relevant to this study is a benefactor; an MP serves as ‘the provider of benefits to particular individuals, usually those who are needy or greedy’ (707). It involves the offer of ‘some help, including sometimes financial help, without
reference to any other body or seeking to obtain some preferences … for a constituent without any dispute being involved’ (Norton 1994: 707). All constituency roles have become increasingly significant to British MPs in the post-war years, except for that of a benefactor; the benefactor role was historically important but diminished (Norton 1994: 707, 713). Applying Norton’s discussion, this study refers to the constituency role of MPs to provide financial or material assistance to voters in their constituencies as a benefactor. This study expands Norton’s definition to include the assistance by MPs to communities in their constituencies as part of their benefactor role. The distinction between individuals and communities will be reviewed in the discussion on clientelism in the following section.

In developing countries where a majority of voters are poor and in need assistance to sustain their daily lives, and the governments lack capacity and resources to provide sufficient social services, a benefactor tends to be a central role of MPs in their constituencies to establish and maintain electoral support (Lindberg 2010). Due to this tendency, constituency service sometimes refers only to a benefactor role in the studies on MPs in developing countries. For example, Barkan (2009) explains that constituency service in sub-Saharan Africa takes the form of either the assistance provided by MPs to some of their constituents with their individual needs or to small- to medium-scale development projects in their constituencies (7). Yet, MPs in developing countries also play other constituency roles such as giving legal advice. This study distinguishes a benefactor role from constituency service in the way that the former refers to the MP’s role in providing financial or material assistance to individual voters or communities while the latter to the overall role of MPs in their constituencies including other kinds of assistance.

Some scholars argue that the four core functions of MPs discussed above are in tension with each other due to the different nature of interests each function entails (i.e. general interests and particularistic interests) and the limited time and financial resources of MPs (Barkan 2009: 8; Norris 1997). It is true that MPs in any democratic countries struggle with balancing their different functions. However, as Lindberg’s (2009) study on Ghanaian MPs demonstrates, a benefactor role is probably the most important task for MPs in developing countries as it directly affects their political survival.
1.5.3. Accountability and Clientelism

There is a large volume of studies on the nature of accountability in democratic countries. This section focuses on vertical accountability with a question as to how CDFs affects the way in which voters hold their MPs accountable in developing countries. Horizontal accountability will be reviewed in Chapter 4 as part of the discussion on legislative development in sub-Saharan Africa.

Accountability between MPs and Voters

The relationship between MPs and voters in democratic countries is often described with the concept of accountability. Whereas the lexical meaning of accountability is being ‘required or expected to justify actions or decisions’ (Oxford Dictionary of English 2005: 11), accountability of elected representatives (e.g. presidents, MPs) to voters is often discussed with two connotations: answerability and enforcement (Schedler 1999: 14). Answerability is ‘the obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing’ (Schedler 1999: 14), which is close to the above lexical meaning of the term. Enforcement is ‘the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on powerholders who have violated their public duties’ (Schedler 1999: 14) or to reward them for good behaviours. In the relationship between MPs and voters, voters are accounting agencies and MPs are powerholders. For citizens to effectively perform enforcement, they need to know about the actions taken by their representatives. Thus, answerability is a precondition of enforcement. Answerability refers to the acts of politicians, while enforcement is an act of voters, and the combination of both constitutes the accountability mechanism of the two actors.

Alternatively, accountability can be explained by a combination of representation and enforcement (Fearon 1999). In this case, accountability between the two actors is often described as a principal-agent relationship, and the agent (elected representative) is accountable to the principal (electoral constituent) when there is an understanding between the two that 1) the agent is obliged to act on behalf of the principal (representation) and 2) the principal is empowered to sanction or reward the agent for his or her performance in this capacity (enforcement) (Fearon 1999: 55). Representation discussed here does not only refer to one of the four core functions of MPs discussed above, but it broadly refers to the delegated roles by MPs, including
Another notion occasionally discussed in the conceptualisation of accountability is **responsiveness**, which is ‘the extent to which the agent has acted in a manner that meets the expectations of the principal’ (Hyden 2010: 2). In contrast to **answerability** and **enforcement** which highlight particular aspects of linkages between MPs and voters, **responsiveness** encompasses the whole acts of MPs as agents of voters. It also encompasses all the four core functions of MPs; for example, **responsiveness** can be assessed on the extent to which constituency service by MPs meets the expectations of their constituents. In elections, voters evaluate the past performance and prospects of **responsiveness** of incumbent MPs or challengers and exercise **enforcement**. Figure 1.2 below summarises the accountability mechanism showing the sequence of the three elements of accountability discussed so far.

**Figure 1.2  Accountability Mechanism**

answerability $\rightarrow$ assessment of responsiveness $\rightarrow$ enforcement

Source: the author

In the situation where voters have high expectations of MPs to provide constituency service, **answerability** is less important for voters than **responsiveness**. This is because **answerability** is particularly critical for the acts of MPs that take place where voters are not present and cannot directly observe them and thus, require the information and explanation of the acts. In other words, **answerability** is particularly important for the delegated roles of MPs such as oversight and lawmaking, as they take place outside their constituencies. On the other hand, constituency service by MPs takes place in the locations where voters are present. Moreover, the acts of a benefactor, or the provision of financial or material assistance by MPs to voters, directly involve voters themselves. Voters not only observe the acts of MPs but they are a part of the acts. Thus, **answerability** becomes less relevant to voters’ evaluation of the **responsiveness** of MPs. Weak answerability in the benefactor role of MPs is important to understand how accountability works in developing countries, which will be

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9 See, also, Carey (2009) and Jewell (1983) on responsiveness in accountability.
discussed in relation to the Tanzanian CDF later in the thesis.

**Clientelism**

Clientelism, or patron-client relationships, in electoral politics explains the features of certain political systems, organisations (e.g. political parties) or actors (e.g. MPs). These concepts originated in anthropology and sociology to describe the social relationships in traditional societies. According to Scott (1972), a patron-client relationship is:

a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron (92).

The key elements of clientelism in the above definition by Scott and other scholars discussing clientelism are *unequal, dyadic* (meaning two-person and face-to-face) and *reciprocal* exchanges between patrons and clients (Clapham 1982: 4; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 48–49; Kanchan 2007: 86; Lande 1977: xiii; Stokes 2007; Taylor-Robinson 2006: 109).

In the late 1960s, political scientists in the rational choice school studying machine politics10 adopted the concept of clientelism to discuss the characteristics of political structures in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa (Schmidt, Guasti, Lande and Scott 1977; Scott 1969; Scott 1972; Taylor-Robinson 2006: 107–108; Zolberg 1966). Scott (1972) argues that there are political associations and conflicts in these regions which cannot be explained solely by the existing theories based on class or primordial sentiments (e.g. ethnicity, language, religion), but can be explained by patron-client relationships (91–92).

Thereafter, the discussion on clientelism in electoral politics, particularly its influence on the relationship between politician and voters in democratic systems, was developed by scholars in comparative politics, notably Piattoni (2001), Stokes (2007; 10 Machine politics is a form of politics in which a political party in power exercises its control by securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing income to those who run it and work for it (Scott 1969: 1144–1145). The nature of the relationship between political leaders and followers in machine politics can be considered as clientelism.
2013) and Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007). They highlight the characteristics of the goods provided by politicians to voters and the way in which they are distributed in clientelism. There is, however, no clear agreement among these scholars on what kinds of goods are used by politicians for clientelistic exchanges (van de Walle 2009: 3–4). The differences between these studies on the kinds of goods exist mainly in the beneficiaries (e.g. individuals, small groups, communities, constituencies).

For example, Piattoni (2001) defines clientelism as ‘the trade of votes and other types of partisan support in exchange for public decisions with divisible benefits’ (4, italics in original). The public decisions with divisible benefits are based on public resources and similar to patronage. Clientelism and patronage are often used interchangeably, but patronage tends to denote public resources such as jobs, goods and public decisions, whereas clientelism entails all kinds of goods provided by patrons to clients (Piattoni 2001: 5, Stokes 2007: 606). Piattoni’s definition of clientelism does not include tangible goods based on private funds raised by MPs, perhaps because her study is mainly on European countries where clientelism based on private funds is not so common as in developing countries.

Stokes (2007) defines clientelism as ‘the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?’ (605). She specifies ‘material goods’ as what MPs use for clientelistic exchanges, which can be sourced with either public or private funds. In contrast to Piattoni (2001), Stoke’s (2007) focus on material goods is not surprising as her studies are centred on developing countries where material goods are commonly used for clientelism.

Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) focus on the types of goods used for the exchanges between politicians and voters and discuss two types of relationships between voters and electoral representatives: programmatic and clientelistic relationships. A programmatic relationship is based on indirect, non-specific exchange of collective goods and votes, and the performance of elected representatives is monitored through collective surveillance such as independent media. For example, the processes of formulating national policies that affect all the citizens in the country and subsequent assessment of the policies by voters represent a programmatic relationship (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 7, 13). In contrast, a clientelistic relationship is founded on the provision of goods by politicians exclusively to individuals or small groups of people in their constituencies as private rewards to voters ‘who have already delivered
or who promise to deliver their electoral support’ (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 10).

Programmatic and clientelistic relationships are characterised by the three broad types of goods provided by MPs to voters: private, public and club goods. Private goods are tangible goods (e.g. money, materials, jobs) provided to individual citizens. Public goods, on the other hand, are beneficial to every member in society ‘regardless of whether they contribute to the production of the goods or not’ (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 11). Examples of public goods include national security, macroeconomic growth and national taxation systems. Finally, between public and private goods there are club goods which provide benefits to certain groups of citizens. Politicians typically seek to distribute club goods to solidify and increase the size of their electoral support. The projects funded by CDFs are generally club goods. While a programmatic relationship is based on the provision of either public or club goods, a clientelistic relationship is based on either private or club goods (Buchanan 1965; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 7–12). Figure 1.3 below presents the two types of the relationships between MPs and voters, the types of goods and some examples of goods including CDFs.

**Figure 1.3 The Nature of Relationships between MPs and Voters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Relationships</th>
<th>Clientelistic</th>
<th>Programmatic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Goods</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>handouts, food, public jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Club</td>
<td>donations to community projects, CDFs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>national security, macroeconomic growth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While this framework is useful for the analysis of the relationships between MPs and voters, it does not give straight answers to the question as to whether club goods, including CDFs, contribute to programmatic or clientelistic relationships.

There are scholars who consider that club goods are not a tool for clientelism or they are a better form of clientelism. Lindberg (2010), for example, distinguishes

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11 Lindberg (2010) adds another type of goods, collective goods, between public and club goods, which are “impure” public goods in that they are directed towards a particular collective (such as legislative instruments providing free healthcare for expectant mothers, or general subsidies to sports clubs) but are non-divisible within that group’ (119). This thesis treats collective goods as a sub-type of club goods.
constituency service, which involves the provision of either club or private goods, from political clientelism, which is limited to the provision of private goods, while recognising the difficulty in empirically separating the two (120–121). Thus, club goods do not contribute to clientelism in his conceptualisation. Similar to Lindberg, Piattoni (2001) assumes that constituency service has a collective character and thus, it is one of the solutions to clientelism by changing particularistic politics into more acceptable forms. She argues that, while still a form of particularism, constituency service is more tractable in view of the harmonisation of particularistic interests into general interests of society (29). According to their conceptualisation of constituency service, CDFs may be an example of constituency service that is not clientelistic. Yet, it needs more explanations as to why constituency service or the provision of club goods does not contribute to clientelism. Chapter 7 explores this question with the case of the Tanzanian CDF.

The distinction of the types of goods is related to the three core elements of clientelism discussed earlier. In electoral politics, clientelistic exchanges are founded on inequality between MPs and voters. Private goods, and club goods to a lesser extent, strengthen the dyadic dimension of the relationships, as they are meant to benefit individuals, cultivate face-to-face personal relationships between MPs and voters. Private goods, and club goods to a lesser extent, generate stronger obligations to reciprocate among the recipients of the goods than public goods. By combining the nature of the MP-voter relationships and the types of goods used for their exchanges, what seems to be ultimately important in examining the nature of clientelism in electoral politics is the extent to which the provision of particular goods by politicians to voters generates a sense of obligation or willingness to reciprocate among voters in elections.

Stokes et al. (2013) provide an alternative conceptualisation of distributive politics and clientelism. They distinguish between programmatic and non-programmatic distribution of resources based on whether there are public and binding rules. If there are formalised and public criteria for distribution (public rules) in place and these criteria shape actual distribution of resources (binding rules), the mode of distribution of resources is called programmatic distribution. Non-public or nonbinding rules mean that one or both of the above rules is missing (Stokes et al. 2013: 7). The distribution of the government budget is more likely to have public and binding rules than the distribution of private resources. Although CDFs use the government budget, they are a unique
mechanism because they have a combination of the both types of distribution; while their criteria of distribution of resources to constituencies are usually public and binding, the criteria of distribution of resources to projects are non-public as they are determined primarily by MPs or project-selection committees established at the constituency level. The characteristics of CDFs will be examined further in Chapter 7.

**Clientelistic Accountability**

The accountability relationship between MPs and voters which is influenced by clientelism is sometimes called clientelistic accountability (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 2) or patron-client accountability (Lindberg 2009: 12). Clientelistic accountability means that the way in which voters hold their elected representatives accountable is based on clientelistic norms and exchanges. As discussed on the benefactor role earlier, answerability tends to be weak in clientelistic accountability, because the interaction between MPs and voters is dyadic, voters are the beneficiaries of the goods provided by MPs and thus, there is no need for MPs to explain about their actions to the beneficiaries. MPs are under less pressure to be answerable in clientelistic accountability as long as they provide tangible goods to voters. Voters evaluate responsiveness of MPs and other candidates, and exercise enforcement based on their senses of reciprocity. Figure 1.4 below shows the clientelistic accountability mechanism by combining the key elements of accountability and clientelism discussed so far.

**Figure 1.4  Clientelistic Accountability Mechanism**

![Diagram](image)

Source: the author

Electoral clientelism is pervasive in developing countries due to ‘widespread poverty and … a relatively weak ineffective state apparatus’ (Stokes 2007: 606). However, clientelism is not necessarily a sustainable mode of relationship in electoral politics. It can be expensive for politicians partly because voters have bargaining power
by holding votes as their political resource in electoral clientelism, which is a major difference from patron-client relationships in traditional societies in which clients did not have such power. In electoral clientelism, the demands of voters tend to be inflated, leading to overinvestment (Müller 2007: 263; Scott 1972: 109). CDFs are associated with the incremental nature of clientelism, as one of the objectives of the establishment of the funds is to relieve the fundraising burden of MPs for constituency service. In other words, the introduction of CDFs may be a response to the expansion of clientelism.

Some studies argue that the declining economic gaps between MPs and voters reduce the use of clientelism. For example, Wilkinson (2007) argues that clientelism in India is likely to decline in the future because the costs of clientelism are increasing due to the expansion of the private sector and the growth of a large middle and upper middle class (112). Weitz-Shapiro (2012) found in Argentina that some mayors of municipalities were opting out of clientelism as it decreases the support from non-poor voters. While the economic gaps between MPs and a majority of voters have remained large in Tanzania, Chapter 6 of this thesis demonstrates that clientelism does not sustain long-term support even from poor voters to MPs in the country and the CDF offers a mechanism for MPs to establish a less clientelistic relationship with voters.
Chapter 2  Patterns of CDF Politics in Asia and Africa

2.1. Introduction

While CDFs in developing countries have a common objective to help MPs serve their constituents better, the way in which CDFs interact with politics varies across different countries. At first glance, MPs are the primary beneficiaries of CDFs as they are vested with authority to decide how to allocate the funds in their constituencies. This means that, from an institutional viewpoint, CDFs strengthen the financial autonomy of the legislature from the executive. While this seems to be generally true, there are countries in which the executive holds power to release CDF funds for constituencies or projects. In such cases, MPs may have to negotiate with the executive or even become financially dependent on the executive.

To understand such variation, this chapter compares seven case countries in Asia and Africa where CDFs have been implemented and proposes four patterns of the interactions between CDFs and politics. This comparative analysis situates the Tanzanian case within the global context and provides a first clue to the question as to why a CDF was adopted by the dominant ruling party in the country.

The comparison of the selected countries suggests that the power dynamics between different actors in the introduction and implementation of CDFs varies significantly. Based on the inductive analysis, a typology of the potential or actual influence of CDFs on politics can be developed by identifying two major dimensions: 1) the power balance between the executive and the legislature (whether the introduction of a CDF strengthens the power of the executive led by the ruling party or the power of MPs) and 2) regime change (whether a CDF is introduced by new leaders following a regime change or not). The former dimension responds to the question as to whether CDFs empower MPs leading to a shift of power from the executive to the legislature, thus leading to enhancing horizontal accountability between the two government branches. The latter dimension highlights whose and what kinds of interests are pursued during the introduction of CDFs and suggests why the executive in some countries allow the legislature to gain power through the establishment of the funds. This dimension is directly related to the overall research question of this thesis as to

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12 See Chapter 6 on horizontal accountability.
why a CDF was adopted by the dominant ruling party without a prospect of regime change in Tanzania. While the executive and ruling parties are different institutions, this chapter does not separate them to illuminate the power balance between the executive and the legislature.

The first half of the chapter discusses four patterns of the CDF politics based on different combinations of the executive-legislature power balance and regime change. The second half categorises seven case countries in Asia and Africa, namely, Pakistan (a CDF was introduced in 1985), the Philippines (1989), India (1993), Ghana (1994), Zambia (1995), Kenya (2003) and Tanzania (2009) into the typology. The seven countries were selected mainly due to the availability of secondary sources and the significance of CDFs in these countries.

2.2. Two Dimensions in Explaining the Variation of CDF Politics

There are two key dimensions that explain the variation of CDF politics, or the interactions between CDFs and politics. The first is whether and to what extent different political actors in the government (i.e. presidents, ministers, MPs, local bureaucrats) have power over CDF funds formally and informally. It demonstrates the power dynamics around CDFs, which can be translated into whether CDFs have an effect on empowering the executive or the legislature. The assumption of this chapter is that, in the countries where MPs are given a high degree of authority over CDF funds, MPs gain autonomy from the executive and thus, the power of the legislature is strengthened vis-à-vis the executive. This seems particularly evident in the countries where presidents used to control patronage and informally distribute funds to MPs for their constituency service. In some such cases, CDFs may even be a significant loss of presidential power over MPs.

In contrast, there are countries where the president or other actors in the executive have a high degree of authority to release CDF funds for particular

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13 The research approach by Cheeseman’s (2011) study on the power-sharing in Africa was adopted and adapted in developing the typology.

14 International Budget Partnership (2010) provides a useful framework to assess the degree of MPs’ influence on CDFs by examining 1) whether MPs have authority to appoint the members of the committees of CDFs, 2) whether CDF funds are disbursed into MPs’ personal accounts and 3) whether MPs have authority to disburse CDF funds. These factors are taken into account in comparing the case countries to the extent possible.
constituencies. In this case, MPs become dependent on the executive and CDFs have the opposite effect; the funds contribute to maintaining or enhancing the power of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature. There are also countries where local bureaucrats, including presidential appointees at district levels, are given authority to release CDF funds. In such cases, CDFs contribute to indirectly strengthening the power of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature with a caveat that it depends on the nature of the relationships between the actors within the executive (i.e. presidents, cabinet ministers, bureaucrats).

The second dimension is the timing of the introduction of CDFs in relation to election cycles. The question is whether a CDF is introduced before or after the elections and in the latter case, whether there was a regime change or not prior to the adoption of a CDF.\(^\text{15}\) This dimension is important because, as discussed earlier, CDFs function as resources for the redistributive game by MPs in electoral politics. There are countries where CDFs are introduced by new leaders immediately after they come to power through elections or appointments. In such cases, the introduction of CDFs is likely to be driven by the intentions of the new leaders to make changes in politics. In contrast, there are countries where CDFs are introduced by long-serving governments. In these countries, although CDF funds are allocated to all the constituencies including those represented by opposition MPs, the adoption of CDFs tends to be driven by the intentions of the leaders of dominant ruling parties to maintain or re-establish their power.

By combining the above two dimensions, the four patterns of CDF politics are identified and shown in Figure 2.1 below. The four patterns are: 1) establishing new patronage politics, 2) changing the rule of the game in electoral politics, 3) maintaining the status quo and 4) alleviating the risk of losing support from MPs.

\(^{15}\) It should be noted that an election cycle is a continuous process and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between ‘before’ and ‘after’ the elections.
First, there are countries where CDFs are introduced following a change of government, but new leaders restrict the power of individual MPs through the use of CDF funds. In such cases, despite sharing the generic objective to enhance MPs’ engagement with the development of their constituencies, CDFs are more likely to be aimed at establishing new patronage politics controlled by new leaders in power.

Second, CDFs that are introduced immediately after a regime change and vest MPs with a high degree of control over CDF funds are likely to represent changing the rule of the game in electoral politics. As mentioned above, in such cases, CDFs are introduced with the intention of new leaders to dissolve the patronage politics established by former leaders. This path may be chosen by new leaders particularly if they won the elections by advocating for removing old patronage politics.

Third, when governments introduce CDFs without a regime change while controlling the release of the funds, CDFs demonstrate maintaining the status quo. There are no examples that belong to this pattern when the funds were established among the seven case countries, but some countries shifted toward this pattern during the implementation processes as executives tried to restrict the power of MPs over the funds. This occasionally happens as a response to growing public criticism on the mismanagement of the funds by MPs.
Finally, CDFs that are introduced by governments without a regime change by giving a high degree of authority to MPs in managing CDF funds are likely to be driven by the intentions of the government leaders to *alleviate the risk of losing support from MPs to the governments*. The use of patronage politics tends to increase when the president is politically vulnerable and in need of parliamentary support (International Budget Partnership 2010: 44), and CDFs can be a strategy of presidents or ruling parties to consolidate support from MPs in preparation for the forthcoming elections.

These patterns are not definite and there are countries that do not neatly fit into one category and some countries shift from one category to another as CDFs evolve over time. There is also a risk of oversimplifying the political contexts of individual cases by pushing them into particular patterns. However, this typology will enable us to compare a variety of CDF politics in developing countries systematically.

To supplement the above typology, there are two aspects that demonstrate how strongly each case falls into one of the patterns identified above. First, the CDF budget and its proportion to the government development budget can be considered as a proxy of the scale of the power created through the establishment of CDFs. There is, however, a caveat that the scale of power cannot simply be compared across countries by using the figures, as the scale of CDF budgets is affected by various factors including the overall level of fiscal decentralisation in the countries.

Second, the extent to which CDFs are consolidated in politics indicates the sustainability of particular patterns of the CDF politics. This aspect concerns not only the actors in executives and MPs, but also the various stakeholders such as the media, civil society organisations and donors, as they often challenge the principle of CDFs by arguing that they erode the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature as well as criticise the mismanagement of CDF funds. Consequently, there is a possibility that CDFs may be abolished. One milestone in the consolidation process of CDFs is the ‘constitutionality test’: whether the judiciary endorsed the legality of CDFs by confirming that they do not erode the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature, if it is stipulated in the constitution. The passing of the constitutionality test makes it difficult for the opponents of CDFs to advocate for their abolition, and it contributes to consolidating CDFs in their countries. To the author’s knowledge, there is no country where a CDF has been judged unconstitutional.
2.3. CDF Politics of Seven Countries in Asia and Africa

By examining the political conditions and key events when CDFs were introduced and the subsequent implementation periods, seven countries in Asia and Africa can be categorised into the four patterns of CDF politics as compiled in Figure 2.2 below.

Figure 2.2 Patterns of CDF Politics of Selected Countries in Asia and Africa

Source: the author

Ghana and Zambia illustrate the cases that shifted from the pattern of *alleviating the risk of losing support from MPs* to *maintaining the status quo*, during the implementation process of CDFs. The remainder of the paper examines the relationships between CDFs and politics of the case countries in turn.

2.3.1. Establishing New Patronage Politics by New Leaders

The first pattern of CDF politics, which is establishing new patronage politics by new leaders, can be illustrated by the Philippines. In the Philippines, a CDF was established by a new government that came to power following a people’s revolution to end the authoritarian rule. The Philippines and Pakistan, which will be discussed in the next section, are different from other examples because CDFs were introduced as part of the
initial democratisation process from authoritarian rule.

**The Philippines: Establishing Presidential Control of Patronage**

In the Philippines, the use of pork barrel funds by politicians dates back to the 1930s during the American colonial occupation (The Manila Times 28 August 2009). A CDF was introduced after the collapse of the Ferdinand Marcos authoritarian rule by the People Power Revolution in 1986 and the inauguration of President Corazon Aquino. In 1989, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund were launched to cover Mindanao and Visayas, two out of the three geographical divisions of the country. Under these schemes, each MP was provided authority to identify development projects worth 10 million pesos (approximately US$245,000\(^{16}\)) per district (Kasuya 2009: 75).

In 1990, the funds were expanded to the whole country, and renamed the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). Under the new CDF, 2.3 billion pesos (approximately US$56 million) in total were allocated to the constituencies of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Between 1993 and 1997, each House member received 12.5 million pesos (US$306,000) and a senator 18 million pesos (US$440,000) per year (Kasuya 2009: 62, 75). In 2000, the CDF was transformed into the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and since then, the amount of funding has risen over the years (Nograles and Lagman 2008: 5). Currently, each House member has been entitled to receive up to 70 million pesos (US$1.6 million\(^{17}\)) per year and a senator 200 million pesos (US$4.5 million) (International Budget Partnership 2010: 44). While the size of the CDF budget in the Philippines is the largest in absolute terms among the countries examined in this chapter, its ratio to the total government budget remained small. For example, the total PDAF budget in 2012 was 24.9 billion pesos and its proportion to the total government expenditure was only 1.8%\(^{18}\). This clearly suggests that, like other case countries, the Philippine CDF is not a primary funding source of local development, but rather a tool for politicians to establish their support base in their constituencies.


\(^{17}\) US$1 = 44.19 Pesos (2000) (Central Bank of the Philippines).

\(^{18}\) The projected government expenditure in 2012 was 1,414 billion pesos (International Monetary Fund 2012c: 32). The data on the government development budget are unavailable.
An official reason for the introduction of the CDF in the Philippines was to address the unequal allocation of government budgets for local development due to pork barrel politics; prior to the adoption of the CDF, legislators needed to reckon with the president for the release of pork funds for the projects in their constituencies and the allocation of the appropriations were unequal across the country. Through the establishment of the CDF, congressional allocations for development became institutionalised with equal allocations to all the districts (Nograles and Lagman 2008: 8).

Yet, in practice, the CDF has been used for the election campaigns of MPs including constituency service and vote-buying. It is reported that on average, about 30% of the total project cost goes into MPs’ pockets (Kasuya 2009: 62–63). Moreover, the Philippine CDF is characterised by the president’s power over the release of the funds, which has made presidents ‘the most important regulator of legislators’ pork in the Philippines’ (Kasuya 2009: 80). The presidential control over CDF funds apparently continued until the Arroyo administration between 2001 and 2010 (Philippine Daily Inquirer 26 November 2006; The Philippine Star 19 May 2010). One Philippine senator claimed that ‘“legislators … must make their periodic pilgrimage to Malacanang [presidential palace] to obtain the approval of the release for their Countryside Development Funds” (PG, October, 1992)’ (Kasuya 2009: 82). Thus, the Philippine CDF is widely perceived as a tool of patronage politics controlled by presidents.

The CDF has been consolidated in politics through years of the operation in the Philippines. There were two failed attempts to change the CDF structure in the 1990s, which strengthened the legitimacy of the funds and the presidential control over the release of the funds. In 1994, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) petitioned the Supreme Court to declare the CDF as unconstitutional and void it, as provided for in the General Appropriations Act of 1994 (Nograles and Lagman 2008: 7). In response, the Court judged that the CDF is valid and constitutional by asserting that the Congress’s spending power, or ‘the power of the purse’ as called by James Madison, includes the power to specify projects to be funded under the appropriation law and it is subject only to the president’s veto power under the constitution (Nograles and Lagman 2008: 7). In 1997, the Congress attempted to take away the power from the presidency to release CDF funds by revising the general appropriations bill, yet President Ramos used his veto power to block it. MPs were silent about the president’s veto and no override attempts followed (Kasuya 2009: 92). As such, the CDF has remained as part of
patronage politics controlled by presidents in the Philippines.

2.3.2. Changing the Rule of the Game in Electoral Politics by New Leaders

The second pattern of CDF politics represents the empowerment of the legislature through the introduction of a CDF following a regime change and thus, it changes the rule of the game in electoral politics by new leaders. This pattern is in accordance with van de Walle’s (2009) argument on the shifting locus of clientelism from the executive to the legislature. Good examples of this pattern are Pakistan and Kenya, though the nature of regime changes differs between them. In Pakistan, a CDF was adopted by the prime minister who was appointed by the president as part of the regime change from military to democratic rule in the 1980s. In Kenya, a CDF was introduced in 2003, one year after the end of the 40-year rule of the dominant ruling party in general elections.

Pakistan: Prime Minister’s Attempt to Strengthen His Power during the Democratisation Process

In Pakistan, a CDF is claimed to have originated in the President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime when he allocated public funds to his chosen members of the legislature he constituted in 1981 (Islamic Republic of Pakistan n.d.; The Express Tribune 8 March 2012; Wasti 2009: 145). Following the elections for national and provincial assemblies in 1985, a CDF was formally initiated as part of the civilianisation of military rule under the five-point programme launched by Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo. The programme was aimed at establishing a democratic system with a strong national defence and foreign policies, and solving socioeconomic problems in the country (Associated Press 31 December 1985; Rizvi 1986).

Under the five-point programme, each minister, senator and Member of the National Assembly (MNA) was allocated 5 million rupees (Rs) (approximately US$314,00019) and each Member of the Provincial Assemblies (MPA) Rs2.5 million (US$157,000) to implement small-scale development projects in their constituencies. It amounted to a total budget of around Rs1.3 billion (US$82 million) (Khan 2006:

19 US$1 = Rs15.94 (1985) (State Bank of Pakistan).
The funds for MPs were aimed at strengthening the connections between elected representatives and voters in their constituencies. It was particularly important because the 1985 elections were held on a non-party basis and boycotted by a coalition of major opposition parties and thus, politicians had low credibility in the country (International Budget Partnership 2010: 45; Rizvi 1986: 1077). Without an accountability mechanism or public involvement in the fund management, politicians exercised discretionary power over the use of the funds. They could approach ‘line departments directly or even involve whoever they wanted, including private contractors, their factotums or members of their own family’ (Khan 2006: 126).

The existing studies of Pakistani politics during this period suggest that the funds for MPs under the five-point programme functioned as Prime Minister Junejo’s instrument to establish his power independent of President Zia in two ways (Waseem 1992). First, the funds helped Junejo gain support from MPs for his party. Political parties were resumed in 1985, having been banned during the martial law period between 1977 and 1985. In 1986, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), Pakistan’s founding party, was reconstituted under Junejo’s leadership. Subsequently, he succeeded in gaining support from a majority of senators, MNAs and MPAs, who were elected on a non-party basis in 1985, for his party (van Hollen 1987: 144). The funds for MPs contributed to his success in gaining their support.

Second, Junejo’s five-point programme sought to attract wide public support to the PML by emphasising economic and social programmes for the rural and urban poor. This was important as the PML was historically elite-oriented, while its rival party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), was based on rural support. Under the five-point programme, the allocation of public expenditures on electricity, water, education, health and other social sectors to rural areas increased from 10% to 50% (Norman 1989: 40–41; van Hollen 1987: 145). As such, the Junejo period can be characterised by democratisation with the “formation of an ‘official’ political party from the top and the subsequent development of a populist programme for cultivating mass support” (Norman 1989: 40), and the funds for MPs played an important part in this process.

However, President Zia, who appointed him as Prime Minister in 1985, feared Junejo’s increasing power. While Junejo was seeking to establish his leadership within the PML and the legislature, Zia intended to maintain his presidential and military power (Norman 1989: 38). Junejo’s move to strengthen independence from the
president and the army created a tension between them. It was particularly evident in the public resource allocation, as Junejo sought to allocate limited public resources to his five-point programme, including the CDF, by restraining the budget for defence. As a consequence, President Zia dismissed him as the premier and dissolved Parliament in 1988 (Norman 1989: 41–42).

Since then, CDFs have existed in the country under different names. The funds were renamed every time new parties came to power: the People’s Works Programme under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s PPP government in 1988–1990 and 1994–1996; the Taameer-e-Watan Programme under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1991–1993 and 1997–1999; the Khushal Pakistan Program I under President Pervez Musharraf in 2000–2007; and the People’s Works Programme-I (PWP-I) under the PPP government in 2008–2013 (Malik 2010: 183; Qureshi 2001: 9). In June 2013, the PWP-I was renamed the Tameer Pakistan Programme by the new government led by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (The Express Tribune 11 June 2013).

The fund allocation to each MNA and MPA increased over the years, yet the scale of the CDF budget remained relatively small. For example, every MNA was allocated Rs20 million (approximately US$239,00020) and every MPA received Rs5 million (US$60,000) under the PWP-I in FY2009/10 and the total expenditure was Rs8.4 billion (US$100 million), which was only 2% of the government development expenditure (International Budget Partnership 2010: 45; Islamic Republic of Pakistan 2012).21

As is the case in the Philippines, whereas some civil society organisations complained of a lack of transparency and accountability in the fund management, more than twenty-five years of operation of a series of CDFs have made them business as usual in Pakistan (International Budget Partnership 2010: 46). Thus, there may no longer be a characteristic of changing the rule of the game in electoral politics in the operation of the fund. Yet, the Pakistani CDF was initially driven by the Prime Minister’s intention to establish his power independent of the President.

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20 US$1 = Rs83.80 (2009/10) (State Bank of Pakistan).
21 The government development expenditure in FY2009/10 was Rs558 billion (International Monetary Fund 2012b: 36).
Kenya: Increasing Degree of Autonomy of MPs from the President in Accessing Public Resources

In Kenya, the introduction of the Constituencies Development Fund (CDF) is characterised by an increasing degree of autonomy of MPs from the president in accessing public resources following the regime change in 2002 (Bagaka 2010). A CDF was first proposed by Muriuki Karue, an opposition MP from the Democratic Party (DP), in 1999. His idea was to devolve power and resources to the local level to secure basic infrastructure across the country. He tabled a private member’s motion requesting the government to set aside 5% of its revenue to fund grassroots projects in electoral constituencies. After the Minister for Finance had halved its budget from 5% to 2.5% of the national revenue, Karue’s motion was passed in Parliament as a resolution in October 2000. He then turned the motion into a bill in July 2002, and gained a permission to introduce the CDF Bill in October in the same year, a few days before Parliament was dissolved before the elections (Karue 2011: 51).

In the elections in December 2002, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), an alliance of several opposition parties including Karue’s DP, took over power from the Kenya African National Union (KANU). After successful re-election, Karue redrafted the CDF Bill in liaison with the Attorney General’s Office (Karue 2011: 51). Subsequently, the CDF Act was passed in Parliament and ratified by the newly elected President Mwai Kibaki in December 2003 (Republic of Kenya 2004b).

Although the Kenyan government embarked on local government reforms in the mid-1990s and a grant system for local councils called the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) was established in FY1999/2000, the overall implementation of decentralisation was delayed due to the enduring centralised policy of the government. Thus, the proposal to set up a CDF was cautiously welcomed by civil society and international donors as a breakthrough in moving decentralisation forward and enhancing local ownership of development (Kimenyi 2005: 1; Sasaoka 2008: 84–95; Tordoff 1994; United Kingdom 2002). Muriuki Karue was even awarded a United Nations Habitat award in recognition of his work in developing the mechanism (Oxford Analytica 2009).

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22 Interview, Bagaka (2011).
23 Interview, Karue (2011).
The CDF targets all types of development projects, but particularly encourages those that address poverty alleviation at grassroots level. As stipulated in the CDF Act, up to 2.5% of the government’s ordinary revenue is allocated to the mechanism annually; 75% of the CDF budget is distributed equally amongst all 210 constituencies, and the remaining 25% is allocated according to the poverty level of each constituency (Republic of Kenya 2007). Figure 2.3 below shows the CDF budgets from FY2003/04 to FY2011/12, which increased from 1.3 billion Kenyan Shillings (Ksh) (approximately US$15 million) to Ksh17 billion (US$200 million), mainly due to the country’s economic growth (Gutiérrez-Romero 2009: 2; Republic of Kenya).

Figure 2.3  CDF Allocations in Kenya

![CDF Allocations in Kenya](chart)

Source: Republic of Kenya, Constituencies Development Fund Board

On average, each constituency received Ksh81 million (approximately US$952,000) in FY2011/12. As a large proportion of the government budget is allocated, the Kenyan CDF has received a wide attention by the media and scholars, and some African countries introduced CDFs by emulating the Kenyan model (Oxford Analytica 2009).

The projects funded by the CDF are selected by Constituency Development Committees chaired by the MP of each constituency. Consisting of a maximum of 15 members, including councillors, a district officer, and representatives from the

constituencies, each committee is responsible for the co-ordination and supervision of all CDF projects within the constituency. Each MP is empowered to select all the members of the committee. The committee deliberates on proposals prepared by the constituents and produces a list of priority projects, which is submitted to the national-level Constituencies Development Fund Board for scrutiny and approval. If approved, CDF funds are disbursed to dedicated constituency-level bank accounts. MPs are not signatories for the withdrawal of the funds (Institute of Economic Affairs and Kenya National Commission of Human Rights 2006; Republic of Kenya 2004a; Republic of Kenya 2007). With the authority to appoint the committee members, MPs have effectively been controlling the distribution of CDF funds (Cheeseman 2006: 333).

