Europeanisation and the European Security and Defence Policy: The Case of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

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I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

**Signature**: Theodora Klountzou
Acknowledgments

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This thesis seeks to develop an under-researched area of Europeanisation theory, namely the link between the ‘export’ dimension of Europeanisation and the European Union’s (EU) external crisis response instruments, and specifically the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It examines the theory of Europeanisation and its relevant dimensions for this thesis, defining ‘Europeanisation’ in this context as the export of European values, principles, structures, ideas and norms beyond the geographical borders of the EU. The thesis sets out to test whether ESDP operations can provide a vehicle for Europeanisation in the countries in which they are deployed. It examines the evolution of European Union security and defence policy and the evolution of the EU’s operational military and civilian mission instrument, and employs case studies of operations in a specific country context in order to test whether ESDP operations can indeed be a practical mechanism with the potential to export the EU’s norms and principles.

The thesis employs case studies of three ESDP missions conducted in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) - the military operation Concordia, and police missions Proxima and EUPAT. It explores whether these
EU external instruments had a Europeanisation dimension, and whether and how in practice they contributed to Europeanisation. FYROM makes a germane case study as a new country emerging from crisis, on the EU's border, and in line for prospective future EU membership. The case studies show that the primary effect of the military operation Concordia, in contributing to the country's security and political stabilization and providing a visible and symbolic EU presence, was to provide a platform for subsequent Europeanisation. The follow-on Proxima and EUPAT civilian operations carried a more direct Europeanisation agenda and effect, playing an important role in transferring the EU's approach to addressing causes of conflict and contributing as part of the EU's wider efforts to promoting the integration of FYROM in the EU. The thesis concludes that ESDP operations can be a vehicle for exporting European values, principles and norms, and as such, a promoter of Europeanisation beyond the EU's borders.

This research can contribute to deepening the area of Europeanisation theory concerned with export dimensions of the theory, and suggests there is academic value in examining the Europeanisation aspects of EU external instruments, including civilian and military operations in other case study contexts, including in countries well beyond the EU's neighbourhood.

The research also highlights the value for the EU of conceptualising the ESDP mission instrument through a Europeanisation lens, in terms of maximising the transformative potential of the instrument as part of wider EU strategy to pursue normative, security and political objectives in its neighbourhood and the wider international sphere.
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<tr>
<td>CAGs</td>
<td>Community Advisory Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARDS</td>
<td>Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>DSACEUR</td>
<td>Deputy Supreme Commander Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capabilities Action Plan</td>
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<td>ECI</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>ECMM</td>
<td>European Community Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
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<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Identity</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMM</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPAT</td>
<td>European Union Policy Advisory Team</td>
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<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCA</td>
<td>Former Crisis Area</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>fYROM</td>
<td>former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>HAI</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid Instrument</td>
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<tr>
<td>HFLT</td>
<td>Heavy Field Liaison Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Historical Institutionalism</td>
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<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFLT</td>
<td>Light Field Liaison Teams</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Instrument for Micro-Financial Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLA</td>
<td>Albanian National Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSCI</td>
<td>Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>Non-Traditional Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDU</td>
<td>Police Development Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIFC</td>
<td>Public Internal Financial Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCT</td>
<td>Rational Choice Theory</td>
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<td>RI</td>
<td>Rational Institutionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRM</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Social Institutionalism</td>
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SSR Security Sector Reform
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
WEU Western European Union
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Setting the scene

The European Union (EU) was born out of conflict and a desire to promote stability and prevent new conflict. The concept of Europeanness is based on the idea that there are common European values and principles, such as fundamental human rights, democratic accountability and the rule of law. Along with the promotion of peace and security, this provides the foundation for the EU, as embodied in the Treaty on European Union. Europeanisation is a theory, a concept and a process relating both to the convergence around these values within the Member States of the EU; the integration of additional neighbouring States into the EU, based on such interests and convergence; and the EU’s promotion of its values more globally.

This thesis focuses on the emergence of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP) and its ESDP, and specifically of its operational instrument – the deployment of military and civilian missions – as a vehicle for Europeanisation beyond the existing borders of the EU, in terms of missions exporting EU values, principles, ideas and institutional models. As such, this research is not concerned directly with the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policies of the EU Member States themselves. Instead, it approaches ESDP as a potential instrument for external Europeanisation, and sets out to test whether, how, and to what extent ESDP operations can in fact contribute to Europeanising countries beyond the geographic borders of the EU.

1 Following the Treaty of Lisbon, ESDP was renamed to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) but I will be using ESDP throughout the thesis.
Through ESDP, the EU launched 26 military and civilian missions up to January 2013. Whilst there has been research on ESDP and ESDP missions, there has been limited application of the Europeanisation lens to academic investigation of either, and the focus has predominantly been on the institutional development of ESDP (within the EU), and issues of operational capability and mechanics.\(^2\) These studies fail to provide a deeper and more strategic assessment of the transformational change potential built-into ESDP operations as external intervention instruments of the EU. This thesis is based on the contention that applying the theory of Europeanisation to ESDP missions makes a valuable contribution to the study of the EU as a political and security actor abroad, including in terms of the EU’s role in crisis management and longer-term conflict prevention. In helping to conceptualise the EU’s mission instrument in these more transformational terms, it may also perhaps help policymakers and those involved in mission design, implementation on the ground, and operational lessons learning and evaluation, to take a more strategic view of the potential value and impact of ESDP missions as part of wider EU external strategy, as well as their limitations.

At the same time, Europeanisation research has given relatively limited attention to the “export” dimensions of the theory, or to the role of external security and defence instruments in Europeanisation processes, despite, as noted above, that the promotion of peace and security within and beyond the borders of the EU being at the heart of the European Union project. As such, this thesis is intended to contribute to the wider body of academic work on Europeanisation theory.

With the evolution of the ESDP, the EU has contributed to the management of crises and the resolution of conflict in a range of countries around the world. The EU has developed and expressed a distinct character for itself, in terms of

\(^2\) An overview of the literature will be presented later in this chapter.
responses to conflict and security challenges, and essentially the way it seeks to project itself abroad, in the following interrelated ways.

Although the EU has the ability to exercise military force, its predominant character is that of a non-coercive civilian actor. This is reflected by the growing number of ESDP civilian operations compared to military missions. It is also reflected in the EU’s emphasis on preventive security action, as expressed in the seminal European Security Strategy (ESS) document of December 2003, as opposed to an emphasis on pre-emptive action in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States (US) for example. The principles of democratic accountability, rule of law and respect for human rights have become part and parcel of the EU’s security doctrine guiding interventions abroad, and underlie non-military ESDP operations that are aimed at safeguarding the above-mentioned principles such as election observation committees, police training, and support to the development of civilian administrations and justice systems. This thesis seeks to demonstrate how the combination of these characteristics, where they come together in the form of ESDP missions, provides the opportunity for the EU to transfer its Europeanness through these missions deployed on the ground.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) represents a particularly valuable case study, in part because it is located on the EU border and therefore one can test the theory of Europeanisation in its ‘export’ form to the ‘near abroad’. The Western Balkans has been a turbulent region through history that has particularly attracted the attention of the EU after the Cold War, not least due to its geographic location and sharing a border with several EU member states, and therefore a direct threat to the security of the EU and wider EU interests. Conflict abroad and particularly in the EU’s neighbourhood,

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3 A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy, (Brussels, 12 December 2003), an earlier version of the document was presented at the European Council meeting in Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003.
5 Delegation of the European Commission to the USA, The EU and Peacekeeping: Promoting Security, Stability and Democratic Values, EU Focus, November 2008, p 1
6 The Western Balkans are comprised by Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo.
with those accompanied by humanitarian crises, pose a particular challenge to the EU’s moral and international credibility and to the EU’s will and capacity to act on its principles. The basis for the case study selection is introduced in more detail later in this chapter.

Although, in this thesis, the Europeanisation effect of ESDP operations is explored in only one country, there is potential and scope for further research with regards to the transferability of the EU values, ideas and norms through ESDP operations in other counties. This research could also be applied to ESDP missions elsewhere in Europe and to operations in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The thesis argues that the geographical proximity of a country to the EU is certainly likely to have an effect on the process of Europeanisation, its depth and longevity, especially if there is an aspiration to join the EU. Nonetheless, this research could possibly be applied to all other countries with ongoing or completed operations, or to those where the EU may be faced with a crisis management context in future, regardless of proximity to the EU, since the common denominator in all cases is the study of ESDP operations as a potential instrument for Europeanisation, and the theory is not limited to Europe or EU integration contexts.

1.2 Overview of the literature relevant to the scope of the thesis

There is a body of research that examines the Europeanisation of EU Member States policies in the area of so-called ‘first pillar’ (Commission) issues – both thematic and country studies, such as such as environmental and monetary policy, immigration policy, and French agricultural policy and education policy.

7 Until 2009 the EU comprised of three pillars. This structure was abandoned with the de-pillarisation process when the Lisbon Treaty came into effect on 1 December 2009. Nevertheless, I will be referring to the pillars as these were still in operation at the time of the case studies.
11
12
The relevance of Europeanisation theory to the ‘second pillar’ of the EU, relating to foreign and security policy, including ESDP, is relatively under-researched and under-developed. And although there are several studies on the Europeanisation of EU and EU member states’ foreign and security policies, research into Europeanisation in countries beyond the geographical borders of the EU are limited.

Studies that link Europeanisation to the second pillar include amongst others the Europeanisation of Germany’s foreign policy by Eva Gross, Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy by Claudia Major, and Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy by Spyros Economides. Although these studies deal with the theory of Europeanisation in relation to the second pillar, including the Europeanisation effect on EU member states’ foreign policies, there is very limited research that deals with the transmission of that common foreign and security policy into third countries beyond the EU border, including specifically through ESDP operations, and in the context of acceding countries. This thesis is not concerned with the Europeanisation of second pillar security and defence policies of EU member states.

A 2004 article by Islam Yusufi (identified after this thesis was underway) is directly relevant to this thesis. The short article, “Europeanizing the Western Balkans through Military and Police Missions: The Cases of Concordia and Proxima in Macedonia” discusses the Europeanising effect of the police and military missions in fYROM. Yusufi suggests that the missions had a positive impact on Europeanising the country, going as far as to argue that “the Europeanization effect of the EU military and police missions has been

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considerable.”\textsuperscript{17} He suggests that, “by stabilizing the country and by including reform tools, the missions laid the foundation for the Europeanization of the country and also assisted in drawing the country closer to EU membership.”\textsuperscript{18}

Whilst Yusufi’s short article represents a useful and supportive reference point to the present thesis, and puts forward some evidence that there is some positive effect of the ESDP missions in the Europeanisation process of FYROM, it does not provide in any way a thorough and detailed academic analysis in support of its arguments. Furthermore, it does not examine the basis by which the ESDP framework provides this potential ‘capability’ to the missions deployed in FYROM, nor for example provide any detailed consideration of the areas in which the ESDP missions managed to have a \textit{Europeanising} effect on the country. It also contains a methodological weakness in terms of not acknowledging or attempting to distinguish the Europeanisation attributes of the ESDP missions versus other EU instruments involved in the Europeanisation process of FYROM. The author of the article was interviewed in the course of the thesis.

This thesis undertakes a thorough analysis of the theory and concept of Europeanisation and its various definitions, and identifies the key relevant dimensions of the theory that the thesis is examining; it presents a concise historical analysis of the evolution of the second pillar of the EU in order to understand the emergence of the framework for ESDP missions and their Europeanisation potential; it further explores in detail the possibility of ESDP missions to be considered as a potential instrument for Europeanisation, going on to examine mission case studies in a case study country; and on the basis of the research identifies some general conclusions and identifies scope for further research based on applying this case study approach to other ESDP missions in other geographical areas, as well as other forms of EU external action.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, p 9
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, p 10
1.3 The problem statement

Throughout the literature on Europeanisation, various definitions and explanations have been put forward by scholars and academics. For the purpose of this research, the thesis seeks to interrogate whether, and to what extent, there was a Europeanisation effect on FYROM through ESDP missions. It will examine what the EU is exporting, how it is exporting it and what are the outcomes and implications of this for future ESDP missions. In particular, the thesis focuses on the values, principles, norms and institutions that the EU may export through ESDP, utilising the lens of Europeanisation as a conceptual framework, aiming, at the same time, to connect the literature of Europeanisation to ESDP.

In order to investigate whether there has been a Europeanisation effect on FYROM through the ESDP operations, a careful examination of the variables will be undertaken. Relevant independent variables include the convergence in the political cultures of the EU countries, and the role of other EU instruments and wider actors on the ground such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN). The dependent variables relate to the Europeanisation impact of the case study missions on the case study context. In order to understand the Europeanisation effect and, as a result, the changes that take place, an understanding of norms and values exported by the EU and shared by the actors is necessary. The modalities of this transmission are also examined. In this thesis, I argue that the EU is exporting norms of good governance, principles and values such as democratisation, the rule of law and respect for human rights, through the vehicle of ESDP operations.

1.4 Research questions and objectives

The principle research question that this thesis sets out to answer is whether the European Security and Defence Policy, and specifically its operational expression (missions) - is a potential instrument for Europeanisation. The aim
is to examine whether, how, and to what extent, the ESDP civilian and military missions are capable of contributing to *Europeanising* a country beyond the EU borders. The thesis is interested in contributing to the enrichment of the theory of Europeanisation through asking questions related to whether there is a link between the EU’s second pillar (and specifically ESDP missions), and Europeanisation theory, thus addressing an under-researched area of this field: as elaborated in the previous section, the majority of previous studies have applied the theory of Europeanisation to first pillar areas such as environmental, agricultural or monetary policy. Within this scope, the objective is also to examine the relevance of Europeanisation in the context of conflict prevention, crisis management, stabilisation and the EU enlargement process.

The research involves the identification of EU interests and motives embedded in ESDP operations. At the same time, the research considers the impact that the missions have on the target actors (states, organisations, institutions, policies and people).

Researching the possibility of the EU exporting its values and principles through the ESDP operations adds value to the way in which ESDP and ESDP missions can be conceptualised, designed and evaluated, and opens a new area of research about the ESDP’s potential to transfer these values and principles to the near abroad and beyond. It further broadens the literature on Europeanisation by linking it to the second pillar of the EU and in particular to the ESDP through a careful examination of the ESDP missions and operations in FYROM that can potentially be applied in other areas and other missions.

