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Self and Agency: A Defence of Praśastapāda’s Differential Naturalism

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Thesis submitted for the PhD in Philosophy
University of Sussex
May 2013
I, Shalini Sinha, hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

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Thesis submitted for the PhD in Philosophy

SELF AND AGENCY: A DEFENCE OF PRAŚASTAPĀDA’S DIFFERENTIAL NATURALISM

SUMMARY

This thesis discusses the Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda’s conception of self in his text, the Padārthadharmasamgraha, and its key commentaries. It examines the arguments these texts propose for the existence of a self that is non-physical and yet non-Cartesian, based in a paradigm I term ‘differential naturalism’. I examine Praśastapāda’s four arguments for the existence of a self from: the structures of agency and action in human cognition; in intentional mental and bodily acts; in the homeostatic regulation of the human body; and in the biological life of the human organism. The core thesis, I argue, is that the rational structures of agency and action we find in these activities require a conscious owner. This must be a self.

The dualist argument for the self’s non-physical nature emerges from a dichotomous ontology of mental and physical properties and causal powers, which entails that only a non-physical substance can be a bearer of the normative and intentional structures that agency and mental causation demand. The minded self is, however, necessarily embodied.

Praśastapāda, I suggest, postulates a naturalistic conception of self. Such a self enables the integration of the mental, moral and physical realms as aspects of natural order, for self is the bearer not only of psychological, vital and normative powers in the natural world, but of natural law qua moral law. This integrative, yet differential, naturalism provides an innovative alternative to Western and classical Indian physicalist and dualist perspectives.
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A Note on Translation

The translation of key Sanskrit terms into English encounters difficulties particularly when establishing a common cross-cultural philosophical vocabulary between classical Vaiśeṣika and the Western analytical tradition.

Manas which is usually translated as ‘mind’ does not conform to contemporary conceptions of ‘mind’ as the network of conscious, unconscious and subpersonal mental states and processes. I leave this term untranslated for the most part, except in the appendices where manas is translated as the ‘executive faculty’ consistent with its conception as an instrument of the self that is the locus of executive functions.

Indriya is usually translated as ‘sense-organ’. However, ‘organs’ generally refer to bodily parts, whereas the indriya refers to the visual, auditory, etc. faculties that operate through the physical sense-organs or bodily parts such as the eye and ear respectively. Indriya is, therefore, translated as ‘sense-faculty’ or simply ‘sense’ and the term ‘sense-organ’ is restricted to the bodily parts these faculties correspond to.

Dharma and adharma are usually translated as ‘merit’ and ‘demerit’ respectively. They refer to accrued powers or states of virtue and non-virtue that have meta-ethical structures in that they register the moral quality of past actions implicitly ‘measuring’ their moral value, and determining their ethical consequences. I therefore translate these terms as the ‘meta-ethical’ states of virtue and non-virtue, or as ‘virtuous powers’ and ‘non-virtuous powers’, respectively. Adṛṣṭa, usually translated as ‘unseen force’, ‘invisible power’, etc., refers to the exercise of causal powers over physical elements that establishes causal regularities and contingencies. It is therefore rendered as the power of ‘natural law’ or ‘causal law’. It is equated with dharma which in this context is translated as ‘moral law’.

Prayatna is usually translated as ‘effort’. It refers to an ‘active’ mental property or power that executes desires and judgements and is therefore translated as ‘will’. In contrast, ceṣṭā corresponds to bodily ‘trying’ or ‘effort’ and is translated as ‘striving’. Samskāra qua mental tendencies that consist of trace impressions of past perceptions, cultivated habits, etc. is translated as ‘cognitive imprints’.
Chapter 1

Introduction

The subject of this study is the idea of self in the classical Vaiśeṣika text, the Padārthadharmasamgraha (A Compendium of the Characteristics of the Categories) of Praśastapāda (c. 530 C.E.), and its key commentarial literature. It examines Praśastapāda’s conception of self and the arguments its existence and non-physical nature against putative physicalist opponents, the Cārvaka, that are set out in the chapter on self (Ātmaprakāraṇam) in this text (PDS 1994: §§ 76-80). The aim here is a philosophical reconstruction of Praśastapāda’s conception of self, and a retrieval of the philosophical contents of his arguments about what a self is, why it exists, and what sort of a thing it might be.

The Padārthadharmasamgraha (PDS) is the foundational text of the Vaiśeṣika tradition and one of the most important Indian texts on the self and has a substantial commentarial literature. There is a range of contemporary philological and historical discussion of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, and an emerging portfolio of philosophical analyses of its metaphysics. A systematic philosophical reconstruction of the classical Vaiśeṣika conception of the self set out in the PDS that takes account of its wider philosophical and ethical project, and its distinct metaphysical paradigm is, however, lacking. This study attempts to bridge this gap.

The edition of the Padārthadharmasamgraha used in this study is Bronkhorst and Ramseier’s Word Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya (PDS 1994) which refers to all twelve editions of the text (PDS 1994: ix). Bronkhorst and Ramseier note (ibid.: x) that the readings of the PDS in the three oldest commentaries, the Vyomavatī, Nyāyakandalī, and Kiraṇāvalī, are invariant and appear to refer to the same manuscript. A translation of the chapter on self in the Padārthadharmasamgraha (PDS 1994: §§76-80) based on Bronkhorst and Ramseier’s Word Index is presented in Appendix I; this updates an early translation by Ganganātha Jha (PDS(J) 1982). The earliest commentaries on the PDS date from the eleventh century C.E. beginning with Vyoṣiva’s Vyomavatī (early 10th cent.). The edition of the Vyomavatī (Vŷ) referred to here is the 1983 text edited by
Gaurinath Sastri (Vy 1983). Śrīdhara’s *Nyāyakandalī* is dated to the mid-late 10th cent. C.E., text references are to the 1984 edition by Vindhyesvari Prasad Divedin (NK 1984). Udayana’s *Kiranāvalī* (Ki) belongs to the late 10th cent./early 11th cent.)¹. Jitendra Jetly’s 1971 edition of the text is used here (Ki 1971). An excellent early modern commentary, Jagadīśa’s *Sūkti* (17th cent.), which belongs to the later Navya-Nyāya school is possibly the most incisive of the early modern commentaries² and indeed of all commentaries on the text. The *Sūkti* (*Śū*) has not been previously translated. A translation of the section on self (*Śū* 1983: 360-69) based on the 1983 edition by Gopināth Kavirāj and Dhunḍhirāj Śastra is included in Appendix II. Apart from these commentarial sources a number of classical and early modern Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts are referenced, in particular, Udayana’s late tenth century text, the *Ātmatattvaviveka* (1995), edited by Dravid, and Gaṅgeśa’s (14th cent.), *Tattvacintāmaṇi* edited and translated by Phillips and Tatakcharya (2004). Oral interpretations of the *PDS* and its commentaries by two contemporary traditional scholars (*pandits*) of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the late Pt. Baliram Shukla (2009) and Pt. Devadutta Patil (2009), are frequently referred to. Kaṇḍa’s *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, of which the *PDS* claims to be commentary, is discussed below (§ 1.2). References are to the 1911 translation and edition by Nandalal Sinha (*VS* 1911).

1.1 *The Metaphysics of Self*

Praśastapāda, I will argue, proposes a naturalistic yet minimally dualist conception of self which locates self as the source of the normative possibilities of consciousness (*caitanya*) and agency (*kartrtva*), and of moral (*dharma*) and natural law (*adrṣṭa*), at the heart of natural order and causation. Self is the locus of the first-personal structures of consciousness and agency and of the impersonal meta-ethical powers of virtue (*dharma*) and non-virtue (*adharma*), or causal laws (*adrṣṭa*), in the natural world. On this account, not only the mental but also the bodily and biological life of selves and their

¹ See Matilal (1977) and Ganeri (2007: 259-60).

² Other early modern commentaries include Padmanābha Miśra’s *Setu*, a commentary on the section on substances in the Praśastapādabhāṣyam in the the text of the *PDS* with Jagadīśa’s *Sūkti*, Miśra’s *Setu* and Vyomaśīva’s *Vyomavatī* edited by Kavirāj and Shāstri (1983), and cited above as Śū 1983.
physical environment come imbued with a moral character, which is concordant with the moral genealogy of a self’s past actions - in the ethical distribution (vyavasthā) of selves. This ‘wide’ conception of self owes to a metaphysics that I term ‘differential (vaiśeṣika) naturalism’, a fine-grained analysis and classification of all the things of the world in a six-category ontology which distinguishes them as distinct kinds of particulars. This differential metaphysics postulates a natural order that is inclusive of both self and physical substances as its constituent elements (§ 1.5). Consistent with its at least partial physicalist orientation (see Ganeri 2012: 34), it locates the distinguishing (vīšeṣa) mental and moral properties of the self in a physical and metaphysical substructure that self qua substance shares with physical substances as the common (sāmāṇya) defining properties of a substance: the properties of spatiality (dīk) and temporality (kāla), causal nexus (saṃyoga, vibhāga), countability (saṃkhya), and metaphysical separateness (prthaktva).

This physical and metaphysical schematics of substance posits a weak dualism of selves and physical substances in a causal architecture that allows the causal integration of the mental and moral structures of self and selfhood with the physical properties of matter in the natural world (§ 1.5). In contrast to radical dualist intuitions such as Cartesianism or, in the Indian tradition, classical Jainism, this enables the first-personal structures of consciousness and personal agency, in particular, the phenomena of selfhood, including ownership (svatva) (NK 1984: 84, 20-22; ATV 1995: 346-7; § 2.5) or ‘mine-ness’ (mama) (NK(J) 1982: 597; § 2.2), at conscious, unconscious and sub-personal levels of mental and bodily activity to arise as an integrated system of self-concern in nature (PDS 1994: § 78).

It is the synonymity of the meta-ethical powers of virtue (dharma) and non-virtue (adharma) with the powers of natural law (adrṣṭa) and causation, as powers of the self that are themselves dependent on its rational agential structures that allows, we see below, an integration of mental, moral and physical phenomena in nature.

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3 The term ‘differential’ (vaiśeṣika) here owes to the conception of a ‘differentiator’ or ‘distinguisher’ (vīšeṣa) that individuates or distinguishes elementary substances and is conceptually unique to classical Vaiśeṣika.
The metaphysical view Praśastapāda proposes here is of a natural order in which human life, embodiment and behaviour are explicable as agential phenomena at all levels of mental and bodily organization. The central claim of the chapter on self (PDS 1994: §§ 76-80) is that all levels of human mental and bodily activity, cognitions, intentional and subintentional acts, subpersonal and biological processes are explicable as agential phenomena because they exhibit values or ‘normativity’ qua striving for what is ‘good’ or beneficial, and shunning what is unfavourable or harmful. In other words, all aspects of human mental and bodily life, exhibit rational and normative structures and regularities that are characteristic of agency (kartṛtva): structures of judgements (jñāna), desires and aversions (icchā, dveṣa) and willings (prayatna) that refer to considerations what is good or beneficial, and unfavourable or harmful for the human being – in this case, the embodied self.

Agency is essentially a ‘normative’ phenomenon in this view, i.e., it refers to reasons and values, to considerations such as what is ‘good’ or favourable for oneself. But the rational and normative structures of judgements, affections and volitions that are constitutive of agency may arise in reflective and deliberative modes in intentional acts or in primitive modes in biological self-organization and maintenance. Such sensitivity to reasons and values, it is assumed, is necessarily self-referring whether in deliberative and intentional or sub-intentional and instinctual acts of self-concern such as striving for pleasure and avoiding pain, or in primitive modes of maintenance of self-continuity and identity of the human organism. The key assumption here is that only a self, a substance that is sui generis self-referring, can account for such self-referring behaviour, and so for the normative contents of human life evident in deliberative or primitive forms of commitment to and maintenance of psychological, bodily, and biological continuity and identity. The possibility of self-referring behaviour here resides implicitly in the possibility of ownership (svatva) or mine-ness (mama) of mental, bodily and biological phenomena which only a self-substance can account for (PDS 1994: § 78-9).

Praśastapāda postulates, however, that not only human life and behaviour but

4 In this thesis, ‘Intentional’ refers to conscious states that ‘have a content’ or are ‘about an object’, and ‘intentional’ refers to states or actions that are ‘goal-oriented’. 
also physical order and causation are inseparable from values and norms. Because the preservation of physical order and causation arises as a meta-ethical or normative imperative, a moral law (dharma) that is exercised through the ethical or meta-ethical powers of virtue (dharma) and non-virtue (adharma) of the self as natural law (adrṣṭa) – regulated by the divinity (Īśvara) qua composer of natural order (PDS 1994: §§ 57-59 ; 80; see §§ 1.2-1.3). This appears to rest on the assumption that only a self can be the source or locus of the ‘good’ (dharma) (PDS 1994: §§ 1-2), and so the source of the norms and values that are implicit in the exercise of the causal powers of virtue (dharma) and non-virtue (adharma) that underpin mental causation (§ 2.8) in human mental and bodily life, as well as physical causation in the natural world.

The meta-ethical powers (dharma, adharma) of self, qua adṛṣṭa or natural law, are held to determine the micro-structural relationships of matter (mahābhūta) that are constitutive of the psychophysical structures and capabilities of the human body (śarīra), and the regularities and contingencies of the physical environment faced by each self (PDS 1994: § 31). These must be concordant with the moral qualities or genealogies of the past intentional actions (pravrttī, nivruttī) of selves, i.e. their ethical distribution (vyavasthā) (PDS 1994: § 80). This means that human beings as living beings have a moral form or character because their psychophysical characteristics are shaped by the ethical quality of their past actions by self’s powers of virtue and non-virtue act which, in this case, act through its will (prayatna). Natural order is constituted as an ethical order where self’s meta-ethical powers of natural law (adṛṣṭa) act directly on matter, independently of its will, in instituting causal regularities – and contingent phenomena – in the physical world, and constituting a world of objects (artha) that are sources of affective and volitional concern for the self (PDS 1994: § 31, § 59, § 80) – concordant with its moral genealogy. Again, this means that the sorts of affective experiences, pleasures and pains a self has accords with the moral quality of its past actions (PDS 1994: § 80). It is the causal role accorded to the meta-ethical powers of the self qua natural law, which are themselves instigated and sustained by intentional actions, or rather their moral character, that enables such a comprehensive integration of the mental, moral and physical domains. And places moral values at the centre of natural order and causation in the constitution of both human life and the physical world - even if the precise relationships between these domains remains unclear.
The incorporation of agential and meta-ethical properties in the self ensures the possibility of distinct yet linked domains of mental and physical causation. For the impersonal causal powers of natural law (*adrṣṭa*) institute a world of physical objects and causal regularities, a domain of physical causation that is intelligible from an ‘objective’ third-person point of view as either causal regularities that exhibit determinism, or as accidental contingencies (§ 4.7). On the other hand, the first-personal structures of consciousness and agency, and their evaluative possibilities, define the structures and scope of rational and moral agency (*Ki* 1971: 92; § 5.6) in a domain of mental causation of intentional actions that is explicable only in terms of the first-personal rational structure of judgements, affections and volitions that constitute the structure of agency (§ 4.7). On this account, mental and physical causation have distinct domains even though they share a common three-tier ontology of causation (see § 1.5).

The rational and normative structures of agency hold the possibility of both freedom and self-transformation, as well as causal deterministic tendencies (§ 5.5-5.6). The possibility of self-transformation lies in the rational and normative capacities of the Intentional consciousness or cognitive judgements. The central premise here is that human agents have the capacity of evaluating and responding to their desires and aversions, pleasures and pains as objects of cognitive judgements. For this reason, agents bear moral responsibility for the evaluative or normative assessments that guide their actions, and so for actions themselves. The moral quality of intentional actions is paramount here and is measured against an implicit normative ethics that self’s meta-ethical powers of virtue and non-virtue appear to refer to (*PDS* 1994: § 31, § 80). Actions, together with deliberative knowledge, mediate between the actual and the ideal or normative, such that the accrued merit or virtuous powers (*dharma*) and demerit or non-virtuous powers (*adharma*) from its past intentional actions shapes the psychophysical ontology of the self and the scope of self-transformation - in accordance with the ethical or soteriological aims of this philosophical paradigm.

I suggest that a three-tier structure of epistemic, ethical and ontological transformation is given in the *PDS* as, what I term, respectively: the ‘personal’ or ‘agential’ self who is the ordinary subject (*jñātr*) and agent (*kartr*) of its cognitions and actions (*PDS* 1994: § 76-78); the ‘impersonal’ or ‘exceptional’ self of the yogin (*PDS* 1994: §§ 241-42) or jīvanmukta (*NK(J)* 1982: 605-7); and the ‘dimensional’ or liberated
(mukta) self (PDS § 319) that is resident in its true nature (svarūpa sthitah) (NK 1984: 287, 16) of bare metaphysical singularity (kevalaḥ dharmaḥ) (PDS 1994: § 319). The agential self refers to desire-based (jucchāpūrvaka) structures of rationality, by will (prayatna) that is impelled by desires (icchā). It is founded on personal conceptions of ownership (svāmitva) and agency vested by self qua subject and agent in the psychophysical structures of its embodiment. The impersonal self refers to virtue- or dharma-based rationality, and bare phenomenal or non-conceptual ownership (svatva) and agency, that is impelled by the impersonal structures of virtue (dharma) - as opposed to personal desires - which act through self’s will (prayatna). This self refers to and marks the primacy of the rational and normative powers of Intentional consciousness that are common to human subjects as their universal powers and capacities over the desire-based, deterministic causal tendencies of agency and action characteristic of the agential self. The dimensional self is the liberated self that is that is devoid of mental and bodily properties, and the phenomena of ownership. It exists as bare self-substance (dravya), identifiable only as a bare metaphysical individual (viśeṣa) (PDS 1994: § 319; NK 1984: 287, 15-16). I term this the dimensional self insofar as it retains only its substantive metaphysical properties of dimensionality, causal nexus, etc. that serve as the metaphysical infrastructure of the agential and impersonal selves – the minded and bodied self. As bare substantive infrastructure of the embodied self, it locates the possibility of freedom of the agential self in nature.

Such a metaphysics of self enables a comprehensive integration of mentality and physicality, freedom and determination, normativity and the natural that, I will argue below (§ 1.6), posits a type of ‘liberal’ or integrative naturalism. It avoids the radical dualities between the mental and the physical, normativity and the natural, that are central to the ‘mind-body problem’ in contemporary physicalisms or naturalisms that are invested solely in a ‘scientific’ view of nature. As such, it offers an alternative to the Cartesian intuitions that ostensibly permeate modern physicalist perspectives as the ‘mind-body’ or the ‘mind-brain’ problem and, more broadly, a naturalistic alternative to the banishment of mind and values from the natural world - or so I will argue - whose modern guise owes much to Descartes. It also offers an alternative to the strict naturalism of the Indian physicalists, the Cārvāka, and the strong dualist perspectives of Sāṃkhya and Jainism in classical Indian philosophy that takes account of mental and moral phenomena in an integrative naturalistic metaphysics.
1.2 Methodological Considerations

The condensed and obscure style of argumentation in the *Padārthadharmasamgraha*, in brief *sūtras*, particularly in the chapter on the self (*PDS* 1994: §§76-80) traditionally presupposes elucidation through commentaries and oral exegesis by qualified teachers of the tradition. Arguments presented in both the text and its commentaries may, however, remain unclear or be subject to varying interpretations. A degree of philosophical reconstruction is therefore necessary to bridge such gaps in argument and exposition, and consider both actual and possible objections. The aim of such philosophical reconstruction is an interpretation of Praśastapāda’s arguments in a manner that is consistent with commentarial expositions, and which satisfies the criteria of consistency and systematic unity characteristic of the procedures of rational inquiry (*anvikṣikī, tarka*) of classical Vaiśeṣika.

There has been a surge of recent cross-cultural approaches to issues in Indian philosophies of self including (Ganeri 2000, 2001, 2007, 2012; Kuznetsova and Ram-Prasad (2012); Siderits, Thompson and Zahavi (2010)). A number of these studies have pointed to common and overlapping arguments between contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind and Vaiśeṣika - and Nyāya, its affiliate school – discussions of self and mind. These refer in particular to arguments for the existence of a self from unity of consciousness and personal identity (Ganeri 2000, 2012; Ram-Prasad 2010; Chakrabarti 1992). But the philosophical concerns of classical Vaiśeṣika also parallel Western philosophical traditions on questions of moral and rational agency and forensic accountability, for example, in Locke’s conception of persons and the notion of the ‘forensic’ this involves (Kapstein 2001: 63). It also resonates with earlier Greek and medieval traditions on questions such as the problem of rebirth (see Sorabji 2006). Many of the broad themes and suppositions that shape Praśastapāda’s inquiry into self, in particular, questions regarding the first-person epistemology of human consciousness and agency, the guidance of action by normative concerns about what is ‘good’ or not for oneself, and the conceptions of human freedom this is associated with, have clear intercultural resonances with contemporary debates about the place of consciousness and mind in the natural world in the philosophy of mind, and questions about the relationship between normativity and nature and debates on causal determinism and freedom in the philosophy of action.
There are, nevertheless, clear limits imposed by historical and cultural distance on interpretation of a text such as the *PDS* – even if we consider this to be no more than that revealed in a philosophical investigation of say early Greek thought. Cultural specificities are evident in Praśastapāda’s distinct conceptions of reason and rationality, the moral and good, and the place of moral values and action in the natural order of things. Clearly, the juxtaposition of personal agential structures and impersonal metaethical qualities in a self are distant from the personal conceptions of self and agency prominent in current debates in the philosophy of mind; and modern conceptions of ‘free will’ in debates on compatibilism in the philosophy of action are quite different from the notions and scope of rational agency and freedom that Praśastapāda assumes as we see in chapter five. Critical and careful use of methods and concepts in contemporary philosophy of mind and action is necessary for a philosophical reconstruction of Praśastapāda’s arguments if this is to remain consistent with the text and its commentaries. This requires the development of common philosophical terms that are capable of providing an integrated framework that highlights the distinctive assumptions, intuitions and contents of Praśastapāda’s arguments, and the philosophical contribution these make to the question of self. Much of the philosophical work in the following pages is done by three core concepts: naturalism, the self, and agency or action. Before considering these, I briefly discuss the analytical framework in which Praśastapāda’s conceptions of self and agency and his arguments for the existence of a self are located in the discussions that follow.

*An Analytical Framework*

The question of self refers quintessentially to the question, ‘Who or what am I?’ ‘What is it that makes me, *me*, an individual who is distinct from others?’ To be plausible, a conception of self must take account of ordinary intuitions of self and selfhood. Galen Strawson (2009: 3) has suggested that ordinary human experience ‘figures the self as a (1) subject of experience that is a (2) single, (3) persisting, (4) mental, (5) thing … that is (6) an agent that has a certain (7) personality and is (8) not the same thing as a human being considered as a whole’. He suggests the self is usually ‘figured as single … both when it is considered synchronically, or as a thing existing at a given moment in time, and when it is considered diachronically, i.e as a thing that persists through time’ (ibid.: 74). Self-experience is here the experience of oneself as an ‘inner’ subject of
experience, or the locus of consciousness (ibid.: 1-2). Sass describes ordinary intuitions of self as possibly a space or medium of conscious internality, an interior origin, source or perspective that is somehow one’s very own. Consistent with the common-sense metaphysics of classical Vaiśeṣika, Praśastapāda’s definition of the self as a unitary mental thing (dravya) that is the locus of consciousness (cātanya) and agency (kārtrtva) (PDS 1994: §§ 76-7) and the basis of the diachronic unity of mental life (PDS 1994: § 78) reflects such ‘ordinary’ conceptions of self and selfhood (§ 2.1-2.2, 2.6).

It is these ordinary intuitions about the nature of self and selfhood, its phenomenal and epistemic presentation, and the work it does in experience and action that are the source of the key question that faces ancient and modern Western philosophical investigations of the self: whether an account of the first-person features of consciousness and the phenomena of selfhood require that self is an immaterial substance, as in Cartesian substance dualism, or whether an account of self can be given that is subject to scientific or liberal varieties of naturalistic explanation and understanding (see Baressi 2011).

The question of self is posed in contemporary philosophy of mind in the context of questions about the relation between the mental and the physical, or the ‘mind-body’ problem broadly conceived. Three paradigmatic conceptions of self are given here which are also useful for considering the wide range of self and selfhood in classical Indian philosophy: Cartesian substance dualism and neo-Cartesian formulations; Humean reductionism - and its modern Parfitian version; and physicalism - reductive and non-reductive. We find, in parallel, a range of conceptions of self in the classical Indian context which include: Cārvāka physicalism which considers the body to be the self; Buddhist trope reductionism which denies that the self exists and considers it to be an illusion or a conceptual fiction; and a variety of ‘dualist’ conceptions of self ranging from the minimal dualism of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya to the non-Cartesian dualisms of Mīmāṃśā and Sāṃkhya (see also Ganeri 2012: 36-49).  

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5 Mīmāṃśā, like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, ascribes physical properties to the body but consciousness and mental qualities to the self (ātman). Sāṃkhya proposes a dualism of non-Intentional consciousness (self or puruṣa) and the intentional structures of its contents (pro-creative Nature or prakṛti) which encompasses both ‘mind’ and body. Jaina dualistic pluralism offers a radical division of soul (jīva) and matter (pudgala) in a substance metaphysics that includes the capacities of motion (dharma) and rest (adharma),
The dualism of classical Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is distinguished metaphysically from other Sāṃkhya and Jaina dualisms, as well as Cartesianism, by its insertion of an ontological connector, the physical particle manas, between self and body (see Chakrabarti 2011; and § 1.6, § 2.8), which rebuts the radical disjunction between the mental and the physical found in these systems. In fact, the radical divide between mental and physical phenomena that permeates not only Cartesian but contemporary physicalist perspectives, as a central philosophical problem, is absent in classical Vaiṣeṣika (see Matilal 1986: 128-9, and Ganeri 2012: 34-5). Nevertheless, many of the motivations behind the Vaiṣeṣika conception of a substantive self are similar to the sorts of considerations that inform debates on the idea of self in contemporary philosophy of mind as well as its historical antecedents. Such considerations include issues regarding the ownership of mental states, the nature of bodily awareness or ‘ownership’, and the phenomenal and epistemic properties of first-person consciousness; the distinct metaphysics of self and body; arguments for a self from personal identity and the unity of consciousness, both diachronic and synchronic, including arguments from memory and unity of agency respectively; requirements of moral agency and accountability, and so on.

A conceptual retrieval of the philosophy of self in classical Vaiṣeṣika can thus usefully refer to modern discussions. I consider Praśāstäpaḍa’s arguments for a self in terms of three interlinked issues about the nature of self, mind and the physical world that we find in contemporary philosophy of mind, namely: (a) the first-person structures of consciousness and selfhood and their place in the physical world; (b) the possibility of human agency and mental causation in the natural world, and questions regarding first-person accounts of action and its causation that refer to rational powers, as opposed to third-person, ‘objective’ accounts of action; and (c) the relationship between normativity and the natural world.

The first group of issues, (a), refer to a set of phenomenological, epistemological and metaphysical claims regarding the existence and nature of the self. These refer to (i) phenomenological questions about the nature of our awareness of ourselves and the

and space. Idealist conceptions are represented by Advaita Vedānta, for which self is reflexive consciousness.
internality of experience; (ii) the epistemological question about whether there is something distinctive about the knowledge we have of ourselves. This concerns the ways in which we know and identify ourselves in contrast to how we come to know and identify physical objects. These phenomenological and epistemic arguments lead to (iii) metaphysical questions about the distinct properties of self, *qua* subject, and the body, and the relation between self and body which includes questions about whether I am identical with my body given the distinct identity conditions of selves and bodies. This set of arguments is discussed in chapter two.

The phenomenology of the first-person perspective, the phenomenal sense of ‘mineness’ or I-hood we have as subjects and agents appears intrinsic to mental states and bodily actions, so that these appear as owned, as ‘me’ or ‘mine. The central issue here is whether the phenomenal feeling of ownership or ‘mineness’ that is characteristic of conscious experience is significant because it reflects the existence of a non-physical substance as classical Vaiśeṣika and Cartesian dualists claim, or whether it reflects a cognitive judgement of ownership, or the Intentional structure of consciousness itself as Zahavi (2005: 124) suggests. Alternatively, is the notion of ownership and of self simply an error of some sort, as Parfit (1984) and Humean reductionists, and the Buddhists claim - although I do not consider the reductionist position at any length in this study.

It is the metaphysical character of the object that ‘I’ refers to that is contested here; whether it is the body, the mind, a soul or self, or a stream of mental events, etc. Anscombe (1975) famously argues that a non-physical self must be rejected because ‘I’ does not refer at all. On the other hand, Sorabji (2006) argues that the first-person perspective and the use of the first-person pronoun are essential for our understanding of the world and for guiding our actions, but ‘I’ refers to the whole person. An impersonal reductionist description as Parfit (1984) proposes would fail to motivate action and responsibility, he claims. Peter Strawson (1963) similarly thinks that ownership of mental states is necessary but it is the whole person to whom mental and physical predicates must be ascribed. Echoing ownership claims, Praśastapāda argues, however, from the necessity of ownership to a substantive bearer of mental states who is a self (*PDS* 1994: § 79) who is non-physical. Śrīdhara (*NK* (J) 1982: 597) contends that ownership is a requisite for the normative demands of mental states that drive mental causation and mental life.
Contemporary philosophy of mind offers a range of views about the relationship between self and body, the mental and the physical that include property dualism, emergentism and panpsychism, together with a variety of reductive and non-reductive physicalist accounts. Praśastapāda’s consideration of possible objections to a non-physical self are restricted to those offered by strict Cārvāka physicalism – excluding its emergentist possibilities. Although these various alternatives are not considered by Praśastapāda himself, his commentators and later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors do consider arguments from emergentism, panpsychism, etc. (see Ganeri 2012).

The second set of issues, (b), concern agency and mental causation; they consider the ‘active’ character of consciousness and mental life, and the first-person rational conceptions of action and its causation as opposed to third-person ‘objective’ views.

The ‘active’ character of consciousness and the mental is central to Praśastapāda’s arguments in PDS (1994: § 76, § 78). The ‘active; nature of the mental is discussed in O’Shaughnessy (1980, 2002), whose distinction between the nature of ‘will’ exercised in perceptions, and ‘trying’ or striving in mental and bodily actions is useful for elucidating the structure of Praśastapāda’s arguments for two types of perceptual agency, and from bodily striving, for an agential self (§ 3.3, 4.3-4.4). Baldwin (2003) and Crowther’s (2009) discussions of the act-nature of perceiving elaborate some of O’Shaughnessy’s claims.

The conception of self as an agent, as the source of willings, the ‘active’ power that vivifies mental and bodily life, is central to Praśastapāda’s arguments. But is the notion that we are agents who exercise agency erroneous, as arguments from cognitive illusion and neurophysiological dysfunction may be taken to indicate (§ 5.3)? And is ‘free will’ an illusion as some have concluded from Libet’s (§ 5.4) experiments? How these issues might be addressed in Praśastapāda’s conception of agency, the structure of mental-physical causation her postulates, and the structures of consciousness and agency, respectively, are addressed in §§ 5.3-5.4.

The key question that arises here is how action and freedom are to be accounted for. Can we explain agency by reducing action to behaviour caused by some belief-desire pair as on a Davidsonian account? Hornsby (1993: 284, § 4.8) questions the expicability of intentional actions from a third-person, objective stance as a chain of
causal events that do not refer to the first-personal structures of the agent or self who is their bearer. She holds this does not adequately capture an agent’s doing something intentionally and that a consideration of the first-personal structures of intentional actions and their bearer, an agent, is necessary. Udayana (Ki 1971: 88, 15-6; § 4.8) argues in a parallel vein that an account of actions that excludes the first-personal structures of an agent, a self, is unintelligible. But for Udayana, this means that both a physical ‘agent’, or causation by instruments such as the senses, etc., are unintelligible as intentional action because these lead to infinitely regressive authorless chains of causation.

Questions about the structure of action refer to issues of causal determinism and freedom, to questions about whether causally deterministic theories of action can take account of freedom or ‘free will’ (§ 5.5-5.6), and to whether causal indeterminism is necessarily unintelligible (§ 5.6). The question of freedom presses the question whether our attitudes are sensitive to our deliberations, or whether our cognitive capacities are simply obedient to our attitudes and passions. Does reason simply direct action towards pre-existing goals, as Hume proposes, so that reason is simply a ‘slave of the passions’ (Treatise Bk 2, pt 1, sec 1, para 4; Bk 2, pt 3, sec 9, para 2) - a matter of adopting the means necessary for achieving what one already wants? Or are our attitudes are sensitive to our deliberations, and altered by these, in which case our cognitive capacities have a significant effect on our attitudes? What sort of evaluative control do we have as subjects over our actions – and over ourselves as agents? These concerns are discussed in Korsgaard (1992). The structures of consciousness and agency, and Udayana’s discussion about the ontological dependence of affections, emotions and volitions on cognitive judgements, elucidate the scope of rational powers and evaluative control over mental attitudes (§ 5.6-7).

Mental causation raises problems of causal closure of the physical and overdetermination which are not considered here, as well as the problem of causal interaction between self and body, the so-called ‘pairing problem’ that Cartesian dualism faces that Kim (2005) and Sosa (1984) discuss at length (§ 2.8).

The third set of issues (c) look at the possibility of values, norms and meaning in the natural world. The context of the argument presented here is McDowell’s liberal naturalism which seeks at least a partial ‘re-enchantment’ of nature in moving towards re-integrating the realm of knowing, thinking and feeling in conceptions of the natural.
But it is not clear what the precise links are between these two realms, the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘realm of law’, beyond the thought that our rational ‘human nature’ is part of the natural world because it belongs to us naturally as living beings who are a part of nature. These considerations are important in elaborating Praśastapāda’s meta-ethical conception of natural law as moral law that connects physical order and causation in human life and the physical world with human values and actions (§ 1.3-1.4) to yield a conception of the natural inclusive of mental and moral phenomena.

Korsgaard (1992: 106) is also insightful here. She claims that the normativity of human values springs from the fact that humans are animals of a certain kind, moral animals, whose life itself is a value, a form of morality, since for a living thing the preservation of its physical identity is an imperative such that it is a law unto itself. These issues refer to Praśastapāda’s conception of the human organism as demonstrating primitive self-concern and normativity in maintaining biological identity and continuity, and of being a ‘moral’ product (§ 5.2) - a product of the moral genealogy, the cumulative virtuous (dharma) and non-virtuous powers (adharma), of the self from the moral quality of its past actions.

It is as a moral product that the body is the basis of consciousness and mental life fit to enjoy experiences of pleasure and pain in a world of objects that arise as sources of affective and volitional concern for the self as agent – consonant with its past deeds (PDS 1994: § 31). Bilgrami (2010: 26-7) is helpful here. Drawing on McDowell (1996,1998), he suggests that values in the natural world make normative demands on us as moral and rational subjects and agents - in contrast to the reductive view of nature of the natural sciences that ‘strip’ it of values. It is a fact of human life, he claims, that the world places normative demands on us that have a historical, social genesis. One of the problems faced here is the sort of links there are between the mental and moral realms, and the physical domain, a problem that both the PDS and modern liberal naturalisms perhaps fail to adequately adumbrate.

Types of Naturalism

A shared feature of the variety of naturalisms in the Western analytic tradition is the rejection of ‘supernaturalism’ and an endorsement of scientific explanations of nature. Scientific or ‘hard’ naturalism identifies nature solely with the ontological,
methodological and explanatory models of modern physics or the natural sciences. It either reduces the spheres of thought, reasons and values, the sphere of normativity, to such an ontology or excludes these aspects as ‘supernatural. A number of ‘liberal’ or ‘soft’ naturalisms propose the incorporation of reasons, values, and meanings as *sui generis* phenomena that are also natural phenomena. These expand the conception of the natural to include the powers of thinking, knowing and feeling we have as living beings as natural powers (1996, 1998, 2004); or they include in the natural that which is part of our nature as social beings and a ‘condition of our humanity’ (Strawson 1985: 33). McDowell (1998, 2004) argues from an Aristotelian standpoint that our ‘human nature’, the nature of creatures who are thinking and rational beings, is a ‘second nature’, and this includes non-reductively in the sphere of the natural the ‘freedom’ we have as minded rational animals. The mind is recognized here as belonging to the ‘space of reasons’ as distinct from the ‘realm of law’ - conceived as the realm of scientific laws. The natural world includes here all our human potentials, including those necessary for becoming ethically virtuous. However, it is not clear how precisely our rational and moral nature is linked to our animal nature, and to the natural laws that are held to govern the realm of the physical.

Praśastapāda’s naturalistic framework, it may be suggested, is a type of liberal naturalism which proposes a conception of self that integrates the mental and moral domains in nature. Certainly, it observes a naturalistic methodology - a continuity between the methods and aims of metaphysics and the natural sciences that prevails in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as in a variety of classical Indian philosophies (Mohanty 1992: 222; Chatterjee 2012). An understanding of this integrative enterprise, its incorporation of the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘realm of law’ as aspects of the self - to use McDowell’s terms - requires some discussion of the philosophical sources that underlie such a conception of self and its place in the natural world.

*Indian Conceptions of Natural Order and Difference*

The emphasis in classical Vaiśeṣika metaphysics on distinguishing a ‘differential’ order of things appears to be influenced by Vedic (circa 1200 – 200 B.C.E.) preoccupation
with the idea of difference and order. The early Vedas propose an aesthetic, harmonic
and ethical principle, *rta*,⁶ that refers to a principle of ‘active, creative truth’ or ‘active
realization of the truth’ (Witzel 2003: 70) which maintains a differentiated order; it
maintains the dynamic structure and unity of all objects and actions in their proper place
and function - across the physical, moral and divine realms, biological and social
phenomena, and human actions (Kuznetsova 2007: 9-12). The conception of nature here
is of things that despite being different are intrinsically interconnected or related
(*bandhu*) by ‘resemblances’ that bind them to each other, whether on the same
ontological level horizontally or across different ontological planes vertically (Smith
1989: 78-9). The interconnectedness and coordination between things across these
parallel, interrelated domains is sustained by ritual actions that activate the connections
that bind these different spheres in the macrocosmic universe. Here ritual or sacrificial
action (*karman*), and its different spheres of operation, are themselves governed by
normative ideals and values imposed by *rta*.

It is possible that the Vedic conception of analogous yet distinct domains or
classes of things accounts for the notion of a distinct yet commensurable order of
mental and physical things in Praśastapāda; for a conception of differential naturalism
rather than a more radical dualism of mental and physical phenomena. In appears that
classical Vaiśeṣika maps the Vedic and Upanisadic conception of parallel structures of
resemblances, equivalences, and distinctions across all domains and entities into a
reified metaphysics of difference and identity of *things* – of substances, their qualities
and motions - that is bound by a system of causal equivalences or commensurabilities (§
1.5).

The Vedic conception of *dharman*⁷ refers to that which structures the
distinctions and divisions that give things their distinct and proper identity and place
(Kuznetsova 2007: 6-7), often with reference to a personal agent who supports and
institutes the norms and rules of *rta* (ibid: 5). This conception of *dharman*, together
with the conception of *rta*, appears in classical conceptions of *dharma* (moral law,

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⁶ *Rta* is held to derive from the root ‘*ṛ*’ meaning ‘to go’ or ‘to move’ (Kuznetsova 2007: 9).

⁷ *Dharma* is derived from the root ‘*dhr*’, ‘to hold’, ‘to support’. Its original occurrence in Vedic
mythology is connected with ‘*vi-dhr*’, ‘to hold apart’.
virtue) which now refers to the set of established distinctions and distribution of things, metaphysical, ethical and social, their distinguishing features and identities which - like its Vedic counterpart - is bound to the notion of activity (pravṛtti). It is this corpus of meanings of dharma and rta that we find in the conception of adṛṣṭa, of natural law that is also moral law (dharma), in the PDS.

I suggest the integration of these notions of difference and order, or natural law and moral law, in classical Vaiśeṣika represents an early naturalistic position. This is based on the assumption that there exists a unity between the natural sciences, such as physics and chemistry, and the theory of self which is integrally associated with these sciences as the very condition of possibility of nature or natural order. For it is the moral forces qua natural law (adṛṣṭa) generated by the actions of the self that account here for empirical nature's composition, so that nature is ultimately both natural and moral, a natural and an ethical order (Mohanty 1992: 222) - as in Vedism.

*Action and Normativity*

The classical Vaiśeṣika conception of action, in common with classical Indian philosophy more generally, represents a universalization and ethicization of the sacrificial act to all actions as that which sustains the phenomenal world of differentiated order (Kuznetsova 2007: 33-36, 156). As Chakrabarti (1999: 260-1) points out, sacrifice is the ‘human rational activity par excellence’ in Indian philosophy. A human being has the capacity to rise above narrow self-interest and perform ‘sacrifices’ both in the literal and ritualistic sense for the sake of ‘unseen’ results in the future. Further, ‘Only humans are capable of dharma considerations of piety and morality, right or wrong conduct’ and reflective analysis (vicāra), and aware of what causes what (karanājña) while consciously seeking pleasure. Intentional action now mediates between the actual and a normative ideal, and brings moral consequences according to its moral character by reference to this ideal by generating ethical powers of merit or virtue and demerit or non-virtue that we find in the PDS. Truth, differentiation and order are activated by intentional action (pravṛtti, nivṛtti) that now integrates the rational, ethical and normative relations that define human agency and action with lawful natural order conceived as the operation of ‘active truth’, of natural law (adṛṣṭa) as moral law (dharma) that operates through the powers of dharma and adharma of the self (§ 1.4; § 5.7).
Sources of the Self

Conceptions of the self emerge in early Indian philosophy in the second half of the first millennium B.C.E. in the Upaniṣads as well as in the non-Brahmanical schools: the Ājīvikas, Jainas, and Buddhists among others. Drawing on the Vedic system of analogies, the inquiry into self (ātman) in the Upaniṣads arises with questions of the various sorts of distinctions and equivalences or identities that are evident among the things of the world and human beings. These speculations come to be framed in terms of a fundamental equation between the personal self (ātman), which harbours the vital essence of human life, and the global, impersonal reality, Brahman, the essence of nature and the cosmos (see Kapstein 2001). Self now refers to both personal and macrocosmic identity. It is this juxtaposition of the personal and macroscopic realms, of personal identity and individuation with the impersonal powers of natural order, that underwrite Praśastapāda’s conception of the self as a locus of both the personal cognitive, agential and vital powers of human life, and the impersonal meta-ethical powers of natural order: the locus of rationality and normativity and causal laws in nature.

1.3. Early and Classical Vaiśeṣīka

Frauwallner (1973 vol. II: 60) suggests that the Padārthadharmasamgraha represents a substantial break with early Vaiśeṣīka, a theological revision of an early naturalistic or ‘nature’ philosophy (see also Halbfass 1982: 311-15). This thesis is hard to concede however, if as I have argued, we consider the aim of the PDS to be a systematic naturalistic integration of the mental, moral and physical spheres as seen above - a ‘differential naturalism’ in which norms and values are placed at the heart of natural order and causation. In this section, I consider some key differences and continuities between early and classical Vaiśeṣīka and the sort of theoretical shift these imply.

The earliest systematic presentation of Vaiśeṣīka philosophy is generally accepted to be the Vaiśeṣikasūtra (VS) of Kaṇāda (‘eater of grains or atoms’), or Ulūka (‘owl’) (1st/2nd cent. C.E. ) (Matilal, 1977: 53-54). This is part of an analytic turn in Indian philosophy that ushers in philosophical reasoning and debate such as we witness between Vaiśeṣīka philosophers and their Buddhist and Cārvāka interlocutors. The Vaiśeṣikasūtra is undoubtedly the authoritative point of reference for Praśastapāda’s
exegesis of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. In fact, the *Padārthadharmasamgraha* is also referred to as the *Praśastapāda Bhāṣya*, ‘The Commentary of Praśastapāda [on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra]’, and references to the *Sūtra* are frequent throughout the text, including the chapter on self. Nevertheless, the *PDS* undoubtedly undertakes a substantial reinterpretation, revision and extension of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* while remaining, I suggest, metaphysically and ethnically consistent with its core philosophical principles and concerns. Given its revisionistic bias, traditional claims (see Thakur 2003: 166) that the *PDS* is a commentary (*bhāṣya*) on the *Sūtra* appear tenuous, for references to the *VS* are in fact embedded selectively in the text in support of its project that, I contend, represents a systematic, naturalistic rationalization of inherited philosophical materials using specific methodological principles (see Thakur 2003: 173; Ganeri 2001: 71).

Praśastapāda’s revision of early Vaiśeṣika thought includes a revisiting of Vedic conceptions of a dynamic order of identity and difference, and Upaniṣadic philosophies of self, as indicated above. It also incorporates developments in ethical theory and practice and spiritual exercises from the Śaṅkhya and Yoga traditions (see § 5.7). Three major shifts are evident between the *VS* and the *PDS*: 1) a shift towards a normative naturalism that is a theorization of the possibility of values in the natural world, by an equation of the natural powers of *adrṣṭa* of early Vaiśeṣika with the moral powers of *dharma* and *adharma* that are considered qualities of the self in the *PDS*; 2) the introduction of an infinite self that has limitless spatial and temporal dimensionality in the *PDS* which contrasts with the finite self of early Vaiśeṣika; 3) a shift from a self that is intrinsically active in early Vaiśeṣika to one that is inactive - *qua* substance - in the *PDS*, but is the basis of an explicitly instrumentalist and mechanistic model of agency.

*Norms and Nature*

There is a shift towards a comprehensive ethical metaphysics in the *PDS* which attempts a re-working of early Vaiśeṣika by an equation of the macrocosmic causal power, *adrṣṭa*, that is responsible for natural regularities in the *VS*, with the meta-ethical powers of virtue and non-virtue (*dharma, adharma*) which are now held to be properties of the self – properties that manifest the accrued moral merit and demerit, or the moral constitution, of the individual self from the moral quality of its past actions. Such an
explicit equation is absent in the Sūtra, as is the ascription of the powers of virtue and non-virtue to the self as its properties.

It is however difficult to argue that an ethical theory is absent in the VS or that adṛṣṭa does not refer to liberation (abhuyudaya) at all, or that it bears no relation to dharma and adharma, so that a link between the ethical and material spheres is excluded in the Sūtra (see Houben 1995: 739). For although adṛṣṭa and dharma and adharma are not explicitly equated in the VS, and dharma and adharma are not explicitly ascribed to the self as its own properties, it appears that that these concepts refer to the same sorts of things in both texts. Adṛṣṭa, dharma and adharma, and samskāra (tendencies) are qualities or powers that that appear to belong as much to selves and mentality as to physical objects in the VS, Houben (1995: 739) claims. However, despite a continuity between ethical and meta-ethical qualities, and natural causal powers, which may be applicable to both the mental and physical domains in the VS, its lack of theorization about the links between these spheres distinguishes it from the PDS.

A theoretical development that emerges from the equation of the powers of virtuous and non-virtuous states with adṛṣṭa is the introduction of a comprehensive notion of psychophysical causation, even if its structures are not explicated in the PDS. Nature qua natural order is now micro-structurally configured by the ethico-natural powers of adṛṣṭa, or dharma and adharma. This theorizes the possibility, already present in the VS, that composite objects are bearers of value and meaning (artha) for selves qua subject and agent, by postulating that the operation of dharma and adharma assures that the objects (artha) a self faces are sources of affective concern, pleasurable and painful experiences for it concordant with the moral genealogy of its past actions – its place in the ethical distribution of selves (vyavasthā).

We find that various concepts in early Vaiśeṣika theory, natural causal powers (adṛṣṭa), virtue and non-virtue (dharma and adharma), objects that are sources of affective and volitional concern for human agents (artha), and the ethical distribution of selves (vyavasthā) which are found scattered across the VS are systematically integrated

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8 Literally, the ‘elevated’ state, or ‘high’ state that is equated with liberation (mokṣa).
in a comprehensive metaphysics: a normative naturalism. This integration of natural causal powers with ethical powers enables the introduction of nomic relationships across the physical, ethical and rational domains that are resident in the self - and the collectivity of selves. On this account, self bridges the microcosmic and macrocosmic order in a comprehensive theory of ethico-natural order and causation that is at best only weakly represented in the Sūtra.

This represents a revisionist extension and re-interpretation of the naturalistic paradigm inherited from the VS towards a naturalism that is inclusive of reasons, values, norms and evaluative attitudes, and the demands these make, as well as of physical causal regularities. In view of the systematic and naturalistic character of changes between the two texts, the notion of a simple shift from a naturalistic to a moral perspective as proposed by Frauwallner (1973, vol. II) may be somewhat simplistic, and at variance with the motivations and philosophical framework of the PDS itself.

The Naturalization of the Mental and Moral

Praśastapāda’s project of systematic naturalization is evident in the fact that self, in the PDS as in the VS, lacks its distinguishing (viśeṣa) cognitive, affective, volitional and ethical properties in its bodiless, liberated or natural state (svarūpa sthitaḥ) (NK 1984: 287, 16). It retains only the set of generic physical and meta-physical properties - infinite spatiality (parimāṇa) and temporality (kāla), causal conjunction (samyoga) and disjunction (vibhāga), separateness (prthaktva), and countability (samkhyā) – that it possesses qua substance. These properties are not explicitly ascribed to it in the VS and now provide the metaphysical infrastructure that enables mental causation and the instantiation of its mental properties when embodied (see § 1.5). The theorization of such a substantive infrastructure of the self is a striking turn that brings parity between self, spatiality and temporality, as substances of infinite spatial and temporal dimension whose true metaphysical nature (svarūpa) qua substance is to lack any essential distinguishing (viśeṣa) characteristics – physical or mental. This theorizes the notion that self is not essentially a mental substance: it is not essentially a bearer of mental properties in a way that enables lateral parity across substances and mitigates the possibility of a radical ontological division of the mental and the physical that, I
suggest, is a keystone of Vaiśeṣika as a ‘horizontally’-defined system of ontological classification (see Halbfass 1992: 49).

*From the Finite to the Infinite Self*

This ‘dimensional’ conception of the self may be seen as an innovative mode of naturalization and rationalization of the notion of the infinitely permeating and penetrating self of the Upaniṣads, discussed above, in a physicalist framework that extends early Vaiśeṣika in a naturalistic manner. It represents a shift to a theory of the global or infinite dimensionality of self where the *VS*, at least in its earliest versions, seems to present a self of finite dimension of the same size as the body (Adachi 1995). This may owe in part to the equation in the *PDS* of the powers of virtue and non-virtue (*dharma, adharma*) with *adṛṣṭa*, a power, whose macrocosmic sphere of operation requires access to all possible spatio-temporal objects and, therefore, a self that has infinite dimensionality.

*From the Active Self to an Instrumental Model of Agency*

The shift to a global dimensionality of self is also associated with the shift from a conception of self that is itself active in the *VS* to one that is, *qua* substance, inactive in the *PDS*. Where the omni-located self of the *PDS* is incapable of motion - self itself *qua* substance is inactive - the earliest editions of the *VS* posit self itself as having the property of movement (*ātmakarman*) (see Bronkhorst 1993; Adachi 1995: 653). The *VS* suggests that self itself has the capacity to move, and this is exhibited in the movements of the body it is causally associated with, as well as in self’s entry and exit from the physical body at the time of birth and death, respectively, of the embodied self. The *PDS*, however, interprets these movements as referring to the motion of *manas*, the ontological connector that mediates between self and its body (see Bronkhorst 1993: 87-92; *VS* 1911: 5.2.18-20).

The exclusion of an active self in the shift to an unmoving omni-located self comes with the introduction of an instrumental conception of agency as the means of accounting for mental and bodily activities, and bodily life itself. This includes a theorization of the instrumental role of the inner sense-faculty (*manas*), the outer senses (*indriya*) and the body (*śarīra*) in the structure of agency for which the agential self, the
embodied and minded self, serves as an efficient or instrumental cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) – the ‘operator’ of these *qua* instruments (§ 3.3). The introduction of an instrumentalist and mechanistic model has the critical effect of introducing an *agential* theory of consciousness, namely, a model of perceiving as mental action that offers a theory of attentional will (*prayatna*), and more broadly, a generalized theory of the agential constitution of all aspects of human life via the instrumental role of the non-conscious ‘mind’ (*manas*) as an executive instrument of the self that is moved by the will. Again, although these various aspects of the classical Vaiśeṣika theory of action are present in the *VS*, they are not theorized in a systematic agent-instrument metaphysics.

The Continuity of Core Arguments

In the first instance, the stated motivation and aims of both texts are similar. The beginning of the *VS* (1911: 1.1.1-1.4) clearly expresses the motivation for its exposition as achievement of the highest good (*niḥśreyas*), by a knowledge of the properties (*dharma*) of things that words refer to (*padārtha*) (Thakur 2003: 24), much in the way the *PDS* (1994: § 2) and its commentaries claim (*NK* 1984: 6, 12-3).

Further, despite the conceptual innovations referred to above, the chapter on self and the *PDS* reiterates the core conceptions of self, perception, agency and action presented in the *VS*. The chapter on self relies in particular on the third chapter of the *VS* (1911: 3.1.1-3.2.29) which concerns the nature of the self and arguments for its existence, but it also explicitly incorporates aspects of self’s agency, action and features that are addressed in other parts of the *Sūtra* (*VS* 1911: 6.1.2, 6.1.5, 7.1.22, 8.1.2, 9.2.6)⁹.