The Kenyan CDF is characterised by changes in patronage politics previously underpinned by the political use of harambee. Harambee (meaning ‘let us pull together’ in Swahili) originally referred to a principle of cooperation among members of communities which existed in Kenya during the late-colonial era. Following independence, the harambee spirit was promoted by the first President Jomo Kenyatta as a national motto for development, and it evolved into a self-help voluntary fundraising mechanism in local communities. In the 1980s, however, the harambee system gradually came to be used by politicians as a vehicle to gain support from their constituents; politicians donated large amounts of money at local harambee meetings to exhibit their wealth, fund-raising abilities and commitment to the communities (Barkan 1994: 19–20; Chieni 1997; Transparency International Kenya 2003a: 1).

Harambee was used by politicians as a campaign strategy, particularly by the ruling party, KANU, in the 1990s. For example, the number of harambee meetings doubled from 97 in 1991 to 203 in 1992, the year of the first multiparty elections, and the total amount raised by politicians for the implementation of community development projects increased seven-fold, from Ksh21 million (approximately US$250,000) to Ksh142 million (US$1.7 million). The number of harambee meetings

26 As a broader political background, whereas the first President Kenyatta maintained stability in the country as the national leader through the 1960s and 1970s, political volatility increased under the rule of President Daniel arap Moi in the 1980s. He stressed the existence of ethnic divisions in the country to prove the superiority of one-party system led by the KANU, claiming that multiparty system would exacerbate tribal factionalism (Barkan 1984b: 10–12; Brown and Kaiser 2007: 1137; Carey 2002: 58–59; Steeves 2006). Consequently, under Moi’s rule, the flow of public resources from central to local levels was tightly controlled by presidentially led patronage politics (Barkan 1984b; Cheeseman 2006; Cheeseman 2009).
declined after the 1992 elections, but increased again ahead of the 1997 elections. It is noteworthy that President Moi himself was a principal *harambee* patron, presiding over 448 meetings throughout the 1990s. His donations increased over time and amounted to an estimated over Ksh130 million (US$1.5 million). He also encouraged cabinet ministers and other members of KANU to follow suit (Barkan 1992: 186; Transparency International Kenya 2001: 3–4).

The expansion of politicians’ engagement with *harambee* led citizens to assess the performance of MPs by the frequency and size of the contributions they made to *harambee* (Transparency International Kenya 2001: 1). There was also a growing understanding among Kenyans that MPs were the ones responsible for financing *harambee*, resulting in a decrease in contributions from other members of the community (Transparency International Kenya 2003b: 2).

Reliance on the *harambee* system for social development also generated inequality across the country (Ochanda 2007). In the 1960s and 1970s, wealthy communities that succeeded in constructing necessary infrastructure through their own funding were entitled to extra support from the government, while their poor counterparts were left behind. After the *harambee* system was captured by the political elite in the 1980s and 1990s, regional imbalances persisted, as local development depended on the wealth and fundraising skills of individual politicians (Cooksey, Court and Makau 1994: 212–213; Sasaoka 2008: 90–91).

While the CDF Bill was supported by ruling and opposition parties, its introduction of the fund coincided with a change of the ruling party. In the 2002 elections, the victory for NARC ended the forty-year rule of KANU. The CDF became a landmark policy of NARC to replace the political use of *harambee* which had been promoted by KANU. The excessive political use of *harambee* was addressed early on by the newly elected President Kibaki. A taskforce to review *harambee* was established by the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs in April 2002. Based on its recommendations, the Public Officer Ethics Act 2003 was passed into law in April 2003, which prohibited MPs from using their official positions to solicit or collect funds for *harambee* activities (Republic of Kenya 2003: 12; Transparency International Kenya 2003b: 6). In parallel with the review of *harambee*, the CDF bill was passed into law in December 2003 with an aim at ending the political use of *harambee* and addressing imbalances in regional development (Daily Nation 14 December 2002; The Standard 24 October 2002). As such, the introduction of the CDF demonstrates an increasing degree
of autonomy of MPs from the president in accessing public funds for constituency service.²⁸

Yet, the establishment of the CDF does not mean a decline in the overall presidential power. President Kibaki also intervened at the last stage of the CDF policymaking process in November 2003 by pressurising Muriuki Karue to relinquish his tabling of the CDF Bill as his private member’s bill. This was based on the constitutional requirement that Bills affecting government budget allocation required permission from the president before the debate in Parliament. In the end, the CDF Bill was tabled as a government Bill and passed into law with no changes to its contents (Barkan 2009: 58; Karue 2011: 51–57). This demonstrates the wielding of power and intention of the president to take the ownership of the CDF as a government policy.

Apart from increased autonomy of MPs through the establishment of the CDF, President Kibaki maintained other presidential prerogatives (e.g. the power to appoint cabinet ministers). In a broader political context, public dissatisfaction with the centralisation of power by the president was one of the reasons for the post-election violence in 2007, and led to a referendum over a change to the Constitution in 2010 (Branch and Cheeseman 2008).

In the 2007 Kenyan elections, the return rate of incumbent MPs, regardless of whether they sought re-election or not, was approximately 30%, which represented a decline of about 10 percentage points from 2002 (Gutiérrez-Romero 2009: 1; Kihoro 2007; Republic of Kenya). The higher turnover rate in 2007 was partly due to the fact that the 2007 elections were the most competitive in Kenyan history, with the total number of candidates having increased from 965 in 2002 to 2,547 in 2007 (Gutiérrez-Romero 2009: 10).

According to Gutiérrez-Romero’s (2009) study of the Kenyan CDF and election results based on interviews with 1,207 people in 76 of the 210 constituencies immediately before and after the 2007 elections, 42% of the respondents who claimed to have voted for an incumbent MP agreed that the competent management of CDF funds was the reason for choosing to vote for the incumbents (9–10). It is also important to note that the mismanagement of CDF funds does not automatically lead to the dissatisfaction of the electorate (Institute of Economic Affairs and Kenya National Commission of Human Rights 2006: 20–35). Gutiérrez-Romero (2009) found no

²⁸ Interview, Kenneth (2011).
statistically significant evidence that voters’ decisions were based on their perceptions of the mismanagement of the CDF by incumbent MPs (9–10). This indicates that voters may appreciate the performance of MPs as long as they receive some benefits from the CDF regardless of whether the funds are properly managed. All things considered, the CDF does not seem to have contributed to enhancing the overall probability of re-election of incumbent MPs in 2007.

Although the findings of the above study provide only a partial picture of the causal relationship between the CDF and the election results, one potential explanation is that the CDF can be a ‘double-edged sword’ in electoral politics in Kenya; if MPs use its funds particularly well, it helps them get re-elected, but if they handle them improperly, it will be a reason for being voted out.29 Otherwise, the effects of the CDF are buried within various factors affecting voting behaviour.

The impact of the CDF on local development has been mixed to date. While the mechanism has greatly aided community development and stimulated local ownership of development, allegations of mismanagement of CDF funds have frequently been reported by the media (Bagaka 2010: 13; Kimenyi 2005; Transparency International Kenya 2005). For example, a special investigation conducted by Parliament in 2009 revealed that some Ksh3.2 billion, or 16% of the fund’s total budget, could not be accounted for in the CDF allocations in FY2007/08 and FY2008/09 (The Standard 1 July 2009). Furthermore, the National Taxpayers Association, an NGO monitoring the use of CDF funds, recently reported that 16 per cent of the CDF budget for FY2009/10 allocated to 34 sampled constituencies had been either uneconomically utilised, wasted, or remained unaccounted for (Daily Nation 7 May 2012; National Taxpayers Association 2012).

Similar to the case in the Philippines, despite the lawsuits filed by civil society organisations to challenge the constitutionality of the CDF in 2004 and 2009, the legality of the fund was sustained (Business Daily 25 February 2013). On the other hand, with efforts by the media and civil society organisations in advocating for greater transparency and accountability in the fund management, the Kenyan CDF had an effect on enhancing public awareness of the government’s public spending and opened a policy space to discuss it (International Budget Partnership 2009). The increased public awareness also supports the idea that the CDF became a ‘double-edged sword’ for

29 This was also pointed out in the interview with Kenneth (2011).
In 2010, the new Constitution was enacted through a referendum and the CDF structure was reviewed. The new Constitution, which took effect after the general elections in March 2013, fundamentally changed the legislature and local government structure of the country. A new tier of government, the county government, was created in between central and district governments, and 15% of the national budget is allocated to the counties. There was speculation that the CDF might be integrated into this 15% allocation to county governments and the role of MPs in the operation of the CDF might be altered in the new arrangement (Daily Nation 17 April 2012; Daily Nation 18 April 2012; Daily Nation 26 June 2011). On the contrary, the CDF Act was amended to make the fund consistent with the new Constitution in January 2013. It redefined the roles of MPs in managing the funds; MPs are no longer chairpersons of the committee but ex-officio members; nor can they freely appoint the members of the CDF committee but have to choose them from the candidates nominated from wards (Republic of Kenya 2013). This implies that the Kenyan case might shift away from this pattern of CDF politics in the future.

2.3.3. Maintaining the Status Quo by the Executive

The third pattern of CDF politics is maintaining the status quo by the executive. While no cases are found to indicate that the introduction of CDFs originally fits into this pattern, Ghana and Zambia show a shift towards this pattern during the implementation process of CDFs. In both cases, the tensions between MPs and local bureaucrats who are appointed by presidents have become significant, as some bureaucrats exercise their power to release CDF funds for political purposes.

_Ghana: Tensions between MPs and District Chief Executives_

In Ghana, the first CDF was initiated as part of the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), a formula-based system of financial transfers from the central government to the District Assemblies which was established in 1994 (Banful 2009: 2). A share for MPs was created within the DACF in 1996 after MPs from both ruling and opposition
parties insisted in Parliament that they would not approve the allocation formula of the DACF until they were given part of the fund. In other words, the executive was blackmailed into agreeing that a portion of the DACF would be allocated to MPs (The Chronicle 19 December 2005). Since then, 5% of the national revenue was set aside to the DACF, of which 5% was allocated to 230 MPs who can decide on the projects to be funded in their constituencies (Public Agenda 12 December 2007; Republic of Ghana). In 2006, 52.3 million Ghana Cedis (GHC) (approximately US$57 million\(^{31}\)) was allocated to the MPs’ share of the DACF, meaning that each MP was allocated GHC227,000 (approximately US$247,000) (International Monetary Fund 2009: 160). The percentage of the allocation to the DACF increased to 7.5% of the national revenue in 2008, and Parliament requested a further increase to 10% in 2013 (Graphic Online 4 May 2013; Modern Ghana 31 July 2007).

The allocation formulas of the DACF, including the MPs’ share, are proposed and submitted by the presidentially-appointed DACF Administrator to the President’s office every year before they are tabled in Parliament, and Parliament had been approving them without any changes (Banful 2009: 9). However, there is a report that the DACF allocation formulas had been manipulated by ruling parties. Between 1999 and 2000, the government allocated a 1.1% higher proportion of the DACF funds to the districts where the ruling party had a stronghold, while the newly elected government in 2001 provided a 16.8% higher allocation to the districts where opposition had a stronghold to attract their votes between 2001 and 2005. It was also found that the DACF disbursement increased progressively towards the election year in 2000 (Banful 2009).

In the operation of the MPs’ share of the DACF, District Chief Executives (DCEs), chief representatives of the central government at district levels who are appointed by the president, need to approve the requests by MPs for their access to their share (The Chronicle 24 March 2006). The power of DCEs over the MPs’ share of the DACF funds created tensions between MPs and DCEs, especially in the districts where they belong to different political parties (The Chronicle 9 May 2007; The Chronicle 19 December 2005). The tensions were particularly evident when a number of DCEs aspired for parliamentary seats in the elections in 2004 and 2008 (The Chronicle 31 July 2003). It is reported that nearly 36% of MPs had experienced conflicts with DCEs over

the appropriation of their share of the DACF funds, and the percentage increased to as high as 80% prior to the elections (Public Agenda 30 April 2007; SEND Ghana 2010: 10).

In 2009, following the change of government in the 2008 elections, newly elected President John Atta Mills announced the establishment of a new CDF to replace the MPs’ share of the DACF to reduce the tensions between MPs and DCEs (Ghana Broadcasting Corporation 13 January 2011; Ghana 2009; The Ghanaian Times 24 August 2010). This may have been due to a concern about tensions delaying the implementation of projects and might cause public dissatisfaction to the government. Mills reaffirmed his intention to establish a CDF in his address to Parliament in February 2012, five months before his unexpected death (Republic of Ghana 2012: 20). Subsequently, his party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), maintained the CDF proposal in its election manifesto in 2012 and thus, it is still on the government agenda (National Democratic Congress 2012: 92–93). There is, however, a view that the authorisation to release the new CDF funds will again be under the district officials, according to the Financial Administration Act 2003; thus, the tensions between MPs and DCEs might remain (Public Agenda 23 February 2009).

Zambia: Tensions between MPs and District Administrators

In Zambia, the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) was introduced as part of a wider decentralisation policy in 1995 (Chileshe 2011). There is no background information publicly available on the Zambian CDF. Since its introduction, the funds have often been used for the election campaigns of MPs and its budget has been on the increase (Mukwena 2004: 14). The latest increase was from 600 million Kwacha (ZMK) (approximately US$123,000 32 ) per constituency to ZMK750 million (US$154,000) in 2011 (Times of Zambia 18 August 2011), and the proportion of the CDF budget to the total government expenditure was 0.6%. 33

As in Ghana, the Zambian CDF is characterised by the power struggle between MPs and District Administrators, local bureaucrats who are directly responsible to the

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32 US$1 = ZMK4,861 (International Monetary Fund 2012d: 25).
33 The number of MPs in Zambia was 150 and the total CDF budget was ZMK112.5 billion in 2011. The projected central government expense was ZMK18,680 billion (International Monetary Fund 2012d: 26). The data on the government development budget are unavailable.
President. As District Administrators are signatories to the CDF accounts and have the authority to release the CDF funds, MPs and District Administrators are often forced to compete over the control of the funds (Cheeseman 2006: 334–335; The Post 16 October 2002; Times of Zambia 1 March 2000). There are media reports on the charges of the mismanagement of CDF funds against not only MPs but also District Administrators, which suggests the levels of involvement of District Administrators with the CDF (The Post 15 November 2003; The Post 25 September 2003).

A slight difference in the roles of local bureaucrats in the CDF operation between Ghana and Zambia is that, whereas District Chief Executives in Ghana were initially provided authority over the release of the DACF including the MPs’ share, the office of District Administrators was created in Zambia in 1999, four years after the establishment of the CDF, to represent the central government and to coordinate activities as the most senior civil servants at district levels.

During the first few years after the establishment, the positions of District Administrators were filled with the ranks of the party cadres of the ruling party, Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), and they were considered the ruling party’s watchdogs to increase its chances of winning the 2001 elections. Many District Administrators were involved in campaigns in the parliamentary and local government by-elections in the following years. They are also considered to have propagated President Chiluba’s attempts to change the Constitution to allow him to run for a third term (Chella and Kabanda 2008; Mukwena 2004: 14–15; Times of Zambia 28 March 2003). Such strong connections between the President and the District Administrators demonstrate that the control over the CDF funds by District Administrators indirectly increased presidential power vis-à-vis MPs.

### 2.3.4. Alleviating the Risk of Losing Support from MPs to the Executive

The last pattern of CDF politics represents the intention of ruling leaders to alleviate the risk of losing MPs’ support to the executive and the ruling parties. The introduction of CDFs in India and Tanzania exemplifies this pattern.

**India: The Ruling Party’s Attempt to Regain Public Support at State Levels**

The Indian CDF, the Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme
(MPLADS), was established in 1993 in response to the MPs’ proposal for allocating government funds for them to recommend development projects in their constituencies because they had frequently been requested by their constituents to assist small-scale projects in their constituencies (Republic of India 2002).

When the MPLADS was introduced, the Prime Minister Narasimha Rao was heading a minority government and his party, the Indian National Congress (commonly known as the Congress), was losing control of several state governments through which the party had been delivering goods to voters to maintain their support. In the parliamentary election in 1989, no party won a majority of seats for the first time in the country’s history, due to the rise of new caste-, religious- and regionally-based parties. As a result, Indian politics had been marked by coalition governments until 2004 (Rudolph and Rudolph 2008: 32–33). Apparently, the MPLADS was a vehicle of the Congress to provide direct funds to its MPs who feared losing access to patronage due to the growing number of states controlled by opposition parties (Keefer and Khemani 2009a: 10; Wilkinson 2007: 121). Yet, given the lack of majority seats in Parliament, the MPLADS should have been aimed at gaining support from opposition MPs as well, which was important for Rao and the Congress to implement government policies effectively.

The allocation of MPLADS funds to each MP was initially 10 million rupees (Rs) (approximately US$318,80034) per year, which increased several times to reach the current level of allocation of Rs50 million (US$977,00035) in FY2011/12 (Republic of India). Yet, the total funds released for the MPLADS, Rs15.3 billion (US$343 million36), in FY2010/11 was only about 0.1% of the central government budget (Republic of India 2012: 3, 15).37

The use of the MPLADS is closely related to electoral politics at local levels. As the unspent MPLADS funds in any one year can be carried forward, MPs use the funds extensively to ‘pay off supporters just after elections and then to reward potential voters in the run up to elections’ (Wilkinson 2007: 121). Indeed, there is a tendency among MPs, particularly right-wing MPs, to accumulate funds by not spending during the first

34 US$1 = Rs31.37 (January 1995) (International Monetary Fund).
36 US$1 = Rs44.6 (2010–2011) (Reserve Bank of India 2012: 175).
37 The central government expenditure in FY2010/11 was Rs11,895 billion (International Monetary Fund 2012a: 36). The data on the government development budget are unavailable.
years of their term and spend that accumulated amount during the second half of their term to ensure their re-election (Pal and Das 2010).

When the MPLADS was established in 1993, there was no major debate on it inside or outside Parliament, and the funds remained a low profile for several years. There was no major media coverage of it either. The turning point came when the Comptroller and Auditor General published a pilot audit report of the MPLADS-funded projects in several states in 1999. It shed light on the serious mismanagement of the funds and the MPLADS received wide public attention (Keefer and Khemani 2009a: 10–11). This corresponded with the change of government in the elections in 1999. The government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party introduced ‘more stringent program implementation guidelines, including provisions for review and scrutiny by ministry authorities if funds are severely under-utilized’ (Keefer and Khemani 2009a: 10–11).

With these guidelines, MPs need to get approval from district authorities that can withhold the disbursement of the funds on the grounds of non-conformity with the project guidelines. As, only 40% of the projects proposed by MPs were sanctioned by the District Commissioners, top public officials at district level, between 1997 and 2000, the MPLADS is characterised by the substantial power held by local bureaucrats (Keefer and Khemani 2009a: 8). Yet, there is no evidence to support that the decision made by local bureaucrats on each disbursement has been influenced by the central government. Thus, the Indian MPLADS remains an example of the strengthening of the power of the legislature.

Similar to the Philippines and Kenya, the constitutionality of MPLADS was challenged by legal experts in India (Sivaramakrishnan 2010). In May 2010, the Supreme Court concluded that:

there was no violation of the concept of separation of powers because the role of an MP in this case is recommendatory and the actual work is carried out by the Panchayats [local councils] and Municipalities which belong to the executive organ. There are checks and balances in place through the guidelines which have to be adhered to and the fact that each MP is ultimately responsible to the Parliament (PRS Legislative Research 9 March 2011).

The judgement is likely to contribute to consolidating the MPLADS in politics in India.
In Tanzania, a CDF was adopted by the initiative taken by the Speaker of Parliament to strengthen the power and functions of Parliament in 2009. The fund was named the Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF) as it was envisioned as a catalyst for accelerating self-help development efforts at grassroots level. Since then, 10 billion Tanzanian Shillings (Tsh) (approximately US$7 million) has been allocated to the CDCF annually, which amounted to approximately 0.2% of the national budget in FY2010/11 (United Republic of Tanzania 2009b: 69).

The design of the CDCF is similar to that of the Kenyan CDF; the funds are automatically allocated to all the constituencies of MPs without any requirement to obtain the approval of the central or local governments. The projects funded by the CDCF are selected by a committee established in each constituency, chaired by the respective MPs. This model is generally considered to strengthen the autonomy of individual MPs from the executive by decentralising the allocation of public funds for their constituency service.

Tanzania is characterised by stable dominant party politics led by the CCM since the country’s independence in 1961. When a CDF was adopted in 2009, a large majority of parliamentary seats (89%) was represented by CCM MPs (United Republic of Tanzania). Thus, it is less clear than the Indian case why the CCM adopted such a mechanism to give financial autonomy to their MPs while the party had not faced any challenges from the opposition in Mainland. There might have been another kind of risk for the CCM to lose support of their MPs which made the party introduce a CDF to reconsolidate their support. While keeping this proposition as a clue to understand CDF politics in Tanzania, the subsequent chapters explore the factors in dominant party politics in the country that led to the adoption of the fund.

2.4. Conclusion

The seven cases examined in this chapter demonstrate that CDFs create new space for power struggles and affect patronage politics, rather than automatically strengthen the financial power of MPs and the legislature. Because CDFs are closely associated with

electoral politics which intrinsically entails competition, the manifestation of power struggles seems to be more evident in the introduction and operation of CDFs than in other government social spending mechanisms.

The nature of CDF politics, or the interactions between CDFs and politics, is diverse. This chapter has demonstrated that the impact of CDFs on politics is subject to considerable political manoeuvring and thus produces different results in different countries. In the Philippines, the CDF contributed to establishing the power base of the president following the democratic transition in the country. Similarly, the CDF was adopted in Pakistan as part of the transition to democratic rule, yet it was rather an attempt by the Prime Minister to establish his support base in Parliament by giving financial power to MPs. In Kenya, the adoption of CDF signifies a change in the rule of the game in electoral politics by the newly elected president after the long-serving president and his party were removed from power.

Ghana and Zambia are characterised by the power held by the heads of local governments over the release of CDF funds to individual projects, which resulted in conflicts between MPs and bureaucrats. Since the heads of local governments are appointed by presidents, these two cases demonstrate an indirect enhancement of presidential power through the adoption of CDFs.

In India and Tanzania, CDFs were introduced by dominant ruling parties without major regime changes. In India, the fund was established when the ruling party was leading a minority government and the CDF was aimed at supporting its MPs who feared losing access to patronage due to the growing number of states controlled by opposition parties. In Tanzania, the ruling party had held an overwhelming majority in Parliament when a CDF was introduced; thus, the reason for the adoption of a fund is less evident. The subsequent chapters analyse the political background of the adoption of a CDF in Tanzania to explore the reasons.

Apart from the case in Tanzania, the general patterns of the interactions between CDFs and politics can be summarised as follows. Whereas some CDFs were aimed at maintaining or establishing patronage politics centrally controlled by the executive, other CDFs functioned to empower MPs. In the latter cases, why did the executive in some countries allow the legislature to gain power through the establishment of CDFs? The comparison of the case countries suggests two explanations. First, in the countries

where CDFs were introduced following regime changes, CDFs were likely to be a strategic tool for the executive (e.g. the prime minister in Pakistan and the president in Kenya) to dissolve patronage politics controlled by former leaders and to gain support from MPs to run the new governments effectively. Second, in the countries where CDFs are introduced without regime changes, CDFs seem to be a compromise of the executive to the legislature to regain the support from MPs of the ruling parties and the wider public.
Chapter 3  Policy Process of Introducing a CDF in Tanzania

3.1. Introduction

The introduction of a CDF in Tanzania was not a straightforward process. The discussion regarding a CDF began among MPs in the 1990s, but other African countries moved fast and initiated CDFs before Tanzania. After a proposal to establish a CDF was made in Parliament in 2006, it faced strong objections, first by donors and later by local civil society organisations (CSOs). It took three more years for the law to establish the Tanzanian CDF, called the Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF), to be enacted in Parliament.

The existing studies on the policy process in Tanzania highlight the donors’ profound influence on the formulation and implementation of the country’s national development policies that undermine accountability between the state and citizens. For example, according to Hyden and Mmuya’s (2008) study, well-informed Tanzanians from different sectors consider that ‘the accountability relationship to donors is … much stronger than that to domestic, non-state actors’ (77) and that ‘donors really correct the government if it strays away from the agenda that they regard as necessary for the country’s development’ (77). Donor influence is evident at the local level as well. Tripp (2012) points out that ‘donor influence crowds out the ability of citizens to participate meaningfully in local government and makes local governments more attentive to donors than their own constituents’ (19).

This view is also shared by Tanzanian politicians. For example, Samuel John Sitta, Speaker of the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010), notes that donors have created ‘parallel accountability’ (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008: 18) in Tanzania; government ministries need to be accountable to donors on policy formulation and implementation, while they are also obliged to be accountable to Parliament. The scrutiny of the government performance is sometimes duplicated and contradicted between donors and Parliament (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008: 36).

This chapter delineates the policy process of the introduction of a CDF in Tanzania by highlighting the interaction and competition between various actors, including donors. It first explains the legislative process of establishing the fund, its budget and operational arrangement, and its initial phase of implementation. The chapter then discusses four rationales for introducing a CDF based on the interviews
with MPs, and analyses the position of various actors involved in the policy process. Through this analysis, the chapter argues that the CDF policy process exemplifies a case in which the formulation of public policies was not dominated by donors but largely shaped by domestic actors.

3.2. How was the CDCF Introduced in Tanzania?

The idea to establish a CDF had been discussed among Tanzanian MPs since the mid-1990s (United Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 51, 60). It gained momentum after the new government led by President Jakaya Mwisho Kikwete began in 2005. In May 2006, a Special Committee was established by Speaker Sitta to review the Standing Orders, a set of written rules by which Parliament was governed (United Republic of Tanzania 2006b: 24; United Republic of Tanzania 2007c: 39).40 The committee consisted of seven MPs: five from CCM, one from the Civic United Front (CUF) and one from Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA: ‘Party of Democracy and Development’) (see Table 3.1 below for the list of the committee members).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1 Members of the Special Committee to Review the Standing Orders</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Job Yustino Ndugai, MP for Kongwa (CCM) – Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Athuman Saidi Janguo, former MP for Kisarawe (CCM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Willibrod Peter Slaa, former MP for Karatu (CHADEMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Harrison George Mwakyembe, MP for Kyela (CCM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Beatrice Matumbo Shellukindo, MP for Kilindi (CCM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Rashid Mohamed Hamad, MP for Wawi (CUF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Nimrod Elireheemah Mkono, MP for Musoma Rural (CCM)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All the members were re-elected in the elections in 2010, except Janguo, who did not contest, and Slaa, who ran for the presidential elections.
Source: United Republic of Tanzania (2006b: 24)

The committee reviewed not only the rules and operation of Parliament, but also the performance of MPs in Parliament, parliamentary committees, party caucuses and their constituencies. The deliberation of a CDF was one of the tasks in their terms of

40 There are two parliaments in Tanzania; the National Assembly in Mainland and the House of Representatives in Zanzibar. Unless specified, Parliament refers to the National Assembly in Mainland in this thesis.
reference as a means to strengthen the role of MPs in their constituencies. The members travelled to Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Mauritius and India to learn about the operations of legislatures and CDFs. They highly evaluated the contributions made by MPs to local development in these countries through CDFs and decided to propose its establishment in Tanzania.41

The committee submitted three documents to the Speaker as their final outputs: 1) a redrafting of the Standing Orders, 2) recommendations for a review of the Constitution and 3) a CDF draft bill. The first document was developed into the new Standing Orders, which was enacted in Parliament in November 2007. The second document on the Constitution was not originally requested by the Speaker but was submitted because some of the challenges facing Parliament were bound by the Constitution and could not be addressed without changing it. The CDF draft bill was a preliminary document which served as the basis for the further discussion of the fund (Shivji 2006: 4).42

In August 2006, Parliament formally began discussions with the government on the CDF proposal with an aim at launching it in FY2007/08 (United Republic of Tanzania 2006b: 25).43 Two years later, President Kikwete announced to Parliament that his government agreed to establish a CDF by stating that:

…it should be publicly announced that the Government has agreed to initiate a Constituency Development Fund (CDF). I believe that this Fund will give opportunities to Honourable MPs to manage some amounts of funds to reduce small problems facing voters in constituencies. Because it is not good that you, Honourable MP, visit your constituency, people ask you for five roofing sheets and you do not have the capacity for that. This fund will help you with such problems (United Republic of Tanzania 2008b: 7).44

Subsequently, a small team was formed by the Parliamentary House Business Committee, comprising all the chairpersons of parliamentary standing committees, to redraft and finalise the CDF bill by collecting views from various stakeholders (see Table 3.2 below for the list of the team members).45

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42 Interviews, Ndugai (2011) and Slaa (2011).
43 The financial year (FY) of Tanzania is from July to June.
44 The text was translated by the author.
Table 3.2  Members of the Parliamentary Team to Redraft the CDF Bill

1. George Malima Lubeleje, former MP for Mpwapwa (CCM) – Chairperson
2. John Momose Cheyo, MP for Bariadi East (United Democratic Party: UDP)
3. Zitto Zuberi Kabwe, MP for Kigoma North (CHADEMA)
4. Estherina Julio Kilasi, former MP for Mbarali (CCM)
5. William Hezekia Shellukindo, former MP for Bumbuli (CCM)
6. Hamza Abdallah Mwenegoha, former MP for Morogoro South (CCM)

Note: All four CCM members lost in the primary election in 2010 (Matukio-Michuzi 2 August 2010; MwanaHalisi 18 August 2010)
Source: Interview, Wankanga (2010)

When the bill was redrafted by the parliamentary team, the CDF was renamed the Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDF), or *Mfuko wa Kuchochea Maendeleo ya Jimbo* in Swahili. The word *kuchochea*, meaning ‘catalyse’, was added to emphasise that it would be a catalyst for accelerating self-help development efforts at the grassroots level, instead of serving as a core funding for large-scale projects.

Once the government bill for the Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund Act 2009 was finalised, it was expeditiously tabled and passed in Parliament. The parliamentary standing committee on the Constitution, Legal Affairs and Governance reviewed the draft and proposed several revisions which were reflected in the bill. The bill was submitted to Parliament on 29 June 2009, published on the following day for the government gazette dated 3 July and presented in Parliament for first reading on 23 July (United Republic of Tanzania 2009d). The above committee organised a public hearing on 26 July to collect the views of stakeholders including CSOs and academics. Then, the bill was tabled in Parliament for second and third readings and passed on 31 July 2009 (United Republic of Tanzania 2009a). President Kikwete assented to it on 21 August 2009.

Although CSOs complained that there was not enough time for the public to...
discuss the bill, the passing of the Act followed the required legislative procedure.\textsuperscript{49} According to the parliamentary standing orders, a first bill ‘must be published at least twenty-one days before it is introduced in the National Assembly for first reading’ (United Republic of Tanzania 2007a: 54; United Republic of Tanzania n.d.: 1). The CDCF bill was published 23 days before first reading.

When the CDCF Bill was discussed in Parliament, both CCM and opposition MPs enthusiastically supported it. This is characterised by the statement of a veteran CCM politician, Gertude Mongella, then MP for Ukerewe (CCM), in Parliament. She endorsed the CDCF and pronounced that:

\begin{quote}
\textit{today it became clear that we are Tanzanians and when we discuss fundamental issues, there are no CHADEMA, CCM, CUF, there are no parties, which is what is happening today. I hope it will be written in history books} (United Republic of Tanzania 2009d: 71).\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

As such, all MPs became one interest group and agreed on the introduction of the CDCF.

The CDCF Regulation was formulated and passed in Parliament in February 2010, and the operation of the fund started several months before the general elections in October 2010 (United Republic of Tanzania 2009c; United Republic of Tanzania 2010c).

\section*{3.3. CDCF Budget and Operational Arrangement}

The CDF budget kept changing during the preparatory process. As mentioned above, there was initially a plan to start a CDF in FY2007/08. First, Tsh50 billion (approximately US$40 million\textsuperscript{51}) was proposed to be allocated to a CDF in the government budget guideline passed in Parliament in April 2007, which was about 0.8\% of the national budget (Mulisa 2007). In August 2007, Prime Minister Edward Ngoyai Lowassa announced in Parliament that Tsh7.5 billion (approximately US$6 million) would be allocated to the CDF in FY2007/08 (United Republic of Tanzania 2007b: 41; United Republic of Tanzania 2007d: 29). In March 2008, the newly

\textsuperscript{49} Interviews, Mwakagenda (2010), Baker (2010), Kilonzo (2010) and Sungusia (2011).
\textsuperscript{50} The text was translated by the author.
\textsuperscript{51} US$1 = Tsh1,239.5 (2007) (Bank of Tanzania 2013: 12).
appointed Prime Minister Mizengo Kayanza Peter Pinda mentioned to a Swahili newspaper that Tsh1 billion was allocated to a CDF in FY2007/08 (Tanzania Daima 18 March 2008). Despite the intentions by the prime ministers to start a CDF in FY2007/08, it took two more years for the CDF funds to be disbursed.

In July 2008, a draft CDF bill was circulated among donors, which states that the CDF budget would be no less than 2.5% of the national recurrent budget excluding national debt, which is the same ratio adopted by the Kenyan CDF (United Republic of Tanzania 2008a). The high ratio of the CDF budget to the government budget raised concerns among donors. It is unknown whether Tanzanian policymakers had an intention to actually allocate 2.5% of the national budget to the CDCF, yet taking into account the smaller scale of the budgets proposed in the government budget guideline and announced by the prime ministers for FY2007/08, it was probably the case that the ratio was tentatively adopted from the Kenyan CDF and remained as it was in the circulated draft bill.

Once the CDCF was launched in 2010, Tsh10 billion (approximately US$7.52 million) was provisionally allocated to the budget for FY2009/10 and FY2010/11, amounting to approximately 0.2% of the national budget in the latter year (United Republic of Tanzania 2009b: 69). There is no fixed percentage or amount stipulated in the CDCF Act or Regulations, and it is not clear how the government determined the budgets. According to the CDCF Act, the funds are disbursed twice per year; 50% of the total budget is disbursed within the first half of the financial year, and the remaining 50% in the second half of the year (United Republic of Tanzania 2009a: 15). In FY2009/10, only half of the annual budget, Tsh5 billion, was disbursed in April 2010, three months before the end of the financial year and six months before the general elections, and there was no second disbursement for this financial year. In the second year of the operation, FY2010/11, approximately Tsh10 billion was allocated in May 2011 (United Republic of Tanzania 2011).

Similar to the Kenyan CDF, the CDCF budget is allocated to electoral constituencies based on a formula. The parliamentary special committee that proposed the establishment of a CDF in 2006 suggested that 75% of the budget be equally allocated to all the constituencies, which is the formula used in Kenya (Shivji 2006: 6).

However, the parliamentary team that redrafted the CDCF bill proposed a more progressive approach in addressing regional inequality and decided that 25% would be equally distributed to all the constituencies and the allocation of the remaining 75% would be based on a combination of population (45%), poverty level (20%) and size of the geographical area (10%) (United Republic of Tanzania 2009a).

In FY2010/11, the CDCF budget for each constituency ranged from Tsh75.3 million (approximately US$53,000) in the Bariadi West constituency to Tsh21.3 million (US$15,000) in the Lindi Town constituency (United Republic of Tanzania 2011b). On average, each constituency received Tsh41.8 million (US$29,000). The scale of the CDCF budget is significantly smaller than the budget of the Kenyan CDF and what donors had anticipated. A simple comparison of the budgets shows that a constituency in Kenya receives 33 times more CDF funds than a constituency in Tanzania.54

The CDCF is administered by the Prime Minister’s Office–Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) and the Ministry of Finance. The PMO-RALG calculates the CDCF budget of each constituency based on the above formula, and the funds are disbursed from the Ministry of Finance to the dedicated bank accounts opened and managed by district councils. The budgets allocated to constituencies for FY2009/10 and FY2010/11 were published on the website of the Ministry of Finance (United Republic of Tanzania 2010b; 2011b). This arrangement is different from the Kenyan CDF. In Kenya, after four years of the operation of the CDF, the CDF Board Secretariat, a parastatal agency, was established under the Ministry of Planning, National Development and Vision 2030, in 2007 to manage the CDF.55

Since the CDCF was launched in the middle of FY2009/10, there was no budget allocated to the CDCF in the government budget that was approved at the beginning of the financial year. Thus, the budget originally earmarked for other activities of the PMO-RALG was modified as the CDCF budget. The CDCF was intended to be part of the district councils’ budgets in the following year, FY2010/11, yet it was again included in the budget of the PMO-RALG.56

The CDCF is managed in similar ways to the regular local development budgets. The only difference between the two budgets is that the former is reviewed and approved at the committees chaired by an MP at district councils, while the latter is

54 As discussed in Chapter 2, a constituency in Kenya received US$952,000 in FY2011/12 on average.
55 Interview, Ojow (2011).
approved at the full district council meetings. There are three levels of local government authorities in Tanzania: 30 regions, 169 districts and 3,643 wards. The budget planning and execution are mainly carried out by district councils (United Republic of Tanzania 2013a). In terms of the geographical areas, some districts consist of only one electoral constituency (e.g. the Arumeru West constituency in the Arusha district), while others contain several constituencies (e.g. the Kawe, Kinondoni and Ubungo constituencies in the Kinondoni district).

The projects funded by the CDCF should be community-based development projects that benefit a wide section of the people in constituencies. It is prohibited to use the funds for political or religious activities (United Republic of Tanzania 2009a: 12–13). Based on the lists of priority projects submitted by wards, the CDCF projects are selected by the Constituencies Development Catalyst (CDC) Committees established at district levels. Each CDC Committee has a maximum of seven members consisting of the elected MP as the Chairperson, the District Planning Officer as the Secretary, two District Councillors, two Ward Executive Officers and one representative of an NGO in the area. The Committee is responsible for the selection, co-ordination and supervision of all the CDCF projects within the respective constituencies (United Republic of Tanzania 2009a).

