INTEGRATION
DISADVANTAGE AND
EXTREMISM

EDITED BY DAVID FELDMAN AND BEN GIDLEY
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Essays arising from a symposium held at the House of Commons
8 May 2013
Organised by
Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism, Birkbeck, University of London
Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford
Hosted by
All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism
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As chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism (APPG), I have been determined to deliver action against anti-Jewish prejudice according to three key principles. Firstly, that non-Jews should lead the fight against antisemitism. Secondly, that the success we have in combating antisemitism can, should and will be used to fight all forms of racism and discrimination. Thirdly, that Parliament can and must set the national standard in these matters and do so across party lines.

I was therefore delighted for our APPG to play host to a symposium organised by the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism, Birkbeck, University of London and the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at Oxford University. Joining together with these two institutions allowed us to more effectively put the aforementioned principles into practice.

This marks a new and necessary venture for our group, founded in the best traditions of policy development whereby scientific rigour informs political debate. Importantly for parliamentarians, this report pinpoints specific policy recommendations.

In an age where integration, cohesion and extremism are often the subject of media hype, political controversy and public frustration, I hope that this collection of essays and the policy recommendations which result from them will feed a different type of national discourse. The findings not only serve to reassure me that my guiding principles are correct, but that continuing research in this area is merited as the learning outcomes are incredibly valuable.
In this collection, we gather a series of short essays which call for a re-focusing of our national debate and our national and local policy on integration, cohesion and extremism. Our essential starting point is the principle that parliament has the opportunity and responsibility to take a lead in combating racism and religious intolerance. However, we extend this principle to set a new agenda for cross-party parliamentary work to tackle intolerance.

The essays presented here arise from the presentations made at a symposium held at the House of Commons on 8 May 2013, hosted by the All Party Group Against Antisemitism and planned jointly by the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism, based at Birkbeck, University of London, and by the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford. Our aim was to reflect on the government’s integration strategy and its Prevent strategies and to do so in the light of both contemporary developments and recent scholarship.

In the course of our work that day it became clear to us that extremist political movements which target ethnic and religious minorities, as well as hate crime directed against Muslims and Jews, need to be seen, understood and combatted as interconnected phenomena. It is for these reasons that antisemitism must be addressed alongside other racisms and forms of exclusion.

At the same time, antisemitism, racism and intolerance must be grasped and tackled in their full social context. This means understanding the ways in which social disadvantage and racial injustice, alienation and disempowerment, generate divisive social relations and political movements that feed on intolerance and hate. Intolerance and racial hatred must be resisted not only as they arise but also by addressing their deeper social and political roots.
The essays collected here develop these insights. They provide the best evidence on the structures of disadvantage which drive grievances in British society, on the drivers and extent of different forms of extremism, and on the processes of integration that emerge from the experiences, attitudes and aspirations of migrant and minority populations in Britain today.

The contributions by Rob Berkeley and Anthony Heath lay bare the penalties faced by specific ethnic and religious minorities in achieving equal outcomes in the labour market, education and other domains. Anthony Heath identifies ‘the paradox of integration’ which can lead to alienation from the mainstream. The paradox arises when second generation populations, which are more integrated by any objective measure, demonstrate greater awareness of unfairness than the preceding immigrant cohorts. As Nasar Meer’s contribution shows, British Muslims are characterised by a strong identification with Britain and by a trend towards greater social integration. Yet the way in which the war on terror is perceived to target Muslims collectively can make some constituencies open to the rhetoric of jihadi Islamism.

As Vidhya Ramalingam’s contribution documents, the British far right has changed profoundly in the last decade, while Dave Rich’s contribution highlights that antisemitism remains a disturbing force in Britain, presenting risks to the safety of UK Jews and contributing to feelings of insecurity. The risk of violent hate crime against Jews, including anti-Jewish terror attacks, remains a potent expression of a politics of intolerance and division. However, racism constantly mutates; classical antisemitism is just one of the many forms its takes. Some far right groups have attempted to re-brand themselves as superficially philosemitic. A politics of division has attempted to play off different forms of racism against each other in a game of competitive victimhood. Yet the evidence – as collected by the Community Security Trust and others – clearly shows that antisemitism remains a species of prejudice that connects far right extremism with Islamist extremism.

The perception that migration-driven demographic change is occurring without consultation with the settled population can make some constituencies open to the rhetoric of far right movements. Yet, as Ben Rogaly and Becky Taylor argue in their contribution, the image of a homogenous ‘white working class’ obscures the complex migration histories of majority ethnic populations, as well as the common experiences and interests they share with people from minority backgrounds. Many in Britain’s diverse population – including both minority ethnic and majority ethnic citizens – face a range of disadvantages, several of which are shared. These disadvantages give rise to both real and imagined grievances – whether about the war on terror or about rapid demographic change.

The more fine-grained understanding of the social context of hate politics outlined in these five essays indicate that there needs to be a new approach towards combatting racism and extremism and promoting integration. This is considered in the final papers: Maleiha Malik, in her contribution, calls for a renewed commitment to a strong legal framework for tackling intolerance while Ben Gidley outlines the need for a re-focused social policy agenda.

Cutting across the politically diverse starting points and perspectives of these essays and the discussions they engendered at the symposium, a number of key themes and principles emerge. These highlight the need to consider the social context of contemporary forms of intolerance and for there to be renewed emphasis on the politics of cohesion. Formulated as a series of recommendations, they provide a tangible and compelling agenda for action.
TACKLING RACISM

1. *Policy on racism, integration and cohesion must be aligned with the realities of disadvantage*

   Grievances relating to disadvantage provide fertile ground for intolerance and division. To combat intolerance, therefore, we need to understand and address its social contexts. Rather than tackle intolerance and extremism in isolation, the debate about achieving racial justice, social mobility and social justice must be at the heart of a renewed strategy for integration and cohesion.

2. *Antisemitism must be addressed alongside other forms of racism. Strategies for combating specific racisms should draw upon and learn from strategies for combating others*

   Antisemitism, Islamophobia and xenophobia are related to each other, but never straightforwardly. Only by working collaboratively and sharing best practice, can we effectively resist intolerance both across and within communities. For example, long-established work in the Jewish community to monitor and respond to antisemitic hate crime has informed innovative work to track anti-Muslim prejudice, such as the Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks (MAMA) initiative, championed by Baroness Warsi. This is an area that parliamentarians have the opportunity and responsibility to lead.

ADDRESSING SOCIAL POLICY

3. *There needs to be a whole-community-approach to integration*

   Integration is not just a duty of migrants and minorities, but of the whole of society and its institutions. Mainstream social policy instruments should be rigorously scrutinised to identify how best they can affect equal outcomes across society. This requires guidance and leadership from central government.

   Targeted social policy measures aimed at specific groups should continue. However, these must form part of the whole-community approach. A selective approach to integration, which only targets ‘problem’ minorities reproduces the flaws of a divisive state multiculturalism: stigmatising groups, driving grievances and competition, promoting division over cohesion.

4. *A national strategy for integration should be developed, along with national guidelines for its implementation*

   Government is right to see integration as something which unfolds differently in each locality, and MPs, rooted in constituencies with differing experiences of the process, are well placed to articulate local dimensions. However, locally devolved strategies are insufficient to build more integrated communities. A national strategy for integration should set out detailed, concrete, substantive actions and a coherent methodology for measuring progress based on robust data: such a smart approach is the only cost-effective approach to doing social policy in a time of austerity.

5. *Britain’s robust body of anti-discrimination law must be maintained and strengthened*

   Having created world-leading mechanisms of redress, which individuals from Britain’s ethnic and religious minorities facing discrimination and disadvantage can access, the priority now for anti-discrimination law is mainstreaming the needs of minorities and instilling a duty on public authorities to promote cohesion. Without this whole-of-society approach, minority populations and individuals within them remain vulnerable to unregulated parallel community structures.
6. **There should be a renewed commitment to the Public Sector Equality Duty.**

   Far from being a top-down bureaucratic exercise, the equality duty mainstreams the needs of minorities. It provides a platform for public authorities to engage in dialogue and consultation with local citizens and to make transparent the ethical debates on which local policy-making is based.

**OPENNESS AND RESPONSIBILITY**

7. **All sectors of society have a duty to speak responsibly on issues around race, migrants and minorities**

   Vigilance against the ‘hard’ forms of racism that drive far right and Islamist extremism should be extended to include ‘soft’ forms of intolerance that are more widespread in all our diverse communities. The kinds of grievances which give rise to these softer forms of racism are often driven by inflamed discourse and debates based on perceptions and assertions rather than facts. To this end, community spokespeople have a responsibility to promote evidence-based, open discussion and debate.

8. **Politicians have the opportunity and a duty to promote a more open, balanced discussion on integration**

   Members of Parliament should seek to engage their constituencies in the debate about integration using language that does not alienate, but rather speaks to their concerns about fairness, equality and justice:

   • Take care in the use of numbers - inaccurate presentation of information leads to divisive debates and bad policy-making

   • Avoid terms such as ‘native population’ which can obscure the contribution and strong British identification of long-settled minority populations and conflate nationality with ethnicity

   • Avoid speaking of Britain’s diverse population as if it is composed of discrete and homogenous entities - ‘Muslim communities’ or ‘white working class communities’ - given that similarities across and differences within such communities are often at least as significant. Such terms, in failing to recognise the diversity and range of voices and positions within such populations, also fail to address the real structures of disadvantage that shape their experiences

   • Reject images of ‘model’ minorities against which the integration of other populations is judged.
It is commonly said that Britain has not had a debate on integration. This is a fallacy: the problem is that we have had the wrong debate, based on unstable and evidence-free foundations. In the field of integration, the approach in the UK has been characterised by no clear policies, no means of measuring progress, no engagement with those most affected, no direction, and no accountability. Government has yet to identify what it is willing and able to do for Britain’s black and minority ethnic communities.