1.5 Overview of the research methodology

A variety of research methods and approaches were used in the course of this research. The study is qualitative in nature, and the principle research type used is the case study approach. One country case study is utilised, with three ESDP mission case studies explored in that country context. The main research methods were interviews, and use of both primary and secondary documents including official EU documents, surveys, studies conducted by
non-governmental organisations, and academic papers and articles. Certain EU documents were accessed via the online public register of European Council documents, whilst non-public EU documents were also obtained by request.

Tailored semi-structured interviews were conducted in FYROM itself in April 2009 with a wide spectrum of individuals including journalists, senior NGO representatives, police officials, academics and politicians. Another series of interviews was conducted in Brussels in September 2009, mainly with officials of the European Commission and the EU Council. The main focus of the interviews was on the case studies of the ESDP operations in FYROM, and namely their explicit and implicit scope, perspectives on effectiveness and outcomes, and testing the main research question relating to the relevance of the theory of Europeanisation to the ESDP missions, and vice versa.

There are many mechanisms through which Europeanisation can operate. Since in this thesis, the Europeanisation effect is explored through examining the export of values, norms and European institutions, the process of diffusion, overt diffusion and social learning is the approach that will be employed in this thesis.

Europeanisation intent and effect is examined considering the time, length, place, mechanisms and other dependant or independent variables. The case study analysis considers whether Europeanisation effects might be short or long-term, with temporary or permanent effects. The Europeanisation potential and impact of the ESDP missions will be assessed a) based on the time and length of the operations, and b) a baseline against which change can be measured, where the baseline is the state of relevant characteristics of FYROM immediately before the launch of the ESDP operations.

The main methodological challenge in this thesis is the ability to distinguish between, attribute, and measure the Europeanisation effect of the ESDP missions vis-à-vis the Europeanisation effect of other dynamic EU-related processes and instruments, as well as the impact of other actors engaged in FYROM who may also carry a Europeanisation agenda. Whilst it has not
always been possible in the course of the research to make such clear distinctions in a robust way, the analysis seeks to control for this weakness by at least placing the ESDP missions in their wider context through an examination of other key instruments and actors, and to examine the intent or potential contribution to outcomes made by the missions in question.

An additional challenge for in-depth case study research in this area was the lack of detailed impact assessments, analysis, evaluations and reporting in the public domain from the missions themselves, from the European institutions in Brussels, or from Member States. Whilst a large number of European Council non-public documents were obtained by request, they were provided up to ‘researcher level’ access, and most were censored to a greater or lesser extent according to the security classification of the information. Another reason for the inability to access such documents, corroborated through the interviews, was that it has not been common practice to commission such evaluations – particularly in relation to the more transformational role of operations. This will be returned to in the Conclusions chapter.

1.6 Case study selection

ESDP missions are EU instruments for crisis management, humanitarian and rescue tasks and peace-keeping tasks. The scope of ESDP mission tasks, which was developed over a period of time, also incorporates certain institutional reform and normative characteristics. There has not, however, been an in-depth examination of ESDP missions as a potential instrument for the Europeanisation of countries emerging from instability and conflict, including where the context also combines a European integration perspective.

FYROM provides a valuable case study context for testing these various dimensions: as a country experiencing conflict and instability; as a country beyond, but on the EU’s border and within the natural geographical boundary of an enlarged European Union; and one which has seen the deployment of
EU ESDP missions into this context, during a period in which the EU has actively developed and sought to operationalise its foreign and security policy externally, containing both technical, symbolic and normative dimensions.

The EU has deployed three ESDP missions to FYROM since 2003, one of them being the first ever military ESDP mission and the other two being police missions. Despite the fact that FYROM is not exactly distant from the EU, and indeed was a natural candidate for EU expansion - with all the Europeanisation implications that that entails - the ESDP operations were conducted in the context of what were seen as *outside* threats, requiring an *externally*-oriented EU policy response. This case history of ESDP engagement in FYROM therefore provides a valuable basis for the study of the role of ESDP missions in ‘exporting’ Europeanisation outside the EU, and as such a contribution to the broader field of Europeanisation theory.

The first case study considers the military operation Concordia which was the first ever military operation to be deployed by the EU under the Petersberg Tasks. There are three key points made in the thesis regarding the launch of operation Concordia. Primarily, the operation had a symbolic meaning as it marked a new era for the EU as a security actor, second, the handover from NATO to the EU marked the ties between the transatlantic partners, and third, through operation Concordia the EU demonstrated its commitment to FYROM and to the implementation of the Ohrid peace agreement. The core aim of Concordia was, at the explicit request of the FYROM government, to contribute further to a stable and secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement.

The second case study is on the EU police mission Proxima that replaced Concordia, and the follow-on EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) mission that succeeded Proxima. The scope of the Proxima mission was to aid the development of a multi-ethnic environment in the region and within FYROM’s borders. EUPAT allowed for a continued presence and Europeanisation

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contribution through ESDP whilst fundamentally being a bridging mechanism between the police reform aspects of Proxima, and the beginning of a delayed European Commission-funded CARDS police reform project still under preparation at that time.

Overall, operation Concordia and police missions Proxima and EUPAT make an interesting case study. Concordia, as the first ever ESDP military operation, and Proxima together with EUPAT are testing whether ESDP missions can be used as an instrument for Europeanisation. In addition, they contribute to the theory of Europeanisation as an ‘export’ of European values, principles and norms to the ‘near abroad’ as they were all launched on the doorstep of the EU.

1.7 Outline of the thesis

This thesis explores one particular dimension of Europeanisation, which is “the diffusion of European forms of organization and governance”\textsuperscript{20} and the transfer of European ideas, values and norms to the near abroad. At the same time it is linking the theory of Europeanisation to the second pillar of the EU and in particular to the ESDP whilst testing whether this transfer of European values and principles is in fact possible through the deployment of ESDP missions and operations. The first chapter of the dissertation presents the background of the study, specifies problems of the study, describes its significance, and presents an overview of the methodology used.

Chapter Two proceeds to examine the various definitions and dimensions of the concept of Europeanisation, among which the ‘export’ which is employed in this thesis. The delimitations of the study are noted and a comparison of Europeanisation to other terms and concepts is made in order to provide clarity: Europeanisation theory has received criticism for being based on a vague concept that can sometimes generate confusion, partly as a result of

multiple definitions, and beginning with the underpinning notion of whether there is such a thing as, and what constitutes, ‘Europeanness’.

As we will see in the second chapter, Europeanisation has been variously described, among others, by Radaelli as a process consisting of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal rules;\(^{21}\) by Bulmer and Burch as the impact of European integration upon the national level;\(^{22}\) Ladrech, meanwhile, saw Europeanisation as a process changing EU politics;\(^{23}\) Featherstone described it as a process of structural change affecting actors and institutions;\(^{24}\) while Olsen gave five different dimensions to the concept of Europeanisation.\(^{25}\) All of these definitions and explanations however have as a common denominator the notion of a change process converging towards a common European approach, which for the purposes of this thesis is represented as an EU approach. These changes may occur at the domestic (member state) level, at the European level, at home (within the EU) or abroad.

In this sense, Europeanisation is shown to provide a usefully flexible concept that can be used in order to explain actions and change processes of and within European member states, accession countries and potential EU candidates, and those further away, as well as the interaction between these countries and the EU. The chapter focuses in on the specific dimension of Europeanisation being tested and applied in this thesis – that of Europeanisation of non-EU actors through the export of European characteristics through external EU action under the second pillar of the EU and in particular the ESDP. Furthermore, the methodological issues of Europeanisation are discussed together with the mechanisms, receptiveness


\(^{25}\) Olsen (2002), *op cit*, 923
and instruments of Europeanisation that show how Europeanisation operates and in our case, how the transfer of European values and principles takes place. Chapter Two also provides an introduction to the relevance of the Western Balkans and the fYROM and ESDP case study for this export dimension of Europeanisation.

The third chapter explores and analyses the evolutionary process that has led to a Common Foreign and Security Policy that incorporates civilian and military external action dimensions. Furthermore, it identifies a number of particular attributes of that policy and external action that have developed over time, in terms of the incorporation of EU values, principles and ethos as embodied in the EU’s approach to security. It will go on to examine how these attributes are incorporated in the framing and *modus operandi* of ESDP operations, with the purpose to test whether, to what extent and how a Europeanisation export potential has come to be built into the ESDP mission framework. In doing so, the thesis opens up the possibility of a widened and deepened scope for the conceptualisation and tasking of ESDP missions, beyond the formal remit the EU has given them, or that academic research has so far illuminated. This hypothesis is tested through a case study approach in the following chapters.

Chapter Four sets out the fYROM case study country context and its particular relevance for this thesis, and provides an overview and background to the ESDP missions conducted there and the way in which they were framed both by the EU and within fYROM, namely the EU military operation Concordia, the EU Police mission Proxima and the EU Police Advisory Team mission EUPAT. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia makes for a pertinent case study in terms of the geopolitical relevance of the country for the EU and its nature as a crisis context. The aim of the chapter is to provide this context for EU interest and engagement, which included ESDP missions, and to present the state, or ‘baseline assessment’, that fYROM was in prior to the deployment of the ESDP operations. This will help to determine the ‘goodness of fit’ or ‘misfit’ between fYROM and the EU in areas of relevance to ESDP, and to provide a
basis for the subsequent analysis of whether and how the ESDP missions acted as vehicles for Europeanisation. In addition, a number of other avenues of EU engagement in FYROM are considered, as well as those of the wider international engagement in the country, in order to place the ESDP instrument and relevance in a bigger picture.

Chapter Five constitutes a detailed analysis of the Europeanisation characteristics of the ESDP military and civilian missions mounted in FYROM, and the extent to which they can be said to have had a Europeanisation effect. The areas and mechanisms of the missions' Europeanisation impact on FYROM are analysed, as well as their depth and likely longevity. The challenges of measuring the Europeanisation effect are also dealt with. The chapter concludes that the ESDP military and civilian missions – Concordia, Proxima and EUPAT - have acted as vehicles for Europeanisation in FYROM through the transfer of EU values, principles, and standards and institutional development.

The final chapter draws together the main findings of the research and offers conclusions and thoughts on the potential application of this research.

1.8 Main findings of the research

This research has identified that the evolution of the European Union has incorporated a set of common and distinct notions of Europeanness that have in turn been incorporated into the EU’s common approach to foreign and security policy and external outlook. The analysis further highlights that, in the evolution of an operational instrument for external action, in the shape of ESDP civilian and military missions, the EU has developed the necessary capability and guiding framework to provide a useful vehicle for the technical and normative export of that Europeanness beyond the EU, that can be used to further the EU’s goals and values. The research identifies the relevance of this development for the EU’s engagement in unstable countries at the EU’s
borders, where there is also an incentive to conduct Europeanisation in order to facilitate EU enlargement/accession.

The case study analysis supports and strengthens these findings by both highlighting the ways in which a Europeanisation agenda has been implicitly or explicitly built-into actual ESDP missions, and the tangible contributions they have made to Europeanisation on the ground. At the same time, the case study research also serves to highlight the challenges in measuring and disaggregating the Europeanisation impact of this particular external instrument, as well as substantiating some of the critiques of Europeanisation theory more broadly.

Despite the theoretical and practical measurement challenges, the case study evidence from the ESDP missions in fYROM supports the hypothesis that ESDP missions can act as vehicles for Europeanisation with positive effect. Bringing stability, resolving the conflict, and EU enlargement and the ‘carrot’ of EU membership was certainly an incentive for fYROM. Hence, the government as well as the people of fYROM were receptive to Europeanisation. The different mission types and timings were found to have a differentiated relevance to, and impact on, Europeanisation. The military operation Concordia was found to convey Europeanisation in the form of improving population security and stability, and in so doing, fostering immediate human rights (protection) improvements. Its primary Europeanisation impacts were however more indirect and less tangible, and the mission can therefore be said to have played an important role in promoting the ‘receptiveness’\textsuperscript{26} of fYROM to Europeanisation generally, and for facilitating the EU’s Europeanisation impacts through the follow-up ESDP missions and other instruments. The Concordia mission had symbolic, for example confidence-building, and normative dimensions, which provided important foundations for the more tangible Europeanisation effects to occur through the activities of the mission itself. Moreover, in its contribution to stabilisation and confidence-building – both in terms of confidence in the security situation and towards the

\textsuperscript{26} See Chapter 2 of this thesis, pages 18, 19 and 23, for a discussion of receptiveness to Europeanisation.
EU itself, Concordia laid the ground for the follow-up Proxima and EUPAT police missions to contribute to Europeanisation, highlighting a sequential and compound Europeanisation contribution through the transition of the different ESDP missions.

Given their mandate, the missions Proxima and EUPAT had a noticeably more tangible, wider and deeper Europeanisation impact compared to Concordia. The areas that are identified as having a Europeanisation effect and examined in this thesis were: Europeanisation of FYROM’s policing concept, including supporting the development of multi-ethnic policing; human rights, including promoting gender equality; supporting peaceful democratic normalisation, including through contributing to elections security; Europeanisation of the approach to border management; contributions to wider Security Sector Reform (SSR), and to promoting EU models and principles of good governance beyond the security sector, including through decentralisation and promoting the responsiveness and accountability of public institutions to all citizens.

ESDP can be seen through this study as a flexible instrument for Europeanisation in transitional security and political environments, and this adaptability can be used to maximize the Europeanisation contribution of the missions in terms of scope, depth, length of time, and in relation to other EU instruments.

The thesis identifies the value of the EU of more deliberately, consistently and systematically conceptualising the ESDP mission instrument through a Europeanisation lens, and designing and measuring the success of missions and undertaking missions lessons learning in Europeanisation terms, as a way to maximise the transformative potential of the instrument as part of wider EU strategy and set of interventions to pursue normative, security and political objectives in its neighbourhood and the wider international sphere.

The Conclusions identify further areas for research of value for expanding and
deepening the theory of Europeanisation and its application to the ESDP instrument.
Chapter 2

Setting the Theoretical Framework: Europeanisation

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an introduction to Europeanisation as a theoretical concept. It examines the various contested definitions of Europeanisation, its mechanisms and processes and introduces the ‘export’ dimension of Europeanisation that is employed in this thesis. This will serve to connect Europeanisation theory with CFSP and specifically ESDP.

The first section will explore the development of the Europeanisation theory. Before embarking on a more detailed examination of what the EU is exporting by using ESDP as a vehicle, the notion of ‘Europeanness’ is explored, followed by an analysis of different dimensions of Europeanisation, among which the ‘export’ dimension of the concept will be introduced, which is the focus of this thesis. The second section will consider the conundrum resulting from the usage of ‘Europeanisation’ vis-à-vis other terms or concepts, and a distinction between Europeanisation and related terms will be made. The mechanisms and instruments of Europeanisation will then be analysed in order to show the ways in which Europeanisation can occur. The export dimension of Europeanisation will then be elaborated further and the link made to the second pillar of the EU - CFSP and ESDP operations.