While the CDCF was modelled on the Kenyan CDF, it was carefully designed to restrict the power of MPs in the management of the funds; MPs are not allowed to select the members of the CDC Committees directly by law. Instead, the two District Councillors on the Committees are nominated by district councils, the Ward Executive Officers by the Council Director and an NGO representative by the CDC Committees.

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56 Interview, Haule (2011).
57 Interviews, Mkongwa (2011) and Haule (2011).
58 See Venugopal and Yilmaz (2010) for the local organisations, namely, villages, streets and hamlets, below ward levels.
59 In urban regions, the local government authorities are city councils, municipal councils and town councils, instead of district councils. The local government authorities in rural regions which administer townships with more than 9,000 residents are also town councils. In this thesis, all the councils are generalised as district councils, and councillors, local politicians, are also called District Councillors to avoid confusion. See Venugopal and Yilmaz (2010: 216-218) for further information on the local government structure in Tanzania.
60 In Zanzibar, one Shehe, Muslim leader, becomes a member instead of Ward Executive Officers. Each shehe leads a shehia, the smallest government administrative unit in Zanzibar consisting of two to three villages, which is equivalent to a ward in the Mainland (Mnyika 2012: 123). Interview, Mohammed (2012).
61 See Chapter 2 for the design of the Kenyan CDF. As discussed in Chapter 2, the CDF Act was amended in Kenya in 2013 and MPs could no longer appoint the committee members, which made the arrangement of the Kenyan CDF closer to that of the Tanzanian CDCF.
This arrangement indicates that MPs cannot easily dominate the project selection process through the appointment of the committee members (United Republic of Tanzania 2010c: 4–5).

The CDCF funds are disbursed for the selected projects upon the authorisation of the designated officials of district councils. The signatories of the CDCF bank accounts are a combination of 1) either the Council Director or the Council Planning Officer and 2) either the Council Treasurer or the Council Accountant. Therefore, MPs cannot directly withdraw the funds from the CDCF bank accounts. The disbursement, procurement and auditing of the CDCF are carried out in accordance with the government laws and regulations (United Republic of Tanzania 2010b: 13–14; United Republic of Tanzania 2011b; United Republic of Tanzania 2010c: 2–3).

3.4. Initial Phase of the Implementation of the CDCF

After the CDCF was formally launched, the first disbursement of the funds reached district councils, and the CDC Committee meetings were held several months before the general elections in October 2010. For example, the first CDC Committee meeting of the Mchinga constituency was held in June 2010, one month before Parliament was dissolved in July before the elections in October, and the first meeting of the Singida Urban constituency was held in September 2010, only one month before the elections. Therefore, the impact of the CDCF on the 2010 elections was limited.

There is variation in the way in which CDC Committees select projects across constituencies. The differences exist in terms of sectors (e.g. education, health) and geographical areas. For example, the CDCF budget for the Mchinga constituency in FY2009/10 was Tsh17.5 million (approximately US$12,000) which was allocated mainly to the projects in education (i.e. secondary school fees, the construction of laboratories in schools and the rehabilitation of teachers’ houses) and infrastructure (i.e. the construction of the culverts bridging rivers). Other MPs allocate the funds equally across their constituencies. For example, the Singida Urban constituency received Tsh38 million (US$27,000) in FY2009/10 and FY2010/11, which was divided by 13 wards and each ward received Tsh2.8 million. Yet, due to the limited budget, it is not

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62 Interview, Yunah (2011).
63 Interview, Latu (2011). She mentioned in the interview that Tsh38 million was for FY2009/10, yet according to the allocations of the CDCF to constituencies published by the Ministry of Finance, the
always possible to allocate the funds equally to all the wards. Sometimes, District Councillors who are members of the CDC Committees complain in the committee meetings that their wards are not allocated any funds. In response, MPs as chairs of the committees convince them, for example, by promising to allocate the following year’s budget to their wards. Several MPs decided to allocate the CDCF to priority sectors, rather than equally distributing them across the constituencies.

MPs seem to have significant influence on the decision-making of the CDC Committees regardless of their party affiliations. There was an example in which the CDCF funds were used to purchase products of a company owned by an MP, which indicates the influence of MPs in the selection process of the projects. It is important for opposition MPs to have good relationships with the district councils so that the selection of the CDC Committee members would not be biased towards the CCM. Opposition MPs sometimes request the Council Directors to balance the party composition in selecting the CDC Committee members.

There is also variation in the way in which the implementation of CDCF projects are monitored and publicised by MPs. For example, Halima James Mdee, MP for Kawe in Dar es Salaam (CHADEMA), encourages people in her constituency to monitor the implementation of the CDCF projects. There was a CDCF-funded project of the rehabilitation of teachers’ houses in a primary school in her constituency, and the teachers’ committee reported to her that the funds were not properly used. She inspected the project with other CDC Committee members and found a gap between the funds disbursed for the project and the actual amount used by the local contractor. They ordered the contractor to return the fund to the district council (Mwananchi 3 November 2011). This exemplifies how an MP can work closely with local government officials and communities in managing the CDCF.

Zitto Zuberi Kabwe, MP for Kigoma North (CHADEMA) and a member of the parliamentary team that redrafted the CDCF bill, has been publishing the lists of the CDCF projects in his constituency on his personal blog to ensure transparency in the utilisation of the funds. In his constituency, the funds were allocated to the projects on schools, clinics and dispensaries and water. Kabwe also reported on the embezzlement

allocation for the Singida Urban constituency in FY2009/10 was Tsh19 million (United Republic of Tanzania 2010b). Thus, Tsh38 million was probably the total amount for FY2009/10 and FY2010/11.

64 Interview, an informant (2012).
65 Interviews, two opposition MPs (2011).
of the CDCF funds by a district council officer. When a water project was implemented in his constituency, the officer purchased old water pipes from a warehouse and submitted a fake receipt issued by another shop. Kabwe ordered the council to punish the officer and the shop that issued a fake receipt. He also asked senior village leaders to closely monitor the implementation of the CDCF projects (Kabwe 23 May 2011; 28 December 2011; 29 September 2011). Mdee’s and Kabwe’s cases show that MPs can play an active supervising role in the implementation of the CDCF. They also suggest that the CDCF is prone to the mismanagement not only by MPs but also by various other actors who are involved in the implementation of the fund.

The first audit on the CDCF was undertaken by the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) for FY2010/11, which revealed that approximately Tsh2.7 billion (approximately US$1.9 million), or 80%, of the total budget was unspent in the 51 sampled district councils (United Republic of Tanzania 2012a). This can largely be explained by the delayed disbursement of the funds to district councils. Yet, the CAG report for FY2011/12 reported again that more than Tsh2.6 billion (approximately US$1.6 million67) of the total budget were unspent in the 69 sampled district councils.68 This report also revealed that CDC Committees in 15 out of 69 sampled districts did not prepare the reports for the PMO-RALG on the CDCF budgets they received and spent. Some of the CDCF projects did not have evidence that the CDC Committees approved the spending or they were initiated by resident community members. Thus, the report concludes that the objectives of the CDCF were not fully achieved (United Republic of Tanzania 2013b: xxxiv, 113–117). Probably in response to these reports, the CDCF Act was amended in October 2013 to strengthen the CDCF audits by articulating that the CDCF funds will be audited and reported upon by the CAG in terms of the provisions of the Public Audit Act (United Republic of Tanzania 2013c: 11).

The CDCF projects have occasionally been reported by newspapers. The most common reports are the pictures of the projects funded by the CDCF or minor problems about managing the fund in particular constituencies (Habari Leo 13 May 2013; The Citizen 22 May 2013). Despite the heated debate on the CDCF in the media when it was discussed in Parliament in July 2009, many Tanzanians do not know about the fund.

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66 Interview, Mdee (2012).
67 US$1 = Tsh1,579.5 (2011) (Bank of Tanzania 2013: 12).
68 The ratio of the unspent balance to the total budget of the sampled districts is unknown because the information on the CDCF budget for FY2011/12 is not publicly available.
According to the Views of the People 2012, a perception survey conducted by the Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), only 21% of the respondents had heard of the CDCF, and very few knew that the funds were managed by MPs (Research on Poverty Alleviation 2012: 32). The CDCF is still at an early stage of the implementation which is not widely known to the public.

3.5. Four Rationales for the Adoption of a CDF in Tanzania

There are various reasons why Tanzanian policymakers supported the establishment of a CDF. While undoubtedly influenced by their electoral incentives, their rationales for adopting a fund are underpinned by the need to address various problems existing in the country. Based on the interviews with MPs, the rationales can be summarised into four groups: the first group is concerned with electoral politics, the second with the role of MPs, and the third and fourth with the development challenges facing the country. These four rationales are actors’ explanations for the introduction of the CDCF. Building on these rationales, a possible explanation for the introduction of the fund is discussed in Chapter 5 by analysing the changing nature of electoral and party politics of the country following the transition to a multiparty system in 1992. The chapter presents an argument that the introduction of the CDCF was an election strategy of Tanzania’s ruling party, the CCM, to re-establish party unity in preparation for the elections in 2010. In contrast to the actors’ rationales discussed in this section, the argument in Chapter 5 is the explanation of external observers based on the political analysis of the country.

During the interviews with MPs, some of the four rationales were mentioned by specific MPs, while others were repeatedly mentioned by a wider group of MPs. Thus, it is important to distinguish two groups of MPs in the policy process: one comprises ‘policymakers’ who set the agenda and directly engaged with the formulation of the CDCF, and the other comprises ‘supporters’ who favoured and supported the establishment of the CDCF in Parliament but were not directly involved in the designing of the fund. The main actors in the former category are the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament and the members of the three parliamentary

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69 5,136 Tanzanians aged 18 and above in a sample of ten regions in Mainland were asked about their experience of recent social and economic change and their views on key policies. There was also the Views of the People in 2007 (Research on Poverty Alleviation 2007; 2012).
committees (i.e. the parliamentary special committee that initially proposed a CDF, the parliamentary team which redrafted the CDCF bill and the parliamentary standing committee of the Constitution, Legal Affairs and Governance) as described in the previous section. All MPs who were elected from constituencies including the ‘policymakers’ are the beneficiaries of the CDCF.

### 3.5.1 To Prevent Collusion between MPs and the Private Sector and Level the Electoral Playing Field

The first rationale is that a CDF would reduce the financial dependency of MPs on businessmen, thereby curbing collusion between MPs and the private sector and creating a more level playing field for elections. This rationale was articulated by the Speaker Sitta, a principal ‘policymaker’.70 One MP described the problem of MPs using private funds for their constituency service by referring to a Swahili saying: ‘Aliyemlipa mpiga zumari ndiye anayechagua wimbo (A person who pays the guitarist is the one who chooses songs)’, and another MP also made a similar point that the CDCF was aimed at mitigating the influence of money on electoral politics.71 In addition, while it was not explicitly mentioned by any MPs in interviews, as discussed in Chapter 2, a CDF can be a means to enhance financial autonomy of MPs from the executive and mitigate the prevalence of patronage politics centrally controlled by the executive.

This rationale was also pointed out by a Kenyan politician on the Kenyan CDF (Cheeseman 2006: 49) and more broadly, it is a general feature of public funds for political finance. For example, Casas-Zamora (2008) discusses direct state funding (DSF) to political parties or individual politicians for their political activities. He argues that there are three areas of dispute on DSF: 1) autonomy of political actors and prevention of corruption, 2) political equality and electoral competition and 3) organisation and institutionalisation of political parties (Casas-Zamora 2008: 4–5, 29). Among them, the first and second areas of debate are relevant to this rationale.

First, the proponents of DSF argue that DSF contributes to strengthening the autonomy of political actors and the prevention of corruption, as ‘subsidies protect

70 Interview, Sitta (2012).
71 Interviews, Ole Sendeka (2012) and Koka (2012).
parties and elected officials from economic dependence on large private donors’ (Casas-Zamora 2008: 4). The opponents assert that DSF is additional to the existing political finance and does not substitute existing private contributions (Casas-Zamora 2008: 5). The second area of debate on DSF is on political equality and electoral competition. The proponents of DSF argue that it enhances equality in electoral competition, as it prevents political dominance of the groups that have access to resources and allows candidates to compete fairly in elections regardless of their economic conditions. The critics argue that DSF generates incumbency advantage and makes it difficult for newcomers to enter politics (Casas-Zamora 2008: 4–5).

These debates can be applied to Sitta’s rationale for a CDF based on financial autonomy of MPs or to CDFs in general, apart from the last point on incumbency advantage because, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, CDFs do not automatically enhance incumbency advantage. Although there are potentially positive effects of CDFs on electoral democracy, CDFs may have only marginal effects on mitigating the collusion between MPs and the private sector or the executive discussed by the opponents of DSF.

3.5.2. To Relieve the Fundraising Burden on MPs

The second rationale is the benefactor role of MPs in their constituencies. The ‘supporters’ welcomed the introduction of a CDF, because it would relieve their responsibilities of raising funds for their constituency service. This rationale seems to be a common rationale across the countries where CDFs were adopted. As mentioned earlier, President Kikwete made this point in his speech to Parliament as well. All the interviewed MPs agree that the financial requests made by voters exceed what they can offer them.72 One MP questioned why MPs had to use their own salaries for the problems of citizens that ought to be addressed by local governments.73 There are MPs who think that voters are misguided about the role of MPs in Tanzania.74 Yet, the popularity of this rationale confirms that there is a social norm in Tanzania and other developing countries that MPs should play a benefactor role in their constituencies.

72 Interviews, MPs (2011).
73 Interview, Mntangi (2011).
74 For example, Nyalandu (2011), Makamba (2011), Kabwe (2011), Lissu (2011) and Slaa (2011) articulated this point in the interviews.
This rationale is also associated with the power balance between MPs and presidential appointees at local levels in Tanzania. The Tanzanian government has been allocating discretionary budgets to Regional Commissioners (RCs), heads of local governments appointed by the President at the regional level, so that they can support community projects in their jurisdiction. Around Tsh10 million (approximately US$8,000\textsuperscript{75}) was allocated to each RC in 2006, which was increased to Tsh20 million by 2009.\textsuperscript{76} Similar to RCs, District Commissioners (DCs), presidential appointees at the district level, started to receive around Tsh45–50 million in 2009 before the CDCF Act was passed into law (United Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 61). The latter amount is about the same scale as the CDCF budget allocated to each constituency (i.e. Tsh47.7 million).

MPs found it unfair that only RCs and DCs had been receiving public funds to contribute to community projects. For example, when MPs, RCs and DCs travelled to villages together, RCs and DCs were able to contribute money to community projects using their discretionary funds without necessarily mentioning that they are public funds; there is no requirement for establishing committees to decide how to use these funds. MPs were similarly expected to contribute to the projects by villagers, and they had to spend their own money to match the contributions by RCs and DCs. MPs claim that although the CDCF is not a discretionary fund they can use immediately, they can refer to it as a means to help community projects when they visit the communities (United Republic of Tanzania 2006c: 1–3; United Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 70).\textsuperscript{77} Although no evidence was found to make a strong argument here, given the fact that the discretionary funds for DCs and the CDCF were introduced in the same year, the executive might have sought to reinforce its support basis at local levels by allocating part of the government budget to both presidential appointees (i.e. RCs and DCs) and elected representatives (i.e. MPs) so that neither of them would feel left out in the provision of the financial power by the executive.

The financial power of MPs and the presidential appointees at the local level has already been discussed in the cases of Ghana and Zambia in Chapter 2. In the two countries, the heads of local governments who are appointed by presidents have power to release CDF funds, and thus the introduction of CDFs indirectly enhances the power

\textsuperscript{75} US$1 = Tsh1,254.2 (2006) (Bank of Tanzania 2012: 32)

\textsuperscript{76} Interview, Slaa (2011).
of executives. In Tanzania, neither RCs nor DCs have authority to release the CDCF funds. Thus, the CDCF in Tanzania is an example of strengthening the power of MPs, and may also have an effect on recalibrating the power balance between MPs and presidential appointees at the local level by equally allocating public funds for their constituency service.

3.5.3. To Supplement the Execution of the Development Budget by Local Governments

As a third rationale, some MPs argue that the CDCF supplements the execution of the development budget by local governments. It also gives MPs opportunities to communicate with local government officials and communities effectively to address local development problems. In other words, there is an expectation that the CDCF would help MPs get more engaged with local development processes and increase their visibility on the ground.

This rationale leads to two areas of discussions. First, it implies that MPs did not fully participate in the budget planning and execution process at district levels before the CDCF was established. It is true that MPs cannot always attend district council meetings that are held four times per year due to the time conflicts with other official duties and send their personal assistants to the meetings. Yet, there is also criticism by the public that MPs spend most of their time in Dar es Salaam and are absent from their constituencies, to be discussed in Chapter 5.

Second, this rationale also suggests that the government budget execution mechanism needs to be improved. MPs argue that the local government budget is inflexible once it is approved and it takes a long time for the budget to be disbursed. The CDCF, on the other hand, is flexible and can be used for urgent problems facing communities. The flexibility of the CDCF is exemplified in the case in which its funds were used for the projects that were supposed to be funded by the local development budget. For example, Tundu Antiphas Mughwai Lissu, MP for Singida East (CHADEMA), complained to the Deputy Minister for the PMO-RALG in Parliament in November 2011 that Tsh51 million (approximately US$32,000), which

77 Interview, Limbu (2011).
78 Interview, Cheyo (2011).
was supposed to be spent by the central government to a water project in the Nkuhi village in his constituency did not arrive at the district council. Thus, Tsh4 million was allocated from the CDCF funds to provide water to the village (United Republic of Tanzania 2011a: 3).

Some MPs emphasise that each constituency has its unique problems which cannot easily be solved by the regular government budget and a CDF would enable them to fill this gap. In response, one can argue that MPs should change relevant laws to improve the budget planning and execution structure, which is their primary function as MPs, instead of creating a new mechanism to channel funds for their constituency service.

3.5.4. To Encourage Community-based Development Projects

The last rationale for introducing a CDF was to accelerate community-based development projects, featured in the CDCF Act as one of the objectives to establish the fund (United Republic of Tanzania 2009a: 20). Partly because the size of the budget turned out to be small, the CDCF funds are to show acknowledgements by MPs of the community development efforts and encourage citizens to contribute to the projects in the form of either money or labour. There are several MPs who emphasised this point in the interviews, including Agrey Deaisil Mwanri, Deputy Minister of the PMO-RALG, in charge of the overall administration of the CDCF.

As discussed in Chapter 2, in Kenya, there has been a long tradition of community fundraising, called *harambee*. Interestingly, while the Kenyan CDF was aimed at replacing the involvement of MPs in encouraging citizens to contribute to *harambee*, the Tanzanian CDCF promotes such involvement, perhaps because of the different evolution of community fundraising in the two countries. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, *harambee* was discouraged during the socialist period in Tanzania. Although Tanzanian MPs are increasingly invited to attend *harambee* (e.g. *harambee* dinners in Dar es Salaam) to raise funds for their constituencies these days, it is still a relatively new movement in Tanzania in comparison to Kenya.

Instead, there was a mechanism to implement community-based development projects in Tanzania. Towards the end of the 1970s, around 200 voluntary hometown

79 Interview, Shellukindo (2011).
associations, called District Development Trusts (DDTs), were established in response to the failure of the government to deliver social services. DDTs were often based on ethnic groups and voluntary, but compulsory at times, contributions by patrons and citizens. DDTs were promoted by the elite and the middle classes in Dar es Salaam who mobilised funds among themselves and from the government to support the local community development projects in their hometowns. Like *harambee* in Kenya, the construction of secondary schools was particularly popular. DDTs cultivated patron-client relationships between the elite and villagers, and MPs were involved as patrons as well as mediators and influenced local politics through DDTs (Kelsall 2002: 610–611; Kelsall 2003: 71; Kiondo 1993: 178–179; Mchomvu 1998: 47; Nyaluke 2008: 6, 12). Although DDTs were eventually evolved into NGOs, they are an example of the tradition of community fundraising which underlies the objective of the CDCF to encourage community-based development efforts in Tanzania.

As discussed so far, the rationales identified by Tanzanian MPs to justify the need for a CDF are related to various political and development challenges facing the country. While the first rationale was mentioned only by the Speaker of Parliament and a few MPs, the other three were mentioned during the parliamentary discussion on the CDCF in July 2009 and seem to be widely shared among MPs (United Republic of Tanzania 2009c). There is an assumption across all the rationales that MPs ought to play a benefactor role to support the lives of voters in their constituencies and MPs should get more actively engaged with local development. At the same time, these rationales are underpinned by the incentives of MPs to create their own space at district levels so that they could exercise their influence more effectively in local politics and be more responsive to voters’ expectations.

Among these four rationales, the first two seem to be the primary explanations for the introduction of the CDCF in Tanzania, both of which are related to the power balance between political actors; the first rationale is to create a level playing field for MPs who have access to resources and those who do not; and the second rationale is to recalibrate the power balance between MPs, RCs and DCs at local levels. As noted in Chapter 1, the question as to who holds the power to distribute CDF funds is commonly discussed in the existing political studies on CDFs in developing countries, and it was a

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81 Interview, Mwanri (2010).
key dimension to analyse the variation of the politics of CDFs in Chapter 2.

The latter two rationales on the budget execution of local governments and community-led development initiatives are important in terms of the administrative and development challenges with which the country is confronted, but they seem to be secondary explanations for the introduction of the CDCF. In other words, there are probably other, perhaps more effective, ways to deal with these challenges. Nevertheless, the identification and articulation of multiple objectives by policymakers and supporters including the latter two rationales was crucial to push forward the CDCF agenda against the strong opposition by internal and external actors.

3.6. Who Opposed the CDCF? And Why?

While the introduction of the CDCF was unanimously supported by both ruling and opposition MPs in Parliament with the above rationales, its policy process was affected by the varying degrees of objections or reservations by groups of actors: opposition MPs, special seats MPs, bureaucrats, donors and CSOs. This section focuses on these actors and how they were involved in the policy process.

As discussed below, there were mainly three reasons for the opponents to be against the introduction of a CDF. First, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, they argued that a CDF breaches the democratic principle of the separation of powers between the legislature and the executive. By becoming the executors of the government budget and reporting to the PMO-RALG on the use of the funds, MPs would lose their supervising role of the government. Thus, a CDF undermines horizontal accountability in democracy. Second, a CDF contradicts with the government’s ongoing efforts in streamlining its budget transfer mechanism from central to local government. A CDF creates a parallel structure and increases the administrative costs of local governments (Nyimbi 2008: 6; Oxford Analytica 2009; Policy Forum 2008b). The third rationale is that a CDF is prone to corruption and mismanagement of funds by MPs or other actors. Such incidences are frequently reported in other countries where CDFs are in place.

Interview, Sungusia (2011).
3.6.1. Opposition MPs

In Tanzania, MPs from both ruling and opposition parties were enthusiastic in their support of the adoption of the CDCF. It was particularly advocated by Willibrod Slaa, former MP for Karatu (1995–2010) and Secretary General of the CHADEMA. As a member of the Special Committee that proposed the establishment of a CDF in 2006, he advocated for the introduction of a CDF in public. Two other opposition leaders, Hamad Mohamed, MP for Wawi (CUF) and Opposition Leader in Parliament during the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010), and John Cheyo, MP for Bariadi East (UDP), who were members of the Special Committee and parliamentary team that drafted the CDCF Bill respectively, supported the CDCF actively. Two other opposition leaders’ support of the CDCF can partially be explained by the lessons they learned from the Kenyan experience. A major reason for MPs to support the adoption of CDFs in both Kenya and Tanzania was that it would be an advantage for incumbent MPs by enabling them to publicly use state resources for constituency service with the expectation that this would increase their chances of re-election. However, in the Kenyan elections in December 2007, the return rate of incumbent MPs, regardless of whether they sought re-election or not, was approximately 30%, which represented a decline of about 10% from 2002 (Gutiérrez-Romero 2009: 1; Kihoro 2007; Republic of Kenya). Thus, the CDF does not seem to have contributed to enhancing the overall probability of re-election of incumbent MPs in Kenya in 2007 (The Standard 21 June 2009).

Although the consideration of the establishment of a CDF began in Tanzania before the 2007 Kenyan elections, opposition leaders in Tanzania were aware of the election results in Kenya and considered that the CDCF would not automatically enhance the incumbency advantage of MPs in Tanzania. In the interview, Slaa emphasised that it is a wrong view that the CDCF would increase incumbency advantage because politicians who are capable of ensuring the proper implementation of development projects in their constituencies would gain electoral support regardless of

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whether they are funded by the CDCF or not.\textsuperscript{86}

During the fieldwork, only 3 out of 34 MPs expressed their objection or reservation towards the CDCF in the interviews. They are all CHADEMA MPs. First, it is Zitto Zuberi Kabwe, MP for Kigoma North (CHADEMA) (United Republic of Tanzania). As the youngest MP during the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010), he has been one of the most outspoken and influential opposition MPs in Tanzanian politics (Englert 2008). He was opposed to the principle of CDFs with the view that Tanzania had one of the best local government systems that could deliver social services and the execution of projects by MPs through a CDF would be an interference with the executive branch. He has good networks with advocacy NGOs in the country, and even assisted local activists with their campaign against a CDF.

Yet, Kabwe’s position was unique and personal rather than his party’s. There were only five CHADEMA MPs in Parliament when a CDF was proposed in 2006. Among them, Willibrod Slaa was a strong advocate of the CDCF. It would have been difficult for Kabwe to get support from Slaa and other CHADEMA MPs. Instead of opposing the proposal, Kabwe engaged with the formulation of the CDCF as a member of the parliamentary team that redrafted the CDCF bill from his critical standpoints. He travelled to Kenya on his own expenses to evaluate the operation and impacts of the CDF, and contributed to the design of the CDCF.

Instead of supporting the CDCF, Kabwe argues that strengthening the power and capacity of MPs in lawmaking and oversight is more urgent.\textsuperscript{87} He published an article entitled ‘Creating the right incentives for MPs’ in The Citizen, a major English newspaper in Tanzania, in April 2011, which was later posted on the website of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in Africa Region. He argues in the article that MPs have to perform lawmaking and oversight duties regardless of the CDCF and the challenges facing Tanzanian MPs such as the lack of access to information and adequate research and administrative support need to be addressed (Kabwe 12 April 2011; Kabwe 2011).

Another MP who was against the CDCF in the interview was Tundu Lissu, MP for Singida East and Chief Whip of CHADEMA. He was newly elected in 2010 and was not in Parliament when the CDCF was enacted. As a lawyer previously working for

\textsuperscript{86} Interviews, Slaa (2011) and Cheyo (2012).

\textsuperscript{87} Interview, Kabwe (2011).
an advocacy NGO in Tanzania and a research institute in Washington DC, he has been critical of the corruption of the government. He considers that the CDCF is an example of pork barrel politics which gives MPs a financial means to distribute money to local projects. Finally, Mustapha Boay Akunaay, MP for Mbulu (CHADEMA) who was also newly elected in 2010, does not like the operational arrangement of the CDCF because voters accuse MPs if CDCF projects are not properly implemented despite the fact that MPs do not have full control over the implementation of the CDCF projects. Overall, the MPs who disagree with the principle of the CDCF are only a few.

3.6.2. Special Seats MPs

Another feature of the policy process of a CDF in Tanzania is the position of special seats MPs for women, as there was a debate on whether special seats MPs should also be allocated the funds. In 1985, Tanzania was the first African country that adopted gender quotas to increase women’s representation in Parliament (Yoon 2004: 450–451; Yoon 2011: 84). Special seats MPs are selected and ranked by political parties, and the seats have been distributed among parties based on the percentage of the votes each party receives in parliamentary elections (Yoon 2011: 86–87). The special seat system makes the current electoral system in Tanzania a combination of a first-past-the-post single-member plurality system and a proportional representation system.

The number of special seats kept increasing from 47 (17.1% of the total number of constituency MPs, members from the House of Representatives, and the Attorney General) in 1995 to 102 (41.6%) in 2010 (United Republic of Tanzania; Yoon 2011: 91). The increase corresponds with the call by the African Union in 2005 for a 50% representation of women at all levels of political decision-making positions by 2015. The increase in the ratio of female MPs was mentioned in the CCM election manifestos.

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88 Interview, Akunaay (2011).
89 The Parliament of Tanzanian consists of five types of member: 1) members elected to represent constituencies (currently the number is 239), 2) special seats MPs for women (currently 102), 3) five members elected from the Zanzibar House of Representatives, 4) not more than ten MPs appointed by the President and 5) the Attorney General (Msekwa 2006: 180; United Republic of Tanzania). See Yoon (2008: 65–67) on how the special seat system was introduced and evolved in Tanzania.
90 The seats were distributed among parties based on the percentage of parliamentary seats won in 1995 and 2000, which was changed to the percentage of the votes each party won in 2005. See Yoon (2011: 63–64) on the nomination procedures of special-seat candidates in the CCM and the CHADEMA.
in 2010 (Chama Cha Mapinduzi 2010; Makinda 2011: 28; Yoon 2011: 83).

Special seats MPs either represent a region, which includes four to nine constituencies, or certain groups of citizens. For example, during the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010), the CCM held 58 special seats. As there were 26 regions in the country during this period, each region was represented by two special seats MPs. CCM special seats MPs who do not serve a region represent universities, the disabled, the youth or NGOs. Special seats MPs of opposition parties served more than one region due to the limited number of seats they hold (Yoon 2008: 67).

When a CDF was proposed in Parliament in 2006, special seats MPs argued that they should also be eligible for it because they represent multiple constituencies or certain groups (Yoon 2008: 74). Yet, there was a counterargument that the fund allocation to special seats MPs would create complication in the coordination of the funds, as voters represented by constituencies and special seats MPs are duplicated.\(^91\) As it became less likely that special seats MPs would be allocated the funds, some of them were against the fund and secretly expressed their support to CSOs’ campaign against it.\(^92\) In the parliamentary discussion on the CDCF Bill in July 2009, Stella Martin Manyanya, special seats MP (CCM), proposed that special seats MPs be part of the CDC Committees. In response, the Minister for the PMO-RALG said only that they would consider the proposal (United Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 77, 82).

Behind the logic of the complication in the coordination of the funds, there is a view that MPs elected from constituencies were afraid of an increase of special seats MPs’ influencing their constituencies through the CDCF.\(^93\) This is related to the political career paths pursued by many female politicians; the special seat system has been served as a stepping stone for female MPs to vie for constituency seats (Yoon 2008; Yoon 2011: 92).\(^94\) The first contest in constituencies is the most challenging for women due to cultural barriers (Yoon 2008: 74) and the special seat system ‘has provided women with experience, skills, and confidence and has inspired some special-seat MPs to contest in constituencies’ (Yoon 2011: 91–92). Thus, some MPs elected from constituencies were worried that they might lose their seats to the special seats MPs aspire to be constituency MPs.

\(^{91}\) Interview, Shellukindo (2011).

\(^{92}\) Interview, an informant (2010).

\(^{93}\) Interviews, Shellukindo (2011) and Slaa (2011).

\(^{94}\) The CCM officially promoted special seats MPs to contest for constituency seats in the elections in 2010 (Chama Cha Mapinduzi 2009). See also Yoon (2008: 74; 2011: 92) for the reasons why special seats MPs aspire to be constituency MPs.
seats MPs who perform well and are popular in the constituencies (Yoon 2011: 92).

Generally, special seats MPs find it difficult to pursue any agenda independently from constituency MPs in the same parties and they lack autonomy in conducting their business outside Parliament. For example;

[w]henever a special-seat MP visits a constituency in her region, she must inform the constituency MP of her visit and her planned activities in the constituency. It is a norm for the special-seat MP to avoid discussing issues or projects that the constituency MP deals with, to avoid causing contention (Yoon 2008: 74).

This is because they are nominated by political parties. Special seats MPs have to balance between their intentions to establish their local support bases and their reputation by MPs elected from constituencies and other leaders in the parties. The exclusion of special seats MPs from the operation of the CDCF exemplifies the power dynamics between constituency and special seats MPs in Tanzania.

3.6.3. Ministries

The officers in the PMO-RALG and the Ministry of Finance kept a low-profile attitude towards the public debate on a CDF. As the expansion of the budget for the legislature ‘comes at the expense of executive power’ (Barkan 2008: 131), they might not have welcomed the establishment of a CDF. Yet, they did not make any public comment on it. A director in the PMO-RALG criticised some donors for establishing separate funding channels to the local level which generate ‘confusion, perverse incentives and a lack of accountability as the planning standards, funding requirements, reporting, and monitoring are different’ (Nyimbi 2008: 6). This criticism can be applied to the CDCF, but there was no comment on it by the officials of the PMO-RALG. The stance of the bureaucrats may be explained by their strong linkages with the CCM (Kelsall 2003: 61). In any case, bureaucrats in the relevant ministries played a passive role in the CDCF policy process.

3.6.4. Donors

Tanzania is one of the largest aid recipient countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which received around US$27 billion in aid between 1990 and 2010. Currently, around 40% of
the national budget and 80% of the development budget come from foreign aid (Tripp 2012: 1; United Republic of Tanzania 2007d). The relationship between donors and the Tanzanian government changed over time. Major donor aid to Tanzania has been based on the national development strategy of the Tanzanian government, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty or *Mpango wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umaskini Tanzania* (MKUKUTA) in Swahili. The Joint Assistance Strategy in Tanzania was formulated to support the implementation of the MKUKUTA effectively, which was signed by major bilateral and multilateral donors and the Tanzanian government in 2006. The second MKUKUTA has been implemented since FY2010/11 (Tripp 2012: 15–16; United Republic of Tanzania 2006a).

Along with the formulation of these strategies, major bilateral and multilateral donors shifted their aid modalities from project aid to basket funds and the General Budget Support (GBS) in the early 2000s. GBS is non-earmarked aid which is directly disbursed into the recipient government budget (Development Partners Group in Tanzania). Eleven bilateral and three multilateral donors have been providing GBS, and its ratio to the entire aid to Tanzania increased from 33% in FY2003/2004 to 51% in FY2007/08 (Tripp 2012: 17).

GBS is a unique aid modality that simultaneously strengthens the ownership of the Ministry of Finance of the aid recipient countries and the influence of donors on the national budget planning and execution of these countries. While project aid goes directly to the project execution agencies, GBS is disbursed into the national account of the Ministry of Finance of the aid recipient countries. GBS gives the ministry more centralised control over aid than project aid. At the same time, as GBS is mixed with the national revenue of the aid recipient countries, GBS donors can monitor the entire government budget more closely than project aid and this enhances the leverage of donors on the formulation and execution of development policies. Consequently, donors have become more powerful in the policy community than Tanzanian policymakers.

In addition to GBS, donors have been providing assistance to elections and Parliament through basket funds in Tanzania. Their aid to support the elections in 2005 evolved into a basket fund to promote consolidation of democracy for a long term. With approximately US$17.6 million financed by eight donors and the Tanzanian government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) implemented a project called the Deepening Democracy in Tanzania Programme (DDTP) from 2007 to 2010. The Parliamentary Corporate Plan 2009–2013 was formulated as one of the
DDTP’s outputs (United Nations Development Programme 2010: 8). Based on this plan, the Legislatures Support Project (LSP), a successor project to the DDTP, has been implemented since 2011 (Cook, Munishi and Mutembei 2010). The LSP supports the two parliaments in Tanzania, the National Assembly in Mainland and the House of Representatives in Zanzibar, with a focus on strengthening the capacity of MPs to fulfil their representative, legislative and oversight responsibilities. It does not provide support to their constituency service.\(^{95}\)

There are also two basket funds among donors in supporting the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), which is one of the governance reforms stipulated in the MKUKUTA. One of them is the Local Government Capital Development Grant (LGCDG), a joint basket fund of the Tanzanian government and donors established under the PMO-RALG in FY2004/05 to finance development projects identified through local participatory planning processes (Nyimbi 2008: 6).\(^{96}\) When a CDF was proposed in Parliament, donors were concerned not only about the breaching of the separation of powers, but also the contradiction with the LGRP which was aimed at streamlining the national budget mechanism to ensure timely and effective fund transfer from central to local governments, and the duplication of a CDF with the LGCDG. Thus, donors in the Governance Working Group (GWG), which monitors the overall governance cluster of the MKUKUTA, and the LGRP Working Group requested for detailed information on the CDF proposal and expressed their concerns to their Tanzanian counterparts in the relevant ministries. Yet, as mentioned earlier, civil servants were not in a good position to discuss the CDF proposal.

In July 2008, donors obtained a draft CDF bill which states that the CDF budget would be no less than 2.5% of the national recurrent budget except national debt (United Republic of Tanzania 2008a). They were increasingly concerned about the scale of the impact of the CDF on governance and brought the issue to the higher levels of dialogues with the Tanzanian government. Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, President Kikwete announced the establishment of a CDF in Parliament in August 2008. The Heads of Missions, usually ambassadors or directors of the development aid agencies, who chaired the GWG and the LGRP Working Group, made a formal request to meet

\(^{95}\) Interview, Lee (2011).
\(^{96}\) Interview, Furukawa (2010). The LGCDG was renamed the Local Government Development Grant (LGDG) in 2008, and the funds can be used not only for purchasing materials but for various activities such as trainings (Tidemand 2009: 1).
Prime Minister Pinda and Speaker Sitta to discuss it. In October 2008, donor representatives had a meeting with Speaker Sitta, where Sitta defended the CDF proposal and pushed back strongly.97

Not only Sitta but other Tanzanian MPs started to express their frustration at donors’ interference with the CDCF. For example, John Momose Cheyo, MP for Bariadi East (UDP) and a member of the parliamentary team that drafted the CDCF Bill, stated at a meeting with Tanzanian CSOs in July 2008 that ‘there was a need for the nation to stop depending on donor funding and that CDF was an alternative way’ (The Guardian 4 August 2008). He added that Tanzanians ‘need to have [their] own fund so that donors should not dictate their terms on [Tanzanians]’ (The Guardian 4 August 2008), which shows an intention of Tanzanian policymakers to create their own space to engage with local developments, independently from donors.