There is a lack of clarity around the question to which integration is the answer. Too often, policy makers proceed from the assumption of dis-integration: minority communities are perceived to be not integrated enough, and migrants are equated with ‘trouble’. These assumptions are based on a notion of Britishness that is frozen in time, and fails to take account of the nature of a modern Britain, its citizenry, or its role in the world.

Bad policy – policy based on false assumptions – creates poor outcomes. But the subsequent failure to make progress as a result of bad policy also generates a policy fatigue that can make debates even more intractable and make it yet harder to revisit the topic. Britain urgently needs a re-focusing of the integration debate.

We need therefore to re-think what the genuine conditions for integration are. Of the five principles for integration adopted by the current government, “common ground” is an essential part of this approach, but it needs to be thought about in a democratic way. An authoritarian integration strategy stresses minority responsibilities; a democratic approach stresses responsibilities but also rights. People from minority ethnic backgrounds are an asset, not a threat, to British values and national unity.
The Coalition Government, in stepping back from a top-down integration strategy, has started a debate to clarify the role of the state, but as yet we have not found the right answer. The state cannot be the arbiter of British values; that is a task for the citizens of this country in all their ethnic diversity.

If it is not the state’s responsibility to define common ground, this does not mean it can step down from ensuring a level playing field for all of Britain’s communities. Thus “localism” is a valuable principle; there is a clear need for local solutions. After all, not only are all politics local, so too are experiences of racism. But a turn to localism will be a step back if it abrogates central government’s responsibility for ensuring effective engagement in the country’s socio-economic life and central government’s responsibility in providing local agencies with substantive guidance on achieving and measuring progress towards racial justice.

Combating extremism and intolerance also remains essential, and we should acknowledge the government’s commitment to challenging extremism and intolerance, particularly its focus on anti-Muslim hate crime. However, Runnymede would like to see a wider approach focusing on racism and discrimination facing all ethnic groups. 57% of ethnic minorities believe that there is racial discrimination in the UK, with 36% reporting personal experience of discrimination. In particular, amongst Black Caribbean people, 49% report personal experience of discrimination.

Similarly, participation in civic life is also essential, but full participation is impossible to achieve for those in our society facing the sharpest forms of disadvantage. “Participation” makes little sense if you worry about where your next meal is coming from. There is little evidence so far that mainstream platforms of civic engagement have the capacity to respond adequately to diversity and to include all of Britain’s communities.

Social mobility – addressing disadvantage – is therefore the real key to creating the conditions for integration, but the social mobility agenda for disadvantaged minority communities has stalled. For some groups, patterns of labour market exclusion and educational failure are depressingly persistent. Even in the wake of the Lawrence convictions we still see persistent racial inequality and injustice in our society.

Youth unemployment among Black and Pakistani heritage young people is more than double the rate of that of white young people. Three times as many young Black men will start a prison sentence this year than will join a Russell Group university. Police waste 5,500 days each year stopping and searching Black and Asian people without reducing the incidence of crime. Government research has highlighted that if you have an identifiably African or Asian name you have to make nearly twice as many applications to even get an interview.

These inequalities are not solely due to racism, or any one simple factor. But racism remains a live issue in Britain. Runnymede research and that of others shows that concern about racial injustice was a key motivator in the riots of 2011. Our football terraces and fields are once again dealing with overt racist attitudes. We cannot start to create the conditions for integration without addressing these fundamental issues of justice.

These inequalities have complex causes, and therefore need tailored and strategic approaches to tackle them; detailed, substantive, concrete solutions are needed. Mainstream agencies have a key role in delivering fairness. However, the evidence shows that targeted responses to racial injustice are also required, based on a realistic assessment of what we know about where disadvantage is concentrated and
on a workable method of measuring progress. This requires a comprehensive, cross-departmental government strategy.

To develop a coherent integration strategy, we need to acknowledge that *diversity without equality is apartheid* – but also that *cohesion without respect for difference is authoritarianism*. A re-focused integration debate would take the opportunity to further benefit from the diversity of the ethnic and faith backgrounds of its citizens, recognising that integration is a two-way process of mutual adaptation. It would fully engage the whole of civil society – but especially organisations with expertise in the fields of community building, race equality and migration: those organisations which work most closely with those most directly affected by integration policies.

A coherent integration strategy, finally, would take *fairness and racial justice*, not assimilation, as its starting point. A return to assimilation is neither desirable nor practicable and puts at risk the benefits we have gained from the ethnic diversity of British people.
Many commentators have raised questions about the extent to which Muslims are successfully integrating into British society. These concerns go back to the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001. Doubts were expressed then, and later, about the extent to which Muslim groups in those cities lived ‘parallel lives’, remaining in homogenous neighbourhoods, apart from the British mainstream, and therefore failing to mix with British citizens and failing to adapt to British values. According to this account, Muslims have failed to integrate either socially or culturally.

Coming at these issues from a completely different angle, other commentators have noted the rise of Islamophobia and the extent to which Muslims suffer various forms of exclusion and rejection by British society, resulting in high unemployment rates and economic disadvantage. In this account, Muslims have indeed not managed to integrate structurally, but this has been more a result of exclusion and discrimination by the white British majority rather than lack of willingness to integrate. Various writers have, for example, shown that there are ‘Muslim penalties’ in the labour market, and there is also a good deal of evidence of anti-Muslim sentiments.

These two arguments could of course be related empirically: exclusion and discrimination might well lead to feelings of being unwanted, which in turn might lead to a reluctance to integrate. Sociologists have developed the concept of ‘reactive ethnicity’ to express the idea that prejudice and discrimination might lead minorities to emphasize their ethnic distinctiveness as a reaction against their exclusion from mainstream society. The same idea could apply in the religious field too. David Voas and Fenella Fleischmann have asked “What happens to the religious identity, belief and practice of Muslims who settle in Western countries? Do they, or their children and subsequent generations, gradually become more...
Our thesis is that there are elements in both accounts for which there is an empirical base but that a deeper understanding of Muslim integration and disadvantage needs to take into account processes of generational change of the kind alluded to by Voas and Fleischmann. Some Muslims have only recently arrived in Britain, perhaps as refugees from civil wars in Somalia or the Middle East, while others born and brought up in Britain, have acquired British citizenship and think of Britain as their home. It would not be surprising if recent arrivals did not speak English and tended to draw their friends and social circle from co-ethnics and co-religionists, and did not yet identify with Britain. The key question is what happens in the second generation, among people who have been born and brought up in Britain. Does the second generation reject British society and British values?

As we shall see below, the empirical evidence generally tells us a very positive story of generational progress and increasing social integration. However, we believe that there may also be a ‘paradox of integration’. While recent arrivals may indeed be oriented to their country of origin, and have frames of reference that owe more to their lives in Somalia or the Middle East or South Asia, British-born young Muslims will have British frames of reference, and will expect to be treated in similar ways to their British peers. They will share British values such as equality of opportunity, and will expect to experience equal treatment themselves. The more socially and culturally integrated they are, the more they will be aware of these values, and the more they will be aware of infractions of those values and of unequal treatment. Awareness of discrimination and resulting discontent with British society may therefore actually be larger among the British-born and among those who are more integrated.

Before providing the evidence for these arguments, we need to remind ourselves about the composition of the Muslim population of Britain. The 2011 census shows that Muslims were Britain’s second-largest religious group with 2.7 million members (4.8 percent of the population) in England and Wales. They are also the most ethnically-diverse religious group: while the largest component consists of Muslims with Pakistani backgrounds, there are also substantial numbers of Muslims with other South Asian, African and Middle Eastern backgrounds, together with white converts. 1.2 million of the Muslim population were actually born in Britain and can therefore be regarded as belonging to the ‘second generation’.

We can use the data from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Survey (EMBES) to explore generational change in Muslim cultural and structural integration into British society, their perceptions of rejection and discrimination, and the extent of ‘reactive religiosity’. We focus on the main Muslim ethnic groups (ie excluding the white groups on whom we have little data), that is on people whose own or family origins were in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Africa and the Caribbean.

In table 1 we show the patterns of generational change in various indicators of social, cultural and structural integration. We distinguish between the first generation, who migrated to Britain as adults and who would therefore have grown up in their country of origin. Next we have what is termed the 1.5 generation who were born abroad but came to Britain before reaching adulthood (which we define for these purposes as age 16) and who will therefore have had some experience of British education. Finally there is the second generation who were born in Britain and have grown up in Britain themselves. (There will also now be a small but growing third-generation population, whom we have included with the second generation.)
TABLE 1. GENERATIONAL PROGRESS IN MUSLIM INTEGRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st generation</th>
<th>1.5 generation</th>
<th>2nd generation</th>
<th>Significance of the generational change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% fluent in English</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>P &lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% British citizens</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>P &lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% expressing British or English national identity</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>P &lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% feeling fair amount in common with British people</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>P &lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% bothered a lot if close relative married a white person</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>P &lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with low qualifications</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>P &lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% economically inactive (women)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>P &lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% unemployed (men)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>P &gt; 0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010, weighted data.

Table 1 shows very clear evidence of increasing cultural and social integration. The biggest change is in the use and fluency of English: by the second generation almost everyone is either fluent in English or uses English as their first language. We also see big increases in British citizenship and British identity and reduced social distance from white British people. All of these changes are highly significant.²

There are also clear signs of structural integration, most notably in education where the 1.5 and second generations have taken full advantage of the educational opportunities available to them. In other research we have also found that the large gender gap in education which characterized Muslims brought up in South Asian countries has completely disappeared among the second-generation, who have fully assimilated to the British pattern where girls fare rather better than boys educationally. There is also very clear evidence of a major increase in the economic activity of second-generation Muslim women, compared with their mothers’ generation. However, while in all these respects we have clear evidence of generational convergence with mainstream British patterns, we also have to note that Muslim unemployment rates among men remain stubbornly high, around double those of the white British. This contrasts sharply with the generational progress in education, and is strongly suggestive that processes of labour market exclusion adversely affect second-generation Muslims.