2.2 Defining ‘Europeanness’

Before embarking on the various definitions of Europeanisation, it is important to determine what makes the EU ‘European’. In this section, I am seeking to depict the essence and uniqueness of Europe by defining what is Europeanness. This is crucial for our understanding of Europeanisation theory.
Europe is not only a region confined in geographical borders. Some of the first characteristics of the European people and European identity appear to have emerged with the Enlightenment. Reason, rationality, morality, freedom of thought and the ‘human’ are among the subjects discussed by Kant, Diderot, Voltaire and Habemas. The principles and values of Europeanness are to be found in the shared European history and common cultural roots emanating from the Enlightenment. According to Prodi, Europeans have inherited “a rich culture, deeply rooted in religious traditions and civic values.” European identity (and hence Europeanness) has been influenced by the Greek and Roman civilisations, Christianity and the universal values of the Enlightenment.

Europeanness, although related to European identity, should not be confused with it. The formation of European identity has been a historical process, transformed and formed through the existence of the “other”, the “orient”, and the “east”. If a distinct European identity truly exists, then automatically the “other” also exists alongside all the differences between them. In more recent times, the EU through Europeanisation and the waves of enlargement has proved it believes in inclusivity rather than exclusivity and hence it accepts the heterogeneity of its Member States and their national identities, having always as a common denominator the shared cultural history and values. Europeanness is a notion that recognises and endorses the existence of a European identity, its values, ideas and principles as well as the sense of feeling European.

Europeanness is a key concept for the study of Europeanisation. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier have pointed out that “the ‘Europeanization’ or ‘Europeanness’ of individual countries has come to be measured by the intensity of institutional relations with the Community and by

29 Idem
the adoption of its organizational norms and rules”. Europeanness is based on the foundations of common European values and principles, such as fundamental human rights, democratic accountability and the rule of law. Additionally, Europeaness also includes institutional models and approaches as we will see later in the thesis and in particular in chapter 5 where it is stated that FYROM was encouraged to take up the EU’s border management model. Some potential examples of Europeanness identified in this thesis include a shared EU model of civilian policing, making the symbolic transition from a military model to a civilian one whilst respecting and promoting human rights. Human rights promotion and the rule of law are embedded in the mandates, activities and impacts of the FYROM missions, through the prevention of violence and through the monitoring, mentoring and advising human rights-related law enforcement, and promoting non-discrimination in policing. Overall, Europeanisation is a process and in a sense, Europeanness is what is being transferred or exported through Europeanisation.

In the consolidating versions of the Treaty on European Union the EU’s values are identified as the following:

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”

In the Lisbon Treaty it was stated that:

“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its

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citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.”

It is clear from the above that the EU claims to be founded on a set of values such as respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and that the EU is setting out to promote these values in order to contribute to peace and security. Whilst frequently citing the UN Charter as its global reference point, the EU sets out a distinct EU vision. These values can define the Europeanness that could be exported through Europeanisation by using ESDP operations as a vehicle/EU instrument to the near abroad. Despite the heterogeneity of the member states, the shared culture and the common European values and principles binds them together in a European identity within which their Europeanness prevails and at the same time differentiates them from the rest of the world (the other). This thesis argues that through the process of Europeanisation, it is possible for the EU to transfer this Europeanness to the near-abroad and beyond.

2.3 Definitions and Mechanisms of Europeanisation

2.3.1 Defining Europeanisation: History, Origins and Change

The concept of Europeanisation as we know it today in the field of European Studies is relatively recent as it has emerged during the 1990s. The theoretical and conceptual development and evolution of Europeanisation, however, is a process that has been ongoing for many years. This section will provide an overview and detailed analysis of Europeanisation covering the historical development of the concept and gradually moving into more recent dimensions to the theory.

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Earlier examples of what we might refer to as Europeanisation today have possibly started around 1200 BC in Greece and Asia Minor where cross-border trading took place and there was a movement of goods, people and ideas. Generally, Europeanisation was then understood as “the spread of forms of life and production, habits of drinking and eating, religion, language, and political principles, institutions and identities typical of Europe and unknown in the rest of the world beyond European territory”. The spread of the European models and habits was often achieved through colonialism or coercion. This notion of Europeanisation has changed dramatically through time before it adopted its current form and the definitions that will be explained further in the text. History proves that a certain form of Europeanisation is not a new phenomenon but “it may have acquired distinctive contemporary attributes”.

The first traits of Europeanisation in its older form may be traced to the 16th century due to the development of technology in the field of transportation, which enabled countries such as Spain, Portugal, England and France to establish European settlements in North and South America, Africa and Asia. In particular, Europeanisation can be seen to have occurred in America through the European values transferred by European settlers on the political, economic, religious and cultural fronts. European power also spread in Asia when Slavs from European Russia migrated to the east in the 19th century.

Radaelli makes a distinction between Europeanisation as a ‘background concept’ and as a ‘systematised concept’. In the case of the former the evolution and history of Europeanisation is studied with references to trade and individualism in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. This form of Europeanisation is understood mostly as a historical phenomenon according to which Europeanisation is linked to the emergence of a distinct European

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33 Olsen (2002), *op cit*, p 937
culture and identity and is transferred through the development of trade relationships.\textsuperscript{36}

Radaelli’s “systematised concept” gives Europeanisation a more current definition assuming that “the readership is made up of political scientists interested in the domestic consequences of the process of European integration”.\textsuperscript{37} In the last decades, and due to the establishment of International Relations and European Studies as disciplines of social sciences, Europeanisation is seen more and more as a systematised concept. The end of the 1990s saw a surge in interest in Europeanisation as a research area in European studies and provided “a focal point for a coherent framework of analysis”.\textsuperscript{38}

Wallace has referred to Europeanisation as “the development and sustaining of systematic European arrangements to manage cross-border connections, such that a European dimension becomes an embedded feature which frames politics and policy within the European states”.\textsuperscript{39} She stresses that Europeanisation is not a process confined to the EU member states as it is not only “locked to the EU” but it can spread or have an impact on Europe’s ‘near abroad’, to the south and the east”.\textsuperscript{40} In brief, the borders of Europeanisation are not the same as the borders of the EU.

Caporaso, Cowles and Risse-Kappen define Europeanisation as “the emergence and development at the European [EU] level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions, associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules.”\textsuperscript{41} Policy networks can be explained as clusters of actors with their own interests

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{36} Radaelli (2004), \textit{op cit}, p 2.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid, p 2.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Wallace (2000), \textit{op cit}, 370
\item \textsuperscript{40} Ibid, 371.
\end{itemize}
interacting or acting collectively “to help determine policy success or failure”.\textsuperscript{42} In general terms, Europeanization involves the evolution of new layers of politics that interact with older ones, encouraging in a few words the development of EU policies in conjunction with the formation of new rules, regulations and norms in other countries, consequently bringing change and having an effect on both the EU and domestic levels.\textsuperscript{43}

Bulmer and Burch have identified Europeanisation as “the impact of European integration upon the national level and specifically upon the domestic institutions of government.”\textsuperscript{44} In addition, Europeanisation does not only affect governmental institutions but it has an impact on the ‘politics, policies and polities’ of all member states. They acknowledge, however, that Europeanisation is a two-way process involving “reception and projection”. By reception, it is meant to describe the way domestic governments ‘receive’ EU policies and influences coming from Brussels and how they reply to these, hence domestic governance. By projection, it is meant to explain the way in which the needs of a domestic government are projected to the EU level and how the EU responds to these, hence EU governance.\textsuperscript{45} Reception and projection are interrelated in the way of forming a chain of changes and responses, actions and reactions connecting the EU to the national level and vice versa, and they should not be studied as two separate processes.

Ladrech noted that “Europeanization is an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making.”\textsuperscript{46} By organisational logic Ladrech means the process during which organisations such as interest groups and governmental units adapt to a changed or changing environment. He differentiates Europeanisation from neo-functionalism and federalism that hold a supranational idea of decision-making and away from neo-realism with its state-centric views. More precisely,

\textsuperscript{42} Peterson, J. (2003), ‘Policy Networks,’ Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Political Science Series, Number 90. Available at: http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_90.pdf.
\textsuperscript{43} Cowles, Caporaso, Risse-Kappen \textit{op cit}, p 3
\textsuperscript{44} Bulmer and Burch, \textit{op cit}, p 2
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibid}, p 2,3
\textsuperscript{46} Ladrech, \textit{op cit}, p 69
he positions Europeanisation somewhere in the middle by saying that “Europeanization preserves the legitimacy and authority of national government, but suggests that it will become, progressively permeated by environmental inputs which become, over time, internalized in politics and policy-making.”47

Featherstone too saw Europeanisation as a process and in particular as “a process of structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests.”48 The impact of Europeanisation on the domestic level that produces structural change is not necessarily permanent as it is “typically incremental, irregular, and uneven over time and between locations, national and subnational.”49 In particular, Featherstone identified four areas in which Europeanisation occurs: historical process, cultural diffusion, institutional adaptation and adaptation of policy and policy processes. Specifically, Europeanisation as a historical process is interpreted as the ‘export’ of European authority, norms, rules and values, but in contemporary Europe Europeanisation may be interpreted as “adaptation to west European norms and practices”.50

Radaelli’s definition depicts Europeanisation as a process consisting of: a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies.51 Here, Europeanisation is seen as an interactive process and deals with the way in which domestic change is processed. Moreover, Radaelli argues that, “Europeanisation is all about bringing domestic politics back into our understanding of European integration… Europeanisation is mostly interested in adaptation to Europe.”52

According to Radaelli, Europeanisation takes place when “The EU becomes a

47 Ibid, p 70
48 Featherstone and Radaelli, op cit, p 3
49 Ibid, p 4
50 Ibid, p 6,7
51 Radaelli (2004), op cit, p 3
52 Ibid, p 3
cognitive and normative frame, and provides orientation to the logics of meaning and action” and when “There is a process of change, either in response to EU pressure or as usage of Europe.”

Jacquot and Woll describe the term ‘usage of Europe’ as “the mediation done by an actor to transform a material or immaterial resource provided by the European institutions into a political action.” By material resources, Jacquot and Woll mean European institutions, policy instruments and funding, while by immaterial resources, they mean “discursive references, ideas and the use of the European public sphere.” ‘Ideas’ can be summarised as beliefs, perceptions, values and norms. Hence, if ‘usage’ is necessary for European integration to happen on national political systems, as per Jacquot and Woll, Europeanisation can indeed occur through the employment of ‘usage’ and, in particular, through the diffusion of European ideas on the domestic level.

Europeanisation has also been seen as a bottom-up process meaning that EU member states are ‘uploading’ their policies to the EU (national state → EU). Europeanisation has also been referred to as a top-down process with regards to the influence and the impact that the EU has on the national level (EU → national state). Thirdly, Europeanisation also has a horizontal dimension according to which EU countries co-operate and influence inter-governementally (state → state) and, finally, it can also be interpreted as a round-about process (national state → EU → national state). All these processes of Europeanisation are in a sense related to the ‘goodness of fit’, meaning the compatibility between the domestic and European spheres. A ‘fit’ or a ‘misfit’ between domestic and European institutions might determine what Europeanisation process will follow, i.e. top-down, bottom-up, horizontal. This argument is elaborated in the next paragraph.

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53 Ibid, p11
55 Ibid, p 7
More precisely, in order for the member states to comply with EU norms, rules and regulations, it is necessary to make some adjustments on the domestic level. The ‘goodness of fit’ is the degree of institutional compatibility between national institutions and European policy. So in order to have a ‘good fit’ between the Europeanisation processes and domestic institutions some adjustments on the national level are necessary. There is, on the other hand, the possibility of having a ‘misfit’ between EU policy and domestic institutions where the compatibility between these two is low. In such cases, countries have to deal with higher adaptational pressures and more institutional adjustments, acquiring a top-down Europeanisation approach. Apart from a top-down and a bottom-up approach, a horizontal approach may also assist adaptation through a bilateral relationship between EU member states or an EU member state and a non-EU state.

The degree of institutional compatibility and the pressure to adapt to EU regulations may vary from country to country and from policy to policy. It is most likely that pre-existing national structures will have an impact on the ‘fit’ and, as a result, on domestic changes. For instance, the United Kingdom liberalised and deregulated its domestic market before the EU made any changes in this policy. When the EU had decided to do the same, the EU legislation matched the UK rules on transport and therefore the UK had little adaptational pressure. Furthermore, a country might adjust to EU policy by making some adjustments to its institutions but that does not necessarily represent change on the country’s domestic structures. In this case, we can say that an ‘epidermic’ form of Europeanisation takes place instead of a long-term and deeper kind of change.

Apart from the ‘goodness of fit’ or the ‘misfit’ between EU and domestic structures, Europeanisation can occur “when the emergent European structure has a precise legal basis and when domestic actors have been involved in

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57 Radaelli (2000), op cit, p 12
58 Bulmer (2007), op cit, p 51
59 Cowles, Caporaso, Risse-Kappen, op cit, p 6, 7
developing the emergent European institution or policy”. Furthermore, these domestic actors which are involved in domestic politics are most likely to apply pressure for changes on the national level.

Olsen has identified five dimensions of Europeanisation to describe Europeanisation as a concept that is applied in a number of ways and is used to describe a variety of phenomena and processes of change. Some of these processes of change might be occurring simultaneously. The five dimensions identified by Olsen are said to “complement, rather than exclude each other” and are used to explain different processes of change and, in particular, “how institutions co-evolve through mutual adaptation.”

Firstly, he explains Europeanisation through “changes in external boundaries” by understanding Europe as a geographical entity whose borders change with EU enlargement and recognises that European transformations are not limited to the EU and its member states. Here ‘Europe’ is used with reference to the EU. Secondly, Europeanisation can be understood as “developing institutions at the European level” meaning “the institutionalisation at the European level of a distinct system of governance with common institutions and the authority to make, implement and enforce European-wide binding policies.” Thirdly, Europeanisation is identified as “central penetration of national systems of governance”, meaning the adaptation of national and sub-national systems of governance to a European political centre. In effect, this is the broadest use of the term Europeanisation according to which change is brought on the domestic level as a consequence of the development of European institutions.