At the parliamentary discussion on the CDCF Bill in July 2009, Bernard Kamillius Membe, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, criticised some ambassadors on their attempts to influence public views towards the CDCF. Drawing on the Vienna Convention of 1961, Membe asserted that the ambassadors who were not satisfied with any aspects of Tanzania should communicate with his ministry in writing, instead of telling citizens what to do (The Guardian 1 August 2009; United Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 73–74). He further stated:

…we want [Ambassadors] to respect the laws and procedures of our country, and not to interfere with [our] internal affairs….if we find evidence that [an Ambassador] uses his money to put pressure on people … so that Tanzanians would deal with issues as he wants, we will immediately take a diplomatic action to make him accountable (United Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 74).98

As such, the CDCF almost became a diplomatic problem between the Tanzanian government and donors.

However, donors’ pressure on the Tanzanian government seems to have already been declining after their meeting with Speaker Sitta. Their concerns gradually shifted from the principle of the CDCF to how to ensure transparency and accountability in the management of the funds. Following the enactment of the CDCF Act into law in August 2009, donors expressed their concerns on the management of the CDCF to the

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97 Interview, a donor representative (2012).
Since then, the LGRP donors have been monitoring the CDCF and raised a related issue at the LGRP annual review in October 2010; however, it was only a technical aspect. Donors requested the government not to include the CDCF in their calculation of the national budget allocation to local governments, which was one of the outcome indicators to assess the progress in the LGRP.101

There are several reasons why donor involvement in the CDCF gradually declined. First, the scale of the CDCF budget turned out to be significantly smaller than what was proposed in the draft bill circulated among donors in 2008, and they considered that its impacts would be limited. Although there is no evidence, the pressure by donors and CSOs might have had some influence on the scale of the CDCF budget. Second, donors were aware that, despite its controversies, the CDCF was a domestic issue and Tanzanian CSOs were the more legitimate actors to get involved in the process. Once it was approved in Parliament in accordance with the formal legislative procedure, there was not much donors could do to change the decision. They decided to re-evaluate the CDCF after its operation becomes fully fledged. Finally, there were changes in the staff of donor agencies in Tanzania. Some ambassadors and governance advisors completed their assignments and left Tanzania after the CDCF was introduced and their successors did not have the same level of interests in it after it was launched.102

As a broader background, at the time when the CDCF was formulated, donor aid in Tanzania was at a turning point. Mainly due to slow progress in various reforms and social services, some donors started to reduce their GBS budgets. The total amount of GBS dramatically declined from US$755 million in FY2009/10 to US$452 million in 2011/12. The European Union, for example, reduced its GBS by 27% in FY2012/13 because of ‘the need for more measurable results and improved accountability, particularly relating to corruption and public financial management’ (Tripp 2012: 17). This change indicates that there was a growing recognition of the limited influence donors can have on national policymaking and the implementation of MKUKUTA. The gradual decline of their involvement in the CDCF corresponds with the beginning of the changing aid relationship between donors and Tanzania.

98 The text was translated by the author.
3.6.5. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

The key actors who were against the creation of a CDF in Tanzania were CSOs. Since the late 1980s, the number of CSOs increased in the country following the political liberation in the early 1990s. It was also due to the emphasis placed by donors on the importance of civil society in building democracy. Tanzanian CSOs have been addressing a wide range of issues including human rights, gender equality and environmental conservation, and they have increasingly been playing important roles as a watchdog of the government (Kelsall 2003: 72; Tripp 2012: 9). While the government has been inviting CSOs to the consultative process of national policymaking, it has remained cautious of CSOs with a suspicion that they might be supporting opposition parties or competing for donor funding (Tripp 2012: 9–10).

CSOs did not pay much attention to the CDF proposal at the beginning, but apparently they learned about it from an article written by a foreign researcher based in Tanzania which was published in The Citizen in December 2006. CSOs began to criticise the proposal with the three rationales discussed at the beginning of this section. Policy Forum, a network of over 75 CSOs in Tanzania, played a central role in raising public awareness and consolidating the views of CSOs. They published several papers discussing the pros and cons of CDFs, organised a public debate among CSOs and donors and analysed the experience of CDFs in Kenya and Uganda (Policy Forum 2007; Policy Forum 2008b; Policy Forum 2009).

There were several consultations between MPs and CSOs in the process. In June 2007, Wilson Mutagaywa Masilingi, then Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Constitution, Law and Good Governance, met CSOs in Dodoma to explain why a CDF was proposed (Peter 2007–2008). Subsequently, Policy Forum established international networks with Kenyan CSOs and the International Budget Partnership to place pressure on the government effectively. In July 2008, the members of the Policy Forum travelled to Mombassa in Kenya to observe social audits of the CDF-funded projects in the Bahari constituency which was organised by a Kenyan NGO, Muslims for Human Rights (Policy Forum 2008a; Policy Forum 2008b). In July 2008, soon after the

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102 Interview, a donor representative (2012).
103 See also Tripp (2000) on the expansion of CSOs in Tanzania following the political and economic liberation.
104 Interview, a CSO representative (2011).
105 The social audit of the CDF projects was published as a video entitled ‘It's Our Money. Where's It
study tour to Mombasa, the members of the Policy Forum were invited by the team of the Parliamentary House Business Committee to a meeting in Dodoma, and they requested Parliament not to adopt a CDF ‘until there has been much greater awareness and wide stakeholder debate about its implications’ (Policy Forum 2008b: 5; The Guardian 4 August 2008).

When the CDCF Bill was tabled in Parliament in July 2009, thousands of activists organised a demonstration outside the Parliament in Dodoma, which was widely covered by the local media. It was rare at that time for CSOs that were based in Dar es Salaam to protest in Dodoma (Daily News 28 July 2009). Apparently, even some Kenyan CSOs also came to support the demonstration (United Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 68). Willibrod Slaa was called to meet CSO representatives. It was a strategic move by Parliament to send the opposition leader to the meeting, as he was a strong advocate against corruption and generally favoured by activists. Despite the efforts by CSOs, the CDCF Act was passed in Parliament.106

In March 2011, seven CSOs jointly filed a petition to the High Court to seek nullification of the CDCF Act by challenging the constitutionality of the CDCF. Their argument is that the CDCF ‘compromises powers of the National Assembly to supervise the executive’ (The Citizen 16 March 2011). CSOs wanted to initiate the litigation process soon after the CDCF was launched (The Citizen 29 August 2009). Yet, it was delayed because key activists were occupied with monitoring of the general elections in October 2010. The case came for the first mention in May 2011, and the Attorney General, respondent of the case, was required to file a reply to the petition (Policy Forum 2011: 9). In parallel with the lawsuit, CSOs have been monitoring the operation of the CDCF funds. The Policy Forum, for example, examined the operation of the CDCF in six case constituencies in 2012, the report of which was expected to be published in 2013 (Policy Forum 2012: 4).107

Yet, overall, similar to donors’ attitudes, there has not been much public discussion on the CDCF compared with the time when the CDCF was prepared. There are only a few public discussions. Some of the few exceptions are the article written by Faustine Ndagulile, MP for Kigamboni (CCM), on the benefits brought by the CDCF to his constituency in Dar es Salaam on his blog and a comment by Semkae Kilonzo, Gone?’ (International Budget Partnership 2009).106 Interviews, Mwakagenda (2010), Baker (2010), Kilonzo (2010) and Sungusia (2011).
Coordinator of the Policy Forum to criticise the CDCF (Ndugulile 17 March 2011) and messages posted by MPs and Kilonzo on the CDCF on Twitter in 2011.

Although donors and CSOs could not halt the introduction of the CDCF, their engagement was not in vain. The power of MPs in the appointment of the CDC Committees and the disbursement of the funds was restricted by law to avoid the risk of potential mismanagement of the funds. Tanzanian policymakers were firmly determined to establish the CDCF and may have compromised in terms of the power of MPs to ensure the introduction of the fund before the elections in 2010. In the parliamentary discussion on the CDCF Act in July 2009, the Minister of the PMO-RALG summarised the concerns raised by the opponents, including their three reasons against the fund, and explained how the CDCF Act addresses each of them (United Republic of Tanzania 2009c). This suggests that there was a certain level of maturity in the debates on the CDCF after three years of deliberation on the fund since it was first accepted in Parliament in 2006.

3.7. Conclusion

This chapter explained how a CDF was introduced in Tanzania in 2009 by shedding light on various state and non-state actors involved in the policy process. There was a competition between MPs on the one hand and donors and CSOs on the other, which was underpinned by their rationales to support or oppose the establishment of the fund. The CDF policy process also demonstrates the power dynamics between constituency MPs and special seats MPs. Among the actors involved in the process, donors are commonly viewed by scholars and Tanzanian politicians as influential actors in policymaking in Tanzania. This, coupled with the change of their aid modalities during the last decade, created ‘parallel accountability’ in the country.

Yet, the CDF policy process shows a different picture. The proposal was initiated and moved forward by Tanzanian MPs and local CSOs were actively advocating against it. Donors expressed their concerns on the erosion of the democratic principle and the creation of parallel funding mechanisms but gradually stepped back from the heated debate between policymakers and CSOs, partly because the scale of the

funds turned out to be small and its impact seemed to be limited. Thus, although there was a certain level of influence by donors, the introduction of the CDCF exemplifies a policy process that was largely navigated and owned by domestic actors in Tanzania.

This chapter also found that the power of MPs in the operation of the funds is restricted by law; MPs cannot appoint the members of the CDC Committees or authorise the disbursement of the CDCF funds. Given the strong CCM networks established within local governments, this arrangement gives a certain level of control to the CCM, especially its local branches.
Chapter 4 *Bunge lenye Meno* (Parliament with Teeth): Legislative Development and the Introduction of a CDF in Tanzania

The ideal situation is to have the teeth, and also to have the meat to chew on. I think we are slowly reaching that point.’ — Samuel John Sitta, Speaker of the National Assembly (2005–2010) (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008: 34).

4.1. Introduction

Frequently coined as ‘rubber-stamp’ organisations, legislatures in sub-Saharan Africa were generally weak institutions with limited power and capacity to perform their core functions in lawmaking and oversight for years after independence. Following the transition to multiparty democracy in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, some of the African legislatures gradually gained power and autonomy from executives and started to exert influence on the national policy discussions (Barkan 2010).

The Tanzanian Parliament is a case in point whose power and autonomy was substantially strengthened during the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010), a decade after the transition to multiparty system in 1992. This change is illustrated in a booklet entitled ‘*Bunge Lenye Meno: A Parliament with Teeth, for Tanzania*’ published by the African Research Institute, a London-based think tank, in 2008 (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008). It is a collection of papers written by the then Speaker of Parliament and two opposition leaders who chaired the Parliamentary Committees on public accounts.108 They are pivotal players in changing Parliament into an effective government institution through the renewal of the Standing Orders, a set of formal rules of Parliament, and monitoring of the government performance. As described by the Speaker above, the Tanzanian legislature started to have its own *meno* (teeth) in its relationship with the executive and the ruling party that had held supreme power in politics since the country’s independence.

As explained in the CDF policy process in Chapter 3, the introduction of a CDF was proposed by the Parliamentary Special Committee that reviewed and revised the Standing Orders and thus, a CDF can be considered as part of a broader legislative

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108 The contributors are 1) Samuel Sitta, former Speaker of Parliament; 2) Willibrod Slaa, Secretary General of CHADEMA and former Chairman of the Local Authorities Accounts Committee (LAAC); and 3) John Cheyo, Chairman of UDP and former Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC).
reform at that time. This chapter examines the development of the Tanzanian Parliament and legislative reform during the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010) with a focus on its oversight role that secures horizontal accountability between government branches, and how the introduction of a CDF constituted this reform. Through the analysis of the legislative development in Tanzania, this chapter examines Barkan’s (2009) theory on the emergence of a coalition for change among MPs that alters the structure of incentives of MPs and leads to strengthening the legislature. This chapter highlights the emergence of reformers within the CCM, enabling the legislative reform including the adoption of a CDF to happen. It sets the stage for the Chapter 5 which examines the internal changes within the CCM during this period.

4.2. Horizontal Accountability and African Legislatures

The legislature is an essential government institution that ensures vertical and horizontal accountability in democratic systems. While vertical accountability exists between the state and society (e.g. accountability between MPs and voters), as discussed in Chapter 1, horizontal accountability refers to the relationship between different branches of the government (e.g. the executive, the legislature, the judiciary). These government institutions oversee, sanction or impeach each other over unlawful actions such as the encroachment by one institution upon the authority of another or the corruption of public officials (O'Donnell 2003). As such, the aim of horizontal accountability is to secure checks and balances among government institutions in democracy.

Horizontal accountability is different from vertical accountability in that state agencies are not strictly in principal-agent relationships; one state agency does not delegate power to another (Kenney 2003: 57–58). Yet, similar to vertical accountability, a core feature of horizontal accountability is the ability of one agency to sanction another, or what is referred to as enforcement in Schedler’s (1999) conceptualisation of accountability discussed in Chapter 1.109 The legislature is at the juncture of vertical and horizontal and accountability as voters are empowered to sanction individual MPs

109 Moreno, Crisp and Shugart (2003) are critical of the concept of horizontal accountability on the grounds that accountability is inherently vertical, as one actor exercise sanctions over the other. Moreover, the checks and balances between state agencies can be ensured when they are independent from each other and protected from sanctioning by one another. They argue that the executive and the legislature are separate agents of voters in presidential systems, as presidents are directly elected by voters and thus, the two branches are not institutionally accountable to each other (Moreno, Crisp and Shugart 2003: 81-82).
through regular elections, while the legislature has the power delegated by voters to monitor and sanction executives and other government branches for their misconduct.

Horizontal accountability tends to be weak in emerging democracies in developing countries including sub-Saharan Africa due to the concentration of power in executive branches of government (Barkan 2009; Wang 2005). Until recently, African legislatures had been unable to scrutinise the performance of executives and hold them accountable effectively. This is partly due to their historical legacy; legislatures in Anglophone countries originated in the Legislative Councils established by the British colonial government, which functioned as a coordinating body between the colonial government and local elite and the public. Members of the Legislative Councils were initially appointed by the governor of each country, and later selected by elections in gradual stages towards the time of independence. These countries adopted a presidential system after independence, while maintaining the Westminster parliamentary system, and legislatures remained as a deliberative body rather than an independent policymaking and oversight institution. For example, after independence, the role of legislatures in the budgetary process was kept to a minimum; they could only accept or reject the budget in its entirety. The legislatures in Francophone and Lusophone African countries experienced similar limitations to the former British colonies (Barkan 2009: 9–12).

From the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, African legislatures were characterised by neopatrimonial rule by executives.¹¹⁰ In the countries under one-party rule, parliamentary elections only provided an opportunity for voters to hold individual MPs accountable, but not the regime or the ruling party for their overall performance. Legislatures were dependent on executives that had the authority to appoint MPs as cabinet ministers and kept the remuneration of MPs low while controlling the distribution of patronage (Barkan 2009: 15). Thus, there was only weak horizontal accountability between legislatures and executives in the region.

Following the transition to multiparty democracy in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, some legislatures in Africa gradually gained power and autonomy to perform their lawmaking and oversight functions independently from executives (Barkan 2009). Yet, the changes did not occur immediately after the political liberalisation. The

¹¹⁰ See Eisenstadt (1973), Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Erdmann and Engel (2006) and Pitcher,
transition to multiparty democracy generally intensified electoral competition between political parties and MPs, and politicians were increasingly focusing on constituency service and bringing tangible benefits to their constituencies to win electoral support. As MPs allocated a disproportionate amount of their time to constituency service instead of parliamentary activities such as lawmaking and oversight, African legislatures remained a weak institution (Barkan 2009: 17).

Eventually, some legislatures in Africa started to have an influence on national policymaking and gained power and autonomy from executives. Barkan (2009) analyses the evolution of legislatures in six African countries and proposes a hypothesis that this change is likely to occur when a coalition for change is formed among MPs that alters the structure of incentives faced by individual MPs so that they will be more engaged with collective actions in lawmaking and oversight without sacrificing their reputation in constituency service (17–18).

Barkan (2009) argues that there are potentially two types of MP in coalitions for change; one is reformers who are keen on transforming the weak legislature into a modern autonomous institution, and the other is opportunists who are ‘primarily interested in improving their own terms of service, especially a raise in salary and other perks that sustain their political careers’ (Barkan 2009: 18). Opportunists are not so interested in improving the institutional performance of the legislature as reformers, yet they do not have strong reasons to oppose reforms either. Both reformers and opportunists may form a coalition for change but with different motivations. Although reformers are the key drivers of change, the number of reformers tends to be limited. Thus, it is important for reformers to gain wide support from opportunists (Barkan 2009: 18).

Although Barkan (2009) does not go into detail on reformers and opportunists, most MPs would probably subscribe to both reformers’ and opportunists’ views to participate in a coalition for change, but to varying degrees. For example, reformers who take initiatives in changing legislatures are not motivated solely by normative reasons to empower legislatures but may have opportunistic reasons as well. The strengthening of the lawmaking and oversight functions of legislatures can benefit some MPs more than others in terms of advancing their political careers, as it increases the power and visibility of MPs who are in high ranks and/or have skills to participate.

Moran and Johnston (2009) on the concept of neopatrimonialism.
effectively in the debates in legislatures. These MPs are more likely to become reformers than MPs whose capacity is limited to individual constituency service. As such, there is an opportunistic dimension in the motivation of reformers.

Under what conditions does a coalition for change emerge? Barkan (2009) makes the point that such a coalition is likely to emerge when there is a decline of cohesion within the ruling party. This is because, when there is strong party cohesion, MPs prioritise their parties to the legislature. In other words, the ruling party MPs, who have more decision-making power than opposition MPs, are unlikely to make an effort to strengthen the legislature to challenge the executive that is led by their own party.

The experiences of legislative development in Uganda, Kenya and Nigeria exemplify that the formation of coalitions for change were facilitated by weak party cohesion (Barkan 2009: 237). Brierley (2012) demonstrates that a coalition for change has not emerged in Ghana due to an established two-party system and strong party identities that help the executive control MPs in the ruling party.

As in other African countries, the Tanzanian Parliament during the one-party period was a weak institution due to the strong executive and the supremacy of the ruling party, CCM. Following the transition to multiparty system in 1992, the CCM strengthened party discipline to ensure the continuation of its dominant power in Parliament. Yet, after President Kikwete was elected in 2005, the party cohesion began to weaken and the Speaker of Parliament and reformers from the CCM and opposition parties moved forward a reform to strengthen the power and autonomy of the legislature.

4.3. Development of the Legislature in Tanzania

The Parliament in Tanzania originated in the Legislative Council during the British colonial rule which was first established in 1926. It was chaired by the Governor of Tanganyika who appointed all 20 members of the Council. In 1958, the first Speaker was appointed to replace the Governor as the chairman of the Council, and a few council members were selected by elections for the first time. Three political parties nominated candidates, and only the Tanganyika African Nationalist Union (TANU) won and became the first party to have its members in the Council.111 In 1960, the

111 See Chapter 5 on the history of the TANU.
appointment of the council members by the Governor was abolished and all the council members were selected by elections. The Legislative Council was changed into the National Assembly in preparation for independence in 1961 (United Republic of Tanzania).

At the time of independence, the executive and the ruling party, the TANU, recognised the National Assembly as a supreme institution by law. Yet, when Tanganyika became a republic and the Constitution of Tanganyika was promulgated in 1962, vast power was shifted to the executive, particularly to the president. For example, the new Constitution did not provide for a parliamentary vote of no confidence to remove the government from office, and the cabinet became answerable to the president instead of Parliament. Although several MPs opposed the centralisation of power to the president when the Constitution was discussed in Parliament, they eventually accepted it, by knowing that the first president would be Nyerere and trusting him (Tambila 2004: 52–59). While the president was given limited veto over legislations and could not legislate without recourse to Parliament at the time of independence, he was empowered to legislate by decree when Tanganyika and Zanzibar were united to form Tanzania three years later (Tordoff 1967a: 3). In 1965, the Interim Constitutions enabled the president to appoint up to 82, about 40%, of the total 204 MPs (Tambila 2004: 58–59). As such, substantial power was shifted from the legislature to the executive during the early years after independence.

The legislative power was also taken over by the TANU through the institutionalisation of a one-party state in 1965 and the Arusha Declaration adopted by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the TANU in 1967, which brought a fundamental policy shift to socialism in the country. Parliament was not given an opportunity to discuss the Arusha Declaration but only passed relevant laws to nationalise major means of production and exchange after it was announced. The NEC further obtained some legislative functions such as the privilege of summoning witnesses and calling for papers in Parliament. The members of the NEC who were not MPs were paid as MPs (Tambila 2004: 49–59). Consequently, the role of MPs was limited to ratifying the policies that had already been approved by the elite of the TANU and explaining the policies to local constituents (Yeager 1989: 69). In 1964, the Presidential Commission, which was appointed under the chairmanship of Vice President Rashid Kawawa, even considered the possibility of amalgamating Parliament with the NEC (Tordoff 1967a: 2).
In the parliamentary session in October 1968, some MPs criticised the encroachment of the executive power into the legislature and demanded change. In response, the NEC expelled them from the party on the grounds that they violated the party’s creed and opposed to its policies (Tambila 2004: 60–61). In 1977, the TANU merged with the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) to form a new party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM), and party supremacy was further consolidated. As such, despite several attempts by individual MPs for change, Parliament was relegated to a rubber-stamp institution that only gave legal endorsement to the decisions made by the ruling party retrospectively.

In the late 1970s and the 1980s, the country faced an economic crisis and there was an increasing public demand for liberalising politics and the economy. In 1984, Parliament started to regain some of its power through the amendment of the Constitution which was initiated by the CCM. For example, the number of elected members increased from 111 in 1977 to 169, while the number of presidential appointees decreased. The new Constitution enhanced the position of the legislature by stipulating that:

the National Assembly shall be the principal organ of the United Republic which shall, on behalf of the people, supervisor and advise the government of the United Republic and all its agencies in the exercise of their functions in accordance with this constitution (Tambila 2004: 66).

The separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary was declared for the first time in the Constitution (Tambila 2004: 65–67). In the following year, President Nyerere resigned from the president’s office, which marked the end of the one-party socialist period in the country.

In the Sixth Parliament (1990–1995), the last one-party parliament before the transition to multiparty system in 1992, there were some changes to minimise the executive power. Parliament was able to pass a vote of no confidence in the prime minister and to impeach the president, and outspoken MPs were critical of the government for corruption scandals and other national issues in Parliament during this period (Kelsall 2003: 63; Killian 2010: 1).

However, the Seventh Parliament (1995–2000), the first multiparty parliament under President Benjamin Mkapa, made amendments to return some power to the executive and the CCM. The president regained the power to appoint up to ten MPs
which was abolished during the previous parliament (Kelsall 2003: 64). CCM MPs were in an ‘inter-party mode’ (Killian 2010: 2) and strongly bound by the party discipline. Main debates on national policies were held in party caucuses prior to the discussions in Parliament to ensure that the party would control the policy process and maintain its power (Kelsall 2003: 64; Killian 2010: 1–2).

The power of legislatures is also dependent on the presence of strong opposition parties. Tanzanian opposition parties remained weak and fragmented for the first ten years of the multiparty period. During the Eighth Parliament (2000–2005), opposition parties failed to represent 30% of all the MPs and could not form an official opposition camp (see Table 5.2 in Chapter 5 for the composition of parties in Parliament). Thus, the Standing Orders were revised so that opposition parties could form the camp as long as the number of opposition seats reached 12.5% of all MPs to facilitate the democratic procedure in Parliament (United Republic of Tanzania 2011c: 17). The CUF, the largest opposition party during the Eighth Parliament, was mainly concerned with the interests of the people in Zanzibar rather than challenging the government on the issues in Mainland, and the ability of the opposition to scrutinise the government was constrained by their limited resources (Kelsall 2003: 63–64).

Not surprisingly, there is no clear demarcation between executives and legislatures during the de jure one-party period as all the members of the two government branches belong to the same party. As Killian (2004) asserts, there is probably limitation in assessing the power balance between executives and legislatures in one-party states (183). Yet, even after the transition to a multiparty system, there may not be a major shift in the power balance in dominant party systems as is the case in Tanzania. CCM members are unlikely to have strong motivation to challenge the government led by their own party. Opposition MPs were less than 20% of the total MPs elected from constituencies between 1995 and 2005. Within this context, the initiative taken by the Speaker of Parliament and reformer MPs from the CCM who have power, expertise and motivations to make changes against potential resistance from the executive and other CCM MPs was a key for the implementation of the reform.

4.4. The Changes in the Standing Orders

A turning point arrived at the beginning of the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010). As
discussed in the previous chapter, the new Speaker of Parliament, Samuel Sitta, embarked on a process to strengthen the legislature by establishing a Parliamentary Special Committee to revise the Standing Orders in May 2006. The renewal of the Standing Orders brought substantial changes to the legislature and contributed to redefining its relationships with the executive and the public in general (Killian 2010; Slaa 2010).

The process of renewing the Standing Orders was ‘full of struggles, negotiations and compromises between the parliament and the executive’ (Killian 2010: 4). After the Special Committee completed their work as discussed in Chapter 3, the Speaker submitted the proposal of the revision of the Standing Orders to the prime minister in July 2006, with the reports of proposals to amend the Constitution and other relevant laws. In response, the government formed its own committee to examine the proposal. In April and May 2007, the Clerk of Parliament set up a committee consisting of experts from Parliament and the Attorney General’s office to discuss the new Standing Orders. There was strong opposition by the government against a few changes suggested by Parliament and some compromises were made between them. The proposal was also discussed at a seminar for MPs in August 2007. The revision of the Standing Orders was officially tabled by the Standing Orders Committee of Parliament and enacted by a Resolution in Parliament in November 2007 (Slaa 2010; United Republic of Tanzania 2007c: 38–40).

Major changes were made to the Standing Orders to improve the lawmaking and oversight functions of Parliament and enhance its administrative capacity. In the area of lawmaking, the new Standing Orders enabled Parliament to initiate its own Bills through Parliamentary Committees. Under the old Standing Orders, only the government and individual MPs were able to submit Bills. The Parliamentary Legal Counsel was established to provide legal advice to Parliament and MPs in drafting and discussing Bills. Parliament is also empowered to influence national budgets by constituting a planning session in February to discuss government budget proposals and priorities for the following financial year (Killian 2010: 4–6; Slaa 2010: 85–86; United Republic of Tanzania 2007c: 42–43; 2008c: 14–15, 55).

There were also several key changes in strengthening the legislative oversight of the executive.\textsuperscript{112} First, following the British parliamentary system, the Prime Minister’s

\textsuperscript{112} There are a variety of oversight tools used by legislatures in the world. See, for example, Pelizzo and
Question Time was introduced for half an hour every Thursday so that MPs could ask questions directly to the prime minister (United Republic of Tanzania 2007a: 24). The introduction of the Question Time was opposed by the government but was enacted in Parliament in January 2008, while the entire Standing Orders were enacted earlier in November 2007 (Killian 2010: 5; Slaa 2010: 85–86; United Republic of Tanzania 2008c). Second, the new Standing Orders strengthened the Parliamentary Committees. It is widely recognised by scholars that the level of effectiveness of legislatures in influencing policymaking and politics are dependent on the arrangement of parliamentary committees (Wang 2005: 9). For example, the new Standing Orders allocated the chairmanship of three committees that oversee public accounts to opposition parties: the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), the Local Authorities Accounts Committee (LAAC) and the Parastatal Organization Accounts Committee (POAC). The new Standing Orders also enabled the committees to open their meetings to the media and order the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) to execute special audits. The reports by the committees are tabled in Parliament and the government is required to respond to them (Killian 2010: 6–7; Slaa 2010: 86–87). Third, the impartiality of the Speaker who shall not be bound by decisions of any political parties in the performance of his/her duties was articulated in the new Standing Orders for the first time (Killian 2010: 5; United Republic of Tanzania 2007a: 6). The Speaker was also empowered to establish Select Committees to investigate urgent or controversial matters. Under the old Standing Orders, the formation of Select Committees required the votes of the whole Parliament. Thus, if requests made by MPs to establish Select Committees seemed inconvenient to the CCM, the party would impose a three-line whip to stop the formation of the committees (Killian 2010: 6; Slaa 2010: 89). As such, the revision of the Standing Orders made a number of major changes to the operation of Parliament.

4.5. Reformers and a Coalition for Change

Why was it possible for Parliament to make such changes to strengthen its power during Stapenhurst (2012).

113 In February and March 2013, the Parliamentary Committees were reorganised and POAC was dismantled. PAC and LAAC have been chaired by CHADEMA and CUF MPs respectively since then (The Guardian 10 February 2013; The Guardian 16 March 2013).
the Ninth Parliament? There are several factors that explain this. First, as an external factor, the strengthening of legislatures was a growing trend in sub-Saharan Africa. Changing formal rules such as constitutions, the Standing Orders and other internal rules of legislatures is one of the common approaches in some African countries (Barkan 2009: 238–239). In East Africa, the Kenyan Standing Orders were revised at around the same time as the Tanzanian ones and some of the similar changes were made in the two countries (for example, introduction of a Prime Minister’s Question Time, the establishment of new Parliamentary Committees). In Kenya, the process of rewriting the Standing Orders began at the same time as Tanzania during its Ninth Parliament (2003–2008), but the Speaker was not keen on the reform and thus, the negotiation over the revision of them was carried over to the Tenth Parliament (2008–2013). The newly selected Speaker was supportive of the reform and the new Standing Orders were enacted in September 2008, one year after Tanzania’s adoption of the new Standing Orders (Barkan 2009: 66–67). Thus, there were some regional trends in strengthening the Parliament through the revision of the Standing Orders.

Another external factor that may have contributed to the legislative reform in Tanzania was the financial assistance by international donors. As discussed in Chapter 3, donors were increasingly assisting Parliament and they would certainly welcome the initiative by Tanzanians to strengthen the lawmaking and oversight functions of Parliament. Indeed, a donor group on public finance management had been supporting the three oversight Parliamentary Committees. Thus, there was an environment favourable for reformers to undertake the reform.

As an internal factor, there are key reformers who promoted the changes within Parliament. First, the Speaker of Parliament can be considered as the champion of the reform (Tripp 2012: 5). Barkan (2009) emphasises the importance of the role of the Speakers in the evolution of legislatures in Africa. The Speakers in some African countries continued to function as the agents of executives or ruling parties even after the transition to multiparty system and hindered the reform processes. For example, in Uganda and Ghana, the pace of legislative reforms was different depending on the Speakers (Barkan 2009: 20). Similarly, in Tanzania, the Speaker of the first two decades after the transition to a multiparty democracy laid the ground for the development of the

114 Interview, a donor representative (2012).
115 Interview, Ndugai (2011).
legislature but returned some of the legislative power to the executive, while the new Speaker initiated the reform process. Second, the members of the Special Committee established by the Speaker played crucial roles in executing the reform (see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 for the list of the committee members). Job Yustino Ndugai, MP for Kongwe (CCM) who chaired the committee, was one of the most active MPs elected from constituencies between 2005 and 2010 (Daily News 19 October 2010; Twaweza 2010a: 4). He was elected the Deputy Speaker in the Tenth Parliament in 2010. Harrison George Mwakyembe, MP for Kyela (CCM), a lawyer and former lecturer at the University of Dar es Salaam, is known as a strong advocate for anti-corruption and, as discussed below, later led the parliamentary investigation into a grand corruption allegation of the power supply contract in 2007 (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008: 81). Beatrice Matumbo Shellukindo, MP for Kilindi (CCM) is one of the few female MPs who advanced her political career from the special seats for women to be elected from a constituency. There were also two opposition leaders in the committee: Willibrod Slaa, then MP for Karatu and Secretary General of the CHADEMA, and Rashid Mohamed Hamad, MP for Wawi (CUF) and Opposition Leader during the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010). The appointment of these influential MPs to the Special Committee signals a determination of the Speaker to bring success to the reform. All the committee members, except Athumani Saidi Janguo, MP for Kisarawe (CCM) who did not contest, were re-elected in the 2010 elections.

One of the potential reasons for the Speaker to take an initiative to strengthen Parliament was his dissatisfaction with the way in the CCM was controlled by a limited number of party leaders. Speaker Sitta is one of the CCM politicians who is purportedly interested in running for presidential elections after President Kikwete’s two terms end in 2015 (The Citizen 26 November 2011). The strengthening of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive might have been motivated by his intention to mitigate the influence of the cabinet members on the party. Although there is no evidence to support this proposition, Sitta is a strong advocate against corruption and he expressed his concern about the collusion between cabinet minister and the private sector in the interview. It underpins his rationale for the adoption of a CDF that it would prevent collusion between MPs and the private sector, as discussed in Chapter 3.116 The emergence of reformers from the CCM to move the reform forward and gain support widely from

116 Interview, Sitta (2012).
other CCM members signifies a weakening of party coherence within the party.

Another internal factor that contributed to the emergence of reformers from CCM was the changes in the vision and leadership style of presidents. President Kikwete has been more tolerant of different views than his predecessor, President Mkapa, and appears to be more willing to ‘let the parliament assert itself in fulfilling its key functions’ (Killian 2010: 8). Thus, Benson Bana, Head of the Political Science and Public Administration Department at the University of Dar es Salaam, calls Kikwete’s administration a ‘listening government’. For example, President Kikwete initiated a constitutional review process in response to the voice of the opposition and the public. In May 2012, he reshuffled his cabinet and removed six ministers and two deputy ministers, following an attempt by Zitto Zuberi Kabwe, then Deputy Leader of Opposition, to move a vote of no confidence in the prime minister over the allegation of the misuse of public funds by several ministers. Kikwete announced that he had heard Parliament's call to hold public officials accountable in reshuffling his cabinet (Daily News 4 May 2012).

**4.6. A CDF as a Pillar of the Legislative Reform**

As a CDF was proposed by the Special Committee together with the revision of the Standing Orders in 2006, the adoption of a CDF can be considered as a pillar of the broader reform. Whereas the revision of the Standing Orders was mainly aimed at strengthening the power of Parliament in lawmaking and oversight, a CDF was aimed at helping individual MPs with their constituency service. Collectively, the adoption of a CDF signals an increase of financial autonomy of the legislature from the executive, as MPs can use CDF funds for development projects in their constituencies without requesting extra funds from central ministries or local governments. A CDF would help MPs take stronger positions vis-à-vis the executive. Thus, a CDF makes the legislative reform more comprehensive and complete.

The CDF proposal was probably important for the Speaker and reformers to gain support to the legislative reform from other CCM MPs. The reform would give public visibility to MPs who are more capable of engaging with the lawmaking and oversight roles in Parliament than the MPs whose roles are limited to representation and

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117 Interview, Bana (2011).
constituency service. In other words, reformers and some other MPs benefit more than other MPs from the legislative reform. Indeed, Sitta gained more power as the Speaker of Parliament through the revision of the Standing Orders. The CDF proposal might have had an effect on encouraging all the MPs to lend their support to the overall reform and avoided potential challenges posed by them.

Barkan’s (2010) hypothesised that a coalition for change alters the structure of incentives of individual MPs so that MPs would get more actively engaged with the lawmaking and oversight activities of Parliament without sacrificing their reputation in constituency service. A CDF may indirectly contribute to MPs’ engagement with lawmaking and oversight by saving their time and energy for fundraising for their constituency service (Killian 2010: 7–8). Yet it is not directly aimed at changing the incentives of MPs but is founded on the existing electoral incentives of MPs. In contrast to Barkan’s argument, a coalition for change did not need to alter the structure of incentives of MPs to implement the reform because of the adoption of a CDF.

4.7. Conclusion

This chapter has examined legislative development in Tanzania and explored how the introduction of a CDF constituted a legislative reform through the revision of the Standing Orders during the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010). The Tanzanian case follows the trend of the strengthening of legislatures in sub-Saharan Africa but particularly demonstrates the importance of the role of the Speaker and the emergence of reformers from the ruling party in accelerating legislative development in the context of dominant party politics. In Tanzania, the Speaker himself initiated the reform process to enhance the power and capacity of Parliament and MPs vis-à-vis the executive and the ruling party. The proposal to introduce a CDF served as a pillar of the reform in the area of constituency service which is an essential task of MPs for the political survival of MPs.

The adoption of a CDF was not aimed at directly changing the current structure of incentives of MPs, but it is based on the existing electoral incentives of MPs. Yet, by enhancing the financial autonomy of MPs from the executive and the ruling party by setting aside some public funds for constituency service, a CDF might have been aimed at strengthening MPs’ ‘teeth’ in overseeing the performance of the executive and enhancing horizontal accountability in the country. The chapter also argues that the proposal to establish a CDF was a strategy of reformers to gain wide support from CCM
MPs to the overall legislative reform.

Although Sitta is credited with the reform, it eventually cost him the speaker’s chair. After the elections in 2010, Sitta vied for the Speaker of the Tenth Parliament (2010–2015) but failed to get a nomination from the CCM Central Committee. There was allegedly strong pressure on the Central Committee to block Sitta from being re-elected, though the party’s publicity secretary denied such pressure. The Central Committee nominated three female candidates to be voted by CCM MPs with a rationale to promote gender balance in the three branches of the government, and Anna Makinda, Deputy Speaker of the Ninth Parliament, was elected as the first female speaker in the country (The Guardian 14 November 2010). This was not only because Sitta took the initiative to reform the legislature but also because the legislature started to ‘bite’ the executive and the CCM after the reform. It generated factional politics and further weakened party coherence in the CCM, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

118 Every political party represented in Parliament proposes one candidate for the election of the Speaker, and an election are conducted in Parliament by secret ballot (United Republic of Tanzania 2008c: 6–7).
Chapter 5  From Takrima to the CDCF: Changing Election Strategies of the CCM in Tanzania

5.1. Introduction

Since its independence in 1961, Tanzania has enjoyed relatively stable and peaceful politics. This can be explained by the effects of African socialism adopted by the first President Julius Nyerere between 1967 and 1985 and the one-party system between 1965 and 1992 (Hyden 1999; Msekwa 2006: 1–19). Even after the transition to a multiparty system in 1992, Tanzanian politics has been characterised by the dominant power of the CCM, which continued to gain over 60% of votes in winning the presidency and over 77% of the parliamentary seats in the last four multiparty elections (Babeiya 2011b) (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for the results of the last four multiparty elections).