Field experiments have demonstrated that there is continuing discrimination against people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi background who have British qualifications.³ To be sure we do not have any specific studies of the discrimination experienced by second-generation Muslims, but the evidence on people of Pakistani background, coupled with recent statistical analysis of the ‘religious penalties’ experienced by Muslims in the labour market, is fairly powerful evidence that discrimination against British-born Muslims is still occurring.

We also have clear evidence that the British-born Muslims are more aware of discrimination and exclusion than are earlier generations. We can see this clearly in table 2.
TABLE 2. INCREASING PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE SECOND GENERATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% reporting discrimination because of one’s religion</th>
<th>1st generation</th>
<th>1.5 generation</th>
<th>2nd generation</th>
<th>Significance of the generational change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>P &lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% feeling things have got worse for Muslims</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>P &lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% feeling there is prejudice against Muslims</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>P &lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010, weighted data.

So, despite being unequivocally more integrated socially and culturally in the second generation, Muslim perceptions of discrimination and exclusion are much increased. We must emphasize that we are not suggesting that actual discrimination against the second generation is greater than against the first generation – we do not have the field studies to show whether or not this is the case, and the statistical analyses of religious penalties in the labour market that we have conducted imply that discrimination has been constant, not increasing, across generations. The key point, which we term the paradox of integration, is that as Muslims become more integrated into British society, speaking English, acquiring citizenship and thinking of Britain as home, so they become more aware of and sensitive to the inequalities of opportunity facing them in British society.

Has this led to ‘reactive religiosity’? Table 3 shows convincing evidence that the second generation maintain high levels of religious identity and practice (much higher it should be noted than British-born Christians). We do not see evidence of major movements in the direction of secularization, but nor is there evidence of ‘reactive religiosity’. Possibly the increased awareness of exclusion in the second generation has cancelled out the movements towards secularization that might otherwise have occurred, but we cannot be sure of this.

TABLE 3: ABSENCE OF MAJOR GENERATIONAL CHANGE IN RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR PRACTICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% religion very important</th>
<th>1st generation</th>
<th>1.5 generation</th>
<th>2nd generation</th>
<th>P &gt; 0.05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who identify as Muslim rather or more than British</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>P &gt; 0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% belonging to an ethnic or religious organisation</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>P &gt; 0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% regularly attending mosque once a week</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>P &gt; 0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMBES 2010, weighted data.
In conclusion, the empirical evidence shows that simple caricatures of Muslims as leading separate lives will not do. In many important respects the evidence of increasing integration across the generations is undeniable and the progress itself is dramatic. In the public sphere, British-born Muslims are overall well-integrated. In the private sphere of religious identity and practice, they have maintained their distinctiveness. But for policy-makers the challenge is to address the increasing awareness of discrimination and exclusion. Integration is a two-way process, and non-Muslim British citizens must do their part too to live up to the ideal of providing equality of opportunity for their Muslim fellow-citizens.

FURTHER READING


Khattab, Nabil, ‘Ethno-religious background as a determinant of educational and occupational attainment in Britain’, Sociology 43/2 (2009), 304-322.


2 We should note that the tables simply show differences between the current first, 1.5 and second generations rather than differences between the parental generation who migrated to Britain and their children who were born in Britain. However, the checks which we have been able to carry out suggest that a comparison between parents and children would yield rather similar results. Secondly, we should note that there will be differences between the generations, for example in their age profiles, which would need to be taken into account for a thorough analysis. Again, preliminary checks have suggested that the main lines of our story would remain after statistical controls.

The current economic, financial and policy climate has expanded disadvantage in the UK creating greater precariousness at work and drastic cuts to welfare benefits and public services. For some analysts, the success of UKIP in council elections in spring 2013 was generated by this climate. Yet UKIP’s narrative does not encourage a united approach to tackling disadvantage. Rather it helps to reproduce a longer established public discourse of divide and rule; one that seeks to separate out ‘strivers’ from ‘skivers’ to justify cuts in benefits, and immigrants and ethnic minorities from the so-called indigenous population in defining who belongs to the UK’s constituent nations.

The category ‘white working class’ has been deployed widely in this debate, but in two ways: pejoratively by some commentators to equate to ‘chavs’ or poor whites living in council estates, and by others as ‘beleaguered natives’ suffering in the face of high immigration, ethnic diversity and unassimilated radical Islam. Both of these uses of the ‘white working class’ acknowledge its disadvantage while portraying it as fundamentally separate from both settled ethnic minority working-class people and migrant workers. Both also figure the ‘white working class’ as fixed in place rather than mobile, and prioritise issues of identity over inequality.

Such approaches contain ahistorical, taken-for-granted and unchanging ways of thinking about working classness and ethnic identity. And yet history is repeatedly mobilised in the support of these notions of the ‘white working class’. Put crudely, the narrative goes something like this: the white working class – often condensed into the iconic and plucky East Enders of the Blitz – endured the war, and earned their place in society and the post-war welfare state. Newcomers, whether 1950s New Commonwealth migrants or later arrivals, did not – and are therefore seen as undeserving of the same level of benefits.
It is not only populist media and politicians that portray the East End as divided between true ‘cockney’, i.e. undifferentiated white, East Enders, and ‘strangers from the Third World’. Perhaps most high profile among recent academic contributions has been Dench, Gavron and Young’s *The New East End: kinship, race and conflict* (2006). This discussed relations among working-class people in the East End (white people and people with Bangladeshi heritage) and relations between working class and recently arrived middle-class residents (mostly white). Yet, throughout, Bangladeshi residents were not ascribed any class, while despite the long history of Jewish, Irish and other immigration to the East End, the diverse ethnic heritages of ‘white’ residents remained underplayed.

Attaching ethnicity to class as in the term ‘white working class’ thus hides more than it reveals. It also detracts from understanding the common experiences of disadvantage. While it has been successfully used to mobilise political outrage, often in the form of xenophobia, the term obstructs attempts to address material inequalities. What we argue for instead is a nuanced approach, one which demands attention to both time and place in any discussions of the working class, white or otherwise. Fifty years after E. P. Thompson published *The Making of the English Working Class*, who the working class of Britain is today, and how its members might be located within (their own) migration histories, needs to be better understood.

In the remainder of this essay, we bring key insights from the disciplines of geography and history to unsettle assumptions made about the ‘white working class’ in the policy and media debate. Even cursory engagement with recent historical and geographical thinking disrupts an uncritical acceptance of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ approach. Geographer Doreen Massey has drawn attention to the ways the places where people live are ‘always already connected to elsewhere, constructed out of… trading connections, the unequal links of colonialism, thoughts of home.’ For Massey, recognition that displacement happens both ‘through migration (or the geographical movement of others)’, and through experiencing dispossession while ‘staying still’ has the potential to ‘bring people together in common anger’.

Rogaly’s current research explores these themes in the seemingly quiet provincial city of Peterborough which was not only host to recent political announcements setting out tougher Labour immigration policies, but was also a chosen rally location for the English Defence League. He explores the mobility and fixity of working-class people from all backgrounds. Building on the understanding that the largest contemporary flow of migrants to Peterborough since the Second World War has been composed of white British people (many of them ‘overspill’ Londoners), his work explicitly considers the recent migration histories of ethnic majority people who moved to the city from elsewhere in the country as well as of settled ethnic minorities and recent international migrants. The resulting oral histories also reveal a close connection between Peterborough and its rural hinterland.

Many who work in Peterborough’s nearby rural areas – in food production, processing and distribution – reside in the city, and many of its white British residents moved there from the surrounding countryside. They, like other incomers, contribute to on-going change in the city, and react to it:

Gill was born in Oundle in 1927. She moved to Peterborough as an infant. Leaving school at 14 during the war, she worked first at a corset factory and later for a Dutch bulb and flowers firm. Her remaining family live in the United States, and while she doesn’t conceive of her relatives as migrants, she reflected on her own ambivalence towards moving: ‘I like it out there but I
don’t know why I don’t want to live out there, because I could go as easy as that, but England’s my home’. Yet at home Gill is perturbed by her experience of the changed city around her: ‘I remember the happy days... [But] we go down town now and there’s nobody saying ‘Hello, how are you?’ And it’s all foreign languages. You don’t know if you’re in Peterborough or not. It’s changed so much it really has...

Joanna, another white British Peterborough resident, was born in 1955 and grew up in a village between Kings Lynn and Wisbech. On leaving school she worked first in a continental quilt factory in Wisbech before moving to Peterborough in the late-1970s to marry a man from the city. Her changing experience of Peterborough was the opposite of Gill’s: ‘I hated Peterborough when I first came because I thought everyone was so unfriendly... I didn’t like it at all.’ Might this have been because she was arriving at the same time as tens of thousands of other white British incomers, all be it that many of the latter came from further away? Joanna’s take on Peterborough shifted dramatically after an abandoned attempt to settle back in Wisbech: ‘I was coming back to Peterborough... I needed to be able to go to the theatre. I needed to be able to go to the cinema... [Wisbech] was boring and people were just odd, they weren’t very friendly. And I always thought that they were friendly when I was young... But actually perhaps they weren’t. I don’t know.’

Both these stories contain ambivalence, movement, fixity, and changing meanings of place over historical time and an individual’s life course. Gill and Joanna, both from white British working-class backgrounds, experienced the same city in different ways. This in turn was related to how they felt about other places they had moved between in the past and present. In Gill’s case in particular her negative feelings about contemporary Peterborough related to other people’s arrival in the city, particularly the arrival of international migrants and their descendants.

While these case studies use geography and oral history to bring into question the nativeness of people constructed as ‘white working class’, it is also important to consider the working class-ness of people who are constructed as migrants. Just as some stories broke down preconceived ideas of a pristine white rurality, others revealed a continuity in exploitive agricultural working and housing practices which leading Labour politicians have recently associated with the post-2004 arrival of Central and Eastern Europeans. Even these brief glimpses from Peterborough give a sense of the complicated relationship between identity, place and time: we cannot presume to read off from an individual’s appearance either their migration history or feelings of affiliation and belonging. Geographically we need to attend to internal moves as much as international ones and to challenge constructions of indigeneity and whiteness on which far-right organising, as well as much mainstream political assumptions, are often based. History, and in this case oral history, reveals continuities as well as change in working-class mobilities and fixities over time. These insights should lead political leaders and national media figures to be more cautious about contributing, even inadvertently, to the stigmatisation of international migrants, both through what they say and where they say it. They might also encourage politicians to be bolder in articulating the structures which give rise to common experiences of inequality and disadvantage, rather than focussing on external markers of difference.