The first set of arguments presented in *PDS* (1994: §76) refer to *VS* (1911: 3.1.18) in inferring a self from the mechanics of perceiving. The second set of arguments, in *PDS* (1994: §77), refer directly to the *Sūtra* in suggesting that perception of sense-objects is an inferential mark for the existence of a property-bearer who is not the senses or the body, given their physicality (*VS* 1911: 3.1.1-6). The third set of arguments, presented in *PDS* 78, that bodily striving and restraint prove the existence of

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⁹ See insertions by G. Jha (*PDS(J)* 1982: 152-4)
a controller refer to VS (1911: 3.1.19). What differs in each of the above cases between Praśastapāda’s presentation and that in the VS is the reference in the PDS to instrumental and mechanical analogies, such as cutting wood (PDS 1994: §76), steering a chariot or throwing a ball (PDS 1994: §78), and so on. And developing the implications of the instrumentality of these, for example, with regard to the role of manas in ensuring mental coherence and organization, even though such arguments are nascently present in the (VS 1911: 3.2.1-3; PDS 1994: §77).

There is even greater congruence between VS 3.2.4 and the arguments for a self in PDS (1994: §§ 78-79) from respiration, blinking, and the first-personal character of mental states. But again, the recourse to mechanical analogies in the PDS is missing in the Śūtra. The core distinction between the VS and the PDS in regard to the nature of their arguments for a self is therefore largely correlate with the shift to an instrumental metaphysics in the latter and the role this plays in theorizing an agential metaphysics of the self. The use of mechanical and instrumental analogies or examples (drṣṭānta) is now a part of the rigorous application of the five-fold syllogism by Praśastapāda as means of proof for the existence of a self which uses exemplification in its third step.

In a similar vein, the argument for self as the referent of ‘I’ in PDS (1994: § 79) on grounds of semantic realism, and from discrepancies between the referential uses of ‘I’ and all other words avers to VS (1911: 3.2.9). Interestingly, Kaṇḍa’s argument for the existence of a self from the intuition that ‘I’ refers to oneself and not another in VS 3.2.14 - is not recounted in the PDS, although it is taken up in a variety of arguments by Śrīdhara (see § 2.6; NK 1984: 84, 23-4). In PDS (1994: § 80), Praśastapāda justifies the ascription of virtue and non-virtue (dharma, adharma) as intrinsic qualities of the self by reference to VS (1911: 6.1.5) which states that the moral consequences of one’s actions accrue to oneself. Similarly, the countability or plurality (samkhyā) and separateness (prthaktva) of selves in PDS (1911: § 80) are adduced from the notion of their ethical distribution (vyavasthā) in VS (1911: 3.2.20-1). The properties of causal connection (samyoga) and disjunction (vibhāga) again in PDS (1994: § 80) are mentioned in VS (1911: 9.2.6).

Clearly, the PDS represents a wholesale extension and rationalization of the principal tenets of the VS in an exhaustive classification of the ‘reals’ or categories (padārtha) constitutive of the world in a way that naturalizes norms and values. This offers a defence of the self not simply on ontological grounds, but from the normative
structures of agency and action and human life itself which are now situated in a natural order that is synonymously a moral order. The context of such a revisionistic project appears to be the explication of a paradigm adequate to the task of defending Vaiśeṣka tenets at a time when other schools, Hindu (Śāmkhya), Buddhist (Sarvāstivāda) and Jaina - Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthasūtra (circa 350 C.E.) - had successfully postulated comprehensive accounts of the metaphysical structures of the world in the context of human ethical and soteriological aims.

1.4. The Aims and Motivation of the Padārthadharmaśāṣṭra

Pleasure and the Highest Good

The guiding motivation of the PDS is unequivocally stated as attainment of the highest good (niḥśreyas) that is to be achieved by an understanding of its exposition of metaphysical truths. Its aim is

‘to describe the nature of things (padārtha) leading to the highest end (mahodayah) …. [because] knowledge of the true nature of the six categories, [namely,] substance, quality, motion, universal, differentiator, inherence, [with regard to] their similar (śādharmya) and dissimilar characteristics (vaidharmya) is the means of attaining the highest good (niḥśreyasa)’ (PDS 1994: §1-2).

Śrīdhara asserts that the PDS is ‘that work from which results the highest good, in the form of liberation … [this] work bears to … the highest result, the relation of cause and effect’ (NK(J) 1982: 6, revised trans.). The highest good is to be achieved by knowledge of the six categories as manifest in their similarities and differences (NK(J) 1982: 13).

The nature of the highest good which is to be achieved by knowledge is bliss (ānanda) which is not pleasure or desire-seeking.10 The reason, Śrīdhara explains, why

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10 Resonances with early Greek philosophy are instructive here. Socrates suggests in the Phaedo (Rasmussen 2004: II, 2) that pleasure entails pain and pain, pleasure. He says:

‘What a strange thing my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure! How wonderfully it is related to that which seems to be its opposite, pain, in that they will not both come to a man at the same time, yet if he pursues the one and captures it, he is generally obliged to take the other also, as if the two were joined together in one head …. [so that] when one of them comes to anyone, the other follows after’ (Phaedo 60b-c).
‘…ordinary pleasure also is included in pain … [is] because it is not lasting … it is accompanied by the trouble of the bringing together the endless accessories necessary for its accomplishment … [and] because it is always connected with pain…” (NK(J) 1982: 14).

He elucidates the distinction between bliss and pleasures in the following way:

‘The pleasure born of the experiencing of sensuous objects disappears in a moment and abounds in pain … [because] it is mixed with a constant dread of loss … shrouded with pain; and as such cannot be called “absolute bliss”. It is only the absolute cessation of pain, which consists in the disappearance of all pains hard to be borne that can be called bliss; especially because it does not allow of the return of those pains. And it is this bliss that is brought about by the knowledge of the true nature of substance and the other categories’ (NK(J) 1982: 13-4).

The good to be achieved by knowledge of the six categories consists, therefore, not in pleasure, the transience and concomitants of which are invariably a source of feelings of loss, fear and pain, but in the complete overcoming of pain: the state of ‘absolute bliss’ (ānanda).

The issue of pleasure versus the good which is blissful and achieved through knowledge is a recurring theme in Upaniṣadic discourse11 and a possible influence here. The theme evoked in the Upaniṣads is that the bliss of self is achieved by knowledge qua self-knowledge through a series of spiritual exercises by which one comes to be located in self alone, having overcome pleasure-seeking and its complements of desire

11 The Kaṭha Upaniṣad states:
‘Both the good and the gratifying present themselves to a man;
The wise assess them and note their difference;
And choose the good over the gratifying …
Far apart and widely different are these two;
ignorance and what’s known as knowledge,
I take Naciketas as one yearning for knowledge;
the many desires do not confound you’ (Ka Up 1996: 2.2-4).
‘Fools pursue outward desires,
and enter the trap of death spread wide.
But the wise know what constitutes th’ immortal,
and in unstable things here do not seek the stable’ (Ka Up 1996: 4.2).
and pain.\(^{12}\) This is echoed in the *PDS*, for the good *qua* absolute bliss is to be achieved by overcoming pleasure and pain; that is, by overcoming object-driven desires, through knowledge of the six categories, which leads by way of meditative exercises to the state of union (*yoga*) with self that consists in direct self-experience or self-knowledge (*ātma-jñāna*) (*PDS* 1994: §§ 315-6; *NK(J)* 1982: 595-6; see § 5.7).

The cessation of pain which is the goal of cognition or knowledge consists here in the cessation all mental properties of the self: the liberated self is devoid of consciousness. As Kaṇāda says, the ultimate goal is liberation of the self (*mokṣa*) and this means freedom from conjunction with all its mental attributes, so there is no scope for further bondage (*VS* 1911: 5.2.8). In its liberated state, its natural metaphysical state (*svarūpa sthitaḥ*), self is both unminded and disembodied, Praśastapāda states, free of the bondage incurred by the body and the senses. This arises with the cessation of the exhaustion of the accrued powers of *dharma* and *adharma* once all passions have quietened like a fire whose fuel is consumed - a metaphor reminiscent of Buddhist precepts (*PDS* 1994: § 319). The conception of liberation elucidated here is distinct because it conceives liberation not as a state of bliss but as the absence of all mental and moral attributes of the self, including consciousness. The liberated (*mukta*) self exists in its own substantive nature (*svarūpa*) devoid of its characteristic (*viśeṣā*) mental qualities and the possibility of further embodiment (*NK* 1984: 287, 15-6); a state which, because it is free of embodiment, is the final cessation of suffering, states Udayana (*Ki* 1971: 5, 4).

This ostensibly negative conception of freedom is heavily criticized by Vaiśeṣika’s opponents and affiliates alike for its denial of consciousness and bliss in the liberated state. The Nyāya, for example, argue that such a conception of liberation is no better than the state of a stone because it does not ascribe any qualities to the liberated self (*Kumar* 2013: 105) – a conception which Śrīdhara defends as necessary given that

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\(^{12}\) Upaniṣadic sources suggest the good and the blissful is to be reached by traversing an ascending series of states of bliss by spiritual exercises until the ‘single measure of the bliss that *Brahman* enjoys – and also the man versed in the Vedas [authoritative knowledge of self and world] and free from desires … [is reached]’. Such a person, when he ‘departs from this world … [reaches] finally the self that consists of bliss’ having transcended the pleasures of perception, thought and imagination and so on (*Ta Up* 1996: 2.8).
liberation is a state devoid of bodily causes or the property of dharma that are necessary for instantiating mental qualities such as blissful consciousness (NK(J) 1982: 609-11).

Reason, Dharma and Freedom

Praśastapāda further notes, ‘This knowledge proceeds from dharma that is manifested in the injunctions of the divinity (Īśvara)’ (PDS 1994: § 2). This means, explains Śrīdhara, that absolute bliss results from dharma alone qua moral law; with ‘knowledge of substance and the rest being regarded as the means to it only because such knowledge brings about dharma [moral law, the good]’ (NK(J) 1982: 16, revised trans.). So, analytical knowledge as knowledge of the distinguishing characteristics (dharma) of things - fundamentally the distinction between self and body, or self and non-self - is the means to the highest good, or bliss, because such knowledge is conducive to virtuous practice (dharma) which accords with moral law (dharma). It leads to the set of correlate ontological, epistemological, and moral changes that structure self-transformation (§ 5.7).

Classical Indian philosophy holds critical or rational inquiry (anvīksikī) to be the same as liberating philosophical inquiry into the nature the self (ātmavidya), a project that meets the demands of not only reason, but also of ethics and soteriology. Rational activity consists here in the avoidance and elimination of suffering, and seeks to acquire true knowledge of the self which alone is held to eliminate the recurrence of pain associated with erroneous conceptions of the self. ‘As far as the classical Indian philosophies … are concerned, rationality is theoretically studied and practically used so that the thinking agent can ultimately lose her individual ego, the object-directed outward mind or intellect which pretends to be the self, the pleasure-seeking wish-generating cognitions which make one other-dependent [on material objects] and hence unfree. The practice of Dharma … brings freedom from suffering’ (Chakrabarti 1999: 276-7).

This practice of dharma which brings self-knowledge involves knowledge of the categories which are the aims and objects of the ‘differential analysis’ of the characteristic distinctions (vaidharmya) and commonalities (sādharmya) between things and is achieved by the use of valid epistemic instruments, as we see below – as well as the nature of virtues and vices (see § 5.7). The primary knowledge, the metaphysical
truth to be known here is the distinction between the conscious self and the non-
conscious (jaḍa) body or matter requisite for being free of the body and the suffering it
engenders (Mohanty 1992: 202; see § 5.7). The commitment of classical Indian
philosophy to philosophical analysis as rational reflection about practice which is a
means of satisfaction of the highest practical interest (Chakrabarti 1999: 263) bears
resemblance to the notion of philosophy as a practical method of training about how to
live in the world suggested by Hadot (1995: 82) in the context of early Greek
philosophy.

1.5. The Structure of Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics

The notion that knowledge of the six-category ontology leads to the highest good rests
on a cluster of assumptions about the place of self in the epistemic, linguistic and
normative structures that define classical Vaiśeṣika metaphysics which, I suggest, are
implicit in Praśastapāda’s conception of direct realism. Praśastapāda postulates an
epistemically and semantically constrained realism: ‘all six categories (padārtha)
possess reality, (astitva), cognizability (jneyatva) and nameability (abhidheyatva)’ (PDS
1994:11). There exists a mind-independent world of particulars, the structures of which
are cognitively accessible as distinct categories (padārtha) or kinds. And this is
verifiable by measures of epistemic success (pramāṇa) and linguistically expressible in
the semantic structures of natural language, in this case, Sanskrit. This is a semantic
conception of realism which insists that words mean what they refer to, and the
categories (padārtha) or general kinds of things that are referred to are ‘reals’ that are
constitutive of the world, and are not simply types of predication (Mohanty 2000: 41;
Potter 1995: 43). Such a realism imposes a condition of complete epistemic and
linguistic transparency, positing an epistemic and semantic realism that has in its
compass the totality of existents: a version of realism quite unlike contemporary
versions (see Perrett 1999; Ganeri 2011: 168).

It is possible that this version of realism is tied to an assumption that is
articulated by Śrīdhara (1984: 70, 19-20), which conceptualizes the natural world from
the perspective of self qua subject and agent in the following way: ‘[It is self] for whose
purpose are all the things [in the world]’. In this view, all objects (artha) are sources of
potential affective and volitional concern for selves qua agents: objects are bearers of
values and meaning (artha), a notion that goes back to the VS (see § 1.3). Making the world of potentially cognizable objects categorically exhaustive may serve the purpose of pragmatically delimiting what is to be known in a way that excludes nothing that could be known, but which avoids soteriologically unproductive intellectual quests beyond an understanding of the differential metaphysics of self and non-self set out in the PDS that is considered necessary for liberation.

Undoubtedly, to claim that what is set out in the PDS is an exhaustive analysis of the nature of things and this is wholly accessible to cognition and reason, under the common-sense realism of Vaiśeṣika, is to grant this work an authority and practical force it might otherwise lack. Because, to achieve the highest good, we must have access to how things really are, our selves and the world; and secondly, we must act in accordance with the way things are, specifically the true nature of our own selves as the good itself. Ethical success requires we are able to decipher the nature of things in a fairly exhaustive manner, with the facility to access all aspects of our mental and bodily life; this is necessary for the comprehensive analytical discrimination between self and non-self that the practice of truth and achievement of the natural state of self require – which the PDS seeks to facilitate (NK (J) 1982: 6).

Such a metaphysics is one whose ontological and causal structures are held to be reflected in the structures of cognition and language, for which reason epistemic instruments and the structures of natural language, namely Sanskrit, become the central point of reference and justification for arguments about how things are.

Differential Analysis

The categorical structure of things is thus revealed by an analytical method that distinguishes the characteristics (dharma) of things or objects that words refer to or stand for (padārtha). The padārtha are the fundamental divisions of reality or categories. They are ‘the most basic correlates of thought and speech’ (Halbfass 1992: 77; Ganeri 2011c: 168) that are revealed by an analysis of the common and distinct features of things. The fundamental distinction that must be identified is that between the self and non-self substances (§ 5.7). Praśastapāda explains that:

*In this way we may describe the similarities of all objects and obversely, their dissimilarities as well, so there is no confusion regarding the various substances (PDS 1994: § 26, PDS(J): 63).
The categories are revealed by a procedure of enunciation or enumeration (uddeśa), which is the first step in a two-step analytic procedure that consists of enumeration and then definition (lakṣaṇa) proposed by Praśastapāda. The second step, definition, presents the ‘common and specific characteristics’ (sādharmya, vaidharmya) of things. Śrīdhara suggests this two-step procedure may be supplemented by a third-step of detailed examination (parīkṣā) (NK(J) 1982: 63-4; Halbfass 1992: 72).

The first step is the statement of a thing, because it is only once a thing has been stated that it can be defined or characterized as the bearer of certain common and distinguishing properties, and it is only once it has been so distinguished that it can be examined further to form a definite conception of what kind of a thing it might be. Śrīdhara elaborates:

‘a science that seeks to describe the nature of things … points out (uddeśa) the things and gives their definitions (lakṣaṇa)’ … [and where] the real nature of the things is not ascertained … take[s] recourse to the method of inquiry and examination (parīkṣā), for setting aside … contending theories’ (NK(J) 1982: 63).

Here:

‘The uddeśa or statement of a thing consists in its being spoken of by its name. Definition (lakṣaṇa) consists in the property that differentiates homogeneous or like things from heterogeneous or unlike things, examination (parīkṣā) consists in an inquiry into the nature of the thing [itself]’ (NK(J) 1982: 64).

Udayana explains that whatever is similar for one type of substance represents a point of dissimilarity with a substance of an opposite type, and vice-versa (Ki 1971: 27, 10-13). Thus earth is distinguished or characterized by its specific (vīšeṣa) quality of smell, and so ‘being devoid of smell’ (nirgandhatva) should be taken as a point of similarity for substances other than earth such as water, etc. Similarly, weight and taste inhere in earth and water and represent a point of similarity between these two types of substances, but are a source of dissimilarity for those substances which are devoid of these properties, for example, fire and air. And being meant for others, i.e., not being an abode of experience and being non-conscious (parārthatva and acetanatva) is a source of similarity among all substances other than the self, which alone is the locus of experience and consciousness; for which reason these features are sources of dissimilarity for the self (Kumar 2013: 46).
The Categories

The categories (padārtha) are natural kinds, where each kind consists of things that share certain common characteristics (see Ganeri 2001). The PDS postulates a six-category ontology, as opposed to the seven category ontology of the later school (see Ganeri 2011c), which consists of substances (dravya), their properties (guna), and motions (karma) – except in the case of self which is devoid of the possibility of motion. These first three categories are called artha; they are objects which are a source of meaning, values and purposes (artha). The next three categories are the ontological relations that unify the first three, namely, universals (sāmānya), differentiators (viśeṣa), and inherence (samavāya) (see Ganeri 2001: 71-81; 2009a). This delineation of categories in the PDS accords with the Vaiśeṣikasūtra (1911: 1.1.5).

There are nine elemental substances: earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, self, and manas, the executive faculty or non-conscious ‘mind’. A substance (dravya) is a property-bearer; it is the substratum (dharmin) which is the locus of a particular property (dharma) that is bound to it by a relationship (sambandha) of qualifier to qualificand. Properties or qualities (guna) must inhere or exist in a property-bearer on which they are existentially dependent (PDS 1994: § 83).

There are twenty-four properties, distinguishable into two types: characteristic or distinguishing (viśeṣa) properties which differentiate a substance from all other substances, but are common to substances of the same class; and generic (sāmānya) properties that all substances possess in virtue of being substances (PDS 1994: § 86, § 90). Praśastapāda explains: ‘The material substances and self have the nature of bearing characteristic (viśeṣa) properties (PDS 1994: § 21), such as ‘colour, taste, smell, touch … cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, …’ (PDS 1994: § 89). But all substances

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13 The later Navya-Nyāya system adds a seventh category: absence (abhāva).

14 This notion of substance as the support of its properties is not unlike Locke’s notion of substantia: ‘the supposed and unknown support of these qualities we find existing which we imagine cannot subsist … without something to support them’ (Essay on Human Understanding II.xviii.2, quoted in Rasmussen 2004: II, 4). It also loosely corresponds to Aristotle’s hylomorphism that an object consists of matter (hulê), the ‘underlying thing’, and form (morphê), the complement of properties that exist in matter, if we take matter to correspond to the category of substance and form to properties and the other categories. However, whereas Aristotle held that matter, devoid of properties could exist only potentially and not actually, Praśastapāda claims that substances can be cognized as independent reals (Rasmussen 2004: III, 1-2) in yogic or extraordinary perception.
bear the generic qualities that define a substance: number or countability (saṃkhya), spatiality (parimāna), temporality (kāla), metaphysical distinction or separateness (prthakta), conjunction or contact (sānyoga) and disjunction (vibhāga) (PDS 1994: § 90; NK(J) 1982: 60). Like qualities, motions (karman) too must inhere in substances as their necessary existential support, but motion is characteristic only of bounded, finite (mūrta) substances (PDS 1994: § 324), atomic and composite matter and manas. Universals (sāmānya) inhere in substances, qualities and motions and classify these as different types, as members of a particular class (jāti) of objects. Differentiators (viṣeṣa) are metaphysical features that distinguish objects as individuals. With regard to inheritance (saṃavāya), or ‘existence-in’ something, whereas Kaṇāda (VS 1911: 7.2.26) defines inheritance as the relationship between cause and its effects, whereby the one is cognized as residing in the other, classical Vaiṣeṣika applies it to five relationships: between a whole and its parts, a quality and the substance it qualifies, motion and the moving, the individual and the class to which it belongs, and the differentiator (viṣeṣa) and the eternal substances in which it resides (Note by G. Jha, NK(J) 1982: 35-6).

The concept of substance as possession of qualities (guṇavattva) is the most characteristic and problematic common attribute (sādharmya) of substances. It revises the definition of substance in VS (1911: 1.1.14), to exclude a conception of substance as that which possesses motion (kriyāvat), since the self qua substance is no longer itself an active substance; it is no longer a bearer of motion. Instead, the following defining features of a substance are set out that Praśastapāda finds implicit in various parts of the VS: connection with the universal substance-ness (dravyatvayoga); capacity for initiating and supporting new dependent entities (svātmanāramhakatva); coexistence of the substratum cause (saṃavāyi kāraṇa) and its effect in this locus (kāryakāraṇāvirodhitva); possession of ultimate differentiators (antyaviṣeṣavattva). The last applies only to atoms in the case of material substances (Halbfass 1992: 96-7).15

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15 The Vaiṣeṣika conception of substance as a property-bearer comes in for criticism from its opponents, not least the Buddhists, on a variety of grounds. Halbfass (1992: 97) discusses a number of problems: how is the own-nature of being of a substance determined not just by the qualities it ‘has’ but by the fact that it actually or potentially supports them? How can it be what it is, a substance, without having its qualities and other attributes? Is the substance as such, divested of its inherent qualifiers, and identifiable
The Ontology of Causation and Textual Structure

This six-category metaphysics offers a carefully calibrated ontological architecture of causation that structures the text itself. The PDS thus opens with a recognition of the most archaic cause, the divine cause (Īśvara), who is the injunctive source of moral law and the good (dharma). After this, follows an enumeration of the six-category ontology that is constitutive of the world. The order of categorical enumeration here records the ontological primacy and metaphysical independence of things in the structure of causation.

Causation itself has a tripartite hierarchical structure. It consists of the substratum cause (samavāyi kāraṇa) which is a substance such as material atoms in which ‘effects’ inhere, for example, earth atoms in which the property colour inhere as a substratum ‘effect’, or a self in which its cognitive states inhere as substratum ‘effects’. There is additionally the instrumental cause (nimitta kāraṇa), such as will or a carpenter’s axe which is directly involved in bringing about an effect; and a non-substratum cause (asamavāyi kāraṇa) which is a property that inhere in the substratum cause, for instance, the property of conjunction which is an essential support or condition of possibility of causation (see Ganeri 2009).16

The ontology of these three causes dictates that the substratum or material cause is discussed first, because it is the locus in which the non-substratum and instrumental causes arise, followed by the instrumental cause which is causally efficient, and finally, the non-substratum cause which is an essential enabling or supporting condition of causation.

Substances are the substratum cause in which effects such as properties or motions are located. Moreover, ‘The character of being dependent [on some thing else] belongs to all things except the eternal [elemental] substances’ (PDS 1994: § 14). For this reason the elemental substances which are ontologically independent and serve as the loci of causation are discussed first, followed by properties and then motions, both

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16 The instrumental cause includes the efficient, formal and final causes of Aristotle, and the substratum cause the material cause (Note by G. Jha: NK(J) 1982: 44).
of which are existentially dependent on substances for their occurrence. The large number of properties gives them priority in enumeration over actions.

Substances are the locus of all causal relationships, the place where cause and effect take place between the relata of causation, which may be substances or their properties and motions. They are the substance or substratum causes (samavāyi kārana) in which event causes and effects, the causal effects of properties and motions arise, and this is possible because substances are bearers of the properties of causal connection (samyoga) and disjunction (vibhāga), the non-substratum causes (asamavāyi kārana), that are necessary for the establishment of a causal nexus.

Śrīdhara (1982: 15) elucidates this hierarchical ontology of causation in the following way:

‘Substance is mentioned first because being the substratum of all the rest it is the most important of all. Quality is mentioned next because its number is larger than that of action. Action is mentioned after quality because it always follows in the wake of the latter. Universals are mentioned next because they are connected with action. Insofar as inherence inheres in all the other five, it is proper that it should be mentioned last; it is for this same reason that differentiators are mentioned before inherence’.

The first three categories, substances, qualities and motions are ‘denoted by the word “artha”, as a technicality of the Vaiśeṣika system’, and this means that they are the ‘cause of virtuous and non-virtuous states’ (PDS 1994: § 15), Praśastapāda states. The idea here is that these objects have a distinct causal role or purpose (artha): they are the relata or objects (artha) of causation, because they are the objects of cognitive judgements, affections and volitions that structure human actions. These objects are presented by cognition as sources of meaning and value (artha), which may then be possible sources of affective and volitional concern as the objects or aims of agential action. Śrīdhara elucidates how these three types of things generate virtue (dharma) and non-virtue (adharma):

‘[These three have the] character of being the cause of states of virtue and non-virtue … [they] are the causes that bring about states of virtue and non-virtue … For instance, earth [that is, land which is a substance] when given away becomes a source of virtue, but when taken away [forcibly] gives rise to non-virtuous states. Similarly, conjunction or contact [which is a property] is a source of virtue (purity) when it is towards a sacred place, and a source of impurity when it occurs in relation to dead bones. Similarly, “going” [an action,] is a source of virtue when it is towards a sacred place, and a source of
impurity, when towards a tavern …. [We see that] substances have an inherent capacity in themselves of producing virtue and non-virtue’ (NKJ 1982: 42, revised trans.).

_Artha_ have a different ontological status from the three categories which follow them in Praśāstipāda’s categorical enumeration. The ontological feature _astitva_ (reality) belongs to all six categories of things; it characterizes all entities that simply ‘are’ as real. The ontological status _sattā_ (beingness), however belongs only to the first three categories or _artha_, because it is the sort of being or beingness that is associated with truth and values – note that _satya_ means truth - associations which go back to the early Vedic texts. Note that _astitva_ includes in its purview both those objects that are defined as _artha_ and those which are not. It includes, therefore, those objects whose existence exemplifies both reality (_astitva_) and the most general universal _sattā_ (beingness), which inheres only in substances, qualities and motions, and those objects which exist in a weaker sense as ‘self-standing’ or self-existing’ (_svarupasattā_) such as universals, differentiators, and inherence which exemplify reality (_astitva_) but not beingness (_sattā_) (Mohanty 1992: 154-5).

In contrast to the first three categories (_artha_), the remaining three categories, universals, differentiators and inherence do not play a direct role in causation: they are ontological features that bind and unify the first three categories in various ways. For this reason, the greater part of the text elucidates the nature of the first three categories, the _artha_, which are the relata of causation.

The elementary substances that constitute the things of the world are discussed first, followed by an extensive discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities among the properties that distinguish them. The discussion of properties takes up more than half the text. Given the significance of the property cognition, that is, of perception and other means of epistemic proof such as inference in determining the precise characteristics that distinguish substances, discussion of cognition dominates the section on properties occupying over a third of this section.

Following the discussion of substances and their qualities is the analysis of motions and actions that are directly involved in physical and mental causation. Brief descriptions of the non-causal categories, universals (_sāmānya_), differentiators (_viśeṣa_), and inherence (_samavāya_) that are responsible for ontological and causal coherence follow after this. The beginning and end of the text voice its philosophical debt to
Kaṇāda as the author of the *VS* which is held to be a product of practices of truth (*PDS* 1994: § 1, § 385).

The topics emphasized in the *PDS* are accorded a similar emphasis by the commentators. Śrīdhara devotes over half the *NK* to a discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities between properties, with a quarter of the text devoted to cognition. Of particular significance is the extensive discussion of self, which now occupies a proportionately greater part in this commentary vis-à-vis the *PDS* itself. Much of the extended treatment of self consists of a rebuttal of Buddhist reductionist claims which is absent in Praśastapāda. This supports Ganeri’s (2012: 304-5) contention that the commentators often rebut later arguments of opposing philosophical schools by tending to find the resources or links for such a rebuttal implicate in the original text.

*The Architecture of Substances*

The examination of the elementary or constituent substances of the world reflects their ontological priority in causation. Here, the atomic elements, earth, water, air and fire are analysed first, because in virtue of being atomic substances, they allow the formation of causal aggregates (*PDS* 1994: § 14) that are the basis of the physical composition of the universe. For this reason, they are elucidated before the infinite that are the condition of possibility of physical causation and composition but not its elementary relata.

The first atomic element to be analysed is the earth element which has priority from being constitutive of the material conditions of mental causation, namely, the body, the senses and their objects (*PDS* 1994: § 30). After a discussion of atomic matter follows a discussion of the composition and decomposition of the physical world from its material constituents by the divine principle (*Īśvara*). The model here is of a potter: just as a potter shapes clay, so *Īśvara* instigates and coordinates the fabrication of the universe from atomic matter, and its decomposition at the appointed time.

This is followed by a discussion of the infinite substances, first the physical substance ether which has limitless extent, and then the infinite dimensional substances, temporality and then spatiality, which are the conditions of possibility of physical causation. Praśastapāda explains: ‘Ether, time and space are all-pervasive, they have the largest dimension, and are the common receptacle of all corporeal things’ (*PDS*...
1994: §19; see VS 1911: 7.1.22, 24, 25). Śrīdhara adds that being the common receptacle of all physical things means being the receptacle of, or having a connection with, all conjunctions of composite objects, that is, being the locus of all causal connections and disjunctions. Largest dimension means having immeasurable spatiality or extension (NK(J) 1982: 54).

Following a discussion of the conditions of physical causation comes the analysis of self, the dimension that is the condition of possibility of mentality and mental causation, and last, a discussion of manas. As the ontologically most dependent substance, whose characteristics and features are restricted to those necessary for serving as a physical functionary of the self, manas is the last substance to be examined in the text.

Self

Praśastapāda introduces a conception of self that is not essentially a bearer of mentality, and so, is not essentially a mental substance. He presents rather, a very ‘formal’ and ‘thin’ conception of self that is itself merely an infinite spatio-temporal continuum that essentially hosts the physical or dimensional (dik, kāla), and metaphysical (prthaktva, sāmkhya, samyoga, vibhāga), properties that provide the metaphysical infrastructure of mental-physical causation and so for the existence of mental and moral states. For mental and moral states arise as contingent features of the self which are essentially causally dependent on physical loci, manas and the body, for their instantiation. The minded self posits here a strong and irreducible metaphysical and causal infrastructure that is physical. I consider this conception of self in greater detail the next chapter.

Manas

Manas is an atomic particle of finite (mūrtta) dimension. This classifies it as a physical substance (see Ganeri 2011: 168). It serves as an ontological connector, a causal conduit between self and its body, and between the self and its senses (§ 2.8). Manas is an executive functionary of the self, it is a substance that is ontologically entirely dependent on the self, and lacks any characteristic (vīšeṣa) properties of its own which would identify it as an independent substance – it is not a substratum cause of its own
properties in the way that earth atoms are a substratum cause of colour, for example, which distinguishes the earth element from other substances. The properties of manas such as speed (vega) refer solely to the functions it performs for the self as the bearer of willful motion in the mental causation of both mental and physical actions.

1.6 Overview of Arguments

The arguments for the existence and nature of the self, and the implications of such a conception, offered by Praśastapāda and his commentators fall into three groups of interlocking claims. 1. The first group consists of a set of four core arguments for the existence and nature of the self from the structures and demands of agency and mental causation in mental and bodily life. These arguments refer to the instrumental structure, rational regularities, and normative characteristics of agential activity and mental causation in mental and bodily behaviour and biological life. 2. The second set of arguments underwrites this first group of claims. These are arguments for the existence and nature of the self that derive from: (a) the phenomenon of ownership at various levels of mental and bodily life, and the work this does; (b) the phenomenal and epistemic presentation of self vis-à-vis the body or physical phenomena; and (c) the ontological characteristics and identity conditions of self and body. 3. The third set of claims considers the sources and scope of agency, the scope of freedom and determinism in action, given the phenomenology, ontology and functional organization of mental states.

The Structures of Agency

The first set of arguments refer to the central postulate of the chapter on self: the existence of a self is implied by the exercise of agency in four types of mental and bodily activity: epistemic acts or acts of cognizing; intentional actions; subconscious and subintentional acts, as well as subpersonal activities; and biological and vital functions and processes. The first argument (PDS 1994: § 76) is for a self that is an

17 I do not consider the brief linguistic argument for self’s existence (PDS 1994: § 79) at any length in this thesis.
agential subject of cognitions. We know our own selves, Praśastapāda claims, from the act-structure of our cognitions. Perceptual deliverances such as sound, colour, etc. arise as ‘effects’ (kārya) that require the use of the sense-faculties qua instruments (karana) - on assumption of an agent-instrument model of action (§ 3.3). From this we infer an agent (kartr) who is the operator of these perceptual instruments: a cognizer (jñātr) who is the agent of its epistemic acts and the subject (bhoktr) of the perceptual deliverances of these acts (§ 4.1).

The second argument (PDS 1994: § 78) claims that intentional actions demonstrate rational guidance, or normativity: they strive (pravṛtti) for objects that are considered advantageous and ‘good’, and seek to avoid (nivṛtti) those which are considered disadvantageous or harmful. The rational structures of goal-oriented activity are empirically detectable, and must be informed by will (prayatna) or agency. However, will, or agency, requires a bearer, or owner, of both willings (prayatnavān) and its cognitive and affective antecedents: a controller (adhiṣṭhātr) of mental and bodily intentional actions, a self (§ 4.3-4.4).

The third argument runs thus: a willful controller (prayatnavān adhiṣṭhātr) of the body, a self, is inferred from the regulation of respiration and blinking (PDS 1994: § 78), the maintenance of bodily equilibrium, waking from sleep, and the myriad unconscious responses to environmental stimuli that are a part of everyday human behaviour (PDS(J) 1982: 563-4, 646). Each of these activities evidences structures of judgement, desire and will that posit self-concern, that is to say, these activities are self-referring even if at a primitive level, such as when we sneeze if there is incoming dust. From this we infer a bodily controller, a self, who is the bearer, or owner, of the agential structures that underlie such activities (§ 5.1).

The fourth argument states that the growth of the body and the healing of its wounds and fractures is proof of a controller of the body who exercises will in the regulation of such biological processes and functions (PDS 1994: § 78). This claims that the self-continuity and self-maintenance of biological life demonstrate a primitive and implicit rationality that seeks what is ‘good’ or beneficial for the organism – and avoids that which is harmful. But only a controller who is an owner, or bearer, of at least primitive cognitive, affective and volitional capacities, can display the implicit self-concern that imbues biological activities of this sort with rationality. The controller
must be self who is *sui generis* the locus of these primitive structures of rationality *qua* self-referring activity (§ 5.2).

*The First-Person Perspective and the Phenomena of Selfhood*

The above arguments are underpinned by the second set of claims. These argue for the existence and nature of the self from ownership of mental states and the body, from the phenomenal and epistemic presentation of self and mental states in the first-person perspective, and from the distinct metaphysics of mental and physical phenomena.

Now, the first set of arguments suggest that all mental and bodily activity, cognitive, behavioural and biological, evidence rational structures of guidance and control that are self-referential and directed at obtaining that which is beneficial or ‘good’ for the embodied being and avoiding that which is unfavourable or harmful for it, whether at a reflective and conscious or a primitive and unconscious level. This implies, Praśastapāda argues, a self, on the assumption that self-referential structures require a substance that is *sui generis* the owner of mental states and bodily capacities at conscious, unconscious and subconscious levels of mental and bodily activity. The ownership criterion for the existence of a self in these arguments is implicit: it refers to the very nature of self as a substance that underivatively exhibits the intrinsic feature of owning or own-ness (*svatva*) with regard to all that it informs: its mental states and its body. And which has the intrinsic capacity to experience – when embodied - its self-identity or being-own (*sva*) ‘from the inside’ that is expressed as ‘I’, a point which Śrīdhara and Udayana elaborate (§ 2.1; NK 1984: 84, 20-2; ATV 1995: 346-7).

Praśastapāda also argues directly from the first-person presentation of mental states that mental states are necessarily owned: from the fact that states such as pleasures, desires, etc. arise inalienably imbued with selfhood or ‘I’, i.e., as ‘owned’, when they are expressed sententially, we infer their bearer or owner, the self (§ 2.1; PDS 1994: § 79). Under Vaiśeṣika’s semantic conception of realism this means that such a thing as a self must really exist and must be the common bearer of these mental states and the I-hood that imbues them. Further, the diachronic unity of mental states that is evident in agential behaviour requires a self who is the unitary owner of these states: such as when I perceive a mango, recall having tasted such a fruit before and
found it pleasant-tasting, and so desire to taste the mango I see now, and so salivate, etc. (§ 2.2; PDS 1994: § 78).

Śrīdhara points, moreover, to the notion that self itself qua owner and agent is the source of normativity, and elicits the normative demands that mental states such as desires and aversions make on us - demands that instigate and motivate mental causation of actions (§ 2.2; NK(J) 1982: 597).

Self is also inferred, argues Udayana, from the epistemology of the first-person perspective. Cognitions, whether introspective or sensory, such as ‘I see x’ or ‘I feel y’, presuppose self-acquaintance; they presuppose ‘I’ as subject because we are directly acquainted with ourselves in our cognizings even if unreflectively. The argument from self-acquaintance relies on the introspective presentation of self by manas, and explicitly excludes a criterial model of perception as the basis of self-experience (§ 2.4; ATV 1995: 344-5).

Śrīdhara (NK 1984: 84, 20-2) and Udayana (ATV 1995: 346-7) make the further claim that ‘I’ as subject is presupposed in all objective identifications of the body as ‘mine’ (§ 2.5). The body must be ‘owned’ by a self-substance because the body, qua material substance, intrinsically lacks the capacity of underivative ownership: it lacks the capacity of being able to distinguish itself ‘from the inside’ as ‘I’ or ‘own’ (sva), vis-à-vis another, as a self-substance must. Śrīdhara argues further that the ‘internality’ or introspective (antarmukha) character of conscious states means that they cannot have a physical bearer since physical objects are susceptible only to ‘objective’ or external identification and perception. Only a non-physical self will suffice in this case.

Dualist Metaphysics

The arguments for dualism, for a non-physical self, rest ultimately on a range of metaphysical arguments postulated in PDS (1994: § 77, § 79) that are elucidated at length by each of the commentators. These argue from the distinct nature of mental and physical causal powers and properties to distinct bearers of these properties and powers as non-physical selves and physical substances respectively.

The core supposition in the first set of arguments for a self, who is an agent and a controller, is that the distinct ontology of mental and physical powers means that the
senses and body, *qua* physical, can serve at most an instrumental function perceptual, mental and bodily action: they must be operated or controlled by a nonphysical agent, a self. The distinct properties and causal powers ascribed to mental and physical substances mean that physical causation can only support a domain of ‘impact’ causation, a domain of systemic causation and random events that are exogenously governed and only objectively or third-personally explicable. Physical causation cannot account, in this view, for the rational regularities and normative characteristics of agency which are endogenously governed and explicable only from a personal point of view, i.e., in terms of rational criteria. A non-physical self must therefore be inferred as the bearer of the rational and normative structures that agency demands: a self who is the owner of Intentional consciousness and the telic structures of agency (§ 4.7). Udayana elaborates the argument here. Were action structured merely by physical causation, he claims, it would succumb to infinitely regressive, non-terminating causal chains, given that physical events are necessarily causally determined by prior physical events – by impact causation. Such actions or movements would appear authorless and unintelligible as intentional action, Udayana argues (§ 4.8), whether such ‘actions’ were a consequence of causation by instruments, or they arose as the ‘actions’ of the body as the putative ‘agent’.

The central ontological thesis that underpins the arguments for dualism is that consciousness and physical properties are necessarily distinct, and distinguish divergent sorts of substances, non-physical and physical respectively (§ 2.6; *PDS* § 77). Moreover, mental properties such as pleasures and pains, and physical properties such as colour, have distinct spatial and temporal features. That is to say, mental and physical properties have distinct conditions of existence. This means that they must be existentially dependent on distinct types of substances: nonphysical and physical (§ 2.6). The distinct properties and conditions of existence of consciousness and characteristic physical properties mean that the identity conditions of selves and bodies differ. We see this in the case of a corpse, which no longer has the possibility of being conscious as ‘I’, as a self must be, although it retains the material structures of the body on its demise - at least ordinarily (§ 2.7; *PDS* 1994: 77).
Will, Freedom and Determinism

The third set of claims addresses the sources and scope of agency given the phenomenal, functional and ontological structure of mental states. These arguments are elaborated by Śrīdhara and Udayana. Śrīdhara suggests that it is the act-nature of cognizing that gives us reason to consider ourselves the agents and subjects of cognition (§ 5.6; NK 1984: 71, 12-7). Udayana argues more explicitly that the activist phenomenology of consciousness is evidence of the active power of will (§ 5.6; ATV 1995: 347). Possible objections to this may be raised from cases of neurophysiological dysfunction which argue that notions of will and agency are a cognitive illusion. Such objections may, however, be countered in this view by the ontology of mental-physical causation in the PDS which can account for such dysfunction in terms of informational failures in the operation of manas as a mediator in mental-physical causation (§ 5.3).

Praśastapāda’s non-Cartesian conception of will and mentality avoids some of the problems that Libet’s (1999) neurophysiological experiments point to. Willings, but also affective and emotional states, are necessarily causally dependent for their instantiation on the subpersonal physical processes of manas. However, since the ontology of the mental dictates that affections and volitions are unconscious states, conscious affections and volitions can arise only after the instantiation of an unconscious affective or volitional event, and the prior subpersonal physical processes of manas that instantiate these events. Such a conception of will does not appear to contradict objections to the conception of ‘free will’ from Libet’s experiments which point to the neurophysiological correlates of will being prior to events of conscious willing (§ 5.4).

Further, the ontology of mental states and their functional organization, in the PDS, posits structures of mental causation that give considerable scope to the exercise of rational and evaluative powers over affective, emotional and volitional dispositions which have deterministic tendencies. From the Intentional structure of consciousness or cognition, unconscious events of willing, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, are available as objects of cognitive judgement, and subject, therefore, to the possibility of evaluative control (§ 5.6). This is again consonant with Libet’s (1999) conclusions that ‘unconscious’ willings once they become conscious may be ‘vetoed’.

The ontological and functional structure of mental states incorporates a possible dialectics of freedom and determinism. In the first place, the first-personal presentation
of will and cognitive states, concurrently with the presentation of selfhood, opens epistemic possibilities of identification of presentations of selfhood with willings and cognitions, by which the latter are conceived and felt to be ‘mine’: the identification of oneself as an agent and an owner of cognitions and mental attitudes (§§ 2.1-2.3). However, the Intentional structure of consciousness opens the possibility of evaluative control over mental attitudes, that is, over affective and volitional events, and of dis-identification of self with these states: the possibility of elimination of conceptions of personal agency and ownership. Therefore, even if actions are, in the first instance, deterministically caused by beliefs, desires, and willings, they are ultimately subject to the possibility of rational control by evaluative judgements. This induces an element of causal indeterminism in the structure of actions. But the point here is precisely that mental causation of action does not follow physical models of causal determinism and indeterminism. Even if mental dispositions display deterministic tendencies, they do not follow a model of impact causation: an infinitely regressive chain of ‘blind’ determination by prior events. Rather, actions are only rationally explicable in terms of the first-personal structures of consciousness and agency in which dispositions such as beliefs, desires and willings are intrinsically subject to the possibility of evaluative control (§ 2.3, §§ 5.6-5.7).

1.7 Literature Review

There is a range of general discussion of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, including Praśastapāda’s metaphysics, in contemporary scholarship on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, of which the key sources I refer to are Frauwallner (1973 vol. II), Potter’s comprehensive ‘Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies’, vol. 2, on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (1977), a comprehensive description of Vaiśeṣika metaphysics by Halbfass (1992), Thakur’s (2003) extensive review of the Vaiśeṣika system, analyses by Bhaduri (1947) and Mishra (1936), a historical study by Matilal (1986), and a recent survey by Kumar (2013).


McDowell (1996, 1998, 2004) and Strawson (1985) present classic conceptions of liberal naturalism. A useful set of articles on naturalism are found in De Caro and Macarthur (2004), which includes John McDowell’s article on naturalism in the philosophy of mind, and articles on normativity and naturalism in De Caro and
Macarthur (2010) which includes Bilgrami’s (2010) essay on the genealogy of naturalism which looks at the possibility of values in nature as a necessary aspect of the possibility of agency.

1.8. Thesis Structure

Chapter two examines Praśastapāda’s core intuitions about the nature of self and body. It looks at the phenomenology and epistemology of selfhood, issues of ownership of mental states, metaphysical arguments why a self must be non-physical and the structure of mental-physical causation in the context of Praśastapāda’s differential naturalism. Chapter three discusses his arguments for the agential structure of cognizings as attendings and intendings that involve the use of cognitive instruments. The subject of chapter four is the core argument, how is an agential self inferrable from the use of instruments in cognizing, but more broadly, from the structures of rational agency that are evident in intentional actions? This chapter discusses the distinct character of mental and physical causal powers and the necessity of different explanatory models of mental and physical causation as grounds for a self that is non-physical. Chapter five discusses the implicit rationalities and self-referring character of subintentional and subpersonal activities and biological self-organization as arguments for the existence of a self. It also discusses Praśastapāda’s conception of will and other mental states, the functional organization of mental life and the scope the first-personal structures of cognition offer for self-transformation. The concluding chapter provides an assessment of Praśāsatapāda’s arguments for an agential self and its philosophical paradigm, in the context of its commentaries, and considers some of the issues this raises.
Chapter 2
Self and Body in Differential Naturalism

2.0. Introduction

In this chapter, I consider claims about the existence and nature of the self in the Padārthadharmaṃśaṃgraha and its key commentaries from the phenomenal, epistemological and metaphysical features of self and selfhood. The questions addressed here are what these texts consider a self to be, why the first-personal presentation of mental states and the nature of bodily awareness mean that such a thing as a self exists, and why the body cannot be the self. We look at the relationship between self and mind and between self and body, and how causal interaction is possible between a non-physical self, its mind, or mental states, and its body. These questions about what a self is, the nature of its involvement in mental and bodily life, and the structures of mental-mental and mental-physical causation this involves, underwrite the inferential proofs for the existence of a self from the structures and demands of agency (PDS 1994: §§ 76-78) discussed in the following chapters.

The first part (§§ 2.1-2.4) of this chapter looks at the phenomena of selfhood: questions of ownership of mental states, the nature of self-experience, and the reference of ‘I’. It discusses these issues in terms of the two levels of selfhood and ownership Praśastapāda alludes to but which are explicated further by Śrīdhara and Udayana: personal ownership (svāmitvā) and mere phenomenal or impersonal ‘ownership’. A number of arguments are considered for the existence and nature of the self from the phenomenal and epistemological features of self and selfhood, and of self as the source of the normative demands of mental states that impels mental life and causation.

The second part (§§ 2.5-2.8) locates Praśastapāda’s notions of self, mind and body in his metaphysics of ‘differential naturalism’. This looks at the conception of self as a non-physical substance and its relationship with the network of mental states that constitute its ‘mind’, and the relationship between the minded self and its body. There are important arguments here about why selves and mental properties are metaphysically distinct from and irreducible to the body and physical properties respectively. We look at some ontological arguments Praśastapāda and his commentators offer in support of such a dualism of self and body, and consider the
structures of causal interaction between self and body this presupposes and how these meet some of the problems of soul-body interaction encountered by Cartesian dualism.

2.1. Selves and Ownership

Self (ātman), Praśastapāda states is that which we refer to when we use the first-person pronoun ‘I’ (aham) (PDS 1994: §79). And this means, from the Vaiśeṣika conception of semantic and epistemic realism, that self is a real existent even if it lacks an obvious referent. This does not, however, answer the question what it is to be a self, something Praśastapāda is silent about. For an answer to this question we must turn to Śrīdhara and Udayana.

Śrīdhara suggests that self is that which has the character of being ‘one’s-own’ (sva or svaṭva); it is that which individuates and distinguishes mental states and the body as ‘mine’ ‘from the inside (antarmukha)’ so to speak (NK 1984: 84, 20-2). Udayana elaborates that a self is that which is non-different from oneself and so explains the meaning of being ‘one’s own’ (sva arthah). ‘To be one’s own means not to be different from oneself. So when one cognizes one’s own self then the cognizer being non-different from the cognized the cognition “I am” in reference to the latter arises’ (ATV 1995: 346-7). ‘I’ or ‘I am’ refers to that which is experienced as self-identical or ‘one’s own’. Both philosophers refer to the introspective or subjective presentation of self as that which is self-identical - non-different from oneself - or ‘one’s own’ (sva) and is, therefore, the basis of ‘owning’ (svaṭva) that is characteristic of all mental and bodily phenomena that evidence selfhood as ‘me-ness’ or ‘mine-ness’.

The phenomena of selfhood, the way in which self and selfhood are presented phenomenally and introspectively, in particular, the ownership of mental states, underwrite Praśastapāda’s inferential arguments for self’s existence. The PDS itself, however, does not directly argue for the existence or nature of the self from self-knowledge, that is, from introspective presentations of the self (see § 3.1). But it assumes that self is experienced - as the I-object (ahāṃkāra) - in first-personal experience of mental states: affections, desires, volitions, and so on (PDS 1994: § 79). Further, the inferential arguments for self’s existence and nature discussed in the following chapters rely precisely on its phenomenal and epistemic features. It remains, however, for Praśastapāda’s commentators to elucidate the phenomenal and epistemic
aspects of selfhood, and explain what sort of an object a self is and how it is cognized, as we see below.

The core thesis regarding the nature of the self in the PDS is that it is a self that has mental states: consciousness or cognition, and unconscious states such as desires, volitions and memories. Only a self can be a subject and an agent as the locus of cognitions, affections and volitions, (PDS §76, §79; see § 3.1-3.3). But it is only the embodied self that is minded, in contrast to the natural or liberated self which lacks self’s characteristic (viśeṣa) mental features (§ 1.5). The embodied self does not, however, possess mental states in the way that a table say, has a brown hue. Rather, self owns its mental states as we see below.

The distinguishing (viśeṣa) properties of the embodied self, the agential or personal18 self, Praśastapāda claims, are cognitions (jñāna, buddhi), pleasurable and painful affections (sukha, duḥkha), emotions such as desires (icchā) and aversions (dveṣa), stored impressions and cognitive imprints (saṃskāra) that consist of learnt habits and practices and memories, and the meta-ethical states of the self that consist of accrued virtuous merit (dharma) and non-virtuous de-merit (adharma), and reflect the moral accountability of the self for its past actions:

‘Its [i.e., self’s distinguishing] qualities are, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, will, merit, demerit,19 cognitive imprints …’ (PDS 1994: § 80).

For a property to be a distinguishing or a characteristic (viśeṣa) property of self is for that property to be existentially dependent on self as its bearer. It is for that property to have its ‘being-in’ or ‘existence-in’ (samavāya) self as the sort of existential support that is consistent with the nature of its being a mental property. The relationship between selves and mental properties, or self and mind, raises two interlinked questions. What is the nature of mental properties that they should need a self? And, what is the nature of self that it alone can be the bearer of mental properties? In the discussion below, I refer only to cognition and those unconscious mental properties that are possible objects of cognition, namely, prior cognitions, pleasures and

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18 For a discussion of the embodied impersonal self see § 5.7
pains, desires and aversions, willings, and cognitive imprints and habitual tendencies. I exclude, for the moment, the meta-ethical or moral states (dharmā, adharmā) of the self, unless these are explicitly referred to.

Ownership of Mental States

It is an essential feature of mental properties, claims Praśastapāda that they are of a self, that is, they have a bearer on whom they are existentially dependent, and who is experienced as ‘I’, or self: ‘From the qualities, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and will, a bearer of these is inferred’. And the nature of these qualities, pleasure and so on, is such that ‘they are always expressed [sententially] with [reference to the] “I-form” (ahāmkāra)’ or ‘I-experience’, for which reason they ‘are not qualities of the body and the sense-faculties’ (PDS 1994: §79).

Praśastapāda’s argument can be divided into two parts. The first refers to the first-personal nature of mental states as owned – as being ‘mine’ phenomenally and so, conceptually; the second argues that the first-personal character of these states, as owned, means that they are not properties of the body. I discuss these two issues in turn in this section and the next.

Śrīdhara (NK 1984: 84, 14-17) explains that not only do the properties pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and will require a property-bearer, but whenever the properties pleasure or happiness, pain and suffering, and so on, are expressed sententially as when we say, ‘I am happy’, they are invariably uttered with reference to ‘I’. What this means is that ‘I’ and pleasure, etc., are both predicated of the same subject, the self: ‘I’ refers to self, and the qualities pleasure, pain, etc., refer to ‘I am’, that is, to self. A sentence such as this records two poles of cognition: an I-cognition or I-experience (ahāmkāra) and the experience of pleasure; it records both I-consciousness and consciousness of pleasure, so that both I-experience and the experience of pleasure are predicates of the same subject: the self which is the object of this ‘I-cognition’ or ‘I-experience’. But the fact that mental states such as pleasure or happiness are invariably uttered in sentential unity with ‘I’ (ekavākyatvam), that is, as predicates of the same subject, means that they have the same substratum (ekādhikāraṇatvam). Because it follows from the Vaiśeṣika theory of semantic and epistemological realism that the word ‘I’ must have a referent, a self; and further, the linguistic and experiential unity of ‘I’ cognitions and mental states
suggests their ontological unity: their existential dependence on the same substratum (PDS 1994: § 79; NK 1984: 84: 14-7).  