Table 5.1  Results of Presidential Elections between 1995 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>President (party)</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Benjamin William Mkapa (CCM)</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Benjamin William Mkapa (CCM)</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete (CCM)</td>
<td>80.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete (CCM)</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: African Election Database, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa

Table 5.2  Results of Parliamentary Elections between 1995 and 2010

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of MPs</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No. of MPs</td>
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<td>No. of MPs</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No. of MPs</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>80.2%</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>88.8%</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
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<td>TLP</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table includes only MPs who were elected from constituencies. Sources: United Republic of Tanzania, Parliament, African Election Database, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa

In this context, one can infer that any policy decisions relating to elections are significantly influenced by the CCM and the adoption of a CDF might also have been a CCM strategy to maintain its large majority in Parliament in the elections in 2010 by bestowing financial advantage on incumbent MPs, given that 89% of those elected to
the constituencies were CCM members when the introduction of a CDF was discussed in Parliament in 2009. In fact, in advance of the previous elections of 2000 and 2005, several laws in favour of CCM candidates were enacted to maintain its dominance in Parliament (Makulilo 2011: 247–248).

As discussed in Chapter 3, Tanzania’s CDF was designed in a way that the funds would be allocated to all the constituencies of MPs without any requirement to obtaining approval of the executive or local bureaucrats. This model could create the financial autonomy of MPs in their constituency service. It could reduce the level of dependency of CCM members on the executive and the party, which might lead to weakening of the control of CCM over its party members. Yet, Chapter 3 also noted that MPs were given limited power in the operation of the CDCF in the CDCF Act; MPs can neither directly appoint the members of the CDC Committees nor authorise the disbursement of CDCF funds to projects. The power to appoint the committee members and to disburse the funds rests on several officials of the district councils. In contrast, in the Kenyan CDF on which the Tanzanian CDCF was modelled, MPs were able to appoint the committee members until the CDF Act was amended in 2013. Thus, the Tanzanian CDF seems to have been more carefully designed to control the power of MPs than the Kenyan one. This gives part of the explanation to the initial question of this study as to why the CCM adopted a CDF in 2009 which might weaken its power over its MPs. The CCM accepted a CDF with a mechanism to limit the power of MPs in the operation of the funds. Yet, a broader question as to why CCM adopted a CDF at this particular point in time is not yet answered.

Chapter 4 examined the introduction of a CDF from the perspective of the evolution of the legislature and demonstrated that a CDF was adopted as part of the reform to strengthen the power of the legislature. The reform was initiated by the Speaker of Parliament and signifies the weakening of party coherence within the CCM. Building on this finding, this chapter examines electoral politics to explain why the CCM introduced a CDF. Specifically, this chapter analyses the changes in the constituency roles of MPs following the transition to a multiparty system in 1992, the nature of electoral competition and the intraparty politics of the CCM and demonstrates that the introduction of a CDF was a CCM strategy to regain party coherence and public

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119 Interview, Makulilo (2011).
120 See Chapter 2 on the arrangement of the Kenyan CDF.
support in preparation for the elections in 2010.

Before a CDF was proposed, the use of a unique financial instrument for election campaigns, called *takrima*, meaning ‘African hospitality’, became widespread in Tanzania. *Takrima* is a practice of politicians to give food, drink or money to their campaign staff as a token of appreciation for their support in elections. *Takrima* was legalised by the amendment of the Electoral Laws in 2000, and it was widely used not only for campaign staff but also for general voters before the elections in 2000 and 2005. *Takrima* was outlawed in 2006, and a CDF was proposed in the same year. Given the common objective of the two instruments to enhance the chances of (re-)election of MPs and the sequence of the events, the illegalisation of *takrima* in 2006 might have helped the introduction of a CDF to respond to the increased expectations of voters for material goods by MPs. This chapter analyses the relationship between *takrima* and a CDF and argues that the two instruments represent changing election strategies of the CCM under the multiparty system.

5.2. Dominant Party Politics in Tanzania

Single-party dominance is one of the central focuses of the studies on new democracies in developing countries. For example, the endurance of dominant parties is featured in the discussions on ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’ (Levitsky and Way 2002) and ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2006). While many African countries were characterised by democracies with single-party dominance in the 1990s, regime changes gradually took place in the region and several countries such as Ghana, Zambia and Senegal even passed the two-turnover test of democratic consolidation (Huntington 1991; van de Walle 2003). Tanzania is one of the African countries that have remained a dominant party state and electoral politics has largely been influenced by the ruling parties.121 The remainder of this section summarises the support base of the Tanzania’s dominant party.

The TANU, later the CCM, is one of the oldest and most successful dominant parties in sub-Saharan Africa. It was originated in the Tanganyika African Association

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121 Various criteria have been developed to define dominant party systems. See, for example, Bogaards (2008) for a range of definitions of dominant parties and their relevance to African countries. Based on Erdmann and Basedau’s (2008) criteria, Tanzania is a dominant party state as the CCM won three multiparty elections consecutively, the party age is more than fifteen years since the transition to a multiparty system and legislative volatility has been below 40.
(TAA), a political association that sought for the expansion of opportunities of civil servants, teachers and urban workers for higher education and posts in the government during the British colonial period. In the 1940s, the TAA’s objectives shifted towards nationalism and independence from the British colonial rule. Julius Nyerere became the president of the TAA in 1953, which evolved into the TANU in the following year. With the mobilisation efforts by Nyerere, other leaders and local initiatives, the number of TANU members rapidly increased from 15,000 in 1954 to over 200,000 in 1958 and over one hundred branches were established across Tanganyika (Kelsall 2000: 100; Pratt 1976: 35; Tripp 1992: 225–227; Yeager 1989: 17–23).

The TANU entered into politics through the elections of the Legislative Council. The TANU and TANU-supported candidates won all 30 contested seats in the first election in 1958–59 and 70 out of 71 seats in the election in 1960. An internal self-government was proclaimed in May 1961 with Nyerere serving as the prime minister, and Tanganyika achieved independence in December of the same year (Tordoff 1967a: 191–192; Yeager 1989: 24–25).

After independence, the TANU, later the CCM, consolidated its status as a mass party supported by different social classes, ethnic groups, religions and ideologies, and successfully established its dominant support base across Tanganyika. The CCM had approximately 2.5 million members, 11% of the population of the country, by 1987 (Tripp 1992: 229). It was underpinned by Nyerere’s inclusive policies providing all groups in society with places within the political framework as well as the capacity of the TANU to absorb dissidents (Hirschler 2006: 3).

There were four key strategies by the TANU/CCM to establish a wide support base in the country. First, the TANU adopted an *ujamaa* (‘familyhood’) policy through the proclamation of the Arusha Declaration and a leadership code in 1967, and the party guidelines called *Mwongozo* in 1971. Under the *ujamaa* policy based on the socialist idea of ‘common ownership and production as well as equal distribution of goods among people of common descent’ (Hyden 1975: 54), people were encouraged to move into villages and engage with socialist activities. The leadership code and *Mwongozo* effectively controlled the behaviour of the political leaders. The leadership code articulated that political leaders must be peasants or workers and prohibited them from associating with the practice of capitalism such as holding shares or directorships in private companies, receiving multiple salaries and owning houses to rent to others (Hyden 1980: 156–160; Shivji 1976: 126; Yeager 1989: 73).
Second, political and social associations such as trade unions and cooperative societies were integrated into the TANU/CCM voluntarily or coercively, which strengthened the rule of the TANU over civil society. Nyerere was strongly against the formation of organised political divisions within the society with a view that they might destroy the fragile unity of the new country. The TANU/CCM had established five national affiliate organisations on women, youth, workers, cooperatives and parents by the early 1980s (Kelsall 2002: 608–609; Mushi 2001: 3; Pratt 1976: 77–78; Tripp 1992: 231; Yeager 1989: 67).

Third, the TANU strengthened its grassroots linkages through local government reforms and the establishment of ten-house party cells. After independence, the government replaced the National Authorities, colonial local government organs, and traditional chiefs by regional and district councils headed by politically-appointed Regional Commissioners and locally-elected District Councillors who functioned as communicators between the party and the people. As the council system became dysfunctional due to the lack of power, resources and capacity later, the TANU government placed regional and district councils under its direct control in 1972 (Bryceson 1988: 42; Mamdani 2006: 117; Nyaluke 2008: 4; Tordoff 1967a: 22, 161; Yeager 1989: 67–74).

The TANU also introduced a ten-house party cell system in 1963 to provide a communication channel between the party and the people. Each cell comprised ten TANU members with one leader, and over 200,000 cells were established across the country by 1987. The cell system contributed more to enhancing central access to the localities (for example, collecting taxes) than encouraging local participation in the national policy process (Havnevik 1993: 213; O'Barr 1972; Pratt 1976: 40, 67–68; Tordoff 1967a: 167; Tripp 1992: 229–230; Yeager 1989: 65–68).

Finally, the merger with the ASP of Zanzibar to form the CCM in 1977 enabled the TANU to consolidate its rule over the entire country. Zanzibar became independent in 1963 and merged with Tanganyika in 1964 following the end of two hundred years of the Arab rule by the Zanzibar Revolution (Yeager 1989: 66–67). The second President of Zanzibar sought to strengthen the union with the TANU and his political influence on Mainland, and the TANU and the ASP coalesced into the CCM after a referendum. All former TANU and ASP members were automatically enrolled in the CCM (Yeager 1989: 68).

While Nyerere intended to achieve a democratic egalitarian society, the
TANU/CCM government established a centralised hierarchical party structure which was propelled by several threats to the TANU/CCM government. For example, there was a mutiny of the Tanganyikan army which sought redress of their grievances over conditions of service in 1964, which resulted in an intervention by the British Royal Marines to disarm them. This event led Nyerere to start to institute stricter policies to dissidents and over 500 people were detained (Tordoff 1967b: 162–165). In the late 1970s, there was increasingly public criticism of Nyerere’s leadership and the party supremacy due to the economic failure of his socialist policy (Yeager 1989: 90–91). Nyerere resigned from the president’s office in 1985, which marked the end of the socialist period, and the government adopted a multiparty system in 1992.

Since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1992, the democratisation process has been slow and managed from the top, which Hyden (1999) terms ‘creeping democratization’ (143). President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who succeeded Nyerere in 1985, eased the tight control of the CCM over economic policies. His ten years in office are remembered as the period of ruksa, meaning ‘permission’ or ‘do your own thing’, characterised by an epidemic of corruption, land grabbing and lawlessness (Hyden 1999: 144). Yet, the CCM continued to exercise monopoly of power while opposition parties remained weak and fragmented. The CCM’s dominant power maintained political stability but also limited the extent of systemic change (Msekwa 2006).

Most of the literature on Tanzanian politics after the transition to a multiparty system in 1992 discusses how the CCM controlled the democratic transition process and maintained its dominant power. Similar to other dominant party states, the CCM’s enduring power is largely attributed to state-party fusion and its control of patronage politics (de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Makulilo 2010; Makulilo 2008; Weinstein 2011). There are numerous examples of the use of state resources by the CCM for elections. For example, a road was constructed by the government in Kigoma prior to the by-elections in 1994 to encourage voters to choose the CCM candidate (Makulilo 2011: 6–7). Regional and District Commissioners are reported to have used government vehicles for CCM election campaigns in 2010 (Babeiya 2011a).

At the same time, the CCM government has introduced regulations to control political competition, the media and civil society, including targeted coercive illegal actions to impede its competitors (Hoffman and Robinson 2010: 219). As an example of controlling political competition, the CCM allegedly buys voters’ cards in those constituencies where opposition has strong support. It is reported that, in the 2010
elections, CCM members and candidates directly or indirectly offered between Tsh5,000–10,000 (approximately US$3.5–7) per card in the Arusha Region returning the cards to each voter after the elections (Makulilo 2011: 6–7). The CCM has maintained an institutionalised organisation including the ten-cell system that reaches down to the lowest level of society and its legitimacy (Therkildsen and Bourgouin 2012). Apparently, the endurance of the CCM’s dominance is also helped by the public nostalgia for the first President Nyerere who achieved independence and built the country (O’Gorman 2009; Phillips 2010). Combining all these factors, it is clear that the CCM has established a comprehensive system to maintain its dominant rule after its transition to a multiparty system.

Building on these studies, this chapter focuses on three factors in electoral and party politics in Tanzania to explain the underlying reasons for the adoption of a CDF in Tanzania. These factors are: 1) the growing benefactor role of MPs following the transition to a multiparty system in 1992; 2) the legalisation and illegalisation of a vote-buying practice, takrima, between 2000 and 2006; and 3) the impact of corruption scandals on the CCM since 2007. The following three sections discuss these factors.

5.3. The Growing Benefactor Role of MPs

The nature of electoral politics in Tanzania has changed over time, which can broadly be divided into two phases: a thirty-year one-party socialist period after independence from British colonial rule in 1961, and twenty years of multiparty democracy since 1992. The subsequent section discusses the roles of MPs in the two phases.

5.3.1. Election Campaigns and Constituency Roles of MPs during the One-party Socialist Period (1967–1992)

While the first post-independent elections in 1965 were held under a multiparty system, all the candidates contested from the TANU. There was vibrant competition in this election, as veterans of the national movement who perceived to have lost interests in their constituencies were defeated by a number of new leaders (Hyden 1999: 143–144)

122 An economics lecturer at University of Dar es Salaam who contested for a parliamentary seat from opposition, NCCR-Mageuzi, in Mwanza in 1995, reported in detail the various tricks, such as bribing and threatening, used by the CCM members to control the election process (Limbu 1997: 114–125).
However, the overwhelming public support of the TANU paradoxically reduced voters’ interests in participating in election debates, as they would support the TANU candidates in any case (Tordoff 1967a: 31).

The Zanzibar Revolution and the military mutiny in 1964 made TANU leaders think that intense electoral competition was undesirable for maintaining domestic security and they decided to shift to a one-party state in 1965 (Hyden 1972: 407; Tordoff 1967b: 600; Yeager 1989: 67). President Nyerere also adopted a socialist policy through by announcing the Arusha Declaration in 1967, lasting until 1985 when he retired from the presidency.

During the one-party socialist period, the nomination process of candidates for parliamentary seats was centrally controlled by the TANU/CCM (Hyden 1972: 408; Yeager 1989: 68). The government provided all the election expenses, and candidates were not allowed to raise campaign funds or to use private money to influence voters (Kiondo 1994: 67 cited in Yoon 2008: 69). The two candidates contesting for a parliamentary seat travelled together to campaign rallies, accompanied by a special supervisory committee that monitored whether the candidates followed the party regulations. The candidates were not allowed to question the party ideology in their campaign speeches (Hyden 1972: 409).

In advance of the elections in 1970, the TANU requested its candidates contesting for parliamentary seats to reside in ujamaa villages and to write on their nomination forms whether they were participating in ujamaa activities, though due to the uneven distribution of ujamaa villages in the country, only about 20% of candidates managed to do so. While a number of candidates were formerly businessmen, a majority of only a few candidates stated in their biographies that they were businessmen in the 1970s elections. Yet, many politicians continued to be indirectly involved in business by, for example, transferring their business to relatives (Hyden 1972: 409–412). Despite the condition on ujamaa activities, the election results suggest that the participation in ujamaa activities did not substantially affect the election results. Instead, the candidates who were highly educated and in higher occupational categories were more successful (Hyden 1972: 412).

The constituency roles of MPs were similarly highly restrictive, as the party leaders regarded entrepreneurial activities by MPs such as the initiation of self-help development projects in their constituencies as incompatible with the government’s socialist policy which is aimed at achieving equality across the country (Barkan 1984a:
74–76). Their roles were restricted by regional and district commissioners, who were not only heads of administrative regions and districts, but also the secretaries of local party organisations (Tordoff 1967a: 49–50). The limitations on the constituency roles of MPs were reinforced by the adoption of the TANU leadership code in 1967 which prohibited public officials, including MPs, from accumulating personal wealth, as discussed earlier (Barkan 1984a: 77; Tanganyika African National Union 1971).

As decision-making and resource allocation were monopolised by the TANU/CCM and the government, MPs were messengers of the party in constituencies, by communicating government policies to people at grassroots level. Elections were the opportunity to confer on MPs the right to engage in lobbying and other entrepreneurial activities through which they extract resources and services from the centre for local communities (Barkan 1984a: 67, 75; Hyden 1972: 412–415). As a result, for MPs, establishing clientelistic relationships with voters was less important than securing central approval (Kelsall 2002: 608–609).

5.3.2. Election Campaigns and Constituency Roles of MPs during the Multiparty Period (1992–present)

In the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, Tanzania experienced political and economic liberalisation by shifting to a liberal economy and multiparty politics. In 1995, the Elections Act was amended to allow MPs to make financial contributions to community development before the election campaign period. These changes resulted in an increase in the engagement of politicians with economic activities and use of money in building their relationships with voters by financially contributing to communities and buying votes (Hyden and Mmuya 2008: 36; Liviga 2011: 22). Political office became a lucrative source of power and access to wealth. It also allowed business people to gain power over politics and policymaking processes, leaving aside the interests of the wider public (Liviga 2011: 22–23).

While all registered parties were entitled to the government subsidies to political parties, called ruzuku, until 1995, the amendment of the Political Parties Act in 1996 restricted these to the parties that represented in Parliament, which impeded the

123 Section 97(4) of the Elections (Amendment) Act 1995 stipulates that ‘an act or transaction shall not deemed to constitute bribery if it is proved to have been designed to advance the interests of community fund raising, self-help, self-reliance or social welfare projects within the constituency and to have been done before the campaign period’ (United Republic of Tanzania 1995: 8).
development of new parties. In 2000, ruzuku ceased due to budget constraints, and political parties began to receive funds from foreign donors such as European countries and Canada (Bryan and Baer 2005: 128; Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa 2010).

The provision of ruzuku eventually resumed and is currently calculated based on the percentage of votes for the presidential candidates and the percentage of parliamentary seats. Whereas the CCM used to receive 3% of the national budget to run the party during the one-party period, it has only received ruzuku since the transition to a multiparty system. This opened opportunities for rich people to stand in elections. Although the subsidies for the CCM have decreased from Tsh1 billion (approximately US$698,000) to Tsh814 million (US$568,000) per month since the elections in 2010, it is still more than twice the total amounts allocated to all the opposition parties (Nipashe 21 December 2010). The CCM also raises funds for its activities from the membership fees from up to 3.5 million members, and various businesses such as real estate and the sales of newspapers (Therkildsen and Bourgouin 2012: 40). Through this transition period, the CCM established its connections with the private sector and maintained its dominant power in politics, while opposition parties remained weak (Gasarasi 1997; Mmuya 1998).

In advance of the first multiparty elections in 1995, the government granted a subsidy to parties in the sum of Tsh1 million (approximately US$1,700) for each candidate to cover their campaign costs, though the candidates still had to raise large amounts of their campaign expenses (Yoon 2008: 70). In 1999, the government decided not to provide the subsidies for election campaigns due to the allegation that some opposition parties randomly nominated candidates to qualify for the subsidies in 1995 (Britain-Tanzania Society 1999; Weinstein 2011: 36–37; Yoon 2008: 70). Instead, the government granted a gratuity of Tsh15–25 million (approximately US$19,000–31,000) for each incumbent MP before Parliament was dissolved prior to the election campaigns of 2000. It became a huge disadvantage for opposition candidates who had fewer resources than CCM candidates.

Nevertheless, many candidates spent much more in funds during their campaign. In addition, due to the growing benefactor role, MPs have to raise funds for their

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124 Interview, Peter (2011).
125 US$1 = Tsh574.8 (2000) (Bank of Tanzania).
constituencies by themselves. For example, one MP claimed to have spent Tsh75 million (approximately US$94,000) of his own savings towards community projects in addition to the funding from his party (Kelsall 2002: 611–612). The growing significance of the benefactor role of MPs increasingly placed pressure on them and created a political environment conducive to the adoption of a CDF.

5.4. Changing Norms and Practices of Takrina

As part of the increasing involvement of politicians in economic activities and the use of their personal funds as a leverage to enhance their chances of election, the informal practice of candidates or their parties offering food, drinks, money, clothes or other material goods to voters in exchange for their electoral support became widespread in Tanzania. It was widely known as *takrima*, meaning ‘African traditional hospitality’ (Heilman and Ndumbaro 2002; Makulilo 2010: 5–6; Sansa 2010: 173–174).¹²⁷

While the word *takrima* has generally been used in Tanzanian social life for a long time, the *takrima* practice by parliamentary candidates became legalised by the amendment of the Electoral Laws in April 2000, six months before the elections. Prior to the amendment, the National Assembly (Elections) Act 1964 which was changed to the Electoral Laws by the amendment in 1969 prohibited the practice of *takrima*. Section 79 (a) of the Act states that the following people shall be deemed to be guilty of treating, meaning vote-buying:

> every person who corruptly by himself or by any other person, either before, during, or after an election, directly or indirectly gives, or provides, or pays, wholly or in part, the expense of giving or providing food, drink, entertainment, or provision to or for any person, for the purpose of corruptly influencing that person, or any other person, to vote or refrain from voting at such election (United Republic of Tanzania 1964: 32).

In 2000, two clauses, known as the *takrima* provisions, were added to Sections 98 in the Electoral Laws. Section 98 (2) states that ‘anything done in good faith as an act of normal or traditional hospitality shall be deemed not to be treating’ (United


¹²⁷ The lexical meaning of *takrima* is ‘generosity by one person to another for the purpose of helping him/her’ (translated by the author) (Baraza la Kiswahili la Zanzibar (Zanzibar Swahili Council) 2010: 385).
Republic of Tanzania 2000: 10) and Section 98 (3) states that ‘[n]ormal or ordinary expenses spent in good faith in the election campaign or in the ordinary cause of election process shall be deemed not to be treating, bribery or illegal practice’ (United Republic of Tanzania 2000: 10). With this amendment, *takrima* was legalised with the view that it was different from corruption (Babeiya 2011a: 92).

Underpinned by the traditional gift-giving and reciprocity culture, *takrima* was widely used as a campaign strategy in the elections in 2000 and 2005 (Bryan and Baer 2005: 129; Kelsall 2003: 73–74; Makulilo 2010: 5–6; Phillips 2009: 34–35; Sansa 2010: 173–174). Consequently, the campaign period came to be known as the ‘harvesting season’ which is ‘the season of exchanging votes for gifts of money, beer, meals, and party apparel referred to colloquially as “food,” “soda,” “sugar,” or “tea.”'(Phillips 2010: 123). The legalisation of *takrima* rendered the candidates who had more resources with significant advantages in standing for election. As mentioned above, the government also stopped providing subsidies to political parties for election campaigns in advance of the elections in 2000. These changes disadvantaged opposition candidates due to their poor financial base compared with the CCM candidates in 2000 and 2005 (Babeiya 2011b: 93; Bryan and Baer 2005: 129).

In 2005, three CSOs jointly filed a petition to challenge the *takrima* provisions in the Electoral Laws as unconstitutional (Legal and Human Rights Centre and Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation 2010; United Republic of Tanzania 2006d). In April 2006, four months after the 2005 elections, the High Court declared that the amendment of the Electoral Laws to allow *takrima* was unconstitutional on the grounds that the *takrima* provisions not only discriminated against lower-income candidates, but also legalised corruption in the electoral process and thus, violated the Constitution which guarantees the right to vote in free and fair elections (Babeiya 2011a: 93; United Republic of Tanzania 2006d: 35–36).

Even before *takrima* was legalised in 2000, it had been widely practised and thus, had already been institutionalised in electoral politics.¹²⁸ While politicians could have clandestinely provided *takrima*, the question is why it was legalised in 2000. Political analysts consider that it was a CCM strategy to give disadvantage to opposition candidates and to avoid election petitions based on corruption filed by opposition candidates and to avoid election petitions based on corruption filed by opposition candidates.

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¹²⁸ Interview, Lissu (2011).
candidates against CCM MPs (Babeiya 2011a: 92–93; Sansa 2010: 173–174).\(^{129}\) Indeed, after the first multiparty elections in 1995, there were as many as 134 election petitions based on vote buying filed by opposition candidates (Kelsall 2002: 611; Omari 1997).\(^{130}\) Some MPs were disqualified and by-elections were held, an embarrassment for the CCM.\(^{131}\) The amendment of the Electoral Laws in 2000, which legalised takrima, also introduced the requirement for an election petitioner to deposit a maximum amount of Tsh5 million (approximately US$6,200) as a security for costs, which made it difficult for opposition candidates to file election petitions (United Republic of Tanzania 2000: 11). Thus, the combination of the takrima provision and the security for costs are considered to advance CCM’s incumbency advantage.

Apparently, for CCM leaders, takrima was simply meant to ensure that the candidates for parliamentary seats could extend their gesture of appreciation to their supporters. Babeiya (2011a) notes that both the president and the two prime ministers found nothing wrong in candidates ‘giving the electorate things like drinks, food and entertainment as long as such things are given in what they described as good faith’ (93). Pius Msekwa, former Speaker of Seventh and Eighth Parliaments (1994–2005) and former Vice Chairman of the CCM in Tanzania Mainland (2007–2012), considers that takrima is part of the Tanzanian culture and the illegalisation of takrima in 2006 was unnecessary in tackling electoral corruption, because hospitality (takrima) and electoral corruption were distinguishable based on the timing of the offering of money or goods by politicians to voters and the intentions of politicians in doing this (Msekwa 2011: 165–167).\(^{132}\)

Despite Msekwa’s claim, hospitality and electoral corruption cannot be clearly separated in practice. As quoted earlier, the National Assembly (Elections) Act 1964 prohibits the offering of money or other goods ‘before, during and after an election’ which covers the whole election cycle; thus, the timing is not a determining factor. In practice, the timing of the practice does not matter much to its effects, as politicians can bribe voters before the official campaign period starts and claim the credits during the campaign period. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to discern whether politicians

\(^{129}\) Interviews, Sungusia (2011) and Peter (2011).
\(^{130}\) By comparison, the number of election petitions after the elections in 2010 was 43 (The Citizen 17 January 2912).
\(^{131}\) Interviews, Mwakagenda (2010) and Ally (2010).
\(^{132}\) Interview, Msekwa (2011).
give money to voters with or without intention to influence their votes.\(^{133}\) Coincidently, *takrima* was legalised one year after the first President Nyerere died in 1999. The legalisation of *takrima* was symbolic of the change in the election rules from one-party socialist period to a multiparty period, as the use of money under the name of *takrima* could neither be widespread nor legalised during the leadership of Nyerere who was strictly against corruption.

There is a understanding among some MPs that *takrima* was originally meant as a token of appreciation and for compensation by the offering of food, drinks or money by candidates to campaign staff such as promotional art groups (e.g. dancers and drummers) who helped to organise campaign rallies. MPs claim that the legalisation of *takrima* was intended to ensure that the compensation to campaign staff is protected as a legal practice.\(^{134}\) Although this sounds a fair rationale, the compensation for campaign staff was legal even before 2000. There were at least two judgements by the Court of Appeal of 1996 and 1999 that declared that serving *pilau* (fried rice) to campaign staff was lawful: ‘Gilliard Joseph Maseko and Two others v. Corona Faida Busongo’, Civil Appeal No. 57 of 1996 and ‘Lutter Symphorian Nelson v. Attorney General and Ibrahim Said Msabaha’, Civil Appeal No. 24 of 1999 (United Republic of Tanzania 1999). If *takrima* was meant as compensation for campaign staff, as some proponents of *takrima* argue, there was no need to legalise it because it was already legal before 2000. The judgement in 1999 also suggests ambiguity in separating campaign staff from the public in campaign rallies. The judgement states that:

> [t]he learned trial Judge analysed the evidence of the scales of justice and found himself unable to make a positive finding that, as was alleged by the appellant and his witnesses, the *pilau* was also served to members of the public. He entertained the view that what might have occurred was that *pilau* was prepared for, and served to the members of the campaign groups but some members of the public invited themselves to the meal (United Republic of Tanzania 1999: 424–425).

This statement suggests that the recipients of *takrima* could easily be expanded to voters, and it is difficult in practice to monitor all the events at the campaign rallies.

There is no information on the number of petitions after the elections in 2000.

\(^{133}\) Interviews, Sungusia (2011) and Peter (2011).

\(^{134}\) Interviews, Wankanga (2010), Mtanda (2010), Missanga (2011) and Mntangi (2011).
and 2005 and whether there were election petitions in which appellants lost due to the 
takrima provisions between 2000 and 2006. Thus, it cannot be fully examined how the 
legalisation of takrima actually influenced the nature of election campaigns and 
ultimately, whether the CCM’s intention to limit electoral petitions by legalising 
takrima was successful. It should also be noted that takrima did not always benefit
wealthy politicians in practice, as they tend to receive higher expectations from voters
than other politicians. If voters know that politicians do not have access to resources,
they would not expect MPs to bring large amounts of money to their constituencies.
Voters are also aware that politicians have their own interests and allow them to gain
personally from political office.\footnote{Interview, Rajani (2010).} However, the legalisation of takrima certainly gave
financial advantage to the candidates who were able to distribute goods to voters, and it
created a public view that the campaign period is a ‘harvesting season’.

Whereas Section 8 of the CDCF Act explicitly prohibits the use of the funds as 
takrima during election campaigns, CSOs cautioned that CDCF funds might be used as 
takrima \cite{Policy Forum 2008b, The Citizen 16 March 2011, United Republic of Tanzania 2009c: 52}. Their view on takrima and the CDCF is presented in one of the 
illustrations (Figure 5.1) in the booklet that explains the problems of the CDCF Act, 
published by the Policy Forum.
As such, CSOs anticipate that the CDCF would have similar negative effects on the country as takrima.

Takrima and the CDCF are different instruments for MPs, as takrima is mainly based on the private funds of politicians targeted at individual voters, or private goods, while the CDCF uses public funds for development projects, or club goods. Whereas the legalisation of takrima was opposed by opposition MPs with a view that it would benefit mainly CCM MPs who were endowed with financial resources, the CDCF was welcomed by MPs of both the CCM and opposition parties. Thus, there is probably no direct causal relationship between the legalisation and illegalisation of takrima and the adoption of the CDCF.

However, takrima can be considered a contributing factor to the introduction of a CDF as both instruments are rooted in the politician-voter relationships based on the
exchange of tangible goods and votes. The widespread use of *takrima* certainly contributed to strengthening the public norm of the benefactor role of MPs. The changes in the practice and legal status of *takrima* illustrate not only a growing benefactor role of MPs, but also a changing norm on election finance and the politician-voter relationship. The wide use of *takrima* exceeded what the original meaning of African hospitality could justify, and it became equal to electoral corruption in the end. While *takrima* lost its legitimacy in 2006, voters continued to expect MPs to bring tangible goods to them near the elections. It placed pressure on MPs and motivated them to establish a CDF. Thus, with a caveat that *takrima* is only one example of many forms of tangible goods provided by MPs to voters, the legalisation and illegalisation of *takrima* can be considered an important factor behind the introduction of a CDF in Tanzania.

### 5.5. Corruption Scandals and Intraparty Competition within the CCM

Following the illegalisation of *takrima* in 2006, the CCM was seriously shaken by several grand corruption scandals. It was triggered by the disclosure of the ‘List of Shame’ by Willibrod Slaa, Secretary General of the CHADEMA, at a public rally which named allegedly corrupt ministers and key party officials of the CCM in September 2007 (Britain-Tanzania Society 2010). Parliament started to investigate the corruption allegations of cabinet ministers and senior government officials, which demonstrates the strengthening of legislative oversight coupled with the revision of the Standing Orders in 2007, as discussed in Chapter 4 (Tripp 2012: 5; Tsekpo and Hudson 2009).

The most notable parliamentary investigation was on the contract between the Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) and the Richmond Development Company based in the United States of America to supply emergency electricity to the country (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008: 82–83). The Parliamentary Committee on Trade and Investments examined the case and requested a further investigation by setting up a Parliamentary Select Committee. MPs supported the formation of a Select Committee in Parliament and one was formed which was chaired by Harrison Mwakyembe, one of the members of the Parliamentary Committee that revised the Standing Orders.\(^{136}\) The Committee revealed that the Richmond Development Company was a fake company which was not registered in the USA, and the procurement laws were not followed to

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\(^{136}\) The committee was formed before the enactment of the new Standing Orders in November 2007.
give the tender to the company. The Committee also found that Prime Minister Edward Lowassa instructed the TANESCO to enter into a contract with the Richmond Development Company (Sitta, Slaa and Cheyo 2008: 83–86; Slaa 2010: 90).

In February 2009, after the Committee presented a report and called for the resignation of all government officials implicated in the scandal in Parliament, Lowassa announced his resignation as premier. The conclusions of the enquiry also resulted in the resignation of two ministers: Nazir Karamagi, Minister for Energy and Minerals, and his predecessor, Ibrahim Msabaha, who was Minister for East African Cooperation at the time of investigation. President Kikwete dissolved the cabinet, and Mizengo Pinda was appointed as prime minister (Legal and Human Rights Centre and Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation 2010; Slaa 2010: 90).

Apart from the Richmond scandal, the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania was fired by President Kikwete after an audit investigation uncovered fraudulent transactions involving the repayment of the country’s commercial external debt in January 2008. The repayment of the external debt at the Bank of Tanzania is widely believed to have been used to finance CCM’s election campaigns in 2005 (Therkildsen and Bourgouin 2012: 40). In April 2008, Andrew Chenge resigned as the Minister for Infrastructure due to the allegation of his involvement in a BAE radar purchase scandal in 1999 (Britain-Tanzania Society 2008).

These corruption scandals made the public more aware of the privileges enjoyed by CCM leaders and the large amounts of money used for election campaigns by the party. They not only tainted the image of the party, but also created sharp divisions among CCM MPs and party coherence was at stake (Msekwa 2011; The Citizen 17 February 2010). While there has always been intraparty competition within the CCM, the growth of intraparty divisions was particularly evident during the first administration of President Kikwete between 2005 and 2010. One group was led by the former Prime Minister Lowassa. His group was often dubbed by the media as mafisadi (meaning ‘corrupt people’). Lowassa and Rostam Abdulrasul Aziz, prominent businessman and MP for Igunga until he resigned from politics in July 2011, are known to have supported the election campaign of President Kikwete in 2005. Another group is called anti-mafisadi which was led by Samuel Sitta. Another influential politician in the

137 See Mnuya (1998: 66–80) for the various dimensions of intraparty conflict within the CCM during the initial phase of the multiparty politics in the 1990s.
CCM is Bernard Kamillius Membe, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. Soon after the elections in 2010, local political analysts considered that the Lowassa and Membe groups were the two biggest forces within the CCM for the coming years, while Sitta and several other politicians would also play roles in the power game within the party.138

Lowassa’s supporters believed that he was not guilty as charged but was framed by his political foes and blamed Sitta for not taking action to stop the attacks against the government and the party when he was moderating parliamentary discussions. In response to the intensified split, the CCM formed a committee of party elders led by the former President Ally Hassan Mwinyi to reconcile it (Legal and Human Rights Centre and Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation 2010: 55). Despite the effort, the struggle between the two groups seriously affected the party up to the elections in 2010 (The Guardian 16 February 2010).

This was not the first parliamentary investigation of corruption allegation of cabinet ministers in the country. In 1996, a parliamentary probe committee investigated an allegation on tax exemptions improperly granted by the Ministry of Finance, which led to the resignation of Finance Minister Simon Mbilinyi from the cabinet post. Whereas there was no formal system of select committees at that time, Parliament could mandate special, quasi-judicial probe committees to examine the political events that were high concerns to MPs, the media and the public (Kelsall 2003: 64; Wang 2005: 186–187). Apparently, the Mbilinyi’s case was driven by factional politics within the CCM. There was a group of politicians, called ‘old guard’, who had held senior positions in the former government led by President Mwyini but they were sidelined under the Mkapa’s administration. This group attempted to damage the Mkapa government by implicating Mbilinyi (Britain-Tanzania Society 1997). Iddi Simba who chaired the probe committee became Minister for Trade and Industries later, but he himself was forced to resign after he was implicated in a sugar importation scandal in 2001 (The Guardian 29 June 2013). It is considered as a revenge of the ‘Southern bloc’, a group of politicians from southern regions, including Mkapa and Mbilinyi (Kelsall 2003: 65).

This case and the Richmond scandal suggest that there is a relationship between intraparty competition within the CCM and the exercise of sanctions by the legislature

138 Interview, a CCM member (2011).
over the executive. Yet, the Richmond case was unique as it was underpinned by the strengthening of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive and the CCM.

Against this background, financial resources serve as an important tool for CCM leaders, especially those who are interested in vying for the presidency in 2015, to gain support from the party members to strengthen their groups. The introduction of a CDF could reduce their leverage over the members by decentralising the allocation of public funds to individual MPs. Indeed, whereas the CCM does not provide funds for constituency service by MPs, senior and/or wealthy MPs provide financial support to other MPs for their election campaigns and constituency service on an individual basis. This can be initiated by either side. In some cases, politicians who need funds ask senior and/or wealthy politicians for assistance. In other cases, senior and/or wealthy politicians approach promising junior politicians and offer them financial assistance.\(^\text{139}\)

As noted in Chapter 3, according to Sitta, the introduction of a CDF was aimed at mitigating the collusion between MPs and the private sector by reducing the temptation of MPs to seek funds from businessmen. In light of the financial power that Lowassa’s group had on the party, Sitta’s rationale can also be interpreted as the CDCF also aiming at mitigating the influence of CCM leaders, in particular Lowassa’s group, on party members. Yet, the CDF proposal was supported by all CCM leaders. This is partly because the offering of financial support from one party member to another would continue regardless of whether there is a CDF in place.\(^\text{140}\) In addition, the CDCF budget is small and thus, it is unlikely to affect factional politics within the CCM significantly. Thus, the intensified intraparty competition within the CCM might have been one driving factor but it does not fully explain why CCM leaders accepted the CDCF.