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Britain’s far right has historically been characterised by failure and marginality. It has been less well organised and less successful electorally than similar organisations across Europe. There is broad consensus among researchers that the failures of the far right owe much to the agency of parties and movements themselves (i.e. due to failures of leadership, strategy, and ability to maintain unity). However, despite these struggles, Britain’s far right has been surprisingly resilient. This is largely because of the wide reservoir of tacit support for far right ideas. The UK has historically been fertile ground for movements thriving on discontent with mainstream political institutions, popular xenophobia, and euro-scepticism. Since the 1960s, large majorities of the British population have been opposed to immigration, and research from the Migration Observatory has noted that over the past 15 years immigration has become one of the most salient issues in Britain.¹ Thus, the demand for the far right has always been there – and in this sense, the extent of the ‘problem’ in Britain is bigger than the success of these parties might suggest.

KEY MOVEMENTS AND DEFINING FEATURES

The far right scene in Britain has been defined by several different actors, both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary in nature. The parliamentary groups include the National Front (which reached its peak in the 1970s) and the more persistent British National Party (BNP). Despite the local successes of the BNP over the years in places like Burnley, Dudley, and the London borough of Barking and Dagenham, as well as the two European Parliament seats they acquired in 2009, the party has today largely collapsed and will likely bear little weight on British politics in the coming years.
In the wake of the BNP’s failure to effectively harness the fertile environment for far right politics, a new form of extra-parliamentary far right extremism has emerged, employing new methods and a new approach to social change. The English Defence League (EDL) emerged in Luton in the spring of 2009 from a series of loosely defined movements that drew on football hooligan networks for support, and today claims to ‘peacefully protest against Islamic extremism.’ The EDL has tended to operate outside of the political system, deploying mass mobilisation or the threat of mobilisation, as its major means of influence. Ranging from lower-level violence to professedly ‘peaceful’ marches and protests, these activities serve to polarise communities and generate fear and tension, often resulting in ‘copy-cat’ threats or violence, even from counter-movements. In addition, the far right scene hosts an array of alternative and often short-lived organisations ranging from political and non-violent groups like British Freedom and the English Democrats to violent groups like Combat 18.

Though the UK Independence Party (UKIP), a Eurosceptic and populist party which surged in the 2013 local elections, is not a right-wing extremist party, there are considerable overlaps between its policy proposals and those of the far right: for example it calls to end ‘uncontrolled immigration’, the removal of benefits for immigrants, and even calls from some party representatives to deport Muslims. There is also evidence of overlaps in the support base; UKIP supporters and leaders have attitudes that have typically been associated with the BNP. Therefore, in order to paint a comprehensive picture of what drives support for the far right, this paper also draws from knowledge about UKIP supporters.

Over the last two decades, considerable research has been done to uncover key characteristics of far right supporters in Britain. The evidence suggests the following characteristics of far right support:

- The far right has actually struggled to galvanise support of young people since the heydays of the National Front. From the BNP to the EDL, these are male dominated, ageing groups, often attracting middle-aged or elderly working-class men.

- It has never been the poorest in society that support the far right; BNP voters tend to be spread evenly across skilled workers, unskilled workers, and those dependent on state benefits. Many far right supporters are in full-time employment.

- There is a higher capacity for violence among supporters of far right movements. While these movements are not openly violent, they have tended to attract citizens who are more likely than average to either engage in violence, or perceive violence as justifiable.

- There is a varying intensity of attitudes from radical to the extreme within the far right. Recent research shows that BNP and UKIP voters are driven by a similar set of concerns. However BNP supporters are more hostile towards immigrants, and more likely to believe that certain racial groups are superior to others.

- There are connections between the radical and extreme, both personal and institutional, as well as overlaps in support base. The BNP is the preferred voting party of EDL supporters, despite the fact that the EDL publicly rejects the BNP. The EDL has professed support for UKIP, despite the fact that UKIP denies any relationship and denounces this affiliation.

- Finally, it is important to note that individuals in these movements often appear to be ‘normal people, socially integrated, connected in one way or another to mainstream groups and ideas’. It is therefore important not to stereotype these groups, or their assumed support base, such as the white working class.
Life history interviews with far right supporters in Britain reveal that the core motive for joining right wing movements is often growing perceptions of cultural conflict, that diversity and migration threaten native groups. Joel Busher from the University of Huddersfield notes that EDL supporters also ‘have a strong enough attachment to their ‘way of life’ to make this cause salient.’ Though this anxiety is often enhanced by media and hear-say about migrant abuse of the system and other scandals, in some cases it can be motivated by a personal experience (e.g. bullying or child abuse). Indeed even personal experiences of racism can shape one’s journey into a racist group.

Islamophobia has become one of the strongest drivers of far-right extremism, particularly in a post 9/11 climate. Large majorities of BNP (85%) and UKIP (87%) supporters are convinced that Islam poses a serious danger to the West. Similarly, 64% of UKIP supporters would feel “bothered a lot” by the presence of an Islamic institution in their community, which is over twice the national average (31%). However, it is important to note that these attitudes are not confined to the far right. In a recent survey, 37% of voters would be more likely to support a party that promised to reduce the numbers of Muslims in the country.

There is however a generational divide in cultural anxiety and Islamophobia. The BNP and UKIP are failing to connect with young people, with only a minority of supporters in the two organisations younger than 36 years old. Even EDL supporters tend to be middle-aged or elderly, with most sympathisers over the age of 44 and more likely than average to be retired. Recent surveys confirm that those over age of 60 are more likely to endorse ideas that we should reduce Muslims in country, or that Islam poses a danger to Western civilisation, while 18 – 24 year olds are far more at ease with role of Muslims in Britain.

There is some evidence of geographical correlations for cultural anxiety and Islamophobia; some research suggests that far right support is concentrated in areas with large Muslim communities, and others claim that it is highest in areas with high levels of residential segregation, suggesting that a lack of interaction and contact between different communities may be an important factor. Interestingly the presence of non-Muslim Asians has been shown to have no significant effect on far right support, and BNP support has actually been lower in areas with larger black populations.

Finally, far right supporters are more distrustful than average of mainstream politicians and of public institutions. Demos’ survey of EDL supporters online notes that 88% of EDL supporters ‘tend not to trust’ the government, compared to a similarly high 68% national average. Mistrust of the police is even more pronounced. Distrust is not confined to the margins; a recent YouGov survey shows that 66% of the public would be more likely to support a political party that ‘pledged to stand up to political and business elites’.

WHAT SUSTAINS COMMITMENT WITHIN THE FAR RIGHT?

Far right commitment is driven by a combination of conviction and protest, but it must not be assumed that it is entirely one or the other. Though it is tempting to believe that the far right groups grow because of their protest narrative rather than intrinsic racism or extremist ideologies, it is important to remember that data from both the UK and Europe suggests that people are strongly motivated by far right ideologies and the politics these groups offer.
It is also important to note the rewarding elements of membership in the far right. Research by Joel Busher notes that for the EDL, the feeling of collective acts of protest brings feelings of empowerment, of ‘doing something,’ or ‘making a stand’, and fighting for your community.\textsuperscript{18} Given that far right supporters are known to have particularly high levels of pessimism regarding their futures, this is an important draw.

There are reasons to be wary about the potential impact of stigmatisation in sustaining membership in the far right. There is some evidence to show that activist’s ideas often develop and intensify after they enter the movement.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, it is critical to think about how the ways we confront the far right could impact those within it – could we inadvertently be further radicalising a group by censoring it? Further research is required to better understand whether low trust in inter-group relations and the political establishment pushes individuals into the far right, or whether these attitudes are a product of membership in the far right, and experiences of stigmatisation from wider society. The process of stigmatisation may reinforce these groups’ hostility towards the mainstream.

\textbf{WHAT BREAKS COMMITMENT WITHIN THE FAR RIGHT?}

The recent exit of the EDL’s leader, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, from the group also raises questions about what drives individuals to disengage from far right movements. First, it sheds light on the internal struggles within far right movements, which often attract a mix of supporters with divergent agendas, ranging from concerned citizens of white working-class background to neo-Nazi and skinhead followings. This diversity can cause movements to fragment and split, in some cases spawning more radical splinter groups like the ‘Infidels’ and Combined Ex-Forces, and in other cases simply causing more ‘moderate’ individuals to leave.

Second, it highlights an important distinction between de-radicalisation, which seeks to change a person’s views, and disengagement, which aims to alter their behaviour. Yaxley-Lennon’s resignation is a welcome act of disengagement, and it remains to be seen whether his ideas and views change. Considering the scale of the problem, there is a relatively small number of practitioners carrying out interventions in the disengagement and de-radicalisation field, supporting individuals leaving far-right extremist movements and ideologies. Their experiences and the personal testimonies of former far-right extremists tell us that the de-radicalisation process requires time.

Finally, we need to set our sights on what the disengagement of the EDL’s leader means for the future of the far right in Britain. It remains to be seen what impact the resignation will have on the EDL itself; the movement’s unique regional structure, prolific online activity and social network mean that it will not disappear overnight. However, the EDL has been on the decline for the past year, fraught with leadership crises and internal disputes, and has seen a massive drop in numbers of activists willing to turn up on the streets for demonstrations. The movement is likely to fragment further, with some individuals following Yaxley-Lennon in his new pursuits or simply losing interest, and smaller, more extreme factions continuing to rally under the EDL brand or breaking away. The fragmentation of the EDL could pose new threats to community safety and national security, as multiple splinter groups departing from the EDL’s tactics could become more challenging for law enforcement to monitor, and could potentially be more violent.