So, when I say or think, ‘I am happy’, ‘I’-cognition and the cognition ‘happy’ arise as ‘effects’ (kārya) or qualities (guṇa) of the same substratum, a self, for which reason, the object of the ‘I’-thought (ahampratyaya), that is, self is experienced as qualified (upādhi) by pleasure, pain, etc. The idea here is that mental properties, the unconscious properties pleasure, desire, etc., are accessed consciously in terms of I-experience as owned, and must therefore have the same bearer as this I-consciousness, a self, which is the referent of I-cognition or consciousness.

The idea here is that by the very nature of mental states as first-personal, it is impossible to have these states except by way of their involving a notion or experience of self or ‘I’; that is, it is impossible to have these states except by way of their being owned as ‘mine’ or ‘me’. For this reason, expressions of pain or perception have sense and meaning as being my pain or my seeing, as when I say, ‘I feel pain’, or ‘I see the signpost’. These states are presented as mine, as belonging to me, or my self as its own. These are necessarily states of someone and exist for that same someone: the subject – or enjoyer (bhoktr) - and agent (karti) who is the owner of these states, and considers herself to be the owner of these states. This is quite unlike the brown colour of a table say which is the colour of that table, but does not appear brown for that table itself; it appears brown only to us.

Self is necessary as that about whom it may be said that it experiences phenomenal qualities such as colour, enjoys pleasures and suffers pains, feels desires and aversions, has memories and wills a course of action. It makes no sense to talk of these mental states except by reference to someone for whom they have value and meaning as pleasurable or painful, as a remembrance or a desire. Nor, for that matter does it make sense to talk about moral accountability, about deserving reward and punishment for deeds, and benefitting or suffering the consequences of these deeds as recorded in one’s moral constitution (dharma, adharma), unless these concern someone, a self who is responsible for them and who must, for this reason, bear their consequences (PDS 1994: § 80). Moral properties must, in other words, be for someone

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20 I thank Pt. Baliram Shukla (2009) for discussing this argument with me.
in relation to whom and for whom they have meaning and value. Mental properties and moral properties of an individual must be of a self who can enjoy mental affects as their subject and the moral consequences of its actions as the beneficiary of its acts (PDS 1994: § 80). This emphasis on the necessity of ownership of mental states bears parallel to Strawson’s (1985) view that mental states are necessarily owned, and Sorabji’s (2006) argument for a self from the ownership criterion.

2.2. Normativity, Ownership and Causation

The above arguments suggest that the sense or feeling of ‘I’, or owning, cannot be excluded from thoughts, affections and emotions, memories, moral precepts and karmic or forensic consequences, without inviting incoherence or at least a loss of meaning. If affections, emotions and volitions were not mine, it does not appear conceivable that they could hold the meaning that they do and so exercise the normative force and guidance that they do in my thoughts and actions, moving me to desire and will something I have experienced as being pleasurable and avoid that which has been a source of pain. Ownership is necessary for the exercise of agency and for mental causation and mental life more generally and so a self that is the source of ownership. This is the gist of Praśātapāda’s argument when say, on seeing a sweet fruit and remembering the pleasurable taste of such a fruit having tasted it in the past, I feel a desire to taste this fruit, and this provokes a willing (prayatna) to taste it observable as salivation - a willful effect on the gustatory faculty. And this is evidence of a unitary self (PDS 1994: § 78). He describes this in the following way:

‘… after perceiving a visual object, we observe modifications in the faculty of taste following the recollection of the taste [of that object]; [from this], a single [unifier] is recognized, [a self]…’ 21

21 Praśātapāda’s model of self as an observer who looks out through the sensory windows of the house he inhabits, the body, in PDS § 78, appears to refer to the unborn self of the Kathā Upaniṣad who, as Śrīdara (NK(J) 1982: 127) points out, pierces outwards the openings of the senses to look out into the world of objects:

‘The Self-existent One pierced the apertures outward, therefore, one looks out, and not into oneself.

A certain wise man in search of immortality,
turned his sight inwards and saw the self within’ (Ka Up 1996: 4.1).
The thrust of the argument here is that it is the implicit presence of the self-same ‘one’ (ekah), the self, who is the unitary owner of perceivings, memories, desires and will, that enables the integration of these states causally over time: the ‘one’ who sees, recalls, desires and wills. It is ownership of mental states qua their metaphysical dependence on the same substantive self that enables their integration, at conscious, unconscious and sub-personal levels, as a coherent system of self-concern over time, a system in which the one who sees a fruit through the visual faculty is the same one who later wills to taste this fruit through the gustatory faculty - manifest in her salivating. Note that mental causation and integration in this sequence of mental states are reliant on the subpersonal processes of manas (§ 5.5).

Ownership of mental states is essential for a coherent structure of agency and its exercise. Thus, on seeing a sweet fruit, what desire could I have to taste it now were it not associated with my former pleasure from eating it, and on what grounds would I desire it now if not because of my expected satisfaction from eating it which motivates me to will that I taste it - as the self-same ‘I’ who owns these states of perception, recollection, desire and will. It is because these states have the same unitary owner that on seeing a sweet fruit, I can recall having tasted such a fruit earlier, and the recollection of this pleasant taste now invokes in me a desire to taste it, which motivates me to - unconsciously - will to taste this fruit quota salivating, as someone apart from these mental states and sense-faculties who can access and unify (pratisamdhāna) these states, and access the sense-faculties they involve (NK 1984: 84, 4-12; Ki 1971: 90, 6-13; Sū 1983: 366).

Ordinary experience and understanding of self and mental life corresponds to just such a view of integrated ownership of mental states, Śrīdhara argues (NK 1984: 84, 24-27): ‘It is understood by all living beings that the one who experiences is the same being who recollects, acquires the means to pleasure, [and] is the [place] of origination of desire, [and] aversion to pain’.

But the sort of ownership Praśastapāda assumes here requires that we refer back to PDS § 79 where he contends that pleasure, desire, will etc. arise with reference to the I-object (ahamkāra). The I-object or I-concept refers to the phenomena of ownership that although based in the bare metaphysical individuation and mere phenomenal ownership (svatva) of mental states and structures in the self (NK 1984: 84, 20-2; ATV 1995: 346-7) are nevertheless constituted in the guise of personal ownership of these
states: the I-object is based in the conceptual appropriation of mental states - and the body - as ‘me’ or ‘mine’ which may arise at a conscious, or a pre-conscious level. It refers to personal or psychophysical identity rather than bare self-identity (see below § 2.3).

The point here is that a self is necessary as that which allows the phenomena of selfhood at conscious, unconscious and subpersonal levels of ownership of mental activity to arise as an integrated system of mental causation - a sequence of mental events - in the self, as outlined above - enabled by manas (see § 2.8). It is again ‘personal’ ownership (svāmitva), agency and identity that take the form of the ‘I-object’ (ahamkāra), Śrīdhara suggests, that are the source of the normative demands made by mental states which instigate mental life and causation. These may be conscious states or unconscious or pre-conscious dispositions such as desires and willings. He explains the genesis of the normative demands made by our conceptions of self, of personal agency and ownership, in mental life in the following way. When a self

‘becomes connected with such limitations as those of the body and the sense-faculties, it comes to have notions such as “I” and “mine”, of being a doer [or an agent] and an enjoyer [of experience] ... from these notions of “I” and “mine” [there] follows affection towards a pleasant [object] and aversion towards an unpleasant object. These affections and aversions give rise to activity (pravṛtti) and restraint of activity (nivṛtti). From this follow [the states of] virtue (dharma) and non-virtue (adharma), and these involve self in the cycle of birth and rebirth’ (NK(J) 1982: 597; revised trans.).

Citing the Buddhists, he continues:

‘In the ever-existing self, the idea of difference comes in when there is a distinction made between ‘I’ and ‘not-I’; from this arise affection and aversion, and it is from these two that all conditions [of personal existence, suffering etc.] are brought into being’.

In fact,

‘every self in earthly life is under the influence of beginningless tendencies and impressions [of having affections and aversions towards the objects of the world because of its sense of “I” and “not-I”] (NK(J) 1982: 597; revised trans.).

Mental states, on this account, already come with the force of existence of ‘I’ or self that is articulated in I-thoughts. The sense of self-existence or ‘I’-ness, the ‘I’-form or ‘I’-content (ahamkāra) of conscious states as states of a self, is that which lends these states the moral and rational force of self-concern: the inclination to proceed towards
the satisfaction of those ends one considers favourable and desirable for oneself. On this account, the sense of personal ownership is the instigator of thought and action, as concern for one’s self-existence that identifies with or appropriates mental attitudes and gives these normative force – inclining, instigating or motivating one to desire, will and act towards the acquisition or avoidance of an object. In other words, it is the association of mental states with the ‘I’-form (ahaṃkāra) that enables these states to exemplify self-concern and lends them the normative force that guides mental life and causation.

Ownership and Self-Existence

The second aspect of Praśastapāda’s claim from the first-personal presentation of mental states (PDS 1994: § 79) is that from semantic and epistemological realism, the fact that mental states such as happiness are invariably uttered in sentential unity (ekavākyatvam) with the I-object as predicates of the same subject, means that they have the same substratum (ekādhikāraṇatvam) as Śrīdhara explains above (NK 1984: 83, 14-17). This substratum, Praśatapāda argues, cannot be the body or the senses because mental states are first-personally presented. The controversial claim here is that the role of ownership in mental life, the fact of mental states being invariably owned by a self or, ‘I’, means that a self is constitutively involved in the being of these states. The assumption here, as Śrīdhara indicates, is that mental states are constitutively informed by self-existence in the guise of the I-object (ahaṃkāra) (NK 1984: 84, 20-2). And this means that such a self qua substance really exists (Śū 1983: 368), and this is a non-physical substance: it is not the body or the senses.

What Śrīdhara is claiming in the above two arguments is that in the first-person perspective, in an experiential state such as, ‘I am happy’, I know myself as the owner of these mental states, as their subject and agent: ‘we cognise self … as “I” and “mine” associated with notions of agency (kartṛṭva) and ownership (svāmitva) …’ introspectively (NK 1984: 71, 12-3). And the I-experience or I-thought, the content or form of ‘I’ (ahaṃkāra), is a cognition of self qualified by the notion or concept of its being an owner (swāmī) of its mental states and an agent (karṭṛ) of its actions (see § 2.3).
The controversial claim here is that self is presented in the first-person perspective as an object of cognition as something that is not different from itself (sva) even if it arises in the guise of the I-object, and such self-awareness and self-reference mean that such a thing as a self really exists, and this is the locus of mental states. For according to Vaiśešika realism, the selfhood that imbues mental life is not simply a phenomenological illusion; nor does it follow simply from the Intentional structure of consciousness, from its reflexivity as Zahavi (2005), for example, claims - note that consciousness is non-reflexive in Vaiśešika. Self also cannot be a conceptual fiction as the Buddhists claim. Such a thing as a self must in fact exist and it must be a unitary substance which is the bearer of cognitions, affections and volitions. But the body cannot be the bearer of these states because they arise first-personally, imbued with selfhood. The reasons why the body cannot be the self, the substratum of mental states, from the fact that these states are imbued with selfhood or ‘I’ ‘from the inside’, i.e., owned, are given in an argument by Śrīdhara which is echoed by Udayana (§ 2.5).22

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22 For arguments why the body cannot be the self see Chakrabarti (1999), and Ganeri (2000, 2011a). Jagadīśa succinctly summarizes the arguments why the body cannot be the bearer, or owner of cognitions, affections and volitions because of its mutability (Śū 1983: 366-7):

Objection: … (pleasure, pain, etc.) inhere in the body; that is why he (Praśātapāda) says they are qualities. Why [must it be self that is their bearer]? [The opponent] asks: “Why are they not intrinsically qualities of the body or the sense-modalities?

The reply to this is: On account of the notion of “I”. This means, on account of the particular cognition, “I”. The meaning [of this argument] is the following. Since [the body and senses] are not [expressed] in one sentence with it (“I”). Here, “are not” refers to logical contradiction. The phrase, “[expressed] in one sentence”, refers to the experience of being based in the same substratum. The sense [of this argument] is that the experience of [the body or the sense-modalities] being based in the same substratum as “I” is logically contradictory. And so, [we might say that] I, who have performed virtuous actions in a previous birth, that very “I” now [enjoy] happiness; I, who have committed non-virtuous acts, that very “I” now suffers. I engage in virtuous actions because I want happiness in my [next] birth and would hate to suffer. Because I want happiness in my next birth, I perform sacrifices to earn virtue. The meaning [of this] is that since such experiences of pleasure, etc., evidence a common substratum of I-ness, it would be logically contradictory to attribute pleasure, etc., to the body [as the substratum cause because the body is mutable and not unitary over time]. Since, the experience of pleasure [arising from] virtuous [deeds performed in a different birth] is based on the sameness of the I-substratum, it is not attributable to the body [given its mutability]. [Such experience] across two births, despite the difference in bodies, is made possible by the persistence of the same substance across these two births; that very [substance] is the substratum of pleasure, etc. [, namely, the self].

Objection: I, who used to be fair, that very ‘I’ have now become dark due to suffering. I, who used to be thin, that very “I”, have now become fat. [If the opponent argues that] the notion of thinness or fairness, etc., [expressed] here, [which appear to be] based in the same substratum as the I-substance, captures bodily distinctions rather than distinctions pertaining to the self; because of the absence of qualities such as fairness in the self, [then] the reply [to this objection] is, “No”. Here, the cognition that associates the I-substance and the body is erroneous, and cannot be taken to be a valid cognition, because it contradicts what we have argued earlier. Distinct states correspond to distinct bodies [over time, in the case of
Praśastapāda gives a number of anti-physicalist arguments below (§ 2.6-2.7) why the body cannot be the self. 23

2.3. Identity, Identification and Self

Self-Identity and Personal Identity

We have seen that self is the substantive medium in which mental states can exist as owned; it is the basis of the psychological integration, persistence and identity of the individual as an agent and a subject - an enjoyer of experiences. It is in virtue of mental states being exemplified in the same existentia medium, self, that they are unified and ascribed to the same self in the way they are, because it is uniquely the nature of a self-substance that only it can directly imbue and unify cognitions and mental states over time by the force of existence of selfhood or ownership as ‘mine’.

There are however, as we have seen above, two conceptions of ownership and identity at work here. The phenomenal experience of ‘being-own’ (sva) that mental states are intrinsically invested with, or phenomenal ownership, refers to the bare experience of oneself as non-different from oneself (sva); it refers to the metaphysical nature of self itself Śrīdhara and Udayana explain (NK 1984: 20-2; ATV 1995: 346-7). But to be an owner of mental states, at least in the case of human selves, means that self also knows itself conceptually to be their owner: it considers itself to be the owner (svāṃtī) of its experiences and the agent (kartr) of its actions, which is an exercise of personal ownership (svāṃtīvā) or laying claim to its mental states and its body conceptually as ‘me’ (aham) or ‘mine’ (mama) (NK 1984: 71, 12-3). This constitutes the ‘I-object’ (ahāmkāra), the ordinary conception and experience of a personal or physical composites such as the body], and so the notion that it is the same body [that could be the bearer of an earlier and a later mental property] is erroneous. It must be noted that the person born in Ācāra’s household does not stop being Ācāra’s son on account of his having a different body, [that is,] because of the difference between his current [bodily] state from [his bodily state in] childhood. [The self is the substratum of “I” and this is why] we recognize Ācāra’s son as such, in spite of his later body being different from his body at birth.

23 For Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments for a self that is non-physical from the demands of unity of consciousness and personal identity against emergentist physicalist and reductionist claims of the Cārvāka and the Buddhists respectively, see Ganeri (2000, 2011a, 2012) and (Chakrabarti 1982, 1999).
agential self. It is important to note that the chapter on self in the PDS refers to human selves. I briefly consider the nature of animal and other selves in § 5.1.

To know oneself or to conceive of oneself as oneself in a certain way is to posit a certain identity. A self, in this account, is able to conceive of itself as itself and to identify itself in a variety of ways as the owner and agent of its experiences and actions. But the two conceptions of ownership at work here, phenomenal and personal, refer to a discrepancy between what a self is, and what it ordinarily takes itself to be, between its true identity (svarūpa) qua self, its intrinsic metaphysical nature qua substance, or self-identity, and the sort of conception it has about itself, or its personal identity. Self’s conception of itself, its personal identity, rests on its identification of itself with its Intentional objects, its mental attitudes and the objects of the physical world, including its body, which is an exercise of personal ownership (svāmitva) over these, a laying claim to them conceptually as ‘mine’ (mama). The basis of such conceptual appropriations of psychophysical entities as oneself, we have seen, is the bare phenomenal or subjective distinctness of oneself (sva) vis-à-vis another that exists in virtue of its metaphysical character as that which is, and so experiences itself as, non-different from itself (sva), as Udayana suggests (ATV 1995: 346-7). It is because of the existence-in (samavāya) such a self-substance of psychological phenomena and the essential causal dependence on it of the body, that these are imbued with that individuation and phenomenal selfhood (svatva) which serves as the ground of the psychophysical identity of the individual over time and at a time, distinguishing it from other such individuals.

Self-identity refers to the experience of self alone: the experience of self qua substance, the experience of being non-different from oneself (sva), that arises as an intrinsic phenomenal presentation of distinctness devoid of all psychophysical identifications of ‘I’ (see also Ram-Prasad 2012)24 - even if self itself is not fully cognized or experienced without considerable philosophical and spiritual practice.

On this account, self-identity is not the same thing as personal identity, the psychophysical identity of the individual, but rather its basis. So, although mental or physical trauma may affect psychological or physical continuity, and so psychophysical

or personal identity, it would not affect self-identity qua phenomenal identity as svatva, the inner distinguishing of me as me because its basis lies in the metaphysical identity of each self, rather than in its psychophysical embodiment. A loss of memory or physical trauma even it affects mental or physical continuity does not affect the ‘I amness’ or sense of own-being (svatva) that is constitutive of that self-identity which imbues mental states so that these are self-referring and can articulate self-concern. However, self-reference and self-concern do require some unconscious memories or inherited dispositions (dharma, adharma) that unconsciously or subconsciously instigate mental causation and mental life in the first place (see § 5.1, 5.4-5.5).

In this view, the self-concern that a psychologically continuous person feels owes not to an unbroken chain of memories and other psychological features but to the sense of self that imbues these – even if some unconscious dispositions are needed. The implication of this is that I feel concern for myself when I have lost a chunk of my memory and other psychological characteristics because I continue to feel a sense of ‘I’-existence or owning here and now supported by this psychophysical organism, but I do not feel concern for a duplicate of myself, even where all my mental and bodily characteristics have somehow been miraculously copied, because a duplicate is not my self – the same existential locus. On this account, phenomenal or bare owning can be felt by me in any suitable physical apparatus which enables the instantiation of my mental states given that self’s expression of ownership is consistent with any suitable physical embodiment.

The Attenuation of Identification and Ownership

If the sources of normativity and the normative demands of mental life lie in self, specifically in our experience and conceptions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’, or personal ownership, what would happen without a sense of personal ownership, which is putatively the condition of the impersonal, exceptional self of the yogin (PDS 1994: § 319) or jīvanmukta (NK(J): 605-7)? Without a sense of ownership there would ensue attenuation and ultimately, cessation of the mental and bodily life of a self because there would be attenuation of the grasping of and identification with objects through their characteristic properties and, with this, even a fading of objective identification of these properties and their substantive loci in perception (NK(J) 1982: 608; see § 5.7).
Quoting Sāṃkhya Kārikā, Śrīdharā characterizes the absence of a sense of personal ownership in the state of self-knowledge in the following way. With cognition of the true nature (svarūpa) of the self there comes the understanding ‘I am not, nothing is mine and [there is] no “I”’ (SK 1995: 64; NK 1984: 279, 2-5; NK(J) 1982: 596), where ‘I’ refers to agency, since in all usages of ‘I’ such as ‘I know’, ‘I give’, etc., ‘I’ represents the agent, the one who is active (SK 1995, Comm.: 121). True cognition (vijñāna) of the self precludes notions of its being an agent and an enjoyer - the subject or owner - who are characterized by the notions ‘I’ and ‘mine’, respectively, asserts Śrīdharā (NK 1984: 279, 21-2; NK(J) 1982: 598). Self-knowledge marks the end of identification of oneself as an agent – as the ‘I’; it marks the end of all sense of agency and ownership, and this eliminates the normative instigation of mental life and causation. For with the elimination of self’s identifications with objects, its inclination to continue its enjoyment of these, via the pursuit of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, ceases. For what sort of mental life and causation continue in the absence of personal ownership and agency and the processes of self-transformation this involves, see §§ 5.6-5.7.

The question of course is what is the nature of identification that enables it to make normative demands and the nature of attenuation of such identification that leads to the cessation of such demands. Śrīdharā’s quotation from the Sāṃkhya Kārikā above, and his discussion of the conceptual appropriation of mental states as ‘I’ and ‘mine’ above (NK 1984: 71, 12-3), clearly indicate that the sort of identification referred to here consists in the identification or appropriation of the contents or objects of mental states as being me or mine. We may call this ‘existential identification’. These states and their objects are taken to be what I am, assimilating or appropriating them to self as itself. It is precisely on this account that someone is moved by what she sees, feels, or thinks, about a particular object.

It is insightful here to consider Velleman’s conception of identification. Velleman suggests that to say we identify with some of our attitudes means ‘imagining ourselves to be those attitudes. To identify with a desire or emotion would be to imagine being the desire or emotion’ (Velleman 2002: 108). He suggests that when we identify with some of our motives and not others this might be a defensive strategy of retreating to certain emotional boundaries. Moreover, when we ‘identify with some of
our motives by imagining ourselves as being those motives’ excluding others, we ‘engage not in self-definition but self-deception’ (ibid.: 109).

Śrīdha and Udayana take a broadly parallel stance here. They suggest that to identify oneself with a part or the whole of one’s motives to pursue pleasures and avoid pains associated with the objective world constitutes a false cognition of oneself, for it is the erroneous location of oneself in objectivity that is necessarily other than the natural or true being of self located wholly in itself. The notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’, of being an agent and a subject, or beneficiary, of objective transactions must be regarded as false, on this account. Because to be an agent is to identify oneself with one’s psychophysical being and the desire (icchā) for pleasure (sukha) and fear of loss (dveṣa) associated with this, rather than to locate oneself in the natural - substantive - self that is free of such fear and desire (ATV 1995: 378). As such, this sort of identification represents self in an erroneous or a deceptive light (NK 1984: 279, 9-11; NK(J) 1982: 597).

But Velleman goes on to assert:

‘Suppose that a person has a part that he is unable to regard non-reflexively, a part on which he cannot attain a truly detached, third-person perspective. That part of him will be essentially “self” to him, in the sense that it is inalienably “me” from his perspective. Its being his essential self won’t mean that it is essential to his identity; only that it always presents a reflexive aspect to his thinking’.

Further:

‘If there is a part of your personality with which you necessarily think about things, then it will be your mental standpoint, always presenting a reflexive aspect to your thought. You will be able to think about this part of your personality as “it”, but only from a perspective in which it continues to function as the thinking “I” – just as you can find a reflection of your visual location “over there” only from a perspective in which it is also “back here”’ (Velleman 2002: 114).

Velleman argues here against the existence of something that is a self. His suggestion that the reflexive aspects of our personality, those which present a reflexive aspect to our thoughts, are the mental standpoints we take rings true. It ties in with the notion that the aspect which we identify with, or imagine ourselves as being, is that which we are unable to observe in a detached, non-reflexive, third-personal manner: we are unable to observe it as an object of reflective judgement. From the standpoint of Praśastapāda’s commentators this correctly specifies the nature of identification. They
would agree, as we have seen above, with Velleman that ‘a human being makes up or invents a self’ in this sense (Velleman 1996: 8), and that the nature of such a self corresponds to the reflexive presentation of those parts of a person which ‘make up his self-image or self-conception’ (Velleman 2002: 112). This means that self, or more appropriately the personal self is ‘the coincidence of object and subject, either of a verb or of the activity it represents’ (Velleman 2002: 111). This is, of course, all that a self is in Velleman’s view.

For Velleman, the notion that such a thing as a self exists is simply a reification of how self presents itself in first-person states. Self is simply that which a person denotes reflexively as ‘me’, ‘a part that he is unable to regard non-reflexively … on which he cannot attain a truly detached perspective’ (Velleman 2002: 113-4). However, it is apparent from the above discussion that this is an untenable position for classical Vaiśeṣika. It would take objection to the assumption that there must always be an aspect of the personality that appears reflexively as a self. On this view, locating oneself in self’s objects rather than in the existential ‘medium’ of self itself is the source of self’s identification with its mental attitudes that engenders a qualified or aspeclual view of one’s self-existence. But locating oneself in self alone allows a self to view each of its mental contents or objects - the aspects of its personality, its mental attitudes, etc. – dispassionately, in a detached way (see NK(J) 1982: 598). It is precisely the nature of self and selfhood that self-knowledge yields a detached standpoint towards all of one’s mental attitudes, and views all parts of its personality ‘third-personally’ and ‘non-reflexively’ in Velleman’s terms. The detached or impersonal self which knows its true nature no longer imputes self-existence to its mental contents appropriating these as its own. It is no longer constrained by the structure of its dispositions: by mental standpoints that are reflexive and it denotes as ‘I’. But for Velleman and theorists of self in analytical philosophy more generally, there is no possibility of there being selfhood or consciousness that is not constrained by the personal structures of an individual’s mental states. I discuss this issue further in chapter five.

2.4. Self-Cognition

Praśastapāda’s arguments for the existence of a self rely on inferential reasoning and do not address the question of self-awareness might justify the claim that self exists. It is Udayana who puts forward a classic version of the argument that the sense or
experience of selfhood we have represents a direct introspective cognition of one’s own self (ATV 1995: 344). His introspective argument for self’s existence runs:

“For every conscious creature the judgement “I am” is self-evident. This judgement is pre-linguistic, so it could not be purely fictional or object-less: there is no question of our being merely duped by the pronoun … It does not await our search for a premise or a reason. Hence it is not inferential … Even if we sometimes are mistaken about our own present judgement, a self-delusive judgement like: “I am in pain” or “I see a snake” – in order to be false, presupposes the existence of and my direct acquaintance with the self about whom it is false’ (ATV 1995: 344-5, trans. Chakrabarti 1992: 114-5).

Udayana argues that cognition of self does not arise in the way as cognition of physical objects arises by perceptual identification. Because, I am acquainted with myself directly, independently of any identifying features or criteria that might justify my identification of something as my ‘self’. The idea is that in being conscious I am at least minimally aware of myself, prior to any judgement I may make about my self as an object with reference to mental or bodily states, and regardless of whether these judgements are true or false. Self-knowledge, such as ‘I feel pain’ or ‘I am fat’ or ‘I see a snake’ whether true or false, presupposes my pre-reflective and pre-linguistic knowledge of the ‘self’ or ‘I’ to whom such predicates as ‘pain or ‘fat’ can be applied.

I am acquainted with myself, Udayana claims, prior to any introspective or perceptual identifications by which I might come to infer or know my self as an object. So, when I say, ‘I feel happy’, and introspectively identify as characteristic of ‘me’, my ‘being happy’, this ‘me’ and ‘my’ implicitly refer to something that I already assume to be ‘me’. First-person reference, Udayana claims, articulates a direct, non-criterial acquaintance with my self that is articulated as ‘me’ or ‘mine’. It would be true to say on this account, as Zahavi does, that first-person reference is an articulation of a non-thematic or non-attentive awareness of oneself that ‘is given immediately, non-inferentially and non-criterially as “mine”’, as a sort of ‘background presence’ (Zahavi 2005: 124).

Udayana claims that self-perception (ātma-pratyakṣa) follows a different model of cognition from sense perception or the perception of physical objects. When I see a table and say, ‘That is a table’ with regard to an object I perceive in front of me, I identify this object as a table on the basis of my perception of those features it possesses that identify it as a table: its having four legs attached below the corners of a flat rectangular surface. I identify and re-identify a table or any other physical object by
reference to perceptual criteria. In the case of self, however, we do not identify a self in thought and language by knowing those of its properties that may be used to perceptually identify it or re-identify it. Self-identification is non-criterial: it has no need of criteria of identification because it is based on direct acquaintance, independent of, and prior to the use of any inferential and linguistic criteria. In fact, the application of such criteria to a self, its objective identification, presupposes my awareness of something to which these criteria are applicable, or not.

How does this argument for self-awareness as proof of self-existence contend with Hume’s classic objection to the existence of a self (Treatise Bk 1, pt 4, sec 6, para 3)? Hume’s objection runs as follows:

‘For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself I stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe any thing but the perception ….‘.

Moreover, Hume continues, another

‘may perhaps perceive something simple and continu’d, which he calls himself; tho’ I am certain that there is no such principle in me’ (Treatise, Bk 1, pt 4, sec 6, para 3).

Hume claims that when we observe ourselves introspectively, we are aware of the occurrence of particular mental events but not of a self that exists apart from these events. We certainly do not perceive an immaterial object, a simple continuous object that we can identify perceptually as my ‘self’.

Udayana’s claim, however, is precisely that we are not aware of ourselves in virtue of features that identify it as a self: we are not aware of ourselves in the way we are aware of a table say or any other physical object. Yet Hume, as well as Anscombe (1975), presuppose just such a perceptual model of self-awareness when they argue against the existence of a self, suggests Shoemaker (1968: 562-3). What Hume wishes to deny is that ‘there is an experiencing or perceiving of one’s self that explains one’s awareness that one is, for example, in pain in a way analogous to that in which one’s sense-perception of John explains one’s knowledge that John has a beard’ (Shoemaker 1968: 562). But unlike our perception of physical objects, where we are able to identify and re-identify these objects by reference to perceptible criteria, self-knowledge already presupposes our ability to identify and re-identify ourselves. I identify an object as myself by already possessing self-knowledge, which identifies this object as myself.
So, when I identify myself as an object in a mirror say, I do so by finding something that is true of this object that I know independently to be true of myself - that identifies it as myself (1968: 560, 562, 564). This indicates that ‘each person’s system of reference [has] that person himself as its anchoring point…’ (ibid.: 567).

But in Udayana’s view, when I ascribe even pain or pleasure to myself, I am able to identify myself as being in pain, or as feeling pleasure because I already know that to whom this property can be ascribed, myself. So, the use ‘as object’ of ‘I’, or for that matter its use as demonstrative reference, is possible only because self-reference involving the use ‘as subject’ of ‘I’ is possible.

Udayana’s answer then to Hume’s objection would be that self is not something that is found in awareness in the way we find perceptual objects. Self-acquaintance is pre-given as the background of all our cognitions. To not recognize self in this way represents a failure to recognize that which is already presupposed and presented in all such cognitions, in our being-conscious itself. For, self slips in inadvertently without our identifying it as self. As Lonergan says:

‘Objects are present by being attended to, but subjects are present [to themselves] as subjects, not by being attended to, but by attending. As the parade of objects marches by, spectators do not have to slip into the parade to be present to themselves’ (Lonergan 1967: 226, quoted in Strawson 2010: 288).

Strawson (2010: 290) remarks that this sort of non-attentive or non-thetic occurrent self-awareness is ‘simply awareness of content that isn’t in the focus of attention … We can also call it background awareness …’.

Udayana claims (ATV 1995: 344-45) that the fact that our awareness of self is prior to any identifying criteria or linguistic mediation, means it is prior to all sources and criteria of doubt and error. This means that if we deny that our awareness of our own existence refers to something that really exists and is truly referring, then given that such self-acquaintance is immediately given and non-criterial, prior to both doubt and error, what grounds do we have for not denying the existence of any and all objects we perceive as existent - objects whose cognition is criterial, both conceptually and linguistically mediated, and therefore subject to doubt and error? Udayana argues that:

‘If self-awareness could be discredited on the ground that it is the product of some beginningless urge how can any other cognition be credited as valid that one could depend upon cognitions of blue, yellow, etc.?’ (ATV 1995: 344-5).
The point Udayana is making here is clearly articulated by Strawson:

‘There’s a narrow, philosophically popular, independent-justification-stressing conception of knowledge that makes it hard for some to see this [self-knowledge] is really knowledge but the claim doesn’t really need defence. Rather the reverse: this particular case of knowledge, self-knowledge in non-thetic self-awareness, shows the inadequacy of the narrow conception of knowledge. The general point is backed up most formidably, by the fact that knowledge of this kind must lie behind all knowledge of the narrower justification-involving sort, as a condition of its possibility. This is because it is a necessary truth that all justification of knowledge claims is relative to something already taken as given’ (Strawson 2012: 289).

Of course, Strawson would deny that such a thing as a permanent non-physical self of classical Vaiśeṣika is what we cognize as the content of such awareness. But his argument does point to the robustness of Udayana’s claim.

There is a second part to Udayana’s claim outlined above. The sense ‘I am’ or ‘I’ that is given in our cognitions and is articulated in first-person expressions of these such as ‘I am happy’, etc., is the ‘I-form’ or ‘I-content’ (ahamkāra) that is not a true cognition of self, it is not true self-experience. As we have seen, both Praśātapāda and his commentators assert that a distinction must be drawn between the metaphysical or natural self qua substance and its cognition in direct self-experience, and the ‘I-content’ or ‘I-object’ which presents itself in ordinary first-person experience. The ordinary sense of ‘I’ (ahamkāra) articulates an underlying sense and conception of ownership which is erroneous: the sense and concept of being a subject and an agent based in psychophysical identification with one’s mental states and one’s body. This ‘I-content’, this implicit sense and conception of ownership, of being a subject and an agent, is the ‘form of I’ (ahamkāra) that is prior to any specific identification of oneself with particular objects as ‘me’ or ‘mine’, but represents one’s sense or conception of oneself as an owner of the collectivity of mental states and one’s body, as I discuss further in chapter five.

This thesis parallels the Buddhist view that when we conceive of ourselves as owners of our conscious states and our actions, our conception of ‘I’ is a conceptual fabrication (vikalpa) and erroneous (see Ganeri 2011: 181). The ascription of a mental state such as pleasure to a self is an erroneous ascription in classical Vaiśeṣika, because self itself is not this state. In other words, the imposition of a subject-predicate model on self-experience is, on this account, false. It interprets self as being something that it
is not, based on models of physical perception and identification, both introspectively and extrospectively.

What is implicitly, and not only explicitly, taken as ‘I’ in all thought, experience and action is a certain self-conception: the structures of the pre-conscious ‘I-content’ or ‘I-form’ (ahaṅkāra). This is akin to the implicit de se thought or ‘I-content’ that Recanati (2007: 176-7) suggests is a condition of all explicit de se thought about oneself, where the latter has a first-person presentation in which the object thought about is identified with oneself.

True self-awareness is not only prior to conceptual and linguistic identifications such as ‘I am such and such’, but it emerges only with the eradication of all self-dispositions; that is, with the eradication of the implicit ‘I’, or ahaṅkāra, the sense of ownership (svatva) of one’s mental states and one’s body that distinguishes ‘I-objects’ and objects that are ‘not-I’. For this reason, experience of the true self is a state free of all ideas of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ (NK(J) 1982: 598). It is a state in which ‘I am not’, ‘nothing is mine’, ‘I do not exist’ (SK 64 quoted in NK(J) 1982: 596). What this means is that there is no longer an implicit ‘I-content’ that is the foundation of the identification of ‘I’ as such and such a thing. True self-awareness or self-acquaintance is devoid of a subject-object structure. It lacks all predication. It appears to refer to my bare presence, an immediate and featureless self-acquaintance that is pre-given in all my cognitions, but is not fully recognized as such even though it infuses all ‘I-content’, or ahaṅkāra, and all self-knowledge. The experience ‘I’ or ‘I am’ refers, I would suggest, to a non-objective experience of existence and ‘amnness’ without any ‘I’-content, except possibly mere (self-)presence and its dimensional globality - from the infinite spatiality and temporality of self. It refers to Praśastapāda’s notion that perception, including introspection consists in the ‘filling in’ of distinguishing features after bare perception or experience of the substance or substratum of these features (PDS 1994: § 223-5; see Halbfass 1992: 100-2).

It is only the ‘beingness’ or ‘presence’ aspect of self-experience that refers to self’s true metaphysical identity - an identity that lacks qualification. Because, what we are truly acquainted with in self-acquaintance is what Praśastapāda calls ‘reality’ (astiṭṭva) and ‘beingness’ (sattā) (see PDS 1994: § 11; § 224), the reality and the beingness of an object (NK(J) 1982: 38-9), which we cognise in the first instance when we cognize an object before we fill in its identifying features (see PDS 1994: § 224). In
the case of self, this is a bare sense of being of its own substantive identity (svarūpa), a sense of own-being or self-presence (sva) that lacks any identifying marks or criteria, because self itself is free of all mental characteristics. This is reflected in the bare impersonal ‘beingness’ (sattā) and ‘owning’ (svatva) of the impersonal self (NK (J) 1982: 598; see § 5.7).

It is this bare experience of existence of the self-substance as that which is self-identical (sva) that is argued by Udayana to be indubitably and unerringly given to us in our cognitions even if in the guise of the I-object (ATV 1995: 344-7). What Udayana claims in the argument from self-cognition is that the acquaintance or experience ‘I am’, despite its erroneous presentation as the I-object in self-knowledge, articulates minimal awareness of ‘own-being’ or ‘self-presence’ (sva). We turn next to the question why ‘selfhood’ or being ‘one’s own’ cannot be, underivatively, the nature of the body.

2.5. Ownership and the Body

Śrīdhara gives an epistemological argument why the body cannot be the self. ‘I’, or self, he claims, refers to that which distinguishes something as being-own (sva); it is this that comes to be experienced and known introspectively (antarmukha) as owning, or ownership (svatva) (NK 1984: 84, 20-22). But the body, he argues, like other physical phenomena lacks the capability of being an owner, a self. The body, he claims, is incapable of the sort of individuation ‘from the inside’ that defines the phenomenal or subjective sense of being one’s own (sva)\(^\text{25}\) that is the very nature of self and constitutive of the sense of phenomenal ownership (svatva) that is fundamentally involved in the nature of being conscious and having mental states, and having a body. The distinguishing factor of own-being that is only introspectively (antarmukha) available and uniquely identifies ‘me’ as me, Śrīdhara claims, is absent in the body qua physical. For the body is only objectively perceivable by the senses as a publicly available object of perception, and lacks the ‘inner’ individuating factor of being a self: the introspective presentation of own-being that is required to limit the object or remit of ‘I’ and individuate it uniquely from within so that not only are my mental states

\(^{25}\) Udayana (ATV 1995: 346-7), we have seen, suggests that ‘self’ refers to the experience of being non-different from oneself (sva), which is the distinguishing feature of ‘I’ or self.
known to me as ‘my own’ but my body is similarly known to me as being ‘mine’, and not that of another. The objective, public presentation of the body from the fact of its being identifiable by sense perception makes it perceptually accessible to all. This undermines the subjective criterion of inner identity and individuation which distinguishes selfhood ‘from the inside’, so to speak, and enables me to identify myself objectively as ‘me’, in various psychophysical guises. The body cannot therefore be the self (NK 1984: 84, 17-21). This argument is reiterated by Udayana (ATV 1971: 346-7).

This argument refers back to the discrepancy pointed out above between how ‘I’ is presented as subject and the way in which physical objects are known. We have seen that self-awareness or self-knowledge is non-criterial knowledge and is directly available without reference to perceptual properties that identify something as a self. The privacy of access to ‘I’, and its presentation as subject by direct introspective ‘identification’ and reference as ‘I’ or ‘me’, corresponds to an awareness of ‘me’ as me, in a way that makes me distinct from another. But the body qua physical object is susceptible only to objective identification by perceptual means that make it publicly accessible and identifiable. It lacks that implicit self-acquaintance to which its objective features can refer back, and by which they can be identified as ‘I’ or ‘mine’. It lacks that underivative selfhood that would allow unique ascriptions of self or ‘I’ to itself. For this reason, qua physical object, any body could be designated as ‘I’, that is, no body could be uniquely designated as ‘I’. The body lacks innate ownership, it is no one, and it belongs to no one; it cannot therefore be the self. There is no way of distinguishing this body demonstratively, as my body if there is no way of distinguishing ‘me’ from another, from the inside, subjectively as self.

Were the body the self, the absence of ownership in it would be tantamount to there being no difference between the features, attributes and movements of a physical phenomenon such as a hurricane whose features and movements belong to no one and mental phenomena and bodily actions, as I discuss in chapter four (§ 4.7). For this reason, ‘I’ cannot have the body qua physical substance as its object or referent. And neither can the body ‘own’ mental states for this reason, that is, the body cannot be the bearer of mental states because then these too would belong to no one.

‘I’ must apply to that which presents the nature of being-own or own-being (sva) underderivatively, a self apart from the body to which the body belongs because it makes this body my body and not that of another, from the inside (NK 1984: 84, 21-22). Self,
on this account, must be that - potentially - introspectively accessible substance which is
pre-given immediately and unreflectively as mere self-presence, as subject or ‘I’, and is
presupposed in all objective presentations of the body as ‘I’ and of mental states as
‘mine’. Only a non-physical self that can ‘from the inside’ define and limit the remit of
‘I’, that selfhood and ownership require, will do in this view.

The central assumption here is that the body, because it is a physical object,
intrinsically lacks Intentional and intentional features. It, therefore, lacks any
possibility of positing a sense of ‘mine-ness’. Such a view is, of course, contestable
because it does not take account of non-reductive physicalist views of how intentional
and Intentional states and ‘mine-ness’ might emerge in complex physical objects such
as the body (see § 6.4) on an emergentist view, for instance, or panpsychist objections
to a dualist view (see Lowe 1996, 2008; Ganeri 2012).

2.6. Differential Naturalism and the Dualist Intuition

A number of metaphysical arguments for a non-physical self, a self that is not the body
or the senses, are voiced by Praśastapāda: (i) Mental and physical properties are distinct
sorts of distinguishing (viśeṣa) features that empirically characterize distinct sorts of
substances, non-physical and physical respectively. (ii) Mental and physical properties
have distinct temporal and spatial features which means they must be existentially
dependent on different types of substances: non-physical and physical respectively. (iii)
Selves and bodies have distinct identity conditions, therefore, the body cannot be the
self. (iv) The partibility and mutability of the body and the senses render these
incapable of serving as unifiers of mental life, synchronic and diachronic. For this host
of reasons, the body - or a part of it - cannot be the self: only a unitary non-physical self
will serve the purpose here. The set of issues associated with the partibility and
mutability of the body, which center on questions of personal identity and unity of
consciousness, are discussed extensively by Ganeri (2000, 2007, 2011, 2012) and
Chakrabarti (1992) and are not reiterated here. I discuss the first two claims (i-ii)
below, and the third claim (iii), the ‘corpse’ argument, in the next section.
From a Dualism of Properties to a Dualism of Substances

The core distinguishing (višeṣa) property of a self, Praśastapāda claims, is the experiential quality (guna) of cognition (jñāna). Elementary substances are distinct in virtue of the fact that each substance is characterised by its own distinguishing (višeṣa) properties and lacks the defining properties of other substances (NK(J) 1982: 63-4; Ki 1971: 27, 10-3; see § 1.5). Thus, physical substances such as a pot are seen to essentially lack cognition that is characteristic of a self (PDS 1994: §§ 77-8); a self, on the other hand, lacks properties such as colour and solidity that characterise physical substances. Since the body is a physical substance, it must lack cognition, or Intentional consciousness; it cannot therefore be a self. Praśastapāda argues:

‘The body, the sense-faculties and the executive faculty do not have [this character], because they lack cognition (ajñatva). Consciousness does not pertain to the body, because it is a product (kārya) of the material elements (bhūta), just as a pot, etc., are …’ (PDS 1994: § 77).

The body, the external senses (indriya) and the inner-sense (manas) cannot be bearers of cognition, the cogniser, because they are physical substances. The body and external senses are in addition produced or composite (kārya), not simple, substances – as a self must be, the argument implies. Udayana explains, that it is metaphysically characteristic of the body, the senses and manas that these lack cognitive experience (ajñātva): they are intrinsically devoid of cognitive experience (jñānarahitarūpa) (Ki 1971: 86, 9-13). The commentators explain that Praśastapāda claims the body cannot be a locus (āśraya) of cognition, because it is a material (bhūta) object just as a pot is - but also because it is a product (kārya), a composite of the material elements, like a pot (Ki 1971: 86, 13; Sū 1983: 362), whereas a self must be a simple substance for the purposes of mental unity and personal identity. Udayana notes, however, that the materiality of the body is a sufficient criterion to exclude it from being a potential basis of cognition (Ki 1971: 86, 10-3).27

Praśastapāda takes the metaphysical distinction between mental and physical things to centre on the quality (guna) of conscious experience: the defining Intentional

26 Of being a cognizer.
27 See Ganeri (2011a) for a discussion of these debates.
and experiential quality of consciousness which is distinct from physical qualities such as colour (rūpa). Note that consciousness is cognition in classical Vaiśeṣika, it is always Intentional, but Intentional consciousness is not representational consciousness (see Mohanty 1992: 202). We observe that consciousness is absent in ordinary physical objects such as a pot. Since the body is a physical object, just as a pot is, it cannot be a bearer of consciousness or cognition. As Mohanty (1992: 27) notes, classical Indian philosophy almost always considers the body to intrinsically lack Intentionality.

This dualist intuition is, prima facie, not implausible, for van Inwagen (2002: 176) notes, ‘the very notion of matter that is conscious or thinks is a mysterious proposition’. On this view, the body is no more capable of being a bearer of cognition, a self, than a pot or a table might be. And as Galen Strawson (2009: 3) notes above, ordinary intuitions of the self consider it to be a locus of consciousness, a mental thing, a unitary subject, etc.

Dualist intuitions based in the phenomenal and subjective character of experience are considered intuitively true, if not theoretically true by contemporary physicalists Papineau (draft) claims. It is these intuitions that are, arguably, the reason why there is a mind-body problem even under physicalism - a gap between the mental, thought of as conscious and intentional, and the physical, thought of as possessing only structural and functional properties (see Chalmers 2002). It points to the intuitive problem: how such a thing as consciousness could be a part of the physical world, especially if this is ultimately a particulate world. It is difficult to see how, given the non-conscious nature of the building blocks of material objects such as a pot or a body, a physical object or system that is composed or produced (kārya) from elementary material particles could posit conscious – any more than a material composite or product such as a pot could.28 These sorts of intuitions also underwrite contemporary alternatives to physicalism, panpsychism, for instance.

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28 Arguments from the mutability of the body against unity of consciousness and personal identity such as those raised by Udayana (Ki 1971: 91, 5-26) and critically reviewed by Ganeri (2011a).
The Nature of ‘Mental’ Substance

But what kind of a thing is such a non-physical self? What type of a substance is it? I suggest that self serves as a condition of possibility of the mental and moral structures of the world, and of mental causation, much as spatiality (dik) and temporality (kāla) serve as the conditions of possibility of the physical structures of the world and of physical causation. Let us look at this more closely. The text suggests:

‘Time, space and self, though having the character of “substance” … are non-finite (amūrta). Finite dimension (mūrta) implies a non-pervading (asarvagata) [bounded] substance …’ (PDS 1994:§ 356).

As described earlier (§ 1.5), space, time, and self are omni-located and possess the five generic properties of substance that are the condition of possibility of causation and individuation (PDS 1994: § 19; NK(J) 1982: 54; see also, VS 1911: 7.1.22, 24, 25).

Further: ‘Space and time have the common character of … being the instrumental cause of all that has an origin [i.e., all that is a product]’ (PDS 1994: § 24). They are also ‘the instrumental cause of all produced things because the production of all material things is invariably restricted within particular points of space and time …’ (NK(J) 1982: 61). Similarly, the self too is the instrumental cause of things. Qua instrumental causes space and time serve as the ‘receptacle’ of causal contact among all physical things. The self, though an instrumental cause, is not a container of physical things but a locus of mental ‘things’ or properties (G. Jha Note in NK(J) 1982: 61); it is an instrumental cause of things insofar as it structures mental causation, as we see in § 5.5; much in the way that the dimensional substances structure physical causation. Further, it lacks essential characteristic (viśeṣa) properties: it is only contingently a bearer of mental properties, and in its liberated state is merely a bare dimensional substance much in the way space and time are. Such a ‘dimensional’ self that is omni-located (vibhu) and unbounded (amūrta), spatially and temporally infinite, lacking in essential mental properties, appears to be quite unlike the thing-like soul or self, composed of ‘immaterial stuff’ on a physical model of the soul, that physicalist accounts critique as something mysterious or inconceivable (Dennett 1991: 34-37; Churchland 1984: 19).
Mental Space and Content

There are other reasons, however, why the notion of a non-physical self may be considered unintelligible. Selves are held to be omni-located, they are present everywhere for they have limitless spatial dimension (PDS 1994: 80), but there is a multiplicity of such selves. There is no bar in this view of different selves, and selves and matter occupying the same spatial areas, as they must in this case. The question is whether this is an intelligible thesis. The idea seems to be that there is no spatial overlap or competition between selves and physical objects, because selves are not physical objects and so do not occupy a bounded area of space: selves are not finite or mūrta in this sense, in the way that physical objects are (see also McGinn 1995). Physical objects, such as a statue, occupy space. They are spatially bounded (mūrta) substances because they are composed of, an aggregate of, ‘stuff’, namely, atomic particles that possess spatial extension and are themselves bounded (mūrta). But selves are pervasive and limitless, they are omni-located (vībhu), not spatially bounded and concrete (amūrta).

Selves, display the capacity of holding phenomenal or Intentional\(^2\) contents in their mental space (PDS 1994: § 79). But the phenomenal and Intentional contents of perceptions and thoughts that a self supports, do not occupy space in the way that physical objects do. For this reason, there would appear to be no contradiction in the possibility of overlapping selves and physical objects. As McGinn (1995) points out, although mental phenomena do have spatial features, the mental is not characterized by the spatial in the way that physical substances are apt to be, and notions of spatial exclusion or spatial occupancy that are constitutive of our notion of physicality and spatiality are not obviously applicable to mental phenomena. For this reason, the application of a spatial exclusion principle to mental objects such as a thought may be misconceived. It does not seem appropriate to ask, McGinn suggests, if two thoughts might be spatio-temporally coincident, or if two mental subjects can simultaneously be in the same place. It is this discrepancy between the dimensional structures of mental

\(^2\)Again, the term ‘Intentional’ refers to mental states that have a content or an object as distinct from ‘intentional’ which is used for ‘goal-oriented’ states and actions.
and physical properties that Praśatapāda turns to in attempting to secure the non-physicality of self, as we see below.

Numerous Selves

The classical Vaiśeṣika notion of innumerable limitless continua of selves is intuitively not a plausible possibility, not least because of objections from ontological parsimony. There are objections to the view of a plurality of selves from the Vedāntins that Śrīdhara responds to (NK(J) 1982: 192-5) with arguments from forensic or ethical accountability and the diversity of psychophysical characteristics and situations of embodied selves - which are not considered here at any length. Nevertheless, objections from parsimony, or against undue ontological ‘weight’ (gurutva), raise the possibility of a singular potentially normative and Intentional dimension rather than an infinite number of these - much in the way that space and time are posited in this framework: a dimension that is individually accessible to each sensory-bodily complex through its assigned executive instrument, manas. A view which is closer to that of Advaita Vedānta.

It is possible that problems of personal identity and mental unity might be avoided in such a conception, if the informational-executive particle, manas, associated with each body invoked and integrated a network of psychological characteristics in self, correlate with the physical characteristics of each body. It appears plausible on such a view, that the irreducible features of mental states, subjectivity, Intentionality and intentional structures, posited by Praśastapāda could be maintained by a single dimensional continuum: a singular, non-physical locus capable of manifesting different sets of psychophysical relations appropriate to each body via the manas allocated to each.

Dimensional Features of Mental and Physical Properties

Praśastapāda argues that mental and physical properties exhibit radically different spatial and temporal features, which means that they occur under very different conditions of possibility in distinct types of substances. Mental states are not properties of the body because of their localized occurrence (pradeśavṛttivāda) in the body (PDS 1994: § 79). Śrīdhara elucidates this argument as follows:
'Pleasure and pain occur at a [particular] place [in the body], as for example, [when I say], ‘There is a pain in my head’, or ‘My feet feel comfortable,’ and for this reason, [they] are not properties of the body or the sense-faculties, because they lack the characteristic property (viśeṣa guṇa) of [physical objects, namely] being coextensive (vyāpyavṛtti) with their substratum … [for example,] the characteristic properties of the body and the sense-faculties such as colour are coextensive [with their substratum]’ (NK 1984: 85, 1-5).

The gist of the argument is that the way in which mental states are spatially located is quite different from the way in which physical phenomena are, by their very nature. Mental states have phenomenal or propositional content, in a perception, for instance, or in the cognition of a desire or pleasure-state or a memory which appear as objects of cognition. Similarly, a burn on my finger is felt as a sensation of pain in the affected part of my finger rather than in my entire body, because its phenomenal content, ‘pain’, arises in the region of my body that is burnt. The distinctive spatial feature of a mental property such as pain is that the experience of pain is felt in the body at a particular bodily location as the content of cognition. I become aware of a burning pain in my finger when it is burnt as a phenomenal content that arises in the right index finger that suffers the burn. But the burn itself is a red patch of skin on my finger that has colour, texture and other properties just as the rest of my body does. Qua colour and texture the burn is coextensive with the colour and texture of the rest of my body, differentiated only by its particular colouring and texture. But the pain I experience is a felt local content that is contingent on where the burn arises, and it is not coextensive with, and does not occupy the space of my body's surface in the same way that the burnt patch of skin does qua colour. So, the felt-experience of pain in a particular spatial location does not share the spatial properties of the burn qua physical property. The first is a felt, spatially local content of experience; the second is merely a feature of the material properties of the skin that are coextensive with the entire bodily surface: its colour, texture and so on. In other words, the spatial features of pain are phenomenally and subjectively presented as local Intentional contents, whereas the spatial features of burnt skin are externally and objectively presented as part of the full spatial extension of the physical body (see Ganeri 2012: 239-40).