Fourthly, Olsen refers to Europeanisation in the sense of “exporting forms of political organisation” and European institutions such as rules, structures and norms to the wider world. Bulmer stated that “although not specifically identified by Olsen, horizontal, intra-EU Europeanization needs to be

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61 Olsen (2002), *op cit*, p 923
62 Ibid, p 929
63 Ibid, p 924
incorporated under this heading." This means that certain things can be exported from one EU member state to another with the EU having the role of the mediator. Nevertheless, Europeanisation does not stop where EU borders stop, and it is safe to make the assumption that Europeanisation can have an impact on other non-EU member states, as long as there is an interaction between them.

Finally, Olsen identifies Europeanisation as “a political unification project” according to which Europe is turning into a strong political entity with a single system of governance. In the meantime, as the borders between the member states are removed, state sovereignty is lost. According to the theory, a central system of governance would bring the coherency that the EU is currently lacking due to the heterogeneity brought by EU enlargement. It should be noted at this point, that for our purposes, whilst the EU is not a single actor in many respects, where this thesis refers to ‘the EU’ it generally does so in the sense that the EU is a unitary actor, at least in relation to external non-EU parties. At some point the thesis does highlight that where there are differences in EU Member State approaches, models, norms and so on, this has implications for the EU’s ability to promote Europeanisation beyond its borders with a clear and coherent approach.

Although the approach used in this thesis, through Olsen’s dimension of Europeanisation that generates changes through the transfer of values, principles and norms, is predominantly a normative approach, it needs to be highlighted that there is another approach that could potentially be used and that is Rational Choice Theory (RCT). RCT is an approach found in a variety of disciplines such as economics, politics, sociology, international relations, and deals with human behaviour and with how choices are made. With regards to EU studies, rational choice is applied through rational choice institutionalism on the study of EU decision-making. However, rational theory has received many criticisms and certain weaknesses were identified.

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66 Olsen (2002), op cit, p 940, 941

According to Pollack, rational choice scholars often “ignore alternative accounts and competing explanations” against which they can test their hypotheses.\textsuperscript{68} Furthermore, Green and Shappiro have highlighted the inapplicability of rational choice theory in a given domain whilst specifically noting that the research conducted on rational choice applications to American politics has been done through ‘poorly conducted tests, and tendentious interpretations of results’.\textsuperscript{69} Due to insufficient empirical evidence on the applicability of RCT in the domain of EU Studies and specifically on ESDP operations, the chosen theoretical framework for this thesis is the Europeanisation dimension of the transfer of values, ideas and norms to the near abroad.

At this point it is also important to identify ‘what is Europeanised’. On the domestic level, Europeanisation can occur on domestic structures and particularly political, economic, administrative and legal structures and their institutions. Public policy can also be Europeanised with a direct impact on “actors, resources, and policy instruments”. Values, norms and discourses of countries where Europeanisation is taking place, can also be influenced, by altering actors’ choices, decisions, preferences and interests.\textsuperscript{70}

In this way, Europeanisation can also be achieved in the domestic sphere by influencing politicians’ decisions on policy-making. It is possible for local actors and political parties to imitate European ways of doing things and embrace European behaviours and patterns when forming policies or restructuring their institutions.

2.3.2 Delimiting Europeanisation - Distinguishing Europeanisation from other concepts

The complexity of the multiple and different definitions given to ‘Europeanisation’ has resulted in confusion around related terminology, with
terms and concepts cited such as ‘Brusselisation’, ‘EU-isation’ and ‘European integration’. Several studies have also compared Europeanisation to globalisation and internationalisation such as Wallace in her study on Europeanisation and Globalisation.\textsuperscript{71} Throughout, the question of whether Europeanisation is becoming an overstretched concept, without boundaries and limitations, has risen on many occasions. Whilst the flexibility with which the term ‘Europeanisation’ is used, approached and applied has some value, it might also confuse and mislead. Thus, in order to understand what Europeanisation is, it is helpful to identify what Europeanisation is not. There are some vital differences between Europeanisation and other concepts, which need to be noted at this point.

One form of Europeanisation is related to the influence of the EU on changes at the domestic level. The process of analysing the patterns of adaptation of the domestic to the European level is complex and should not be seen as a simple reaction to ‘Brussels’.\textsuperscript{72} First of all, there is a geographical connotation according to which ‘EU-isation’ refers to the European Union as an organisation but Europeanisation may refer to Europe as a region as a whole. Since the EU can transfer policies beyond EU borders and can bring change to accession countries and to non-EU member states, then the term Europeanisation and not EU-isation should be used. As noted above, Wallace has stressed that Europeanisation is not only “locked to the EU” but it can spread or have an impact on Europe’s ‘near abroad’, to the south and the east.\textsuperscript{73} In essence, the borders of Europeanisation are not the same as the borders of the EU. EU-isation should be used when one examines the impact and influence of EU institutions on other countries, the top-down approach. Europeanisation includes, apart from the EU member states and EU institutions, other European countries and the impact of their policies and institutions on the EU as an organisation as well as on other European or non-European countries, including, therefore, the bottom-up approach. Hence, EU-

\textsuperscript{71} Wallace (2000), \textit{op cit}, p 369
\textsuperscript{72} Radaelli (2004), \textit{op cit}, p 4
\textsuperscript{73} Wallace (2000), \textit{op cit}, p 371
isation with its top-down approach can be seen as a component of Europeanisation.

Second, “Europeanisation is more than just EU-isation”\textsuperscript{74} EU-isation purely means the adoption of EU-level policies primarily by EU member states and secondarily by accession countries and is linked to institutionalisation. Wallace argues that “Europeanisation is a process independent of the EU; rather a condition of enabling the EU to succeed than directly the consequence of the EU.”\textsuperscript{75} Europeanisation signifies even more as it includes European ideals, values, ideas and norms as well as links with organisations such as NATO and the OSCE that enables EU countries to cooperate with non-EU states and to engage into ‘constructive multilateralism’\textsuperscript{76} Thus, it would be fair to make the judgment that Europeanisation comes before EU-isation as an “underlying process”\textsuperscript{77} that makes EU-isation likely to succeed.

Zaborowski supports the view that there is “a normative, mostly political debate that equates ‘Europeanisation’ with political and economic transformations, pluralism and modernisation.”\textsuperscript{78} He identifies EU-isation as “a multifarious process of the EU influencing, shaping or even determining the internal processes of member states and candidate countries.”\textsuperscript{79} Zaborowski also argued that both notions may have “a similar force, instruments and tangible point of reference…. while Europeanisation lacks a material reference point, such as the EU, it is based on an ideational reference and an ‘imagined’ Europe”.\textsuperscript{80} Wallace, on the other hand, makes a distinction between the two by pointing out that Europeanisation means the adoption of West European


\textsuperscript{76} \textsuperscript{77}\textsuperscript{78} Zaborowski, M. (2004), ‘Germany, Poland and Europe. Conflict, cooperation and Europeanisation’, (Manchester University Press), p. 7, 8.

\textsuperscript{79} Wallid, p 7.

\textsuperscript{80} Wallid, p 13,14
models while EU-isation is a process leading to changes driven by the desire for EU membership.  

Europeanisation is also different to European integration as they are two different processes but Europeanisation as a bottom-up process may be seen as similar to European integration. Radaelli, however, argues that Europeanisation is not political integration. He pins down the difference between the two by saying that European integration “belongs to the ontological stage of research, that is, the understanding of the process in which countries pool sovereignty, whereas the former is post-ontological, being concerned with what happens once EU institutions are in place and produce their effects”. According to this interpretation, Europeanisation is then concerned with the changes of domestic institutions as a result of adaptation to the EU, during and after European integration.

According to Wallace there are three dimensions of integration: the territorial, the functional and the affiliational. The territorial dimension deals with the management of security and with relationships with immediate neighbours. The functional includes issues of political economy and resource management, most importantly agreements that determine how the wider European economy works. The affiliational concerns certain norms and values that European countries share and “operate collective arrangements” such as the promotion of human rights and democracy through the European transnational human rights regime and the OSCE. According to Wallace, the combination of all three dimensions of integration is necessary in order to promote a deep integration.

Another view that challenges the conceptual robustness of Europeanisation is that of Liberal Inter-governmentalism. According to this theory, domestic changes at EU member state level might be influenced by exogenous changes

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82 Lenschow, op cit, p 57
84 Wallace (2000), op cit, 377-378
in the international arena rather than a response to Europeanisation *per se.*\(^8^5\) Globalisation may have an impact on EU governance and policies but Europeanisation may serve as a response to possible changes caused by Globalisation “by shielding EU member states against their undesired effects.”\(^8^6\) Cowles, Caporaso and Risse acknowledge Globalisation’s impact on domestic change but they also support the view that Europeanisation has independent effects on domestic change that can be shown through comparisons and careful process-tracing.\(^8^7\) For instance, if we focus on the changes of the domestic structure and trace the process of these changes, we can see that some processes might already be under way, that result from the impact of Europeanisation on those countries and vice versa, meaning that certain changes might occur due to the effect of Globalisation. Another argument that supports the distinction between Europeanisation and Globalisation is the de facto geographic delimitation. Furthermore, the liberal inter-governmentalist approach supports that Europeanisation is mainly occurring from the decision-making and interests of the ‘big three’, namely the UK, France and Germany and, hence, “Britain, France and Germany are unlikely to face significant adaptational pressures from Europeanization”.\(^8^8\) If this was true, however, these three countries would not have been under any pressure to adapt to EU policies as they already have, for instance, by complying with EU requirements on various policy areas such as environmental policy.

The relationship between Europeanisation and Globalisation has also been explored by Sidenius. In his case study of Danish business and governance structures, he noted that Europeanisation and Globalisation are connected in the sense that the economic policy of the EU can be both a reaction to Globalisation as well as a motivation to promote EU businesses and competition globally.\(^8^9\) The formation and structure of certain European politics

\(^8^5\) Cowles, Caporaso, Risse-Kappen, *op cit*, 220
\(^8^6\) Ibid, 4
\(^8^7\) Ibid, 221
\(^8^8\) Featherstone and Radaelli (2003), *op cit*, p 62
and policies might, often, be a result of globalisation and of a need to adapt to international political and economic trends. Hence, the Europeanisation effect that brings change on the national level of a country might well be a result of the same globalisation effect.

After clarifying the differences between Europeanisation and those concepts, which add to the conundrum and confusion around the true meaning of Europeanisation, the term that is used in this thesis is, indeed, the mainstream usage of the term ‘Europeanisation’. The literature used for the purposes of this thesis employs the term ‘Europeanisation’ to analyse the impact of the EU on other countries, hence, Europeanisation is used in this thesis in the same way as in the rest of the literature of Europeanisation. The specific, and less examined dimension of Europeanisation that is employed in this thesis is that relating to Europeanisation as an export of European values, norms, ideas, structures and “forms of political organisation” beyond the EU borders, by the EU.

2.3.3 Methodological issues of Europeanisation – Mechanisms, Receptiveness and Instruments of Europeanisation

This section examines the mechanisms and instruments through which Europeanisation may operate. Through these mechanisms the impact of Europeanisation on the domestic level of a country is explained and analysed. The mechanisms show the way according to which the EU influences and causes changes on the national level. In brief, the mechanisms of Europeanisation show how Europeanisation takes place.

Among the mechanisms identified and studied by academics the most notable are those developed by Knill and Lehmkuhl. More precisely, they identify three mechanisms of change to better explain the domestic impact of European policy making, with a top-down focus on domestic change and a Historical Institutionalism approach. In essence, the first mechanism is based on the

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90 Olsen (2002), p 924
existence of transferrable European models, the second on domestic structures and the third on ‘framing’ beliefs and expectations.

Analytically, these are:

a) **institutional** compliance according to which “European policy-making may trigger domestic change by prescribing concrete institutional requirements with which member states must comply”. In this case, it is necessary for the states to comply with European requirements;

b) **changing** domestic opportunity structures where European legislation may affect domestic arrangements by altering the domestic rules of the game”. Furthermore, “European influence is confined to altering domestic opportunity structures, and hence the distribution of power and resources between domestic actors”. In this way, changes in the structures can challenge the balance of the institutions and produce change;

c) **framing** domestic beliefs and expectations, in particular, “European policy neither prescribes concrete institutional requirements nor modifies the institutional context for strategic interaction, but affects domestic arrangements even more indirectly, namely by altering the belief and expectations of domestic actors”. In this third scenario, it is the actors’ preferences and choices that many times promote institutional change.

These three mechanisms have been identified as ‘positive’, ‘negative’ and ‘framing’ forms of integration respectively. These mechanisms gave a

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92 Ibid p 2
93 Ibid, p 2,3
94 Ibid p 2
framework for the analysis of the domestic impact of European regulatory policies through Europeanisation.

In a more recent study by Knill and Lehmkuhl, it was argued that, “the distinctive basis of Europeanization rather than the particular policy area is the most important factor to be considered when investigating the domestic impact of varying European policies.”\footnote{Knill, C and Lehmkuhl, D (2002) ‘The national impact of European Union regulatory policy: Three Europeanization mechanisms’, \textit{European Journal of Political Research}, Vol. 41, p 256.} Hence, it is the Europeanisation mechanism or process itself and not the actual European policy that is necessary in order to explain domestic impact or change. In addition, during a process of Europeanisation, there might be more than one mechanism involved in a specific policy area that reinforce, strengthen or weaken each other and it is possible that these mechanisms [and their relative importance] might change over the course of time.\footnote{Ibid, p 276}

In another recent research conducted by Toshkov seven points that may influence receptiveness to institutional change and implementation of EU legislations and policies were identified: (1) the existence of governments positioned to the right of an ideological Left/Right continuum; (2) the orientation of governments towards traditional values related to national sovereignty; (3) the civic and political support for EU Integration; (4) the effectiveness of domestic governance; (5) the absence of numerous veto points; (6) the existence of strong political pressures for compliance to EU rules; and (7) the presence of unfavourable economic conditions, such as unemployment.\footnote{Cerami, A. (2007), ‘Europeanization, Enlargement and Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe’, Centre d’Études Européennes, \textit{Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po}. No 1, p. 6. Available at: http://www.portedeurope.org/IMG/pdf/Cerami_Connex_Paper.pdf. (Accessed 17 October 2007).}

The mechanisms of change according to Olsen vary among the definitions or categories of Europeanisation. Change might be a result of “rule following” procedures, “argumentation” or “persuasion”, for instance in the case of EU enlargement. Change might also be “a consequence of choice - problemsolving, as well as conflict resolution, diffusion or socialization”, and finally,
change might also be a result of adaptation through processes of learning or competitive selection.\textsuperscript{98}

Overall, mechanisms can also be divided into two main categories: a) vertical and b) horizontal Europeanisation. Vertical Europeanisation includes top-down and bottom-up approaches where either the EU or individual member states have to conform and adapt to pressures. Radaelli suggested that when vertical Europeanisation takes place, “in certain policy areas the European Union prescribes the adoption of a specific model.”\textsuperscript{99} Member states are conforming to a concrete European model or policy and, eventually, have to adapt to institutional structures. But change and eventually conformity to the EU can occur in the absence of a European model or direct pressure from the top. As Radaelli puts it “the strength of new governance architectures which creates the preconditions for the diffusion of shared ideas and policy paradigms”\textsuperscript{100} can affect national policy without EU rules and regulations. Europeanisation may also take place via horizontal mechanisms, even though there is no direct or indirect pressure to conform to EU requirements and policies. According to Lenschow, “Horizontal, state-to-state transfer processes may take place independently of the existence of the EU.”\textsuperscript{101} Conformity in this case is seen more as a matter of choice and preference and not as a necessary requirement.