The problem of tangential violence associated with far-right groups has existed for decades. Members or loose affiliates of these movements have been arrested and convicted of
attempted or actual acts of violence and terrorism. The startling numbers of hate crime recorded against Muslims in the UK raises questions about the possibility of sustained violent campaigns by far-right cells or individuals against Muslims, such as the terror campaign carried out by convicted Ukrainian terrorist Pavlo Lapshyn in the Midlands in 2013.

The main challenge now will be to identify what can be done to stem individual recruitment to ‘hard’ far right support, and how this can be managed without further intensifying individuals’ beliefs. Secondly, there is need for more creativity in tackling the wider reservoir of ‘soft’ public sympathy for the far right agenda, beyond simply reinforcing social norms against racism and extremism. Finally, there is a need for greater emphasis on how to nurture and support tolerance and understanding of cultural difference among younger generations, to ensure that the trend of generational decline in prejudice continues.

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3 Ibid.


5 Goodwin and Evans, op cit.

6 Ibid.


9 Goodwin and Evans, op cit.


12 Extremis Project, op cit.

13 Ford and Goodwin, op cit.


15 Ford and Goodwin, op cit.


17 Extremis Project, op cit.

18 Busher, op cit.

Over the last decade or so, and across a variety of policy domains, ‘integration’ and ‘extremism’ have been two of the most pressing and – on occasion – divisive topics. Sometimes conflated with each other (or at least conjoined), ‘integration’ and ‘extremism’ have both given rise to public policies that have not infrequently focused on Britain’s Muslims.

**TOUCHSTONES FOR ASSESSING MUSLIM INTEGRATION**

‘Integration is a concept both dazzling and treacherous’, insist Saggar and Sommerville, such that ‘policy makers must use and define it with care’.\(^1\) It is a warning that is rarely heeded even though it describes a concept with a long history. For a concern with integration is as old as the earliest social scientific accounts of modernity; in so far it goes to the heart of how we understand the kinds of social relations that characterize modern societies. This dynamic has been recast in thinking about the integration of minority diversity – something that ‘can neither be wished out of existence nor suppressed without an unacceptable degree of coercion, and often not even then’.\(^2\) A large part of European history reflects the implications of coming to terms with this through cycles of migration and patterns of settlement, whereupon the intermingling of diverse cultural, religious and ethnic groups renews and/or un-settles established social and political configurations. Here integration starts to become a normative debate that describes not only processes of change that occur amongst groups, but what a principled position on that change should resemble.

If we turn away from the theoretical accounts toward applied analyses of Muslim integration we find, as Castles and others point out, that ‘the very broadness of the integration process makes it hard to define in any precise way’ because it ‘takes place at every level and in every
sector of society’ and ‘involves a wide range of social players’. This has obvious implications for agreeing what indicators are best suited to measure success and failure. Integration as a policy objective therefore needs to take a number of interdependent spheres into account. I take one behavioural indicator (residential settlement) and one attitudinal indicator (identity), to spotlight some important patterns in understanding Muslim integration in Britain.

Residential settlement has commonly been identified as a source of visible resistance to social mixing; the view has been that Muslims tend to cluster and develop very strong ‘bonding capital’ (with kith and kin) at the expense of ‘bridging capital’ (with other groups and communities). The 2011 census tells us that 4.8 per cent of the population self-defines as Muslim (over 2.7 million), and it is true that a considerable percentage of British Muslims are concentrated in certain local authorities in East London, the North West, Birmingham and West Yorkshire (as well as in areas that border these wards). But it does not follow that this clustering is tightly configured and nor does it mean that the pattern is fixed. Indeed, according to an analysis of demographic distribution using the Index of Similarity which measures concentration, the broad tendency is for Muslims to be less separated than other religious groups and more likely to display a pattern of dispersal (e.g., settlement away from family of origin). As Jivraj outlines: ‘the Muslim population is relatively evenly spread through England and Wales (Index of Similarity of 54%), which means that the separation factor has decreased since 2001.’ As a comparison, the current Index of Similarity for British Hindus is 52%, British Sikhs 61% and British Jews 63%, respectively. This behavioural tendency is further supported by polling on the kinds of neighbourhoods Muslims would ideally choose to live in. For example, when asked ‘If you could live in any neighbourhood in this country, which comes closest to describing the one you would prefer?’, Muslims are nearly 10% more likely (than non-Muslims) to want to live in ‘Mixed’ neighbourhoods (Muslims and non-Muslims) and half as likely to want to live in exclusively Muslim neighbourhoods (than other groups who would like to live in neighbourhoods exclusively reflecting their ethnic or religious groups).

Indeed, if we move to a further attitudinal indicator concerning self-identification with Britain, we find that Muslims are in some respects highly integrated. This is supported by Heath and Roberts who, in their analyses of the UK Government’s Citizenship survey, report: ‘We find no evidence that Muslims or people of Pakistani heritage were in general less attached to Britain than were other religions or ethnic groups. Ethnic minorities show clear evidence of ‘dual’ rather than ‘exclusive’ identities.’ These authors point instead to hyphenated identities, in showing that 43% of Muslims belong ‘very strongly’ to Britain and 42% say that they belong to Britain ‘fairly strongly’. Taken together these figures are higher for Muslim respondents than they are for Christians or those of ‘no religion’. What is especially interesting is that this confident British Muslim identity has developed alongside pan-Muslim solidarities, the idea of the Muslim ‘ummah’ or ‘community of believers’. The evidence suggests that ‘Muslim trans-nationalism should not be treated as a post- or near- 9/11 phenomenon, but rather as a space and set of practices that have evolved over decades’. This has proved quite consistent with the widely accepted body of findings, recently reiterated by Wind-Cowie and Gregory’s conclusion, that ‘overall British Muslims are more likely to be both patriotic and optimistic about Britain than are the white British community.

These are important multiculturalist advances, yet the problem with measuring Muslim integration is that it quickly becomes a ‘vortex’ issue that sucks in range of others. One of these is of course ‘extremism’ to which we now turn.
EXTREMISM AND TACIT SUPPORT

Following the 7/7 and several aborted bombings in a similar ‘leaderless Jihad’,¹⁰ the Labour government developed its Preventing Violent Extremism strategy.¹¹ Pursued by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Prevent identified five strands to address the causes of extremisms:

1. Undermine extremist ideology and support mainstream voices
2. Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and strengthen vulnerable institutions
3. Support individuals who are being targeted and recruited to the cause of violent extremism
4. Increase the capacity of communities to challenge and resist violent extremism;
5. Address the grievances that ideologues are exploiting.

Both the previous and present governments have sought to advance these objectives through a variety of local community partnerships and across statutory bodies, as well as voluntary agencies and community groups ‘with police forces, local authorities and their partners working closely together to oversee and deliver the project’.¹² So while Prevent included security-related work, it was also meant to build capacity in Muslim communities, to take a hearts and minds approach that would engender resilience against extremist politics amongst those deemed susceptible to recruitment into that milieu.¹³ Of particular concern was the possible exploitation of what Saggar calls the ‘politically unmentionables’.¹⁴ Quoting the 2007 Commonwealth Secretariat report, published in the aftermath of the Iraq War, these unmentionables rotated around a feeling of double standards in the West’s treatment of Muslim countries, and especially anger at the on-going plight of the Palestinians. The feeling that Britain was ‘indifferent to Muslim feelings of hurt, humiliation and dishonor’ was not squarely engaged with in Prevent, however, despite its stated intention.¹⁵ Prevent became more broadly criticized for a variety of reasons, ‘ranging from targeting the wrong people to stigmatizing Muslim communities by treating them all as potential terrorists’.¹⁶ Two recurring issues were that, firstly, intelligence agencies were using the softer cohesion aspects of Prevent ‘to spy and illicitly collect intelligence, which has dramatically harmed the programme as a whole’.¹⁷ Secondly, that Prevent was oriented to address wider social policy within Muslim communities, which implied that this policy was only valuable because it contributes to counter-terrorism (something illustrated by the fact that Prevent funding was directly linked to the size of the Muslim population in a local authority, not on the basis of known risk).

The securitization of British Muslims through that approach has contracted the spaces in which a dissenting citizenship can be exercised. Despite evidence that Britain’s Muslims are integrated according to conventional measures (more so than some ‘model minorities’), Muslim empathy for those deemed radical, and indeed Muslim trans-nationalism more broadly, has come to be seen through a counter-terrorism lens. In these conditions the risk is that Muslim active-citizenship becomes framed purely within a security agenda and Muslim communities become the ‘locus of the issue of extremism’.¹⁸

For example, throughout the time of the Prevent program, opinion polling was interpreted as showing evidence of ‘tacit support’ for extremism amongst British Muslims.¹⁹ Typical examples included the finding in a 2007 Gallup poll that 5-10% of those polled accepted that violence is justified in aid of a ‘noble cause’ (something that was within the range of the
general public, with Muslims at least as likely to reject violence, even for a ‘noble cause’). In a 2005 YouGov poll, 24% ‘expressed sympathy’ with the feelings and motives of the London bombers, and over half – 56% – ‘could understand’ (whether or not they sympathised with the bombers). Further, a 2006 ICM poll found 20% had ‘some sympathy with the feelings and motives’ of the London bombers. The question for us is how to understand this in order to address it. Saggar puts the task in the following terms: ‘It is a moot point whether the job of penetrating the circle of tacit support is aided or deflected by further and finer interpretations placed on such findings. It may be that such results show that Western Muslims are aware that they are caught on the horns of a dilemma; or that they are reflections on the perpetual human condition that is drawn to sympathy for kith and kin, however misguided others may see this.’