Praśastapāda further contends that material and mental properties have distinct conditions of temporal occurrence. Material properties only cease to exist when their substratum is destroyed. So an apple will have colour and taste as long as it exists. But mental properties are episodic occurrences that arise and cease even though their
substratum persists. The temporal conditions of existence of mental properties are clearly different from those of physical properties. But this runs into problems because there are physical properties, in this framework itself, that arise and cease even while their substratum continues to exist, such as sound which is an episodic phenomenon that subsides even while its substratum continues to exist (NK 1984: 85, 7-9).

The central intuition behind this thesis, despite its problems, appears to be that the conditions of exemplification of a mental property are independent of the conditions of existence of its substratum; in fact, the existence of mental properties is ultimately determined by the scope of agential control over mental contents – as we see in chapter five – and not the dimensional features of its substratum. Mental properties are not existentially dependent on the temporal and spatial conditions of occurrence of their locus in the way that physical properties are. The exemplification of physical properties is determined by the temporal and spatial features of the object they are embedded in, because the existence of this physical object and so its properties is determined by the spatio-temporal structures of causation involved in its genesis. But mental properties are not existentially dependent in the same way on temporal and spatial parameters. Therefore, mental properties cannot have the body, or for that matter any physical object as their substratum. The above argument is re-presented in the Corpse Argument below.

2.7. The Corpse Argument

The close connection between self and life, and the derivation of the terms self (ātman) from breath (ātman) (see Olivelle 1996), and the later derivation of the term soul (jīva) from life or living being (jīva), in both Hindu and Jaina literature (see Bhatt 1989) is well known. Self holds the vital essence of human life. In this section, I consider some aspects of the vitalistic arguments for the existence of a self, which are detailed in § 5.1. I first set out Praśastapāda’s arguments against the identity of self and body from the dualism of mental and physical properties sketched above, and from his theory of vital personalism, and note the sorts of objections these arguments are susceptible to.

The impossibility of consciousness in a corpse, a dead body, claims Praśastapāda, means that the body cannot be the locus of consciousness; it cannot be a self:
‘Consciousness is not [a property] of the body … because of the impossibility of its occurrence in a dead body’ (*PDS* 1994: § 77).

The body *qua* body cannot account for consciousness, because the dead body, which is nevertheless a body insofar as it is physically continuous with the living body, does not hold the possibility of consciousness. The idea is that at t1, the moment just prior to my death, I am an embodied self, ‘*x*’, where my body B1 is constituted of an arrangement of physical atoms P1. At t2, the moment just after death, there is a body B2 that is broadly constituted of the same set and arrangement of physical atoms P1, if it is not severely injured or destroyed and has not disintegrated. The physical arrangement and constitution of the body between t1 and t2 differ only in the absence of life in the corpse, for which reason the corpse is still recognisably organised and identifiable as ‘my body’: the body of the embodied self ‘*x*’ which was alive at t1. But, the dead body cannot be identified as my self because it lacks the possibility of consciousness and so of ‘I’ or selfhood. However, the existence of the corpse marks the continued existence of the body *qua* a dead body. So, if the body were identical to the self, then since the body continues to exist as a dead body, consciousness *qua* conscious selfhood, ‘I’, would also continue to exist, potentially at least, in the corpse. But it does not. Therefore, the body cannot be identical to the self (see Ganeri 2012: 241-2).

This discrepancy stems from the different identity conditions of selves and bodies. As Śrīdhara and Udayana explain (*NK* 1984: 72, 11-3; *Kī* 1971: 84, 13-6), were consciousness a property of the body, that is, were self identical to the body, it would continue to exist as long as the body does in the way that the characteristic properties of the body such as colour do: the occurrence and persistence of consciousness would correspond to the identity conditions of the body which are defined by its characteristic (*viśeṣa*) properties being *essential* properties. But consciousness is not an essential property of the body; therefore, the locus of consciousness, the self, cannot be identical to the body. The argument is simply another version of the argument discussed above: the occurrence of consciousness and other mental states is not determined by the persistence conditions of the substance in which they instantiate. Their occurrence is not determined in the way the occurrence of bodily properties *qua* physical properties is necessarily determined by the spatio-temporal structures of their substratum. For this reason, the locus of consciousness cannot be the body.
One objection to this thesis might be that it is circular: it presupposes that consciousness cannot be a physical property because physical properties are necessarily essential properties; that is, properties that last as long as their substratum, so that their existence ceases only with the destruction of that substratum - the body in this case. To exclude the body as a possible locus of consciousness from the nature of its episodic association with consciousness is based on an *a priori* assumption about the nature of mental and physical properties. This may not stand up to a notion of consciousness as an emergent property, or a panpsychist view in which consciousness might be a latent property of the body’s physical constituents, which requires certain additional necessary causal factors to manifest – factors that are missing in the context of a corpse (see Ganeri 2012: 70-83).

There is a further objection, however. If consciousness, the property which is to be proven to exist (*sādhya*) in the body were present, but its substratum cause, the body which is the subject (*paksā*) of this inference were absent, this would be proof against the thesis that the body is the substratum of consciousness. In Praśastapāda’s argument, however, the body, which is the subject of the inference is present but the property that is held to qualify it (*sādhya*), namely consciousness, is absent. The argument is not definitive in this case (Patil 2009). It is arguable, for instance, that the absence of consciousness owes simply to the absence of a necessary but insufficient causal factor, since causation in Vaiśeṣika takes the form of INUS causation: a number of necessary factors are required to be present, none of which is sufficient in itself (Patil 2009; Rasmussen 2004: IV, 4) – as a panpsychist view might contend.

*Objections from Animalism*

The corpse argument is also susceptible to objections from animalists who might claim that consciousness is a property of the living body or organism. Animalists argue that consciousness ceases with the going out of existence of the animal or living organism. The corpse itself, they assert, is an entirely different entity from the living body or animal; it is not a dead body or a dead animal but merely the remains of the organism, a residue that does not constitute an individual thing but is a mere collection of a plurality of things (see Olson 2004). For this reason, the corpse cannot be said to have existed in the living organism as its material structure. The absence of consciousness in the corpse does not, therefore, serve to show that consciousness is not a property of the living
body, because the corpse is not a continuation of the animal as a dead animal or a dead body - as Praśastapāda’s argument presupposes.

The corpse is not a continuation of the living body or the living animal as a dead body or a dead animal, Olson (2004: 271) argues, because the nature of the living body is quite different from that of a corpse. The former maintains a dynamic identity of matter over time by constantly engaging in activity, like the water that continuously flows through a fountain; the latter demonstrates merely a static stability of its constituent materials. The persistence of an organism consists in the dynamic stability of form and the maintenance of formal organization over time: repairing damage and maintaining bodily integrity, fighting infection, etc. It consists, in other words, in the persistence of life. The identity of a corpse over time, however, lies in the ‘intrinsic stability of its materials’; its persistence is not linked to the self-organizing activities required of living. Given the dramatic difference between the persistence conditions of an animal and a corpse, a corpse cannot be an animal, that is, it cannot be a dead animal.

On the animalist view, I am identical to a living organism, ‘x’ at time t1. This living organism, ‘x’ will cease to exist at time t2, when a corpse, ‘y’ will come into existence. At this point t2, the possibility of life and therefore of consciousness will cease because, in Vaiśeṣika terminology, its substratum the living organism will cease to exist. The problem with this view is the implausibility of the assumption that there is no individual where once there was a living body. Baker (2000: 120, 207-8), for example, does not believe that the organism or animal disappears at death: it merely becomes a dead animal. The objection from Baker (2000) and others (Shoemaker 1999) is the implausibility of the possibility that a new material object suddenly comes into existence at t2, at death, which did not exist prior to it at t1. To take account of this objection, we may say that the material structure that makes up my corpse is in fact coincident with my body when I am alive, and does not suddenly come into existence as a corpse. The animal’s body qua material structure then coincides with the animal when it is alive, and continues to persist when it dies as a dead body. But this raises the problem that when the organism is alive there is a thinking body where there is a thinking human animal: there are then two numerically different thinking things spatially coincident in the same place instead of one, which raises the problem of too many cognizers. If, on the other hand, it is held that the corpse is merely a dead animal and for this reason lacks the possibility of consciousness, of ‘I’, animalism is
undermined because then it must be admitted that the animal is not simply that which persists essentially only as long as its ability to organise the biological functions of the body that render it alive is not undermined (see Olson 1997:135; Baker 2000: 206-7).

Praśastapāda would agree with Olson that the living body is quite a different sort of a thing from a corpse; and that the persistence conditions of the living body are quite different from the persistence conditions of a corpse. However, his counter-argument to the above views would be that the material object, which on my death is my corpse is, while I am embodied, constitutive of my living body but not identical with it, because the life of the body is a relational and intentional property of the body; that is, it is a property of bodily matter for a conscious being, a self (see § 5.1). The argument for a non-bodily self from this sort of vital personalism then runs as follows: the life of the body is a necessary condition of possibility of consciousness; but this requires the right sort of causal association between a self and a body via the executive faculty, manas, because life is a relational and intentional property of bodily matter in relation to a self who it is for. It is this causal association between self and body of which the instrumental cause is the dharma and adharma of the self, which instigates life in bodily matter via establishing the right sort of causal connection between the executive faculty and the body. Once, this causal connection is severed, at death, it is impossible for the body qua body or matter to be alive, and to be the material basis of conscious selfhood.

The persistence conditions of the living body qua living are determined, on this account, by the causal association of its physical structure with a self, and not by the persistence conditions of the body as a physical structure. With the severance of causal association with a self which is necessary for bodily life, the body is dissociated from the instrumental or efficient cause of life. But the persistence conditions of the body as a physical structure remain unscathed, as long as the bodily structure of the corpse remains reasonably intact. It is on account of the body’s causal association with a self, or not, that the persistence conditions of the living organism and the corpse are distinct, and why consciousness is absent in a corpse. This avoids the problem of too many cognizers that animalism incurs, as well as the psychological continuity perspective, on an animalist critique (see Olson 2004). It also avoids the implausibility of a sudden material object appearing where there was once a living body that animalism must contend with according to its critics.
2.8. The Architecture of Mental Causation

The conception of dualism postulated by Praśastapāda, we have seen above, is in many ways ‘minimal’, if we contrast it with Cartesian notions but also with other Indian dualisms as discussed above (§ 1.2). It is important to note its precise ontological and causal structures.

The Embodied Self

Selves, in Praśastapāda’s account, are non-physical substances that are distinct from bodies and other physical objects. Human beings are embodied selves, who are essentially constituted of a non-physical substance as well as bodily matter. The metaphysical infrastructure of the self is the condition of possibility for the existence of mental and moral states and structures. But mental states are in turn essentially causally dependent on physical loci for their instantiation: manas and the body. Even the meta-ethical states of the self are only found in its embodied state and those post-mortem states in which it still has a ‘subtle’ or ‘transportive’ physical body ( ativāhika śarīra) (PDS 1994: §§ 358-9; see Kumar 2013: 102). Mental states thus have an irreducible physical infrastructure on which they are ontologically and essentially causally dependent.

Conscious, Unconscious and Subconscious Mind

Self is not the same thing as ‘mind’ in Vaiśeṣika in contrast to contemporary conceptions (Barresi 2011). A self is potentially - but not essentially - a bearer of mental properties. It is the locus of conscious Intentional states, cognition (jñāna) or consciousness (caitanya), and of unconscious affective and volitional states, and mnemonic traces, namely, pleasure (sukha) and pain (duḥkha), desire (icchā) and aversion (dveṣa), will (prayatna), and cognitive imprints (saṃskāra). I dub these states unconscious because they are states that may become objects of cognition: they may become conscious. Note that conscious and unconscious mental states are events or episodes (see Matilal 1986: 112-3). Self is also a bearer of sub-conscious states, the meta-ethical states of virtue and non-virtue (dharma, adharma). These are dispositional states or structures of some sort (PDS 1994: § 77, § 80) that are not cognitively
accessible - except to exceptional individuals (*yogin*). For this reason, these may be considered sub-conscious states.

‘Mind’, if we define this as the totality of mental states, structures and functions, as well as moral states and structures, thus has several strata here: a conscious, unconscious and a subconscious aspect. The meta-ethical states of virtue and non-virtue may be considered an aspect of the mind insofar as they act through will (*prayatna*) in enabling the sub-personal processes that underpin mental life.

*Non-Conscious Mind (manas)*

But to these conscious, unconscious and sub-personal mental and moral structures that reside in the non-physical self must be added the non-conscious, physical ‘mind’ or *manas*. *Manas* serves the functions of a non-conscious ‘mind’ (see Ganeri 2012, 263-4) and is usually translated as ‘mind’. It is a substance whose existence, however, must be inferentially proven as a necessary ‘inner’ instrument (*antaḥkaraṇa*) that is required as the faculty of attention (*dhyana*), which is essential for perceptual focus and mental coherence (see § 3.7), and as the faculty of introspection, which is required for experiencing internal emotions such as pleasure and pain (see Chakrabarti 2011).

As an ontological connector (see Chakrabarti. 2011) between self and body, *manas* enables the host of causal functions and processes that underpin mental and bodily life. As an inner-sense or inner instrument of the self, it performs essential executive functions for the self as a subpersonal processor that acts as a causal conduit between self and its conscious, unconscious and subconscious mental and moral states, and between self, its mental states and its body. It is the bearer of willful motion, which is produced either by the powers of *dharma* and *adharma* in the subpersonal processes that underpin mental and bodily life, or by desire in the case of mental and physical actions (*PDS* 1994: § 81). *Manas*, in other words, is responsible for the mental, neural and physiological organization of the human organism, a sort of ‘control module’ that enables subpersonal processing and signaling between self and its senses, and co-ordination and integration of mental processes and functions, bodily behaviour and the biological life of the human organism. It acts as the physical anchor and integrator of the network of mental states themselves, and of bodily life and behaviour in mental-mental and in mental-physical causation.
Body

The body (šarīra) is a material substance. Here, the term šarīra signifies the vital and organic structures of the body, rather than simply the matter it consists of. It is a bearer of material properties such as colour (rūpa), odour (gandha) and heat (tejas), sound (śabda), gravity (gurutva), atomicity (anutva), velocity or momentum (saṃskāra) and so on. The body serves as the necessary locus (āśraya) of action (PDS 1994: § 78) and the necessary causal support (ādāra) of consciousness and mental life (see § 5.2). There is a sharp distinction, as we have seen above, between self as something that is potentially conscious, and the body (šarīra) as something which is essentially non-conscious (jada or acit). Yet the causal role of the living body (šarīra) in the acquisition of knowledge is considered essential: it is considered the ādāra, the causal base or receptacle within the confines of which, and through which consciousness is experienced in the self.

The conception of the body (šarīra) is of an irreducible whole (antyāvayāvi) that is the place or location within whose structures, and by which, a self can experience pain and pleasure in accordance with the moral quality of its past actions (Ki 1971: 37, 16-7). It is therefore called bhogāyatana, the place for experiencing the karmic results of actions. Cognition, affections and emotions, and will, are delimited by the body in the infinitely spacious and permanent self (PDS 1994: § 31, § 79; Shukla 2009; Kumar 2013: 86; Ganeri 2012: 231-3). Conscious experience of pleasure and pain, desire and aversion or volition arise and are experienced at various locations in the bodily complex but in the self: ‘…their occurrence is localized [in a region of the self enclosed in the body]…’ (PDS 1994: § 79).30

The body is the causal support of all experiences, whereas the senses, including manas, are the means or instruments of such experiences as we see in the next chapter. The senses are located in the body, their bearer, as perceptual instruments that can be operated by self qua agent - via manas, self’s executive and cognitive instrument. This agent-instrument structure of mental causation is foundational for Praśastapāda’s four

30 This interpretation owes to Shukla (2009).
arguments for an agential self discussed in the following chapters. This causal architecture of self, manas and body, together with the objects of the world, posits what we might consider, metaphorically, an ontological ‘grammar’ of the world. For, as ontological elements of the world, self, manas, the body and physical objects are positioned to explicate a syntactically coherent agent-instrument, or means-end, causal structure of action that underwrites Praśastapāda’s arguments for a self in the semantic conception of realism he invokes.

Minimal Dualism

What enables causal interaction between self, manas and the body is that although mental and physical substances are considered metaphysically distinct, they nevertheless share certain common physical and metaphysical properties (PDS 1994: § 90) that make them causally commensurable: the generic ontological features of substance, spatiality (dik) and temporality (kāla), ontological distinction (prthaktva), countability (saṃkhya), causal connection (saṃyoga) and dissociation (vibhāga). Note the latter two properties appear to derive, rather controversially, from the observation of physical causation, which is otherwise refuted in the case of mental phenomena.

What this metaphysics proposes is an ontological gradation of substances that are causally structured in a way that yields an ameliorated dualism of substances for which mental-physical causation is not considered an issue. As Matilal states, in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

‘the “mental” and the “physical” may not constitute … two strange categories so very different from each other that causal explanation would be relevant to the latter and not the former’ (Matilal 1986: 128).

‘The idea that mental and physical events are basically and irreducibly different is somewhat foreign to the Indian … In Nyāya and Buddhism such talk of ‘interaction’ [between mental and physical phenomena] must be regarded as a reference to simple causation among similar sorts of items’ (ibid.: 129).

This ‘differential order’ of substances and its causal architecture stands in contrast to the sort of dualism that has its origins in Descartes’ Meditations – and as we saw above to most other Indian dualisms (§ 1.2). Descartes proposed that there are two kinds of substance, soul, which has the essential property that it thinks, and matter which has the
essential property of spatial extension. Praśastapāda shares with Descartes the notion of a dualism of mental and physical substances, and also the notion that the characteristic property of a mental substance is consciousness. But contrary to the Cartesian model, he maintains an essential metaphysical dependence of the mental on the physical and retains core features of physicality in the mental realm. Most significantly, he postulates that consciousness is essentially causally dependent on the body, that is, on embodiment. In other words, the mental life of selves is essentially dependent on their having a physical body and senses, and possessing the inner instrument, manas. Secondly, consciousness is not an essential property of self, that is, self is characteristically but not essentially a subject and an agent. It is only contingently and not essentially a thinking thing unlike the Cartesian soul, because the liberated, bodiless self is devoid of mental properties (PDS 1994: § 319). Thirdly, self is non-physical but, nonetheless, it has the property of spatiality (dik) (see also, Lowe 2008; Zimmerman 2007: 24). The bodiless existence of self does bear resemblance to the disembodied Cartesian soul, but with the distinction that while the latter continues to be a thinking thing, Praśastapāda’s bodiless self is necessarily insentient. Further, as Ganeri (2012: 34) points out, unlike Cartesianism, in classical Vaiśeṣika the ‘mind is not transparent to itself; there are both affective and cognitive processes below the level of consciousness’.

Problems of Mental-Physical Interaction

Self qua agent has a body that it is causally directly associated with and that it has direct causal control over. Thus, if I wish to raise my hand, I can do so by the desire and will to do so – at least under normal circumstances. In turn, the senses and the body have an influence on my mental life – a pin prick on my thumb gives rise to a sensation of pain. But this sort of dualist causation raises the problem, how can non-physical and physical substances, self and body, interact with each other?

The definitive argument against Cartesian interactionism is that it is difficult to see how substances that have radically diverse properties, such as a non-spatial thinking substance and a spatial, unthinking substance, could interact (see Kim 2005: 70-92). But, in fact, any model of dualist interactionism that posits two radically diverse substances, such as a non-physical self and a physical body, calls for an explanation of how it is that two such utterly diverse substances could causally influence each other.
On the one hand, we see that diverse kinds of substances do interact. Sound and solid material objects, electromagnetic radiation and sea currents, despite having seemingly very different properties and features appear able to engage in causal interaction. Similarly, the movement of particles, which are quite different sorts of things from fields such as gravity or electromagnetism, is nevertheless influenced by these fields. In turn, these fields are affected by the presence of particles in their midst (see Robinson 2003). The assumption that only substances of the same kind may engage in causal interaction is not plausible. However, it is arguable that these seemingly diverse substances are able to interact because they are nevertheless physical things. As such, they have common dimensional structures of spatiality and temporality, which enables causal interaction between them, something that is not possible between the non-spatial Cartesian soul and its spatially extended body. In other words, these substances are able to interact in virtue of certain essential dimensional properties they share which render them able to interact causally; the lack of which would arguably leave these substances unable to interact causally, as in the case of the Cartesian soul whose lack of spatial properties render it unable to interact causally with its body or with other souls (see Kim 2005: 78-85).

But the assignment of common dimensional properties to mental and physical substances in Praśastapāda appears to mitigate this problem. The question is whether it solves it. For there remains a question of what sort of a causal nexus might be formed between a mental substance, a dimensionally limitless self, and its body and between such selves themselves. We can hardly refer, in the case of mental-physical causation between a dimensionally limitless substance and a physical body, to a physical model of causation: the impact model of cause and effect between two billiard balls say. The nature of mental-physical causation in this case is clarified by the role of manas, the executive faculty of self as discussed above (see also, § 3.7, § 4.6).

Manas, we have seen above, appears as an ‘inner instrument’ (antāhkarāṇa), an information-processing unit that mediates between the ‘inner’ spatio-temporal dimensionality of self, its states and structures, and the ‘exterior’ spatio-temporal dimensionality of the body and the world. As we see in chapters four and five, it serves as a dynamic processor that functionally integrates the Intentional contents of self’s conscious states with the unconscious intentional or telic structures of its affective and volitional states, and the latter with bodily processes. It mediates the transition from
Intentional conscious contents, to intentional or telic structures of mentality in the self, and from these to the non-conscious intentional or telic structures of the body. The nature of this transitional process is not, however, sufficiently theorized to give us an idea of how precisely it might occur. It appears, however, that manas may be able to mediate between self and body because of its nature as an information-processing character: a transmitter of information, whether agential directives from the self to its body and senses, or sensory and kinaesthetic data from the senses and body to the self. But as a dynamic processor, it is a substance that appears to be intrinsically a bearer of dynamic intentionality, qua willed movement, that arguably makes mental-physical causation intelligible.

Such a theory of self-body interaction appears to avoid the objections levied at Cartesian dualism from the ‘pairing problem’: the impossibility of causal interaction or causal ‘pairing’ of non-physical, non-spatial substances with physical, spatial substances. Since the lack of spatial extension and spatial coordinates of non-physical Cartesian souls bars any possibility of causal interaction with physical bodies based in the ‘pairing’ of spatial coordinates (Sosa 1984: 275, Kim 2005: 78-85). It also overcomes the problem of self-self interaction, because in Praśastapāda’s account, selves interact with each other only as embodied selves. Selves interact with their bodies via manas and through their bodies with the world of objects, including other embodied selves.

Essentially, it is by establishing a common spatio-temporal or dimensional fabric and the possibility of causal nexus (conjunction and disjunction) as the very essence of what it means to be a substance, with a finely tuned causal architecture of mental and physical substances, that Praśastapāda ensures the possibility of causal connections across substances, non-physical and physical, incorporating selves, manas and matter.
Chapter 3

An Activist Model of Perceiving

3.0. Introduction

At the heart of Praśastapāda’s arguments for an agential self is a dynamic conception of consciousness which has as its basis an agent-instrument conception of the structure of cognitive action. Cognizing (jñāna, buddhi), runs the argument, is an act (kriyā) that requires the use of cognitive instruments (karaṇas). As we see in the next chapter, this is a prelude to a further claim: the use of cognitive instruments requires an agential self, because instruments require an agent to operate them. I will argue, however, that Praśastapāda postulates what I term ‘a dual-mode view of perceiving’, the view that the agential character of perceivings takes two forms, namely, attentional receptivity and goal-oriented striving that are, in Crowther’s terminology (2009), atelic and telic, respectively.

I first set out the analytical methodology in which Praśastapāda’s arguments are based: the definition of selfhood and the epistemic procedures by which such a thing as a self may be proven to exist. I then move on to Praśastapāda’s first argument: perceiving is an act analogous to actions such as cutting (chedana) wood; as such, it requires the use of cognitive instruments as the means of attending to an object just as cutting wood requires the use of an axe. Perceiving is an act of attention (dhyāna), for epistemic receptivity requires the exercise of mental control or will (prayatna) over the instruments of cognition to maintain the causal connections that sensory attention to an object, which is required for perception, involves (PDS 1994: § 76). Will is directly exercised over the executive faculty, manas, the ‘inner instrument’ (antahkaraṇa) of attention (dhyāna) and introspection of a self to allow guidance of its attentional and executive functions. In turn, the manas controls the functioning of the sense-faculties (indriya), the instruments (karaṇa) of sense-perception, by directing them towards desired objects of perception.

In contrast to this conception of perceiving as attending to an object, or an attentional act, is the concept of perceptual action as striving (ceṣṭā) to attend, a conception of perceiving as an intentional, or goal-oriented act (PDS 1994: § 78). I refer to the first thesis from perceiving as attending as the Perceptual Attention Argument, and to the second argument from perceiving as intending as the Perceptual
Striving Argument. As we see in chapter four, the first argument is the basis of establishing an agential subject of cognition; that is, a subject who is the locus of perceptually attending to an object by acts of willing that sustain perceptual attention and focus. The agential subject is the agent of perceptual focus on an object; it is an epistemically receptive agent. The second argument seeks to establish a perceptual agent who is the locus of goal-oriented willings or perceptual intendings. The perceptual agent strives to attend to an object. In other words, Praśastapāda’s thesis is that in both ‘looking at’ and ‘looking for’, the senses are instruments whose employment requires a self.

The interplay between these two distinct structures of perceptual action is crucial for the achievement of the epistemic virtues, in particular, self-knowledge that the ethical aims of this system demand. For it is the re-direction of attention so that one strives to attend to virtuous objects, in particular, one’s own self that enables the development of virtuous values, intentions and dispositions which are conducive to the generation of the sort of attentional control that self-knowledge demands. It is by the development of self-attention (dhyāna), the intense attentive location in one’s own self that self-knowledge which is the goal of virtue is achieved (as I discuss in chapter five).

The conception of the perceptual system as an instrument is crucial to the cogency of the above theses: the dual-mode of perceiving and the interplay between these modes. Of particular importance is the instrumental structure of attention and its relation to will in perceptual action. Following a discussion of these perceptual structures, I turn to the implications of, and possible objections to, this instrumental - or ‘technological’ - conception of the perceptual system and the conception of perceptual action as instrumental action. Finally, I look at how the instrumental model of perception, and the conception of will it presupposes, justify the controversial claim that all perceivings are acts by way of the notion of ‘primitive attention’.

3.1. The Definition of Self

Praśastapāda’s inquiry into the nature and existence of self opens with methodological preliminaries. According to the Vaiśeṣika method of differential analysis, we require a definition (lakṣaṇa) of self to establish that such a thing (vastu) exists, for we cannot establish the existence of something if we have no notion what sort of a thing it might
be. A second requirement for establishing the existence of something is the availability of an authoritative epistemic method (pramāṇa), which in the classical Vaiśeṣika view are perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna).

The definition of an object ‘x’ refers here to the universal (sāmānyya) that identifies ‘x’ as a member of a particular class (jāti) ‘y’ of such objects, and it is by a characteristic feature(s) of this class ‘y’ that the object ‘x’ is identified as a member of this class. So, an object ‘t’ is distinguished as belonging to the class of tables, for example, by being a material object that has the necessary distinguishing features that characterize a table as a table: having a flat material surface that stands on one or more legs. This is the defining feature of ‘tablehood’, the universal which is present in all members of the class, ‘table’. Similarly, a substance is characterized as a self by its connection (samyoga) with the generality or universal (sāmānya), selfhood (āmatva):

“It is in virtue of its connection (samyoga) with [the universal] selfhood that [a substance] is a self” (PDS 1994: § 76).

It is through its connection with selfhood that a self is differentiated (bhidyate) by the similarities (sadharmya) and dissimilarities (vaidharmya) of its features as an object that is a member of the class (jāti) of selves, and distinguishable from members of other classes of substances (NK 1984: 70, 20-1; Ki 1971: 85, 1-2). The question remains, however, what are the distinguishing features of selfhood; what is the specific property-universal that is present in all selves, and distinguishes selves from other things? Praśastapāda, Jagadīśa asserts, holds that:

‘Selfhood is a universal, which distinguishes [a substance] as being the substratum of cognition, by [its] inheritance [in that substratum]’ (Śū 1983: 361).

The defining trait (lakṣaṇa) of self in this view is cognition-hood (jñānatva): self is the substratum in which cognition resides. It is the substance on which cognition is existentially dependent, but not vice-versa. Note, however, that Praśastapāda himself refers only to the association or connection (samyoga) of self with the universal selfhood, whereas it is usually asserted, as Jagadīśa does, that the universal selfhood inheres (samavāya) in self.

Udayana points to a problem with this definition of self:
‘The nature of selfhood is not established [by this definition] because other selves are not cognized. [Self] is not established as a distinct entity, because a specific universal [selfhood] is not established [by perception] … [Because of the absence of a universal that is perceivable in all selves, Praśastapāda] speaks of its (self’s) subtlety and unperceivability’ (Ki 1971: 85, 10-1).

Udayana suggests that the nature (svaṁpa) of self is not established (asiddha) by a perceivable feature or property which identifies both one’s own self and other selves (parātman) as selves. Cognition, which is held to be the specific quality that characterizes a self, cannot be said to have a universal, because we have access to our own cognitions but not the cognitions of others. In the absence of a property-universal that is perceivable in all selves, we cannot establish what selfhood as the universal that distinguishes a substance as a self, is (Ki 1971: 85, 10-1).

In the absence of a characteristic property that is perceivable in all selves, one’s own self and other selves, which identifies these as selves, we cannot establish a non-controversial definition of self. We cannot establish selves in the way we might establish the existence of something by a characteristic property that is perceptually evident in all members of the class of objects to which it belongs: bodies of water, for example, may be identified by their characteristic property of liquidity, and apples by perceivable characteristics such as their redness, roundness and sweetness. Udayana acknowledges the physicalist objection here, namely, that selfhood cannot be established as a universal on the basis of its introspective presentation (Ki 1971: 85, 10-1).

The physicalist Cārvāka raise the objection that if there is such a thing as a self then it must be an empirically detectable object, such as the body, with which our notions of self and selfhood are invariably associated in some way. This debate, Udayana tells us (Ki 1971: 85, 10-2), is the point of departure for Praśastapāda’s arguments in PDS § 76, for it is because of the rejection by Indian physicalists of an introspective argument for the existence of self that Praśatapāda offers an inferential argument for its existence, the argument from the agential constitution of cognition that I discuss in this and the next chapter. I turn to the debate regarding the epistemic presentation of self next.
The Dual Presentation of Self

Self is a ‘subtle’ (sākṣma) substance, Praśastapāda claims, and consequently, unperceivable (apratyakṣa) by the sense-faculties: ‘On account of its subtlety, it is unperceivable…’ (PDS 1994: § 76). The question of perceivability is a question of the epistemic presentation of self. At issue is what features are to be judged characteristic of self: the objective, perceivable features of bodily existence which appear to be a necessary condition of self-reference, whether we refer to them directly or merely presuppose them when we speak about ourselves; or mental features such as consciousness and will, the arguably ‘subtle’ properties that are less readily ascribable to the body, as opposed to characteristic physical properties such as weight (gurutva) or colour (rūpa). Clearly, how we characterize self and selfhood influences the claims we can make about it, such as whether it is bodily or non-physical, as well as how we may attempt to prove those claims.

Śrīdhara explains that the application of the epithet ‘subtle’ to self is a reference to the ‘unperceivability’ of one’s own self to others (NK 1984: 71, 1-4), that is, its lack of perceivability by the senses. But the fact that self is not perceivable by the senses does not mean that self is not cognized introspectively. For it is the case that one’s own self is introspectively available to each person by means of the executive faculty (manas) (NK 1984: 71, 12-4). Jagadīśa (Śū 1983: 361) concurs that the notion of self’s subtlety refers merely to its unperceivability by the sense-faculties: an unperceivable self is a subtle object in comparison with perceivable objects such as our bodies or other macroscopic objects that are perceivable by ourselves and others. But again, the unperceivability of one’s self by others does not preclude the introspective cognition of one’s own self:

‘Subtlety means lack of perceivability by the external sense-faculties,’ but, ‘it (self) is an object of introspective cognition’ (Śū 1983: 361).

The Cārvāka objection is that if we admit such a thing as a self, surely it is the bodily features with which a self appears inextricably associated that must characterize the self. Self, if it exists, must have a bodily nature. The notion of self or ‘I’, they suggest, is invariably associated with the body or a bodily feature as its essential condition, that is, embodiment is an essential condition of self-reference, whether or not the body is directly alluded to. Udayana reconstructs the Carvāka argument as follows:
‘Body, etc. are not different from self. It is evident that we do not apprehend a self apart from the body, etc., because we say, ‘I am fat’, ‘I am fair’, ‘I am a brahmin’, ‘I am a man’, ‘I am my father’s son’, ‘I am my son’s father’ … The basis of all such qualities, actions, universals, particulars, caste, etc., [that we ascribe to ourselves] is sensory perception, for instance vision. Since only a bodily self is perceptually identifiable, we must accept the body is the self” (Ki 1971: 85, 3-6).

The argument above is that the variety of uses of ‘I’ in ordinary forms of self-reference, such as ‘I am a man’ or ‘I am fat’, or even ‘I am a brahmin’, presuppose as a necessary condition of their possibility a body that is used to identify ‘I’ as having that particular nature. I cannot, for example, identify myself as a woman or a mother without reference to my female body and, in the latter case, its causal history of giving birth to a child. It is arguable, however, that to be a necessary condition for the occurrence of something is not tantamount to being a sufficient condition for its occurrence. Thus, Śrīdhara argued effectively in the last chapter that the identification of objective presentations of ‘I’ presupposes its subjective presentation: were the self the body, it would not be possible to identify this body as my body precisely because the introspective presentation of self is a necessary pre-condition of its objective identification qua body, or of any objective identification that refers to the body. In other words, the presentation of self as subject, that is, its introspective presentation is necessary for it to be outwardly identifiable.

Moreover, to identify the body with self because the former is a necessary causal factor in its occurrence is to conflate causation with constitution, or in this view, to conflate efficient cause (nimitta-kārana) and substratum cause (samavāyi-kārana), or existential dependence. For, while the body is admittedly a necessary causal factor for the occurrence of consciousness and self-reference, this does not establish that it is the substratum cause of conscious selfhood: that on which I-cognition is existentially dependent. For the causal involvement of a factor ‘a’ in the occurrence of a phenomenon ‘b’ is not proof of the constitutive or existential involvement of ‘a’ in the occurrence of ‘b’: it does not determine the type of causal factor ‘a’ is in the occurrence of ‘b’ – a substratum, non-substratum or efficient cause on the classical Vaiśeṣika model of causation.

But the Cārvāka voice a further objection, Udayana suggests. We cannot ascribe the above characterizations of selfhood to a non-bodily self, they claim, because such a self is held to be omni-located (vibhu), eternal (ananta) and unchanging (acalam); and
we cannot say about such an entity that it is smaller than or bigger than something, that it arises from anything. Such an eternal, pervasive and unchanging entity is independent of space, time, causality and, indeed, all substances. We cannot say of a non-bodily self that it is the father or son of anyone as we are apt to say about ourselves because it lacks determinate dimensional features, and so cannot increase or decrease, or be causally related to anyone. Yet I know from say visual perception, that I am fair or small, fat or thin, etc. No one experiences, even in sleep, a self that is ‘formless, pervasive, motionless, unprecedented, unsurpassed, etc.’. A non-bodily substance cannot, therefore, be established as the self (Ki 1971: 85, 6-7).

A non-bodily self, unperceivable by the senses, accessible only to introspective experience, is held to be unintelligible by the Cārvāka. They deny, like Hume, that such a self is cognized or experienced at all, introspectively, especially a self that has the amorphous features of the classical Vaiśeṣika self: permanence, boundlessness and so on. But also, it is incoherent to attribute selfhood to a non-physical self which is held to be dimensionally limitless, permanent and unchanging, independent of concrete spatio-temporal features and causation, because these objective parameters are a necessary condition of the very nature of selfhood. This non-objective self that is not available to sense perception and is immune to causal involvement cannot possibly be what we refer to when we say ‘I’. For, it does not sustain the dimensional structures and the causal relationships that are essential for the identifications and designations that human interactions involve, such as being a father or a son of someone, or being fat or thin: a self that is devoid of the concrete spatio-temporal parameters of a macroscopic object which can be identified as ‘fat’, or a ‘brahmin’, etc., and as the locus of causal relations such as birth, cannot generate the relationships and identifications that are integral aspects of our personal identity – as bodily objectivity can and does.

A self that is unstructured by dimensionality and causation is clearly unable to meet the criteria of causal relationships and perceptual identifications that worldly transactions require. There is an implicit assumption here that a limitless and unchanging self lacks the possibility of causal interaction with a body through which it could engage in the range of causal transactions outlined above. A dimensionally global and permanent self is held by Indian physicalists to necessarily entail a lack of bodily references that are an essential condition of worldly designations and transactions. However, as we saw in chapter two, Praśastapāda recognizes the necessity
of a physical basis of mental life, and of the very possibility of conscious behaviour: embodiment is a necessary condition of the conscious and minded self. Causal interaction is enabled, we have seen, by the mediation of manas as a causal connector between self and body which enables self-body interaction. We saw that this conception of causation is intelligible whether or not we find it plausible. And it allows not only self-body interaction but, through this, interaction between embodied selves. For these reasons the Cārvāka objection does not necessarily mount a devastating blow to this conception of a non-physical self. The Cārvāka objection threatens a Cartesian conception of self, the notion of a minded self that is not metaphysically dependent on its body. However, in Praśastapāda’s three-tier conception of self in which the minded self is necessarily embodied, whether as the personal or the impersonal self, and only the mindless self, that is, the dimensional or natural self, is bodiless, the impact of this fundamental physicalist objection is considerably attenuated (see § 1.1).

3.2. An Inferential Procedure

It is the controversy surrounding the subjective and objective presentations of self, suggest the commentators that is the primary reason for Praśastapāda’s inferential arguments for its existence, a controversy that owes to the lack of an obvious, ostensible object that can be perceptually identified as one’s self. Praśastapāda himself suggests that

‘because of its unperceivability (apratyakṣa) ... knowledge (samadhipamaḥ) of [self], is obtained (kriyate) [inferentially]...’ (PDS 1994: § 76).

The idea is that self must be established inferentially, in the same way that we infer other unperceivable substances such as time, the inquiry into which immediately precedes the inquiry into space and self. We acknowledge the existence of unperceivable things, such as time or even particulate matter (PDS 1994: 42), inspite of their unperceivability, by inference alone. We must establish the existence of a self by a similar procedure.

But perception is the only valid means of epistemic proof for the Cārvāka. Śrīdhara presents the Cārvāka argument in the following way:
The existence of an observed thing is pervaded by its form (ākāra) that is cognized (saṃveda) by us. We have no cognition (saṃvedana) of anything that is cognized as a self. Because of the non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) of the pervader (vyāpaka)\textsuperscript{31}, its existence itself is denied (nirākriyate). What is the point of stating its characteristics? (NK: 70, 21; 71, 1-2).

The objection that unperceivable entities lack proven existence is clearly debatable. Unperceivability does not bar proof of existence, because certain substances are ‘unperceivable by their very nature’ asserts Śrīd hara (NK 1984: 71, 2-3), such as time, atomic particles and self. The limitation of epistemic instruments to perception is appropriate only in the case of perceivable entities (NK 1984: 71, 2-3).

The inferential procedure followed in PDS § 76, the commentators suggest, attempts to eliminate the physical substances involved in cognition, namely, the sensory-bodily complex, as a possible substratum of cognition, and so establish, by elimination, a non-physical locus of cognition and selfhood. The idea is that ‘first, we should eliminate (niṣetsyate) everything such as the body that the notion ‘I’ (ahamkāra) has as its object… that is the aim of this passage [PDS §76]’ (Ki 1971: 85, 9).

\textit{The Factoring of Cognition}

The physicalists claim that cognition is already proven to exist in the body and we do not need to seek its locus elsewhere. But, contends Jagadīśa, consciousness is established in the body not by a relation of inherence, or existential dependence. Rather, cognition is associated with the senses and their bodily basis by spatio-temporally structured causal relations (Śū 1983: 362; Shukla 2009) that are characteristic of the senses as the instrumental or efficient cause of cognition. In line with Jagadīśa’s interpretation, Praśatapāda must distinguish between those entities on which cognition is causally dependent as its instrumental or efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa), and those on which it is existentially dependent (samavāyi-kāraṇa), where the former acts through spatio-temporal structuring processes while the latter refers to the direct, existential relation of inherence (samavāya). He must demonstrate that the senses and their bodily basis are not the existential basis of cognition but rather

\textsuperscript{31} Vyāpaka refers to the specific perceivable property or mark that identifies an object, in this case, self.
substances on which cognition is necessarily dependent, at most, as its efficient cause. For instance, the sense-faculty of touch and its bodily basis must be proven to be the instrumental or efficient cause of the burning sensation I have when my finger is burnt, when it comes into contact with a hot pan, and not its existential basis.

To establish that the senses are not the substratum cause of cognition, it is sufficient on the Vaiśeṣika model of causation to establish that the senses are perceptual instruments. For, *qua* instruments, the senses serve as the instrumental means of bringing about the effect of cognition, which is necessarily mediated by spatio-temporal parameters of causation, such as contact between sense and object. But this excludes the senses from being the substratum cause of cognitive states, since cognitive states are necessarily existentially dependent on their bearers, a relationship that cannot be spatio-temporally mediated: the red colour of an apple as a property of the apple does not stand in a spatio-temporally mediated relationship to its substratum but is existentially dependent on it. As we see below, it is precisely by defining the senses as perceptual instruments and so as the efficient or instrumental cause of perception that Praśastapāda attempts to exclude them from being the locus of perceptual states. Moreover, the body, as the physical basis of the sense-faculties, is similarly spatio-temporally related to the onset of cognitive states and cannot be their bearer.

The issue here is how the organization of cognition can be factored to distinguish existential dependence and efficient or causal dependence, and what sort of a conception of causation would enable such a distinction to be made? We have already seen that Praśastapāda presumes a tripartite structure of causation: an efficient or instrumental cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*), a substratum or existential cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*), and a non-substratum cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*). It is on assumption of this tripartite causal structure of cognition that *PDS* § 76 offers a two-part argument and a third supplementary argument for the existence of a self as an agent of cognition that is not the senses or their bodily basis. This third argument is retrieved more from the commentators than from Praśastapāda himself. The tripartite causal structure used in the arguments for the existence of a self, follows on the assumption of an agent-instrument-object model of cognition in which: (1) the sense-faculties and *manas* are the instruments or instrumental cause of the act of perceiving – the cause that is directly involved in bringing about cognitive effects; (2) self, or the agent (*kartr*), of perceptual acts is the substratum cause of states of willing and cognition – the substance in which
cognitive effects (kārya) inhere; (3) the property of conjunction of the components of cognition - self, manas and the senses - is the non-substratum cause, a cause which inheres in the substratum cause as a supporting causal factor. In this case, it enables causal connections between the senses and manas and manas and the self (PDS 1994: § 76; see Ganeri 2009).

The aim here is to eliminate the sensory-bodily complex as a basis of cognition by showing it to be a mere instrument, or instrumental cause of cognition, on the premise that if the senses and the body are instruments, they are necessarily instruments, and cannot therefore, on pain of contradiction, be agents. Given that the senses, the executive faculty and the body are the only possible physical substances that could be agents because they are the only physical substances that are causally involved in cognition, their elimination would imply that agency must have a non-physical locus. A non-physical agent and subject of cognition is then secured as the sole remaining possibility by a procedure of elimination or subtraction that serves as a standard method of proof in the text (see PDS 1994: § 77).32

3.3. An Act-Model of Cognition

To contextualize the Perceptual Attention Argument, I set out Praśastapāḍa’s argument in full:

Since, it (one’s own self) is unperceivable [by others] on account of its subtlety, knowledge of it is gained [by inference] from the [use of] perceptual instruments, such as the auditory sense-faculty [in the perception of sound]. [For just as] the employment of an instrument such as an axe is seen to require an agent [so too are the senses]. [The instruments of perception, in turn,] are inferred from the perceiving of sound, etc. [Further,] from [the occurrence of] perceptual consciousness (prasiddhi) such as [the experience of] sound, we infer a perceiver (prasādhaka) (PDS 1994: § 76).33

32 [Having demonstrated] by elimination, that [consciousness] is an effect (kārya) of the self [alone] … the self is established (PDS 1994: § 77).
33 Prasiddhi and prasādhaka have an agential connotation here of accomplishment and accomplisher, respectively, of cognition. The perceiver or cognizer is therefore a subject and an agent: an agential subject. Note, mental properties, including cognition or consciousness, are not essential properties of the self.
There are three arguments here. The first is the argument that the senses are instruments of perception, the second establishes an agent from the instrumentality of the senses, and the third is an *a priori* argument that asserts an agential subject of cognition: a common bearer of agency and cognition. The implications of this *a priori* claim are developed by the commentators rather than by Prāśastapāda himself. I discuss the first argument in this chapter and leave the other two to chapter four.

Note that unlike *PDS* § 78, the argument in *PDS* § 76 does not appeal to will as an instrumental or efficient cause of perceptual actions. In *PDS* § 76 it is the instruments of perception, the sense-faculties (*indriya*), that are posited as the efficient or instrumental cause of the act of cognizing, and cognizing is considered to be an act of perceptual attention (*dhyāna*). In *PDS* § 78, it is will (*prayatna*) that is the instrumental cause of striving (*ceṣṭā*) to perceive, or perceptual intending. There are two distinct structures of perceptual action here, from which derive two different arguments for agency: the first is an argument from attending or attentional control (*dhyāna*) and epistemic receptivity; the second is an argument from striving (*ceṣṭā*) to attend, or epistemic projection. These two structures of perceptual action refer to two modes of exercise of attentional will in the governance of mental life and hold two distinct sorts of epistemological possibility, the dialectic between which, as noted before, is critical for the attainment of the ethical goals of this system.

*The Argument from Perceptual Attention*

The first thesis attempts to establish the instrumentality of the sense-faculties from the notion that perceiving objects, such as the sound of a piano playing, is an action which *qua* action requires the use of a means, the instruments (*karaṇa*) of perception, the sense-faculties (*indriya*). It proceeds in the following way:

‘… the [use of] instruments of perception (*karaṇaḥ*), such as the auditory sense (*śrotrādi*)… are inferred from the perceiving of sound (*śabdaupalabdhi*), etc. … by [analogy with] instruments such as an axe [which are used for cutting wood]’ (*PDS* 1994: § 76).

On the premise that perceiving (*upalabdhi*) is an act (*kriyā*) analogous to acts such as cutting wood, we infer that just as cutting (*chedana*) wood requires the use (*prayoga*) of an instrument (*karaṇa*), such as an axe, the act of perceiving too, requires the use of instruments, namely the sense-faculties (*indriya*). That is to say, in the same way as the
deployment of an axe brings about the act-effect (kārya) of cutting, so too the employment of the sense-faculties brings about the act-effect of perceiving, which consists in objects being-perceived, that is, in cognition (jñāna, buddhi) or the being-conscious of objects (prasiddhi). Note, the argument moves backwards from the object-effect of the action to the structure of the action itself: from wood being-cut or objects being-perceived that are act-effects, to the action itself which, on this account, requires the use of a means, that is, an instrument to bring it about.

There are two core assumptions here: perceivings are actions; and action necessarily involves the use of a means or an instrument. The argument then runs: perceptual focus or attention (dhyāna) to an object is a necessary condition of perceiving. But attention itself is an act and an action necessarily involves the use of cognitive instruments to bring it about on the assumption that all actions follow an agent-instrument model of action. So perceivings are actions, but qua knowings or cognizings they are in fact attendings or attentional acts that require the use of cognitive instruments.

Perceiving then is an act that exhibits a distinct sort of instrumental structure that consists in the use of perceptual instruments (karāṇa) which alone enable the sensory operations (vyāpāra) by which an object is perceived. Note, however, that the argument from cognitive instruments presupposes the exercise of will over manas. For even though will is not appealed to as the instrumental cause of perceptual attendings, qua actions attendings necessarily involve the exercise of control over manas in some way, namely, in the mode of attending. The act of perceiving then has two distinct components: the active power of will and the physical movement of the perceptual instruments that embodies will.

Perceptual acts are then attentional acts, but to understand the nature and role of the attentional function in perceivings, and the role the executive faculty plays in this, we need to examine the two core premises that underwrite the attentional character of perceivings: 1. perceivings are acts; 2. qua acts, perceivings are subserved by a perceptual system that has an instrumental structure akin to artefactual or technological systems, despite the biological basis of perception. I first discuss the notion that perceiving is an act and then its instrumental structure and how this is employed in ‘looking at’ and ‘looking for’ perceptual objects.
3.4. Can Perceiving be an Act?

The crucial premise in the above argument is that perceiving is an act (kriyā). Now, it is not obvious that perceiving could be an act, nor for that matter is it clear what sort of an act perceiving might be. We need to look closely at what the nature of perceiving is, principally as a way of cognizing or knowing, and whether this means that it could be an action. To examine whether perceiving could be an act and what sort of an act it might be, we need to consider what actions themselves are, or what they are generally thought to be.

For our purposes in this chapter, I start with the general notion that acts are something that agents do or are engaged in doing, as opposed to things which simply happen to them. An action, it is generally conceded, is something that is undertaken with an aim or an intent in mind: an action is an event that is in some way intentional (see Stout 2005). An intentional action, it is generally held, is a goal-directed act that is motivated by desire, and strives to achieve a certain aim. So, bumping into a table in the dark is something that simply happens to me: it is not my doing, it is not an action. This definition of action is reflected in Praśastapāda’s conception of perceptual actions as having an intentional character (PDS 1994: § 78).

Action is thus usually held to be distinct from other events in being goal-directed and motivated by desire: the desire to achieve or accomplish a particular goal or end, or to generate an effect, hammering a nail in an attempt to fix it to the wall, for example, or looking for a set of keys one has misplaced. Perceiving, however, is a source of evidentiary knowledge and considered to be a responding to, and a receptivity to objects, rather than the doing or accomplishing of a goal or an end. We cannot usually say of perceiving that we are doing it, when we happen to see a flower or hear a thunderclap, for example, in the way we think of climbing a tree as doing something, or eating an apple (see Baldwin 2003). In the above cases, we experience perceivings as unintentional: we happen to look at the signboard; or our attention is suddenly drawn to something, say a thunderclap, against our will, while we are trying to concentrate on reading a book. We are perceptually sensitive to objects in our environment and respond to them unintentionally, even against our will. This leaves us with the question: if perceivings qua knowings are responsive and receptive to environmental objects in the way that they are, can there be an agential account of perceiving as Praśastapāda claims?
Although, we do not always conceive of perceiving as something we do, in the way we engage in intentional bodily actions for example, we do experience certain kinds of perceivings as doings, as acts that are agential or active: say when we peer at a small typescript or listen intently to a concerto (see Crowther 2009). Significantly, what appears to make these perceivings active or acts is that they involve attention, an intent or attentive looking or listening. Thus, if I am savouring the taste of chocolate, I perceive its taste only as long as I remain attentive to this taste, the taste of this object; that is, as long as I attend to this piece of chocolate in a gustatory mode. These acts are agential because they involve active attention: they are acts that sustain perceptual attention to an object and so perceptual consciousness of that object, haptic, visual, and so on.

It is not simply my desire to listen to what someone is saying that constitutes an act of perceiving: it is my actually listening to what that person is saying that constitutes an act of perceiving. Surely, the desire to listen is why I attend to this object and not to another in the first place (Gaṅgeśa 2004: 560-3), but it is my attending to this object, maintaining sensory attention and contact with it, that is the immediate reason why I take this perceiving to be an act (see again, Crowther 2009). There may well be an aim or a desire that is a condition of my continued attending to this object but this is not directly implicated in what is required in perceptual attending itself. I suggest, this is the view of perception that Praśastapāda offers in PDS § 76, a view that shows us a way in which perceivings may be agential in a non-intentional manner.

In contrast to the above, Praśastapāda gives an account of perceptual actions as strivings when he describes our attempts to perceive a desired object in voluntary or intentional perceptual acts (PDS 1994: § 78). We may, for example, strive to taste a sweet fruit we desire (PDS 1994: § 78), or we may be looking for Venus in the night sky. In these cases, it is our desire for certain objects that leads to their selection and to our striving to perceive them, whether or not we are successful in perceiving them: tasting the desired fruit or catching sight of Venus. In such cases, perceivings refer to intentional acts that involve choice and selection of the objects of perception, motivated by desire for that object, rather than continued attention to an object that I may now be perceiving.

The distinction between the two sorts of cases is clarified by Udayana. Choice and selection of desired objects presupposes that we have knowledge of these objects,
because for an object to be desired, it must first be known. Only that which is known can be an object of desire (ATV 1995: 385; Ki 1971: 89, 26). Cognitions, Udayana suggests, are receptively prone (pravana) towards objects in the world: they are Intentional\textsuperscript{34} states. For Praśastapāda, consciousness is cognition. It exhibits Intentionality, for it is directed at an object that it presents as its content. Cognition is evidentiary, a pramāṇa or means of epistemic success. For this reason, cognitions cannot be willings. If we willed cognitions, we would control the contents of our perceptions, in which case, our perceptions would cease to be an evidentiary source of our knowledge (pramāṇa) about the world, independently of our willings. They would cease to be the evidentiary basis of the judgements we make about the world and about ourselves: perceptions would cease to be the basis on which we formulate our goals and ends. They would be subject to our will and whims, which is nonsensical (see Baldwin 2003). If cognitions are to be receptively prone towards objects, they cannot be willings in this sense. Similarly, willings cannot be cognitions because their objects must be intentional: the ends or goals of an action based in prior judgements and desires. As we see in chapter five, will in Praśastapāda is a non-Intentional state that has the structure of being directed towards a target object or end in some way.