When the CDCF Bill was tabled and passed in Parliament in July 2009, the relationship between the executive and the legislature was deteriorating due to the corruption scandals. Not only opposition MPs, but also CCM MPs began to criticise the Kikwete administration openly. In such circumstances, the CDCF might have signified a gesture of the executive to show its support to MPs and relieve the tension between the executive and the legislature.\(^\text{141}\) As discussed in Chapter 3, the fact that civil society and donors were against the establishment of the CDCF helped in unifying MPs beyond

\(^{139}\) Interviews, a CCM MP, an informant and an opposition politician (2010, 2011).
\(^{140}\) Interview, a CCM member (2011).
party lines. While the legalisation of takrima and the increase of the petition fees in 2000 was a CCM strategy to favour its MPs, the introduction of the CDCF can be considered a symbolic concession made by CCM leaders to the legislature to regain their support in preparation for the elections in 2010.

5.6. Elections in 2010

As the 2010 elections approached, the Kikwete government made an effort to show its commitment to curb electoral corruption and improve the public image of the CCM. In March 2010, the Election Expenses Act was passed into law with an aim to hold candidates and political parties more accountable for their campaign finance. It sets a monitoring mechanism of the funding of nomination processes, election campaigns and elections (Babeiya 2011a: 97–99; National Democratic Institute 2010; United Republic of Tanzania 2010a). In addition, the Election Expenses (Maximum Amount of Funds) Order (supplement No 26) of 2010 issued by the Prime Minister stipulated the maximum amounts allowed for each candidate to run for a parliamentary seat between Tsh30 million (approximately US$21,000) and Tsh80 million (US$56,000), depending on the size, population and communication infrastructure of the constituency. The expenditure for the intraparty nomination process of each candidate was allowed up to Tsh2.5 million (US$1,700) (Babeiya 2011a: 99).

To prohibit the practice of takrima, the election expenses for promotional art groups at campaign rallies were also clarified. Section 7(2) of the Election Expenses Act 2010 stipulates that ‘[a]ll funds used for promotional art groups for purposes of presentation of a candidate to voters including the cost of providing food, drinks, accommodation or transportation which has been reasonably incurred by a candidate for members of his campaign team shall be deemed to constitute election expenses’ (United Republic of Tanzania 2010b: 7).

There was also a change in the rule of kura za maoni (‘opinion poll’) or the primary election of the CCM by increasing the number of party members who could vote to curtail vote buying including takrima by candidates in the primary election.142 Whereas only hundreds of selected party numbers were eligible to vote in the primary election in the past elections, all party members who paid annual fees in the amount of

141 Interview, Ally (2010).
Tsh1,200 (approximately US$1) became able to vote in the primary election in August 2010.

A legal expert in Parliament considers that the legalisation and illegalisation of *takrima* and the adoption of the Election Expenses Act was a learning process; Tanzanians learnt from their mistakes made with *takrima*.\(^\text{143}\) Moreover, in view of the impact of the corruption scandals on the public image of the CCM, the adoption of the Election Expenses Act was important for the CCM to show its commitment to curb electoral corruption prior to the elections in 2010. The CDCF and the Election Expenses Act supplement each other, as the former gives financial power to MPs in providing constituency service, while the latter restricts their campaign finance.

Despite the above effort by the CCM to regain trust of the party members and its supporters, the elections in 2010 marked a turning point in its dominant power in the country. President Kikwete was re-elected with a lower support rate in 2010, from 80.3% in 2005 to 61.3% in 2010. The CCM also reduced the number of parliamentary seats from 206 (88.8% of the total MPs who were elected from constituencies) in 2005 to 186 (77.8%) in 2010, while the CHADEMA MPs increased from 5 to 23. Pius Msekwa states that the CCM returned to the ‘position it held at the commencement of multi-party electoral competition in 1995’ (Msekwa 2011), because the percentage of the votes the CCM obtained for elections in 2010 was similar to the one in 1995. The voter turnout in the 2010 elections was the lowest since the transition to a multiparty system in 1992, and dramatically declined from 72.5% in 2005 to 39.5% in 2010 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). This suggests that voters did not want to vote for the CCM but were not keen on voting for opposition candidates either.\(^\text{144}\)

There are several reasons for the decline in the public support to the CCM. First, Tanzanians were dissatisfied with the failure of the CCM in delivering what they promised in the election manifesto of 2005 such as the slow pace of economic growth and poverty reduction. Second, as discussed above, it was due to the weakening of party unity of the CCM because of grand corruption scandals and internal divisions. Third, the CCM apparently started to lose its grips on some of the traditional supporters such

\(^{142}\) Interview, Nyalandu (2011).

\(^{143}\) Interview, Wankanga (2010).

\(^{144}\) Interview, an informant (2011).
as the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania.\textsuperscript{145}

Another reason is the increase in the number of voters in the primary election of the CCM. It generally made intraparty competition more intense, and despite the intention of the party to curb vote buying, some politicians spent more resources to buy votes and distributed fake party cards in some regions (Nipashe 1 November 2011).\textsuperscript{146} Due to the intensified competition in the primary election, the candidates nominated by the party could not easily gain the support of those party members who voted for other candidates at the primary election. The CCM campaign manager stated that ‘it becomes more difficult to iron out differences amongst CCM members, since the system involves many people in the voting process’ (The Guardian 3 November 2010).

Finally, the decline in the public support of the CCM was attributed to the successful mobilisation of supporters by the CHADEMA, particularly from the youth in urban areas in northern regions. Willibrod Slaa, CHADEMA presidential candidate, attracted massive crowds during his election campaigns. The CHADEMA also established financial resources to compete with the CCM effectively.

One of the features of the elections in 2010 was the prevalence of vote-rigging in the country, characterised by a new Swahili word, \textit{chakachua}, meaning ‘adulterate’. The word was originally used for fuel adulteration by mixing petrol or diesel with cheaper kerosene, which became a nationwide problem as the fuel price kept going up between 2007 and 2009 (The Citizen 17 July 2009). In 2010, the word was used for misconduct in the elections and it became a popular word used by Tanzanians to refer to any forms of cheating in their daily lives. There were some incidents of \textit{chakachua}ji (‘adulteration’) by CCM candidates in the vote counting process in the constituencies where opposition candidates won by narrow margins.\textsuperscript{147} Although vote-rigging is not a new phenomenon in Tanzania, the widespread use of the word \textit{chakachua} indicates that the CCM struggled with winning some of the parliamentary seats. Despite the efforts made by the party to regain its coherence and the public support by establishing the CDCF with an accountability mechanism and enacting the Election Expenses Act, the CCM experienced a tougher competition in 2010 than in the past.

The practice of \textit{takrima} continued in the elections in 2010. According to the Views of the People 2012, more than half of the respondents (54\%) considered that vote

\textsuperscript{145} Interview, Makulilo (2011).
\textsuperscript{146} Interview, an academic (2010).
buying by politicians was becoming more common, while 20% offered the opposite views (Research on Poverty Alleviation 2012: 36–37). This result does not necessarily mean that the vote-buying practice continued to grow in the country. Instead, it may suggest that Tanzanians have become more aware and critical of the practice partly due to the legal changes to prohibit it prior to the elections. Nevertheless, it means that the practice continued to exist. The enduring prevalence of vote buying can partly be attributed to weak law enforcement mechanisms in the country (Babeiya 2011a: 99; Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee 2011: 64). For example, the office of the Registrar of Political Parties which is supposed to track and control the amounts of the campaign expenses of political parties and candidates under the Election Expenses Act does not have an institutional capacity to exercise its duties (Babeiya 2011a: 99). In the actual interactions between politicians and voters, it does not significantly matter whether takrima is legal or illegal. If politicians reject the financial requests by voters on the basis of illegality, voters consider them ‘funny’.\(^\text{148}\) Apparently, because of the Election Expenses Act, money and gifts were given more secretly, for example, through third parties or at fake events such as weddings so that it would be more difficult for the government anti-corruption agency to identify the perpetrators.\(^\text{149}\)

The CDCF did not have a major impact on the 2010 elections mainly because no CDCF projects had been fully implemented by the time the country went to the polls, as discussed in Chapter 3. Apparently, some incumbent MPs made pledges during the campaigns on how they would spend CDCF funds if re-elected and the candidates who challenged more appealed for better use of the funds than the incumbents.\(^\text{150}\) However, as there was no major change in the re-election rate in 2010, the CDCF did not have an effect of incumbency advantage (see Table 5.3 below for the re-election rate in 2005 and 2010).

\(^{147}\) Interviews, three informants (2010).
\(^{148}\) Interview, an informant (2010).
\(^{149}\) Interviews, an academic, a CSO representative and two opposition MPs (2010, 2011).
\(^{150}\) Interview, Ally (2010).
Table 5.3 Number of Constituency MPs Re-elected in 2005 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Re-elected MPs</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of MPs is different from Table 5.2 due to the creation and abolishment of constituencies between the election years. John Magalle Shibuda who changed his party from CCM to CHADEMA in 2010 is not counted.

Source: compiled by the author, based on the United Republic of Tanzania, Parliament

5.6. Conclusion

The CDCF was introduced in Tanzania against the background that the benefactor role of MPs had continuously expanded since the transition to multiparty politics in 1992. It was accelerated by the growing exchange of tangible goods and votes between politicians and voters, partly due to the legalisation of takrima between 2000 and 2006. However, takrima could not maintain its legitimacy after being utilised for two elections and the corruption scandals implicating the CCM politicians tarnished the image of the party. Thus, it was important for the CCM to demonstrate that it is fully committed to anti-corruption efforts and a fair player in the elections. The CDCF, which has clear rules and regulations and a monitoring mechanism, was an optimal choice for the CCM and the executive to show their support to CCM MPs and demonstrate fairness in advance of the 2010 elections. The above examination of the political events, changes made to the election regulations and the introduction of the CDCF suggests that CCM’s election strategy was adjusted to changing political conditions and challenges to maintain its level of responsiveness to its MPs, party members and voters.

When the CDCF Bill was tabled and passed in Parliament in 2009, the relationship between the executive and the legislature was deteriorating due to the corruption scandals. Not only opposition MPs, but also CCM MPs began to criticise the Kikwete administration. In such circumstances, the CDCF might have signified a gesture of the executive to show its support to MPs and relieve the tension between the executive and the legislature. The fact that civil society and donors opposed the establishment of the CDCF helped in unifying MPs beyond party lines. This suggests
that the introduction of the CDCF was a concession made by CCM leaders to the legislature to regain the party unity.

Since the CDCF budget was set at relatively low levels and the power of MPs in the operation of the fund was restricted in the CDCF Act, it was evident that the financial autonomy of MPs created by the CDCF would be limited. The objective of the CDCF was neither to change the way in which public funds would be used for local development substantially nor to stop the formation of internal groups within the party. In other words, it was expected by party leaders that financial support from one party member to another would continue to happen regardless of the introduction of the CDCF. There would remain a space for party members to establish personal relationships between them. Thus, on the question as to why the CCM decided to introduce a CDF which might weaken their control over the party members, this study finds that CCM leaders probably did not perceive that a CDF would affect intraparty competition and power dynamics significantly. Instead, the introduction of the CDCF was a symbolic policy decision to acknowledge the role of MPs in bringing development to their constituencies and support it.
Chapter 6  Back from *Bunge*: The Relationship between MPs and Voters in Tanzania

In my constituency, my house is a hospital and a police station. I am a doctor and a police officer. When people have problems, they come to my house first. — Said Mtanda, MP for the Mchinga constituency (CCM)

In developing countries, if an MP is doing his work properly, there is no one who understands the realities of development on the ground better than an MP. — Willibrod Peter Slaa, Secretary General of CHADEMA

6.1. Introduction

Tanzanian MPs and political analysts describe the constituency roles of MPs with various phrases, namely benefactors, providers, executors, social workers, saviours, multi-faceted donors and even walking ATMs. As Mtanda states above, voters directly seek assistance from MPs on their various problems. A common story told by MPs during the interviews is that, when they go home in their constituencies, people make long queues outside their houses every morning, and MPs meet them one by one to hear their requests for assistance before having breakfast. Thus, as Slaa argues, MPs may be in a position to know about local development challenges better than anyone else. These accounts suggest that the roles of MPs in their constituencies are not merely underpinned by the election incentives of individual MPs but have been institutionalised as a public norm in the country.

As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the main reasons for establishing a CDF in Tanzania and other countries was to relieve the fundraising burden on MPs for their constituency service. Chapter 5 demonstrated that the benefactor role of MPs, which was prohibited during the one-party period, gradually expanded in the country after the transition to the multiparty system in the early 1990s. Building on these findings, this chapter examines what kinds of role Tanzanian MPs actually play in their constituencies, based on the interviews with MPs and other key informants to elucidate the benefactor role of MPs and the fundraising burden on them. The chapter also explores the public

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151 Interview, Mtanda (2011).
152 Interview, Slaa (2011).
153 Interviews, MPs and academics (2010, 2011).
perceptions of MPs through the regression analysis of the Afrobarometer survey results. Through a combination of the two analyses, this chapter explains the changing nature of the relationship between MPs and voters in Tanzania.

Afrobarometer is a series of surveys on public attitudes towards social, political and economic conditions which have been undertaken in eighteen African countries since 1999. In Tanzania, five rounds of the Afrobarometer surveys were conducted by the Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) in 2001 (with 2,198 samples), 2003 (1,223), 2005 (1,304), 2008 (1,208) and 2012 (2,400). In the surveys, nationally representative, random, stratified probability samples were selected, the sizes of which were sufficient to yield an overall margin of error of +/-2% or +/-3% at a 95% confidence level. The REPOA’s Afrobarometer research team conducted face-to-face interviews with the respondents in Swahili (Afrobarometer).

6.2. Constituency Roles of MPs in Tanzania

The first section of the chapter analyses the way in which Tanzanian MPs and voters interact with each other and features various approaches taken by MPs to serve their constituencies, mainly based on the interviews with MPs and other key informants, and supplemented by the Afrobarometer surveys. The following four areas are explored: 1) how often and how long MPs visit their constituencies; 2) how and what kinds of requests voters make to MPs; 3) how MPs respond to these requests, with a focus on the sources of funds and the types of goods they provide; and 4) how important the CDCF is to the overall constituency service by MPs. The selection of the types of goods is indicative of what kind of relationships MPs intend to establish with voters in relation to the two types of accountability relationship between MPs and voters, namely programmatic and clientelistic relationships, discussed in Chapter 1. An examination of the above four areas confirms the significance of the benefactor role of MPs in their constituencies, and thus the MP-voter relationship is not programmatic based on public goods. Yet, there is wide variation in the way in which MPs respond to voters’ requests for assistance and the types of goods MPs provide to voters. This section also highlights the mechanisms set up by MPs to provide assistance to voters in systematic ways, which suggests that some MPs are shifting away from the provision of private goods on an ad-hoc basis.
6.2.1. MPs’ Visits to Constituencies

As the Parliament of Tanzania is located in the country’s capital, Dodoma, which is approximately 500 kilometres away from Dar es Salaam, the largest city where most of the central ministries and major private companies are situated, the lives of Tanzanian MPs are characterised by the frequent movements between Dar es Salaam, Dodoma and their constituencies throughout the year. Parliamentary sessions in Dodoma are held for four months per year: two-week regular sessions in February, April and November and a ten-week budget session between June and August. Parliamentary Committee meetings are held in the office of Parliament in Dar es Salaam for two weeks before each of the parliamentary sessions, totalling two months per year (United Republic of Tanzania).

If MPs attend all the parliamentary sessions and the committee meetings, they have a chance to visit their constituencies four times a year between these activities for up to six months. In reality, there is large variation in the time MPs spend in Parliament and their constituencies. Among the five MPs interviewed in 2011 and 2012, the time they spend in Parliament varies from 1 to 5 months, and in their constituencies from 50 days to 6 months per year. While MPs are members of the full district council meetings, the frequency of their attendance to the council meetings also varies between 8 days and 2 months among the five interviews MPs.154

The time MPs spend in their constituencies is often viewed as an indication of the level of voter satisfaction of their MPs. There is a stereotype that MPs spend most of their time in Dar es Salaam, enjoying city life, and visiting their constituencies only before the elections. According to the Afrobarometer surveys, Tanzanian voters have higher expectations of MPs on the frequency of their visits to constituencies (Figure 6.1). Almost 20% of the respondents expected MPs to spend almost all the time in their constituencies in 2005. While the ratio declined in 2008, a majority of the respondents still expected MPs to visit their constituencies at least once a month. A number of respondents consider that MPs never visited their constituencies or visited at least once per year in practice.

154 Interviews, five MPs (2011).
Despite the above public image, MPs do visit their constituencies between parliamentary sessions to inform voters about the parliamentary discussions on key issues, collect the views of voters and hear their problems so that they can effectively represent the constituents inside and outside Parliament.\textsuperscript{155} There are MPs known as grassroots politicians who spend most of their time in their constituencies except for parliamentary sessions and committee meetings.\textsuperscript{156}

However, the frequency of their visits to or the lengths of their stay in their constituencies do not determine the actual level of voter satisfaction of the performance of MPs. For example, it does not necessarily matter to the MPs who make large financial contribution to the constituencies how often they visit there. The MP who said he spends only 50 days in his constituency in the interview exemplifies this type of MP. Another example is the cabinet members who have limited time for their constituency work. For example, Lazaro Samuel Nyalandu, MP for Singida North (CCM) and the then Deputy Minister for Industry, Trade and Marketing, usually visits his constituency only on weekends due to his responsibilities in the ministry, yet he has sustained a high

\textsuperscript{155} Interviews, MPs (2010, 2011).
\textsuperscript{156} A conversation with a parliamentary official (2010).
level of voter support. Not only cabinet members but also some backbench MPs argue that they cannot meet the financial demands of their constituents unless they go to Dar es Salaam, other large towns or abroad to raise funds for their constituency development. This suggests that the time MPs spend in their constituencies is not a determining factor of the voters’ assessment of responsiveness of MPs.

6.2.2. Requests by Voters to MPs

Voters seek assistance from MPs to solve their personal as well as community problems in various locations. Some voters even travel to Dodoma during parliamentary sessions to meet MPs as they think that it is easier to find MPs in Dodoma than in Dar es Salaam or their constituencies. As the use of mobile phones has expanded in the country, MPs are increasingly receiving calls and text messages from voters. The telephone numbers of MPs are publicly available, for example on the Parliament’s website, and it is not difficult for voters to find the numbers of their representatives.

In the Afrobarometer surveys, there was a question as to how often respondents contacted their MPs to talk about important problems or to give them their views during the past year. In 2012, 22% of the respondents said they contacted their MPs once or more. This result suggests that on average, each MP was contacted by around 13,000 voters between 2011 and 2012. The same question was asked in the past surveys. As Figure 6.2 shows, the ratio of the respondents who contacted MPs increased between 2008 and 2012. Yet, even in 2008, each MP was contacted by around 10,000 voters per year on average. As such, although a majority of voters have never contacted their MPs, those who have contacted are a large number for each MP.

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157 Interview, Nyalandu (2011).
158 The voting-age population of 18 years old or older in Tanzania was around 21 million in 2010 and 22% of it is 4.6 million (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). If it is divided by the total number of constituency MPs and special seats MPs (which is currently 341), it will be around 13,000.
159 15% of the voting-age population is 3.2 million. If it is divided by the total number of constituency MPs and special seats MPs (which was 307 then), it will be around 10,000.
Figure 6.2  Frequencies of Contacting MPs

Note: To make the data comparable across the years, the value of ‘Sometimes’ in the 2001 survey is translated as ‘A few times’ in the table.
Source: Afrobarometer

Since MPs do not stay in their constituencies all the time, their personal assistants play a crucial role in their communication with voters. Almost all MPs have personal assistants in their constituencies. Their main task is to receive opinions and requests from voters and bring them to MPs or local governments depending on the nature of the issues.160 Voters come to see them or write letters to the offices of MPs in the district council offices. For example, there are large files of request letters from voters to Mohammed Dewji, MP for Singida Urban (CCM), in his office within the Singida Municipal Office. Some of the personal assistants are active CCM members at the local level. For example, Dewji’s personal assistant is the CCM Publicity Secretary in the Singida District and a cadre member of the party. He facilitates the relationship between Dewji and the CCM members as well as other stakeholders in his constituency.161

The interviews with MPs confirm that they receive all kinds of financial requests from voters, including donations to community projects, school fees, medical expenses, weddings and funerals. In addition to the financial requests, MPs are also asked for non-financial assistance such as legal advice on the family disputes over inheritance and becoming guarantors for people in police custody. Due to insufficient public service provided by central and local governments, MPs have become the first point of contacts

160 Interview, Tondoro (2011).
for voters on any serious problem they face in their daily lives. There is no major difference between urban and rural areas in the kinds of requests made by voters.\textsuperscript{162}

There seems to be a tendency that voters seek assistance from MPs for less urgent matters for their survival. For example, Said Mtanda claimed that he receives more requests to help with the payment of school fees than medical expenses because medical problems are often more urgent than education of children.\textsuperscript{163} People who have urgent medical problems are more likely to seek assistance from their relatives, neighbours or friends, rather than MPs. MPs tend to receive requests of support for special medical treatments, such as the operations for chronic diseases in hospitals in Dar es Salaam or abroad.

Some voters even take advantage of MPs and try to manipulate them. For example, two MPs from the NCCR-Mageuzi announced in November 2011 that they would not receive any telephone calls and text messages from voters because they had received fabricated requests from voters asking for assistance regarding rapes and killings in their constituencies. They asked voters to send letters to their offices instead of calling or texting them (Mwananchi 28 November 2011).

Most of the interviewed MPs think that voters’ requests for financial assistance have grown over the years, while some politicians consider that needs for assistance had always been there but they have become more expressive of the demands, partly because of the increasing knowledge of the assistance provided by MPs to voters in other constituencies.\textsuperscript{164} MPs claim that they receive more requests during election years than non-election years. What these accounts suggest is that while the relationship between MPs and voters in Tanzania seems to be characterised by a patron-client relationship based on the provision of financial assistance by MPs to voters, Tanzanian voters are not necessarily ignorant clients dependent on their patrons; but rather, they can be opportunistic and strategic in their interactions with MPs.

\textsuperscript{161} Interviews, Ibrahim (2011), Mazala (2011) and Ngimba (2011).
\textsuperscript{162} Interviews, Mdee (2012) and Zungu (2012).
\textsuperscript{163} Interview, a CCM MP (2011).
\textsuperscript{164} Interviews, Mziray (2011) and Cheyo (2011).
6.2.3. Responses by MPs to Voters’ Requests: Sources of Funds and Types of Goods

There is variation in the way in which MPs respond to voters’ requests. One interviewed MP contributes materials (e.g. cement, bricks) to community projects instead of giving people money to avoid the potential misuse of it. Another MP provides partial financial support to individual voters, usually half of the amount voters ask for, as a token of encouragement. Some MPs consider that openness to listen to voters and give them encouragement is important even if they cannot offer any tangible assistance.165

In terms of the types of goods, some MPs provide private as well as club goods to assist both individuals and communities. Other MPs try to provide only club goods and avoid offering private goods except for urgent cases. This is partly because of the higher transaction costs incurred in the provision of private goods. Yet, the unit cost of club goods is higher than that of private goods, which makes it difficult for some MPs who do not have access to large amounts of funds to provide club goods. There is also a strategic dimension in the provision of private goods. The recipients of private goods may act as agents of MPs and can mobilise support during the election campaigns. Private goods are probably better to establish such individual networks than club goods. MPs also negotiate with local government officials and heads of schools and hospitals to provide assistance or to grant exemption of payments to certain voters.

The common source of funds for constituency service by MPs is their salaries and allowances. The remuneration of MPs varies significantly across the countries in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the monthly remuneration of Ghanaian MPs was US$2,760 in 2008. Kenyan MPs received US$13,090 every month between 2008 and 2013 (Barkan and Matiangi 2009: 56; Lindberg and Zhou 2009: 167). The monthly remuneration of Tanzanian MPs has been Tsh7.3 million (approximately US$5,100) since 2010, as summarised in Table 6.1.

165 Interviews, four MPs (2011, 2012).
Table 6.1 Monthly Remuneration of Tanzanian MPs since 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>Tsh2.3 million (approximately US$1,600)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency allowance</td>
<td>Tsh800,000 (approximately US$600)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary allowance</td>
<td>Tsh1 million (approximately US$700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office allowance (a personal assistant, a driver, an office attendant, stationary and secretarial service)</td>
<td>Tsh700,000 (approximately US$500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mileage allowance (fuel for a private car)</td>
<td>Tsh2 million (approximately US$1,400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone allowance</td>
<td>Tsh500,000 (approximately US$300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tsh7.3 million (approximately US$5,100)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The net salary is Tsh1.6 million after income tax (30%) is deducted. The allowances are exempt from income tax. MPs who do not represent constituencies receive special allowance instead of constituency allowance.

Sources: United Republic of Tanzania (2008d), Mwananchi (10 December 2011; 18 January 2012)

In addition, each MP receives Tsh70,000 (approximately US$45) as a daily sitting allowance during the parliamentary sessions. Apparently, there is no strict regulation for MPs to use the allowances for the given purposes; they can use them for supporting constituents or any other activities.

In December 2011, an increase in the sitting allowance of MPs during parliamentary sessions, known as *posho* in Swahili, caught wide public attention. The suggested increase was from Tsh70,000 to Tsh200,000 consisting of Tsh80,000 as per diem and Tsh50,000 for transport (Mwananchi 10 December 2011; Mwananchi 18 January 2012). Prime Minister Pinda defended the increase and stated that ‘MPs have a chain of responsibilities that requires them to spend colossal amounts of money, chief among them attending to the problems of their constituents’ (The Citizen 26 January 2012). This comment supports the norm on the benefactor role of MPs that their remuneration should be shared with their constituents.

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166 US$1 = Tsh1,432.3 (2010) (Bank of Tanzania 2013).
167 Interview, Sitta (2012).
168 Interview, a parliamentary official (2011). For example, January Makamba, MP for Bumbuli (CCM) mentioned in a television programme that he used the allowance for purchasing a car to buy computers for his company that supports the development of his constituency (Orijino Komedi 2012).
169 Interview, Anangwe (2011). Sitta made a point in the interview that the request should have been made for increasing the constituency allowance if it was meant to help MPs’ constituency service (2012).
During the election campaigns, political parties support their candidates in the constituencies where the level of competition is high. Yet, there is no formal system for MPs to get financial assistance from their parties for constituency service between elections. On the contrary, parties sometimes ask MPs to make contributions to various party activities at local levels. Instead, as noted in Chapter 5, some MPs seek assistance in mobilising funds from party members who are senior and/or wealthy on an individual basis.170

Most of the MPs have other sources of funds, such as businesses of their own or their families. They are eligible for higher loans from private banks than other citizens. For example, the maximum amount MPs can borrow from the National Bank for Commerce, one of the commercial banks in Tanzania, during their five-year term is Tsh200 million, ten times more than ordinary citizens whose loans are up to Tsh20-30 million.171

Some MPs have established funding mechanisms to systematically provide assistance to their constituents rather than providing assistance to voters on an ad-hoc basis. For example, Nyalandu established scholarships to support 2,600 secondary school students and 50 university students and a funding mechanism for water projects in his constituency. Dewji also has scholarships for secondary school fees and supported 2,000 students in 2010.172 He also established funds for medical expenses for special treatment and helped fifteen people in 2010 including an operation in India.173 Mary Michael Nagu, MP for Hanang (CCM) and Minister for the Prime Minister’s Office for Investment and Empowerment, set up a Ward Fund for Education which is funded by herself and adults in her constituency. Part of the CDCF was also allocated to the fund.

January Makamba, MP for Bumbuli (CCM) and Deputy Minister for Communication, Science and Technology, is one of the young rising politicians who takes an innovative approach to the development of his constituency (The Guardian 26 August 2012). As a former personal assistant to President Kikwete, Makamba considers that the government alone cannot solve the existing social problems of Tanzania and private enterprises need to tackle them as well. Based on this view, he established the Bumbuli Development Corporation (BDC), a private company which specifically aims

171 Interview, an informant (2012).
to promote economic growth and reduction of poverty in his Bumbuli constituency. Based on the baseline research undertaken by a consultant, the BDC formulated a development strategy of the constituency with a focus on three areas: microfinance, nutrition and education. The BDC is currently implementing a three-year pilot programme of cash on delivery for education through which secondary schools receive awards based on the performance of students in examinations. Makamba also utilises technology in communicating with the people in his constituencies. For example, he set up a computer programme that receives all the telephone messages sent from his constituents to several toll free numbers. The programme is monitored by the BDC staff and he can efficiently keep track of the problems facing his constituents through this programme (Bumbuli Development Corporation ; Orijino Komedi 2012). As such, MPs can be social entrepreneurs in accelerating constituency development.

While establishing funding mechanisms for constituency service requires the ability to raise funds and manage them effectively to maximise their effects, there is an example of another kind of mechanism to systematise constituency service. Muhammad Sanya, MP for Mji Mkongwe in Zanzibar (CUF) established a development committee consisting of twelve members from different areas of his constituency and an accounts officer to keep record of all the voters’ requests and his responses to make his constituency service fair and transparent. Although his constituency is small and the nature of his relationship with voters may be different from a majority of MPs of Mainland, it is an interesting example of how the assistance provided to voters by MPs can be systematised.

There are a number of factors explaining the variation in the approaches taken by MPs to their constituency service such as their vision and personal background, particularly, the level of their exposure to the west and career orientations. Constituency service is fundamental for MPs to retain their seats in Parliament but not sufficient for them to further advance their positions in the government and their parties. Thus, MPs have incentives to reduce the transaction costs for constituency service so that they could allocate more time and energy to other activities that would directly contribute to advancing their political careers.

174 Interview, Makamba (2011).
175 Interview, Sanya (2011).
6.2.4. The Significance of the CDCF to Constituency Service

As there is wide variation in the amount MPs raise for their constituency service, the level of the significance of the introduction of the CDCF to MPs varies widely. Among several MPs interviewed in 2011, the ratio of the CDCF funds, their personal contribution to community projects and their personal contribution to individuals ranged from 30:1:2 to 1:10:15. Clearly, the CDCF is an important source of funds for constituency service for the MP who said the ratio was 30:1:2. The MP who answered 1:10:15 may not represent typical MPs as he is a wealthy businessman. The ratios of other MPs fall between them (e.g. 1:2:2). Although the sample size is too small to generalise how important the CDCF is to MPs, these examples suggest that there is wide variation in the ratio of the CDCF to their entire financial contributions to the constituencies. It should also be noted that the level of significance of the CDCF to constituency service is contingent on the characteristics and skills of individual MPs, including their party affiliation and strategies for constituency development and elections.

6.3. Public Views on MPs in Tanzania

One of the core rationales for introducing a CDF in Tanzania was to relieve the fundraising burden on MPs to respond to the financial requests made by their constituents. As described in the previous section, MPs are indeed under constant pressure to meet the financial expectations of voters and some MPs have established mechanisms to raise and allocate funds for their constituents. This section examines the public views concerning MPs in Tanzania by analysing the Afrobarometer survey results. It explores how the public views have affected the constituency approaches taken by MPs and moreover, underpinned the rationale of ‘relieving the burden on MPs’ to adopt a CDF. The rest of the section consists of three analyses: 1) election incentives (takrima), 2) public expectations of the role of MPs and 3) public views on the performance of MPs.

6.3.1. Election Incentives

The first analysis is on the characteristics of voters who are likely to receive election
incentives, known as \textit{takrima} as discussed in Chapter 5. Although legally prohibited, election incentives are one type of private goods used by politicians and political parties. In the Afrobarometer surveys in 2005 and 2012, the respondents were asked how often, if ever, a candidate or someone from a political party offered them something such as food, a gift or money in return for their votes in the 2000 and 2010 elections, respectively. As discussed in Chapter 5, \textit{takrima} was legal between 2000 and 2006. A large majority of respondents did not experience any offers of election incentives (Figure 6.3). However, the ratio of the respondents who did increased by 7.1 percentage points from 6.3\% in the 2000 elections (reported in the 2005 survey) to 13.3\% in the 2010 elections (reported in the 2012 survey). Thus, the legal changes made during the Kikwete’s first administration (2005–2010) (e.g. the illegalisation of \textit{takrima} in 2006 and the enactment of the Election Expenses Act in 2010) do not seem to have had an impact on curbing vote-buying practices in the country.

\textbf{Figure 6.3} \quad \textit{Election Incentives Offered by a Candidate or Political Party}

![Election Incentives Offered by a Candidate or Political Party](image)

Source: Afrobarometer

As the question was on an illegal vote-buying practice, there is a possibility of misreporting (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013: 7); some respondents might have tried to give what they perceived to be correct answers to the interviewers instead of their actual
experience. Although each respondent was told at the beginning that the surveys were conducted independently from the government or political parties, a number of respondents perceived that the surveys were conducted by the government. For example, in 2012, 65.6% of respondents considered that the interviewers were sent by the government, political parties or politicians. Indeed, these respondents were slightly less likely to report that they were offered election incentives than those who perceived that the survey was conducted by a non-governmental agency (Kendall’s tau-b = -0.05, P = 0.01). This suggests a slight possibility of underreporting on their vote-buying experience. However, if the group of respondents who perceived that the surveys were conducted by the government, political parties or politicians are excluded, the ratio of the respondents who were offered election incentives increased more radically than the whole group of respondents by 11.9 percentage points from 3.9% in 2005 to 15.7% in 2012. Thus, it is fair to interpret that the use of election incentives expanded over years or Tanzanians became more honest about their vote-buying experience, irrespective of their perception of the survey sponsor.

The next step is to explore who were more likely to be targeted by candidates or political parties to influence their votes by using incentives. To answer this question, binary logistic regression models were adapted from Kramon’s (2009) Afrobarometer Working Paper, which examines the effects of election incentives on the voter turnout in the 2002 elections in Kenya. The first model examines the demographic characteristics of the respondents, namely, gender, age and residential (urban or rural) areas. The second model tests the socio-economic background of respondents by creating: 1) a dummy variable from the question on the frequency of running out of cash income in the past twelve months; 2) a dummy variable from the question on the frequency of running out of food in the past twelve months; and 3) an interval variable on the level of education (see Appendix C for the list of variables and questions of the Afrobarometer used for the analysis). The variables on cash income and food represent two levels of economic condition of the respondents; the former demonstrates economic instability (i.e. those who went without cash income are economically unstable) and the latter indicates extreme poverty (i.e. those who went without food to eat are extremely

176 The interviewers were trained to state the following sentences as part of the introduction of each interview: ‘I am from the Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), an independent research organization. I do not represent the government or any political party’.
177 The question (Q100) is ‘Who do you think sent us to do this interview?’ See Appendix C for the
poor). It is expected that there are a number of Tanzanians who are economically unstable but not extremely poor. The hypotheses for the model on socio-economic conditions are that ‘[p]oorer voters may be more susceptible to vote-buying because even small transfers are valuable to them’ (Kramon 2009: 7) and less educated voters may also be more targeted by politicians or political parties due to their lack of understanding of the legal and ethical problems inherent in election incentives (Lindberg 2010: 134).

The third model examines the nature and level of political engagement of the respondents. Following Kramon’s (2009) approach, this model includes political parties; whether the respondents supported the CCM or opposition parties. The responses in the 2005, 2008 and 2012 surveys are compiled in Table 6.2 below. As there is no question on election incentives in the 2008 survey, logistic regression was run only for the 2005 and 2012 surveys.

Table 6.2 Public Support to Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One of the other parties</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not choose</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer

It is widely known that takrima was used mainly by CCM politicians in the elections in 2000 and 2005. Opposition parties were against the legalisation of takrima. If Cox and McCubbins’ (1986) argument that ‘private goods (like bribes or gifts) are more likely to be targeted toward core supporters’ (Kramon 2009: 13) is right, CCM supporters are expected to have been offered election incentives more often than opposition supporters. Alternatively, if Dixit and Londregan’s (1996) argument that politicians often target resources at swing voters is right, CCM politicians might have targeted at swing voters or even opposition supporters.

While Kramon (2009) examines only political parties, this analysis also included options for the answers.

178 The respondents were asked, ‘Do you feel close to any particular political party?’ (Q89A); and if they said yes, they were asked, ‘Which party is that?’ (Q89A).
179 Interview, Wankanga (2011).
four variables on political engagement from the survey data with a speculation that the more politically engaged the respondents are, the more likely they are offered election incentives, because it is easier for candidates or political parties to approach politically active citizens to offer incentives and convince them. The first indicator of the level of political engagement is whether they voted in the elections. The voter turnout had generally been high in Tanzania, except in the last 2010 elections; it declined dramatically from 72.4% in 2005 to 42.8% in 2010 (Legal and Human Rights Centre and Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation 2010: 103). Yet, 80.5% of the respondents said that they voted in the 2010 elections in the Afrobarometer survey in 2012. As Table 6.4 shows below, it did not make a difference on whether they voted or not in the regression analysis on election incentives; thus, I did not examine the gaps in the voter turnout further between the official report and the Afrobarometer.

In the 2012 survey, there are three more variables relating to political engagement of voters: 1) attendance at a campaign meeting or rally in the elections; 2) persuasion of others to vote for a certain presidential or legislative candidate or party in the elections; and 3) work for a candidate or party in the elections. Seventy-two per cent of the respondents attended campaign meetings or rallies, 25% persuaded others to vote for a certain candidate or political party, and 14% worked for a candidate or a political party (see Appendix C for the details of the variables). The 2005 survey does not have these questions.