Is it then through this empathy that extremism is engendered? ‘Yes’ is the view we find in The Islamist, the highly influential account by the self-professed ‘former radical’ Ed Husain, who went on to create the Quilliam Foundation. In his memoir of a time spent in various burgeoning and politically active Muslim groupings in London during the 1990s, Husain recounts a journey through a number of Islamist organisations that overlapped with or operated among East London’s Bangladeshi communities, but which also held transnational ambitions. These included the East London Mosque, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Young Muslims Organisation (YMO) and the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), among others. While it is true that the search for identity at moments of crisis has often gone hand in hand with lack of religious literacy as two characteristics of those drawn to extremist groups, this does not mean that people drawn to these groups remain embedded within them over a life course. Not only does Husain’s own rejection of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) illustrate this, but also Hamid’s ethnographic work with ex-members reports that:

Many young people ... credit HT for awakening their religio-political consciousness. HT appeals to a section among young people frustrated with what they see as the inaction of traditional authority in their communities and ineffectiveness of other Islamic groups. [...] Joining HT seems, for most, to be a phase young people go through while at college or university. As they grow older, ex-members either join more moderate groups, withdraw from the activist scene or in some cases join groups that are influenced by HT (emphasis added).

The implication being that a more fruitful means of engaging a variety of Muslim groups, from across the political spectrum, would proceed on the understanding that complex forms of democratic politics, where citizens have widely different sets of beliefs, is a challenge for – and not an obstacle to – State-Muslim engagement.

2 B. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism (Basingstoke, 2000), 196.
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12 Ibid., 9.

13 For a recent study of this approach, see: T. O’Toole, T. Modood, D. DeHanas, N. Meer and S. Jones, *Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance* (Bristol, 2013).


15 Ibid., 400.


17 Ibid.


19 Saggar, ‘Boomerangs and Slingshots’, 386.

20 Ibid., 387.


Identifying and describing what connections exist, if any, between antisemitism and both far right and Islamist extremism is a sensitive and complex task, especially regarding the question of antisemitic attitudes found within British Muslim communities. A degree of generalisation is inevitable, and this paper, perforce, focuses on the negative side of the story rather than the many positive examples of Muslim-Jewish friendship and cooperation, not least between my organisation, Community Security Trust (CST), and our counterparts at Tell MAMA (the service Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks), in our joint work combating anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim hate crime. But with those caveats in mind, it is possible to make some important and useful observations.

The first and most obvious point to make is that far right and Islamist extremists try to use antisemitism for political purposes. It can be argued that this political mobilisation of antisemitism is its defining characteristic, which differentiates it from other forms of bigotry. This is most commonly found in antisemitic conspiracy theories that blame a Jewish ‘hidden hand’ for the ills of a particular society, party or community; and that accuse Jews of ‘dual loyalty’ – the idea that Jews are loyal only to each other or, nowadays, only to Israel.

This political use of antisemitism by far right parties and movements form a familiar and tragic part of European history. In recent years explicit antisemitism has largely disappeared from the public propaganda of Britain’s main far right movements, but the underlying ideas remain in euphemistic references to ‘international finance’ or ‘Zionist businessmen’. In 2000, British Nationalist Party (BNP) Chairman Nick Griffin advised BNP writers to get around the law by using “Zionists” as a euphemism for “Jews” when writing articles. This is not to suggest that anybody who criticises Zionism is antisemitic; just to note that genuine antisemites developed an antisemitic usage of the word “Zionist” a long time ago. Three years later, Griffin blamed
the Iraq war on what he called Tony Blair’s “pro-Israeli big business backers”. In 2006 he changed tack, publicly denouncing antisemitic conspiracy theorists as “Judeo-obsessives”; only to return to their ranks a few years later in describing the English Defence League (EDL) as a “Zionist” plot.¹

Less well known is the use of antisemitism by Islamist extremist movements, again for their own political purposes. The Egyptian Islamist ideologue Sayyid Qutb, in his 1950s essay Our Struggle with the Jews, claimed that Muslim societies were threatened by large numbers of Muslims acting as “Jewish agents”. He included academics, writers, scientists, journalists and even Muslim religious authorities – all serving, he claimed, a vast Jewish conspiracy to undermine Islam. In this example, Qutb was using antisemitism not against Jews, but against Muslims who disagreed with him. In its leaflets, Hizb ut-Tahrir falsely describe Uzbek President Islam Karimov as Jewish, while in Britain, Islamist organisations regularly claim that British politicians and media are under the sway of Jewish or Zionist financial influence.²

Recently the question of antisemitism within British Muslim communities became a topic of mainstream debate, after the Labour peer Lord Ahmed was revealed to have blamed his 2009 imprisonment for dangerous driving on a Jewish conspiracy. He was condemned by a range of Muslim commentators, one of whom, Mehdi Hasan of the Huffington Post, warned that antisemitism is “routine and commonplace” in “some sections of the British Muslim community.” “There are thousands of Lord Ahmeds out there”, he wrote: “mild-mannered and well-integrated British Muslims who nevertheless harbour deeply anti-Semitic views.”³

Mehdi Hasan wrote from his own experiences; the research on this subject is limited and now a few years old, but what research exists tends to back up his claims. In 2006 polling by the Pew Research Center found that 47% of British Muslims said that they had an unfavourable opinion of Jews, compared to just 7% of the general population. For comparison, 28% of French Muslims, 44% of German Muslims and 60% of Spanish Muslims felt the same way. In 2005, Populus found that 46% of British Muslims agreed that “the Jewish Community in Britain...are in league with the Freemasons to control the media and politics.” 53% agreed that British Jews “have too much influence over the direction of UK foreign policy” and 37% agreed that they “are legitimate targets as part of the ongoing struggle for justice in the Middle East” (the poll did not clarify what they might be “targets” for). What we don’t know is whether these attitudes have changed in the past 7 or 8 years, and of course opinion polls come with their own limitations.⁴

An attempt to find out what motivates anti-Jewish attitudes amongst young Muslims was made by Günther Jikeli, a German PhD student, who conducted street-based interviews in London, Paris and Berlin between 2005 and 2007. He identified four different arguments used by those interviewees who expressed anti-Jewish attitudes to justify their views: classical antisemitism, such as conspiracy theories; hostile attitudes towards Jews with reference to Israel; negative views of Jews based on Muslim or ethnic identity; and hostility towards Jews with no particular rationalisation given. When asked for the sources of their attitudes towards Jews, interviewees cited family, friends, media old and new, mosques and schools. None, so far as Jikeli’s published research shows, mentioned any involvement in extremist political movements.⁵

After October 2000, Jewish communities across Western Europe experienced a surge of antisemitic hate crime that appeared to have been triggered by reactions to the Second Intifada, which began in Israel and the Palestinian territories that month. Several Jewish
communities reported that the people responsible for these antisemitic hate crimes were more likely to be young people of Muslim or Arab background than had been the case in previous years. Many people found this observation unpalatable, but it reflected the perceptions of the Jewish communities in question. Precise data that confirms or refutes this perception is hard to come by. For Britain, the only publicly-available data come from the Antisemitic Incident Reports published by CST, which are based on information taken directly from victims and witnesses, from the police, and through CST’s own volunteer network. These show that, in general, most antisemitic incidents where CST received a description of the offenders were carried out by people of white appearance; but the data suggest that people of south Asian and Arab appearance are over-represented to a limited extent amongst antisemitic incident offenders. This is clearly not a precise measure of Muslim offenders, given the ethnic diversity of British Muslims and the religious diversity of south Asians and Arabs, nor should it be assumed that the religious beliefs or ethnic identity of any hate crime offender are the primary determinants of their offending. While a significant minority of antisemitic incident offenders of all backgrounds express extreme political views during the course of their offence, in relatively few cases is there anything more than superficial evidence that they are activists in extremist movements, whether that be far right, Islamist or any other kind.\(^6\)

The antisemitism of extremist movements finds its most acute expression in anti-Jewish terrorism. The shooting at a Jewish school in Toulouse in 2012 is a well known example; less well known is how close the United Kingdom has come to a similar tragedy. Between December 2010 and September 2011 four different terrorist plots in which violent jihadists targeted British Jews were uncovered by authorities in the UK and abroad. Attempts by neo-Nazi terrorists to attack Jewish, Muslim and other minority targets have also been foiled by the police in recent years. Antisemitism and incitement to kill Jews are now a regular part of the ideological package that counter-terrorist police encounter in their investigations.

While many people in Jewish and Muslim communities try to reduce the impact of this extremist activity, far right extremists seek to exploit community tensions. In 2011 the BNP claimed that “Zionist neo-Conservatives” were behind the terrorism of both al-Qaeda and Anders Breivik. Muslims are currently the primary targets of the far right’s hatred while Jews are a historic enemy; but Muslims and Jews are assumed in the far right worldview to be mortal enemies of each other. Some on the far right settle this by choosing to target what they see as the greater of two evils – currently Muslims – but with an integrationist twist. The BNP justified their apparent repudiation of antisemitism partly on the grounds that “Israel is a part of Western, if not European, Civilisation, and the Arab world is not.” More subtly, antisemitism from Muslims is presented as one of the indicators of an alleged Muslim inability to absorb Western values and integrate into Western societies.\(^7\)

The EDL uses the antisemitism charge against Muslims with particular enthusiasm. They tried to recruit a Jewish EDL Division and EDL members wave Israeli flags at demonstrations. Again, this is both superficial and cynical. The Facebook pages of EDL members reveal plenty of antisemitism alongside their Islamophobia and racism, while the EDL Jewish Division never grew beyond single figures of active Jewish members. The issue has also been divisive: as the EDL has splintered into different factions, some of those who are opposed to its current leadership have returned to overt displays of old-style neo-Nazi antisemitism. But however cynical the EDL’s professed philosemitism, it still implicitly acknowledges that, in post-Holocaust Western Europe, opposition to antisemitism is generally seen as a ‘European’ value.
The EDL’s expressions of opposition to antisemitism align it with many groups on Europe’s new radical populist right, and it is a novel development that inverts the normal way in which far right movements mobilise antisemitism for political advantage. However, it is likely to fail for two reasons: first, because it is so transparently cynical and has been overwhelmingly rejected by British Jews; second, and the main reason for its likely failure, is because, even for the far right’s own purposes, it is based on a false premise. In 2008/9 German academics conducted polling in eight European countries for the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, to look at six different types of prejudice: antisemitism; anti-Muslim attitudes; anti-immigrant attitudes; racism; homophobia; and sexism. What they found were strong correlations across all six: that people who harboured any one of those prejudices were also likely to hold one or more of the others. The researchers called this “Group Focused Enmity”: a way of seeing society as a hierarchy of unequal groups, some of which are ‘out-groups’ that do not belong at all. They found that people who dislike Muslims are likely to also dislike Jews, and vice versa. In Britain, people who dislike immigrants are particularly likely to also dislike Muslims; and also to dislike Jews. They also found a strong correlation, especially in Britain, between Group Focused Enmity and ideological convictions associated with far right politics. This brings us to a conclusion that may seem like stating the obvious, but is worth stating nonetheless: that despite changes in the public propaganda of far right movements, as far as many of their potential supporters are concerned, hostility to Jews remains an important part of their xenophobic mindset.