So the sort of agency that Praśastapāda is referring to in the above two theses about the act-nature of perceiving cannot concern the contents of cognition. Perceptual agency refers, in these cases, to the sort of attention or attentional agency that is exercised in each of these cases which we have already distinguished as receptive, involving focal attention on the object of perception, and projective and goal-directed striving to attend to an object, respectively. I turn next to the instrumental structure of perceptual action that underpins these two models of perceptual agency.

3.5. The Instrumentality of the Sense-Faculties

The sense-faculties, Praśastapāda claims, are instruments (karanaï) of perception (jñāna), just as an axe is an instrument of cutting (PDS 1994: § 76). But what are the sense-faculties and what makes them instruments? There are six sense-faculties, the

\textsuperscript{34}Again, ‘Intentional’ refers to ‘having an object’ or ‘being about’ something.
olfactory, the gustatory, the visual, the haptic, the auditory and manas (PDS 1994: § 234). The nature of the senses is such that ‘a perceptual sense-faculty is [an object] made up of the type of matter that corresponds to its particular sensory function. So the olfactory faculty, for example, is composed of the earth element and not of water atoms’ (PDS 1994: § 32).

It is the nature of the sense-faculties, however, that they are not perceivable. Their existence is thus inferred from perceivings such sound or smell on the assumption that such perceivings are necessarily actions and actions can only be accomplished by means of an instrument, in this case, the senses (PDS 1994: § 76; (NKJ) 1982: 80). Śrīdharma explains that

‘the fact of the auditory sense, etc., being instruments is proved by the fact of their illuminating or manifesting, or rendering perceptible, definite objects, in the way a lamp does’ (NKJ) 1982: 156, revised trans.).

An instrument is that which enables the occurrence of an act and its effect. The senses enable acts of perceiving and the awareness-events that are its effects, just as a lamp is an instrument that illuminates objects. In the absence of the sense-faculties qua instruments, states of perceptual consciousness would not occur. For perceiving cannot take place without the use of the sense-faculties, any more than cutting wood can take place without the use of an axe. A blind person, for example, cannot have visual perception or a deaf person auditory perception. Jagadīśa reiterates the point. The sense-faculties, he claims, are instruments and cannot, therefore, be the loci of consciousness. For just as a pot is a means of bringing water, so the senses are the means of bringing about perception (Śī 1983: 362). The above arguments, however, prove only that the sense-faculties are a necessary causal factor for the occurrence of perception, which by itself does not prove that they must be instruments. I suggest that Praśastapāda’s thesis is that it is the way in which the senses are used in perceivings that makes them instruments (see § 3.7).

The axe analogy clarifies why the sense-faculties might be instruments, an argument that derives from the attentional structure of perceivings. The suggestion is that the appropriate sense-faculty can be ‘picked up’, that is, it can be selected and employed for cognizing a specific object (see NK 1984: 71, 10-2): just as an instrument such as an axe may be picked up and employed for cutting wood.
The analogy here with an instrumental or technological system suggests that just as within the macro-operating principles of a mechanical system, an instrument has a specific scope of operation, and its successful employment must meet system requirements, so too, the sense-faculties serve the scope and parameters of the perceptual system they are embedded and deployed in. Praśastapāda’s underlying claim is that the sense-faculties are constituted at microscopic levels of physical reality to serve the perceptual ends of the subject (see § 5.2), much in the way that a technological system caters to its users. However, technological instruments are artifacts that are consciously designed and constructed to serve the ends of conscious beings at macroscopic levels of physical reality, at which level, their processes of production are empirically observable and intelligible. The sense-faculties, on the other hand, are naturally produced biological entities that do not obviously have an author or a producer in the way artefacts do, nor is their genesis intelligible in the way the fabrication of artefacts is.

Moreover, the system of perceiving is a system of direct rather than perceptually-mediated control, whereas our access to, and executive control of a technological system is based in our perceptions and knowledge of how these instruments may be used, as in say, cutting or surgery. This raises further questions about the appropriateness of a technological analogy in the case of perceiving. For, the nature and role of the subpersonal in perceiving appears disanalogous to the nature of intentional systems that have a technological character. Thus, in the case of technological systems, when we act, we know that we exercise agency and will and use instruments in doing so, but we are not cognitively aware of our use of the senses in perceiving. This might explain why we might say, ‘I’m cutting wood with an axe’, but would find it so odd to say, ‘I’m listening with my ears’. Even if the notion that I listen with my ears may be grammatically implicit, it does not appear intuitively or epistemically appropriate to ascribe it to such acts.

The biological as opposed to artefactual constitution of perceptual and technological systems and the entirely different structures of control involved in each raise the objection that these two sorts of cases are disanalogous to a degree that threatens the plausibility of Praśastapāda’s argument. It would appear to be more plausible, in this case, to consider the subpersonal mechanism of perceiving to be embedded in the natural intentional and teleological structures of the physical world,
rather than present it as a system that has its origin in the values and actions of conscious beings. I address this worry in the next section.

3.6. The Instrumental Structure of Perceiving

Perceiving as a kind of instrumental act is directed at an object, the object of perception. Just as an axe is directed at a wooden object. The question is, what is the structure of these acts that they should require an instrument to enable their occurrence? Thus, a hand, for example, can be directed at an object such as an apple to pick it up because one wishes to eat it. An act such as this does not require the use of an instrument. On the other hand, a knife may be used to cut this apple before eating it. In this case, we have a choice of whether we wish to use an appropriate instrument to effect the act of cutting the apple, or not. In the case of cutting a thick piece of wood, however, we have no choice but to use an appropriate instrument to bring this about. An action, if it must necessarily use an instrument or an instrumental apparatus, must participate, it appears, in a pre-existing artefactual or technological system.

An instrument is necessarily availed of only where the action it is deployed in constitutes an intervention in, or an activation of, a pre-existing structure: a structure that operates according to certain principles, to serve the ends of conscious beings, in the way an axe, a knife or an automobile is constructed to serve the structure in which each operates for the accomplishment of certain ends for its community of users (Franssen, et al., 2009). Action, in this case, is mediated by the operational principles of an intentional system, that is, a system that serves a user or a community of users and must operate within the parameters or the dynamics and purposes of this system. Thus, we can drive a car, pilot a plane, or use an axe only according to the operating principles, the control system and the mechanism of each. The presupposition of the Perceptual Attention argument is that the perceptual system as well is a pre-existing intentional structure, intervention in which involves the selection, activation and operation of its given instrumental components according to its concrete principles and purposes, namely, perceiving.

The idea is that the perceptual system is a dedicated system for it serves certain specific ends of thinking beings, namely, perception. Its operation is sustained by its operating principles and mechanisms, namely, the sub-personal systems and processes
that structure perceptual acts. The nature of these subpersonal processes is that they enable the carrying out of the range of perceptual tasks that are appropriate to the dispositional and conative requirements of a particular conscious being or self (see § 5.1-2).

This artefactual and instrumental analysis of perceiving means that perceivings as attendings entail perceptual effects rather than directly generating perceptual effects. The structure of perceptual acts is therefore one of entailment of perceptual effects, rather than of generating or producing cognitive states, in the way that perceptual acts qua intentional actions do (see Crowther 2009; O’Shaughnessy 2009). This is correlate with the reverse structure of the argument from Attentional Perception as compared with the argument from Perceptual Striving pointed to above: the former moves from an object-effect, a cognitive state, to the instrumental act that sustains it, whereas the latter moves from desired aims and goals to an intentional act and its object-effect.

**Attentive Operation**

Consider a case akin to Praśastapāda’s example of cutting: a surgical operation. This is a conscious action informed by the goals of a particular surgical procedure that requires effective execution if it is to be successful and its aims achieved. Right execution of the operation involves control and guidance of the surgical instruments used: it involves attention to proper implementation of operational procedures. Otherwise, the operation might go astray and fail to achieve its aims. So the aim of an operational action determines its orientation and parameters, for example, the choice of one of a set of instruments rather than another, and how these are to be used within the operational framework, and so on; but the aim of the operation need not be present to one’s mind at each moment of performance of surgical action – in fact, this could be a distraction that might hinder the successful performance of this act (see Romdenh-Romluc, draft). The aim determines the ultimate object of the act and informs it, but it does not play a direct role in its successful execution. The execution of the act, therefore, requires a different sort of agency, what I dub attentional or operational agency, involving control of the instrumental mechanism in which it is operational.

The implication of this ‘technological’ model of act and agency is that the agential requirements of perceiving extend beyond intention, because perceiving is an
operational act agentially dependent on procedures of perceptual attending. Thus, when cutting wood or performing surgery, it is the attentive operation (vyāpāra) of cutting or operating that is important at each moment, although the eventual aim or end of this operation - that wood is cut or a certain operation performed - surely informs the performance of this act. The aim determines that the act is performed at all: its initiation and activation, such as picking up an axe or a surgical tool for use, and then using it. But the measure of success, so to speak, in the case of an action such as attending to the operation of an instrument, stands in contrast to how we measure the success of actions in which we use an instrument for the achievement of a desired goal or end. While the success of the former type of act is measured by the proper performance of a task, the success of the latter is measured by the achievement of an end or goal (see Romdenh-Romluc, draft; Crowther 2009; O’Shaughnessy 2009). Note that in contrast to the perceptually-mediated attentional control that is exercised in a technological system, attentional control in perceiving involves direct, internal control, in fact, attention is a mode of internal control, in this view (NK 1982: 71, 10-2).

Perceiving, as set out in PDS 76, thus falls under an attentional rather than a goal-oriented description of instrumental action. We might think of such operational or instrumental actions, following Crowther (2009), as ‘tasks’: ongoing acts such as running, which are not immediately oriented to the achievement of a goal or aim that completes them. Acts, such as running, require active engagement in an ongoing performance; they are not immediately telic or goal-directed, because they are not immediately characterized by the achievement of an end. On this view, operational acts are atelic acts like running, they are acts which have duration whereas telic acts are durationless occurrences. But note the use of the terms ‘task’ and ‘atelic’ suggested by Crowther do not capture the peculiarly instrumental character of acts whose task-character requires the operation of an instrument. As we see in chapter five, the epistemological possibilities of ‘atelic’ attention qua self-attention are highly significant in Praśastapāda.

Sensory and Bodily Acts

Perceivings are held to be attentional acts that require the use of instruments. But there are attentive bodily acts that do not, at least overtly, appear to require the use of instruments. Why might this be so? A bodily act such as a dance performance or
singing a song is an action, and bodily acts such as executing a dance-step also require attending to the act being executed. Yet these do not appear to involve operational attention to and guidance of an instrument. In fact, however, both the body and the sense-faculties are internally ‘enlivened’ or structured by contact with the executive faculty qua instrument when an action is to be produced in either of them (PDS(J): 629-30; NK(J): 631-2). The difference here is thus more seeming than real as both sensory and bodily action follow a fundamentally instrumental model shaped by the role of the executive faculty, in accord with the classical Vaiśeṣika notion that all action must be instrumentally structured by a ‘means’ (sādhana) (see Chakrabarti 2011). Further, the instrumental role of the executive faculty in ‘enlivening’ the sensory or bodily part involved in an action is constrained by the subpersonal systems that underwrite its scope of operation. This means that the difference between the instrumental structures of sensory and bodily action is one of scope rather than of type, determined by the embedded teleological ends that underwrite each. The nature and scope of subpersonal systems in perception as well as in bodily action, by being dedicated and even recursive systems, opens questions of the degree of agential intervention these systems can sustain, insofar as their recursive character might imply determinism.

3.7. The Perceptual Mechanism

Praśastapāda claims that perceiving is an act analogous to actions such as cutting (chedana). As an operational act involving the use of instruments, perceiving involves attending or attentional guidance in a direct, internal mode. But we require a further delineation of the causal structures and processes that ground perceiving to appreciate how it serves what I term ‘a dual-mode view of perception’, the view that the agential character of perceiving takes two forms, namely, ‘atelic’ attentional receptivity and ‘telic’ goal-oriented striving. I will first set out the four-fold causal structure of the perceptual system and then the attentional mechanics that guides it, as the condition of possibility of the two sorts of perceptual action we have encountered.

Perceiving, Praśastapāda claims, has a four-fold structure: ‘… direct sensory perception … follows from fourfold contact,’ (PDS 1994: § 245). Śrīdhara explains that perception requires the contact of four things:
'self' and the executive faculty (manas), the executive faculty and the [appropriate] sense-faculty (indriya), [and] this sense-faculty and the object [of perception]’ (NKJ: 395, revised trans.).

Without this four-fold contact sensory perception cannot arise. Contact of these four elements is regarded as the cause of perception, given the conditions of possibility of causation, namely, time and place, and the moral constitution (dharma, adharma) of the person (NKJ 1982: 395). The factors required for cognition to take place thus include the subject and object of perception, the instruments of cognition, and the dimensional conditions of causation, together with the moral constitution of the individual.

**Attendings and Intendings**

Perceiving occurs if and only if these four ‘causes’ of perception are arranged in an appropriate series of causal connections. This means that perceptual consciousness requires at least minimal causal contact between a sense-faculty and the object of perception, other things being equal. Thus, aural consciousness of the sound of an object, say of a piano playing, requires contact of the faculty of audition with *that* aural object: the object which bears that sound-property, a piano, in this case. Further, aural consciousness ordinarily arises only where the appropriate causal connections between self and manas and between manas and the sense-faculty are also maintained. The analogy with cutting wood holds in that the maintenance of operational contact between an axe and the wooden object of this act is a requirement of successful cutting, as long as appropriate causal contact between the agent and the axe also holds.

Perceptual attention, as the maintenance of causal contact between sense and object, is enabled by the exercise of will over the executive instrument of self, manas, which performs the attentional function in this system. It is by the exercise of will in this mode of attending that the four-fold structure of perceptual contact is maintained. Just as cutting involves the sustenance of contact between its instrument and its wooden object by the exercise of will over the instrument of cutting, so perceiving involves the sustenance of perceptual contact between a sense-faculty and its object by the exercise of will over manas, and so over the appropriate sense-faculty. Any measure of sustained cognizing must be an act of active attending to an object on this account: it must be an act of attentional will.
There is a parallel with O'Shaughnessy here who holds that although in the case of bodily actions it is true that whenever we act we *strive* to do something, this breaks down in the case of many mental states. As a general rule, he claims the will is operative whenever we act. But the nature of certain mental actions demonstrates that not all willings are goal-oriented acts of striving to accomplish or achieve an end. Perceptual actions may also be attendings that involve attentional focus of a sense-faculty on an object, rather than a striving to grasp it perceptually (see Crowther 2009; O’Shaughnessy 2009).

Perceptual attendings, such as listening or looking intently, exhibit a different schematics of action from desirous, goal-oriented perceptual intendings. Attendings require the maintenance of an appropriate set of causal connections that ensures sensory attention and receptivity. This contrasts sharply with the volitional striving of the sense-faculties towards a desired object in goal-oriented perceptual acts. In the latter case,

‘the *motion* of the executive faculty ... is the instrumental cause of connection with the [sense-] instruments, which present the desired object [of perception]...’.

This movement of the executive faculty is:

‘…similar to a child throwing a ball [at other balls, the sense-faculties]...’ (*PDS* 1994: §78).

Jagadīśa explains that

‘the executive faculty is directed by ... will on account of its having movement that effects contact with a desired object, like a ball ... which is thrown by a boy (*Sū* 1983: 365).

In this case, we strive to attend to an object by bringing about causal contact between the appropriate sense and its object. We are able to bring about this causal connection by directly and implicitly directing *manas qua* attentional function in a way that it may, in turn, guide the appropriate sense-faculty towards its object. Intendings involve the transmission of agential directives through the intentional striving of *manas* that, in turn, guides the sense-instruments accordingly. This striving to attend involves a direction of movement from agent to object as it attempts to perceptually grasp a desired object. This is a projective movement of the executive and sense-faculties and the information streams they carry. I discuss this further in the next chapter.
The agential structures of attending to, or knowing an object on the other hand, are receptive in nature. They involve the maintenance of causal connections that are constitutive of cognitive receptivity, in which sensory movement and communication proceed in an opposite direction to intentional sensory movements: they proceed from object to subject.

However, in virtue of their different schematics of action, perceptual attendings and intendings are necessarily complementary aspects of perceiving, whose distinct modes of exercise of attentional agency and distinct structures of action are important for the attentional dialectic that knowledge, and in particular, self-knowledge require, as we will see in chapter five. Note that manas serves, in this account, as a two-way interlocutor between self and the sense-faculties and their objects. Not only does it transmit sensory data from the senses to self, it also transmits the agential directives of self to the senses which corresponds to the two sorts of attentional agency that perceiving presents, and the two directions in which information flows in perceivings.

We have discussed the four components of perception and the sorts of causal connections they must exhibit for perceivings to occur, but we still do not know what the nature of attention is, and the structures that define its role and scope as an agential component of perceptual acts.

*The Mechanics of Attention*

What is the nature of attention (dhyāna)? Attention has the nature of focusing on something, or noticing something. It is the executive faculty (manas) that performs the attentional function in the PDS, by its direct selection of the relevant sense-faculty for perceiving a specified object. Attention, on this account, consists in the right sort of causal action of this executive instrument vis-à-vis an appropriate sense-faculty and its object, or we might say that the right sort of causal action of manas is attention.

Śrīdhara explains that the agent or self cannot directly operate the sense-faculties, that is, it cannot come into direct contact (sāksāt) with the senses. An intermediary is required to establish a causal connection with the sense-faculties for cognizing (pradīpavat) or attending to specific objects. This function is served by manas, which allows self to enter into an indirect (parampara) causal relationship with the sense-faculties. By means of manas, self is able to select the appropriate sense and
use it for attending to a specific object(s). Śrīdhara suggests that this is to be understood by way of analogy with the manner in which a pair of forceps held in one’s hand enables us to pick up a piece of red-hot iron, which we would not otherwise be able to do. Thus,

‘the inner instrument (antahkarana) [that is, manas] is the basis for its (the auditory sense-faculty’s) use by self: just as a hand makes contact with a hot piece of iron through a [pair of] forceps’ (NK 1984: 71, 10-12).

This analogy suggests that self is able to use manas to select and direct the appropriate sense-faculty required for attending to an object in the same way that I can direct my hand to use a pair of forceps to pick up a red-hot piece of iron.

Attention, this model suggests, is an instrumental act of selecting and making causal contact with the appropriate sense-faculty that perception of an object requires. It requires establishing the causal connections by means of which it is possible to ‘pick out’ and focus on a particular sensory object, or a domain of objects from the variety of such objects available in perception (PDS 1994: §§ 77-78).

The Necessity of Attention

Manas performs a set of tailored perceptual functions. As Śrīdhara’s analogy suggests, it transmits sensory information to self in serial form as a perceptual data series, by establishing appropriate causal contacts across the perceptual apparatus that open up individual channels of communication between self, an individual sense-faculty and its object, allowing object selection and focus. The absence of such mediation by manas, that is, the absence of attention, would result in mental incoherence because

‘… if it [the executive faculty] were not causally dependent on the other [sense-] instruments, recollection and perception would occur simultaneously’ (PDS 1994: § 77).

Śrīdhara explains that

‘… at the time that the colour of an object is perceived, its smell is also in contact with the sense of smell, from its being in proximity to the body containing that sense’ (NK(J) 1982: 200, revised trans.).

The problem, Jagadiśa elaborates, is that
‘[if] the respective objects of the visual and other sense-faculties were in contact [with the sense-faculties] at the same time, this would result in multiple perceptual cognitions arising simultaneously, if these [perceptions] did not depend on the executive faculty being in contact with the respective sense-faculty, and if [the executive faculty] as] an instrument (which it is) lacked activation and regulation [by will] ...’ (Śū 1983: 363).

We would be unable to process the mass of perceptual inputs we are inundated with in the absence of procedures of attentional selection and focus. And so a bearer of attentional function, the executive faculty that performs this necessary function must be inferred as a condition of coherent perception. As Jagadiśa suggests, we need

‘to establish an instrument, which would be responsible for originating engagement with just one object [at a time], and prevention of the undesirable occurrence of simultaneous engagement with several [sense-objects]’ (Śū 1983: 363).

The question is, how is the executive faculty able to perform this function? Manas is an atomic particle, only one of which is ontologically assigned to each self. This guarantees that ‘being one only, [and atomic] there is only one contact of it at a time [with a sense-faculty or a mental state]; and hence it follows that at one time, there is a single cognition’ (NK(J) 1982: 204, revised trans.); or, ‘... a single cognition comprising a number of objects ...’ (NK(J) 1982: 205, revised trans.).

Manas is able to perform its attentional function because as a single atomic, particle that is attached to each self, it can make causal contact with only one sense or one mental state at a time, and so allow cognition of only one object, or domain of objects, at a time.

This argument is premised on the assumption that our cognitive capabilities allow us to make sense of only singular, sequential bits of sensory information at any one time. And this requires rapid switching between the sense-faculties, because simultaneous connection with all the senses would lead to perceptual incoherence. It is true, Śrīdhara argues, that

‘we have a notion of more than one cognition appearing at one and the same time; but that is due to the fact of cognitions following each other very rapidly [and so imperceptibly]; just as in the case of the whirling of a firebrand, we have the idea of a circle of fire, though in reality it is a single flaming point revolving so swiftly as to give rise to that notion’ (NK 1982: 205, revised trans.).
It is the quick succession of mental states that gives a feeling of continuity and unity to mental perceptions over time. In fact, the sense of continuity and temporal order in mental life, the sense of an objective order of things that is presented in our perceivings is preserved by the rapid, sequential processing of perceptual data by manas (PDS 1994: 81).

The Perceptual Functions of Manas

Manas functions, in this case, as a meta-sense, as an inner processor or control mechanism of sensory selection, transmission and regulation. It allows sequential attention and focus on the deliverances of each of the sense-faculties and so a comparison of their contents, that is, cross-modal comparisons. Undoubtedly, a cognitive system devoid of a faculty of attention, and its aspects of selection, focus and concentration, would be incoherent and untenable (see Eilan: 1995). However, as a meta-sense, the role of manas goes further, for it allows the sort of organized mental life, judgements, comparisons, evaluations and so on that underwrite mental and bodily action – as we see in subsequent chapters.

How is manas able to exercise the agential force that it does in perceivings qua attention? Attention consists in the right sort of causal action of manas, but it is the ontological character of manas that it is the locus of willed movement: its movements are directly sustained by willings. Attention consists then in the direct exercise of will over the executive faculty, manas, by which specific attentional functions and acts of manas are sustained. It should be clarified that the nature of will involved here is unconscious or pre-conscious because will itself is not a conscious state; it becomes conscious only as an object of cognition. The subpersonal processes that underpin attentional willings owe to the moral dispositions (dharma, adharma) of the embodied self, and the motive force that drives such willings are conscious, unconscious, and even instinctual desires and aversions (PDS 1994: § 81; see § 3.8). Note that the functions manas is able to perform of processing sensory information, as an ‘internal instrument’ (antahkaraṇa) of self, appear to refer to its information-bearing capacities and dynamic functions as an ‘inner’ atomic informational module (see Phillips 2004: 538) that mediates between a non-physical self, its senses and body, as we saw in § 2.8.
I suggest that the instrumental character of attention as the willed movement of manas has two possible sources. On the one hand, it is undoubtedly a product of Vaiśeṣika realism for which all identifiable objects, whether elementary or ordinary objects, properties, acts and processes have a thing-like nature that is either resident in or is a substance. But also, as a physical object, manas exemplifies the minimal physicalist bias of classical Vaiśeṣika realism (see Ganeri 2012). It is also the case, that the instrumental conception of manas as a locus of attentional action serves the structure of Praśastapāda’s overall agential project. Although attention, or the act of attention, is unconscious or pre-conscious in the first instance, it does hold the possibility of being controlled because the exercise of attentional will can be an object of cognition and thereby subject to evaluative control, as we will see in chapter five.

The ontology and role of manas offers a metaphysics of knowing that is able to give extensive scope to attentional agency in cognitive development. The direct subservience of manas to will qua inner instrument of attention and introspection provides the possibility of exercising control over the act of attending and knowing itself, for example, in practices of meditative attention that are a condition of possibility of the sort of self-knowledge and self-experience that are essential to Praśastapāda’s ethical project, and can be provided only by exceptional attentional control and focus that control of manas affords (see § 5.7). It is arguable that a view of attention as an instrumental function that is sustained by an atomic physical instrument that one has direct volitional control over makes these cognitive competencies more accessible and explicable theoretically. It is a controversial thesis, however, that attention has an instrumental structure such that it consists in the exercise of an ‘inner’ instrument (antahkarana), manas, a substance that is directly moved by willings. It might be argued that it would be more plausible to have merely a functional concept of attention rather than associate it with an inner instrument that is a substance (see Chakrabarti 2011).

3.8. Primitive Attention

A theory of perception must take account of those myriad situations where attention is unintentionally or even forcibly drawn to, and sustained by, say the flashing light of a car in front of me, the touch of a cool breeze when I take a stroll, or the sound of constant hammering while I try to write this passage. How are we to account for these
online, unintentional aspects of perceiving within Praśastapāda’s framework? For as Gāṅgeśa says, cognition may be involuntary as when one suddenly hears a loud sound (Gāṅgeśa 2004: 574), although it may also sometimes be voluntary as when one deliberately listens to a piece of music. Moreover, how are we to account for the claim that Praśastapāda, and at least some of the commentators make, that all perceiving is desire-based in some way?

Praśastapāda’s account of the desirous nature of perceiving is part of his account of the onset and sustenance of waking consciousness. Waking consciousness is founded on the subpersonal establishment of the right kind of causal connection between self and its executive faculty, manas. This primitive causal relation is the onset of a state of perceptual alertness or attention of manas: the onset of primitive attention that is constitutive of the waking state as online perceptual attention and consciousness. The onset of this primitive state of attention, a state of perceptual alertness of manas, is enabled by a particular sort of causal connection between self and manas that is instigated by subpersonal processes associated with the vital powers (dharma, adharma) of the self. By this causal connection, manas’ attentional function comes online, and becomes causally associated with self’s desires and willings; and in fact, with its network of mental states. Praśastapāda elucidates this in the following way:

‘During the state of sleep, the [causal] action of manas at the moment of waking up is produced by the instrumentality of will due to the mere act of living (jīvana) [which is supported by dharma and adharma]’ (PDS(J) 1982: 647, revised trans.).

This ‘mere act of living’ consists of a specific kind of causal contact between self and manas; it is this contact that brings about the effects we refer to as ‘living’, explains Śrīdhara (NK(J) 1982: 649).

It is the vital powers of self that act through will (prayatna) to sustain the subpersonal processes associated with biological life, and instigate the activity of waking up from sleep together with the onset of the state of perceptual alertness of manas, whereby it is subject ‘to the instrumentality of will proceeding from desires and aversions’, so that

‘the perception of different objects by the different senses follows the bent of our wishes’ (PDS(J) 1982: 646-7, revised trans.).
In other words, waking or perceptual consciousness is subpersonally brought online by the initial causal movement of *manas*, a particular kind of self-*manas* contact that makes *manas* perceptually alert or attentive, such that it is susceptible to being moved by self’s desire-based willings towards contact with the appropriate sense-faculty (*NK(J) 1982: 648-9*).

Note here that the sustenance of the state of perceptual attention that is characteristic of waking is entirely dependent on willings moved by desires and aversions, where desires and aversions need not be conscious, because they are not intrinsically Intentional states in this framework (see § 5.5). So the effect of desires and willings on perceptual movement may be entirely subconscious or unconscious in instigating subintentional and unintentional perceptual acts.

*Can All Perceivings be Desire-Based?*

Praśastapāda articulates a wide conception and function of will here, a view of different levels of willing, that may be unconscious or conscious, and may act subpersonally, subintentionally or intentionally. It is in his account of the unconscious and subconscious nature of desires and willings that implicitly impel perceptual acts and responses, that the justification for Praśastapāda’s claim that all perceivings may be willings lies.

We have seen that desire-based willings sustain online perceiving, given the right sort of subpersonal contact between self and *manas*, which means that ‘the perception of different objects by the different senses follows the bent of our wishes’ (*PDS* (J) 1982: 647, revised trans.). Śrīdhara explains what this means:

*In the waking state we find that we never have any sense-perceptions except those that are in keeping with our wishes; that is to say, we see colour only when we have the wish that we should perceive colour; and so on with taste and other things; and as a matter of fact we know that the external senses have no perceptual power without the connection and help of *manas*, which comes into contact with the external senses by [the causal power of] will, [which is motivated] by certain desires and aversions of the person’ (*NK(J) 1982: 648-9, revised trans.*).

The range of ‘desirous’ or ‘aversive’ acts in the above claim includes most of what we would consider unintentional actions. Śrīdhara gives examples such as sneezing in a dusty environment as an act of aversion (*NK(J) 1982: 646; see § 5.1*). On this account,
closing one’s eyes to a blinding light is a consequence of unconscious control of the perceptual mechanism motivated by unconscious or subconscious aversion to blinding light, which impels will to direct the visual system to avoid exposure to such light; and similarly, with the response of the olfactory sense to a sharp odour. Teleological acts such as pupil dilation in a dark room would be considered acts that are controlled by unconscious desires. It is what is conducive or non-conducive to cognitive, perceptual and bodily life, and accords with our conscious or unconscious evaluations and preferences that determines what is considered desirable and undesirable for a human being. As we see in chapter five, it is for this reason that Praśastapāda claims that even breathing and blinking are agential desire-based actions (*PDS* 1994: § 78). The idea is that our subconscious or unconscious desires actively engage us in the world, perceptually and otherwise, in involuntary and unintentional ways in the mode of unreflective and non-cognitive perceptual and bodily judgements that are moved by these unconscious desires and aversions, as when my pupils dilate in a dark room or the olfactory sense responds to a sweet scent in the air. The range of perceptual acts and responses thus includes the domain of non-cognitive judgements that are implicit in the unconscious and unintentional responses of the senses to their physical environment during waking, as well as those perceivings that stem from primitive instinctual desires and aversions such as hunger and thirst (*PDS* 1982: 645-47; *NK* 1982: 646, 648-49).

Thus, all perceivings, indeed all acts of an embodied self display and articulate dispositional concerns, either desirous or aversive, that have a fundamental normative grip on *manas* through the power of will which drives all our waking activities – with the exception of basic biological functions. For our purposes here, it is sufficient to note that this is perhaps the reason why we cannot assign unintentional perceptual acts, such as hearing a thunderclap, to the same category of things as say a falling stone or a lightning strike. Because even our unintentional acts of perceiving embody normative values of desire or aversion, or even indifference, a sensitivity and alertness, conscious and pre-conscious that mere physical activities do not.

*Manas* in being in contact with self in this way is implicitly attentive to the perceptual system itself so that its sensory parts, the sense-faculties, are available for engagement either by environmental and bodily stimuli or by self in a way that a sleeping person’s cognitive instruments are not. It is this cognitive attention or alertness
of the executive sense-faculty, *manas*, implicit in all waking acts and responses that make these appear distinct from mere physical movements such as a stone falling.

This responsive alertness and sensitivity to stimuli and to unconscious and conscious intentions is a state of enlivened attentiveness brought to the senses - and the body – by the causal state of *manas*, which makes sensory movement as attentional alertness intuitively distinct from mere physical movement, and waking distinct from sleep. In fact, the range of possible causal relationships and contact of *manas* with sensory – or bodily – parts, whether intentional or unintentional, is an *enlivening* of that sensory or bodily part (*NK(J)* 1982: 250). Note that such enlivening is enabled against a background of implicit I-awareness that pervades the senses and the body in waking: the notion this body is ‘mine’ (*svatva*) (see *NK* 1984: 84, 23-4; *Sū* 1983: 368) which must ensue from the sort of causal contact between self, *manas* and the sensory-body complex that is constitutive of waking, namely, primitive attention. The normativity that is embedded in this conscious I-alertness implicit in the perceptual alertness of the body and senses is the condition of exercise of the causal agency of desires and willings; that is, the capacity of the dispositional pulls and pushes of desirous and instinctual willings to elicit sensory and bodily responses. The idea is that we cannot be without a state of desire-based or instinct-based willing when we are in a state of consciousness, because it is desirous will that supports waking itself as long as the right subpersonal state of self-*manas* contact holds.

Desire-based will therefore has a characteristic role in waking consciousness. It grounds the distinction between waking and sleeping as a distinction between the active or agential, and governable, mental and bodily states of self, and its non-governable states – biological functions in sleep for instance. This echoes in some measure O’Shaughnessy, who vividly suggests (2000: 229) that a ‘will freeze’ on conscious experience would inevitably mean the replacement of the prevailing state of waking consciousness by another state, perhaps sleep. Mental action plays a crucial role in the state of wakeful consciousness in the self-conscious, he claims:

‘The mind of one who is conscious is necessarily a mind actively governing the movement of its own attention and thinking processes’ (ibid.: 89).

Again,
... ‘it is because thinking is active and thinking is essential to consciousness that mental action is a necessary condition of consciousness’ (ibid.: 264).

Now, this is a contestable thesis, but parallels Praśastapāda’s claim that it is the activity of will *qua* perceptual attentiveness of *manas* that makes waking consciousness active and agential, and distinct from sleep.
Chapter 4

The Self Defended

4.0. Introduction

In this chapter, I consider Praśastapāda’s arguments for an agent (kartr) of perceptual and bodily actions. The argument for a perceptual agent is the second part of the arguments from the act-structure of perceiving that we discussed in the previous chapter. Two arguments are put forward for an agent of perceptual actions from the two ways in which epistemological contact is made with the world. The first is an argument for an agential subject, an agent of attentive perceivings or perceptual attention; the second is an argument for an agent of intentional perceivings, or striving to perceive. An agent of perceptual attendings, a self, is inferred from the use of perceptual instruments in perceivings because the use of instruments requires an agent or operator. I refer to this argument for an agential subject as the ‘Instrument-Operator Argument’. There is a supplementary a priori thesis, the ‘Property-Effects Argument’: willings and the cognitive states they bring about have the same substratum, the cogniser who is an agent and a subject, a self. Central to this argument is the assumption of a metaphysics of cognition that invests causal powers of agency and instrumentality in non-physical and physical substances, respectively. This is the basis of Udayana’s first anti-physicalist thesis which argues from infinite regression against causation by instruments to an agent who is a non-physical self.

An agent of perceptual intendings is inferred from our striving to attend to, and restraint in attending to, advantageous and desired and disadvantageous and undesired objects respectively. This is part of a wider argument for an agent who is the willful controller of bodily actions. An agent of intentional actions is adduced from bodily activity (pravṛtti) and restraint (nivṛtti) that seeks the acquisition of objects that are advantageous (hita) and the avoidance of objects that are disadvantageous (ahita). Desire-sensitive actions, actions that are responsive to reasons, runs the argument, demonstrate the presence of will which is motivated by desires, where desires, in turn, arise from judgements about what we consider advantageous or not for ourselves. The essence of this set of arguments for an agent of goal-oriented actions is that these acts demonstrate the exercise of will or mental control (prayatna), and so a bearer of the mental structures of cognition, desires and willings that are necessary for the conduct of
wilful acts: a bearer of conscious agency (prayatnavān) who is the controller (adhiṣṭhātr) of mental and bodily life. Such an entity is a self. I refer to the argument for an agent of perceptual striving as the Mental Controller Argument, and to the argument for an agent of bodily striving as the Bodily Controller Argument.

This agential self must be a non-physical substance because the distinct ontology of mental and physical causal powers means that the structure of agency and causation that willed actions demonstrate are distinct from the structures of physical agency and causation that are manifest in natural physical movements: agential actions are based in the normative demands of judgements regarding what is beneficial and favourable or not for the individual, and the desires and willings these elicit. In other words, goal-oriented actions have rational sources and structures. But physical substances are incapable of bearing rational structures: physical movements lack the rational structures that define intentional actions. They have different conditions of possibility from mere physical movements. From this, we conclude that the source of intentional actions must be a non-physical substance: a mental substance or self.

The Controller arguments rest essentially on the rational structure of judgements, desires and willings that are the defining feature of agency. But the assumption here is that agency, or rather the network of states that define agency, must have its locus in a self: the owner of the states of cognition, desire and will that structure agency and action. In each of these arguments, a controller of bodily activities who is a self is inferred from the normative structure of these activities; that is, from the fact that these activities are self-refering even if at a primitive level, and demonstrably pursue what is favourable or beneficial for the human being or human organism and avoid that which is unfavourable.35

Each of the arguments for an agential self is incumbent on the thesis that the normative sources and structure of the acts involved require an agent who is a self: an owner of the rational and moral powers that such acts entail, whether at a conscious, unconscious or pre-conscious level. The assumption that the body, like other physical substances, essentially lacks the possibility of bearing conscious Intentionality or goal-

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35 Two further arguments for a bodily controller: from the ability of the ‘conscious’ body, that is, the body in the waking state, to maintain equilibrium, its activities such as regulated breathing and blinking, and from the self-organising activities of the human organism, are discussed in the next chapter.
oriented intentional states underwrites Udayana’s second anti-physicalist argument from infinite regression for a non-bodily agent. It may also underlie possible Vaiśeṣika responses to physicalist objections to a non-physical agent that may stem from the nature of ‘choice’ and ‘control’ that is ostensibly demonstrated by machines and mechanisms.

4.1. The Instrument-Operator Argument

The argument for a self who is an agent of cognition proceeds in the following way:

‘… knowledge of it [self] is gained [by means of inference] from the instruments of perception, such as the auditory sense: [just as] the employment of an instrument, such as an axe, is seen to require an agent [so too are the sense-faculties qua instruments] …’, (PDS 1994: § 76).

An a priori thesis follows, the ‘Property-Effects Argument’:

‘from perceptual consciousness (prasiddhi) [itself], such as [the experience of] sound, we infer a perceiver (prasādhaka)\textsuperscript{36} (PDS 1994: § 76).

Śrīdhara elucidates the first argument argument in the following way:

‘We find that instruments such as an axe, etc., [by their very nature] are employed by an agent. Whatever the instrument, it is used by an agent (kartṛ); [this means], it is put into operation (vyāpāryate) with reference to an effect (kārya), in the way an axe [is employed] by a carpenter [for the purpose of cutting wood]. In the same way, the instruments of audition [too], must be used (prayoktavyam) by someone [to bring about the effect of perceiving]. [The one] who uses them is the self’ (NK 1984: 71, 6-8).

The inherent instrumentality of the senses makes it necessary that their operation, or use in an act such as perceiving is conducted by an agent who exercises control over these instruments to enable the effect (kārya) their usage entails, namely, perceptual consciousness. This is proven by way of analogy: just as a carpenter must exercise control over an instrument such as an axe to sustain the effect of cutting wood, so an agent is required who exercises control over cognitive instruments to sustain the act of perceiving objects. Udayana reiterates this claim in the following way:

\textsuperscript{36} In PDS § 76, the prasādhaka is considered to be the subject and agent of cognition, the agent who accomplishes or sustains cognitive effects.
'the instrumentality of those [sense-faculties] is the definite means of establishing the perceiver, who is the bearer [of agency and cognition]' (Ki 1971: 85, 16).

For, adds Jagadīśa,

'[the faculties of] audition, etc., must be operated by an agent because they are instruments, just like an axe’ (Śū 1983: 361).

This argument infers an agent from the fact that the use or operation (vyāpāra) of instruments requires an operator who is capable of exercising attentional control for sustaining a particular effect, perceiving, in this case: just as the use of an axe in cutting wood requires an operator of this axe who is capable of attending to the act of cutting to sustain the effect of wood being-cut. The argument has two premises: the sense-faculties, including the inner executive faculty, manas, are instruments; and secondly, the operation of the senses requires the exercise of will (prayatna) over the executive instrument, manas. I briefly discuss the structures of will and instrumentality in cognition.

Will is a mental property, albeit one which manifests as an active causal power. As an active causal power, willing in the mode of perceptual attention is the instrumental or efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) of operating the instruments of perception in perceptual attendings. It is the instrumental cause of maintaining the set of causal connections between self, manas, the appropriate sense-faculty and its object, as perceiving requires. But will requires a bearer, an agent: the self who is its owner. This argument is implicit in Śrīdhara’s claim that just as physical actions require a bearer or locus, so does will require a substantive locus, the agential self:

'Cognizing (jñāna) must reside (āśrita) in something because it is an act, like cutting; that wherein it resides is the self” (NK 1984: 71, 16-7).

Cognizing is an act because it involves the use of instruments. However, acts are acts in virtue of being willed movements, even if will is not directly appealed to in establishing the act-nature of cognizings. The exercise of will, however, requires a bearer in which the property of willing is located: the self. Of course ‘acts’ of will are, in fact, states (guna); they are ‘acts’ only in a grammatical sense, given that actions or movements (karma) are limited to finite (mūrta) physical substances. The a priori thesis from Property-Effects then proposes that will and cognitions have the same locus, the
agential cognizer (prasādhakaḥ) who accomplishes cognitions but is also its subject or knower (jñāṭr) (Śū 1983: 363).

Praśastapāda claims that the agential subject, the bearer of cognition and will, must be a self. There is a presupposition here that this is a non-physical substance distinct from the physical components of perception - the sense-faculties and their bodily basis. Why? Because the ontology of mental and physical causal powers dictates that physical substances can serve only as instruments, or as the physical basis and conditions of agential action, and not as agents. This means that only a non-physical substance can be a self. This assumption underwrites all the arguments for an agent that I consider in this chapter. I briefly set out the conceptions of agent and instrument next.

The Agent-Instrument Structure of Action

Praśastapāda assigns agential and instrumental causal powers to the non-physical and physical elements of cognition, respectively. The idea is that the senses qua instruments are necessarily instruments, and causally dependent on an agent, their operator, as the source and sustainer of actions that are instantiated by their operation as instruments. The structure of perceptual causation is exemplified in the following way by Śrīdhara:

‘…the lamp … is cognised by the person; [it] is made cognizable by the eye; and cognition only constitutes its action …’ (NK(J) 1982: 201, revised trans.).

Cognition is here the act carried out by the perceiver by use of her senses. This is a model of cognition that rests on the fundamental presupposition that agency and instrumentality are distinct, and even opposite, sorts of causal powers and require, therefore, very different kinds of loci as Śrīdhara goes on to explain:

‘There can also be no compatibility between the characters of the agent and the instrument because the character of the agent consists in not being urged [or used] by some thing else, while that of an instrument consists in being employed by others [in actions] – and thus one is positive while the other [is] negative; and as such the two are wholly incompatible with each other; and for this reason they could never coexist in the same substratum’ (NK(J) 1982: 202, revised trans.).

Further,
‘... [in] the action of cognition … self is independent [of all other things]’, because of which, ‘it has the character of being the agent …’ (NK(J) 1982: 202, revised trans.).

An agent is a substance that is causally independent of all other elements of cognition in the sense of not being ‘urged’ or subject to use by any other substances for the fulfillment of their own ends. The implication is that an agent’s acts are at least potentially self-urged or self-instigated. Instruments, on the other hand, have an opposite nature: they are subject to use by other substances, that is, their acts are externally instigated. Instruments thus suffer from certain causal liabilities that are absent in agents, and conversely, agents possess certain causal powers that are absent in instruments.

The reason why agents and instruments demonstrate such opposing powers and liabilities is because instruments are necessarily not-conscious whereas agents are at least potentially conscious. For this reason, the senses and manas qua instruments must be non-conscious, asserts Praśastapāda:

‘Neither does consciousness pertain to the sense-faculties, on account of their instrumentality … Neither [does consciousness pertain to] the executive faculty … on account of its own instrumental nature’ (PDS 1994: § 77).

The instrumentality of the sense-faculties means that they are essentially non-conscious and so are excluded from being agents. Agents, on the other hand, are at least potentially conscious and therefore capable of bearing together with cognition those mental properties that are dependent on cognition and constitutive of the structure of mental agency, namely, desire and will. The causal powers of agency and the causal liabilities of instrumentality cannot reside in the same substratum, because this would involve a contradiction, as Śrīdhara states above. Agents and instruments must, therefore, have distinct loci. They must reside in different types of substances, the argument implies: non-physical and physical respectively.

4.2. Causation by Instruments

Udayana (Ki 1971: 85, 17-9) reconstructs a Cārvāka objection to the Instrument-Operator thesis in the following way. How can we infer that the sense-instruments must have an agent to operate them, when we observe that some instruments, such as an axe, are operated by another instrument, a hand, and yet infinite regression is not incurred?
In such cases, we observe that an instrument is not necessarily operated by an agent even if in some cases it is. This means that it is possible to have causation of actions by instruments; that is, it is not necessary to have an agent of actions, even if this may sometimes be the case. The objection is that since some instruments are observed to be operated by other instruments, without incurring infinite regression, such as an axe which is operated by a hand, it clearly is not the case that infinite regression results in all cases where one instrument is operated by another. Further, only some, not all, instruments are observed to be operated by an agent. Clearly, an agent is not always required to operate an instrument, and so we cannot prove that an agent of the sense-faculties is invariably required. The physicalists object here to the agent-instrument model of action that is a core presupposition of Praśastapāda’s arguments.

Udayana responds to this (Ki 1971: 85, 19-20) by reference to the syntax of sentences in Sanskrit that express a means-end or agent-instrument structure of causation. It is not acceptable, he argues, that the instrumental case (kāraka) in a sentence should be dependent on a case of the same type (samānajāti), because this would result in an infinite regress (anavasthā). The instrumental case must depend on a case of a different type (vijāti). The rule of dependence of a grammatical case on a different type of case is expected (isyate) and must be observed, otherwise the meaning (lakṣaṇa) of the sentence is destroyed.

The argument relates to the distinction between saying, ‘Mary cut the cloth with a pair of scissors’, and ‘The scissors cut the cloth’. In the former case, we take Mary to be the agent who is the substantive cause or basis of the action of cutting. Here, the instrumental case, the pair of scissors, is grammatically dependent for its meaning in the sentence on Mary’s use of it qua agent. But when we say, ‘The scissors cut the cloth’, we do not take the nominative case to refer to an agent; certainly, we do not take the scissors to refer to the ultimate agential source of the action of cutting. We expect the cutting action of the scissors to be the effect of a further causal source, the agent; because, we expect implicitly that the scissors serve the purposes of the agent or controller of its movements, who is a member of the community of conscious beings whose purposes this instrument serves - and in which it has been designed and constructed to serve precisely these purposes. If we do not acknowledge an agential source of such instrumental action, we are bound to an infinite regress that makes the action of the scissors qua intentional action unintelligible grammatically and, by
Vaiśeṣika’s semantic realism, metaphysically. For example, we might say: ‘The hand moved the scissors’, ‘The body moved the hand’, ‘The brain moved the body’, and so on indefinitely.

In this case, the means-end structure of action is used to argue for an agent on the assumption that the ontology of causation in action reflects the syntax of causal statements that describe such actions. That is, on the premise of semantic realism, metaphysics mirrors language and, therefore, syntax is a guide to the metaphysics of causation in action. From the syntax of causal statements, a coherent account of causation in the case of action requires a causal structure of agent-instrument-object in which an instrument stands to an agent in a relationship of causal dependence. The action of the instrument must have its basis or source in an agent to prevent a non-terminating, endlessly regressive chain of causation. Because, since it is the nature of instruments to be causally dependent, the action of each instrument must be the result of a prior action by another instrument, and so on ad infinitum. So the relata of causation in an action must stand in a relation of causal dependence of instruments on an agent, just as in a Sanskrit sentence the instrumental case is dependent on the nominative or agential term; otherwise, we will be left with the possibility of infinitely regressive, authorless action. The argument fails, of course, if we do not accept a means-ends structure of act-causation, as in the case of basic actions, which I discuss below (§ 4.9).

4.3. The Mental Controller Argument from Striving to Attend

Praśastapāda argues that an agent is inferred from the causal movement of manas in acts of striving to perceive a desired object, because such desire-motivated acts manifest the exercise of will. And from the exercise of will, we infer its bearer, the controller (adhiśṭhātr) of these mental actions. In this account, such a substance must be a self. He claims:

‘From the motion of the executive faculty (manas), which is the instrumental cause (nimitta-kārana) of connection [of the perceiver] with the [sense-] instruments, which present the desired object (abhimata viṣaya) [of perception, we infer a willful controller], similar to a child throwing a ball at [other balls in] the corners of a house’ (PDS 1994: § 78).

The assumption is that the motion of manas as the executive faculty of attending is the cause of striving to attend to an object, and so of the sort of causal contact between
itself and the appropriate sense-faculty by which the latter attempts to perceptually grasp the desired object (NK 1984: 83, 24-6).

Śrīdhara explains this argument by way of analogy in the following way:

‘[Self is like a boy who throws a pebble [the executive faculty] on another pebble [the sense-faculty]. The executive faculty is an object that is mobilized by will because it is the substratum of [willed] movement. [As such,] it causes contact [of the appropriate sense-faculty] with the desired object, just as a ball [held] in the hand of a child [is mobilized by will when it is deliberately aimed at and thrown towards another ball]’ (NK 1984: 83, 26; 84, 1).

An agent is established by analogy with a boy who throws a ball at a second ball that is his target. The intentional act of throwing the first ball towards the second ball is an act akin to the act of striving to attend to an object perceptually, in which manas is propelled by self towards the appropriate sense-faculty, which is represented by the second ball in this analogy. The second ball or the sense-faculty is then moved by the first movement, its speed, trajectory and momentum to hit a third object that is the ultimate target of this perceptual action. This third object is the object that we desire to perceive by use of the appropriate sense. This is essentially an impact or billiard ball model of causation in which the first billiard ball is impelled by an intentional act towards a second ball in such a way that the latter proceeds to hit a third ball that is the ultimate target of this action. The argument is that the guided behaviour of manas, its striving to attend to a desired object, demonstrates the presence of conscious agency: it demonstrates an agential structure capable of executing acts in accordance with the judgements, desires and judgements of an intelligent agent who is the bearer of these mental states. As Jagadīśa elaborates:

‘from the movement of the executive faculty, which by effecting contact with the visual faculty causes its (the desired object’s) perception, we infer a controller (adhiṣṭhātr) of the body who exercises will (prayatna). The reason is that the movement of the executive faculty, which effects contact between the sense-faculty and the [desired] object would be impossible without [that someone] who exercises control (Sā 1983: 365).

So from the striving to attend of manas and the guided movement of the senses that follows in trying to perceive desired objects, we infer that this movement is caused by will, which must have a bearer: the willful controller of the body. It is assumed that this willful controller (prayatnavān adhiṣṭhātr) must be a self. The inferential reason (hetu) for proving an agential self, in this case, is not simply the movement of the
executive faculty, or attention, but its controlled, *guided* movement towards a desired object. Attentional guidance of the senses by the executive function requires will. It requires, in other words, a structure of agential control that is based in judgements and desires which can be effectively and coherently executed by will via by the instruments of cognition: *manas* and the senses. The idea is that will executes desires by its direct access to, and control over the executive faculty which directly harnesses the relevant sort of sensory movement. Before turning to a discussion of this argument I consider the wider argument from bodily striving of which this forms a part.

**4.4. The Physical Controller Argument from Bodily Striving (ceṣṭā)**

The argument for a mental controller, a controller of acts of striving to attend to objects, forms part of a wider argument from striving (ceṣṭā) as an inferential mark of the presence of will (*prayatna*), and so its bearer: the willful controller of the body:

‘Just as a charioteer is inferred by the motion of the chariot, so a willful controller (*prayatnavaṇ adhiṣṭhā�*) [of the flesh and bones] is inferred by such activity (*pravrtti*) as is fit for obtaining what is advantageous (*hitṛ*) and such restraint (*nivrtti*) as is fit for avoiding what is disadvantageous (*ahitṛ*), both being located in the body (*vīgraḥ*)’ (*PDS* 1994: § 78).

The thought here is that we demonstrably engage in striving (ceṣṭā) that seeks to obtain beneficial objects as a means of gaining pleasure or satisfaction (*sukha*), and avoid unfavourable objects as a means of avoiding pain or dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*), where striving rests on judgements about what we consider to be pleasurable and painful (*NK* 1984: 82, 25-6; 83, 1). Voluntary bodily actions thus take one of two forms, activity (*pravrtti*) and restraint of activity (*nivrṛti*) that are, respectively, the means of gaining pleasure (*sukha*) and avoiding pain (*duḥkha*) (*Ki* 1971: 88, 9-11; *NK* 1984: 82, 25-6). This capacity for engaging in desire-motivated acts, the capacity (*yogyatā*) to do or not do something as a means of acquiring what is advantageous and avoiding that which is disadvantageous is the true nature (*svarūpa*) of the very specific (*vīṣṭā*) type of activity that inheres in the body (*Ki* 1971: 88, 10-2), activity of the type, ‘striving’ (ceṣṭā). Such acts of striving, that is, of activity and its restraint are *induced* respectively, by our judgements and evaluations of what we consider to be pleasurable, favourable or beneficial for ourselves and what we consider to be painful, unfavourable or harmful; because such judgements provoke desire and aversion that motivate the two ‘forms’ of
will that are exercised as activity and restraint, respectively. Note that by definition will is something that is motivated by judgement-sponsored desires, that is, by evaluations and appraisals and the desires these incline one to. Will, therefore, has cognitions and affections as its preconditions (see § 5.5). Further, will is a property, so we must infer from its exercise, its bearer: the willful (prayatnavān) controller (adhiṣṭhātr) of the body. The controller must be a unitary owner and bearer of will as well as of its cognitive and affective preconditions: it must be a self.