The level of electoral competition might also have influenced the use of election incentives. The more competitive the elections are, the more likely the voters are perceived as pivotal to winning the elections and have been offered election incentives (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Kramon 2009: 8; Lindberg 2008). With the assumption that 'voters can estimate how close an upcoming election might be’ (Kramon 2009: 8), the vote margins of the 2010 elections were calculated and added to the Afrobarometer dataset, and to the model on political engagement (see Appendix C for the calculations of vote margins).  

Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 show the results of logistic regression of the 2005 and

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180 As CCM’s dominant power in politics has not been challenged by any other parties in Tanzania Mainland since independence, the primaries of the CCM have often been more competitive than the general elections, and election incentives may have been used more often during the party primaries. However, due to the lack information on the party primaries, only the vote margins of the general
2012 surveys, respectively. As Model 3 on political engagement showed that opposition supporters were more likely to claim that they were offered election incentives than CCM supporters, two models (Model 4 and Model 6) were added to test which opposition supporters were more likely to be offered incentives by creating two dummy variables in 2012: CUF supporters and CHADEMA supporters. As presented in Table 6.2 above, the sample size of opposition supporters in 2005 was too small to test this.

Table 6.3 Logistic Regression Analysis of Election Incentives (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.502*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-0.605+</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.513</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without cash income</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.263</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without food</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM supporters</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.142**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.238***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in the last elections</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.737***</td>
<td>-3.209***</td>
<td>-2.095***</td>
<td>-2.257**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1248</td>
<td>1267</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.0137</td>
<td>0.0047</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.0388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent was offered an election incentive (e.g. food, gift, money) by a candidate or someone from a political party in the last elections (0 = No, 1 = Yes).
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer
### Table 6.4 Logistic Regression Analysis of Election Incentives (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demographic</td>
<td>Socio-economic</td>
<td>Political engagement (CCM supporters)</td>
<td>Political engagement (opposition supporters)</td>
<td>All (CCM supporters)</td>
<td>All (opposition supporters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.009*</td>
<td>-0.015*</td>
<td>-0.014*</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-0.202</td>
<td>0.149**</td>
<td>0.527***</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without cash income</td>
<td>0.487*</td>
<td>0.683*</td>
<td>0.656*</td>
<td>0.424*</td>
<td>0.424*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without food</td>
<td>0.519***</td>
<td>0.424*</td>
<td>0.433**</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.11)</td>
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<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM supporters</td>
<td>-0.326*</td>
<td>-0.301*</td>
<td>-0.301*</td>
<td>-0.326*</td>
<td>-0.326*</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF supporters</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA supporters</td>
<td>0.498**</td>
<td>0.503**</td>
<td>0.503**</td>
<td>0.498**</td>
<td>0.498**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in the last elections</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended a campaign rally</td>
<td>0.643**</td>
<td>0.639**</td>
<td>0.563*</td>
<td>0.554*</td>
<td>0.554*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuade others</td>
<td>0.342+</td>
<td>0.351+</td>
<td>0.332+</td>
<td>0.341+</td>
<td>0.341+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked for a candidate/party</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.140</td>
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<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote margin &lt;=80</td>
<td>0.007*</td>
<td>0.007*</td>
<td>0.008*</td>
<td>0.008*</td>
<td>0.008*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.550***</td>
<td>-2.711***</td>
<td>-2.611***</td>
<td>-2.981***</td>
<td>-2.957***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2388</td>
<td>2388</td>
<td>1418</td>
<td>1418</td>
<td>1417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R^2</td>
<td>0.0356</td>
<td>0.0114</td>
<td>0.0365</td>
<td>0.0255</td>
<td>0.0255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

**Dependent variable:** Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent was offered an election incentive (e.g. food, gift, money) by a candidate or someone from a political party in the last elections (0 = No, 1 = Yes).

**Source:** the author, based on Afrobarometer

As a majority of voters were not offered election incentives, the improvements in the correct classification of Model 4 (full model) in 2005 and Model 6 (full model) in 2012 are less than 0.01 percentage points.\(^{181}\) In 2005, male voters in rural areas were more likely to say that they were offered election incentives in the 2000 elections (Model 1 of 2005). A large majority (91.9\%) of respondents who selected a party are CCM supporters and they were less likely to claim that they were offered election incentives (Model 4 of 2005). In 2012, poor CHADEMA supporters in rural areas who were

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\(^{181}\) The ‘improvement in correct classification’ demonstrates how much more accurately we can predict the result. It is a gap between the baseline prediction (%) and the model prediction (%). The more accurate we are in the first place (i.e. the baseline prediction is high), the harder it is to improve it (i.e. to get a high improvement in correct classification). In this case, as a majority of voters were not offered election incentives, the baseline prediction is high and it is hard to get a high level of improvement in correct classification.
actively involved in election campaigns (e.g. attending campaign rallies, persuading others to vote for certain candidates or parties) were slightly more likely to be offered incentives. Their youth and the level of electoral competition in the constituencies also show a significant but very weak relationship. The respondents who worked for candidates or parties did not make significant difference.

The results suggest that CHADEMA supporters in rural areas were slightly more likely to be targeted by candidates or parties than CCM or CUF supporters for buying votes in the 2010 elections. There is no information on which candidate or party offered incentives to them. If the incentives had been offered by CCM politicians, as Dixit and Londregan (1996) argue, the respondents who expressed their support to the CHADEMA in the survey might have been perceived by the CCM as swing voters, and the incentives were used by the CCM to convince them to vote for CCM candidates. If incentives had been offered by CHADEMA politicians to motivate their supporters to go to the polls, it supports Cox and McCubbins’ (1986) argument on the use of incentives for core supporters.

There is, however, a caveat on potential misreporting. CHADEMA supporters may have been more honest and open about their experience of election incentives than CCM or CUF supporters. With the assumption that voters are aware that vote-buying is a wrong practice, they are expected to be open about the vote-buying practice of the politicians or parties they oppose, but hide the practice of the politicians or parties they support in the surveys. There were incidents that CHADEMA supporters received money at CCM campaign rallies and used it for CHADEMA’s election campaigns. These CHADEMA supporters are probably critical about the prevalence of vote-buying by the CCM and its candidates, and might have been more honest about their experience of being offered incentives by the CCM.

182 Interview, an informant (2010).
183 In the 2012 survey, there were two more questions on election incentives. One is the repetition of the above question with slightly different wordings (Q83B-TAN), and the other is the question on election incentives offered to neighbours of the respondents (Q83C-TAN). The respondents who said they were offered incentives increased by 3.4 percentage points from 13.3% to 16.7% when the question was asked for the second time, perhaps because some respondents became more open about their experience of election incentives at the later stage of the survey. On the questions on election incentives to neighbours, 27.1% said that their neighbours were offered incentives during the 2010 elections. As expected, it is higher than the incentives offered to the respondents themselves. Model 5 and Model 6 of the 2012 analysis were tested for election incentives to neighbours, and the results are similar to those of election incentives to respondents themselves, except urban-rural areas, food, CCM supporters and vote margins which became insignificant for the question on neighbours. Interestingly, CUF supporters were less likely to report that their neighbours were offered incentives (coefficient = -0.81, p < 0.05), while CHADEMA
To sum up, the Afrobarometer surveys show that the use of *takrima* was increased in the 2010 elections, and the practice occurred not only between CCM candidates and CCM supporters, but it also involved opposition supporters.

### 6.3.2. Public Expectations of the Role of MPs

Second, what kinds of expectations do Tanzanians have toward MPs? Do they expect MPs to provide programmatic, club or private goods? What determines their expectations? In the Afrobarometer survey in 2008, respondents were asked to select the most important responsibility of their MPs among the four core functions of MPs: 1) listen to constituents and represent their needs; 2) deliver jobs and development to people; 3) make laws for the good of the country; and 4) monitor the performance of president and his government.\(^{184}\) A majority of respondents consider that representation is the most important responsibility of MPs, which is followed by constituency service (Table 6.5).

### Table 6.5 Most Important Responsibility of MPs (Afrobarometer 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility (options)</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representation (listen to constituents and represent their needs)</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency service (deliver jobs and development to people)</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawmaking (make laws for the good of the country)</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight (monitor the performance of president and his government)</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these / Don’t know</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer

A similar result was found in the Views of the People in 2012, when the respondents were asked about the main responsibility of MPs (Table 6.6).

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\(^{184}\) There is a caveat in interpreting the second option as constituency service. Although this option in the original questionnaire in English is 'Deliver jobs or development to your constituency' (underline added by the author), it was translated to 'Kawapatia watu kazi na maendeleo (to deliver jobs and development to people)' (underline added by the author) in the Swahili questionnaire, which made the option less specifically related to constituency service.
Table 6.6  Main Responsibility of MPs (Views of the People 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility (options)</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representation (represent the interests of constituents)</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency service (bring benefits to their constituencies)</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawmaking (passing laws)</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight (supervising government)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research on Poverty Alleviation (2012: 38)

These results are in line with the existing literature on the expected roles of African MPs (Barkan 2009; Lindberg 2010). However, it is important to note that Tanzanians weigh more on representation than constituency service.

There are also two sets of questions on the public expectation of MPs in the Afrobarometer. The first set is to measure the public preference for service- or constituency-oriented MPs. In the 2008 survey, the respondents were asked whether they preferred to vote for ‘an MP with capacity to bring citizens good services’ or ‘an MP who will bring policies that benefit every citizen’. While there are some overlaps between the two options, the first option weighs more on the role of MPs in delivering tangible goods to citizens than the second option which highlights their role in delivering public goods through policymaking. The survey result shows that 65.1% of the respondents preferred service-oriented MPs (the first option) while 34.9% preferred policy-oriented MPs (the second option).

There was a related question in the survey in 2012. Each respondent was asked to choose between ‘a candidate who can deliver goods and services to people in [his or her] constituency alone’ and ‘a candidate who can make policies that benefit everyone in [the] country’. The former option refers to constituency-oriented MPs who deliver club or private goods while the latter refers to policy-oriented MPs who deliver public goods. A large majority (85.9%) of the respondents preferred policy-oriented MPs and only 14.1% preferred constituency-oriented MPs.

185 The wordings of this question are different between the questionnaires in English and Swahili. In the English questionnaire, the options are ‘a candidate who can deliver goods and services to people in this community’ and ‘a candidate who can make policies that benefit everyone in [the] country’. In the Swahili questionnaire, the first option is ‘mbunge mwenye uwezo wa uwezo wa kuwaletwa wananchi haduma bora (an MP with capacity to bring citizens good services)’ and the second option is ‘ambaye ataleta sera zitakonzomufaisa kila mwananchi (an MP who will bring policies that benefit every citizen)’. As such, there are no words referring to ‘this community’ in the first option in Swahili.

186 One potential explanation for the low rate of support to constituency-oriented MPs is the influence of a ‘leading question’ (Johnson 2001: 322). The first option in the original questionnaire in English was ‘a candidate who can deliver goods and services to people in [his or her] constituency’ (Afrobarometer 2012: 44), but when it was translated to Swahili, the word ‘pekee (alone)’ was added after ‘constituency’.
It should be noted that the respondents who prefer service- or
countryside-oriented MPs are not necessarily clientelistic voters. As discussed in
Chapter 1, the clientelistic relationship is characterised by the provision of club or
private goods by MPs to voters in exchange for their electoral support, while the
programmatic relationship is characterised by public or club goods. While public and
private goods are relatively easy to identify, there is a wide range of club goods which
can serve for either clientelistic or programmatic exchanges. For example, if an MP
makes a contribution to the rehabilitation of a bridge which benefits everyone in his or
her constituency, the bridge can be considered as a club good, or even a public good.
This type of constituency service is less clientelistic in comparison to the bridge which
benefits a limited number of residents in the constituency. Thus, the questions on
service- or constituency-oriented MPs in the Afrobarometer surveys are indicative of
their tendency for clientelism, but should be considered with a caution.

There is also a set of questions on public views on favouritism of MPs in the
Afrobarometer surveys in 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2012. The question wordings in the
first three surveys are slightly different from those of the 2012 survey. In the first three
surveys, Tanzanians were asked to choose between the following statements: 1) ‘[s]ince
leaders represent everyone, they should not favour their own family or group’ and 2)
‘[o]nce in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community’. In 2012, they were
asked to choose between the following statements: 1) ‘[o]nce in office, elected leaders
are obliged to help their home community or group first’ and 2) ‘[s]ince elected leaders
should represent everyone, they should not do anything that favours their own group
over others’. Technically, the question is not specifically about MPs but about (elected)
leaders, which also include the President and District Councillors. Yet, as the public
perception of MPs is probably similar to the results of these questions, this chapter
treats them as a variable on the public preference of favouritism of MPs. In the first
statement of the 2012 survey, the phrase ‘their own family or group’ was qualified with
the word ‘first’, which makes the degree of favouritism stronger in 2012 than the
surveys of previous years.

In comparison to the questions on the public preference for
service/constituency-oriented MPs, this set of questions on favouritism of MPs is more
strongly associated with clientelism. The types of goods provided by MPs in this scenario are club or private goods like the previous question, yet these goods are exclusively targeted to certain groups of people, which are more likely to contribute to generating the senses of reciprocity among voters.

There are two potential limitations in understanding the public views on favouritism through these questions. First, it is about what MPs should do, which might have prompted the respondents to provide their normative views rather than their actual preferences in elections. Second, if respondents do not belong to the ‘home community or group’ of the MPs elected from their constituencies, it is natural for them to select MPs who serve for all the constituents equally, regardless of whether they prefer favouritism or not.

Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 below show the results of the questions on favouritism in Tanzania and several other countries in 2008 and 2012. The 2012 survey results are available only for three countries. The ratio of the respondents who supported favouritism of leaders declined in Kenya and Tanzania in 2012, perhaps because the favouritism option in 2012 became more rigid than in the past surveys due to the wording of ‘first’ as mentioned above, than in the past surveys. In particular, Tanzania shows the lowest ratio among the three countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.7 Public Preference for Favouritism of Leaders (2008)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statement 1: Since leaders represent everyone, they should not favour their own family or group. Statement 2: Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community.
Source: Afrobarometer

have immensely parochial view about the role of MPs.
Table 6.8  Public Preference for Favouritism of Leaders (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Respondents who prefer favouritism of elected leaders (who selected Statement 1*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statement 1: Once in office, elected leaders are obliged to help their home community or group first. Statement 2: Since elected leaders should represent everyone, they should not do anything that favours their own group over others.
Source: Afrobarometer

Like the questions on election incentives discussed earlier, the respondents who perceived that the survey was conducted by the government might have tried to give what they perceived as correct answers instead of their actual preferences. However, chi-square tests show that, in 2012, the respondents who perceived that the survey was conducted by the government were slightly more likely to prefer constituency-oriented MPs (Kendall’s tau-b = 0.10, P = 0.00) and favouritism of MPs (Kendall’s tau-b = 0.07, P = 0.00). Thus, there is no issue of misreporting on these two questions derived from their perception of the survey sponsor.

As a next step, the characteristics of the respondents who prefer service-oriented MPs in the 2008 survey, constituency-oriented MPs in the 2012 survey and favouritism of leaders in both surveys were analysed by logistic regression. The models for election incentives discussed above were employed in these analyses, and the variable on whether respondents made contacts with MPs during the past twelve months was added to the model on political engagement (see Appendix C for the questions on the contacts with MPs). For the 2012 analysis, the variable on vote margins was removed from the model on political engagement because it was specifically related to the question on election incentives. As the variable on CCM supporters was not significant in any of these analyses, the difference between CUF and CHADEMA supporters was not tested, either. The variable on election incentives was added with the speculation that those who were offered election incentives were more likely to be clientelistic and support constituency-oriented MPs and favouritism of leaders (Model 4). Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 show the results of the regression analysis of the public preference for service-oriented MPs in 2008 and constituency-oriented MPs in 2012, respectively.
Table 6.9 Logistic Regression Analysis of Service-oriented MPs (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demographic</td>
<td>Socio-economic</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without cash income</td>
<td>-0.172</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without food</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM supporters</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in the last elections</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>-0.146</td>
<td>-0.146</td>
<td>-0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted the MP</td>
<td>-0.284</td>
<td>-0.311+</td>
<td>-0.311+</td>
<td>-0.311+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.544**</td>
<td>0.969***</td>
<td>0.890***</td>
<td>1.038*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>1190</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
<td>0.0074</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent prefers an MP who will bring policies that benefit every citizen or an MP with capacity to bring citizens good services (0 = policy, 1 = service).
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer
Table 6.10 Logistic Regression Analysis of Constituency-oriented MPs (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demographic</td>
<td>Socio-economic</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>Election Incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>- 0.245*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Urban</td>
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</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent prefers a candidate who can bring benefits to the whole country or the constituency alone (0 = country, 1 = constituency alone).

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

In 2008, there is almost no improvement in correct classification of Model 4 (less than 0.01 percentage points). Neither demographic nor socioeconomic conditions have a significant influence on the public preference on the types of MPs. Their party support did not matter, either. It only shows that the respondents who contacted MPs were less likely to prefer service-oriented MPs.

As mentioned earlier, in 2012, a large majority of respondents (85.9%) preferred policy-oriented MPs and thus, there was only marginal improvement in correct classification for Model 5 (0.41 percentage points). With the caveat of the low level of improvement in prediction, Model 5 suggests that less educated voters who did not attend campaign rallies but were offered election incentives and voted in 2010 are more likely to prefer constituency-oriented MPs. They are more likely to have contacted MPs.
after the elections. This result demonstrates that the political engagement of voters who prefer constituency-oriented MPs was limited to the direct and personal interactions with MPs.

Table 6.11 and Table 6.12 show the results for the public preference for favouritism of leaders in 2008 and 2012, respectively.

### Table 6.11  Logistic Regression Analysis of Favouritism of Leaders (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
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<td>Political engagement</td>
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<td>0.493**</td>
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<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.120</td>
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<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
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<td>0.547**</td>
<td>0.547**</td>
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<td>(0.18)</td>
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<td>- 0.674*</td>
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</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

**Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent thinks that, once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community (0 = No, 1 = Yes).**

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer
Table 6.12  Logistic Regression Analysis of Favouritism of Leaders (2012)

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Model 1</th>
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<th>Model 5</th>
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<td>Socio-economic</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Election incentives</td>
<td>All</td>
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<td>(0.15)</td>
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<td>(0.22)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gone without food</td>
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<td>0.148</td>
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<td>(0.14)</td>
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<td>(0.15)</td>
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<td>(0.19)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>- 0.131</td>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
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<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
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<td>1.034***</td>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent thinks that elected leaders should help their home community or group first (0 = No, 1 = Yes).
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

The improvement in correct classification was again marginal with only 0.32 percentage points for Model 4 in 2008 and 0.57 percentage points for Model 5 in 2012. Not surprisingly, in 2008, extremely poor Tanzanians who contacted their MPs were slightly more likely to prefer favouritism of leaders. In 2012, the result is similar to that of public preference for constituency-oriented MPs. Less educated voters who contacted MPs and were offered election incentives were more likely to support favouritism of leaders. Gender, residential areas, economic status, political parties or political engagement, except contacting MPs, did not make a significant difference.

The results of the above two analyses suggest that while a large majority of Tanzanians expressed their preference for MPs who would treat everyone equally and did not have direct interactions with MPs, there are groups of voters who established direct personal relationships with MPs regardless of their party affiliation. MPs or
political parties were more likely to target them in using election incentives, and they were likely to seek assistance from MPs to solve their community or individual problems after the elections. This represents a typical clientelistic relationship between MPs and voters.

Finally, by combining the two sets of questions on service/constituency-oriented MPs and favouritism of leaders, the characteristics of programmatic voters were examined. Here, programmatic voters are defined as those who did not select either service/constituency-MPs or favouritism of leaders. Programmatic voters significantly increased from 21.5% in 2008 to 88.7% in 2012. Although the difference in these results cannot be taken at face value because the question wordings were different between the 2008 and 2012 surveys, it at least suggests that Tanzanians were increasingly in favour of programmatic MPs who were capable of contributing to national policymaking. The results of logistic regression are shown in Table 6.13 and Table 6.14 below.
Table 6.13 Logistic Regression Analysis of Programmatic Voters (2008)

<table>
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<tr>
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent prefer programmatic MPs: those who did not prefer either community-oriented MPs or favouritism of leaders (0 = No, 1 = Yes).
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer
Table 6.14  Logistic Regression Analysis of Programmatic Voters (2012)

<table>
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<td>Political</td>
<td>Election incentives</td>
<td>All</td>
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<td>- 0.145</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>- 0.145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without cash income</td>
<td>- 0.008 (0.16)</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without food</td>
<td>- 0.085 (0.10)</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.333***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM supporters</td>
<td>- 0.028 (0.12)</td>
<td>- 0.081</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in the last elections</td>
<td>- 0.095 (0.16)</td>
<td>- 0.167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended a campaign rally</td>
<td>0.317* (0.14)</td>
<td>0.296*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuaded others</td>
<td>- 0.137 (0.15)</td>
<td>- 0.107</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Worked for a candidate/party</td>
<td>- 0.025 (0.18)</td>
<td>- 0.057</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted the MP</td>
<td>- 0.909*** (0.12)</td>
<td>- 0.729***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election incentives</td>
<td></td>
<td>- 1.226*** (0.13)</td>
<td>- 1.098***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.007***</td>
<td>0.593**</td>
<td>1.322***</td>
<td>1.366***</td>
<td>0.401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>2368</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2361</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.0018</td>
<td>0.0069</td>
<td>0.0300</td>
<td>0.0351</td>
<td>0.0636</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent prefer programmatic MPs: those who did not prefer either constituency-oriented MPs or favouritism of elected leaders (0 = No, 1 = Yes).

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

In 2008, there is almost no improvement of correct classification for Model 4 in 2008 (less than 0.01 percentage points) and unsurprisingly, extremely poor Tanzanians in urban areas were less likely to be programmatic voters. In 2012, the improvement in correct classification for Model 5 is better than 2008 with 1.93 percentage points. The results confirm some key aspects of the earlier analyses on constituency-oriented MPs and favouritism; educated voters who attended campaign rallies were more likely to be programmatic voters. They were also less likely to have been offered election incentives in the 2010 elections or to have contacted MPs after the elections.

6.3.3. Public Views on the Performance of MPs

While the analyses so far demonstrate that there are clientelistic voters who are more
likely to have dyadic interactions with MPs and are prone to vote-buying practice, how do voters evaluate the performance of MPs in Tanzania? Do the types of goods offered by MPs matter to their assessment of the performance of MPs? In the 2005, 2008 and 2012 surveys, the respondents were asked whether they approved or disapproved of the performance of MPs over the past twelve months (Figure 6.4). The results show that Tanzanians became increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of MPs, as the disapproval rate increased by 8.7 percentage points from 29.2% in 2005 to 38.0% in 2012.

**Figure 6.4 Public Views on the Performance of MPs**

![Graph showing public views on the performance of MPs from 2005 to 2012.

Source: Afrobarometer

While the participation to the parliamentary debates is an essential task of MPs to represent their constituencies, to make policies by crafting laws and to oversee the executive, African legislatures had been ineffective institutions in policymaking for a long time, as discussed in Chapter 4. Against this background, Twaweza, a Tanzanian civil society advocacy initiative, published the ranking of how actively MPs participated in *Bunge* by comparing the number of interventions they made in the Ninth Parliament (2005–2010) (Twaweza 2010b: 7–14). The interventions include basic questions, supplementary questions and contributions by MPs. Although this does not explain the quality or effectiveness of the interventions, the ranking can be treated as a proxy of the level of engagement of MPs with Parliament, or their programmatic roles. Based on the
ranking and 2010 election results, Twaweza (2010c) argues that backbenchers who were re-elected in 2010 were generally more active in Parliament than those who were not, as the average number of interventions made by re-elected MPs was 92, while that by non-returning MPs was 81 (4). This finding indicates that the more active MPs are in Parliament, the more likely their performance would be approved by their voters.

With the assumption that voters have some ideas about how their MPs are engaged with Parliament through the media, meetings with MPs or word of mouth, I added the Twaweza’s intervention ranking to the Afrobarometer dataset to test if the level of engagement of MPs with Parliament affected the public views on the performance of MPs (Twaweza 2010b). Since ministers and deputy ministers represent the government and participate in Parliament differently from backbenchers, the respondents whose representatives were cabinet members between 2005 and 2010 were removed from the analysis (see Appendix C for the scatterplot of the MPs’ interventions in Parliament and the public assessment of the performance of MPs).

To analyse the factors determining the public views on the performance of MPs, logistic regression was run for the 2005, 2008 and 2012 survey data, by applying the models used for the previous questions on the public expectations of the roles of MPs. As discussed above, the interventions by MPs in Parliament can be considered as their efforts in producing public goods, while election incentives is one (extreme) type of private goods. While MPs’ interventions in Parliament and election incentives are only two examples of the goods provided by MPs to voters, they were added to the regression analysis as one model (Model 4) to examine the types of goods in 2012. The public preference for service/constituency-oriented MPs and favouritism of leaders were also added as a model on the expected roles of MPs. The results are presented in Tables 6.15, 6.16 and 6.17 below.
### Table 6.15  Logistic Regression Analysis of the Performance of MPs (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demographic</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Gone without cash income</td>
<td>Gone without food</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.410**</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.296+</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-0.211</td>
<td>-0.422***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected roles of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>-0.265</td>
<td>-0.016*</td>
<td>0.683**</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
<td>0.607***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent approved or disapproved of the performance of their MPs over the past twelve months (Disapprove = 0, Approve = 1).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>the author, based on Afrobarometer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1
Table 6.16  Logistic Regression Analysis of the Performance of MPs (2008)

<table>
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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demographic</td>
<td>Socio-economic</td>
<td>Political engagement</td>
<td>Expected roles of MPs</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>- 0.259*</td>
<td>- 0.177</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>- 0.005</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>- 0.266+</td>
<td>- 0.184</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without cash income</td>
<td>- 0.126</td>
<td>- 0.212</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without food</td>
<td>- 0.237+</td>
<td>- 0.185</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>- 0.190</td>
<td>- 0.273+</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM supporters</td>
<td>0.348</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in the last elections</td>
<td>- 0.149</td>
<td>- 0.033</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted the MP</td>
<td>1.128***</td>
<td>1.192***</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service-oriented MPs</td>
<td>- 0.224+</td>
<td>- 0.022</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favouritism of MPs</td>
<td>0.391**</td>
<td>0.302+</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.659***</td>
<td>1.266***</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.691***</td>
<td>1.339**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
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<td>946</td>
<td>1156</td>
<td>910</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo-(R^2)</td>
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<td>0.0043</td>
<td>0.0246</td>
<td>0.0082</td>
<td>0.0369</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent approved or disapproved of the performance of their MPs over the past twelve months (Disapprove = 0, Approve = 1).

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer
Table 6.17  Logistic Regression Analysis of the Performance of MPs (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demographic</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.325***</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.301*</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-0.151+</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>0.113</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.736***</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.066</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended a campaign rally</td>
<td>-0.194</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
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<td>Persuaded others</td>
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<td>-0.350*</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contacted the MP</td>
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<td>(0.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.147</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS’ interventions in Parliament (except cabinet members)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Election incentives</td>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.600**</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Constituency-oriented MPs</td>
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<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.465*</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Favouritism of leaders</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.339*</td>
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<td>(0.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>0.0009</td>
<td>0.0348</td>
<td>0.0163</td>
<td>0.0143</td>
<td>0.0572</td>
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</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent approved or disapproved of the performance of their MPs over the past twelve months (Disapprove = 0, Approve = 1).

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

As for the 2005 and 2008 results, improvements in correct classification were 1.28 percentage points (Model 6) in 2005 and 0.66 percentage points (Model 5) in 2008, respectively. In 2005, female voters in urban areas and less educated voters were more likely to approve the performance of MPs (Models 1 and 2). While CCM supporters who contacted MPs were more likely to approve their performance (Model 3), those who were offered election incentives during the 2000 elections were less likely to approve it (Model 4). Their preference for favouritism of leaders did not have significant influence (Model 5).

In 2008, female voters in rural areas were more likely to approve the performance of MPs (Model 1), while extremely poor voters were more likely to disapprove of it (Model 2). Similar to the 2005 survey, voters who contacted MPs were
more likely to approve their performance, while voters’ party preference did not have significant difference (Model 3). The result also shows an interesting combination of the public expectation; voters who expected MPs to contribute to national policymaking but also to favour their home communities were more likely to approve the performance of MPs (Model 4). Less educated voters who contacted MPs and preferred favouritism were slightly more likely to approve the performance of MPs (Model 5).

In 2012, Model 6 shows a higher level of improvement in correct classification than the previous years with 3.82 percentage points. Again, the results suggest that female CCM supporters were more likely to approve the performance of MPs (Model 5). Those who persuaded others to vote for certain candidates or political parties were more likely to disapprove of the performance (Models 3 and 6). This implies that they might have supported the candidates who lost the election in 2010. Similar to the 2005 results, the respondents who were offered election incentives were more likely to disapprove of the performance of MPs. However, in contrast to the 2008 results, the respondents who supported constituency-oriented MPs and favouritism were more likely to disapprove of the performance of MPs. These results explain why MPs feel pressure to serve for their constituencies, as the clientelistic voters who were not satisfied with the performance of MPs may persuade others not to vote for them.

Despite the high public expectation of programmatic MPs in the country, the level of MPs’ engagement with Parliament did not affect the public views of the performance of MPs in 2012. This poses a question on the earlier assumption that voters have some ideas about how their representatives are engaged with Parliament. They may not have access to the information on parliamentary debates or may not be interested in them. At least, it suggests that this is not what voters really care about.

Two findings can be drawn from these analyses. First, as the 2005 and 2012 survey results show, the provision of private goods in the form of election incentives did not particularly help MPs gain long-term support from voters in Tanzania. It illustrates the negative effects takrima might have had on the public views of MPs; takrima may have helped some MPs win elections, but it made voters become more critical of the performance of MPs after the elections.

Second, as Model 4 of 2008 shows, during the time when a CDF was discussed in Parliament, clientelistic voters who preferred favouritism were more likely to be satisfied with the performance of MPs. It implies that MPs were meeting the expectations of clientelistic voters. Why was a CDF needed to be adopted while
clientelistic voters were still satisfied with MPs’ performance? One possible explanation is that, as Model 4 of 2008 demonstrates, voters who expected MPs to bring good services to citizens were more likely to be dissatisfied with their performance. In other words, MPs managed to satisfy only their home communities and not wider groups of voters in their constituencies. When it came to the elections, MPs needed to gain support not only from their home communities but from the whole constituencies. The Tanzanian CDF which was designed to deliver development projects across the constituencies widely fitted well with such need of MPs to provide goods to the whole constituencies.

In 2012, there was a small group of clientelistic voters who preferred constituency-oriented MPs and supported favouritism. They were more likely to have been targeted for vote-buying in the 2010 elections and to have sought assistance from MPs to solve their individual or community problems after the elections. However, due to their high expectation of MPs to deliver locally, they became less satisfied with the performance of MPs than non-clientelistic voters. This implies that it became difficult for MPs to keep their clientelistic supporters satisfied after the elections. As Lindberg (2010) argues, clientelism is costly and an unsustainable tool to establish long-term electoral support. Weitz-Shapiro (2012) argues that ‘clientelism decreases support from non-poor constituents even while it generates votes from among the poor’, but this result suggests that the support from the beneficiaries of clientelism also diminishes in the long run. As a Tanzanian MP described, voters easily forget what they have done for them. 189

This result also supports the finding from the interviews with MPs in the previous section that some MPs, particularly those who were capable and aspired to advance their political careers, started to opt out of clientelism based on the provision of tangible goods on an ad-hoc basis. Perhaps, by recognising the negative effects of clientelistic behaviours such as favouritism and election incentives on their long-term reputations, some MPs started to focus on providing club goods in more systematic ways and tried to change the public views on the kinds of benefactor role they are playing. However, as demonstrated by the evidence of the increasing use of election incentives in elections in 2010, it should be noted that opting out of clientelism is not a consistent trend; MPs’ approaches to their constituencies vary across MPs and change.

189 Interview, an MP (2011).
along the election cycles.

6.4. Conclusion

Building on the previous chapters that examined legislative development and changing electoral strategies of CCM at the national level, this chapter examined the relationships between voters and MPs at constituency levels to understand one of the main reasons for adopting a CDF: to relieve the fundraising burden on MPs for their constituency service. This chapter presented that while Tanzanian MPs receive all sorts of financial requests by voters, there is some variation in the way in which they handle these requests, and some MPs started to provide club goods in more systematic ways rather than giving private goods on an ad-hoc basis to reduce their transaction costs, while maintaining their reputation in constituency service.

This suggests their attempts to shift away from the conventional clientelism based on dyadic interactions with voters. The Afrobarometer surveys underscore this point. First, the last survey results in 2012 suggest that a majority of Tanzanians prefer MPs who can contribute to the whole country rather than only serving their constituencies, while there are a limited number of clientelistic voters who expect MPs to bring benefits to their constituencies. At the same time, it is increasingly difficult for MPs to continue to satisfy these clientelistic voters who had high expectations of MPs to favour their communities or themselves. This implies that clientelism is an unsustainable mode of relationship to establish wider long-term electoral support in the country. Against this background, a CDF fits into the needs of MPs as it is designed to serve wider groups of their constituents.
Chapter 7 Conclusion

This research started with a question as to why Tanzania’s dominant ruling party, the CCM, adopted a CDF in 2009 despite the fact that it had not faced any threat of losing its power in Tanzania Mainland. Deriving from this question, this thesis was aimed at answering two questions. First, were there any changes in dominant party politics in Tanzania that explain the adoption of a CDF in 2009? Second, how does the introduction of a CDF affect the nature of electoral politics and accountability in the country, in particular the accountability relationship between MPs and voters? This chapter summarises the findings of this research to answer the first question and examines the design of the Tanzanian CDF in relation to the concept of clientelism to provide a partial answer to the second. The CDF was still a new mechanism in Tanzania when this research was undertaken and the nature of the fund and its implication to the MP-voter relationships in Tanzania could not be fully examined. As the discussion in this chapter to answer the second question is mainly based on the analysis of the design of the CDCF, and not on the actual practice, it is rather speculative. Nonetheless, drawing on the critical review of the concept of clientelism in Chapter 1, the discussion presents an example of how to assess whether a particular type of CDF is an instrument of clientelism.

7.1. Why Did the CCM Adopt a CDF in 2009?

As a first step, the thesis explored the interactions between CDFs and politics in seven countries in Asia and Africa to understand the similarities and differences across these countries based on the existing literature and other secondary sources (Chapter 2). This comparative analysis also situated the Tanzanian case in the global context to set the stage for the case study of the country. The thesis developed four patterns of CDF politics by identifying two major dimensions: 1) the power balance between the executive and the legislature (whether the introduction of a CDF strengthens the power of the executive led by the ruling party or the power of MPs) and 2) regime change (whether a CDF is introduced by new leaders following a regime change or not). Among the seven countries, India and Tanzania are the cases in which CDFs were adopted by the long-serving ruling parties without major regime changes that were designed to enhance the power of legislatures. These two countries exemplify a pattern
of alleviating the risk of losing support from MPs to the executive. There is, however, a
difference between the two countries; when CDFs were adopted, India’s Congress was
leading a minority government, while Tanzania’s CCM was holding a large majority of
parliamentary seats. Apparently, the Indian CDF was for the Congress to support its
MPs who feared losing access to patronage due to the growing influence of opposition
MPs, yet it was unclear why the CCM adopted a CDF to strengthen the financial
autonomy of MPs. Applying the logic of the Indian case, there might have been a need
for the CCM to show support to its MPs and prevent a loss of its dominant power in
politics.

With this speculation in mind, the thesis examined the political background of
the establishment of a CDF in Tanzania. First, it analysed the policy process in which a
CDF was proposed, accepted and formulated in the country with a focus on various
actors involved in the process in Chapter 3. The rationales for these actors to support or
oppose the establishment of a CDF demonstrate the competing norms of the roles of
MPs in Tanzania. Among the four rationales for the introduction of a CDF which were
identified based on the interviews with Tanzanian MPs, two of them seem to be the
primary explanations for the adoption of the fund. One was to level the electoral playing
field and prevent the collusion between MPs and the private sector. The other was to
relieve the fundraising burden on MPs and recalibrate the financial power balance
between MPs and presidential appointees at the local levels.

Chapter 3 also highlighted that the introduction of a CDF exemplifies a policy
process largely led by domestic actors in Tanzania rather than donors who were
considered to have substantial influence in the policymaking of the country. It also
underscored that after the deliberation of the design of the CDF, the power of MPs in
the management of the fund was restricted by law; MPs were not entitled to appoint the
members of the project-selection committees or disburse the funds to projects. Council
Directors and other local government officials have the authority to do so. Thus, the
assumption of the initial research question that the Tanzanian CDF would give the
financial power to MPs needed to be corrected; the introduction of a CDF gave financial
power to MPs but with some restrictions. Given the strong CCM networks established
within local governments, this arrangement gives a certain level of control of the fund to
the CCM. Figure 7.1 shows again the patterns of CDF politics in which Tanzania is
relocated to reflect its operational arrangement.
The thesis further analysed the two dimensions that affected the introduction of a CDF in Tanzania, legislative development and electoral politics, to explain why the CCM government adopted it in 2009 (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). First, the thesis highlighted that the introduction of a CDF was a pillar of the reform to strengthen the legislature which was initiated and moved forward by the Speaker of Parliament and reformer MPs from the CCM and opposition parties. This reform was made possible partly due to the weakening of the control by the CCM over its members and the leadership style of President Kikwete who is more open to reforms and the initiatives taken by MPs than his predecessor. As the CDF would benefit all MPs regardless of their abilities in lawmaking and oversight, it may also have encouraged a majority of MPs to lend their support to the overall reform.