The concept of integration was introduced to the UK’s political agenda in the 1960s by Roy Jenkins, who defined it “not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.” A nativist tradition in British politics – exemplified by Enoch Powell – was never comfortable with equality, diversity or tolerance, while the anti-racist movement saw the concept as insufficiently distinct from assimilation: there has thus never been a consensus around the term’s meaning, nor a political constituency backing it.

Only in the present century, in the wake of the milltown riots and terrorist attacks of 2001, has the concept returned to the agenda, but with little clarity around what it might mean. Sarah Spencer, in her book The Migration Debate, proposes the following definition: it refers to the processes of interaction between migrants and the individuals and institutions of the receiving society that facilitate the socio-economic, cultural, social and civic participation of migrants and an inclusive sense of identity and belonging.¹

Two points are worth taking from this definition. The first is that it is not a single process but a whole family of processes occurring in different domains, each of which is clearly related to the others, but not in a straightforward way. The second is that it cannot be seen as the sole responsibility of an individual migrant or of a minority community, but rather that the institutions and public of mainstream society have a role, a stake and a responsibility too.

LOCALISM AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE

But how and where do these processes occur? Thinking about each of the domains of integration, it is clear that they take place at different scales, and most often at a scale smaller
than the nation-state. Socio-economic participation means above all participation in labour markets which are local, or at most regional, rather than national. Social interaction means interaction in real neighbourhoods, streets, libraries, playparks and sports fields – again, that is, at a profoundly local level. Civic engagement may mean participation in national electoral politics – but is more likely to mean involvement in a community. A sense of identity and belonging might be municipal or regional (feeling at home in your neighbourhood, becoming a Brummie or a Yorkshireman) as much as national.

Both David Cameron and Ed Miliband have captured this well. Cameron in 2011 with his comment that: “Real communities are bound by common experiences... forged by friendship and conversation... knitted together by all the rituals of the neighbourhood, from the school run to the chat down the pub.”; and Miliband in 2012 when he observed that “the impact of change is often felt differently in different places.”

The evidence bears this out. Locality matters. I will illustrate this with just two examples. The 2011 Census has revealed not just the national transformation of Britain’s demography brought about by mass migration, but also its complex geography. Previously demographically diverse areas – “old contact zones”, as David Robinson puts it – have become more diverse, but it is in the previously more homogeneous “new contact zones” that the changes are more visible. Absolute numbers of migrants arriving in these previously more homogenous areas are often quite small and the proportions of migrants in the population remain low outside a few core areas. On paper, 6000 extra migrants in Fenland looks like nothing compared to a rise of 30,000 in Luton. But on the street, the long-settled might notice and feel the multiplication of the proportion in the new zones of encounter (like the 211% increase in Fenland) more than the higher numbers in traditional gateways.

And these sorts of dynamics make a huge difference to the possibility of integration in a given area. To take the domain of local belonging, recent research by the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) with new citizens asked them if they felt a sense of belonging in their area, and then analysed this using the Mosaic database used by market researchers. Respondents were much more likely to report that they belong most strongly if they live in postcodes in classic multicultural inner city areas, including relatively deprived high density social housing and urban terraces, than if they live in less deprived modern suburbs without a history and ethos of mixing.

The importance of local processes and a locality’s distinctive character is why a localist approach to integration is important and valuable. Indeed local authorities have taken a lead in developing innovative and effective work around integration, working in partnership with other local stakeholders. In Breckland, in the rural East of England, environmental health officers worked with local businesses, service providers and European agricultural labourers to deflect the sort of tensions that have developed in other comparable areas, for example by helping Portuguese and Polish café owners and retailers make their premises welcoming to English-speakers so they are seen as positive assets to the whole community. In Bermondsey in South London, Southwark council has worked with the voluntary sector, Millwall Football Club and tenants and residents associations to create a St George’s Day festival that is inclusive and celebratory both of the white working-class residents at the heart of the community and of newcomers. In Scotland, the Confederation of Scottish Local Authorities has developed a migrant toolkit that helps councils better understand their demographic profile (which might mean population decline in some areas) and to plan for change effectively. In Rushmoor and other areas where large numbers of Ghurkhas have arrived in a fairly short period, a Home Office Ghurkha Integration Fund has enabled local authorities to work intensively with both...
Ghurkha and non-Ghurkha community groups to address the issues that have emerged as a result of rapid change.

But in returning to the multiple processes of integration, it is clear that these sorts of policies can only have purchase in some domains, for instance in forging local belonging: the “softer” elements. Looking at the “harder” domains – often more objectively measurable – the evidence is very clear that persistent disadvantages remain for migrants and minorities in general and for some groups in particular.

**BEYOND LOCALISM**

This means that integration cannot be the remit of integration policy alone. Integration cannot be addressed in isolation from social justice and social mobility. In fact, integration policy may be much less important for facilitating integration than other policy areas, fields with “heavy-lifting” capacity, as Shammit Saggar and Will Somerville put it, such as employment and education.

As Saggar and Somerville argue, this means we need a holistic approach to integration, an approach which asks how we can use mainstream policy to facilitate it. As Saggar and Somerville say, the muddling along British approach to integration has “relied a great deal on pinpointing, adapting and targeting mainstream policies to reach the needs of immigrants and minorities” – but in an ad hoc rather than systematic way.\(^6\)

The political scientist Peter Scholten refers to a welcome trend towards “deconcentration” of integration policy, with integration no longer seen as a discrete, stand-alone field but rather a collective policy.\(^7\) We can see this in three areas: mainstreaming in discourses, narratives that stress the diversity of the whole population rather than the needs of specific groups, seen in UK in the shift to a community cohesion approach that replaced a multicultural celebration of different identities with an emphasis on shared values and coming together; mainstreaming in policies, replacing group-targeted policies with an emphasis on generic policies, seen in an anti-discrimination framework which requires public authorities to “equality-proof” generic services; and mainstreaming in governance structures, creating mechanisms to co-ordinate work across different departments or levels of government.\(^8\) In a review of what works in integration policy, Vidhya Ramalingam has argued that “Policy makers need to move away from the current focus on perceived ‘problem’ communities, to [an approach] which sees integration as something much more comprehensive... a ‘whole of society’ or 360° approach - to ensure that no groups within society are left behind.”\(^9\) However, as Sarah Spencer has argued, we cannot address these persistent disadvantages without attending to integration’s foundations: the legal rights and responsibilities which make participation in each domain possible or impossible.\(^10\)

**THE NECESSARY INTEGRATION DEBATE**

The UK has a uniquely complex web of entitlements and limitations on entitlements for the dizzying range of categories of migrant our immigration system creates. We need to acknowledge that there is a trade-off between restrictions and integration.

How do we square politicians’ emphasis on learning English with the restrictions on access to English language provision? How do we reconcile limiting the right to family reunion with the goal of promoting family life? Should entitlement to housing be based on local belonging or
on severity of need? Are there principles by which some needs might justify jumping a queue to reach a rationed resource? Do only those born here have the right to even be in the queue?

And for settled minorities, fundamental inequalities wired into our system (and worsening in the context of austerity) constitute a major barrier to successful integration. As shown in research by the Runnymede Trust and sociologists such as Anthony Heath, there are specific penalties in educational and labour market outcomes for particular ethnic and religious groups.\(^{11}\) We cannot discuss integration, therefore, without discussing racism – and especially the forms of everyday, institutional racism that subtly structure our workplaces and institutions of learning.

But disadvantage is not an effect of ethnicity alone. White working class people face both damaging forms of everyday prejudice and objective disadvantage across several domains of social policy. Ignoring this has fostered a dangerous politics of resentment and backlash, a politics fed by the perception that decisions about immigration have been made without consulting the settled population.

In conclusion, then, a 360° approach must first of all be “smart” and evidence-based enough to allow mainstream levers to be calibrated to address the specific disadvantages faced by different social groups, without generating stigma for those groups. Secondly, a 360° approach needs to attend to the human rights on which the possibilities of full social participation rest – but also emerge from an open, transparent debate on what is at stake. And, third, it needs to have the courage to talk about racism and class, while acknowledging as legitimate the concerns created by rapid demographic change.

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1 Sarah Spencer, *The Migration Debate* (Bristol, 2011).
7 Peter Scholten, *Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research-Policy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective* (Amsterdam, 2011).
11 For the Runnymede Trust, see Rob Berkeley’s article in this report; and for Anthony Heath, see his article in this report.
Since 9/11 and 7/7 debates about integration started to focus on extremism within the Muslim community and very rapidly moved towards identifying a problem that there was a failure of ‘integration’ by Muslims. Within this debate Islam and Muslims were frequently ‘blamed’ as being the cause of the problem: it was assumed that Muslims were ‘sleepwalking’ their way to segregation or because of their radically different values they were ‘choosing’ to cut themselves off and live in ghettos or ‘no go’ areas.

Despite evidence to the contrary, this paradigm of ‘blaming’ Muslims for extremism and a failure of integration has been dominant. Consequently, political solutions have been sought in anti-terrorism law or anti-radicalism strategies such as Prevent. Less attention has been paid to anti-discrimination law as a policy response that addresses problems of extremism through alleviating social exclusion that – in turn – ensures a greater level of integration. This is surprising because the Northern Ireland experience suggests that anti-discrimination law can be part of a range of policies that can address extremism, disadvantage and encourage integration.