Praṣastapāda argues that we infer a bodily controller from the exercise of will in bodily strivings, because the nature of striving is akin to the movements of a chariot which is guided by the perceptual judgements, and subsequent desires and willings, of the charioteer who steers it. Just as a chariot requires a conscious agent, a bearer of cognition-induced and desire-motivated willings to steer it, so too do voluntary bodily actions require a conscious agent or controller respectively, a self.37 Śrīdhara explains what this analogy means in this way:

37 Praṣastapāda’s model of self as the charioteer and the body as the chariot in PDS § 78 refers to the popular philosophical metaphor of the body as a chariot repeatedly re-worked by Hindu and Buddhist schools in a variety of guises. Although the intellect is the charioteer in the following model and the self the rider, this is in fact an accurate metaphor for the self in Praṣastapāda, as the unmoving locus of the network of cognitive and agential capacities that guide mental and bodily action:

*Know the self as a rider in a chariot,
and the body, as simply the chariot.
Know the intellect as the charioteer,
and the mind, as simply the reins.
The senses, they say, are the horses,
and the sense-objects are the paths around them;
He who is linked to the body, senses, and mind,
the wise proclaim as the one who enjoys’ (Ka Up 1996: 3.13-4).

The Upanisadic model clearly ascribes an instrumental role to the senses (indriya) and the ‘mind’ (manas), which carries over into the classical Vaiśeṣika model of cognition. Note manas is translated as ‘mind’ in the Upaniṣadic passages but in the context of Vaiśeṣika, I translate it as the ‘executive modality’ (manas) or the ‘inner instrument’ or ‘inner sense-modality’ (antahkarana), given its peculiar specification as an instrumental substance – a notion that is absent in the Upaniṣads. In the Upaniṣadic passage, the intellect as the charioteer corresponds, in the PDS, to the network of mental states that are constitutive of conscious agency, namely, cognitive judgements, desires and willings. The self as the rider in the chariot corresponds, in the PDS, to the unchanging self-substance that is involved in action as the locus of mental states but which, like the rider, is itself inactive.
‘... activity capable of acquiring what is advantageous and avoiding that which is disadvantageous through accepting and rejecting, respectively, the means leading to these [which is located in the body], must be regarded as preceded by will, because it is a specific kind of activity, like the movement of a chariot ... [Such activity must be] controlled by an intelligent agent’ (NK 1984: 83, 1-4).

Voluntary movements of the body are held to be analogous to the controlled movements of a chariot that are guided by a charioteer. Just as a charioteer is required, who is able to willfully steer a chariot in the right direction towards its destination, avoiding wrong turnings and even potholes on its way (Patil 2009), so too a willful controller of the body is required who is able to guide its actions in accordance with its cognitive judgements and desires by its exercise of will (PDS 1994: § 78; Śū 1983: 364). Will is the instrumental or efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) that initiates bodily activity and restraint as it does the guided movements of a chariot. Its bearer, or owner, a controller (adhiṣṭhātr) of the body is required who has the ability to control the actions of the body in the same way that a charioteer controls a chariot, by responding willfully to his judgements and desires. The difference, of course, between willful control of the body and of a chariot is that whereas the charioteer controls the movements of the chariot from the ‘outside’ so to speak, based in perceivings and judgements about this vehicle, its mode of operation, location, the direction to be taken, etc., the controller of the body exercises direct control over bodily movements, from ‘within’, albeit based on sense-perceptions and judgements.

So the capacity of being the bearer of intentional or desire-motivated movements that we find in the body and its parts owes to its causal association with an agential self, who governs bodily movement by its exercise of will over the relevant bodily part (PDS(J) 1982: 629-31; Ki 1971: 88; 10-1; see § 4.6). This means that activity and restraint arise as relational and intentional properties of the body for a self which is causally associated with the body (PDS 1994: § 78). I take an intentional property to be a property that necessarily owes its existence to its usefulness for a conscious being, a self for whom, as Śrīdhara explains above, the body is a means of achieving pleasurable ends and avoiding possibilities that may be harmful to it.

Note, Plato’s use of the chariot allegory in the Phaedrus parallels the two sorts of choices a self can make in Praśātapāda, choosing the path of self-knowledge and freedom by the exercise of its rational powers, or the path of pleasure and suffering in which self is invested in its passion for psychophysical objects (§ 1.4, § 5.6-5.7).
The central assumption of this argument is clear from the analogy used. From the guided movement of a chariot we infer the presence of a charioteer who drives and steers it by exercising mental control (prayatna), because we know the chariot itself to be a non-conscious entity, and so incapable of mental control. Similarly, on the assumption that the body qua bodily matter is also essentially non-conscious and so incapable of exercising will, we infer from its controlled movements the presence of a controller or self, who possesses will (prayatnavān), where will is the efficient cause necessary for guiding the body for achieving desired ends (NK 1984: 83 1-3; Ki 88:13-6). Just as distinct causal powers and liabilities of conscious agency and non-conscious instrumentality are assigned to the charioteer and his chariot respectively, so too, by analogy, are distinct causal powers and liabilities assigned to the conscious controller and its body.

Jagadīśa brings to light a possible motivation behind this argument:

‘... from the cognition of sound, etc., [one’s own] self is inferred as their substratum, and in establishing the category of self, the aim is not just to establish one’s own self but to establish all selves. However, since others’ cognitions are not perceivable [and, therefore,] the inferential means [of establishing their selves] cannot be cognized [by us], how [can we] infer those [selves] from their cognitions? [In response] to that he (Praśastapāda) establishes [activity and restraint of activity] found in the body as the perceivable inferential reason which establishes all selves. The meaning is that self, others’ and one’s own equally, is joined to the body as its controller who exercises will’ (Śū 1983: 364).

Jagadīśa argues that to prove other selves an empirically detectable inferential mark (hetu) is required. For this reason, Praśastapāda uses bodily striving and restraint in pursuit of desired objects and avoidance of undesired ones as inferential criteria for establishing all selves, others as well as one’s own. The assumption is that intentional bodily behaviour is an activity that is detectably different from unintentional activities. For this reason, it can serve as an inferential reason for inferring the exercise of will and its agential bearer, unlike cognition, which is only introspectively available, or will. So the observation of the bodily behaviour of others and of oneself in given circumstances, behaviour of the type ‘striving’, is sufficient to infer the presence of will. Note that Praśastapāda and Śrīdhara do not explicitly make bodily striving and restraint an argument for proving other selves, while Udayana and Jagadīśa do (Ki 1971: 88 4-6; Śū 1983: 364).
4.5. The Objective Presentation of Will

In the above argument, Praśastapāda suggests that sensory and bodily actions that are motivated by desire exhibit a physical trajectory in which the presence of will is empirically detectable. There is an objective, behavioural presentation of will in intentional acts that is distinct from any phenomenological or subjective presentations it may have. So, when someone throws a ball or drives a chariot, we know these to be intentional phenomena from the controlled response to circumstances we detect in these physical movements. For this reason, Praśastapāda cites the calculated movement of a ball thrown with an aim in view, or the guided motion of a chariot as indicating the presence of control and guidance that owes to an agent (PDS 1994: § 78). A ball thrown intentionally towards another ball follows a trajectory that from its point of inception to its point of termination detectably traces a non-arbitrary path; in contrast with a ball that is blown away by a gust of wind according to the physical variables of its situation. In the same way, a voluntary bodily movement exhibits a dynamic intentionality that is empirically detectable as being controlled and agential; that is, we know from the parameters that contextualize and define a movement, the circumstances of its inception, the path followed, and the context and nature of its termination that it is an intentional or reasons-based action. As Marcel argues:

‘The intentional nature of an action or its agentive, autonomous nature can be a perceptible characteristic of the action or movement itself, rather than relying on attribution, and this can be perceptually available equivalently in the actions of oneself and others. In addition to movement initiation unaccompanied by other spatio-temporally adjacent movement or impact, the dynamics of movement acceleration, trajectory, and termination themselves reflect agency and intentionality, and force-changes over time in a voluntary or controlled movement that are different from those in reflex and mechanically caused movements’ (Marcel 2003: 55).

Desire-motivated bodily actions executed by will are held to be empirically discernable by Praśastapāda in PDS § 78. The assumption here appears to be that willed actions demonstrate the active, objective thrust of desire into the physical world. But the inference from this desire-basis to the willful execution of these desires in bodily actions, presupposes a functionalist framework: a framework in which mental states such as desires and willings are defined by their particular roles, their characteristic causes and effects, including their causal relation to each other. Evidently, the claim here is not one of entailment from behaviour to inner mental states,
but an argument from certain kinds of sensory inputs and mental states, such as seeing an apple and judging it to be pleasurable, to causal relationships of these mental states with other mental states, such as desiring that same apple, and certain mental and behavioural outputs, namely, willing to obtain that apple by reaching for it (PDS 1994: 78). On this functionalist conception of mental life, a mental state of willing is identified by its causal role, that is, by its characteristic causes in terms of sensory inputs and cognitive judgements and desires, and its behavioural effects or outputs such as bodily action.

What Praśastapāda proposes is that willings are behaviourally manifest in bodily movements as the navigation of a controlled path of bodily movement, from inception to conclusion, such that the path carved out is discernably reasons-responsive. The gist of this claim is that bodily strivings give defeasible evidence for will. The question is how this serves as an argument for a self, and how this supports Praśastapāda’s implicit thesis that such a self is a non-physical substance. The answers to this lie in the structure of mental-physical causation involved in actions.

4.6. The Structure of Mental-Physical Causation of Action

The structure of mental-physical causation in action is described in the following manner in the text:

‘… when one wishes to perform acts such as … studying, giving, farming, etc., throwing the hand up or down, then will (prayatna) arises in the self occupying the region of one’s hand, and the [indirect] contact of one’s self and one’s hand [,the non-substratum cause of bringing about this action,] aided by [the instrumentality of] will and the weight [of the object], produces a motion in the hand; and similarly, in the case of other limbs of the body’ (PDS(J) 1982: 629-31, revised trans.; see also, FS 1911: 5.1.1).

Similarly:

‘When picking up a stick, [if] a man has a desire to throw it up by means of his hand, then there follows a will (prayatna) on his part, and when this willing influences the [indirect] contact of the self with his hand, there appears in his hand the action of being thrown up or raised, and simultaneously with this there

39 Contact between self and material objects is indirect (parampara), mediated by manas.
arises a like action in the stick following from the contact of his hand and the stick, effected by the will of self” (*PDS(J)* 1982: 630, revised trans.).

The structure of action presented here is that a desire to do something is followed by will, and from the ‘instrumentality’ of will and the contacts that proceed from it between the component parts of an action – indirect contact between self and hand mediated by *manas*, and direct contact between hand and stick - there arises the bodily movement of hand-raising and the raising of the stick it has picked up (*PDS(J)*1982: 634).

In a similar way, when we desire to throw a mace, for example, this induces a willing on our part that brings about mediated self-hand contact and direct hand-mace contact, which is called ‘impulsion’ (*nodana*), as well as an act-effect in the mace itself of the type ‘impulsion’. Impulsion, produces in the mace a certain momentum (*vega*) and from these two, impulsion and momentum, a number of actions are produced until the mace is released from the hand. At this point ‘impulsion’ ceases, but the momentum of the mace continues to produce a number of actions shaped by the intentional structure of the will that initiates it, until finally the mace falls to the ground under the influence of causal factors such as its weight (*gurutva*) (*PDS* 1994: 634). Note here that a will-event introduces in the body a chain of causal events that are shaped and structured by its particular intentional structure; that is, by its target object and the means and method required to achieve this end.

The parts of mental-physical causation involved in action are then factored in the following way:

‘In the production of bodily action, self-body contact is the non-substratum cause, and will produced by the self occupying the regions of the body [involved in the action is] the instrumental cause’ (*PDS(J)* 1982: 631, revised trans.).

The underlying supposition here is that it is *manas* that mediates the interaction of self and body as the executor of the intentional structure of volitional states. For with regard to the executive faculty, *manas*, Praśastapāda states that ‘it (*manas*) embodies in itself all the will (*prayatna*) and vital powers (*adṛṣṭa*) [requisite for self’s] actions’ (*PDS* 1994: § 82). Will is the efficient cause of an intentional action. It is when will arises in the sensory or bodily region where movement is required for accomplishing a particular end that bodily striving is initiated in that region, such as when I reach up with my arm
to pick up an apple I wish to eat. So a strong determination such as, ‘I will eat that apple’ initiates a willful arm-movement in my arm and hand by which I am able to reach up and pick up that apple. Śrīdhara (NK(J) 1982: 562) gives an example of the propositional form of willing that may be present in a willful determination as ‘I will kill him’. Will, or rather, its intentional structure is the progenitor of an intentional bodily action that carries out this determination through the causal relation which it establishes between self and body, via manas, at the point where bodily movement is required to achieve its end – the event of picking up the apple so I may eat it. Note that it is the intentional structure of will that impels a physical movement, because willing itself is an unconscious, non-Intentional state, like desire and pleasure. But since will can be an object of cognition, it is also possible that it is the contents of conscious willing that impel an action.

Praśastapāda points out above that when I wish to raise my hand and succeed in doing so, my hand rises, and among the causes of its going up are my desire and will that my arm should go up. We see from this example that intentional structures and attitudes, namely, unconscious desires and willings are simply directed upon the occurrence of those bodily events relevant to achieving the goal aimed for, such as picking up that apple with my hand because I wish to eat it. So mental causation by willing and its cognitive and affective precursors is such that what is caused by these states is directly related to the intentional structures and objects of these states – which except for cognitive judgements need not be conscious and Intentional. More generally, in the case of ordinary voluntary actions, movements of the agent’s body have among their causes intentional structures and attitudes such as judgements, desire and will of that agent that are about such movements and directed upon such movements.

What is the mechanism by which willings bring about voluntary bodily actions? In the case of voluntary actions, the mediation of the executive faculty between self and body is instrumental for ensuring that the agent’s desires and willings, that is, her intentional attitudes and structures are attentionally directed upon the event the agent strives to accomplish in fulfillment of her goals. So, if I consider it advantageous to raise my arm, I can ordinarily do so, because the goal of raising my arm induces the desire to do so and this motivates my will to direct the executive faculty attentionally upon the requisite bodily part for carrying out the appropriate bodily movement. The direction of the executive faculty by my will is a subpersonal process that is governed
by the vital will (dharma and adharma) of the self; that is, the agent directs her body
directly from within by a subpersonal attentional mechanism anchored in manas which
mediates the inner causal association (samyoga) of self and its body (PDS 1994: 78, 81;
PDS(J) 1982: 630-1).

**Enlivening and Intentional Form in Mental Causation**

In the above discussion, will is causally responsible for initiating the particular
intentional form of a bodily movement; that is, its dynamic structure and organization.
It is responsible for the particular intentional features of a required bodily movement or
‘striving’, such as raising one’s hand to pick up that apple I wish to eat, or the act of
‘throwing a mace’ or ‘picking up a stick’ in the examples given above. It is responsible,
in other words, for the structure of bodily intentionality in an act of striving. As Praśastapāda asserts, ‘… will influences the contact of the self with the hand, [so that]
there appears in the hand the action of being thrown up or raised … [italics mine]’ when
I pick up a stick, for example (PDS(J) 1982: 630). Similarly, the series of physical
movements that constitute the motion of a mace, when it is released from my hand on
being thrown, are shaped by the intentional structure of the will that initiates this
movement. The role of the willed action of the executive faculty in this case is to
‘enliven’ the sensory or bodily part that is to be used to accomplish a particular goal
(see NK(J) 1982: 205), and structure the chain of causal events that constitute the
physical movements necessary for accomplishing this aim as discussed in the mace-
throwing example (PDS(J) 1982: 634). We might say that will structures physical
causation involved in bodily action, as well as physical causation in objects that are
associated with such actions in that their movement is shaped by the causal powers of
will via a chain of physical causal contacts or causal events that terminate in will, or
have their source in it.

The ‘intentional form’ of bodily movements, such as throwing up one’s hand if
one wishes to, is constituted of physical causal events that are initiated and coordinated
by the dynamic intentionality of the executive faculty. The executive faculty appears to
have the role of translating the intentional structure of willings into co-ordinated chains
of physical causation of the type ‘impulsion’, for example, that constitute bodily action
(PDS(J) 1982: 634). The executive faculty provides the critical ontological and causal
link between self and body, as we have seen in chapter two, by which the intentional structures or conscious determinations of will, to pick up a stick or throw a mace, are directly, sub-personally translated by the executive faculty into a dynamic structure of bodily intentionality. This appears to derive from the nature of the executive faculty as a dynamic information-processing unit. The executive function enables willings to bear responsibility for the organizational characteristics and identity of a particular bodily movement, its particular dynamic organization and unity, such as a voluntary hand-raising, or throwing movement. The idea seems to be that manas is able to transmit the particular intentional structures of a volitional state, which may be unconscious, in a sort of dynamic syntax to the sense-faculty or bodily part appropriate for achieving the aims of the person.

4.7. The Ontology of Powers and the Causation of Action

The description of action given above is a description of the structure of ‘conscious and unconscious actions of things that are under the guidance of the self’ (PDS (J) 1982: 638). Such action involves mental-physical causation of the sort we have seen above between self and body. However, the nature of natural physical causation makes it the case that the exercise of will can only occur in a non-physical substance: an agent must be non-physical. The argument derives directly from the ontology of causal powers that are attributed to physical phenomena.

The text describes natural physical causation in the following way. In the four atomic substances, earth, water, air and fire that are

‘not guided by the self, we have only non-conscious motion … proceeding from impulsion and other such other causes. Impulsion is that particular kind of conjunction that is brought about by the instrumentality of weight, fluidity, momentum and will, functioning either collectively or singly’ (PDS(J) 1982: 638-9, revised trans.).

The role of will in the list of possible causal factors in the type of physical causation that is brought about by ‘impulsion’ is that of initiating and lending ‘intentional form’ or structure to physical movements as we have discussed in the previous section. There are, however, also other types of physical cause such as ‘striking’ (abhīghāta) which is a
'particular kind of conjunction which is produced by momentum, and is the cause of that motion which brings about disjunction [as well] ... in the four atomic substances. For instance, when a stone falls upon a solid body ...' (PDS(J) 1982: 640, revised trans.).

Śrīdhara elucidates the distinction between physical agency and movement and intentional or goal-oriented bodily actions. Bodily striving in the form of activity and restraint of activity, he claims, is distinct from the movement of say a creeper floating in a body of water, or the movement of a corpse in a river (NK 1984: 82, 23-5), because the movement of a creeper or a corpse in a river accords with causal factors such as 'impulsion' (nodana) and 'striking' (abhighāta) that refer to objective causal factors in the physical system it is embedded in, such as the direction and velocity of the water current, the force of gravity, slope of the water-bed, etc., given its own material properties such as weight (gurutva). A creeper or a corpse merely transmits the causal influences of the physical system it is embedded in, it is impelled or struck from the outside by objective and systemic causal powers, given the nature of its own powers and liabilities. In other words, physical objects are ‘urged’ by other substances as Śrīdhara has already argued above (§ 4.1). But what we might call the conscious body, or the body of a conscious person, demonstrates ‘striving’; it demonstrates willful controlled movement that is motivated by the desires and ends of the conscious self, even if these motivations are not themselves conscious.

As we saw above (§ 4.5), the physical characteristics of a bodily movement that is internally motivated and controlled in this way appear distinct from one which is externally impelled: the controlled movement of a body swimming across a river which aims to achieve the result of crossing the river for its own ends and purposes, is manifestly distinct from the movement of a corpse in a river, which floats aimlessly according to the direction of the water current, or is haplessly carried downstream. We know from observing the direction of movement of the swimmer, and the self-controlled and calculated manner in which his body swims rather than simply being moved, that it incorporates mental control or will. We know this movement is guided by reasons because it appears to be self-motivated and self-guided and actively responsive to environmental and internal causal factors. But the movement of a non-conscious entity appears merely to transmit causal influence; it appears to be a bearer of passive causal powers and liabilities. We might say that we discern the objective thrust or expression of desire and will in the first type of action; we observe self-instigated
acts, acts that are motivated and controlled as one’s own. In the case of natural physical motions, however, we do not observe self-instigation and motivation or control: we observe a lack of ownership in such motions. However, such observation of movement can only give defeasible evidence of will, because there might be a case where someone chooses to just drift along in water, in which case we may find no discernable evidence of an intentional act.

Similarly, striving to attend perceptually is not explicable as the causal effect of physical agencies such as the vital air or vital energies (prāṇa) of the body, Śrīdhara argues, because physical agencies such as air have the propensity to bring about chance events of accidental contact, say when contact between two pebbles is brought about by a gust of wind (NK 1984: 84, 2-3), or the clash of two winds produces a whirlwind (NK 1984: 83, 12-3). In perceptions, were the executive and sense-faculties qua physical entities moved simply by physical forces, this would lead to random fluctuations and movements of perceptual attention:

‘Contact between [any two physical objects such as] pebbles can be established by chance [by a gust of wind, say]; [in the same way, if physical agencies such as the vital airs were to be the cause of perceivings,] random contact of the executive and sense-faculties would occur and so, perceivings of undesired sense-objects. By using the term ‘desired’ (abhimata) object, Praśastapāda avoids the possibility of a physical and non-conscious agent of perceivings’ (NK 1984: 84, 2-3).

Jagadīśa distinguishes mental and physical causal powers in this way:

‘[Self is inferred from these] two [types of movement, bodily striving and restraint, insofar as] they enable that [, the acquisition or avoidance of desired and undesired objects, respectively]. The movement of wind, etc., on the other hand, does not have the capacity of bringing about and averting what is favourable and unfavourable, respectively, for the wind, etc. …’ (Śū 1983: 364).

Physical movements brought about by wholly physical causes such as the causal agency of wind are not sensitive to judgements of what is considered favourable and desirable: natural physical movements are not reasons-sensitive. They do not demonstrate the power of acting for reasons or on consideration of reasons such as one’s evaluations and beliefs about what is advantageous or beneficial for oneself. For this reason, it is not plausible that intentional actions are generated by physical agencies.

On the above account, it is the rational sources and structure of will, the intimate links between cognitions, desires and willing, that mark out action and agency. They
mark out the acts of agents and subjects in pursuit of their desires and pleasures, from the motions of non-agents and non-subjects, namely, physical objects. Voluntary or intentional bodily movements as opposed to mere physical movements differ, in this view, both in how they are causally explained in terms of reasons, and also in terms of what constitutes them.

Voluntary actions are informed by mental states such as desire and will which have meaning and normative value for someone, a self, the normative demands of which, as we saw in chapter two, give force to the causal powers of mental states in the structure of action. For these mental states, and the actions they structure, are meaningful as bearers of rational and ethical values of being favourable, good, desirable, etc., for someone who is the owner of these states, a self. As we saw in chapter two, it is ‘I-hood’ or selfhood as the source of normativity of mental states that motivates and integrates their causal powers in the mental causation of action. This is the essence of Praśastapāda’s argument why an agential self is required as the basis of acts of striving.

4.8. Causal Arguments Against the Body as Agent

Udayana presents the Cārvāka view against a non-physical self in the following way: the examples of bodily and sensory striving that seek to establish a controller of the body in fact present the body (vigrāha) itself as the willful (prayatnāvān) controller (adhiṣṭhātra) of its actions (kṛiyā), in the example of the charioteer who steers a chariot, or the boy who throws a ball, etc. Why not, therefore, accept the body to be the controller of its actions? Udayana responds that were the body accepted to be the controller, an infinite regress (anavasthā) would loom (Ki 1971: 90, 14-6). The argument, in parallel with the argument against causation by instruments (§ 4.2) rests on an agent-instrument, or means-end, model of action.

From the division of mental and physical causal powers explicated above, the body qua physical cannot exhibit will, nor can a part of the body such as the brain do so. The body because it is a physical thing is essentially a means. The only model of causation that either the body or a part of the body can follow is a model of physical causation of the sort we might call impact causation, or a billiard-ball model of causal action, which is illustrated in the following claim:
'If we did not accept that intentional acts were governed by a non-physical controller of the body (vigrāhasyādhiṣṭhātā) who exercises will, we would have to accept that the body is controlled by something which does not exercise will, i.e., we would have to accept production without mental control (prayatna), as in the case of inanimate things [such as stones]. But this is not possible and is a hindering factor (bādhaka)' (Ki 1971: 88, 15-6).

The body, since it lacks the possibility of bearing mental properties such as cognition, desires and willings, i.e., the Intentional and intentional structures that are characteristic features of the mental, is bound to physical causation as objective causation of the sort we find in nature, when a boulder hits another boulder and sends it rolling forward; but here the first boulder is necessarily moved by the action of a further causal factor, the impact of a second boulder on it, and this second boulder moves because of the action of say, a gale-force wind on it, and the latter is moved by the action of air-pressure in the region, and so on ad infinitum. Now, in the case of causation in natural physical phenomena this appears perfectly intelligible as a model of causation of such physical movements. But as a model of causation of intentional actions of the body such a theory leads to an infinitely regressive chain of causation where the agent of the action disappears, rendering such action inexplicable. The underlying assumption here is that whereas a model of impact causation and ever-receding authorless chains of causation may be entirely appropriate in the explanation of physical phenomena, intentional actions call for an entirely different sort of explanation, one that is based on mental agency and causation of the sort discussed in the last section. And the body and its parts, such as the brain, being a physical object simply cannot be the bearer of such powers.

Supposing we were to take the brain to be the agent and the remainder of the body to be its instrument, the brain could not in fact be an agent, say as the controller of the neural processes of the body and its vital and biological functions. Because even though the brain is a necessary causal factor for carrying out an action, the dynamic neural processes and other vital and biological processes that it appears to control have the material structures of the brain and the body as their material substratum but not as their efficient cause, in the classical Vaiśeṣika view. By definition, the causal organization of mental and bodily life and behaviour cannot emerge or arise as a property of the brain or the body itself, because matter intrinsically lacks self-referring and self-organizing capacities. So the organizational control of the brain and its bodily basis must be vested in a non-physical substance, a self who underivatively has the
capacity of conducting self-organizing processes from its very nature as a bearer of self-referring cognitive, affective and volitional and vital powers. However, the exercise of mental causal powers necessarily requires a bodily apparatus, including a brain on which it is essentially dependent as the physical structure that enables the realization of its intentional states and structures via the executive faculty; because since mental states are necessarily Intentional or have an intentional structure, they have an object or are directed towards an object or aim, respectively. But these require the physical structures of the body and the executive faculty for access to these objective inputs, their processing and responses to them (Ganeri 2012: 226-32, 262-7).

The gist of this argument is succinctly summarized by Hornsby. Actions, she suggests, are inextricably connected to beliefs, desires, and intentions, and are explicable only in terms of the personal point of view of these states. For on a non-personal or objective view of things, they appear as act-events that are merely links in a causal chain. Actions, qua intentional, cease to be present on a non-personal view of things: they cease to be explicable in terms of non-personal, objective and scientific explanatory models (Hornsby 1993: 161-2). Unlike Hornsby, however, for our philosophers the personal explanation of intentional actions is held to imply that they must have their locus in a non-physical self.

Bodily Ownership and Causation

The body, Praśastapāda claims, is the substratum cause (samavāyin) of its intentional movements (PDS 1994: § 78); it is the substance in which its strivings (ceṣṭā) are located. It therefore appears to be the ‘agent’ of its activities, but in fact, these activities are possible only because of their ‘impulsion’ (nodana) by the willings of the self (PDS 1982(J): 634) which are exercised within the body. The body is the physical basis, the substratum of intentional movements or bodily strivings (PDS 1994: § 78). But the actions of the body are not motivated and guided by itself. The body is able to act in a guided and calculated manner in strivings, because it stands in a relationship of ‘being-owned’ to the self, claims Śrīdhara:

‘… the body belongs to the self … it is not the body that supplies the force impelling itself; as any such impulsion (nodana) by itself would involve a contradiction… it is the object of the impelling…’ (NK(J) 1982: 124, revised trans.).
In fact,

‘… the body can only be accepted as impelling or giving rise to desire [for example, hunger] and will. After desire and will have been brought about [towards an object(s),] and when these desires, etc., begin to operate towards impelling [the body towards a certain course of action], the body ceases to be the impelling agent. Because the body, being the object of this impelling cannot, at the same time, be its agent. And thus we find that there is no similarity between the action of the self and that of the body’ (NK(J) 1982: 125, revised trans.).

The idea here is that even though it may be the hunger of the body that gives rise to my desire to eat a slice of chocolate cake I see on the table and the will to it pick up with my hand, we find that once these have arisen the body serves merely as the means or instrument required for achieving these desires and willings. The body is a means which is impelled by will to achieve self’s aims, even if it is instrumental in the arising of these aims in the first place. The body is the object of will and that which is impelled by will; it is a means that cannot itself be the impeller, that which impels, on pain of contradiction – the ascription of two contradictory properties to the same substance.

As in the case of causation by instruments, the possibility of the body being an agent is also denied on linguistic grounds. Jagadīśa argues that we consider ourselves to have a body, or to possess a body, rather than to be one. Our apprehension, he suggests, is that ‘I have a body’, not that ‘I am a body’ (Śū 1983: 368). For this reason, we are apt to say if speaking of an intentional action of raising one’s arm: ‘I raised my arm’. Were we to say, ‘The arm rose’, this would convey that the arm rose because of the action of an exogenous force, or by its own force independent of my determination to raise it. It is ownership by a self that is the defining feature characteristic of human minds and bodies, and the mental structures of intention and Intention these are inalienably associated with are underderivatively found only in a substance that is sui generis a self, in virtue of being non-physical.

The arguments from infinite regression are based on a controversial assumption, namely, that the body and its parts qua matter are essentially no different from a pot or a ball or any other instrument as far as their intrinsic properties are concerned. It is for this reason that the body or a part of it cannot be a bearer of agency and necessarily requires an external causal agency to enable its actions. The Cārvāka objection to a non-physical agent, however, refers to the living body as the obvious agent of intentional actions, and not merely the physical structure of the body: ‘… the [living]
body is observed to be the willful controller’ (*Ki* 1971: 88, 14-5), it is ‘the embodied being who is the agent and the operator’ (*ATV* 1995: 394). But as we have seen (§ 2.9, see also § 5.1), *qua* matter the body is considered by Praśastapāda to be animated or alive solely in virtue of its causal connection with a self via *manas*. This excludes the living body, by definition, as a potential substratum of agency. I look at this objection from the nature of the living body or living organisms more closely in the next chapter (§ 5.1).

*Mental Actions*

Udayana argues that there are acts such as contemplation that do not require bodily involvement. In such cases the body is a mere appendage, a presence that serves no causal purpose, in the way that the presence of light serves no causal purpose ‘in the positive or negative association of smoke and dry-grass-fire’ (*ATV* 1995: 394-5, revised trans.). However, classical Vaiśeṣika metaphysics posits that mental contemplation and mental actions such as imagining, deliberating and so on are necessarily dependent on the information-processing and executive functions of *manas*. What we take to be the neural processing activity of the brain would be imputed by our philosophers to the physical particle *manas*, so that the exclusion of the body as a causal factor in mental actions does not exclude the essential causal role of the executive faculty and its subpersonal physical processing of mental functions (*PDS* 1994: 239). For any action is necessarily a physical movement, regardless of whether it is a mental or a bodily action because the ground of all action is the exercise of will through the executive faculty as the minimal physical basis that is essentially involved in any mental or a bodily act.

*The Human Body, Mechanisms and Machines*

Possible objections to the argument from infinite regression, and the thesis that an agent must be non-physical, can be raised from the nature of agency that might be ascribed to complex machines and forms of artificial life, such as robots or androids and other autonomous mechanisms. An objection might be raised that the body or the brain is a mere mechanism of the same sort. And just as robots are able to perform many of the operations a human agent does, and exhibit ‘choice’ of ends to be accomplished and ‘control’ over actions necessary to accomplish these, so too does the body. The
objection is apt, it may be claimed, because Praśastapāda himself depicts the body as a sort of natural artifact, and Udayana describes it as a mechanism (yantra) (Ki 1971: 89, 15-6) that is produced to serve certain ends. Is it not possible that such a natural artefact, like physical artefacts fabricated by human agents, would likewise be able to engage in actions that exhibit choice of ends and control of physical movement in a goal-oriented way? Does not the possibility of robotic actions or actions of similar mechanisms threaten the thesis that conscious states, desire and will which are considered necessary for the causal explanation of intentional actions are, in fact, not required and, therefore, neither is their putative non-physical locus (see Lowe 2008: 39-40)? And, surely, mechanisms and machines raise a valid objection to Udayana’s infinite regression argument?

The causes of ‘acts’ ascribed to mechanisms and machines, qua artefacts and instruments are, however, traceable via their design and construction and relevant facts about the evolution of their design back to their Designer, or Controller. Such mechanisms are constructed to serve the aims and purposes of their Designer and Controller (see Franssen 2009; Vihvelin 2011), and cannot be said to have their own aims and purposes, that is, aims and purposes that are determined normatively by reference to themselves. For a mechanism or machine performs only those tasks and serves those purposes that fall within the scope of its algorithm, or programming, the operational framework embedded in it by its Designer or Controller, who then represents the ultimate agent.

So even though a robot may do household chores, or a chess-playing computer play chess, and an airplane on autopilot might navigate a plane, and while the series of physical movements performed by these mechanisms may emulate or imitate the movements of a human agent, with similar consequences on the object acted upon – household rubbish, chess pieces and the airplane respectively – the possibility of such action presupposes the original Intentional states and intentional structures of the designer and manufacturer of the robot, the computer and the air-navigation system. Such devices could not come into being without any causal contribution from the mental structures of a conscious being, an agent. So a chess-playing computer, an airplane on autopilot, or a robot performing a variety of tasks, are in this account merely the proximate causes of their actions in the sense that the ‘choices’ they appear to make are in fact caused by factors external to ‘themselves’: their design and construction is
imposed by their designers or creators to serve their own purposes (see Lowe 2008: 39-40).

The sorts of ‘choices’ or modes of ‘control’ that we find in mechanisms lack Intentional content, intentional structures and their semantic features. The determination of a course of action, a ‘choice’ in this sense, does not depend on the meaning this action or rather the aims of this action have for this entity itself as its own goals and desires, i.e., it is not undertaken because it is judged advantageous or desirable in some way. In other words, the states of a robot or another complex mechanism lack the self-referring features of Intentional and intentional structures. The kind of syntactical information-processing we find in mechanisms is not unlike the functioning of manas as a physical processor, which necessarily requires a non-physical bearer of agency to guide it.

4.9. Basic Actions

The problem of infinite regression arises, as we have seen, if we assume that a means-end structure of causation is necessary for intentional actions – a means-end structure of causation is expected (isyate) when we describe intentional human actions Udayana claims (Ki 1971: 85), but not when we describe the behaviour of inanimate objects. An objection may be raised that the means-end schema does not apply to all actions: basic actions for instance. A basic action (see Lowe 2008: 124-33; see also McCann 1998: 180, 185, Ginet 1990: 13) is caused without the mediation of a means, for example, the spontaneous movement of my legs as I run to catch a bus. In actions such as this, there is nothing by doing which I do this act. As such, basic actions eliminate the possibility of infinite regress that a means-ends structure entails in Udayana’s argument. In a basic action, there is no question of a means by which the action is brought about; there is nothing by doing which I bring about this action. So, pace Udayana, infinite regress would be avoided in the case of physical causation of actions if we posited certain actions to be basic actions.

On Praśastapāda’s will-based account of action, however, there is something by doing which I cause my legs to run: I will my legs to run, and I am able to do so because my will exercises direct control over the executive faculty by which mental and bodily actions are initiated. The exercise of will, in such cases, may be attentional or
intentional, conscious or unconscious, but it remains the primary and essential component of any action, the ‘enlivening’ or ‘vitalizing’ causal factor that makes something an action. For this reason, the only truly basic action in this view is the act of attention: the act of willful control over the executive faculty that is the most basic component of any intentional or subintentional action, mental or physical. But the act of will as a basic action is an instrumental action, for it involves the exercise of control over an instrument, the executive faculty, for its occurrence. Yet the genesis of the causal motion of the executive faculty as the carrying out of agential attention or intentional goals resides not in another action but in the exercise of the active power of will, which is a state and not an action. This prevents an infinite regress here. It is of course controversial that attention should be seen as an instrumental act.

While this argument is open to physicalist objections on many fronts, these arise from different metaphysical presuppositions and intuitions. I suggest the main contribution of the above arguments for a dualist agent is the role they accord to attentional will; that is, to the unconscious or conscious direction of the attentional function of manas by will which lies at the heart of consciousness and of mental and bodily life more generally as we see in the next chapter. It is attentional will that gives consciousness its dynamic structure, and mental and bodily behaviour their intentional structures. But it does so, not only in virtue of being the exercise of an active mental power but also an instrumental act. The act of unconscious attention or attentional will is the first thrust of intentionality, the condition of possibility of consciousness and action, in the physical world.

4.10. Conclusion

The arguments for a non-physical agent of cognitive and other actions in Praśastapāda are based on a radical division of agential and instrumental properties. This, in turn, presupposes a strict dualism of mental and physical causal powers. Central to this dichotomy of mental and physical causal powers is the conception of human will, and its rational sources and structure in judgements and desires as the defining feature of human intentional actions. There are substantial objections to the ontology of mental and physical powers that lies at the heart of Praśastapāda’s arguments for a dualist conception of agency, from emergentism, including from the Cārvāka, and from various other versions of non-reductive physicalism. These objections are not addressed by
Praśastapāda, and the commentators have little to say about them in the context of his arguments. Physicalist objections from the nature of ‘choice’ and ‘control’ found in mechanisms and machines, and objections from the nature of basic actions have been addressed, but these do not appear seriously to threaten the claims for a non-physical agential self. Ultimately these physicalist objections and responses to them from the commentators rely on the adoption of different metaphysical primitives that indicate a fundamental clash of intuitions.
Chapter 5

The Scope of Agency and Rationality

5.0 Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss Praśastapāda’s conceptions of will (prayatna) and more broadly, the mental and moral structures that define the nature and scope of agency in mental and bodily life. I consider the two types of will, desire-motivated (icchāpūrvaka) and vital (jīvanayoniyatna) and how these are postulated as comprehensively responsible for all aspects of mental and bodily activity and function. This dual conception of will and its sources in the rational mental structures of a self is a personal vitalist view of the presence of primitive intentionalities and teleologies in organic life. It responds in part to physicalist objections to a self, and moreover, to a self that is non-physical.

There are, however, objections to the conception of will itself from the psychopathologies of agency and action that accompany a range of different kinds of neural dysfunction. I discuss in greater detail the structure of mental-physical causation that defines the relation between willing and striving in Praśastapāda, and how this meets some of these objections to the concept of will; and the implications this non-Cartesian conception of will and its subpersonal aspects has for the argument, based in Libet’s neuroscientific experiments, that ‘free will’ is a fallacy. The conception of will is subject to further objections from theories that actions are deterministically caused by belief-desire states. I show how this issue is addressed by the distinct intentional attitudes and structures that define the functional organization of mental states in Praśastapāda.

Mental states such as pleasure and pain, desire, fear, and will, are properties of the self, but these are not themselves conscious states in classical Vaiśeṣika. This means that unconscious events of pleasure and desire, for instance, become conscious only as objects of cognition. Further, these states are necessarily causally dependent on a prior cognition of objects that may subsequently serve as the target ‘objects’ of a desire, or will, or as a source of pleasure or pain. These two ways in which non-conscious mental states are necessarily causally dependent on cognition defines the role and scope of rational powers in mental governance; that is, the role of rational and moral judgements in the governance of mental attitudes.
It is important that the agent-instrument structure of cognition, and arguably for Udayana, its phenomenology as well, are essential for the very possibility of agency. The instrumental structure of cognition, and in particular, its attentional structures underpin the dialectic between attentional and intentional epistemic acts in which ‘practices of truth’, and their goal of direct self-experience, are founded.

We see in this chapter, as indicated earlier (§ 2.2), that mental causation in classical Vaiśeṣika is founded on the objective thrust or force of self’s desires and willings for the objects of the physical world, which is based in self’s identification with its affections and desires for such objects. However, the ordinary mental and moral structures of the self are themselves the source of epistemic, emotional and ethical rationalities that may be provoked towards those practices of truth that accomplish the ethical and soteriological aim of this system: self-knowledge. We see that these practices of reason redefine the epistemology and agency of self from one that is desire-based to one that is virtue-based, where the latter consists in the application and practice of emotional and ethical values, and the cultivation of mental attitudes and rationalities, that are the common or universal potentia of all human selves. These universal possibilities of the self derive from its nature as the highest good (nihīreyasa); their realization or fulfillment consists of global in-sight, and emotions and ethics that exemplify virtuous purity. We see in this discussion, how it is that self as the source of rationality and normativity underwrites the locus and possibilities of self-transformation of human life and behaviour. That is, how it is that the rational and moral powers of the self enable the acquisition of the epistemic and ethical truths that are the aim of human life.

5.1. Homeostatic Regulation and Organic Teleologies

We saw in the last chapter that the Indian physicalist objection to a non-physical self was that the living body itself is an agent, and is what is referred to in the exemplifications of an agential self mentioned by Praśastapāda: a charioteer, a carpenter, a ball-thrower, and so on. A physicalist critique such as this could raise an objection to the assumption of a radical division of mental and physical causal powers that underpins our philosophers’ arguments that only a non-physical self can be an agent of intentional actions. The assumption that mental and physical causal powers are necessarily ascribable to only mental and physical substances, respectively, is
potentially threatened by simple teleological or purposive systems such as plants and elementary living organisms. These may be considered to be primitive cognitive and conative systems whose behaviour and biological processes are plausibly explicable on a physical account of the structure and function of these systems (see Thompson 2007: 222-3; Chalmers 2002: 247-8). It may be held that the presence of primitive forms of goal-directed, intentional systems of the sort we find in simple forms of organic life demonstrates that mental states such as cognitions, desires and will that are defined by their Intentional or intentional features might have a natural physical genesis: we merely find a more complex version of these phenomena in human beings.

Without entering the debates from non-reductive physicalism and emergentism or dual-aspect theory, which are not considered by Praśastapāda, his possible response to such objections may be seen in a series of arguments that claim to attribute all forms of bodily intentionality in human bodies, all acts and functions from biological life to involuntary and voluntary sensory and bodily behaviour, to will; and so to its bearer, the willful (prayatnavān) controller (adhiśṭhātr), the self. The possibility that all human behaviour and activity might be attributed to will is explicated by Praśastapāda (PDS(J) 1982: 562-3) via the notion that there are, in fact, two types of will (prayatna). The first type of will is motivated by desires or aversions and informs intentional, sub-intentional and even certain sub-personal acts of the human agent in its conscious or waking state. This desire-motivated (icchāpūrvaka) will is

‘the cause of activities that strive to obtain what is desirable and avoid what is undesirable; and is also conducive to keeping the body in a state of steady equilibrium’ (PDS(J) 1982: 563, revised trans.).

It is also responsible for other activities of the waking state such as breathing and blinking (PDS 1994: § 78).

The second type of will is the will that impels instinctual, biological striving (jīvanayoniyatna) that is constitutive of the ‘mere act of living’ (NK(J) 1982: 563). This ‘vital will’ is impelled by the moral dispositions or constitution (dharma, adharma) of the individual and is required for maintaining the biological functions of the living organism. The vital will is the source of biological phenomena such as

40 I thank Pt. Baliram Shukla for discussing this subject with me (Pune, India, August, 2009).
inhale and exhale in the sleeping body \( (PDS(J)\ 1982: 563) \), and ‘the growth of
the body and the healing of its wounds and fractures, etc.,’ \( (PDS\ 1994: \S\ 78) \).

We have discussed the willed nature of intentional acts in the last chapter. Will
that proceeds from desires and aversions and is involved in maintaining the steadiness
of the body and a variety of subintentional and subpersonal processes that are
characteristic of waking is described in the following way:

‘the fact that the body, which is a heavy object, does not fall down is due to one’s will which itself owes
to the desire [to keep it steady]’ \( (NK(J)\ 1982: 564) \).

We similarly find that

‘the act of breathing is regulated by a person’s will. When dust gets into our nostrils, we breathe out with
force in order to blow dust out [of our nostrils]; this [sort of regulation of] breathing follows from
aversion. And from these facts, we are led to the conclusion that breathing is produced by will (prayatna)
\( (NK(J)\ 1982: 646) \).

Moreover, claims Praśastapāda,

‘from observing the changing (vikṛta) movement of the air contained in the body,\(^{41}\) [we infer a
controlling agent who is] like one who pumps the bellows. On account of the regular activity of opening
and shutting the eyes, [we infer a controlling agent who is] like a puppeteer [directing] a wooden puppet’
\( (PDS\ 1994: \S\ 78) \).

In the waking state, the regulation of breathing and of blinking, and the fact that these
shift in response to stimuli from the external environment as well as the internal
environment of the body, according to what is favourable or beneficial for the body,
means that such activities are sustained by desire-motivated will:

‘Action is produced in the air called “vital breath” (prāṇa) by self-air contact, by the instrumentality of
willings that originate from desires and aversions; and we learn this from the fact that the breathing of the
waking man follows the bent of his desires’ \( (PDS\ 1994: \S\ 355) \).’

\(^{41}\) The word vikṛta is used here in the sense of ‘transformation’ or being ‘unnatural’. The claim here is
that the ‘vital air’ which regulates bodily functions represents a transformation of the natural movement
of air in nature. The circulatory movement of ‘vital air’, the five prāṇas, in the body, as well as the
vertical movement of air in inhalation and exhalation differs from the natural horizontal movement of air
we find in nature (see \( NK\ 1984: 83, 7-10)\).
In subintentional and subpersonal acts such as the above, will is necessary to take account of the normativity these acts express, the self-concern that is evident in their implicit reference to what is good or not for the conscious organism. The unconscious and instinctual desires and aversions expressed in such acts have a self-referring character that tokens their owner, a self, in *PDS* § 78. Note the assumption here that in the waking state *manas* is in a state of attentional alertness: a state of sensory and bodily alertness that is responsive to inner and outer environmental stimuli, and mental states, from the onset of primitive attention (see § 3.8).

The self-organising activities of the human organism are similarly thought to evidence the existence of a willful controller, a self:

‘From the growth of the body, the healing of its wounds and fractures, etc., [we infer a controller] like a house-owner [who extends and repairs his house]’ (*PDS* 1994: § 78).

Jagadīśa elucidates the norms of self-integrity and self-continuity that define the presence of will and its bearer:

‘[Self is inferred] from the totality of the body’s activities such as its growth, the maintenance of its well-being, the healing of its wounds and fractures that allow it to recover its former condition, on account of its being the instrumental cause of these [activities]’ (*Śū 1983: 365).

Biological activities seek to maintain or recover the well-being and wholeness of the body itself, and its continuity. In so doing, they embody normative judgements and commitments about what is favourable for the organism as an autonomous system, such as bodily repair and growth (see Thompson 2007).

In fact, life itself is explained in the following way:

‘Living consists in a particular kind of [causal] contact between self and *manas* that is assisted by the states of *dharma* and *adharma* [of the self]’ (*NK(J) 1982: 649, revised trans.*).

Moreover, ‘the actions of in-breathing and out-breathing [that are characteristic of living in someone who is asleep] are the effects of this [vital] will, because they are actions’ (*NK(J) 1982: 563, revised trans.*); that is, the breathing in and out of someone who is asleep is ‘due to the instrumentality of the [vital] will that is involved in the processes of living’ (*PDS(J) 1982: 646*). The vital will is also the cause of bringing about contact of *manas* with self and the other sense-faculties at the moment of waking up (*NK(J) 1982: 563; see § 3.8*). This will proceeds directly from the contact of self and
*manas*, impelled by the vivifying powers of *dharma* and *adharma*, the virtuous and non-virtuous states of the self.

I suggest the key feature that characterizes the presence of these two types of will, desire-motivated and vital, *as* willing, in the above acts and functions, is the presence of implicit or explicit normativity in these activities. For the defining feature of these activities is that they have as their telos or end what is conducive to, or supportive of the well-being of the living organism or the human being, at a biological, behavioural or psychological level. The idea is that these activities make implicit or explicit reference to norms of some kind: they refer to a space of reasons of what is good or favourable, or not, for the human being as a self-guided biological and psychological system which is defined by its endogenous ends and purposes, mental, bodily and biological.

The defining characteristics which demonstrate the presence of will, and its owner, in mental and bodily life is the ostensible involvement of norms and judgements, in some way, in these activities; where these norms and judgements may be reflective and deliberative as in some intentional actions, or non-reflective and non-deliberative as in the case of sensory and bodily judgements that maintain bodily equilibrium or respond to environmental stimuli (see also Solomon 2003: 10). So the scope of agential behaviour and function includes the range of self-guided and self-referring behaviour from intentional and voluntary actions, to involuntary and instinctual responses (*jīvanayonīyatna*) (*PDS* 1994: § 78; *PDS(J)* 1982: 562-3), and the maintenance of organic ‘wholeness’ and self-continuity through repair and maintenance that ensures the biological integrity of the human organism.

*Human and Non-Human Selves*

The presence of biological intentionality and teleology naturally extends beyond humans to plants, trees, and simple organisms. The commentator Vyomaśīva suggests in this regard that the teleological or purposeful activities of plants, such as their turning to face the sun, exhibits desire (*Vy* 1983: 148, 26-7; 149, 5-8). Udayana similarly argues that trees and vegetation are subjects of experience, they are experiencers and enjoyers (*bhoktrādiśṭhātah*) and for this reason, selves. For they


‘evidence all the characteristics of what we generally consider the body (śarīra) to be [qua living organism], [namely,] living, dying, sleep, waking, illness, [self-]healing, [bearing] seeds, attachment to their own species, seeking what is favourable and avoiding what is unfavourable [to themselves]’ (Ki 1971: 39, 21; 40, 1-2).

Trees and plants, Udayana argues, are embodied selves because their activities arise as regularities and dispositions that evidence guidance by norms or values in seeking that which is favourable or ‘good’ and avoiding that which is unfavourable to themselves – that which is advantageous for their growth and continuity. The claim here is that plants and trees seek self-continuity through bearing seeds and germinating, and through biological processes such as healing, or simply the self-sustaining vital functions of of living itself. The preservation of life is assumed to be a value that guides activities and processes in these living beings; their activities ostensibly manifest values such as what is ‘good’ or favourable for the well-being and maintenance of these beings, where such activities are for themselves and so self-referring. The maintenance of their dynamic identity over time in various ways as an inner imperative, a self-referring value, is evidence of the presence of a self in these beings: a substance that is guided by norms and values that refer to its own structures and modes of well-being, continuity, and eventual dissolution as self-guided beings (see Halbfass 1991: 317-8).

The idea that not only humans and animals, but trees, plants and simple organisms experience pleasure and pain, and so desire and strive to obtain pleasure, and fear and seek to avoid pain and injury, is common to early Indian philosophy. Hindu and Jaina philosophers, in particular, consider evidence of sentience in plants, trees and simpler organisms to lie in their capacities for growth, reproduction and their demonstrably desire-seeking activities (see Schmithausen 1991 and Bhatt 1989). The idea behind this thesis is that living beings or organisms manifest various grades of purposive behaviour or intentionality, differentiated by the distinct characteristics of their psychophysical embodiment; where the latter is accounted for by the moral genealogy of their actions, which situates them appropriately in the distributive order or ethical distribution (vyavasthā) of selves.

The self-referring character of organic life, such as the self-organizing activity of the human organism exhibits, in this view, a rationality that is lacking in physical causal processes associated with inanimate phenomena such as a stone falling or a flash of lightning. Organic life exhibits a rationality that is based in self-concern, in
judgements, desires and willings, even if at a primitive, non-cognitive and unconscious level. This means that the crucial distinction that is evoked here is not between intentional, and sub-intentional or unintentional phenomena, or even between intentional and simple teleological phenomena, as in contemporary philosophy of action, but between the spectrum of behaviours and physical intentionalities associated with mental and bodily life, on the one hand, and those causal processes which define non-living and inanimate entities, on the other.

As Dennett (1991) says of the intentionalities that characterize simple organisms, albeit from a physicalist perspective, this capacity for behaviour which

‘staves off, however primitively, its (the entity’s) own dissolution and decomposition …brings with it into the world its “good” … the creature comes to have interests, … creating reasons…’ (Dennett 1991: 174).

Korsgaard (1992: 106) puts the matter succinctly in neo-Aristotelian terms: ‘A living thing is an entity whose nature it is to preserve and maintain its physical identity; it is a law to itself. Life is a value, since a living thing is a thing for which the preservation of identity is an imperative, life is a form of morality. Or as Aristotle put it, morality is just the form that human life takes.’

We have seen that Vyomaśīva and Udayana take plants and trees to manifest purposiveness or teleologies that ostensibly reflect primitive structures of rationality: archaic, non-cognitive modes of judgement, desire and will (Vy 1983 149, 5-8; Kī 1971; 39, 26; 40, 1-2). Even simple organic systems exhibit primitive, non-cognitive or non-reflective forms of bodily judgement that serve the ends and purposes of this system itself, in a way that the processes that define the functions of inanimate systems do not. For the former are rationally self-guided where the latter are not. Such a view distinguishes ultimately between those bodily movements and functions which exhibit norms or reasons, such as judgements and desires - in some way - and so constitute ‘rational’ systems that are self-referring or self-concerned, and those bodily and other physical movements which do not involve rational norms or reasons in any conceivable way.