In his study on Normative Europe, Manners has seen the EU as a promoter of norms and recognised six forms of diffusion. \textit{Contagion} is an unintentional form of diffusion based on which EU ideas are transferred to other political actors. The \textit{informational} diffusion results from a range of strategic communications such as policy initiatives and from communications such as the President of the Commission or the EU presidency. The \textit{procedural} diffusion deals with the institutionalisation of a relationship between the EU

\textsuperscript{98} Olsen, in Cini’s book, \textit{op cit}, p 335
\textsuperscript{99} Claudio M. Radaelli, ‘Europeanization of Public Policy’ in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds), \textit{The Politics of Europeanization}, (Oxford University Press, 2003), p 42
\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Ibid}, p 43
\textsuperscript{101} Andrea Lenschow, Europeanisation of Public Policy, Chapter 3 in Jeremy Richardson (ed), European Union: power and policy-making, third edition, (Routledge, 2006), p58
and a third party, for instance, when EU enlargement takes place or when the EU becomes a member of an international organisation such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Transference is the form of diffusion involving trade relationships between the EU and third parties where community norms and standards might be potentially transferred. Overt diffusion takes place through the physical presence of the EU in third countries and/or international organisations. According to Manners, this type of diffusion has occurred in FYROM at the time of the EU monitoring missions. The final type of diffusion is the cultural filter which affects the impact of norms and political learning in countries and organisations, leading the countries to learn, adapt to or reject the norms.  

In the case of the export of values, norms and European institutions Europeanisation can be understood as occurring through a process of diffusion and social learning. According to Olsen, the framework for the explanation of the diffusion process is borrowed from epidemiology. In this sense, diffusion operates in the same way as an epidemic as European values are spread across Europe and structures and norms or a form of political organisation and governance are transmitted through networks or individual contacts. Relevant questions that may be asked in this case are: what is being diffused, where is it being diffused, how fast and how long does the process of diffusion take, which is the form of diffusion and whether the product of diffusion stays there permanently or just temporarily after the diffusion ends?

The process of diffusion as a mechanism for Europeanisation, that Olsen borrows from epidemiology, is utilised in this thesis. According to Olsen, the export of European models in the past has taken the form of colonialisation, coercion or imposition but since European states have lost their hegemony at the present time, it is less likely for the European models to spread abroad through coercion or any form of imposition. More precisely, diffusion “may

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103 Olsen (2002), op cit, p 937, 938
depend more on the exposure to and the attractiveness of the European forms.”

A view from an institutional perspective supports that “diffusion will be affected by the interaction between outside impulses and internal institutional traditions and historical experiences. What is diffused is likely to be transformed during the process of diffusion.” The new institutionalism, however, does not accept the existence of unique European models of organisation and governance in order for diffusion to happen. Assuming that there are differences between the European models of governance and organisation and those in the rest of the world, the EU could export these models, values and ideas beyond the EU borders and a diffusion process would be viable.

A series of processes or mechanisms of Europeanisation might apply simultaneously in a particular case. Therefore, it is necessary to have a certain degree of flexibility when analysing the way that mechanisms are operating. Since in this thesis, the Europeanisation effect is explored through the export of values, norms and European institutions, Olsen’s process of diffusion and social learning is the approach that will be employed. Taking under consideration, however, that more than one mechanism might be needed in order to explain the vehicle and impact of EU influence and, hence, the Europeanisation effect, Knill and Lehmkuhl’s mechanisms will also be investigated in the next chapters.

For the purposes of this thesis it is relevant to expand on the particular relevance of the relationship between export Europeanisation and EU enlargement. Countries in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU are already effectively prospective candidates for membership. This geographical proximity factor, and their existing close political and financial ties with EU countries provide a strong incentive to converge with EU principles and values and adapt to EU standards. This ‘closeness’ also implies the likelihood that those countries already to some extent have some ‘European’ attributes, are

104 Olsen (2002), op cit, p 938
105 Ibid, p 938
to an extent pre-disposed to progressive Europeanisation, and that the process of Europeanisation will therefore be quicker. Therefore, it would be safe to assume that countries which are geographically further away from the EU and do not have either the option or aspiration to join the EU might still be willing and able to adapt to EU norms but the process may take longer. For instance, whilst the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Barcelona Process similarly aim to expand an area of peace, security and shared prosperity, since EU membership is excluded for Mediterranean Arab countries, it has been argued that they are slower in adopting EU norms and values.\textsuperscript{106}

\textbf{2.3.4 Measuring Europeanisation – Methodological Challenges}

The presence of the process of Europeanisation might be evident in some cases but it is difficult to measure the impact of the process, in particular, the changes brought by Europeanisation. Among the theories than can be used to methodologically help measure change are: a) rational institutionalism (RI) based on actors’ choices and preferences as well as responses to EU policies,\textsuperscript{107} b) historical institutionalism (HI) with an emphasis on the role of time, timing and tempo in the integration process, path dependency and critical junctures and c) social institutionalism (SI) measuring the EU’s impact on institutional change from a sociological and cultural perspective, in particular, norms, ideas, discourse and attitudes.\textsuperscript{108} Some academics utilise one theory to explain the impact of Europeanisation such as Bulmer and Burch\textsuperscript{109} or, in some cases, two or three are used.

On questioning whether Europeanisation can indeed be measured, Radaelli stated that “Europeanisation is sometimes measured according to a scale comprising adaptation, transformation, inertia, retrenchment and, perhaps, hostile reactions to Europe.”\textsuperscript{110} According to Radaelli, identifying the difference

\textsuperscript{107} Bulmer (2007) \textit{op cit}, p 50
\textsuperscript{108} Bulmer and Burch (2000) \textit{op cit}, p 5,6
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid, p 6
between transformation and adaptation, however, is a problematic and complex case. Assuming there is a degree of adaptation to EU rules, there should be a degree of transformation happening at the same time. After all, Europeanisation is all about change. Nonetheless, the instruments and criteria used for the measurement of change depend on the type of Europeanisation under research.

It is very difficult to attribute change to the EU or a particular mechanism when those changes may also be influenced by other actors and dynamics. Domestic change can be measured differently to the changes on the EU institutional level or during the enlargement process or by exporting forms of EU governance abroad. Change through Europeanisation should be examined considering the time, length, place, mechanisms and other dependant or independent variables. In addition, the process of Europeanisation might be a short or long-term process with temporary or permanent, deep or superficial effects. Such changes could be studied through a careful and thorough case-by-case examination.

When measuring Europeanisation it is also important to identify a baseline against which one can measure change. Thus, it is important to take account of the actual state that a country is in before attempting to assess the effect of a particular Europeanisation intervention, in this case ESDP missions. In order for a Europeanisation process to occur, there must be at least some degree of ‘misfit’ that provides scope for change. Therefore, an assessment of the policies and institutional structures in the country concerned provides a basis for measuring the impact of Europeanisation. It is also important to consider the adaptability of the country in order to determine the success of Europeanisation: according to Börzel and Risse, “The lower the compatibility between European and domestic processes, policies and institutions, the higher the adaptational pressure.” Although adaptational pressure is important, it is the response to that pressure, the receptiveness and adaptability of the country in question, that determine the success of

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Europeanisation. Even with high adaptational pressure, it is the specific country context that determines the extent and pace of adaptational change.

2.4 The Export of Europeanisation through the EU’s second pillar

2.4.1 Europeanisation in the second pillar of the EU

Although, as seen in chapter 1, there are several examples of work and case studies on the impact of Europeanisation at the domestic level of EU member states, the focus of research has primarily been on policy adaptation in areas covered by the first pillar\(^\text{112}\) of the EU (falling under the competence of the Commission), such as the Europeanisation of immigration policies,\(^\text{113}\) of agricultural policy,\(^\text{114}\) and education policy.\(^\text{115}\) There was a lag in serious attention within the field’s literature to the Europeanisation of domestic foreign and security policy (the second pillar of the EU, covering European Security and Defence Policy, under the competence of the Council). Tonra indentified that “The Europeanization of national foreign policies, the evolution of a converging set of European foreign policy values and the development of new forms of social learning all deserve sustained academic attention.”\(^\text{116}\)

Keatinge was one of the first authors to refer to the ‘Europeanization of foreign policy’, in his 1983 study of how Irish policy was influenced as a result of entry into the EC.\(^\text{117}\) Elsewhere, and of direct relevance to this thesis, Othon Anastasakis has referred to the Europeanisation of the second pillar seen through the lens of a bottom-up approach arguing that the security situation in the Western Balkans and the security concerns in FYROM have indirectly influenced the strengthening of CFSP and the development of the civilian and

\(^{112}\) As mentioned in Chapter 1, until 2009 the EU comprised of three pillars. This structure was abandoned with the de-pillarisation process when the Lisbon Treaty came into effect on 1 December 2009.

\(^{113}\) Geddes, op cit

\(^{114}\) Roederer-Rynning, op cit

\(^{115}\) Alexiadou, op cit


\(^{117}\) Keatinge referenced in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization, (Oxford University Press, 2003), p 10
military mission aspect to CFSP with “the introduction of police and military forces”. As highlighted in chapter 1, more recent studies related to the second pillar include amongst others the Europeanisation of Germany’s foreign policy by Eva Gross, Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy by Claudia Major and the Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy by Spyros Economides. Although these studies have Europeanisation as their main focal point, they do not investigate the potential of ESDP operations to be used as an instrument for Europeanisation. In addition, they fail to deepen into the ‘export’ dimension of Europeanisation and explore the transfer of values, norms and ideas to the near abroad or beyond.

There is an impact of both the EU (using the top-down approach) and individual EU member states especially Britain, France and Germany (using the bottom-up approach) on the evolution and formation of CFSP and subsequently ESDP. Europeanisation in the second EU pillar is evident in both of these cases. The 2003 European Security Strategy is an example of top-down Europeanisation for EU Foreign and Security Policy as it represents an articulation of the common threats that the EU is facing, proposing the sharing of intelligence amongst member states, bringing together all the EU instruments and capabilities and serving as the basis for a collective security and defence, and proclaiming “we are stronger when we act together.” The Franco-British initiative of 1998 at Saint-Malo that would lead to the launch of ESDP can be interpreted as an example of bottom-up Europeanisation in the second pillar, as change came from two member states up to the EU-level. As a result, it gave the EU autonomous capacity to conduct civilian as well as military operations and to take common decisions and action in the fields of security and defence. This initiative coincided with the appointment of Javier

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119 Gross (2007), op cit
120 Major, op cit
121 Economides, op cit
Solana as the first High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU and additionally led to the creation of new structures and capabilities that would allow the EU to autonomously conduct its military and civilian operations.

Considering, however, horizontal mechanisms of Europeanisation in the second pillar, “where there is no pressure to conform to EU policy models”, we can see Europeanisation happening in its more relaxed form. This horizontal approach is based on inter-governmental cooperation done in a non-coercive manner and, most importantly, based on the free will of the states to participate. Although there are numerous studies on top-down and bottom-up (downloading and uploading) approaches on Europeanisation and domestic policies, not enough research has been conducted on what Radaelli calls ‘the horizontal approach’ of the CFSP.

Inter-governmentalism and interaction between states are predominant in the second pillar. Based on a study by Lisbeth Aggestam exploring the roles and identities of European states in foreign policy, “Europeanisation of foreign policy has taken place”. The study argues that this has occurred because “The commitment to reach common positions in the CFSP is foremost based on the build-up of mutual trust, increased communication and the political will among its members.”

For Wong, Europeanisation, from a CFSP perspective, can be understood “as a process of foreign policy convergence. It is a dependent variable contingent on the ideas and directives emanating from actors (EU institutions, statesmen, etc) in Brussels, as well as policy ideas and actions from member state capitals (national statesmen)”. Taking the top-down approach, Wong debates that the EU manages to converge policies in the long term, by “structural and procedural adaptation” by the member states.

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125 Radaelli, op cit, p 11
127 Ibid
There are, however, certain limits to the use of the concept when one deals with foreign and security issues. CFSP has always been linked to the preservation of national sovereignty and security interests of the member states. A preference in creating bilateral or multilateral agreements among states over a possible cooperation through an institutional body is evident. “Even taking into account the recent institutionalisation through the founding of CFSP in Maastricht (1991), Member States have continued to be the main actors within this field as CFSP follows an intergovernmental approach: treaties, not legislation, govern CFSP.”

Evidence of Europeanisation and changes in the domestic level might be easier to track when single countries are researched as case studies.

Pinning down precisely how Europeanisation operates in a policy area as broad and complex as CFSP might prove to be methodologically complicated and problematic. This does not mean, however, that Europeanisation is not taking place but may mean that “it is much more voluntary and non-hierarchical”, and as such may be harder to identify.

### 2.4.2 Europeanisation beyond EU borders

Among the broad literature on contemporary Europeanisation and various country case studies, relatively little research has been done on Europeanisation beyond the EU’s borders – what we will term ‘export’ Europeanisation. In general, “An export is something which is transferred from one international actor to another or from one actor to the global system.” Among other dimensions, Olsen has observed Europeanisation as “exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory, focuses on relations with non-European actors and institutions and how Europe finds a place in a larger world order.”

This thesis employs and examines Olsen’s notion of the export of

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129 Major, op cit, p 183
130 Ibid, p 184, 185
133 Olsen, op cit, p 924
Europeanisation, but for the purposes of this thesis we are specifically interested in ‘export’ through EU external action beyond the borders of the EU.