One example is the harmonized public sector equality duty (PSED) which was introduced by the Equality Act 2010 but which the new Coalition Government put under review as part of its ‘red tape challenge’. The independent review of the PSED has now reported and made recommendations for improvement, although there was disagreement about whether or not the PSED was operating as intended.

The present Coalition Government strategy of deeming the PSED part of red tape underestimates the potential for the PSED to contribute towards the goals of reducing disadvantage and extremism and promoting integration. The public sector equality duty was first designed...
and implemented in Northern Ireland to reconcile Protestant and Catholic communities as part of the peace efforts.

The equality duty was first introduced by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 requiring public bodies to take proactive steps to achieve racial equality. Duties covering disability and gender were subsequently introduced in the Equality Act 2006. The PSED has now been extended in a harmonized way across all the equality grounds of not only race, gender and disability but also religion and belief, sexual orientation and age. The equality duty is the main policy lever that requires national and local government to mainstream equality and non-discrimination into national and local public structures.

In the present context, the mechanism of the public sector equality duty could provide a unique opportunity to consult widely with local groups in the design of public policies to ensure that potential conflicts are minimized or resolved before they become entrenched. This is a proactive promotion of equality which can prevent conflicts that could lead to costly litigation and tensions in community relations. Moreover, a harmonized PSED has the potential to ensure that less powerful groups within religious or racial minorities – e.g. women, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people, young and older people – are consulted as part of the process of public consultation prior to the design of public services. The duty also requires public authorities to gather baseline evidence on discrimination and equality across their functions. It provides a mechanism for monitoring, consultation and training that has the potential to cover all discrimination grounds. This allows the development of public services that are more appropriate for their users, potentially taking into account any tensions and conflicts between groups before policy decisions are finalized.

The more inclusive public institutions which should result from a harmonized public sector equality duty would also better promote equality, integration and community cohesion. The duty can contribute to cohesion and help to minimize conflict by ensuring that the needs of minority religious groups are aligned with the needs of other religious and non-religious social groups in the community through a process of consultation, negotiation and compromise.

It has been argued that the new duty should not cover religion or belief in the same way that it covers the other equality grounds. However, merely consulting with religious or belief groups does not mean that public authorities have to implement all of the demands of such groups. And consultation with, or accommodation of, religious groups does not give them a veto; and nor is consultation in itself a breach of the principle of secularism which is a principle that applies to the institutional separation of religion and state.

This process of mainstreaming the needs of religious minorities is a disincentive to them setting up parallel community structures where there is no regulation and no protection for vulnerable groups. It also provides an opportunity for public authorities to promote the wider goals of equality and non-discrimination within religious minorities. The process of consultation, negotiation and compromise with the local community ensures that members of both majority and minority communities are involved in this decision-making process. This process also ensures greater transparency so that local people feel involved in and can challenge public decision-making. As the public sector is a leader in shaping attitudes, the positive duty could help ensure that individuals are treated as equal citizens, and this focus on equality will also shape broader social attitudes.

It is also sometimes argued that there should be no public sector equality duty in relation to religion or belief because of a risk of harm to women. In fact, the exact opposite is true:
A harmonized public sector equality duty is essential to prevent harm to women in religious minorities. Tackling violence against minority women requires appropriately designed services that meet the needs of women in religious communities – e.g. domestic violence support that targets Muslim or Hindu women – designed after full consultation with women from those communities. A harmonized equality duty should require public authorities to cross-refer gender with religion or belief to ensure that vulnerable women are protected through appropriate service delivery.

The PSED, for all these reasons, is a key legal and policy lever to encourage integration for all social groups, but especially for religious groups such as British Muslims who experience social-economic disadvantage as well as being associated with political violence and extremist ideas. A harmonized public sector equality duty gives central and local government, as well as public decision-makers, a key legal and social policy tool to address disadvantage, extremism and promote integration.

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1 See announcement of the Home Secretary on 15 May 2012 to set up an independent enquiry into whether the PSED in the Equalities Act 2010 was operating as intended.

I am delighted that the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism and the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society have compiled essays from their symposium in the Houses of Parliament in May 2013. It was a hugely successful event and I was fortunate enough to attend and chair part of the discussion.

These essays are thought-provoking and timely; they offer key commentary on some of the most pressing issues we face in society, from far right extremism to antisemitism and Islamophobia. Understanding these phenomena is crucial to ridding them from our society – something the current government is committed to doing. In fact, the starting point of our approach to integration and extremism is that there is no place for hatred and intolerance of any kind in Britain.

These academics’ findings make for compelling reading, and the Pears Institute and COMPAS should be congratulated for bringing them to a wider audience.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ROB BERKELEY

Rob Berkeley has been Director of the Runnymede Trust, the UK’s leading race equality think tank, since January 2009. He was Deputy Director of Runnymede between 2005 and 2009. His doctoral studies at the University of Oxford focused on exclusion from school. He has previously been Chair of governors at a South London primary school, Chair of Naz Project London, a Trustee of Stonewall, and a member of the Commission on 2020 Public Services. He is currently a trustee of the Baring Foundation and the Equality and Diversity Forum and a member of the Cabinet Office Review of Consultation Principles Independent Advisory Panel.

DAVID FELDMAN

David Feldman is Director of the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism, Birkbeck, University of London. The Institute’s programme reflects his belief that the study of antisemitism is not only important in its own right but is also vital to understanding racism, prejudice and xenophobia more widely. His research centres on the history of minorities and their place in British society. In particular, he has worked on three overlapping groups: Jews, immigrants and internal migrants. This work is, in the first place, about the past, but it also addresses controversial issues – antisemitism, racism and immigration - in the present.

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Anthony Heath CBE FBA is Professor of Sociology at Manchester University and Emeritus Professor at Oxford. He is one of Britain’s most important sociologists and has researched and written widely on ethnicity, stratification and labour markets. Recent research, funded by the Economic Social Research Council and others, has explored minority ethnic electoral behaviour, multiculturalism, social trust in ethno-religiously diverse neighbourhoods, and analysis of longitudinal data on the integration of children of migrants. He has carried out commissioned research for UNDP, OECD and a range of government departments.

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**JOHN MANN MP**

John Mann MP is the Labour Member of Parliament for Bassetlaw. Since 2005 he has been Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism and commissioned the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiries into Antisemitism and Electoral Conduct. He chaired the Football Association’s Commission on Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Football and is a founder and chair of the Inter-Parliamentary Coalition for Combating Antisemitism.

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Vidhya Ramalingam is a projects coordinator at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, where she is responsible for ISD’s programme of work on far-right extremism (including a major pan-European project supported by the European Commission, aiming to enhance European cooperation in the prevention of right-wing extremism across ten countries) and integration.
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Dave Rich is Deputy Director of Communications at the Community Security Trust (CST), which provides security advice and assistance to the UK Jewish community and represents British Jewry to police, government and media on antisemitism and security. Dave is CST’s lead analyst of antisemitic hate crimes and the author of CST’s annual Antisemitic Incidents Report. His published work covers comparative antisemitic discourses on the political extremes of both left and right; anti-Zionism and Holocaust remembrance; and Islamism in Britain. Dave is also a PhD student at the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism, Birkbeck, University of London.

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Ben Rogaly is Professor of Human Geography and a member of the Centre for Migration Research at the University of Sussex. His recent work has explored social and historical geographies of identity and migration in England, focusing on areas in the East of England including Norwich (the setting of his 2009 book with Becky Taylor, *Moving Histories of Class and Community: Identity, Place and Belonging in Contemporary England*) and Peterborough (site of his current research with Kaveri Qureshi). He also works on political economic geographies of temporary migrant work in India and the UK, including pioneering research on A8 agricultural workers in England.

**BECKY TAYLOR**

Becky Taylor is Lecturer in History at Birkbeck, University of London, and Visiting Research Fellow in the Department of Geography, University of Sussex. She has published extensively on the history of migrants and minorities in Britain, as well as on the history of medicine. Books include *Moving Histories of Class and Community: Identity, Place and Belonging in Contemporary England* (2009, with Ben Rogaly) and *Another Darkness, Another Dawn: A History of Gypsies, Roma and Travellers* (2014).

**SAYEEDA WASRI**

The Right Hon Baroness Warsi was appointed Senior Minister of State at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Minister for Faith and Communities at the Department for Communities and Local Government in September 2012. She is a Conservative member of the House of Lords. Outside of politics, Baroness Warsi trained with the Crown Prosecution Service and the Home Office Immigration Department before setting up her own specialist legal practice. She has been a racial justice campaigner for many years and was instrumental in the launch of Operation Black Vote, a not-for-profit national organisation that works towards greater racial justice and equality throughout the UK.
THE PEARS INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF ANTISEMITISM

The Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism was established by the Pears Foundation and is based at Birkbeck, University of London. It is a centre of innovative research and teaching, contributing to discussion and policy formation on antisemitism and racism. It is both independent and inclusive. www.pearsinstitute.bbk.ac.uk

CENTRE ON MIGRATION, POLICY AND SOCIETY (COMPAS)

The Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) is an ESRC-funded Research Centre within the University of Oxford. Since 2003 COMPAS has established an international reputation for original research and policy relevance. It has undertaken a strategic programme of multi-disciplinary social scientific research, publications and dissemination, events, knowledge transfer and user engagement activities with a broad set of academic and non-academic users in the UK and abroad. COMPAS research covers a spectrum of global migration processes and phenomena, from conditions in places of migrant origins, through to institutions and activities affecting mobility, to social and economic effects in receiving contexts. www.compas.ox.ac.uk

THE ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP AGAINST ANTISEMITISM

The All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism was established to combat antisemitism and help develop and seek implementation of effective public policy to combat antisemitism. With committed members and an enviable reputation within Westminster and Whitehall for its impartiality, integrity and measured approach, the Group enjoys unique standing. Administrative support is provided to the Group by the Parliamentary Committee Against Antisemitism Foundation. www.antisemitism.org.uk/parliament