However, as we saw in chapter four, intentional behaviour and human agency, are defined by our philosophers in terms of sensitivity to reasons which necessarily requires an implicit or an explicit awareness of oneself as oneself. Reasons, such as the
contents of judgements and beliefs and the objects aimed at by desires and willings are first-personally presented as our philosophers repeatedly emphasize (PDS 1994: § 78). Reasons are necessarily presented in thought and utterance in unity with the ‘I-notion’ (ahamkāra), as we saw in chapter two (§ 2.1); and this is necessary for the self-referential formulation of aims and decisions that structure intentional behaviour, whether such self-awareness is reflective and explicit or consists in implicit self-acquaintance, the background givenness of selfhood that Udayana points to (ATV 1995: 344 see § 2.4). Thus, I determine whether I should eat an apple rather than a piece of chocolate cake in view of the health benefits associated with each, ascertaining thereby what is favourable and so desirable for myself. But the purposive responses and behaviours associated with organic life, whether in plants, elementary organisms and animals or even human beings demonstrates at most non-cognitive judgements, ends and desires. So, human beings are conscious agents and selves who know themselves to be agents and subjects. But simpler organisms that lack developed cognitive powers are not self-aware agents and subjects: they are not personal selves, selves who are acquainted with themselves as selves.

Plants and trees are not plausibly agential subjects or personal selves, Vyomaśiva and Udayana would agree, because they are not conscious agents. They are nonetheless selves because they exhibit primitive desires even if these are not based in cognitive judgements. For Praśastapāda, however, plants and vegetables are not classified as loci of experience; they are not organisms (śarīra) that could be ‘receptacles of consciousness’. They are simply material structures and objects (viṣṇaya), the same kind of things as stones (PDS 1994: § 33). With regard to this, Udayana argues that Praśastapāda chose not to classify plants and trees as living beings, that is, as experiencing beings, because of their minimal levels of inner awareness (atimandāntaḥsaṃjñātā), and because they largely serve the purposes of other living beings (Ki 1971: 39, 13-4; see Halbfass (1991: 317-8).

Śrīdhara (NK 1984: 83, 22-4), similarly denies the possibility that there may be selves who lack cognitive powers, trees for instance, for a self it appears must be an agential subject of cognition, and demonstrate cognitive powers as its defining feature, as we saw in chapter four. Again, the fundamental intuition voiced here is that selves are characteristically agents and subjects of consciousness; and it is on account of the agential constitution of consciousness that selves have reflective and explicit self-
referential capacities, in virtue of which they are self-motivated, and capable of evaluating and defining their own ends and purposes, capacities that plants and trees and simple organisms lack. Thus, a sunflower’s turning towards the sun arises simply from its characteristic nature and constitution on this account. Activities, such as these are not based in reflective judgements or beliefs about what is advantageous, good, or beneficial, or not so, for that living being: they are not based in reasons or rational and ethical considerations.

But for Vyomaśiva and Udayana, plants are not an exception to selfhood because they exhibit archaic modes of ‘striving’ and, therefore, a primitive sort of will or agency, which is evidence of the presence of a self, that is, a minimal capacity of ownership and self-reference. And since the subintentional and subpersonal activities and responses of human beings are considered by Praśastapāda to demonstrate will and self-reference - based albeit on non-cognitive judgement and primitive modes of desire and willing - Vyomaśiva and Udayana’s position appear more consistent in this regard, and reflects what the later philosophical tradition takes for granted (see Halbfass 1991: 318). Surely, if the subintentional and subpersonal, and even biological activities of human beings are considered willful, based in primitive self-referring judgements and desires of some sort, then it is more coherent to argue that the non-cognitive, simple intentionalities of plants and elementary organisms likewise demonstrate the presence of a self, albeit one that lacks developed cognitive capabilities. In the case of animals and simple living beings such as ants and so on, Praśastapāda and the commentators concur that these are embodied selves whose psychophysical characteristics reflect their moral genealogy. Note that the cognitive powers ascribable to such selves, and so their self-referential capabilities vary, according to the physical constitution and structures the moral genealogy of their past actions incurs (PDS 1994: § 31).

The standpoint that Udayana and Vyomaśiva take is closer to the Jaina view that the primitive levels of sensory response of even microscopic organisms indicate the presence of very basic cognitive (caitanya), affective (ānanda) and volitional (vīrya) capacities that necessarily reside in a non-physical self or soul (jīva). For this reason, the Jaina view does not deny the presence of self even in microscopic beings. Even seeds, since they have the potential to germinate, and the simplest plants, in virtue of being alive, possess minimal consciousness as ‘one-sensed’ beings - with corresponding levels of primitive affection and will. Certainly, the Jaina view fits more consistently
with the overall thesis of a cosmogenic order of consequential action, and karmic causality, in which different levels of obfuscation of the mental qualities of consciousness, happiness and will are determined by the moral character of a self’s past deeds - where this is valid across all organisms from unicellular, ‘one-sense’ life-forms right through to ‘five-sensed’ animals and humans (see Bhatt 1989, Schmithausen 1991). This provides a comprehensive graded spectrum of selves that accords more consistently with the classical Vaiśeṣika conception of an ethical distribution (vyavasthā) of embodied selves - a psychophysical distribution of selves that accords with the moral genealogy of their past deeds. And with the fundamental divide between the inorganic and the organic that it posits as the basis of defining rational agency and selfhood across the domains of biological, subpersonal, subintentional and intentional activities, which lies at the heart of Praśastapāda’s arguments for a self – in contrast to the distinction between the intentional and the not-intentional that arguably informs conceptions of agency and action in contemporary philosophy of action.

Vaiśeṣika philosophers, however, deny this comprehensive Jaina view of selfhood by ascribing the sensory and regulative features of simple life-forms to the application of adṛṣṭa, the vitalizing powers of dharma and adharma of selves, by a divinity or divine self (Īśvara). However, adṛṣṭa or natural law is available, even for divine application, only as the states of dharma and adharma of the collectivity of selves.

The Buddhist view is that one must ascribe the possibility of striving as well as life to consciousness, but consciousness itself does not imply a self in either humans or animals. The later Buddhists, at least, deny consciousness to plants and simple organisms, in contrast to the Jaina view (see Schmithausen 1991). The Buddhist view is, of course, denied by our philosophers because they consider it impossible for there to be consciousness or agency in the absence of a substance that is their bearer: a self.

5.2. The Human Organism

The body (śarīra), according to our philosophers, is not just a collection of material particles. The body is a body in virtue of being a receptacle (ādhāra) or vehicle of consciousness; where it is the living body (sarīra) that is a receptacle of consciousness. Śrīdhara claims: ‘The body is the receptacle of the experiences of the conscious
agent…’ (NK(J) 1982: 76). What makes the body a physical basis of consciousness is its fabrication as a means or a mechanism (yantra) that enables a self to experience the pleasures and pains that are the moral consequences of its past actions (see Ki 1971: 89, 15-6). It is the nature of the body then to sub-serve the inherited dispositional predilections (dharma, adharma) of the individual self, by providing the objective condition of possibility of favourable and pleasant and unfavourable and unpleasant experiences in accordance with the moral quality of its past actions.

Bodies, Praśastapāda tell us, are born ‘out of atoms acted upon by certain meritorious deeds … [or] non-meritorious deeds …’ (PDS(J) 1982: 66). The structures of psychophysical causation involved in the fabrication of bodies is such that

‘the virtuous (dharma) and non-virtuous (adharma) actions of beings … act on atoms to form bodies as a means of experiencing pain and pleasure that is consistent with the quality of their past actions. Gods and sages thus obtain bodies that result from the action of meritorious deeds on atomic matter, whereas insect-bodies are appropriate to experiencing punishments that accord with the past deeds of these beings’ (PDS 1994: 31).

The body is fabricated in accordance with the dispositional specifications or traits of the individual self, by its powers of moral constitution which have the capacity to enable the causal organization of matter at a micro-structural level in a way that is constitutive of organic life (PDS(J) 1982: 66, 199; NK(J) 76; 208). Thus, bodies are ‘impermanent composite products of earth [that] are structured by arrangements of atomic particles that tend to make these [structures] solid, rigid, etc.’ (PDS 1994: § 30). Thus, the specific properties of solidity, hardness, softness, etc., we find in organic bodies, such as that of a cow owe to the force of adṛṣṭa ‘that produces these subclasses of things, such as a cow’ (NK(J) 1982: 75) by regulating the character or kind of each body (NK(J)1982: 77) – in accordance with its moral genealogy of its self.

The central intuition articulated in the above claims is that the body is the first thrust of desire into the physical world, the objective push of will driven by the vivifying powers of the self’s rational and moral constitution (dharma and adharma), and its conative predilections which are the motive force behind psychophysical causation that is constitutive of embodiment. The fabrication of such a receptacle requires the causal association of matter with a substance that has the capability of imposing form on matter, in a manner consistent with making it a suitable vehicle for
the satisfaction of those sensory experiences of pleasure and pain that human selves incur by the nature of their past actions. The living body is conceived here as the imposition of dynamic form, or a dynamic, structural configuration on particles of matter, such that this arrangement of particles enables the conduct of life (PDS(J) 1982: 66), and provides the objective, spatial and temporal, support of consciousness: its physical basis.

The claim here is that the biological properties of the body, its being alive, is not a property or a phenomenon that is intrinsic to matter *qua* matter. Rather, living is a relational and intentional property of matter *for* a self; it requires the interaction of bodily matter, mediated by manas, with the volitional powers of a non-physical substance, an agential self. Life or living (jīvāṇa) is an inferential mark (hetu) of the existence of a self, on this account: it demonstrates causal association with a self (PDS 1994: § 78, PDS(J): 563; NK(J): 563-4). And it is the entrance and exit of manas from the body, its causal association and dissociation with the body that is constitutive of the biological life of the body and its death respectively. Manas is the connector by which will vitalizes bodily matter and makes it a suitable physical basis of consciousness and consciousness-dependent mental states and actions (PDS 1994: §§ 358-9).

This artefactual construction of the body bears similarity to the imposition of form and function on the hunk of matter that constitutes a pot or say, a radio, in line with Praśastapāda’s instrumental conception of it. Consider the example of a working radio. When operating, the radio is structured and functions in a way that enables the receipt and transmission of sound; but it does so because its mechanical functions or ‘behaviour’ are subject to volitional control – when we tune it. We can causally intervene in the functioning of a radio according to our desires. In a similar way, the living body or the bodily mechanism has an artefactual structure that is configured to enable sensory experiences, affections, and willings, through the integration and coordination of volitional acts and biological processes. On this account, bodily construction allows conscious and unconscious interventions that are seamlessly integrated with biological functions, ostensibly because voluntary, subintentional and biological activities, which derive from the two types of willing (prayatna), are both integrated in the same causal basis: the self.

Further, the dispositional powers of dharma and adharma impel will which is then exercised through the executive faculty to ensure bodily life and function.
Similarly, desires and aversions motivate will which is exercised over the executive faculty to enable intentional and subintentional acts. The integration of these two types of will vis-à-vis the body is thus also assured by their integrated transmission through manas (*PDS*J: 563; *NK*J: 563-4). The assumption seems to be that the coordination required between these two types of willing is possible because they belong to the same substance, the self, and are regulated through the same physical coordinator, manas - as the subpersonal unit of attention and information processing that coordinates and monitors all aspects of mental and bodily life.

The human body is thus construed to be essentially an intentional whole; it is identified by its relational and intentional properties that are relevant to the functions it performs for a potentially conscious being: the conscious self. But the human body as far as its essential ontology is concerned is merely a structured mass of matter, a composite product, like a pot, as we saw in chapter two. And the organic unity of the body may then be seen to be not unlike the intentional unity of a pot (*PDS* 1994: § 77; *Śī†* 1983: 362), which too serves the purposes of conscious beings. The relation of the body to the hunk of matter that constitutes it is then not dissimilar to that of a statue to the hunk of marble that constitutes it or of a pot to the hunk of clay that constitutes it; or the relation of a fully functional radio or computer to its material configuration, as we have briefly discussed earlier (see § 4.8).

### 5.3. Will and Cognitive Error

There are objections, however, to the conception of will itself. It may be objected that the phenomenal presentation of will or personal agency is merely a cognitive illusion. The argument relates in the first instance to conscious willings, rather than to the unconscious states of will that our philosophers put forward. It comes from psychopathological cases or neural dysfunction in the context of agency and action. Thus, brain-damaged patients may report that their hand or foot is acting of its ‘own will’. Or, in certain psychopathological conditions patients may report that they are exercising control over events over which they do not, or could not, possibly exercise causal control. It is therefore possible for someone to be acting in a particular way and yet have no experience of exercising control over her actions. Equally, we find cases where a person may in fact not be exercising control over an event and yet feel she is wielding control over that event. This would appear to be a valid objection to the notion
that willings *qua* psychological events are the cause of our actions (see Lowe 2008: 82-3).

In Praśastapāda’s account, these claims are explicable as a failure of the causal-informational link between willings and bodily strivings that is mediated by the executive faculty. Since, the causal connection between self and body, which is mediated by the executive faculty, determines the relationship between willings and strivings, should this causal connection fail because of informational failures in the subpersonal processing of the executive faculty, as a consequence of inherited dispositional liabilities (*adharma*), an accident or some other cause, a dissociation might lodge between willings and strivings. Thus, in the case of a patient suffering from Parkinson’s disease there may be a clear dissociation between the will of this patient and her bodily movements or strivings (Patil 2009). In other cases, such as Anarchic Hand syndrome, a patient may find one of her hands performing an ostensibly goal-directed action that she is unable to control (Eilan and Roessler 2003: 1-2). This, as well as other forms of dissociation between mental and bodily willings, may be explained in terms of a failure of appropriate causal-informational connections between the mental and the bodily.

In any event, if willings are held to be the cause of bodily strivings then it must be possible, from the logical independence of cause and effect for there to be a willing without a corresponding bodily action (Lowe 2008: 83-4). As, Praśastapāda clearly states, will confers merely the capacity (*voyyata*) to achieve one’s ends (*PDS* 1994: § 78); it does not guarantee success in achieving those ends. Moreover, as Lowe (2008) suggests, examples such as the above of psychopathological or otherwise dysfunctional cases do not demonstrate that in normal circumstances our willings do not in fact cause bodily actions.

5.4. *A Non-Cartesian Model of Will*

Praśastapāda’s theory of cognitive and other actions proposes that willings based in judgements and desires are necessary for the execution of intentional actions. Willings serve, in the *PDS*, to bridge through *manas* the distance between an inactive non-physical self-substance and its mental states and processes, and between self and its body. Willings, I will show below, bring to light the active or executive element of
mental life: the element of mental ‘doing’ or executing as opposed to having or ‘being-about’ that is characteristic of cognitions or conscious states. Will has a pre-eminent activating and vitalizing role in mental life and bodily action which bears some parallel O’Shaughnessy to a degree, albeit in a dualist rather than a dual-aspect framework (O’Shaughnessy 2003; O’Shaughnessy 2008).

As we have seen, this is a non-Cartesian dualism, the role of manas in which may be seen as a dynamic, information-processing version of Descartes’ pineal gland (see Mele 1997: 65). Willings initiate the transfer of the unconscious information events they consist in, held in their intentional structure, into the physical system of information-processing that is sustained by manas, which serves here as a vehicle of dynamic translation of mental processes and structures into the physical processes and structures of the body and senses.

In light of Libet’s neurophysiological experiments, which I discuss below, it may be asked whether the direction of causation between the mental and the physical in willing is simply from the mental to the physical as in a standard Cartesian account. It may also be asked in what way willings qua psychological events are dependent on physical events and bases. As we have seen, willing is a property or state (guna) which does not itself involve movement (karman), because movement can only be a feature of physical substances. Nevertheless, insofar as will is an active mental power, an executive power, it is considered an act (kriyā) if only in a grammatical sense. Willing is an active state, a mental power whose exercise initiates actions – in the absence of overpowering obstacles.

Exercising the power of will causes an action-event appropriate to the result aimed for. Thus, when I wish to listen to a piece of music, I listen by doing something, namely, by willing to listen, which directly involves willing an act such as turning my ear in the direction where the sound of music is coming from in order to attend to it. But the sensory-bodily movement required for listening is enabled by the causal movement of the executive faculty whose movement is necessarily implicated in any act of will: states of willing are instantiated if and only if there occurs the right sort of causal contact between the executive faculty and self. This means that willings necessarily have a physical correlate in the movements and processes of the executive faculty that are necessary for the occurrence of a will-event. So, even though willings, in virtue of being psychological phenomena, require a mental substance as their locus,
and cannot, in this view, have a physical locus, they are essentially causally dependent on the physical processes and properties associated with the executive faculty. Because, the instantiation of willings, as well as of other mental events, requires causal contact between the executive faculty and self which provokes the will-event – as we see below. Praśasatapāda tells us that

‘will is the direct result of [causal] contact between the executive faculty and the self, aided by dhārma and adhārma’, (PDS(J) 1982: 563, revised trans.).

The requisite causal connection between manas and the self that initiates a will-event must occur prior to the will-event it brings about. This means there are changes in the physical properties and processes borne by manas correlate with the psychological instantiation of a state of will, prior to the will-event itself. So, the subpersonal physical processes of manas that bear information about the will-event about to take place occur prior to this will-event itself.

Appropriate causal contact between self and manas is necessary for all intentional states and structures of the self: ‘It (desire) proceeds from the contact of manas and self’ (PDS(J) 1982: 560 revised trans.). In fact:

‘Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and will are perceived by contact of the executive faculty and the self’ (PDS 1994: § 239).

Thus, states of willing and other mental states have distinct physical if not bodily correlates prior to but also contemporaneous with their instantiation in the subpersonal processing by manas prior to and at the moment of their instantiation. This is clearly a non-Cartesian view. Whether it supports a claim of supervenience of the mental on the physical is, however, more doubtful (see Ganeri 2012: 226-236).

Moreover, the event of willing, like the states of desire and pleasure that occur, is itself unconscious, but may then become conscious as an object of cognition. So, we are not aware of willing even when a will-event in fact occurs. All that registers at the time of a will-event and immediately prior to it are the necessary subpersonal physical processes carried forward by manas as the mediator between mental states and a processor of mental functions. Here, the subpersonal processes associated with manas immediately prior to a will-event bear information from the state of desire that immediately precedes a will-event and motivates it. So the physical processes
associated with _manas_ immediately prior to a will-event bear relevant information about the characteristics of the will-event that is yet to occur.

This is clearly a non-Cartesian dualist model of will; as such, it avoids some objections levied at Cartesianism. As in a Cartesian model, to perform an intentional action an event of willing must take place (see Stout 2005: 8). But willing itself is an unconscious event that is causally necessarily dependent on subpersonal physical processes, and can only thereafter become conscious as an object of cognition. Further, willing itself is not an action but a state. This avoids the problem of infinite regress that the notion of will being a mental action suffers in a Cartesian model. For the component of physical action (_karman_) associated with a will-event is borne as we have seen by _manas_.

**Libet and the ‘Free Will’ Debate**

There are direct objections to the notion that we exercise autonomous agency or ‘free will’ in our actions, from neuroscientific experiments. Autonomous agency, or ‘free will’, in this context refers to the sort of control we have over our actions. At issue is the relationship between the neural bases of mental will and our awareness of our willings and actions. Libet’s experiments (Libet 1999) on the neural initiation of voluntary actions led him to infer that we are aware of an intention to act, that is, of willing, only after the region of the brain responsible for initiating this act has already been activated. He suggested this means that the brain ‘decides’ on courses of action independently of our consciousness of ‘willing’ or ‘intending’ that action. This conclusion compromises the notion that our actions are controlled by our conscious willings: the notion of ‘free will’ (see Eilan and Roessler, 2003: 1). Haggard (2003) agrees with Libet that voluntary or freely willed actions may be initiated unconsciously, but considers that the agent’s becoming conscious of her intention or volition may enable her to exercise a kind of ‘veto power’ over it (Eilan and Roessler 2003: 42). Libet (1999) himself appears to have accepted the possibility that his experiments do not refute ‘free will’, insofar as subjects retain the ability to veto an action which has been initiated before its intended conclusion (see also, Lowe 2008: 84).

Now, on the non-Cartesian conception of will outlined above it is clear that while our philosophers do maintain a notion of autonomous agency, this is not the
conception of ‘free will’ we find in standard libertarian accounts, and it is not a conception that obviously contradicts Libet’s account in any way. In fact, it appears to support Libet’s account. For clearly, subpersonal physical processes and events necessarily precede a will-event in Praśastapāda, where this will-event is, in the first instance, unconscious and may only subsequently become conscious. So there is no requirement here that all the physical events that causally bear on the occurrence of a will-event must be instantiated only after consciousness of that event of willing itself arises. Quite the contrary, for not only do the physical causal processes of manas that are causally responsible for the occurrence of the will-event precede it, but further, subpersonal processing by manas is required to bring about the causal contact between self and manas by which we become conscious of this unconscious will-event as the object of a subsequent cognitive event.

The causal movement of the executive faculty that instantiates the will-event bears a form of dynamic intentionality, for it bears the desirous motivation to will that particular will-event. This means there are necessarily prior and ongoing physical causal processes that carry dispositional information relevant to a particular will-event prior to its instantiation. Moreover, conscious willing, we have seen, must occur after the instantiation of the physical correlates or causal processes in manas that correspond to the event of willing itself, because cognition of the will-event requires further self-manas contact. Note the subpersonal processes of manas that enable its causal integration of mental states and mental and bodily life are coordinated by the inherited dispositions (dharma and adharma) of the individual.

5.5. The Functional Role of Willings

A further objection to the notion of will comes from the structure of mental causation involved in action. The contention here is that willings, if they occur, must be caused to occur by the onset of desire and belief states (Davidson 1980). The structure of mental causation involved in action means that beliefs and desires serve as event-causes that have act-events as their effect. This makes willings a redundant feature in both the causal explanation and ontology of actions. The introduction of willings means the introduction of an unnecessary link in the causal chain of beliefs and desires that cause actions, because when we bring in will, we merely say that beliefs and desires causally determine willings. Willings serve no real purpose in this case; they are mere fillers
between the real causes of intentional acts, namely, the onset of belief and desire states, and the actions these motivate (see Lowe 2008: 172-3).

To prove that willings are not a redundant feature of actions we are required to prove that desires and beliefs as causes are insufficient for the occurrence of intentional actions, and that intentional actions require cause and causation of the type incurred by willings. The requirement is that willings must serve an essential purpose that requires their incorporation not only in the causal explanation of action but also in the ontology of act-causation.

I suggest that the necessity of will at both an explanatory and at a constitutive level is drawn out in Praśastapāda’s conception of the intentional structure and functional organization of mental life, which assigns specific functional roles and intentional attitudes to those mental states that bear on the mental causation of action. For the purposes of this chapter, I take functionalism to be the view that mental states have causal roles that are at least partly constitutive of the nature of these mental states and events. As indicated earlier, ‘Intentional’ refers to the aboutness of conscious states, their having an object, for example, a perception that a fruit is sweet and the judgement that it has a pleasant taste. Only cognitive or conscious states such as perceptions, cognitive judgements and evaluations have aboutness or Intentionality in this account. Affective and volitional states such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and will are unconscious states, and so non-Intentional, even though they may become objects of cognition. These mental events have ‘intentional’ structures, that is, they have target objects they may be disposed or motivated towards acquiring as objects of desire or will, but they lack Intentional contents or aboutness. So, mental states are defined here in terms of the way in which they are related to their objects: conscious states have an object or are about an object, but desires are attracted towards certain objects, aversions are repelled by certain objects, and willings execute the acquisition or rejection of desired and undesired objects, respectively (see also Ganeri 2012).

Rational Powers and the Structure of Mental States
Mental states bear certain causal relationships to each other according to Praśastapāda. In accordance with its specific intentional features, each state has a defined causal role in the system of cause-effect relationships that structure mental life. The set of causal
relationships that characterize the functional organization of mental states is described in the following way by Śrīdhara:

‘Cognition consists in the perception of the goodness, badness or indifferent character of an object. The perception of goodness constitutes the cognition of this object as something to be acquired; the perception of badness constitutes the cognition that it is something to be rejected or avoided; and the perception of an indifferent character constitutes the cognition that this object is to be neither acquired nor avoided. Whenever the form of an object has been duly cognized, we remember the help or not it has afforded us in the past; we then come to form definite notions about whether it is a source of pleasure or pain, and then a [further] cognition about its acquirability or not …’ (NK(J) 1982: 419-20, revised trans.).

Note that it is cognition, qua cognitive judgement and evaluation, that is foundational for the onset of the unconscious mental states of desire and will. For it is only from the presentation of an object in cognition that one can judge it to be pleasurable and favourable or not, have beliefs about it, and recall it as pleasurable, and so desire it and will to obtain it in a calculated manner. Thus, Praśastapāda asserts that ‘... pleasure, pain, desires, etc., follow as the effects of cognition. We thus judge things as good and bad …’ (PDS 1994: § 420). As Udayana explains:

‘Only that which is cognized or known can be an object of desire. Therefore, an object must first be known for desire to arise, and desire, in turn, leads to will,’ (Ki 1971: 89).

Śrīdhara elaborates that it is only when we attend to an object and so come to perceive it that we may judge it as either pleasurable or painful:

‘Even when the desired object is within our reach, if our mind is taken up by some other object (and we fail to perceive the former), we do not feel any pleasure; hence, we conclude that a perception or cognition of the object is also a factor in the cause bringing about pleasure’ (NK(J) 1982: 558, revised trans.).

The relationships between judgements, desires and willings in the structure of action is described by Śrīdhara in the following way:

‘Pleasure is productive of desire, pain of aversion, desire and aversion of will and will of action’, (NK(J) 1982: 220, revised trans.).

Thus:
‘When a pain-giving object has passed off, the aversion towards it is born of the remembrance of that pain caused by it, [and] the will or determination [is made], for example, “I will kill him”’ (NK(J) 1982: 562).

We see in such cases that:

‘Desire is the cause of will, etc. When we desire an object (the cause of pleasure), we exercise will in a way calculated to bring it to us’ (NK(J) 1982: 561, revised trans.).

We see that the object of cognitive judgement and evaluation supplies the object of desire and so the object of willing. It does so by inducing a tendency to desire that object which is judged to be pleasurable or advantageous, and aversion towards an object that is judged to be a source of pain. Desire, in turn, motivates the executive power of will to seek the acquisition of the desired object by executing the right sort of bodily action. Aversion motivates will to avoid an object that is considered painful by exercising bodily restraint. Willing has the nature here of a calculated or strategic attempt to acquire a desired object, and avoid an undesired one through the use of a means to achieve its aims, namely, the sensory-bodily complex, in an appropriate way. Again such a ‘calculation’ or ‘strategy’ may be unconsciously or consciously conducted involving a conscious or unconscious judgements.

The above gives us a common-sense account of the role of perceptions, judgements and beliefs, desires and willings in the mental causation of action, but it is an account that differs from accounts that grant primacy to will as ‘free will’: the capacity of will itself to exercise choice and control by endorsing desires, repudiating aversions, etc. For we see that will is not conscious, in the first instance, and its occurrence is initially causally ‘determined’ by preceding desires and judgements.

It is the rational and normative powers of conscious judgement that play the key role in provoking agency and action in this view. Desire and will, that is, the target object of a desire whose acquisition is then willed serves as the ‘means’ (sādhanā) of satisfaction of pleasure – the end judged to favourable for oneself (Ki 1981: 88, 9). Desires and willings are a means for the satisfaction of valued goals, by the acquisition of objects one cognizes to be beneficial. It is not surprising therefore that it is the normative power of cognitive judgements and evaluations that is paramount here. Rational and ethical powers determine the aims and goals to be pursued and these have,
as we see below, overriding authority over mental states and the causal relationships between them.

The particular intentional structure or attitude of a mental state determines its distinct causal role and powers in the mental causation of action. The psychological character of judgements is that these are states that have an object; this is why they may incline one to desire or acquire an object they judge to be favourable for oneself. The content or object of these states is the reason I have for undertaking a course of action, for choosing an end that I proceed to act towards via desire and will. Perceptual and evaluative states, that is, conscious states consist in the having of reasons for doing something; they incline one towards striving to obtain an object \( x \), for instance. These judgements serve to incline me to desire \( x \), and desire motivates me to actively seek the acquisition of \( x \) by initiating an act by the executive power of ‘willing’, which is a ‘doing’ that attempts to achieve or obtain \( x \), by moving my arm say, to pick up an apple I wish to eat. What is not obvious is that the having of reasons, such as wanting \( x \) because I find it pleasurable, can be equated with the doing or executing that strives to obtain \( x \). The point is that the having of Intentional objects or contents of judgements, and having this object as something one desires are each quite different to each other. And each of these is distinct from the executing of this aim or desire qua action. Judgements have contents that incline one to desire, desires have a target object they are motivated towards acquiring. But neither has the character of an executive impulse that actively enables acquisition of the desired object, or achievement of the desired end, by striving to obtain it by sensory or bodily means. Each of these states appear as distinct psychological attitudes that have distinct intentional structures and roles in mental life that in this account, at least, are irreplaceable.

Thus, Udayana argues:

‘Will is endowed with two different characteristics, it is the product of cognition and it has the same object as cognition. This will is agency … by its very nature, will cannot be Intentionally directed \( \text{(pravana)} \) towards an object for then it would turn into cognition … this itself is what distinguishes will from cognition, namely, that it is not Intentionally directed towards any object [i.e., that it is not about an object]. [It cannot be wholly objectless either, because] it would [then] cease to be the cause of action, etc.’ \( (ATV\,1995:\,385,\,revised\,trans.) \).

Cognition is directed towards \( \text{(pravana)} \) an object, in the sense that it has an object, an Intentional content. But will has a target object that it seeks to acquire by sensory and
bodily means, mediated by the instrumental actions of the executive faculty. Will is here the efficient cause of the action that executes the goal of judgements and desires in action.

For this reason, we do not think of judgements or beliefs, or desires as the doing of something, or as executing something, in the way we think of willings as a ‘doing’. Thus, I may have a desire to taste that apple I see, but this desire-state intuitively lacks the element of doing or execution that defines the occurrence of the act of salivation that follows my desire for this particular apple (PDS 1994: § 78). Desire may motivate me to make it effective by acting but it is not clear that a desire-state is the ‘acting’ that initiates striving to obtain this object. The assumption in Praśastapāda’s functional approach is that for desires to be made effective in action as doings, an executive power is required, which is the active or immediate cause of the action: a mental doing, which is capable of initiating action by exercising the power of executive control. This is a power we do not associate with the evaluative and motivational powers of judgement and desire states, respectively, which are reasons for action that at most merely dispose us towards the acquisition of a particular object. As Lowe argues: What is wrong ‘with the belief-desire approach … is that it makes no room for the executive element in intentional action (Lowe 2008: 172). It is for this reason that belief-desire complexes are insufficient causal factors for the onset of actions and require in addition an executive power, will, for their execution qua action.

5.6. Evaluative Control and Indeterminism

Agency, in Praśastapāda, we have seen, refers to far more than the ability to merely act on the basis of one’s desires and beliefs, for it is induced or provoked by cognitions and the judgements we make about our aims and objectives which, in turn, dispose us to desire or be averse to various objects. So, it is the rational and moral powers of judgement that are paramount here for determining what we should desire and will, and even whether we should do so at all. But further, as we see below, the unconscious nature of desires and willings and the fact that they can be objects of cognition, makes them subject to reflective or evaluative control. It is the possibility of mental agency, the possibility of exercising evaluative control over mental contents, that is the basis of the capacity for transformation of one’s mental attitudes, and so of oneself. We are not, on this account, simply bound by our desires, or even by our desires about desires, as on
a Frankfurtian view (1971), because as self-reflective agents, we have evaluative control over our mental lives that can determine the objects our desires and willings veer towards or not. Mental agency has the capacity to redirect our aims and intentions, and what we attend to cognitively and behaviourally.

Udayana describes consciousness or cognition as the controller of other mental properties: pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, and will are ruled or controlled (niyata) by cognition (buddhi), as its effects (kārya), he claims. In the first place, these states arise as the causal effects of cognition, because we can judge as favourable or not, and desire or be averse only to those objects we are already cognizant of (ATV 1995: 385). Secondly, these states, once they have arisen, are unconscious. They can become conscious states only as objects of cognition. So the possibility of conscious existence of these states is dependent on their being objects of cognition, that is, objects of the conscious subject or self. So pleasure, pain, etc., are causal effects of cognition, which also serve as objects (viṣaya) of cognitive judgement (jñāna, buddhi), that is, qua conscious states they reside in the conscious subject (viṣayī) (Ki 1971: 92). The idea here is that these states arise as effects (kārya) of cognition and as its object (viṣaya) in such a way that they are ontologically dependent on cognitions for their existence and their character. This sort of ontological dependence is possible because these states arise in the same substratum as cognition as properties of the same owner or self. In this case, cognition or consciousness is the basis and controller (niyāmaka) of these mental states because these states arise in the same subjective self, or ‘I’ (Ki 1971: 92, 7-9). So, although our beliefs and desires do dispose us to act in a certain way, we retain at all times once we are conscious of our desires and judgements as cognitive contents, the possibility of evaluating these states, and so changing them, and with this changing our actions, what we intend to do and what we attend to.

Mental agency as the exercise of evaluative control over the contents of our mental states has its sources not only in the cognitions and other mental states that are its preconditions, and in these states having a common substratum, although this is necessary in this view. Agency qua personal agency has a further prerequisite: we must be aware of ourselves as agents of the cause-effects relationships that structure mental and bodily action. Udayana and Śrīdhara point out (ATV 1995: 347; NK(J) 1982: 156) that it is the experience of will in cognizing, the experience of the act-nature of cognizing that makes us aware of personal agency in cognition, and of ourselves as
conscious agents. We are aware of our cognizings as agential and of ourselves as agents because cognitions and willings have a common substratum (Ki 1971: 92, 7-9). and so we experience the willful cause of cognizings and their conscious effects as an exercise of personal agency, that is, as cause-effect relationships that are based in oneself. The possibility of experiencing oneself as the cause of one’s cognizings is precisely what a unitary locus of one’s willings and its cognitive effects allows, which is denied to the discrete events of cause and effect in Buddhist reductionism (NK 1984: 71, 12-3, 22-6).

But the possibility of cognizing being an act owes, as we saw in chapter three, to its instrumental structure. So does our awareness of ourselves as agents of our cognizings. Without the instrumental structure of cognitions, and a common substratum of cognizings and willings, we would not experience our willings and cognitions as being agentially related.

These arguments imply that the source of our capacity for motivating and instigating our actions ourselves is a consequence of the agent-instrument structure of cognizing and the location of cognitive cause-effect relations in a common substratum, under the unitary ownership of a self. For it is these factors that make us aware of personal agency, of being owners and agents of our cognitive, mental and bodily actions and being able to exercise reflective control over mental contents and our mental lives. It is also our awareness of personal agency qua selves that gives us our capacity to bear moral responsibility for our actions and its psychophysical consequences. I suggest this is the fundamental intuition behind Udayana’s explication of the phenomenology of cognizing and possibly the significance of the argument for the agential constitution of consciousness at the outset of Praśasatapāda’s proofs for the existence of a self.

This view of agency poses a problem for the deterministic causation of action, the thesis that belief-desire events are sufficient for bringing about actions, and its physicalist versions in which belief-desire events are held to be either identical to, or ‘realized’ as physical properties and states. For as the above arguments make clear, it is the normative powers of cognition, its capacity for rational and ethical judgements that is the final arbiter of mental life and causation, for it creates the controlling inclinations or dispositions that shift and alter desires and willings, moving mental life and causation, cultivating it according to its judgements and goal-orientations. The question
is whether this type of causal indeterminism is threatened by the possibility that causal indeterminism means that intentional acts arise in a random manner by chance.

Now, as Śrīdhara explained above (§ 4.7), although the application of principles of randomness, and its obverse, determinism, may be suitable for explaining the way in which causation occurs in the case of physical events such as the clash of two winds or two pebbles, it is unsuitable as an explanation of the sort of rational causation we witness in the case of intentional acts. For, the nature of causal powers exercised in the case of willful actions necessitates a very different sort of explanation, one based on the powers of rational and ethical judgement and control. And this is not explicable in terms of a model of physical event-causation that the determinism-randomness argument assumes. Mental causation, as we saw above, requires and has as its condition of possibility rational and ethical considerations and causal powers; it is, therefore, inexplicable on a model of physical event causation (see also Lowe 2008). It requires a theory of rational powers and rational control that adumbrates the role of knowledge and procedures of control applicable to the act of knowing itself, which is the point of departure of Praśastapāda’s arguments for a self.

5.7. Unitive Rationalities and the Impersonal Self

It is the ‘drawing together’ of the object of cognition, the appropriate sense-faculty, the executive faculty and self in fourfold contact that is the cause of perception (§ 3.7), and the occurrence of pleasure and pain as the objects of cognition (§ 5.5). From judgements of what is pleasurable and painful arise, we have seen, desire and willful striving for the pleasurable, and aversion with willful restraint towards that which is considered painful. But pleasure as much as pain is held to be a source of suffering ultimately. Therefore, the elimination of fourfold contact must be sought, to eliminate the possibility of cognition itself, for by the very structures of mental life, it entails suffering. This requires that

‘the executive faculty is in the self [in such a way] that there is neither pleasure nor pain for the embodied [self]; this is yoga’ (VS 1911: 5.2.16).

Elimination of suffering requires control of manas qua attention to bring to an end the possibility of cognition itself by re-directing attention in self, one-pointedly, an intense attentional training by which attention ceases to be directed towards objects and the
affections, etc., they engender. The dialectic of virtuous intention and attention that underpins attentional training is founded on the development of certain inherent epistemic, emotional and ethical rationalities that are potentially available in the moral and mental life of selves as I discuss below (see Chakrabarti 1999).

The possibility of cognition itself, we saw in chapter three, rests in desires, whether as striving to attend to desired objects, or attentional focus on objects one is unconsciously or consciously attracted to. Cognition itself is motivated by desire which arises from identification of oneself with objects, in particular, identification with one’s psychophysical embodiment, as we saw in chapter two. Udayana explains that this ‘false cognition of self is the ground of worldly existence ...’ (ATV 1995: 378). He describes how this occurs:

‘For one who regards non-self as self, the body is the totality of [his] existence and so clinging to the body such a person has inordinate craving for all the things in all the worlds, which cater to bodily pleasure and has aversion for things which are anything but pleasant’ (ATV 1995: 378, revised trans.).

We saw in chapter two that to identify self with that which is not self, such as one’s psychophysical embodiment, is to identify oneself with those states of attraction, fear and loss that these objects engender in oneself. It is to identify oneself as being these states; that is, being their owner, which is an erroneous ascription of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ to that which is not oneself, namely, psychophysical objects (see § 2.3). It is this ‘I-object’ or ‘I-content’ that impels the mental life or selves:

‘From these notions of “I” and “mine” follow an affection for the pleasant and aversion for the unpleasant; these affections and aversions give rise to activity and restraint of activity; thence follow dharma and adharma ...’ (NKJ 1982: 597).

We are accountable for our desire-motivated actions. Because the moral quality of the ‘objects’ or ends we strive for or refrain from in intentional actions, that is, the values and emotions of the intentions that inform striving and restraint, accrue virtue and non-virtue concordant with their moral quality. The accrued virtue or non-virtue determines the ethico-ontological consequences of intentional actions - the character of psychophysical embodiment they incur.

The possibility of a shift from pleasure-seeking, desire-motivated actions towards the ‘good’ (§ 1.6) lies here in the inherent rational potential of mental life itself: its affective experiences of pain and loss leads to evaluative discernment that happiness
and the ‘good’ are to be found by experiencing the true nature of self itself - as the ‘highest good’ (*nīḥśreyasa*) (*NK* 1984: 70, 18) to be achieved. Thus:

‘When a person is hampered daily by pain, he comes in due course to the conclusion that the objects of the world are the source of all pain, and thus becomes disgusted with these objects, and desiring a cessation of pain, the only unfailing means he has is the realization of the true nature of his self’ (*NK(J)* 1982: 595-96, revised trans.).

Suffering itself provokes the insight that it is dissociation of oneself from physical objects, dis-identification with objects, that is the means of happiness, the ‘good’. Suffering provokes epistemic and ethical reasoning about the ‘good’, where it is freedom from suffering that is the happiness and the ‘good’ which is sought.

It is, however, because self is the ‘good’ that it itself has the qualities of virtue (*dharma*) and non-virtue (*adharma*), and that its affections and emotions *can* have a rational and ethical utility for itself as pleasure and pain, happiness and suffering. And it is because self is the ‘good’ itself that it *is* the source of normativity, of normative and therapeutic possibilities. For here, it is the metaphysical nature of self that it is the source of normativity and the ‘good’ and as the experience of absolute bliss (*ānanda*), the freedom from pain which is experienced with self-knowledge (*NK(J)* 1982: 15).

Self-knowledge comes with an understanding of the real nature of things by differential reasoning and analysis that distinguishes self and non-self and thereby elicits virtuous actions: epistemically by redirecting attention towards objects of cognition that are sources of virtue, most significantly, self itself; ethically by the adoption of universal, impersonal moral values and their application in impersonalized conduct; and emotionally, by seeking only that which is a source of real happiness: the self. Ethics, emotions and metaphysics converge in a rational unity, the practice of epistemic, emotional and ethical reason that embodies the rational essence of the impersonal self (see Chakrabarti 1999), in its cultivation of global insight, bliss and virtuous practice, as the practice of moral law (*dharma*) itself (see § 1.6, 2.3-2.4, 5.7).

Udayana elucidates the above claim in the following way:

*Conditioned, the self does engender suffering. ... The discarding of the conditioned self is needed ... for bringing about the destruction of suffering .... [For this reason] The unconditioned self should be contemplated ... Because by means of continuous contemplation of it release is attained. What is the
nature of the contemplation of self? It is discrimination. Discrimination … from the body, etc., which are other than self’ (ATV 1995: 377).

Discriminative reasoning consists in the practice of philosophical, ethical and emotional analysis as the means of dharma (the ‘good’, moral law). It requires discernment of those objects and practices that are sources of virtue as laid out in scriptural texts, the Veda and Hindu law books, namely,

‘the various [virtuous] substances, qualities and actions … [including] the following: faith in dharma (moral law, right doctrine), non-injury, benevolence, truthfulness, non-possessiveness, sexual restraint, honest intentions, absence of anger, …’ (PDS 1994: §§ 309-10).

Virtue (dharma) consists in thought and action that refers to the variety of standard moral precepts and virtues that are applicable universally to all humans, and are held in common by the Buddhist, Jaina and classical Hindu traditions (Sāṃkhya and Yoga): faith in dharma qua moral law and the right doctrine, non-injury (ahimsā), benevolence (bhūtahitvatvam), truthfulness (satyavacanam), non-possessiveness (asteyam), honest or good intentions (anupadhā), etc. But in classical Vaiśeṣika, as in other ‘orthodox’ Hindu schools that accept Vedic authority, ethics also has a deontological aspect, for the objects and practices one tends to must reflect the fulfillment of duties (dharma) that are appropriate to one’s caste (varṇa) and stage in life (āśrama) – as a student, householder, etc. However, exceptional virtue which leads to the result or yoga (union), the happiness of self-knowledge has further requirements: faith (śraddha) - in the doctrine and philosophical teachings elaborated in the PDS - and the vow of benevolence or granting fearlessness (abhayam) to all beings, renunciation, proper observances and spiritual exercises (yama, niyama) borrowed here from the Yoga Sūtra and finally, knowledge of the six categories (PDS 1994: § 315).

Virtue and virtuous practice consists in the observance and application of ethical and emotional universals and the development of universal epistemic insight – qua knowledge of the six categories - that represent what we might call the ‘impersonal essences’, the common, universal possibilities of the cognitive, affective and moral qualities of embodied selves. Virtuous practice and knowledge leads to the impersonalization of self, its qualities and its very identity qua self-knowledge: the experience and insight into itself as not the psychophysical or personal self. Udayana declares:
‘… one who regards the self as absolute is not affected by these passions; for one who has discarded all limitations has no attachment to progeny or riches because he is not benefited by these. … So the false
cognition of self is the ground of worldly existence. This false cognition is dissipated by right
knowledge. As to this right knowledge, it arises gradually through listening to scriptural statements, then
meditation on these and so on. The cause (of desires and aversions) being thus eliminated, the effect [that
is, desire and aversion] is also eliminated’ (ATV 1995: 378, revised trans.).

The being and practice of impersonal selfhood represents a transformation of the
personal standpoint delimited by a perspective and sense of personal ownership and
appropriation of experiences as ‘mine’ that instigates the desire-motivated agential
structures of mental life. It represents a shift from a standpoint centred in one’s
psychophysical embodiment towards a global or impersonal standpoint of unbounded
virtuousness (dharma), the detached non-reflexive perspective in Velleman’s terms
(2001: 114) that is not curtailed by self-identification with psychophysical objects.
Such a shift to impersonal agency and selfhood consists in the development of the
virtuous and impartial judgements and ends of self which arise with the cessation of
desires as the virtuous willings of dharma itself, that is, of the causal power of the states
of pure virtue that remain once desires have come to an end. Action is structured first
by virtuous desires and on the elimination of personal desires solely by the power of
virtue (dharma) itself, the emotional and ethical universals cultivated through right
understanding of dharma which now act directly thought will (prayatna) to carry out
those actions that the remaining dharma of the self elicits (NKJ 1982: 608-9).

This shift from a desire-motivated to a virtue-based epistemology and practice
appears, with the elimination of personal desires, one might say as the ‘automatic’, sub-
conscious, virtuous cognitive and behavioural actions that are impelled by the sub-
personal causal powers of virtue remaining in the self. Note that the ‘store’ of virtue -
or for the ordinary self, non-virtue – is something that is used up or spent in mental and
bodily life (see PDS 1994: § 319). Willings (prayatna), borne by manas, are no longer
‘actively’ driven by desires. They are no longer motivated by desires and do not arise
as an active, intentional power of the self. Rather, willings are now sub-consciously
moved or motivated solely by virtue. Willings no longer arise as my ‘own’, personally,
even though they are associated with my mind and body, because the sense of selfhood
now lies in the substantive nature of self itself, its self-identical nature free of all mental
and bodily characteristics. Manas, as we see below, is now focused wholly in self
itself, insofar as the nature of the self-manas causal connection is concerned, even while
tending to objects as moved by dharma. There is then a shift here to the development of that attentional receptivity that is the first argument for a self in PDS § 76, which now consists in attentive concentration in self itself – which is no longer tied to intentional willings but remains focused in self itself, one might say effortlessly, or without intentional will, through the development of the attentional powers of manas as the instrument of meditation (see Kumar 2013: 92-3).

**Impersonal Selves and Selfhood**

We have seen in chapter two that Śrīdhara characterizes the achievement and nature of impersonal selfhood in the following way:

‘Thus, it is that by the practice of truth, wisdom is attained [that] “I am not, nothing is mine and [there is] no “I”’ (SK 64, quoted in NK(J) 1982: 596, revised trans.).

This is a state of self free of the ideas of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ in which ‘the phenomenal world even though existing ceases to affect the self … the self is [then] like a “spectator” under the force of true wisdom,’ claims Śrīdhara quoting Sāmkhya Kārikā 65 (NK(J) 1982: 598).

The idea of impersonal awareness posited here refers to the phenomenon that the de-objectification of self corresponds to a non-appropriative, detached view of the world of objects. It is the grasp of oneself and one’s mental life as objects of personal desires and willings that gives an appropriative grip on the world. Transformation of this sense of ownership and agency, as opposed to its pathological dissolution, involves a transformation of experience. But what sort of awareness is this?

We discussed in chapter two that the commentators seem to consider the nature of ordinary self-experience to be the experience of bare self-presence even if this is cloaked in the psychophysical investments of the personal self. A shift to the impersonal standpoint consists of increasing immersion in this bare self-presence qua true self-experience. But the nature of self-experience, how one experiences, thinks and feels about oneself, as the ‘I-object’ (ahamkāra), the implicit de se ‘I-content’ of the first-person presentations (see Recanati 2007: 176-7) of the personal self, or as the bare self-presence of the impersonal self, implicitly structures the way in which one knows, experiences, thinks and feels about the world. For the practitioner immersed in
self-attention, whose attitude of direct self-awareness is not mediated by personally grasping the identifying criteria of objectivity, the impersonal nature of his self-awareness devoid of personal agency and ownership means that he no longer is an agent and an owner who can incur non-virtue (adharma), or even virtue for that matter from activity or restraint, such as

‘from the non-performance of prescribed duties, as all duties cease for him who is no longer conscious of distinctions of time, such as, “It is evening now” [and I must say my evening prayers], and so on, or of castes and conditions, such as “I am a Brāhmaṇa” and so on. Thus, it has been declared: “How could a man devoid of egotism\(^{42}\) such as I am a Brāhmaṇa perform any acts?” For, such a person who has ceased from performing all activities incurs no non-virtue such as from killings animals’ (NK(J) 1982: 608).

The impersonalization or de-objectification of self as the elimination of ‘I-content’ or ‘I-object’ (ahamkāra) marks the development of a universalist existential perspective, a ‘de-objectified’ perspective in which the objective features and identifications of all objects are attenuated. A bare awareness of objectivity appears to arise with immersion in bare awareness of self itself as mere presence. All objective phenomena appear as themselves existentially bare with the attenuation and elimination of grasping their characteristics or identifying features as objects that are for oneself. The elimination of personal ownership and agency marks an attenuation of experience, or so this passage indicates, as the appropriative grip of personal selfhood on it ceases - at least where ordinary everyday perceptions and actions are concerned.

Such a perspective, based in self-presence or self’s distinct beingness (sattā), involves awareness of the beingness (satta) of objects (artha) and their own distinct characteristics as articulated in the six-category ontology, rather than a structure of self-other, or ‘I’ and ‘not-I’ identifications (NK(J) 1982: 597). It is a possibility that is common to all embodied selves from the fact that all substances, properties and motions possess beingness (sattā) which is first cognized before the particular properties of that substance are ‘filled in’ (PDS 1994: § 224 ). But such awareness is only possible and goes hand-in-hand with bare self-awareness.

We have to presume that self-awareness itself must be global and impersonal given the infinite spatio-temporal dimensionality of self-substance devoid of personal

\(^{42}\) That is, ‘I-content’.
mental attitudes - although our philosophers have little to say on this. And that such awareness of the distinct nature and existence of all objects (artha), inanimate objects, other sentient beings and oneself, is the condition of possibility of non-appropriative judgements and conduct, and with this the cultivation of non-possession, benevolence and non-injury towards all living beings, etc. that is required.

The shift to this impersonal, global standpoint does not, in this case, mark the loss of normativity that the first-person perspective endows us with, but the expression of its innate nature as the universal potential of ‘goodness’ or dharma itself that is available to all embodied selves. The impersonal view is not a turn to indifferent detachment that might be thought to characterize a third-person detached view of oneself and one’s mental life. But rather, a de-personalized epistemic, emotional and ethical state that is based in its awareness of the existential distinctness and beingness of things, where beingness (sattā) has connotations of truth and value that the everyday objects (artha) of the world inherently have for conscious selves. It is not value that is lost here but its personal restrictive and unethical forms for one which is more globally responsive. Nevertheless, self-immersion leads it appears to an attenuated awareness of the world in which objects no longer have personal values for a self that is immersed in self-experience.

The thesis here is that a transformation in the experience and conception of selfhood and self-experience constitutes a transformation of the first-person perspective itself, which ethicizes its mental contents, attitudes and structures so these are an exercise of pure virtue. Such a shift from a personal, desire-based to an impersonal, virtue-based epistemology leads to the evaporation of the moral underpinnings of the self-embodiment, as not only do selves no longer attempt to appropriate objects in the world driven internally by their own dispositions - their affections and desires – but objects in the world no longer appear to them as sources of personal value and meaning, i.e., as value-laden objects (artha). So the shift to a virtue-based epistemology has ethical consequences and these have ontological consequences for self’s embodiment itself as we see next, which emphasizes the moral underpinnings of human life.
Virtuous Attention

Exceptional cognition, that is, true self-experience and the capability of cognizing everything in an ‘unobstructed’ manner or global insight (PDS 1994: §§ 241-2), which develops as a consequence of the cultivation of understanding and virtue consists not only of discriminative reasoning and ethical conduct, but also the meditative analytical practices of self-attention: the intensely focussed attention on oneself (asamprajñāta samādhi) that is generated by intense analytical separation of self and non-self as the practice of lived rationality by the yogic philosopher (yogi) who is not motivated by desire and will (PDS 1994: §§ 241-2; see Sjöden 2012: 473). The development of epistemic and ethical powers here is a consequence of the exercise of epistemic agency, that is, control over the act of cognition itself so that it is re-directed towards virtuous objects and practices, and comes to be focused in particular on self, by which its universal rationalities are realized. Śrīdharā explains that by the withdrawal of

‘the executive faculty from the external sense-faculties, and fixing it upon a definite part of the self … one-pointedly to practice meditation upon the self; … there accrues [to the practitioner] virtue (dharma) that tends to the accomplishment of true knowledge, [that is,] there clearly appears before his mind the real self free of all impositions of “I” and “mine”’ (NK(J) 1982: 596, revised trans.).

For such a self,

‘all his desires, etc., having ceased, his actions have the nature of pure dharma, tending towards cessation (nirodha) or peace (sānta). Such actions produce in him (the self) happiness or contentment and a disregard for the body. [After] having brought about happiness owing to vision of highest truth, this dharma also disappears. With such complete cessation, the self becomes ‘seedless’, and when the present body falls off, [it] takes no further bodies. The cessation of being equipped with bodies and sense-faculties is like the extinguishing of a fire once its fuel has been burnt up.43 [This] constitutes what is called liberation (mokṣa)’ (PDS 1994: § 319).