Featherstone posits that Europeanization exports refer to the transfer of “...European authority and social norms: imperial control, institutional organization and practices, social and cultural beliefs, values, and behaviour.” Olsen provides further examination of the idea of Europeanisation as an ‘export’: for Olsen, Europeanization signifies a more positive export/import balance as non-European countries import more from Europe than vice versa and European solutions exert more influence in international fora. Among the values that are being exported are: spreading good democratic practice, the rule of law and the principle of international law, and human rights. Europeanisation as the export of a European model of political organization can be understood as occurring through a process of diffusion.

Papadimitriou and Phinnemore have extended the scope of Europeanisation beyond existing EU members and beyond the geographical borders of the EU by studying the transfer of EU policy to Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as part of the EU enlargement process and the implementation of the acquis through institution-building and ‘twinning’. Meanwhile, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig refer to enlargement as “the most prominent case of external action” projected by the EU and the acquis communautaire as “the basis of EU external action”.

Grabbe, in her study on the EU’s transformative power and, evidently, the process of Europeanisation on CEE countries, has identified two different types of transfer. A ‘hard’ transfer happens when the EU transfers rules, procedures and policy paradigms to CEE countries during EU enlargement.

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134 Featherstone, op cit, p 6
135 Olsen, op cit, p 924
136 Community acquis is the body of common rights and obligations which bind all the Member States together within the European Union.
138 Ibid, p 791
The ‘soft’ transfer deals with EU beliefs, norms, values and ideas that the EU is sharing with accession countries. The Europeanisation mechanisms that are used in such cases are diffusion and institutionalisation of EU policy processes, prior and during accession. Another method of external action is the coercive transfer which “involves one government or supranational institution pushing, or even forcing, another government to adopt a particular programme”. In such cases, “cultural effects can influence the evaluation and implementation stages of the transfer process.” The EU is largely seen as a ‘soft’ civilian actor which does not employ coercive means of action, while it uses its military and its ‘hard’ action only as a last resort.

Noticeably, Europeanisation can occur through the export of Europeanness (values, principles and norms) during the EU enlargement process to candidate member states by influencing policy-making and “policy-makers driven by a will for joining the EU.” The effect of Europeanization, however, is not only evident in those countries preparing to join the EU as full members through EU enlargement. Europeanisation continues having an impact on existing EU member states as changes on domestic structures happen before the completion of negotiations and continue to happen after the successful accession of countries. However, the adaptational pressure faced by candidate countries to meet EU regulations and legislation within a certain time frame can prove to be ‘too much to handle’. Quoting Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, “accession negotiations and, in particular, the transposition of the EU acquis, have led to even further change often leaving legal systems in the CEECs struggling to ‘digest’ and adjudicate upon a huge volume of ‘imported’ EU legislation in a very short period of time.” It is widely acknowledged that each candidate country to join the EU follows a separate path when going through the accession process. For some countries the process of seeking to

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141 Ibid, p 24
142 Cerami, op cit, p 15
143 Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, op cit, p 6
achieve “compliance with the *acquis* requires painful economic reforms and social upheaval.”

There are differences between the effect of Europeanisation on candidate countries for EU membership and present member states. Case studies have shown that Europeanisation has a deeper impact on candidate countries, especially CEE countries, in the pre-accession stage, due to their willingness to join the EU. According to Grabbe, the effects that were noted as a result of the EU’s impact on CEE countries during the accession process “are likely to have been similar in nature to those in the existing member-states, but broader and deeper in scope.” More precisely, the EU had a direct effect on policy areas and key domestic institutions of CEE countries that facilitated the consolidation of democracy. Once the candidate countries, however, became full EU members, the EU pressures for integration and the ‘deep’ Europeanisation effect stopped. As a result, the new members received no preferential treatment by the Commission and acquired a similar relationship to that of the older EU member states.

The transfer of *acquis* through the EU enlargement process is undoubtedly one of the key theatres of EU external action through which Europeanisation may occur. But, EU enlargement should not be seen as the only way that the EU may transfer its values and principles abroad. Living in a globalised world, the EU has realised that in order to strengthen its security and promote its identity it should not only focus on strengthening its borders or engage with its immediate neighbourhood but will benefit from promoting Europeanisation in the global arena.

### 2.4.3 Europeanisation through EU instruments and external relations

The EU uses a variety of different instruments when engaging with non-EU counties in areas such as economic development, conflict prevention and security. The instrument of European Security and Defence Policy operations

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144 *Ibid*, p 7
145 Grabbe, *op cit*, p 39
146 Scherpereel, *op cit*, p 100
is addressed in detail below. Amongst the EU’s other external assistance instruments are: 1) the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), 2) the Economic Cooperation Instrument (ECI), 3) the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), 4) the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), 5) the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (NSCI), 6) the Instrument for Stability (IS), 7) the Instrument for Micro-Financial Assistance (MFA), 8) the Humanitarian Aid Instrument (HAI), 9) the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). All of these instruments can be seen as vehicles of Europeanisation in the sense that they are promoting development, political and economic stability, strengthening of security and civil society and democratic political culture.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its related instrument ENPI can be seen in particular as a framework of Europeanisation. According to Schimmelfennig, “the ENP is based on the EU’s commitment to promote core liberal values and norms beyond its borders and, second, it claims to use political conditionality as the main instrument of norm promotion.”

Another instrument is the EIDHR. Under EIDHR “the EC contributed to conflict prevention by supporting human rights and democratisation projects at the global, regional and national level, with a special focus on the role of civil society. EIDHR has been employed to promote minority rights and multi-ethnic dialogue, including through guidelines and national laws on anti-discrimination in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Nepal and India.”

The Instrument for Stability is a follow up to the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and was established by the European Commission in 2007 to support

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149 Council of the European Union,’ Presidency report to the European Council on EU activities in the framework of prevention, including implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’, 11013/07, Brussels, 19 June 2007, p 16
the EU’s efforts in the areas of crisis management, conflict prevention and peace building. The IS finances a large number of projects across the world amongst which a project in the Western Balkans - Kosovo - aiming to contribute to peace and stability in the region.\textsuperscript{150}

In a report presented in 2004 to Javier Solana, then High Representative for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, an independent study group argued that:

“The European Union pioneered the technique of integration at the level of society, based on interdependence and adherence to common standards, as a way of promoting peace. The same approach should be adopted in external relations. Elements of this approach are contained in association agreements, trade and other forms of co-operation. This approach should also apply to the rule of law and public security”.\textsuperscript{151}

This thesis argues that another key instrument that represents a possible vehicle for such Europeanisation to be promoted through the EU’s external action is that of EU civilian and military missions. In contemporary terms, these facets of EU external action have emerged under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – a key and symbolic expression of EU Member States’ Common Foreign and Security Policy. The following section will introduce the link between Europeanisation and ESDP operations.

\textbf{2.4.4 Linking Europeanisation to ESDP operations – an introduction}

Since the end of the Cold War and the war in the Western Balkans, the EU has made efforts to strengthen its second pillar by introducing a new component to CFSP, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks and the Madrid and London bombings, the EU has managed to increase its security activity and become


\textsuperscript{151} A human security doctrine for Europe: the Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities; Spain, 2004, p11
an international security player. In a post 9/11 security environment, the EU is facing new challenges such as to prove itself as an international security actor, equal to the US, with an appropriate share of the security burden as with other actors.

The creation of ESDP under the second pillar is significant as it has provided for increased independence on the part of the EU over choosing where and when a civilian or military operation will take place, and crucially for this thesis, the ability to inculcate its missions, mandates and staffing with EU values, principles, standards and models. The operational ability of the ESDP operations was speeded up due to some external factors such as the terrorist attacks in the USA, UK and Spain as a related result of the redirection of the US interests away from the Balkan region and into Iraq and Afghanistan where US national security priorities became paramount. There was an imminent need for the EU to start playing a bigger role in international security and the prevention of conflict, especially after it has been criticised heavily for its response to the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s. This thesis argues that through its ESDP operations, the EU has been able to utilise its ESDP operations as an additional instrument for Europeanisation, including in the Western Balkans and specifically FYROM - by using them as vehicles for exporting EU norms, values and ideas that generally constitute the norms of good governance.

2.5 Conclusion

It has been shown that there are a multitude of definitions and contested meanings relating to the concept of Europeanisation, which has lent it to considerable criticism over the years, including that the concept has become vague and over-stretched. Notwithstanding, this thesis supports the view that Europeanisation remains a valuable concept for students of International Relations and European Studies, researchers, academics and practitioners alike since it provides a useful and flexible framework for understanding motives, models, incentives and processes of change. As we have seen, this
can mainly be done through a careful examination of the impact of the EU on the national level (top-down approach), the impact of the national level to the EU (bottom-up approach) and the intergovernmental interaction of states (horizontal approach). Through the study of Europeanisation we can also interrogate why change does not happen.

In this chapter, a thorough analysis of the numerous definitions of Europeanisation was presented, starting from its early meanings and moving into more recent ones. In general terms ‘Europeanisation’ is linked to studies evaluating the changes on the domestic level of a country and on the impact of Europeanisation processes within a specific country, for instance, “adaptational pressure” as a top-down approach where countries have to conform with EU rules.¹⁵² In this thesis, the term Europeanisation is employed in a manner different to more common uses and conceptualisation of the term, and specifically relates to Olsen’s export dimension, that is concerned with the external transmission of European values, structures, ideas and norms.

This chapter has also made the distinction between Europeanisation and other concepts such as Globalisation and EU-isation to give the reader greater clarity. Mechanisms of Europeanisation were examined next. In certain cases, multiple mechanisms may be operating, and Olsen’s diffusion and socialisation explanations, and the mechanisms identified by Knill and Lehmkuhl will be investigated in the following chapters in order to identify to the relevant change processes.

Next, the question was posed on whether and how Europeanisation can be measured. In certain cases, especially when there are several actors actively involved, there is a great difficulty in pinpointing the actual sources of Europeanisation and to attribute Europeanisation to one actor, or many or one or more instruments of Europeanisation. For the purposes of this thesis, Europeanisation is measured by studying the framing and actions of the

¹⁵² Cowles, Caporaso, Risse-Kappen, *op cit*, p 2
missions and changes on the domestic level of the case study country through the examination of EU diffusion patterns adopted nationally.

Next, the link between Europeanisation and the second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy has been made. This section shows that there is relatively limited research carried out on Europeanisation in relation to the second pillar, in comparison to Europeanisation research into first pillar instruments. In more recent years, the link between Europeanisation and CFSP has begun to receive more attention. However, a review of the literature indicates that, alongside the limited attention to the export dimension of Europeanisation, there is a gap in rigorous research into the relationship between Europeanisation and ESDP operations and whether such missions can act as vehicles for Europeanisation. This thesis therefore seeks to address this gap, by asking whether, and to what extent, ESDP missions can facilitate the process of Europeanisation in countries beyond the EU borders. It approaches this hypothesis through case studies on ESDP missions conducted in FYROM.

The following chapter will examine the evolution of the EU’s approach to security and external security projection, culminating in the establishment of ESDP missions, with the aim of identifying whether and how ESDP missions hold the potential to contribute to Europeanisation processes.
Chapter 3

The evolution of ESDP as a potential vehicle for Europeanisation

3.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out to examine the development of contemporary notions of European security and the emergence of ESDP as an instrument for EU external action. The essence of this chapter is to show how the European Union (EU) has adopted a CFSP that incorporates civilian and military external action dimensions. Furthermore, it identifies a number of particular attributes of that policy and external action in terms of the way common EU values, principles and ethos are embodied in the EU’s approach to security. It will go on to examine how these attributes are incorporated in the framing and *modus operandi* of ESDP operations, with the purpose to test whether, to what extent and how a Europeanisation export potential is ‘built-into’ ESDP.

It begins by tracing the origins of modern European collective security developments starting from the history of the Western European Union (WEU) and continues with the elaboration of a common approach and framework for EU foreign and security policy in the Treaty of Maastricht, the adoption and significance of the so-called Petersberg Tasks, and the launch of ESDP. The study of this evolution provides a valuable background for understanding how the ESDP mission instrument could be considered as a vehicle for Europeanisation, as a practical expression of the development of a common EU approach to security that provides the EU with another avenue for projecting that approach beyond the borders of the EU.
3.2 The emergence of a European common security framework

3.2.1 The early days: WEU

After the end of the Second World War, Europe was left in political and economic turmoil. As well as the dire economic situation, Western European countries remained fearful of a resurgent German threat and the spectre of the intimidating Soviet military power on its Eastern flank. This strategic backdrop led to the signature of the Dunkirk Treaty between Britain and France on 4 March 1947. The main aim of the treaty was to prevent Germany from posing a military threat in the future. More specifically, the signatories were: “Determined to collaborate in measures of mutual assistance in the event of any renewal of German aggression, while considering most desirable the conclusion of a treaty between all the Powers having responsibility for action in relation to Germany with the object of preventing Germany from becoming again a menace to peace.” The Dunkirk Treaty became an early basis for the inclusion of more Western countries into a collective security and defence framework. Indeed, not long after the signature of the Dunkirk Treaty, the Benelux countries joined the UK and France to sign the Brussels Treaty on 17 March 1948, which established the Western European Union (WEU).

According to the Brussels Treaty, the signatories agreed to pursue economic recovery for all Western states, to assist each other in the maintenance of international peace and security, European integration, as well as to “take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression”. At the Hague Congress of Europe in May 1948, Churchill talked about the need “to bring about the necessary economic and political union of Europe” declaring that “the time had come when the European nations must transfer and merge some portion of their sovereign rights so as to secure common and political action”.

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America was also encouraging the formation of some kind of European Union. In particular, in several of his speeches, the US Secretary of State George Marshall promoted the creation of such a union that would lead to economic co-operation saying that European unity was “absolutely essential”.\footnote{Ibid, p 30}

Significantly, the WEU encouraged West Germany’s inclusion into the Union. At the time, it was agreed that it should be included as a demonstration of good will and trust based on equality. More specifically, there are two interrelated views on the West German inclusion. The first had to do with purely financial reasons based on the fact that West German industrialism would help immensely with West European defence. The second had a more diplomatic and political connotation since there were fears that West Germany could still pose a potential threat to the rest of the Western countries. Hence, an alliance with Germany would prove to be beneficial for all of the members of the alliance for both of these reasons.\footnote{Ibid, p 20}

Whilst Western European nations were coming together around common security arrangements, there were different views among the members on the most appropriate way to respond to a threat. Western Europe still needed the US for financial aid, and the North Americans still had an interest in the European security. These mutual security interests led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on 14 April 1949 which was intended to guarantee security for its members in case of a military threat from an external party. On 14 April 1949, NATO was formed by the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington between the Brussels Treaty powers, Canada and the United States, which had an interest in developments of European security. At the same time, “the exercise of the military responsibilities of the Brussels Treaty Organisation or Western Union was transferred to the North Atlantic Alliance.”\footnote{NATO Handbook: The Western European Union (WEU), Chapter 15: The Wider Institutional Framework for Security, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1504.htm accessed 10 August 2008} This played a vital role in the future development of WEU as well as NATO. The implications of this transfer to NATO had already undermined the influence and power of WEU on
European and international security issues, even before its official formation, since NATO was responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Even with the creation of NATO, the French in particular were keen on strengthening the existing West European security framework. In 1950, the French President of the Council of Ministers of the French Republic, René Pleven, proposed the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC) that would include the formation of a European army and that in “binding the countries of Europe closely together in integrated institutions would make war impossible between them”, 160 avoiding in this way the potential German threat. The EDC Treaty was signed on 27 May 1952 but due to French fears that the treaty would limit their sovereignty and the refusal of Britain to join, EDC came to a standstill.