The thesis also explored electoral politics of the country to explain why the CCM accepted a CDF. Specifically, it examined three sequential phenomena in electoral politics: 1) the growing benefactor role of MPs after the transition to a multiparty system in 1992; 2) the legalisation and illegalisation of takrima between 2000 and 2006; and 3) an intraparty competition within the CCM which was intensified by the revelation of corruption scandals involving its senior members starting in 2007.
The revelation of corruption allegations involving cabinet ministers and senior CCM members and the parliamentary investigation into them enhanced public awareness of the privileges enjoyed by CCM leaders and the large amounts of money used by the party for election campaigns. As CCM MPs started to criticise the Kikwete government openly and the tension between the executive and the legislature escalated due to the corruption scandals and intensified factional politics with the party, the adoption of a CDF served as a gesture of the executive to show its support to MPs, regain their trust and re-establish party coherence in preparation for the elections in 2010. The introduction of a CDF was a symbolic rather than substantial policy decision; it was not aimed at substantially changing the power balance between the legislature and the executive, as the scale of the CDF budget was set at a low level and it had its own project-selection and monitoring mechanism so that the power of MPs was limited.

The thesis finally analysed the relationship between MPs and voters at the constituency level to identify the underlying reason for the adoption of a CDF in the country (Chapter 6). The analysis of the Afrobarometer survey results found that while a majority of Tanzanians have expectations of MPs to serve for the country rather than serving only for their constituencies, clientelistic voters who expect MPs to help their home communities were increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of MPs after the elections in 2010. The interviews with MPs also found that some MPs had established mechanisms such as NGOs, scholarships and a committee system to play their benefactor role in systematic ways rather than on an ad-hoc basis. These trends underpin MPs’ need for a CDF that would enable them to provide tangible goods to wider groups of voters in systematic ways and save their time for other activities to advance their political careers while maintaining their reputation in their constituencies.

7.2. Is the CDCF an Instrument of Clientelism?

With the above understanding of why a CDF was introduced in Tanzania in 2009, this chapter returns to the broader question on CDFs and clientelism; is the Tanzanian CDF an instrument of clientelism?

As discussed in Chapter 1, CDFs in general are a funding mechanism that enables MPs to allocate national public resources mainly in the form of club goods to their constituents. In contrast to public or private goods, club goods are ambiguous about whether they contribute to programmatic or clientelistic relationships between
MPs and voters. In terms of the mode of the allocation of the goods to voters, CDFs entail a combination of both programmatic and non-programmatic distributions, as discussed in Chapter 1; CDFs generally have public and binding rules in the allocation of the budget to constituencies (i.e. the information on the amounts allocated to constituencies is public and the set amounts are actually allocated), while there are no public rules in the allocation of the funds to the projects (i.e. projects are selected by MPs and other government officials and there are no criteria that are known to the public). While these are the generic feature of CDFs, there is variation in the way in which CDFs are operated and affect politics across the countries in reality. For example, the Philippine CDF can be considered an example of non-programmatic distribution, as the President controls the release of the CDF funds and thus, a binding rule is missing in the distribution of the budget to the constituency level. Therefore, it is difficult to discuss generally whether CDFs are an instrument of clientelism.

Given the ambiguity in the types of goods and rules as well as the variations in CDFs, this chapter goes back to the three core elements of clientelism, namely, *inequality, dyadic* (two-person) interactions and *reciprocity*, and examines the CDCF in Tanzania. First, there is a less unequal relationship between MPs and voters in the CDCF than in other forms of the provision of club or private goods because, as discussed above, the power of MPs over the funds is restricted by a formal project-selection and monitoring mechanism. This mechanism is not as strict as the public and binding rules on the criteria for the distribution of resources, yet it makes the CDCF a more transparent form of constituency service and voters can potentially make MPs more answerable on the use of the CDCF than other types of distribution of resources by MPs.

Second, the interaction between MPs and voters in the implementation of the CDCF is designed to be less dyadic than other forms of the provision of club or private goods. The projects are collectively selected by the CDC committee members and the implementation of the projects involves a number of people. Although the CDCF Act stipulates that the funds should be used for community-oriented development projects, the CDCF funds have been used to provide private goods such as scholarships to poor families in some constituencies. Yet, even in this case, they would be less dyadic as long as the scholarships are granted widely to a number of students with certain criteria.
The recipients of scholarships consider that they have been awarded the funds because they met the criteria, not because of the favours of MPs.\textsuperscript{190}

Finally, the reciprocal relationship between MPs and voters generated by the CDCF does not seem to be strong either. This is because, in the CDCF, the fixed amounts of public funds are automatically allocated to all the constituencies regardless of the performance of individual MPs. Voters may not feel benefit from incumbent MPs in the CDCF as much as when MPs voluntarily use their personal funds or raise funds from the government or other sources to offer them assistance. Voters may even consider that it is one type of public service provided by the government rather than a constituency service by MPs. Thus, voters are less likely to feel the obligation to reciprocate to MPs in elections.

Since the three basic elements of clientelism are not strong in the CDCF in comparison with other forms of the provision of club or private goods by MPs to voters, the CDCF can be considered as a less clientelistic form of constituency service by design. This does not mean that all MPs and other actors involved in the operation of the funds follow the rules in practice. Yet, at least the CDCF is designed in the way that the allocation of funds will not be controlled solely by MPs but it will be managed collectively by MPs, local government officials and District Councillors.

In summary, while there is wide variation in the design and operation of CDFs, the fund in Tanzania is by design a less clientelistic form of constituency service than other forms of the provision of tangible goods by MPs to voters. This is because there are public and binding rules in the allocation of the CDCF funds to constituencies and there is a formal project-selection and monitoring mechanism at the constituency level. This arrangement potentially makes the relationship between MPs and voters less unequal, less dyadic and less reciprocal, thus generating a less clientelistic relationship between the two. This interpretation of the CDCF conforms to and further elaborates Lindberg’s (2010) and Piattoni’s (2001) view that constituency service is different from clientelism. This thesis views constituency service as one of the core functions of MPs and does not argue that all the kinds of constituency service by MPs are non-clientelistic, yet it argues that there is a form of constituency service which is less clientelistic and the CDCF is an example of it. As mentioned earlier, this finding is largely based on the

\textsuperscript{190} Stokes et al. (2013) make a similar point on private goods by stating that distributive programmes targeting at individuals that have public and binding rules are programmatic politics (12).
analysis of the design of the CDCF, and further research is needed to examine whether the actual interactions between MPs and voters in the CDCF become less clientelistic over time as they would expect.

7.3. How Does the CDCF Affect the Nature of Accountability in Tanzania?

The final question of this thesis is how the introduction of a CDF affects electoral politics and the nature of accountability in Tanzania. The thesis demonstrated that horizontal accountability between the legislature and the executive was strengthened between 2005 and 2010 and the parliamentary investigation into the corruption scandals involving cabinet ministers exemplified the strengthened oversight role of the legislature. This institutional change affected the public perception of the government, the CCM and politicians; voters became more critical of the political finance used by the CCM and its MPs. As such, the strengthening of horizontal accountability started to affect the way in which voters assess the responsiveness of MPs, or the nature of vertical accountability. The introduction of a CDF played a supplementary role in this change, first by facilitating the legislative reform and second by changing the way in which MPs provide assistance to their constituents.

The CDCF did not have a major impact on the elections in 2010 partly because it was still a new mechanism and most of the projects had not been implemented by the time of the elections. Although the CDCF was aimed at regaining party coherence in preparation for the elections, the factional politics within the CCM continued and President Kikwete was re-elected with a lower rate of support in 2010 than the 2005 elections. The CCM also lost some parliamentary seats.

The impact of the fund on future elections needs to be examined further, but it is expected to be limited mainly due to the small size of the budget. Even if it functions as a ‘double-edged sword’ for incumbent MPs, as was the case in Kenya, it will not be as ‘sharp’ as the Kenyan CDF. Similarly, it is unlikely to have a substantial impact on the power dynamics within the CCM or the nature of dominant party politics in the near future.

On the other hand, the CDCF may affect the constituency roles or identities of Tanzanian MPs in the long run. As discussed above, the CDCF does not require fundraising skills or efforts by MPs. Instead, it requires skills in coordinating with other
stakeholders in managing the funds and supervising the execution of the projects. Thus, the introduction of the CDCF created a new role for MPs as managers of public resources rather than fundraisers or benefactors who use private resources to provide club or private goods to voters. For voters, the CDCF can be a new tool to evaluate the performance of MPs in managing and supervising public resources at the constituency level. This is what Rakesh Rajani, Head of Twaweza, describes as a shift ‘from no accountability to direct accountability’.191 ‘Direct accountability’ is based on the role of MPs in the distribution of public resources to their constituencies and thus, differs from programmatic accountability based on the provision of public goods. Yet, direct accountability is better than the situation of ‘no accountability’ where the voters’ assessment of the performance of MPs is limited to their arbitrary financial contributions based on private resources. CDFs may serve as an instrument to strengthen direct accountability between MPs and voters.

Although the CDCF does not promote the programmatic relationship between MPs and voters directly, it also has the potential to contribute to it by reducing the transaction costs for constituency service. According to the latest Afrobarometer survey, a majority of Tanzanian voters preferred programmatic MPs who can contribute to the country to the parochial MPs who contribute only to their constituencies. The public expectation of MPs may be changing partly because people began to recognise the significance of the role of the legislature in holding the executive accountable. There is an incentive for Tanzanian MPs to shift away from clientelistic exchanges with voters.

The introduction of a CDF in Tanzania in 2009 mirrors the shifting landscape of dominant party politics of the country. The growing benefactor role of MPs after the transition to a multiparty system in 1992 even led to the legalisation of the use of election incentives, takrima, yet it eventually lost its legitimacy. At the same time, the legislature was strengthened and the CCM started to lose its party cohesion which was accelerated by the corruption allegations of its leaders. A CDF was a strategy of the CCM to adapt to the changes in electoral politics including the social norm on political finance and to improve the relationship between the executive and the legislature and reconsolidate party unity to retain the same level of dominant power in the elections in 2010 as before.

191 Interview, Rajani (2010).
The thesis has also demonstrated that the adoption of a CDF contributed to strengthening horizontal accountability between the legislature and the executive and increased the level of transparency in political finance in the country. It also shows the potential to enhance direct accountability between MPs and voters. A CDF was adopted when clientelistic voters were increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of MPs and some MPs with fundraising capacity had begun providing financial assistance to voters systematically. With a formal project-selection and monitoring mechanism in place, the Tanzanian CDF has more potential to restrict the prevalence of clientelistic accountability than the provision of private or club goods by MPs based on private resources.

While this thesis focused on the case in Tanzania, it has an implication to other developing countries where the responsiveness of MPs is primarily assessed by their performance in delivering tangible goods to their constituents. Given the current political and socioeconomic environment of these counties, the design of the Tanzanian CDF demonstrates the potential to control the influence of clientelism in the accountability relationship between MPs and voters.
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Appendices

Appendix A  List of Interviewees

1. Tanzania

Two rounds of fieldwork were undertaken in Tanzania from October 2010 to April 2011 and from October 2011 to March 2011, during which I interviewed 34 MPs, 3 leaders of political parties who were not MPs, 5 parliamentary staff, 2 officials of central ministries, 5 personal assistants of MPs, 4 officials at the District Councils in the Lindi and Singida regions and 3 District Councillors in the Singida Urban constituency, 9 academics, 10 members of CSOs and private companies, 4 officials of donor agencies.

1.1. MPs

The MPs who provided me information and ideas related to this research, mainly through interviews but also conversations, are listed below. Although not listed here, I also heard the views of the special seats MPs who were not allocated the CDCF funds.

I mainly interviewed two groups of MPs during the first fieldwork. First, I interviewed the members of the Parliamentary Special Committee that reviewed the Standing Orders (Table 3.1 in Chapter 3) and the parliamentary team that redrafted the CDF Bill (Table 3.2 in Chapter 3) to understand the CDF policy process in Tanzania. Second, I interviewed MPs who had served Parliament for three consecutive terms since 2000 to hear their views on how the interactions between MPs and voters changed over time. There are some MPs listed below who are not in either of these categories, but I interviewed them through other contacts. I used a set of questions (Appendix B) for the interviews with ten MPs who are marked with an asterisk (*) in the list. I used the set of questions only partially for the remaining interviews due to time constraints, or I did not use it at all because the interviews were held before the questions were formulated. All interviews were held in English, except for Said Juma Nkumba who answered in Swahili. MPs are listed by their full names, constituencies and regions, political parties in parentheses, their positions in the cabinet or parties if any, which are followed by the interview dates.

1. Said Mohamed Mtanda, MP for Mchinga, Lindi (CCM), 7 November 2010 and
many times in 2011

2. Agrey Deaisil Mwanri, MP for Siha, Kilimanjaro (CCM), Deputy Minister of Prime Minister’s Office–Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), 16 November 2010

3. Hamad Rashid Mohamed, MP for Wawi, Zanzibar (CUF), member of the Parliamentary Special Committee on the Standing Orders, 31 January 2011

4. Festus Bulugu Limbu, MP for Magu Town, Mwanza (CCM), 11 February 2011*

5. Abdallah Omar Kigoda, MP for Handeni, Tanga (CCM), 11 February 2011*

6. Beatrice Matumbo Shellukindo, MP for Kilindi, Tanga (CCM), member of the Parliamentary Special Committee on the Standing Orders, 14 February 2011

7. Zitto Zuberi Kabwe, MP for Kigoma North, Kigoma (CHADEMA), former Deputy Secretary General of CHADEMA (2007–2013) and a member of the Parliamentary Team that redrafted the CDF Bill, 14 February 2011

8. John Momose Cheyo, MP for Bariadi East, Shinyanga (UDP), Chairman of UDP and a member of the Parliamentary Team that redrafted the CDF Bill, 15 February 2011* and 7 February 2012

9. Lazaro Samuel Nyalandu, MP for Singida North, Singida (CCM), Deputy Minister of Industry, Trade and Marketing, 17 February 2011*

10. Mary Michael Nagu, MP for Hanang, Manyara (CCM), Minister for the Prime Minister’s Office for Investment and Empowerment, 17 February 2011

11. Masoud Abdalla Salim, MP for Mtambile, Zanzibar (CUF), 17 February 2011*

12. Tundu Antiphas Mughwai Lissu, MP for Singida East, Singida (CHADEMA), Chief Whip of CHADEMA, 17 February 2011*

13. Mohamed Hamisi Missanga, Singida West, Singida (CCM), 24 February 2011*

14. Nimrod Elirehema Mkono, MP for Musoma Rural, Musoma (CCM), member of the Parliamentary Special Committee on the Standing Orders, 11 April 2011*

15. Job Yustino Ndugai, MP for Kongwa, Dodoma (CCM), Deputy Speaker and former Chairman of the Parliamentary Special Committee on the Standing Orders, 11 April 2011

16. Herbert James Mntangi, MP for Muheza, Tanga (CCM), 11 April 2011*

17. Said Juma Nkumba, MP for Sikonge, Tabora (CCM), 12 April 2011*

18. Mohammed Gulam Dewji, MP for Singida Urban, Singida (CCM), 14 April 2011

During the second fieldwork, most of the MPs I interviewed were randomly
selected while trying to maintain a variety of political parties and representative geographical areas. The objectives of the interviews were 1) to understand constituency service by Tanzanian MPs by using standardised questions with ratings (e.g. asking for the ratings of significance between 1 (=Least) and 5 (=Most)) for potential generalisation and comparison across MPs and 2) to learn about how the CDC Committees function in their constituencies (see Appendix B for the questions). Due to the limited time available for each interview, I managed to use the standardised questions only for eight interviews. Despite the limited number of responses, the use of the standardised questions helped me objectively understand the variation in the way in which MPs interact with voters and provide assistance to them. The interview data are presented as examples in Chapter 6. The names of these interviewees are not marked below to ensure confidentiality.

1. Mendrad Lutengano Kigola, MP for Mufindi South, Iringa (CCM), 10 November 2011
2. Hamisi Andrew Kigwangalla, MP for Nzega, Tabora (CCM), 15 November 2011
3. David Zacharia Kafulila, MP for Kigoma South, Kigoma (NCCR-Mageuzi), 15 and 16 November 2011
4. Mustapha Boay Akunaay, MP for Mbulu, Manyara (CHADEMA), 16 November 2011
5. January Yusuf Makamba, MP for Bunbuli, Tanga (CCM), Deputy Minister for Communication, Science and Technology, 16 November 2011
6. Gosbert Begumisa Blandes, MP for Karagwe, Kagera (CCM), 16 November 2011
7. Khalfan Hilaly Aeshi, MP for Sumbawanga, Rukwa (CCM), 17 November 2011
8. Muhammad Ibrahim Sanya, MP for Mji Mkongwe, Zanzibar (CUF), 18 November 2011
9. John Magale Shibuda, MP for Maswa, Shinyanga (CHADEMA), 31 January 2012
10. Samuel John Sitta, MP for Urambo East, Tabora (CCM), former Speaker of the National Assembly (2005–2010) and Minister for East African Cooperation, 1 and 2 February 2012
11. Halima James Mdee, MP for Kawe, Dar es Salaam (CHADEMA), 3 February 2012
12. Musa Azan Zungu, MP for Ilala, Dar es Salaam (CCM), 7 February 2012
13. Ahmed Juma Ngwali, MP for Ziawani, Zanzibar (CUF), 8 February 2012
14. Christopher Ole Sendeka, MP for Simanjiro, Manyara (CCM), 9 February 2012
15. Silyvestry Francis Koka, MP for Kibaha Urban, Pwani (CCM), 10 February 2012
16. Rajab Mbarouk Mohammed, MP for Ole, Zanzibar (CUF), 10 February 2012

1.2. Party Leaders

1. Peter Kuga Mziray, Chairman of the African Progressive Party of Tanzania (APPT-Maendeleo) and a presidential candidate in 2010, 4 February 2011.
2. Pius Msekwa, former Deputy Chairman of the CCM Mainland (2007–2012) and former Speaker of the National Assembly (1994–2005), 6 December 2011
3. Willibrod Peter Slaa, Secretary General of CHADEMA, a former member of the Parliamentary Special Committee on the Standing Orders and a presidential candidate in 2010, 15 December 2011

1.3. Government Officials

1. Nenelwa Mwiambi Wankanga, Deputy Chief of the Legal Counsel, National Assembly, 9 November 2010
2. Angelo J. Haule, Senior Economist, Planning Department, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, 26 January 2011
3. Packshard Mkongwa, Director of Policy and Planning, Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), 6 April 2011

1.4. Academia

Meetings with the scholars listed below were not only for collecting data but also for broader discussions on politics in Tanzania.

1. Bernadeta Killian, Dean of the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Dar es Salaam, 15 October 2010
2. John Jingu, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dar es Salaam, 20 October 2010, 23 November 2010, 23 March 2011, 13 October 2011, 12 January 2012 and more
3. Richard Mbunda, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dar es Salaam, 9 December 2010, 24 March 2011 and
Meetings with CSO representatives were a mixture of data collection and discussions.

1. Hebron Mwakagenda, Director, the Leadership Forum, 9 October 2010 and 23 October 2011
3. Michael Ward, Director, Development Advisory Services, KPMG Tanzania, 22 October 2010
4. Geir Sundet, Programme Director of Accountability in Tanzania, KPMG, 22 October 2010
5. Rakesh Rajani, Head, Twaweza, 22 October 2010
6. Semkae Kilonzo, Coordinator, Policy Forum, 4 November 2010
9. Peter Bofin, consultant, 25 January 2011
10. Harold Sungusia, Director of Advocacy and Reforms, Legal and Human Rights Centre, 12 December 2011

1.6. Donors

2. Diana Henderson, Governance Working Group Secretariat, 21 October 2010
3. Steve Lee, Senior Governance Advisor, United Nations Development Programme, 21 October 2011
4. Aran Corrigan, Senior Governance Advisor, Embassy of Ireland, 10 January 2012

1.7. Interviews in Lindi (March 2011)

I accompanied a visit by Said Mtanda, MP for Mchinga (CCM), to his constituency for two weeks in March 2011 to understand the constituencies in rural areas and to observe his interactions with his personal assistant, District Councillors, local party members, voters, his family and friends. I interviewed his personal assistant to understand his role in the constituency and the two officials of the Lindi District Council. The interview with Rashid Ibrahim Tondoro was held in Swahili and translated by Said Mtanda, while the other two interviews were held in English.

1. Rashid Ibrahim Tondoro, Personal Assistant to Said Mtanda, MP for Mchinga (CCM), 7 March 2011
2. Hanus Yunah, District Planning Officer, Lindi District Council, 9 March 2011
3. Selemani S. Ngaweje, District Natural Resources Officer and Acting District Executive Director, Lindi District Council, 9 March 2011

1.8. Interviews in Singida (April 2011 and February 2012)

I also visited the Singida town for two days in April 2011 to interview personal assistants of MPs, District Councillors and the officials of the Singida Municipal Office to understand their roles in relation to MPs and the operation of the CDCF. I went to the Singida town again for two days in February 2012 to see the projects funded by
Mohammed Dewji, MP for Singida Urban (CCM) and the project funded by the CDCF.

The two regions were selected mainly due to my familiarity with the MPs and the seniority of MPs in the case of Singida. Singida was traditionally a stronghold of the CCM with three politicians. Lazaro Nyalandu, MP for Singida North and Deputy Minister of Industry, Trade and Marketing, and Mohamed Missanga, MP for Singida West have been MPs for three consecutive terms since 2000. Since 2005, Singida Urban has been represented by Mohammed Dewji, one of the leading businessmen in the country (Mohammed Enterprises Tanzania Limited). He spent US$500,000 from his income every year on various development projects in his constituency during his first term. He also contributed to the construction of 88 CCM branch office buildings across Singida Region.\(^\text{192}\) In 2010, Tundu Lissu, current Chief Whip of CHADEMA, won the newly created Singida East constituency.

All interviews were arranged by Hassan Philip Mazala and held in Swahili with his presence.

1. Hassan Philip Mazala, CCM Publicity Secretary in Singida District and Personal Assistant to Mohammed Gulam Dewji, MP for Singida Urban, 18 April 2011
2. Mwajuma Shaha, District Councillor in Singida Municipality, CCM Special Seat, 18 April 2011
3. Halima Athumani Ngimba, Personal Assistant to Mohamed Hamisi Missanga, MP for Singida West, 18 April 2011
4. Anisa Awadhi Mbaraka, District Councillor for Mughanga Ward in Singida Municipality (CCM), 18 April 2011
5. Reuben E. Ibrahim, Personal Assistant to Lazaro Samuel Nyalandu, MP for Singida North, 18 April 2011
6. Fatuma Omari Latu, Acting District Planning Officer, Singida Municipality, 19 April 2011
7. Bakari Ntamau Omari, Member of the Constituencies Development Catalyst (CDC) Committee in Singida Urban, 19 April 2011
8. Eva Simon Mbelwa, Member of the CDC Committee in Singida Urban, 19 April 2011
9. Hamisi Homamedi Kisuke, District Councillor for Misuna Ward in Singida

\(^{192}\) Interviews, Dewji (2011) and Mazala (2012).
Municipality, 19 April 2011
10. Joseph S. Sabore, District Executive Director, Singida District Council, 19 April 2011

2. Kenya

I interviewed key individuals who were engaged with the policymaking and operation of the CDF in Nairobi, Kenya, in January 2011. Most of the interviews were arranged by Munene Charles Kiura.

2. Muriuki Karue, former MP for Ol’Kalau, Nyandarua (NARC), 9 January 2011
3. Lameck Siage, development consultant, 10 January 2011
5. Tom Wolf, Lead Researcher, Synovate Kenya, 13 January 2011
6. Jacton Omondi Ojow, Project Officer, CDF Board Secretariat, 13 January 2011
7. Obuya Bagaka, lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, 13 January 2011
Appendix B  Questions for the Interviews with MPs in Tanzania

I prepared two sets of guiding questions for semi-structured interviews with Tanzanian MPs. Some of them were adapted from Cheeseman’s (2006) questions for his interviews with Kenyan MPs. The questions were tailored to each interview depending on the interviewees as explained in Appendix A.

1. Questions for First Fieldwork

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.</th>
<th>Expectations of Constituents to MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1)</td>
<td>What do your constituents expect you to personally provide as an MP? Choose from the options below and give examples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Donation to local self-help projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. School fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Medical expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Wedding/funeral expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. Funds for local businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f. Legal advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>g. Others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Have these expectations changed over years? Do expectations change between election and non-election years? If so, how?

2. Responses of MPs to Constituents (Constituency Service)

1) How do you respond to these expectations of constituents?

2) How much time do you allocate to responding to these expectations, in comparison to other activities as an MP (e.g. lawmaking, parliamentary committees)?

3) How do you raise funds to respond to these expectations?
   a. Your own salary
   b. Funds allocated by the government
   c. Funds allocated by the party
   d. Leaders (e.g. senior party members, cabinet members)
   e. Your family members
   f. Business partners
   g. Borrow funds from a bank
   h. Others

3. Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF)

1) Why is the CDCF needed in Tanzania? Who promoted it?
2) What are/will be the criteria for the CDCF Committee of your constituency in selecting the projects? Choose from the options below and give examples.
   a. Sectors (e.g. education, water) which need assistance more urgently than other sectors
   b. Geographical areas which need assistance more urgently than other areas
   c. Management capacity of the implementing organisations
   d. Others

3) Do you think that the CDCF will decrease the burden on MPs to raise funds to respond to the expectations of their constituents?

4) Do you think that the CDCF will give MPs greater autonomy from their parties?

4. **Takrima**
   1) What is takrima in politics? How did it change over years?

   2) Did the legalisation of takrima by the amendment of the Electoral Laws in 2000 affect your electoral campaigns? If so, how?

   3) Did the illegalisation of takrima in 2006 by the High Court judgement and the adoption of the Election Expenses Act in 2009 affect your electoral campaign? If so, how?

5. **Roles of MPs in local government budget planning and execution process**
   1) How do you engage with the local government budget planning and execution process in your constituency?

   2) Can you respond to some of the expectation of your constituents by allocating part of the local government budget?

---

2. **Questions for Second Fieldwork**

1. **Background**
   1) Please tell me about the following information: year in which you were elected as an MP; current and past position(s) in your party if any; current and past cabinet position(s), including shadow cabinets, if any.

   2) How many personal assistants do you have? What are his/her/their main roles?

2. **Allocation of Time to Different Duties**
   1) How much time (e.g. number of months, weeks or days) do you spend in a year on each of the following duties?
      a. Participating in the parliamentary sessions in Dodoma
b. Participating in the parliamentary committee meetings in Dar es Salaam

c. Participating in your party’s meetings

d. Participating in the district council meetings

e. Preparing written and oral questions for the parliament

f. Preparing the Bills

g. Visiting your constituency

h. Others, if any major duties (e.g. parties, cabinet)

3. **Expectations of Constituents to MPs**

1) What kinds of requests do you receive from your constituents? Choose from the options below and rate them by their frequencies between 1 (=Least) and 5 (=Most).

   a. Change in national policies
   b. Legislations
   c. Complaints to the central government
   d. Complaints to the local government
   e. Complains to your party
   f. Donation to local self-help projects (e.g. *harambee*)
   g. School fees of individuals
   h. Medical expenses of individuals
   i. Wedding/funeral expenses of individuals
   j. Funds for businesses of individuals
   k. Legal advice for individuals
   l. Others (please specify)
   m. Don’t know

2) In the average month, how many requests do you receive from your constituents (including requests made through your personal assistants)? Please indicate the approximate number of requests for each of the following means of communication.

   a. Public meetings
   b. Individual meetings
   c. Letters
   d. Phone calls and text messages
   e. E-mails
   f. Others (please specify)
   g. Don’t know

3) Do the types and/or frequency of the requests differ between election and non-election years? If so, how?

4. **Responses of MPs to Constituents**

1) Apart from the government budget, do you raise funds by yourself to respond to some of the requests? If so, what are the main sources of the funds? Choose from the options below and rate them by their significance between 1 (=Least) and 5 (=Most).

   a. Your salary from the government
b. Income from your business  
c. Organising fundraising events (e.g. dinner)  
d. Assistance from cabinet members  
e. Assistance from senior party members, except cabinet members  
f. Assistance from your family members  
g. Assistance from business partners and friends  
h. Assistance from foreign donors  
i. Funds borrowed from a bank  
j. Others  
k. Not applicable

5. **Elections and Career Development of MPs**

1) In your view, are there any differences between the following factors?
   a. factors that contributed you to win the last general elections  
   b. factors that contributed you to win the last primaries (*kura za maoni*)  
   c. factors that contributed you to win the last primaries (*kura za maoni*)  
   (e.g. legislative activities, raising funds for constituencies, gaining support from members of your party, speaking to the press).

2) Please tell me three major factors for each category. If there are any differences between these factors, how do MPs balance between them?

6. **Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF)**

1) Do you think the CDCF will reduce your fundraising responsibility to help your constituents? If so how?

2) In your constituency, what is roughly a) the ratio of the amount of CDCF funds allocated to your constituency, b) your personal contribution to community projects, and c) your personal contribution to individual voters? (e.g. CDCF: community projects: individuals = 1: 2: 3)

3) What are the criteria for the CDCF Committee of your constituency in selecting the projects? (e.g. sectors which need assistance more urgently than other sectors, equal distribution across the constituency)

4) Have there been any disagreements between yourself and other Committee members on the allocations? What was the final outcome?
Appendix C  Supplementary Notes for the Regression Analysis in Chapter 6

1. Variables

Tables C.1, C.2 and C.3 below provide the explanations on the variables created from the Afrobarometer surveys for the regression analysis in Chapter 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variable Name and Question in Afrobarometer Survey</th>
<th>Removed Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor</td>
<td>'Sponsor' (dummy) from Q100 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>'Gender' (dummy) from Q101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Q1 (interval)</td>
<td>999 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>'Urban' (dummy) from URBRUR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without cash income</td>
<td>'Cash' (dummy) from Q8E</td>
<td>9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without enough food to eat</td>
<td>'Food' (dummy) from Q8A</td>
<td>9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>'Education' (ordinal/interval) from Q90 **</td>
<td>99 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM supporters</td>
<td>'CCM support' (dummy) from Q86</td>
<td>997 (Would not vote), 998 (Refused to answer), 999 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted the MP</td>
<td>'Contact' (dummy) from Q32B</td>
<td>-1 (Missing), 9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in the elections</td>
<td>'Voted' (dummy) from Q30</td>
<td>9 (Don't know/Can't remember)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election incentives</td>
<td>'Incentives' (dummy) from Q57F</td>
<td>9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favouritism of leaders</td>
<td>'Favouritism' (dummy) from Q21</td>
<td>6 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve MP’s performance</td>
<td>'Perform' (dummy) from Q68B</td>
<td>-1 (Missing), 9 (Don't know/Haven't heard enough)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * The following values in Q100 were treated as the government in the dummy variable 'Sponsor': Government (General), National/Union Government, Provincial/Regional government, Local Government, President’s/Prime Minister’s office, Parliament, Government census/National Bureau of Statistics, National Intelligence/Secret Service, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Other Government Department/ Ministry, Constitutional Commission, National Electoral Commission, National Planning Commission and Political Party/Politicians, Government of Zanzibar (SMZ) and Human Rights Commission. The rest of the values including 'Refused to answer' and 'Don't know' were treated as non-government.

** Taking into account that there were not many respondents with post-secondary school education, three values were created from Q89: 1) primary school uncompleted (including those who have some primary schooling), 2) primary school completed (including those who have some secondary schooling) and 3) secondary school completed (including those who have post-secondary qualifications from colleges or university). Although it is an ordinal variable, it was treated as an interval variable in the regression analysis.
### Table C.2  Variables from Afrobarometer (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variable Name and Question in Afrobarometer Survey</th>
<th>Removed Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>'Gender' (dummy) from q101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>q1 (interval)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>'Urbrur' (dummy) from URBRUR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without cash income</td>
<td>'Cash' (dummy) from q8e</td>
<td>9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without enough food to eat</td>
<td>'Food' (dummy) from q8a</td>
<td>9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>'Education' (ordinal/interval) from q89 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM supporters</td>
<td>'CCMsupport' (dummy) from q86</td>
<td>997 (Not applicable), 998 (Refused to answer), 999 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted the MP</td>
<td>'Contact' (dummy) from q25b</td>
<td>9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in the elections</td>
<td>'Voted' (dummy) from q23D</td>
<td>9 (Don't know/Can't remember)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service-oriented MPs</td>
<td>'Service' (dummy) from q55</td>
<td>5 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favouritism of leaders</td>
<td>'Favouritism' (dummy) from q17</td>
<td>6 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic MPs</td>
<td>'Programmatic' (dummy) by combining 'Service' and 'Favouritism' variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve MP's performance</td>
<td>'Perform' (dummy) from q70b</td>
<td>9 (Don't know/Haven't heard enough)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * The same values as ‘Education’ in Table C.1 were created.
### Table C.3 Variables from Afrobarometer (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variable Name and Question in Afrobarometer Survey</th>
<th>Removed Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor</td>
<td>'Sponsor' (dummy) from Q100 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>'Gender' (dummy) from Q101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Q1 (interval)</td>
<td>999 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>'Urban' (dummy) from URBRUR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without cash income</td>
<td>'Cash' (dummy) from Q8E</td>
<td>9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gone without enough food to eat</td>
<td>'Food' (dummy) from Q8A</td>
<td>9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>'Education' (ordinal/interval) from Q97 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM supporters</td>
<td>'CCMsupport' (dummy) from Q89B</td>
<td>9997 (Not applicable), 9998 (Refused to answer), 9999 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUF supporters</td>
<td>'CUFsupport' (dummy) from Q89B</td>
<td>9997 (Not applicable), 9998 (Refused to answer), 9999 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEMA supporters</td>
<td>'CHADEMAsupport' (dummy) from Q89B</td>
<td>9997 (Not applicable), 9998 (Refused to answer), 9999 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in the elections</td>
<td>'Voted' (dummy) from Q27</td>
<td>9 (Don't know/Can't remember)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended a campaign rally</td>
<td>Q29A (dummy)</td>
<td>9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuade others</td>
<td>Q29B (dummy)</td>
<td>9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked for a candidate or party</td>
<td>Q29C (dummy)</td>
<td>9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted the MP</td>
<td>'Contact' (dummy) from Q30B</td>
<td>9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election incentives</td>
<td>Incentives’ (dummy) from Q61F</td>
<td>9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote margin</td>
<td>'Margin' (interval) added to the Afrobarometer dataset **</td>
<td>100 (Uncontested), 999 (Not available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs' interventions in Parliament</td>
<td>Intervention’ (interval) added to the Afrobarometer dataset **</td>
<td>888 (New constituency), 999 (Not available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet members</td>
<td>'Cabinet (dummy) added to the Afrobarometer dataset ***</td>
<td>8 (New constituency), 9 (Not available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency-oriented MPs</td>
<td>'Constituency' (dummy) from Q79A_TAN</td>
<td>5 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favouritism of leaders</td>
<td>'Favouritism' (dummy) from Q18</td>
<td>6 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic MPs</td>
<td>'Programmatic' (dummy) by combining 'Constituency' and 'Favouritism' variables</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve MP's performance</td>
<td>'Perform' (dummy) from Q71B</td>
<td>9 (Don't know/Haven't heard enough)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * The following values in Q100 were treated as the government in the dummy variable 'Sponsor': Government (General), National/Union Government, Provincial/Regional government, Local Government, President’s/Prime Minister’s office, Parliament, Government census/National Bureau of Statistics, National Intelligence/Secret Service, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Other Government Department/ Ministry, Constitutional Commission, National Electoral Commission, National Planning Commission and Political Party/Politicians. The remaining values including 'Refused to answer' and 'Don't know' were treated as non-government.
** The same values as 'Education' in Tables C.1 were created.
*** The cabinet was reshuffled in February 2008, and both the cabinet members before and after the reshuffle were counted as cabinet members.
2. Vote Margins

Vote margins were calculated based on the difference between the percentages of votes won by the winner and by the runner-up. While there is no information on the constituencies of the respondents in the Afrobarometer surveys, the constituencies of 1,870 samples were identified with the information on wards in the Afrobarometer dataset and the postcode list published by the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (United Republic of Tanzania 2012b).

There is no significant relationship between vote margins and election incentives ($r = 0.02$, $P = 0.36$). However, as Figure C.1 below shows, there are some samples that have large vote margins and are remotely located in the scatterplot, which can be considered as outliers.

**Figure C.1 Scatterplot of Election Incentives and Vote Margins**

![Scatterplot of Election Incentives and Vote Margins](image)

Note: Election incentives offered: $0 =$ never, $1 =$ once or twice, $2 =$ a few times, $3 =$ often
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

Thus, the samples whose vote margins are above 80 percentage points were removed. When the vote margins are 80 percentage points or below, the relationship becomes statistically significant, but there is no correlation ($r = 0.04$, $P = 0.09$) (Figure C.2).
Figure C.2 Scatterplot of Election Incentives and Vote Margins (with the Exclusion of Margins over 80)

Note: Election incentives offered: 0 = never, 1 = once or twice, 2 = a few times, 2 = often
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

This result shows that there is no influence of the level of electoral competitiveness on the likelihood of voters to be offered election incentives in the elections in 2012.

3. MPs’ Interventions in Parliament and the Public Views of Their Performance

Despite the high public expectation of MPs to contribute to the whole country in the Afrobarometer survey in 2012, there seems to be no significant relationship between the levels of engagement of MPs with parliamentary discussions and public views of the performance of MPs ($r = 0.03$, $P = 0.25$) (Figure C.3).
Figure C.3  Scatterplot of the Ranking of MPs’ Interventions in Parliament and the Performance of MPs (except Cabinet Members)

Note: Performance of MPs: 1 = Strongly Disapprove, 2 = Disapprove, 3 = Approve, 4 = Strongly Approve
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer and Twaweza (2010b)