This bodiless, liberated self exists in its natural state (svarūpa) of isolation or singularity (kaivalya). So the upshot of the development of the virtuous competencies of manas, qua self-attention and extraordinary perception, and the practice of pure virtue, is the de-objectification of self, epistemically, ethically and ontologically. Not only is

43 The influence of the Buddhist of liberation (nirvāṇa) as cessation (nirodha) with the burning up of the fuel that ignites samsāra is evident here.
epistemic, affective and ethical de-objectification of the self cultivated but this results in
the loss of the objective ‘thrust’ of desire and will that is the basis of embodiment itself
– because this is by its very nature for self itself.

The ultimate state refers to the natural singularity of things, the ‘isolated’ state
of self (kaivalya) but also the ontologically isolated and independent state of matter at
times of world-dissolution or de-composition. It is the objective thrust of desire that
ultimately wills and vitalizes objective composition and life through the accrual of
virtuous and non-virtuous causal powers in the self; and the absence of desire leaves
self in a state of ontological independence with regard to matter and the psychological
characteristics that embodiment enables.

5.8. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have discussed the wide scope of agency that Praśastapāda postulates
through a two-fold conception of will as desire-motivated and vital that stems from a
conception of self as a bearer of the rational, affective and vital essence of mind and
life. We have seen how this enables the entire range of mental and bodily life to come
under the scope of will, conceived ultimately as the objective thrust of desire, of self-
concern across intentional and subintentional, subpersonal and biological activities.
Praśastapāda’s conception of will is, however, non-Cartesian, and its subpersonal
structures are anchored in the role of manas as the mediator of mental-physical
causation in mental and bodily life. This conception of will agrees, it appears, with
Libet’s conclusions that conscious willings are preceded by physical processes that bear
information relevant to what is willed, but that willings that we subsequently become
aware of may be subject to a conscious ‘veto’. The structure of action postulated by
Praśastapāda means that will has a specific executive function that makes it
irreplaceable in the causation of action, contrary to Davidsonian theories of the
determination of action by belief-desire complexes.

The scope of rational agency extends, in this view, far beyond what we find in
contemporary philosophy of action to the cultivation of epistemic, ethical and emotional
rationalities, via philosophical analysis using the six-category ontology that enables
discriminative reasoning that distinguishes self and non-self, pre-eminently the body or
the material. The virtuous powers engendered by such discriminative analysis enable
the development of extraordinary attentional and cognitive capabilities, and emotional experience as an expression of the unitive potential rationality of embodied selfhood. This marks a transformation from a personal, desire-motivated to an impersonal, virtue-based epistemology that is consequential for self’s embodiment itself – as the objective thrust of will into the physical world. For, this transformation marks the emergence of bare self and object awareness characteristic of the impersonal self which enables its achievement of the bare, featureless state of singularity (kaivalya) of the free self.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

The aim of this thesis has been to examine Praśastapāda’s conception of self, why such a thing is held to exist and why the self must be a non-physical substance. Praśastapāda’s arguments for the existence of a self and for its non-physical nature, we have seen, are underwritten by specific conceptions of agency, normativity and natural law in a paradigm that I have dubbed ‘differential naturalism’. In this chapter, we step back and consider the insights this metaphysics of self offers and some of the worries it raises.

The metaphysical view Praśastapāda proposes is of an inclusive naturalism which integrates mental, moral and physical phenomena in the natural world. It does so by integrating the rational and normative powers that regulate action and the meta-ethical powers that regulate physical order in the self at the heart of natural order and causation. Such a self is the locus of the first-personal structures of consciousness and agency, and the impersonal structures of natural law (adṛṣṭa) qua moral law (dharma), in nature. Self, on this account, is the locus of the rational and evaluative possibilities of Intentional consciousness whose normative assessments guide actions, as well as the meta-ethical powers of natural law (adṛṣṭa) qua moral law (dharma) that shapes physical order. In this latter capacity, self is the source of physical causal regularities, and, when acting through will (prayatna), of bodily life and vitality, and the subpersonal processes of mental causation. The vesting of natural law as moral law in the self means, in the first instance, that the world of physical objects faced by each self are sources of affective and volitional concern for it so that the natural world is a source of values for each self. Here, the sort of values and affective qualities objects bear for each self reflects the moral quality of their past actions - as does the psychophysical character of each self. Self posits, on this account, the possibility of values in nature and at the very foundations of human life.

This mode of naturalistic integration of mental, moral and physical phenomena in human life and the natural world through the agential and meta-ethical causal powers of the self offers a more inclusive naturalism than contemporary liberal naturalisms such as McDowell’s. It also provides an alternative to strict naturalisms, whether contemporary scientific naturalism or the strong physicalism of the Cārvāka, that is
ostensibly more successful in taking account of the phenomena of selfhood and the first-personal structures of consciousness and agency, and their normative dimension, as aspects of the natural world (see also, Ganeri 2012). What is not entirely clear, however, is the precise relationship between normativity and nature, moral values and laws and physical variables and laws, as I discuss below.

Praśastapāda’s ‘differential naturalism’, we have seen, includes both self and physical substances as constituent elements of the natural world. The physicalist bent of this paradigm grants to self and physical substances generic dimensional and causal properties which enable causal commensurability between self and body through the mediation of the physical particle manas - an ontological connector between self and body that performs subpersonal functions of co-ordination and integration in mental-mental and mental-physical causation. This ontological architecture invokes a minimal dualism that avoids the radical mental-physical divide that invokes the ‘mind-body’ problem: the problems of consciousness and mental causation in a physical world that arise in a physicalist perspective, and the problem of self-body interaction under Cartesianism. For it allows the location of Intentional consciousness and the rational structures of agency in the natural world as properties of a self that qua substance is integrated with matter in a metaphysics of substance that includes selves and matter.

Praśastapāda’s core arguments for the existence of a self, we have seen, rest on the claim that all levels of organization of human mental and bodily life and behaviour are explicable as agental phenomena, because all levels of mental and bodily activity exhibit rational and normative structures and regularities that are self-referring. This requires a substance that is sui generis a self. This must be a non-physical substance because the ontology of the physical, the nature of physical properties and causal powers, preclude the body and the senses, or a part of these, from being bearers of Intentionality, that is, of Intentional consciousness and derivative intentional states such as desires and willings that are goal-oriented.

We have seen that the functional organization of mental life, the rational and normative possibilities this grants to Intentional consciousness, together with the unconscious telic structures of affections and volitions, allows the possibility of both freedom and determinism. Here, ‘unconscious’ desires and willings founded on beliefs guide the mental causation of action in a deterministic manner.
The unconscious nature of affections and willings, and the fact that their instantiation as unconscious states, as well their becoming conscious as objects of cognition is mediated by prior subpersonal processes that are executed by manas. This takes account of the possibility that physical correlates of will – and desire – arise prior to consciousness of these, consistent with Libet’s claims that neurophysiological correlates of will arise prior to conscious or ‘free’ will. However, the fact that unconscious mental attitudes may become objects of cognition means that mental attitudes are sensitive to judgements about them. On this account, the evaluative and normative possibilities of Intentional consciousness, its judgements, reasons and values, have primacy over the structures of deterministic causation of action impelled by unconscious affective and volitional dispositions.

The scope of rational powers enables a three-tier conception of epistemic, ethical and ontological self-transformation: from the desire-based (icchāpūrvaka) rationality and conceptual investments of personal ownership (svāmitva) and agency (kartrtva) in psychophysical phenomena of the agential self; to the virtue (dharma)-based rationality, epistemology and ethics of the impersonal or exceptional self of the yogin whose mental and moral properties exemplify their common universal possibilities across selves; and finally the liberated (mukta) or dimensional self that is devoid of mental and bodily properties and exists as bare self-substance. The ethical aims of self-transformation secure the ultimate metaphysical reality of the self as the bare substratum of mental and ethical life. It does so by first securing the true ethical nature of the embodied impersonal self as the ‘good’ (niḥśreyasa) itself whose conduct accords with moral law and true virtue (dharma) and whose cognitive powers access the metaphysical ‘truth’ of the six-category ontology as global cognitive insight (PDS 1994: §§ 241-2).

The mediating role of manas in the causation of bodily actions means that problems arising from neural dysfunction that repudiate ascriptions of agency as cognitive illusion, etc. may be attributed to failures in the processing of signals and information between self and body by manas.

The structure of mental-physical causation offers a graded transition from Intentional consciousness to the unconscious telic mental structures of affections and volitions, and finally the physical telic structures of manas and bodily behaviour. The structures of mental causation postulated here are prima facie not implausible or at least
not unintelligible. They offer a more complex, carefully crafted ontological system that avoids severe disjunctions between the mental and the physical that we find in radical substance dualisms such as Cartesianism or Jainism. It offers a system of graded transition from structures of Intentionality to physical telic or intentional structures.

Nevertheless, the dualist aspects of this metaphysics specify that mental properties and mental causation require a non-physical self as their locus, even if they are essentially causally dependent on the physical structures of manas, the body and its senses. The intuition here is that the body qua physical cannot be the locus of the first-personal structures of conscious agency and selfhood that underwrite mental and bodily life because it cannot support Intentional consciousness and the unconscious intentional structures of agency. It cannot therefore be a bearer of the rational and normative structures of agency at deliberative and complex, or primitive, levels in intentional actions and biological life, respectively. The body cannot, in other words, be the agent (kartr) or ‘controller’ (adhiṣṭātr) of bodily behaviour, nor can it be the ‘controller’ of biological life which similarly exhibits structures of rationality and self-reference, even if primitively. But the assumption that physical substances, in particular, the body is incapable of Intentionality and intentional structures is a controversial presupposition.

I turn next to the two sets of concerns raised by this metaphysics of self: the precise nature of the relationship between normativity and the natural it assumes; and the plausibility of the ontology of mental and physical phenomena and the relation between them it presupposes.

6.1. Normativity and Naturalism

At the heart of Praśastapāda’s conception of self and nature is the supposition of an objective normative space of moral and rational values centered on the notion of self, or rather self-knowledge, as the ‘highest good’ that is to be achieved, which leads to the ethical end of human life: liberation (kaivalya) of the self. This normative sphere is the source of the norms and values that structure psychophysical causation, and the ethical values assigned to intentions and actions in the determination of karmic accountability for one’s actions, both of which owe to dharma and adharma.

We are not, however, supplied with a clear theory of the meta-ethical values and structures that define this normative realm and how these are applied via the states of
_dharma_ and _adharma_ in the moral assessment of intentional actions. This means that it is not clear precisely how actions mediate between the actual and the ideal or normative, that is, how their moral qualities are assessed and measured against normative ideals or meta-ethical values of _dharma_. Further, it is not clear what the nature and structure of these norms and values are that they have the nature of unifying in some way the ethical norms of human conduct and the norms of psychophysical and physical causation. We are not provided with a theory of how precisely it is that the norms or rational and moral values of self-concern that structure intentional actions can shape or influence the structures of mental-physical causation and personal identity, i.e., the processes of psychophysical embodiment and causation that connect the mental and moral, and physical domains.

6.2. Self, Manas and Body

The differential non-Cartesian metaphysics Praśastapāda presents is undoubtedly innovative and _prima facie_ promising. However, if the scope and possibilities of mental-physical integration it postulates are to have any traction, a more precise specification of how the translation of mental facts into physical facts, and vice-versa, occurs is required. Here, Praśastapāda and the commentators do not offer us a clear or detailed conception of the nature of the causal interface between self and _manas_, as the primary interface between the mental and the physical. We are not told how precisely the Intentional contents and intentional structures of mental states, and a system of mental information processing, is translated into the system of physical information processing of _manas_ to enable mental-physical causation.

A partial solution to these questions may lie in the atomicity of _manas_ as an informational particle that enables it to serve as a kind of grammatical or syntactic key, which translates and processes the syntactic structures and semantic contents of mental states into forms of bodily intentionality. That is, into bodily action and behaviour by enabling spatio-temporal coordination and alignment between self and body, the mental and the physical, in a manner that is semantically and syntactically coherent. This is possibly made more plausible by the structure of agency which shows a graded transition from the conscious Intentional structures and contents of cognition, to the intentional or telic structures of desire and willing, and finally, the physical telic, intentional structures of bodily behaviour, by _manas_.

A further question is what sort of a causal link or nexus is maintained between manas and the body that allows causal integration of the body by manas, synchronically and diachronically at intentional, subintentional, and subpersonal levels? Although, Praśastapāda offers an impact model of physical causation between the executive and sense-faculties, this is insufficient to explain the role of manas in the coordination of bodily behaviour, and the self-organization of the human organism. For this, we need a detailed conception of how will imposes, via manas, ‘intentional’ form and structure in the physical causation of bodily actions and biological organization, as we discussed in chapters four and five respectively. These questions present gaps in this metaphysical framework that remain unanswered.

6.3. The Limits of a Technological Conception of Mental and Bodily Life

Praśastapāda presupposes an instrumentalist or ‘technological’ model of action and agency: the perceptual apparatus and the bodily complex are conceived as artefactual constructions that shape epistemic, behavioural and biological action and agency in an instrumentalist mould. This technological schematics enables a strict ascription of instrumental and agential powers and properties to physical and non-physical substances, respectively, that is fundamental to Praśastapāda’s arguments for non-physical agency.

The basis of this ‘technological’ conception of action is the notion that the human body serves as a vital artefact constructed to enable the experiences of those pleasures and pains that are a consequence of a self’s past actions. The body is the objective material condition of consciousness and action, however, as such, it represents an imposition of ‘intentional form’ on matter, guided by the vitalizing powers of self’s meta-ethical powers (dharma, adharma), shaped by the moral genealogy of its past actions. Essentially, the body is fabricated to enable the objective thrust of self’s inherited dispositions in sensory, mental and bodily acts that seek their satisfaction. Even the biological property of being alive arises here as a relational and intentional property of bodily matter for realizing a self’s instinctual and intentional strivings: life arises from the causal association of a self in the body.

We might think of this as a theory that holds that the functional characteristics of mental states, of cognitions, desires and willings, posit the right level and type of
interface for the manipulation of organic functions and bodily behaviour through *manas*, which serves much like the reins of a chariot by which a charioteer may guide and manipulate his chariot. Mental properties, namely, judgements, desires and willings but also states of virtue and non-virtue, are designed to meet the functional requirements of mental-physical causation at various macroscopic and micro-structural levels of bodily and physical reality, in a way that enables effective macroscopic, functional control of the organized mass of particles that constitutes the body.

The living body, on this account, is at most a causal factor of the same sort as a robot or an airplane that is activated and utilized by its designer and controller for its own purposes - in this case, through accrued *dharma* and *adharma* which enables its ‘self-organizing’ features, it dynamic identity and continuity. The question naturally arises whether the body can be plausibly considered a natural artefact of this sort: a receptacle of consciousness, on the model of a pot that is used to carry water, but which lacks a conscious author, a designer and producer. In the first place, it may be objected that an instrumental *qua* technological conception of the body and mental and bodily behaviour is inapplicable to a system of natural biological activity. A biological system cannot plausibly be assimilated to a technological or artefactual model, a system that is designed and constructed by human beings to serve their conscious aims and purposes. Such an analogy assimilates a host of conceptual and metaphysical primitives from the depiction of action in a technological system to the case of a biological system of perceptual and bodily actions, not least the agent-instrument or means-end structure of action that such systems presuppose. A premise of this sort is arguably circular, for it presupposes an instrumentalist and technological apparatus of mental and bodily causation that must be conducted by a conscious agent who, by assumption, can only be a non-physical substance. Since physical substances *qua* instruments are necessarily instruments.

This objection extends to the range of arguments Praśastapāda postulates from a ‘technological’ conception of agency and action for an agential self that is sometimes implicitly, if not explicitly, held to be a non-physical substance. These arguments include a carpenter’s act of cutting wood with an axe as analogous to how we perceive objects by means of our senses, and the way a charioteer steers a chariot as analogous to the way we engage in calculated acts of bodily striving for desired objects and avoidance of undesired ones. Similarly, the manner in which a puppeteer controls the
movements of a puppet is held to be similar to the way self, as the willful controller of the body, controls subintentional waking activities such as breathing and blinking – where breathing is a subintentional activity only in the waking state. Further, self controls bodily growth and healing in the way a house-owner repairs and extends his house.

The disanalogy between technological and biological systems is also evident in the epistemic and semantic awkwardness of presenting sensory and bodily actions and functions in an instrumentalist-technological model. It appears epistemically inappropriate to say, ‘I hear with my ears’, even if this may be grammatically implicit. Or to say, ‘I picked up my clothes with my hand’. With respect to biological functions, it is surely more natural to say, ‘The body heals itself’, rather than to say, ‘I heal my body’, or ‘I am growing my body’. However, a possible response to such objections might be that where non-cognitive or unreflective forms of intentionality are involved, agency must remain implicit in any statements about these activities. For, undoubtedly this awkwardness has to do with the immediacy and directness, that is, the implicate nature of executive control in these acts and functions.

Nevertheless, in view of the above objections, it would appear more plausible to posit the perceptual or bodily system as a subpersonal mechanism that is embedded in the natural teleological structures of the physical world rather than describe it on a technological model. On this alternative view, the body might be considered an intentional system that is embedded in a wider system of natural physical intentionalities rather than a self-contained artefactual system. But this would undermine the possibility of an instrumentalist conception of perceptual and bodily agency and actions, the control of which necessarily requires a non-physical self in Praśastapāda’s arguments. It would undermine Praśastapāda’s arguments for a non-physical agential self by calling into question the limited conception of physicality, a physicality devoid of any possibility of agency from its intrinsic inability to support consciousness and intentionality.

6.4. Models of the Physical

An attempt to assimilate the mental to a more naturalistic or physicalist conception, however, faces the question how we might bridge the sort of systemic behaviour that
appears in inanimate physical structures or inorganic phenomena, with the systemic behaviour we find in organic systems *qua* vital systems; as well as how we might bridge the divide between inanimate processes and the consciousness-linked waking behaviour of human beings. For it is, in Praśastapāda’s view, the impossibility of conceiving or explaining how the dichotomy between inanimate matter and bodily and mental life might be bridged that grounds his argument for dualism, on the fundamental intuition that matter cannot support subjectivity, selfhood and intentionality – the irreducible features of mentality and mental causation, cognitive, behavioural, and biological. A conception of the physical as particulate inanimate matter that Praśastapāda largely posits is intuitively more likely to support such assumptions and claims. But it is not obvious that we need to stay with such a conception of the physical, and a dualism of powers and properties that excludes the very possibility of emergentism with regard to mental properties, panpsychism or various forms of non-reductive physicalism.

Further, the crucial distinction for determining the appropriate metaphysical schema for an account of conscious agency may not simply be the distinction between the inanimate and the animate, as Praśastapāda’s examples and analogical reasoning would have it, in support of a particular conception of substance dualism. Rather, a distinction between different *intentional* levels of physical reality, where higher levels of intentional complexity of the physical posit more complex forms of self-reference may be considered more appropriate. We might consider that what distinguishes the inanimate and the animate is the advent of local reflexivity at higher levels of intentional complexity: the level of intentionality associated with say, human or animal physiological systems. It is conceivable that such a system of local reflexivity that is embedded in a wider system of natural intentionalities, might account for localized reflexive structures that allow access to an immediate local space of intentional and normative possibilities in the physical realm itself, *qua* biological self-organisation and the self-organisation of the network of consciousness and mental states. But the structure and possibility of embedded natural intentionalities in primitive and complex modes must rest on natural norms and values - of some sort - that are implicit in natural phenomena and order itself, if natural processes are held ot be intelligibly ordered. Such values may be held to exhibit primitive and complex modes in accordance with the level of reflexive organization of intentional structures they enable.
The plausibility of the above view depends on the conception of the physical that is accepted. However, Praśastapāda’s notion of physical spatio-temporal continua, such as ether, space and time, that are much like self in that they have common dimensional structures and related causal properties, as well as the innovative notion of a physical information-processing substance, manas, that mediates between the mental and the physical, and the conception of a self-substance that is the bearer of personal and impersonal causal powers in nature, goes some way towards opening the possibility of a truly ‘differential’ metaphysics that is grounded in a more ‘neutral’ view of substance – a view of substance and phenomena that is not divisively physical and mental in contrast to a dualist view of mental and physical phenomena.

6.5. Concluding Remarks

Praśastapāda’s conception of self is located in a metaphysical paradigm that I have termed ‘differential naturalism’. This provides an innovative alternative to contemporary models of physicalism as well as to Cartesian and classical Indian dualisms, and sheds considerable light on how mentality and normativity may be located in a naturalized self at the very heart of natural order and causation. Such a self is a bearer of primitive and complex levels of rational and moral agential powers that are constitutive of mental and bodily life. What distinguishes this conception of self is that as the source of normativity, of rational and ethical values and powers, regulates not only the psychophysical processes of individual mental and bodily life but, as the source of the norms and powers of natural law, it also regulates physical order and causation. This differential rather than radically dualist metaphysics conceives self as the locus of mental and moral structures, rational and moral norms at the centre of the natural world. It locates self’s own possibilities of rationality and freedom inalienably in the natural order of things.
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Appendix I

A Translation of ‘The Chapter on the Self’ (Āmaprakaraṇam) in the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha, §§ 76-80

(76) It is in virtue of its connection with [the universal] selfhood that [a substance] is a self. Since, it (one’s own self) is unperceivable [by others] on account of its subtlety, knowledge of it is gained [by inference] from the [use of] perceptual instruments, such as the auditory sense-faculty [in the perception of sound]. [For just as] the employment of an instrument such as an axe is seen to require an agent [so too are the senses]. [The instruments of perception, in turn,] are inferred from the perceiving of sound, etc. [Further,] from [the occurrence of] perceptual consciousness (prasiddhi) such as [the experience of] sound, we infer a perceiver (prasādhaka).44

(77) The body, senses and the executive faculty (manas)45 do not have [this character]46, because they lack cognition. Consciousness is not [a property] of the body, because it is a product of the material elements, just as a pot, etc. are, and because of the impossibility of its occurrence in a dead body.47 Neither is consciousness [a property of] the sense-faculties, on account of their instrumentality; and because we observe that there is recollection [even] when [the sense-faculties] are destroyed or when the object is not proximal. Neither [is consciousness a property of] the executive faculty, because if it [the executive faculty] were not dependent on the other [sense-]48 instruments, recollection and perception would occur simultaneously, and [also] on account of its own instrumental nature. [Having demonstrated] by elimination, that [consciousness] is

44 Prasiddhi and prasādhaka have an agential connotation here of accomplishment and accomplisher, respectively, of cognition. The perceiver or cognizer is therefore a subject and an agent: an agential subject. Note, mental properties, including cognition or consciousness, are not essential properties of the self.

45 Manas is translated here as the ‘executive faculty’ rather than as ‘mind’ as is often the case, in view of the fact that it performs executive functions as an ‘inner instrument’ (antabhakaraṇa) of the self.

46 Of being a cognizer.

47 The body qua bodily matter cannot account for consciousness because the dead body, which is nonetheless a body, is not conscious.

48 The executive faculty (manas) is considered to be an inner (antar) sense-faculty (indriya), while vision, hearing and so on are considered to be external (bāhya) faculties.
an effect of the self [alone, and not of the body, the senses or the executive faculty], [we see that] it is in virtue of consciousness [as the inferential mark of a cognizer] that [the existence of] the self is established.

(78) Just as a charioteer is inferred by the motion of the chariot, so a willful controller (prayatnavan adhiṣṭhātr) [of the flesh and bones] is inferred by such activity (pravṛtti) as is fit for obtaining what is advantageous (hita) and such restraint (nivṛtti) as is fit for avoiding what is disadvantageous (ahita), both being located in the body (vigraha). [It is inferred too] from such processes as breathing in and breathing out.

How so? From observing the changing movement of the air contained in the body, [we infer a willful controller who is] like one who pumps the bellows. On account of the regular activity of opening and shutting the eyes, [we infer a controller who is] like a puppeteer [directing] a wooden puppet. From the growth of the body, the healing of its wounds and fractures, etc., [we infer a controller] like a house-owner [who extends and repairs his house]. From the motion of the executive faculty, which is the instrumental cause of connection with the [sense-] instruments, which present the desired object, [we infer a controller who is] similar to a child throwing a ball [at other balls] in the corners of a house. [And also,] because, after perceiving a visual object, we observe modifications in the faculty of taste following the recollection of the taste [of that object]; [from this], a single [unifier] is recognized, who is the perceiver of both

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49 Consciousness is an effect of the self, which serves as the substratum cause or basis (samavāyi kāraṇa) on which it is existentially dependent.

50 Udayana’s Kīraṇāvali version lacks ‘tenātma’ here, i.e., ‘in virtue of… the self’.

51 Self is established by default, as the substratum cause of consciousness, in virtue of the fact that consciousness is a property and properties must have a property-bearer. By the elimination of all other possible loci of consciousness, such as the senses, manas and the body, the bearer of consciousness, the self, must be a non-physical substance.

52 ‘Changing’ (vikṛta) refers to the ‘unnatural’ movement of air in the body: the fact that it moves differently from the way it does in nature.

53 This refers to inhalation and exhalation, which in being vertical movement of air differs from its natural horizontal movement in nature (see NK 1984: 83, 7-10).

54 Vaiśeṣika recognizes three types of cause: the substratum or inherence cause (samavāyi-kāraṇa), the non-substratum cause (asamavāyi-kāraṇa) and the instrumental cause (nimittā-kāraṇa).

55 The commentaries explain this as, ‘like a boy in the corner of a house who throws a ball towards another ball…’. Jha follows the commentaries here rather than the text.
faculties, vision and taste], like a spectator situated behind two round windows [of a house].

(79) From the qualities, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and will, a bearer of these is inferred. And these are not qualities of the body and the sense-faculties. Why so? Because they are always expressed [sententially] with [reference to] the ‘I-object’ (ahamkāra), because their occurrence is localized [in a region of the self enclosed in the body], and because they do not last as long as their substratum [that is, they are episodic]; and because [they] are not perceived by the external sense-faculties. Also [self is inferred] because of the [essential] distinction between the [uses of the] word ‘I’ and [the usage of] words such as ‘earth’, etc.

(80) Its [i.e., self’s] qualities are, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, will, [states of] virtue, non-virtue, cognitive imprints, number, dimension, metaphysical distinction, conjunction and disjunction. In the text [i.e. the section of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra] dealing with the characteristics of self, [the characteristics] from cognition up to

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56 The ‘I-object’ or ‘I-form’ (ahamkāra) refers to that experience of self as subject, which implicitly identifies ‘I’ with objects or predicates. The argument is that pleasure, pain, etc. are always predicated of ‘I’. From the fact that these qualities are always expressed with ‘I’, it follows that these mental properties, like ‘I-cognition’, are properties of the same substratum, the self – by the referential theory of meaning that Vaiśeṣika adopts mental properties and ‘I’ have the same substratum, namely, the referent ‘I’, the self.

57 The qualities of the material elements, such as earth, pervade their substance or substratum, i.e., they possess vyāpti (pervasion). The qualities of the maximal or omni-located substances, such as self, are local or non-pervasive phenomena (avyāpti).

58 Dravya refers to the substratum of the qualities.

59 Dharma and adharma are the inherited moral dispositions and capacities of the individual self, derived from the moral quality of its previous deeds, which are usually translated as merit and demerit, respectively. They are the reason for the experience of pleasure or pain in a self’s current embodiment. ‘Virtue’ and ‘non-virtue’ refer more directly to the moral character, moral powers and connotations of the terms dharma and adharma than ‘merit’ and ‘demerit’.

60 These are the imprints of cognitive experience, affections, and actions, including the learning of theoretical and practical skills, acquired in a self’s current embodiment. These are retained and accessible as memories, dispositions, character traits, and theoretical and practical skills.

61 Number (samkhya) is the property of their being one or more (selves).

62 Prthaktya refers to the quality of ‘internal’ metaphysical distinctiveness that is responsible for the numerical identity and individuality of a substance. It is very similar, in this respect to the category of viśeṣa or differentiator of the permanent substances, although arguably the latter refers to the differentiating features of substances with regard to other objects as well, rather than wholly to their inherent quality of metaphysical distinctiveness. For this reason, viśeṣa is considered redundant and excluded as a separate category in the later Nyāya-Nyāya literature.
will have been established. Merit and demerit [are established as qualities of self] because of the claim [in the Śūtra] that the qualities of one self are not causally responsible [for the arising of qualities in another self]. Cognitive imprints [are established] by the claim [in the Śūtra] of their causal role in bringing about recollection. Number [is established] by the claim [in the Śūtra] of the distributive order [of selves]. And for the same reason, [the] distinctive identity [of each self] too [is established]. From the statement [in the Śūtra], ‘And so also is self’, the maximal dimension [of the self is established]. Conjunction [is established as a quality of self] from the fact that pleasure, etc. come about through contact. Disjunction [is established] from the fact that there is a terminator of that [contact].

63 This passage establishes what the qualities of a self are, in addition to those specified in the Vaiśeṣika Śūtra, by inference from the reasons and conditions under which these occur.

64 Literally, ‘the qualities of another self are not causally responsible [for the state of this self]’.

65 The distributive order (ṛjavasthā) of selves refers to the qualitative differentiation of embodied selves, whose current conditions of embodiment and existence accord with their past actions. This assumes that selves are metaphysically distinct individuals (prthaktva) and that they are one or more in number (samkhyā). Unembodied or liberated selves are metaphysically distinct individuals since they bear the property of individuality (viṣeṣa).

66 Distinctive identity (prthaktva) refers to the necessary assumption of metaphysical identity or individuality that the distributive order of selves assumes.

67 The Vaiśesika Śūtra specifies that ākāśa, the substance in which sound manifests, is of maximal dimension, and then states, ‘And so also is self’. From this, it is concluded that, self has maximal dimension.
Appendix II

A Translation of ‘The Section on Substances: the Self’ in the Sūkti of Jagadīśa (pp. 361-369)

[p. 361] He (Praśastapāda) says: Selfhood is a universal, which distinguishes [a substance] as being the substratum of cognition, by [the relation of] inherence. Selfhood is a universal, which is characterized by the capacity of serving as the substratum of cognition by [its] inherence [in a substratum]. [This universal] is of two kinds, [as it refers to] God and [to] ordinary [beings]. Even though it is not perceivable in another self, a yogin perceives it in himself by [means of] his executive faculty. Similarly, although a universal such as earth-hood is not perceivable in an atom, it is visually perceived in a pot, etc.

Even though it (self) is introspectively cognized, he (Praśastapāda) also speaks of its inferrability, [when] saying, “On account of its subtlety…” Subtlety, refers to [self’s] lack of perceivability by the outer senses. [What Praśastapāda means here is that] despite its being unperceivable, in the sense of being unperceivable by the outer sense-faculties, inferential knowledge of it (self) is obtained by means of the sense-instruments such as [the faculty of] audition.

Objection: Since, the sense-instruments such as hearing, etc. are themselves not perceivable by the sense-faculties, how can there be inference based on them?

Reply: “By inference from the perception of sound, etc.” As for how the faculty of audition, etc., is inferred from the perception of sound, etc., it is the case that perceptions of sound, etc. are accomplished by means of instruments. [And so] like the action of cutting, etc., which is [accomplished] by means of an instrument such as a cutter that must be operated by a person, [the senses too require a person who operates them]. As for how self is inferred on the basis of audition, etc., [the faculties of] audition, etc., must be operated by an agent because they are instruments, just like an axe. An axe is a particular kind of weapon that is an instrument of cutting. He (Praśastapāda) points to the invariable concomitance of the inferential reason [, an instrument,] and the thing to be proven [, an agent,] in cases such as that of an axe, etc., by saying, “As in the case of an axe, etc.”
He\textsuperscript{68} also cites another proof for the self by saying, “and from the cognition of sound\textsuperscript{69}, etc.” In [the phrase], “In sound, etc.,” the seventh case [locative] is used in the sense of the sixth [genitive]. It means, “of sound, etc.”

[p. 362] [Thus,] on the basis of evidence derived from [the cognition of] sound, etc., from cognizing [itself], we infer the cognizer who accomplishes it. That is the meaning. This inference may be stated in the following way: Cognition has a locus because it is an effect, like smell. Having a locus should be understood as the existential dependence [of cognition on this locus]. The body cannot be proven to bear the capability [of being the locus of cognition].

Objection: But, cognition is inalienably connected to the body, the outer senses and the executive faculty.

To that he replies: “Not the body, the sense-faculties…” Cognition does not pertain to these [substances as their substratum effect]. He says the reason for this is that these [substances] are not conscious. The meaning is that they do not serve as the locus of cognition. He points out the absence of consciousness in each of them, when he says, “Not of the body…” Here is what cognition is. Consciousness is cognition and it does not pertain to the body. He says that the reason for this is that [the body] “is like a pot, etc.” Two reasons are given [why the body cannot be the locus]: it (the body) is made of material elements and it is an effect (a composite product). “Like a pot, etc.,” is the proving example.

Objection: This is improper reasoning. What is the problem with a material entity or an effect being a substratum of consciousness?

To that he replies, “And in a dead body…” If the body were the substratum of consciousness then, it (consciousness) would persist even in a dead body. Because it is absent in it, [that is,] we do not observe it, [we must infer that] consciousness does not have the body as its substratum; that is the meaning. He points out the absence of consciousness in the outer sense-faculties, by saying, “Not of the sense-faculties…”.

\textsuperscript{68} ‘He’ refers to Praśastapāda in this commentary, unless otherwise indicated.

\textsuperscript{69} The literal translation would be, “in sound” rather than “of sound”.

This means, [consciousness] does not pertain to the external sense-faculties. The reason he gives is, “On account of their instrumentality.” The proving example here is of a pot, which is a means for carrying water.

Anticipating that this too would be [objected to] as improper reasoning, he gives another [reason], “When they are destroyed…”. Recollection is a particular type of cognition. If it [recollection] inhaled in the sense-faculties such as those of audition, etc., then, if these senses were impaired, on account of some type of disease, such as deafness, there would be no recollection, because of the destruction of its substratum. [But] Even when they (the senses) are destroyed, there is recollection of these [past sense-perceptions]. This demonstrates that [recollective cognition] has a different substratum [from the senses].

He mentions another reason why the sense-faculties are not the substratum of recollective cognition: “from the non-proximity of the object.” If recollective cognition is [held to be] produced by the sense-faculty itself, [then] for the sake of proper reasoning, it must [be held to] be invariably connected with that sense-faculty. But, the fact that recollection is observed, even when it could not be produced by the [relevant] sense-faculty, because of the object [of perception] is not proximal to this sense, [or] the [because of the] destruction of the sense-object, [or because of an] obstruction [in the operation] of the sense-faculty, demonstrates that it (recollective cognition) has a different substratum [from the senses].

[p. 363] What should be said is that, recollection of that [previously perceived object] does not arise by itself, [but] by its nature arises from a cognitive imprint left by [past] experience. The sense-faculties are not the locus of cognitive imprints, otherwise, if the sense-faculty were impaired or destroyed, recollective cognition could not occur. Thus, consciousness definitely is not existentially dependent on the body because it is a material entity and a product, [and] also because recollective cognition is observed even when the body is damaged. Neither is it (cognition) existentially dependent on the outer sense-faculties, because recollective cognition is observed even when the sense-object [recalled] is not proximal [to the relevant sense].

[Surely,] therefore, [runs the objection,] consciousness must be located in the executive faculty, which is non-material [that is, not composed of matter even though it is a physical substance], unproduced and indestructible, is not obstructed by anything and
[which occasions cognition when] it is in contact with an object. To this Praśastapāda responds, “Of the executive faculty …”. This is to be interpreted in the following way. If the executive faculty were inferred to be the substratum of cognition, [then,] it would be the agent of cognition, not its instrument. Moreover, if the respective objects of the visual and other sense-faculties were in contact [with these senses] at the same time, this would result in a multiplicity of perceptual cognitions arising simultaneously. [This would be the case] if these (perceptions) were not dependent [for their occurrence] on contact between the executive faculty and the relevant sense-faculty, and if the [executive faculty qua] instrument lacked activation and regulation, which can only be achieved through its [willful] operation by an agent.

[On the other hand], if it is said that the executive faculty produces, by itself, the perceptual cognition corresponding to whichever sense-faculty it is in contact with, then also, the executive faculty would be established [only] as the substratum of cognition, and not as its instrument. Then it (the executive faculty) would be established as the self, [and] the only difference would be that it is called the executive faculty. And self would thereby indeed be established, but it would remain [for us] to establish an instrument that would be responsible for originating engagement with just one object [at a time] and prevent the undesirable occurrence of simultaneous engagement with several [sense-objects]. And, this will be [further] discussed in the chapter on the executive faculty.

Objection: The executive faculty has been inferred to be the instrument [of cognition] and should also be inferred to be the substratum of cognition.

He replies: “[No,] because the executive faculty is itself, by its very nature, an instrument”. “Itself”, here means, “in itself”. If the executive faculty itself, being by its own nature an instrument of cognition is established to be an instrument, [we have succeeded in identifying] the instrument of cognition but not its substratum: this is the sense [of Praśastapāda’s argument]. Since the substratum of cognition is not established, and cognition, because it lacks a substratum is also not established, the instrument of cognition cannot be established [either]. It has been proven that what we establish as the substratum of cognition must be different from the instrument of cognition. Due to the executive faculty’s intrinsic instrumentality, it cannot be the substratum of cognition: this is the sense [of this argument]. [Thus,] consciousness is
the [substratum] effect of the self, [because, by elimination of the senses, the executive faculty and the body as possible loci, it is] the sole remaining [substance that could be the locus] of consciousness.

[p. 364] Objection: It is said that, from the cognition of sound, etc., [one’s own] self is inferred as their substratum, and in establishing the category of self, the aim is not just to establish one’s own self but to establish all selves. Moreover, since others’ cognitions are not perceivable [by us and, therefore,] the inferential means [of establishing their selves] cannot be cognized [by us], how [can we] infer those [selves] from their cognitions?

[In response] to this [objection] he establishes, [activity and restraint of activity] found in the body as the perceivable inferential reason, which establishes all selves. The meaning [of this argument] is that self, others’ and one’s own equally, is [causally] connected to the body as its controller, who exercises will.

By what inferential reason is [the controller-self] inferred?

To that he replies, [self], (one’s own and others’ equally) [is inferred] on the basis of activity and restraint of activity. “Activity” and “restraint of activity” are two forms of will; these words refer to the movement that arises as activity and restraint of activity in consequence of the self’s actions. On account of the mistakenness [of the notion that bodily movements refer to] mere [physical] movement as in the case of wind, etc., [he asserts that] only a movement, which arises from either activity or restraint of activity [can serve as] an inferential reason [for establishing self]. He explains these two types of movement as being generated by activity and restraint of activity, by reference to the desirable and the undesirable [objects], which are to be acquired and avoided, respectively. [The self is inferred from these] two [types of movement insofar as] they enable that [, the acquisition or avoidance of objects, respectively]. The movement of wind, etc., on the other hand, does not have the capacity of bringing about and averting what is favourable and unfavourable, respectively, for the wind, etc. In the inference that the body is joined to [self] that possesses will, on the basis of its having movements that are capable of acquiring and avoiding the desirable and the undesirable,

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70 ‘Acts’ pertaining to the self refers to grammatical ‘acts’ rather than to physical movement or motion.
respectively, [Praśastapāda] establishes the subject [of the syllogism] in which this inferential reason is found, as the body. This means that [self is inferred] on the basis of these two types [of movement] of which the body is the locus. The proving example he gives here is, “From the motion of a chariot”, which means, “Just as from the [guided] motion of a chariot, the fact that the chariot is controlled by a charioteer who exercises will is inferred [so from the guided movements of the body, its willful controller is inferred].”

He gives another inferential reason, “From the out-breath and others.” “And others”, refers to all the breaths such as the down-breath, which move inside the body.

[Objection:] However, the out-breath, etc., must occur in the body even if it is not governed by [a self] that possesses will, [so the opponent asks,] “Why is it invariably concomitant with them?”

He replies, “[Because of the particular nature of] the breaths contained in the body”. Since, the natural movement of air is horizontal, and its movement in an upward and downward flow, on the other hand, is a transformed movement, from observing the latter in the body, a controller who exercises effort is inferred, that is the meaning. The proving example here is the bellows. A bellows is a leather bag into which air is pumped by an agent; the one who pumps it [and] generates this kind of movement of air [in it] is the agent, that is the sense [of this argument]. The application [of this syllogism] is thus: the living body, like the bellows, is governed by [an agent] who exercises will because it is the locus of air, which is made to move in a transformed way, dissimilar to [the movement generated by] a collision [of winds].

[p. 365] He gives another reason: The opening and closing of the eyes. The meaning is that a controller of the body who exercises will is inferred from the regular, natural movement of the eyelids when the eyes open and close. [The controller is established] on account of the difference [between this movement and] the regular [movements] generated by the impact of wind, etc. In the same way as a puppeteer operating a puppet [is inferred] from the opening and closing of the eyes of the puppet. The application [of this example] is as follows: The living body is controlled by [someone] who exercises will, by virtue of its opening and closing its eyes [a movement, which is] different from [that] generated by the impact of wind, etc., just as a puppet that is
characterized by a similar opening and closing of its eyes [must be controlled by a puppeteer].

He gives another reason: “The body has…”. [Self] is inferred] from the totality of the body’s activities such as its growth, the maintenance of its well-being, the healing of its wounds and fractures that allow it to recover its former condition, as the instrumental cause of these [activities]. It must be inferred that the body has a controller who exercises will. The proving example is, “Like a house owner.” However, in the inference from reasons referred to [above] by the words, “such [activities] as …”, the example of a house owner is inapplicable because a house lacks purposeful activity, since [purposeful] activity is just the activity of the body which is based in will. The application [of this example] is as follows: The living body is controlled [by someone] who exercises will, on account of its having growth, etc., just as a house, etc., [can] be extended, etc., [only by someone who exercises will].

He gives another reason, “The desired [object]…” A desired object is wherever attention is directed despite the presence of many objects. The meaning is that, from the movement of the executive faculty, which by effecting contact [of the object] with the visual faculty causes its (the desired object’s) perception, we infer a controller of the body who exercises will. The reason is that the movement of the executive faculty, which effects contact between the sense-faculty and the [desired] object, would be impossible without [that someone] who exercises will. Otherwise, there would be the invalid consequence that even the executive faculty of someone who is asleep [would by itself] generates that kind of [causal] connection [resulting in perceptual cognitions]. The proving example, here is, “In the corner of a house…”. The “ball”, refers to a rubber ball [used in] a particular kind of children’s game. The meaning is, a child, a boy, throws a ball at another ball or another object situated in a corner of a house. From the movement of the ball, which effects contact between the ball and the desired object, a child who throws it is inferred. The application [of the example] is as follows: the executive faculty is directed by [someone] who exercises will on account of its having movement that effects contact with a desired object, like a ball [in] the above mentioned [example], which is thrown by a boy. As for the contact between the visual faculty and
the desired object, the difference that must be noted between the executive faculty, which by its movement causes that [sense-contact, and the ball] is that, in the case of the ball, its contact with a desired object is [contact between things] of the same kind.71

[p. 366] He also states that it (self) can be inferred on the basis of change in the gustatory faculty, by saying, “the visual object…” The visual object [refers, in this case, to] a sour substance such as a tamarind fruit. [When,] after it has been perceived by the visual faculty, recollection of [its] sour taste arises, it is a recollection of that very sour taste. “On account of this order…”. In what follows, it is outlined how self is inferred from observing that a change in the faculty of taste, which manifests in the form of salivation, [occurs] in this order. [This requires] a cognizer who perceives both the sour substance and its taste. And the order, which is referred to above as, “On account of [this] order, [is as follows]: Upon recollection of the sour taste, its cognizer, who is unperceivable, is therefore inferred from observing the change in the [gustatory] sense-faculty; this is the meaning. Change in the gustatory faculty would not occur without perception of both the sour substance and its taste, [and] perception of these two would not occur without the controller of the body who is the cognizer of both – through this sequence [of argument] the controller of the body, who is the cognizer of those [two cognitions] is inferred; this is the meaning. He gives here the example of, “several round windows…”, [to illustrate] the fact that [the self] is the cognizer of both [these cognitions]. The meaning is: Like a person looking through the many holes in the net covering a round window in the house, he (self) too is a cognizer of both [perceivings].

He states that it [self] is also inferred from qualities such as pleasure, by saying, “Pleasure and pain”, etc. Pleasure, etc., since they are qualities [must] inhere in a substance. The sense [of this argument] is that by inference from these qualities, we infer their bearer.

71 The example does not work neatly because it does not capture the two-step process of the executive faculty hitting the sense-faculty, which is then propelled towards the desired object, where each of these components of perception, especially the sense-object and the relevant sense it is associated with, is a different kind of thing.
Objection: This could have the alternative meaning that they (pleasure, pain, etc.) inhere in the body; that is why he says they are qualities. Why [must it be self that is their bearer]? [The opponent] asks: “Why are they not intrinsically qualities of the body or the sense-faculties?

The reply to this is: On account of the notion of “I”. This means, on account of the particular cognition, “I”. The meaning [of this argument] is the following. Since [the body and senses] are not [expressed] in one sentence with it (“I”),

Here, “are not” refers to logical contradiction. The phrase, “[expressed] in one sentence”, refers to the experience of being based in the same substratum. The sense [of this argument] is that the experience of [the body or the sense-faculties] being based in the same substratum as “I” is logically contradictory. And so, [we might say that] I, who have performed virtuous actions in a previous birth, that very “I” now [enjoy] happiness; I, who have committed non-virtuous acts, that very “I” now suffers. I engage in virtuous actions because I want happiness in my [next] birth and would hate to suffer. Because I want happiness in my next birth, I perform sacrifices to earn virtue. The meaning [of this] is that since such experiences of pleasure, etc., evidence a [p. 367] common substratum of I-ness, it would be logically contradictory to attribute pleasure, etc., to the body [as the substratum cause because the body is mutable and not unitary over time]. Since, the experience of pleasure [arising from] virtuous [deeds performed in a different birth is based on the sameness of the I-substratum, it is not attributable to the body [given its mutability]. [Such experience] across two births, despite the difference in bodies, is made possible by the persistence of the same substance across these two births; that very [substance] is the substratum of pleasure, etc. [, namely, the self].

Objection: I, who used to be fair, that very “I” have now become dark due to suffering. I, who used to be thin, that very “I”, have now become fat. [If the opponent argues that] the notion of thinness or fairness, etc., [expressed] here, [which appear to be] based in the same substratum as the I-substance, captures bodily distinctions rather than distinctions pertaining to the self, because of the absence of qualities such as fairness in the self, [then] the reply [to this objection] is, “No”. Here, the cognition that associates the I-substance and the body is erroneous, and cannot be taken to be a valid cognition,

72 By the referential theory of meaning that Vaiśeṣika adopts.
because it contradicts what we have argued earlier. Distinct states correspond to distinct bodies [over time, in the case of physical composites such as the body], and so the notion that it is the same body [that could be the bearer of an earlier and a later mental property] is erroneous. It must be noted that the person born in Caitra’s household does not stop being Caitra’s son on account of his having a different body, [that is,] because of the difference between his current [bodily] state from [his bodily state in] childhood. [The self is the substratum of “I” and this is why] we recognize Caitra’s son as such, in spite of his later body being different from his body at birth. [Pleasure, etc.,] cannot pertain to the sense-faculties either, because they [too] are different in different births.

He gives another reason against the body or the sense-faculties being the bearers of qualities such as pleasure: [their] localized [occurrence]. The meaning [of this argument] is that [these qualities are not qualities of the body and the senses] because [these] qualities occur in a localized area. They persist through the conjunction and the disjunction of the body and the sense-faculties [with objects], [that is, the body and the senses are the instrumental cause of the occurrence of these properties and not their substratum cause.] Therefore, they are not qualities of the body or the sense-faculties, i.e., [they are] not qualities of the substances that have the property of touch [namely, atomic matter]. This is the sense [of this argument].

Objection: The above argument does not rule out [pleasure, etc., being like] sound, which is located in the auditory faculty.73

[In response,] he gives another reason, the fact that they (pleasure, etc.,) do not persist as long as their substratum. Pleasure, etc., are not qualities of the body or the sense-faculties, because they do not persist as long as their substratum, [that is,] due to their lack of persistence contemporaneously with their substratum, [which is necessary exhibited by] the characteristic properties [of atomic matter qua essential properties]. The sense [of this argument] is that because qualities such as pleasure happen not to persist as long as their substratum, whereas it is never the case that the essential

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73 That is, like the physical property of sound, which occurs locally rather than pervading its substratum, even though it is a material property.
properties of the body and the sense-faculties, such as colour, do not persist as long as their substratum [, these substances cannot be the locus of pleasure, etc.].

Objection: If it is to be understood here that they [that is, pleasure, etc., are destroyed] the very moment they arise then they might as well be qualities of the body, or of the sense-faculties [which too are ever-changing].

[Thus,] Another reason is given, “By the outer senses…”. The meaning here is, because they (pleasure, etc.) are essentially unperceivable by the outer sense-faculties.

[p. 368] Objection: But the fact that they (pleasure, etc.) are unperceivable by the outer sense-faculties does not exclude them from being properties of the sense-faculties, because these too are unperceivable.

Reply: Pleasure, etc., however, do not actually lack that (cognizability), and this is what establishes the self. He says that its (self’s) cognition is [expressed] by the word “I”, from its being the object of [introspective] cognition, it must be added. And thus the word “I” refers to the cognition of “I” [that is, the self]. The sense [of this argument] is because “I” is an object of cognition [its existence is proven]. And the object of this kind of cognition is not the body, on account of the difference of the apprehension, “I have a body” [from, “I am a body”].

Objection: The apprehension “I” should refer to “earth”, etc. To that he replies, “The words ‘earth’, etc….”. The meaning [here] is, because we do not use expressions such as, “I am earth”.

He refers to the qualities of self, when he says, “Its qualities.” With respect to these qualities, he also expresses agreement with the author of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra that they are the inferential marks of the self. [These] inferential marks of the self establish [it]; with regard to these [marks] the Sūtra says that they have been established beginning with cognition. The meaning is that if cognition, etc., lacked the quality [of establishing self] it would have been inappropriate to speak of them as the inferential marks of the self. In agreement with him (the author of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra), he establishes [the states of] virtue and non-virtue by saying, “Virtue and non-virtue.” From [the performance of] prescribed and prohibited actions, [states of] virtue and non-virtue [respectively] are generated at a later time. Virtue and non-virtue are declared to be the certain means of that [namely, pleasure and pain] because [otherwise,] it would
obviously be impossible for pleasure and pain to be generated from [the performance of] prescribed and prohibited actions [respectively]. [Lest] it should be the case that virtue and non-virtue themselves, located in one substratum, [a self,] should give rise to pleasure and pain in a different self, the author of the Sūtra says here, “Qualities of one self cannot be the cause of qualities in another self.” The meaning here is that the qualities of virtue and non-virtue located in the substratum of one self cannot give rise to the qualities of pleasure and pain in the substratum of another self. Thus, virtue and non-virtue have been proven. The meaning [of this argument] is that the absence of virtue and non-virtue would make the expectation [of reward] and justification [in terms of retribution] impossible.

To establish cognitive imprints, in agreement with the author of the Sūtra, he says, “Cognitive imprints [are required] for the arising of recollective cognition. The Sūtra says: “Recollective cognition [arises] from the conjunction of self and the executive faculty, and from cognitive imprints”. The meaning [of this] is that cognitive imprints are established from the statement which asserts the causal role of cognitive imprints in the arising of recollective cognition. With regard to number, in agreement with the author of the Sūtra, he says: “Number [is established] on account of the statement of the distributive order [of selves]”. The Sūtra says: “On account of the [p. 369] distributive order [of selves] the multiplicity of selves [is established]. The meaning [of this] is that, the multiplicity of selves [is established] on account of the distributive order [of selves], [differentiating] “I”, “he”, etc. And multiplicity is plurality of number. Therefore, from that statement, number is established; this is its meaning. This statement also establishes the distinctness [of selves]; that is why, he says: “From it also…” “From it also”, means on account of the fact that plurality of number is impossible without [the] distinctness [of individual selves]. On the maximal dimension of self, in agreement with the author of the Sūtra, he says, “And so also is self.” The Sūtra says: “[Just as] ether has maximal dimension, so does self.” The meaning [of this] is that, it (self) is just like ether. The idea here is that from the statement that self is like ether, the maximal dimension of the self is established.

Objection: But how is the omni-location of self [established]?

And the reply is: “If it were not [omni-located]…”. If it is not omni-located, then it (self) must be declared to be delimited by the body; and if it is a delimited substance,
then it must be declared to be of limited dimension. And if being of limited dimension, if it is eternal, then it must necessarily be atomic. If [the opponent says:] “So, let it be atomic,” [our answer is:] “No,” because that would prevent it being the substratum of qualities that are directly cognizable [introspectively]. If [the opponent says:] “So, let it be a composite,” [our answer is:] “No,” [because] as a composite, it would not be eternal, and as a necessary consequence of this, it would produced and destroyed. And this means that, when it is destroyed, there would be no one [left to act as] the enjoyer of the fruits of [past] virtuous and non-virtuous actions.

He also establishes conjunction and disjunction from the fact that pleasure, etc., arise from contact [with an object]. Conjunction is contact; the meaning [of this statement] is that, [conjunction is established] on account of the arising of pleasure, etc., from that (contact). And this conjunction is between body and self; if this were not the case, pleasure, etc., could arise in a part of the self that is not delimited by the body. Thus, self has conjunction, otherwise pleasure, etc., could arise continuously [without contact with an object].

“From its dissolution…” This kind of conjunction is not permanent; if it were, then pleasure, etc., would be eternal and would arise continuously. So, it must be said that it [that is, pleasure] is subject to dissolution and that its dissolution is due to disjunction. Therefore, from its dissolution, disjunction is established, this is the meaning.