Over this period, the WEU had a limited role on European security matters due to institutional weaknesses and partly due to the fact that its members showed more faith and trust in NATO to deal with military and security issues. Nevertheless, it remained active in three main areas: “as a channel of intra-European communication and conflict resolution; as part of the debate about American leadership on the continent and as an element in the evolution of European integration.” 161

WEU, as ‘a channel of intra-communication’ between some West European states provided the opportunity for discussing security issues without the involvement of the US and it also served as an arena for the resolution of post-war tensions. Notably, it facilitated the resolution of the Saar territorial dispute between France and Germany by providing recommendations to the Saar government and by organising a commission that supervised the referendum which granted the Saar region to the Germans on 23 October 1955. 162

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160 G. Wyn Rees, op cit, p 7
161 Ibid, p 10
162 International Organization, Political and Regional Organizations: Western European Union, Volume 9, Number 3, August 1955, p 448
In 1961 as a further sign of a desire to strengthen integration on foreign and security matters, French President Charles de Gaulle proposed the Fouchet Plan suggesting ideas for further European integration. More precisely and according to the Plan, it was expected that the European organisation, based on intergovernmental cooperation, would “increase its capacity to defend itself against external threats”.\(^{163}\) The plan stated: “It shall be the aim of the Union to reconcile, co-ordinate and unify the policy of Member States in spheres of common interest: foreign policy, economics, cultural affairs and defence.”\(^{164}\) Although the Fouchet Plan did not flourish, partly due to its federalist bent, the debate over further integration in the field of foreign and security issues in 1970 led to the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The EPC institutionalised a forum for European foreign policy discourse by organising meetings between (what had by then become) European Community (EC) foreign ministers on foreign policy issues. The EPC was the forerunner to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Overall, the Fouchet Plan and the EPC facilitated the Europeanisation and integration process of security and defence and brought the Europeans closer together in deciding collectively and finding common lines with regards to their security and defence.

After a period where WEU was largely dormant, in the mid 1980s it was reactivated and its role was resumed as the security/defence arm of the EC and “with a view to developing a common European defence identity through cooperation among its members in the security field and strengthening the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance.”\(^{165}\) At a meeting between Foreign and Defence Ministers held in Rome in October 1984, Ministers recognised the necessity to strengthen security and the impact that a strong WEU would make, not only on the security of Western Europe, but also on the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. The findings of the meeting were recognised as the Rome Declaration which reaffirmed that “the WEU Council could – pursuant to Article VIII (3) of the modified Brussels

\(^{164}\) ibid, Article 2
\(^{165}\) NATO Handbook: The Western European Union (WEU), ibid
Treaty – consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world.¹⁶⁶ This gave a new impetus to the WEU and was symbolic in expressing an interest in a collective role beyond the EC’s borders, and laid the ground for an operational role for WEU in mounting missions abroad such as in the Gulf between 1987-1990. Furthermore, this signifies the beginning for establishing a strong and credible security and defence policy that would provide the EU with an external operational instrument to pursue autonomous EU operations and missions, which could have a Europeanisation impact on the countries where these missions are launched.

Another important development was the outcome of the Hague meeting in October 1987, where the WEU Ministerial Council adopted a "Platform on European Security Interests".¹⁶⁷ The Hague Platform set out general guidelines for WEU’s future programme of work as it was stated that “We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.” At the Hague meeting, the Ministers expressed their interest to “strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance”¹⁶⁸ as well as to create a stronger security and defence through WEU.

3.2.2 The Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the Petersberg Tasks

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union left the US as the sole superpower. The end of the bipolar world created some confusion in European political and security circles about which was the most appropriate security framework they should follow.¹⁶⁹ Even so, there was a general consensus among EU members and especially France, who realised that “Europe in its present form was incapable of taking external or military action abroad”¹⁷⁰, that a new European security organisation was needed to offer autonomous action to the Europeans, as a counterbalance to the US and to

¹⁶⁸ Reactivation of WEU op cit
¹⁶⁹ G. Wyn Rees, op cit, p 41
complement NATO. Hence, the end of the Cold War was catalytic for the emergence of a distinct European identity on foreign and security policy.

The 1992 Treaty on the European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) was an historic landmark in the evolution of the European Union. A major component of the Treaty was the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar of the Union. The objectives of the CFSP as stated in the Treaty were:

• to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
• to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
• to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
• to promote international cooperation;
• to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.\(^\text{171}\)

The Maastricht Treaty proclaimed WEU to be “an integral part” of the EU with the WEU being formalised as the security and defence branch of the new European Union. More precisely, in the Maastricht Treaty it was agreed that there was a need for all WEU Member States

“to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters... WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. WEU Member States agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European

Union which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.”

Soon after, in June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers at a meeting in Petersberg, Germany, adopted the Petersberg Declaration, which noted that the EU security institutions should be strengthened in order to preserve peace and security in Europe, and articulated a set of tasks that became the basis for future EU joint military and civilian operations. The so-called “Petersberg Tasks” included:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peacekeeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

On that occasion, the WEU Member States declared their readiness to make available to the WEU, but also to NATO and the European Union, military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces. It is worth noting, however, that due to the fact that the Maastricht Treaty was implemented in 1993, the EU was still operating under EPC rules at that time and it could not discuss any military issues.

The 1990s subsequently saw a period of intensive and often tense efforts to establish a distinct European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) pillar within NATO. This was partly about the EU taking on its share of the burden within NATO, in relation to the US, but also aimed to establish a separable structure and military assets for the WEU to conduct missions, allowing the EU a greater degree of freedom to carry out operations autonomously in areas where EU security interests lay, but where wider NATO priorities did not.

172 European Union, Treaty on European Union, Declaration on Western European Union, OJC 191, Maastricht, (29 July 1992), Page 105
173 Ibid, p 1
Over the following years the WEU went on to conduct a number of joint military and civilian operations such as focusing on the instability that erupted in the Western Balkans with the disintegration of the Republic of Yugoslavia, on the borders of the EU. Between June 1993 and October 1996, the WEU participated in a joint naval mission with NATO – Operation Sharp Guard monitoring an arms embargo against Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. In July 1994 the WEU deployed a police contingent to support the EU Administration of Mostar, Bosnia & Herzegovina. The operation aimed to assist the Bosnian and Croat parties in Mostar to establish a unified police force in the ethnically divided town of Mostar following the war.\textsuperscript{176}

Despite these operations, and the EU’s efforts to enhance its role as a security actor in general, the WEU’s distinct role was relatively minor role during this period, and the conflict in Yugoslavia proved to be more than what the EU could handle. At the time, the EU did not have the experience of operating autonomously in peace-keeping and crisis-management activities since, till then, it was participating in security activities mainly through NATO. Furthermore, the EU did not possess the necessary capabilities and assets in order to conduct a successful military operation abroad. This left the EU playing the role of the “bystander”\textsuperscript{177} even in its own backyard, watching NATO and particularly the US dealing with the conflict in Yugoslavia, or as Robert Kagan has put it, with the United States “making the dinner” and the Europeans “doing the dishes”.\textsuperscript{178}

Nevertheless, and largely driven by the lessons from its failure to mount an effective crisis management response to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the EU demonstrated a certain determination to pursue an operational capacity of the EU to project itself on the international security scene. Furthermore, it has been argued that, whilst they were of relatively minor significance in resource

terms, and one could say operational impact, the WEU operations “were sometimes major from the point of view of their symbolic European value”.179 As we will see, whilst the practical significance of the EU’s operations on the ground evolved considerably over the coming years, culminating in ESDP missions, this symbolic aspect remains an important dimension to the study of the Europeanisation effect of recent ESDP missions.

Further developments towards the end of the 1990s laid important ground for the emergence of a distinct EU approach to security matters, the emergence of the ESDP mission instrument, and the role it could play in delivering the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, including the Petersberg Tasks set out in 1992.

3.3 The emergence of ESDP 1997-2002

In the period between 1997 and 2002, there were a number of rapid landmarks in the development of ESDP which are relevant background for this thesis. In this section, the relevance of the scope of the Treaty of Amsterdam will be briefly examined, followed by a look at the St Malo initiative which laid the ground for the establishment of ESDP, and follow-on developments at the Cologne, Helsinki, and Feira European Councils, the Treaty of Nice and the Council meeting at Laeken.

3.3.1 The Treaty of Amsterdam

Further developments have arrived in June 1997 when the Petersberg tasks were included in the Treaty of Amsterdam (which eventually came into effect in May 1999). Fabrizio Pagani highlights that this constituted the first codification of the notion of peace-keeping and peace-related operations in the constituent treaty of an international organization, that no other treaty of such legal and political importance makes reference to these kinds of activity, for example there is no mention of peace-keeping in the United Nations Charter;
and that furthermore, there was no geographical limitation placed on the scope of implementation of the Petersberg Tasks, unlike geographical constraints adopted by other regional organisations.\textsuperscript{180}

Whilst the Treaty did not merge the WEU into the EU, it did for the first time provide for non-WEU EU members states to participate fully in WEU missions and the related decision-making process, which for the first time meant missions could be said to represent the EU’s collective approach to security. Overall, it can be said that the Treaty also continued the process of establishing an autonomous mission vehicle for the EU.

Under Amsterdam, WEU was committed to focus on areas such as defence intelligence, organising its operational means for implementing the Petersberg Tasks, strengthening its operational role through the establishment of a Planning Cell, Situation Centre and Satellite Centre as well as the “definition of principles for the use of armed forces of the WEU States for WEU Petersberg operations in pursuit of common European security interests”. A policy planning and early warning unit would be established that would identify and assess situations that could have implications for European security, and put forward options for an EU response.\textsuperscript{181} It is evident that the EU was hence mirroring WEU structures.

Pagani also usefully highlights the relevance of the Treaty of Amsterdam in formally adopting the Petersberg Tasks and bringing them together with an EU-wide capability to implement them (through the WEU at this stage), which gave the EU the unique ability as a regional organisation to intervene across the continuum of crisis contexts with a range of civilian-military instruments, from early warning and humanitarian intervention through to post-conflict reconstruction and extending to economic development aid.\textsuperscript{182} It was also

\textsuperscript{182} Pagani, op cit p749
agreed in Amsterdam that WEU would support the UN and OSCE in their crisis management tasks.

Taken all together, this points to the relevance of these developments for the potential for the EU’s emerging crisis response instrument to be conceptualised and act in practice as an additional vehicle for the EU to export its values, principles, standards and models beyond its borders, alongside other EU instruments, and alongside other actors.

The Amsterdam Treaty affirmed the relevance of the CFSP in the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security including through the promotion of the European Union’s principles. The EU would be able to promote its principles abroad through WEU and later ESDP operations by Europeanising conflict-prone areas and promoting European integration. The uniqueness of such operations is found not only in the autonomous decision-making on the place, time and length of an operation, but also in the fact that the EU would operate as a unit promoting its principles abroad and it is these very principles that distinguish the EU from other organisations.

Over this period, the WEU launched a mission in Albania in 1997 with the aim to restructure the Albanian police force by providing training and advice to police officers and instructors; a security surveillance mission in Kosovo in 1998, and a demining operation in Croatia in 1999. The Albania operation, under which the WEU Council deployed a Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) formed part of a wider international effort to tackle the growing instability in the region. It provided advice to the Albanian Ministry of Public Order in relation to restructuring the police, and supported the development of a new State Police Law laying the foundations for building a democratic police to internationally accepted standards, and the training of police instructors.\(^{183}\) In the context of the developments in European security thinking and operationalization, this appears to have been an early example of a civilian mission that implicitly contained a Europeanisation agenda.

3.3.2 The St Malo initiative and the birth of ESDP

Despite the continuous efforts being made by EU member states to strengthen its role in security matters, it was only after the Franco-British Summit in Saint-Malo, France, in December 1998, that the EU can be said to have set in place the foundations for acting as an autonomous, credible security power. In a Joint Declaration on European Defence issued from the summit, France and the United Kingdom (supported by Germany) agreed that the Treaty of Amsterdam should provide the basis for action for the EU in order for the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP to be implemented. The initiative led to the launch of the ESDP at the Cologne European Council as an element of CFSP giving to the EU the capacity to conduct autonomous civilian and military operations and take decisions on security and defence matters.

According to Howorth\(^{184}\), there are two significant developments that triggered more focussed European discussion on security and defence and eventually led to the Saint-Malo Declaration. The first was the divergence between EU and US strategic interests created by new global challenges which were accompanied by the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR. Merlingen and Ostrauskaite also share this view stating that key decision-makers in London and Paris believed that it was in their interest “to render the EU capable of filling the geopolitical vacuum in places like the Balkans and Africa where the United States had few national interests at stake.”\(^{185}\) The second was related to the Single European Act followed by the European Monetary Union (EMU) that brought the EU closer to a “political union” and that generated a necessity to begin serious discussions on security matters.\(^{186}\)

Gnesotto also cites as one of the explanations of why the EU member states at the time decided to launch ESDP was the relevance of transatlantic relations and the role of NATO, more precisely, that “a European military

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\(^{184}\) Howorth (2003), op cit, p 3

\(^{185}\) Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, op cit, p 38, 39

\(^{186}\) Howorth (2003), p 3
capability was considered necessary to compensate for the new uncertainty over US military involvement in crisis management in Europe”, whilst at the same time, reinforcing the EU capabilities meant that NATO would also be strengthened, since “NATO itself had failed to create, within the old rules of its ESDI, any European political or military momentum.”187 From the time that the US showed its preference in deploying its troops elsewhere other than in the Western Balkans, it was imperative for the EU to act drastically and strengthen its capabilities.

The events in the Western Balkans, the painful lessons from the Union’s inability to grasp the seriousness of the situation on its doorstep and its political and operational incapacity to intervene in a timely and appropriate manner or even to have a collective defence and political voice, all highlighted the necessity to establish a concrete defence aspect to CFSP and to speed-up the development of ESDP.

More generally, another reason for developments in the EU at this time was related to the fact that the Single European Act followed by the European Monetary Union (EMU) that brought the EU closer as a political and economic union further highlighted the gap on the security side, and generated the necessity to begin serious discussions on security matters.188

At the same time, the EU frequently felt it necessary to clarify that the establishment of this capacity for autonomous action was not intended to diminish or overshadow NATO’s part in security and defence, on the contrary, that NATO would remain “the basis of the collective defence of its member states and will continue to play an important role in crisis management”.189 More precisely, it was noted that “In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations

188 Howorth, (2003) op cit, p 3
189 Howorth, ibid, p 4
in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.”\textsuperscript{190} This meant that the EU member states would act in solidarity on security issues and the EU would become a world security actor, without undermining NATO’s role as a security organisation and constituting a threat to its interests.

The Saint-Malo Declaration paved the way for an ESDP framework that would give the EU the opportunity for autonomous action politically and militarily. It was noted that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”\textsuperscript{191} The body responsible to take this forward and make decisions on the implementation of the Petersberg Tasks would be the European Council, on an intergovernmental basis. These developments helped bring closer the potential for the Union to have autonomy in its ability to decide where the EU would launch an operation, based on the EU’s own priority security interests, the nature of the mission and the number of personnel it would deploy and therefore the potential for the EU to give its operations a distinct European character.

\textbf{3.3.3 Evolution of ESDP post St-Malo}

At the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the EU formally launched the European Security and Defence Policy. It changed the emphasis from developing a European pillar within NATO, to a focus on enhancing the security and defence pillar within the EU.\textsuperscript{192} Hence, the EU members were adopting the St Malo declaration. The Petersberg tasks were placed at the core of the ESDP, and more specifically, the discussion revolved around the necessary capabilities and structures that would enhance the operability of the

\textsuperscript{190} St Malo Declaration, British-French summit, St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998
\textsuperscript{191} Idem
EU as a security actor within the scope of the Petersberg tasks. Furthermore, it was agreed that, “the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the Petersberg Tasks”. It was also agreed that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”

At the following Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999, a ‘Headline Goal’ and institutional framework for ESDP was decided. The Helsinki Headline Goal was established according to which all Member States would be able to cooperate together and voluntarily in order to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg Tasks. Member States agreed that by the year 2003 they should be able would deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year and joint force of 50000 to 60000 ground troops. These troops, known as the European Union Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), were to be capable of delivering the full range of the Petersberg Tasks, allowing the EU to conduct EU-led missions and to be able to project its values and principles abroad.

At the Santa Maria da Feira European Council in June 2000, the military and civilian aspects of ESDP crisis-management operations were discussed and strengthened. This moment, particularly on the civilian side, was to prove an important step in laying and deepening the ground for the potential role of ESDP missions to act as vehicles for Europeanisation. The Headline Goal capabilities for future ESDP missions were further elaborated through the identification of four priorities: i) increasing police capabilities to protect civilians; ii) strengthening the rule of law and aiming for the re-establishment

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of a judicial and penal system by training and deploying prosecutors and judges, liaising with the UN and regional organisations and recruiting local court personnel and police officers; iii) strengthening civilian administration by training and deploying civil administrators; iv) civil protection both within the framework of crisis management operations and natural disaster relief by improving the EU’s capabilities. A commitment was made to promote coordination through establishing a database on civilian police capabilities aiming at the maintenance and sharing of information.\footnote{196}{European Parliament, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000, Conclusions of the Presidency, II – Military Aspects of Crisis Management in Annex I - Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy, point C}

ESDP was subsequently incorporated into the EU’s institutional structure with the signature of the Treaty of Nice in February 2001.\footnote{197}{European Union, Treaty of Nice, Amending the Treaty on European Union, (10 March 2001)} In the Treaty the role of the EU has changed with regards to security and defence. One of the changes that were made in the Treaty was that CFSP would no longer be framed by the WEU but by the EU. In addition, most of the WEU’s functions would be transferred to the EU meaning the creation of new military and political structures such as the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) as well as the Political Security Committee (PSC) respectively.\footnote{198}{Bono, G. (2002), ‘European Security and Defence Policy: theoretical approaches, the Nice Summit and hot issues’, Research and Training Network: Bridging the Accountability Gap in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)/ESDP and Democracy, pp. 20, 21. Available at: http://www.nassauer.org/CESD-PA/esdp02.pdf.} In the Presidency Report on European Security and Defence Policy which was submitted to the Nice European Council, it was noted that the aim “is to give the European Union the means of playing its role fully on the international stage and of assuming its responsibilities in the face of crises by adding to the range of instruments already at its disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defence field.”\footnote{199}{Council of the European Union website, ‘Presidency Report on European Security and Defence Policy’, (4 December 2000), 14056/2/00} The new structures gave the potential to the EU to develop its military component and strengthen its role in security and defence.

Further progress of significance was made at the Laeken Council meeting in...
September 2001, which along with other steps during this period, “provided essential input to establish ESDP and to define the strategic outlook and profile of the Union”\(^\text{200}\) that was being progressively embodied in the framework for the ESDP mission instrument. As part of a wider action plan to develop its civilian and military capabilities, Laeken committed to implementation of a Police Action Plan to develop the capabilities necessary for carrying out ESDP police operations spanning objectives relating to promoting the rule of law, civil protection and civilian administration.\(^\text{201}\)

The European Council in Seville in June 2002 represented another step forward. The Council Declaration noted the determination to reinforce the role of the European Union in combating terrorism and to develop the capabilities to do so, including, through paying greater attention to conflict prevention as well as to the promotion of human rights and democracy through the establishment of stronger relations with third countries.\(^\text{202}\) These themes were picked up the following year as part of a new European Security Strategy.

3.3.4 The European Security Strategy 2003: An expression of Europeanness

One of the most important developments in the evolution of a distinctly European approach to security, and the framework guiding ESDP operations, was the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) at the European Council summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003.\(^\text{203}\) The main driving factor for the signature of the ESS was the willingness of the European member states to prove that they stand united with regards to issues of security and defence.\(^\text{204}\) The EU was heavily criticised over its policy and weak response to the Balkan


\(^{203}\) A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003

\(^{204}\) Interview with Mr. Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, Head of ESDP Task Force, Policy Unit, Council of the European Union, 1 October 2009, noted interview
war, and again after the divisions between the EU over Iraq. The signature of the ESS document aimed to prove a common European view on key defence and security issues. The adoption of the Strategy highlighted the fact that there had not been such a statement of common EU analysis and approach up to that point. In fact, the EU member states had attempted to create a single security strategy in 1995 within the framework of the WEU but this was never realised due to divisions amongst the members.\textsuperscript{205}

The ESS can therefore be seen as an important step forward by the Union. Overall, the ESS document for the first time presented a common and relatively detailed EU security strategy, gathering the EU security priorities in one single document. It took a broad approach to threats, making reference to global challenges such as diseases, poverty, economic failure, global warming and shortage of natural resources, whilst noting that “security is a precondition of development”. Additionally, it outlined the five high-priority key threats for Europe (terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime) in a single document, noting the gravity of those threats if they were put together.

In the second part of the document, the three EU strategic objectives were given. First, the EU should be “addressing the threats” and addressing them early through a range of instruments. It highlighted that “In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand\textsuperscript{206} and that “the first line of defence will often be abroad”.\textsuperscript{207} It went on to note that “The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan and in the DRC”, and that “Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime” is one of the priorities of the EU.\textsuperscript{208}

The second strategic objective for the EU outlined in the ESS was to create a

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid
\textsuperscript{206} A Secure Europe in a Better World, op cit, p 6
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid, p7
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid, p 6
zone of security in its neighbourhood, especially in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus, and the Middle East in relation to the Arab/Israeli conflict. The EU worked hard to restore the security in the Western Balkans and create a safe neighbourhood for its member states. The ESS acknowledges that “The credibility of [the EU’s] foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there” and that “the European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform”.  

The third and final strategic objective is an international order based on effective multilateralism working towards developing “a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order”.  

Subsequently, NATO and international organisations such as the UN and the OSCE, can work together in confronting threats to international peace and security.

In the third part of the document “policy implications for Europe” it is stressed that the EU needs to be more active, more capable and more coherent as well as working with others in tackling threats and preserving security and peace. By naming the European Union “a global player”, the ESS most importantly, realises the need for the EU to “...be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.” ESDP operations can be used in conflicts both within and between states by supporting and assisting the UN to respond to threats. Last but not least, a very significant point raised in the ESS document was the reference to “a wider spectrum of missions” which might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism, and for the first time explicitly, security sector reform. This effectively expanded the list of the Petersberg Tasks to include a wider scope for missions and as such a wider scope for the possible ways that the ESDP instrument could play a role as a vehicle for exporting European norms, values and institutional approaches.

209 Ibid, p 8
210 Ibid, p 9
211 Ibid, p 1
212 Ibid, p 12
It has been widely noted\textsuperscript{213} that the earlier draft of the ESS emphasised the EU's preference for early \textit{preventive} action where threats may arise, as opposed to an emphasis on pre-\textit{emptive} action in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States (US) for example.\textsuperscript{214} Preventive action usually is taken in case of a possible conflict arising, and in which case, for the EU, the use of military force is seen only as a last resort. Pre-emption can be defined as the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack in order to counter a threat to national security.\textsuperscript{215} Although the NSS document states that the US will not use force in all cases to pre-empt a threat, the different emphasis was clear.

Haine usefully highlights the EU's different approach to the threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and points to the way the EU takes a different European approach to addressing them:

“…if the European analysis of the threats of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is similar to that of Washington, the ways in which Europe addresses them are different. In its view, the fight against these threats cannot be limited to military force alone: while not excluding it, the Union intends to take a broader approach, combining the political and the economic...While the Union recognises that bad governance is a major source of instability, it advocates the extension of good governance rather than regime change. The message for Washington is, therefore, nuanced: from a similar analysis of the threats associated with terrorism stems a more diversified strategy, one that better reflects the European identity.”\textsuperscript{216}

\textsuperscript{213} Several studies have dealt with the textual comparison of the ESS and NSS documents. See for instance Bailes, A.J.K (2005), ‘The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History’, SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 10.


\textsuperscript{216} Jean-Yves Haine, ESDP: an overview; European Union Institute for Security Studies http://www.eutlex-kosovo.eu/training/material/docs/esdp/reading_material/ESDP_an_overview_by_JY_Haine_ISS.pdf
This more holistic European approach to crises, based on the prioritisation of human security\textsuperscript{217} over state security, was also advocated by an independent study group which cited the range of instruments available to the EU which it could use to “influence political processes in other countries—opening up authoritarian regimes, strengthening legitimate forms of political authority, and promoting inclusive political solutions to conflict”, and went on to highlight that the development of instruments to deploy civilian personnel was a crucial additional capability, as “they represent the EU’s commitment to help build and sustain legitimate political authority in crisis situations”.\textsuperscript{218}

### 3.3.5 ESDP and Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Over these years, the notion of ‘Security Sector Reform (SSR)’ was receiving increasing attention in international security and development circles, particularly in Europe, and as part of the dialogue over the scope of the EU’s external action and the tasks and capabilities required to conduct operations abroad. As noted above, the 2003 European Security Strategy specifically referred to the inclusion of SSR as part of the wider spectrum of missions the EU should use to address security threats abroad. It also proposed that SSR should be understood as part of a broader institution-building process in unstable or conflict-prone countries.\textsuperscript{219} Indeed, SSR has become a core element of ESDP, and coupled with this fact and that in placing a reform, or ‘transformation’ function squarely under the mandate of ESDP missions, SSR-related missions provide a natural focus for examining whether ESDP missions have a role in exporting European norms, values and institutional models. At the same time, security sector reform covers a wide scope, and it is not only under CFSP or ESDP that the EU engages in SSR. Study in this area

\textsuperscript{217} “Human security refers to freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations.” In A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project, principles, practicalities, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds) Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2006, p 5. In the recent years, the EU has taken a stronger approach to human security safeguarding the security of every individual and not only on the defence of the Union’s borders.


\textsuperscript{219} European Security Strategy, \textit{op cit}, p 12
also allows us to consider the Europeanisation role of ESDP alongside other EU instruments.

Under pressure to put forward a coherent shared vision of its approach and role in the area of security sector reform, in November 2005 the EU has presented an EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform based on the following principles:

- democratic norms and internationally accepted human rights principles and the rule of law, and where applicable international humanitarian law;
- respect for local ownership;
- coherence with other areas of EU external action.\(^\text{220}\)

According to one study, by 2006, the EU was contributing to SSR processes in more than 70 countries worldwide through engagement in areas such as development, human rights, democracy, conflict prevention, crisis management, and in promoting freedom, justice and security, and that in certain cases, it is doing so through ESDP missions focussed on, for example, disarmament, police reform and border control.\(^\text{221}\) Elsewhere, ESDP missions have taken up SSR tasks in contexts ranging from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau and the Western Balkans, and they have come to incorporate a Europeanisation agenda, where some countries in which they are deployed are in the EU’s neighbourhood and hence have an EU enlargement perspective, whilst others have been much further afield.

Through the SSR operation in DRC (EUSEC DR Congo), launched in June 2005, the EU provided ‘…advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, gender


issues and children affected by armed conflicts, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law.\textsuperscript{222} A more recent ESDP SSR mission has been EU SSR Guinea-Bissau launched in June 2008, according to which the EU would contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the country’s National Security Sector Reform Strategy, through for example providing advice and assistance in restructuring the armed forces, and supporting the development of a legal framework for the restructuring of the police forces.\textsuperscript{223} ESDP operations in the Western Balkans have all incorporated some contribution to the wide definition of SSR.

3.4 The conceptual framework of ESDP: aims, limitations and relations with other security organisations.

3.4.1 The doctrine of ESDP: Aims and reasons for evolution

The central aim of ESDP was to provide the EU with military and civilian assets for international conflict prevention and crisis management. Since the EU seeks to promote non-violent settlement of conflicts, which is very much embedded in the philosophy of the EU when dealing with conflict, alongside the military capabilities, the EU aims to emphasise the development of civilian capabilities which focuses on the four priority areas (police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection capacities) as had been adopted back at the June 2000 Feira European Council. The essence of ESDP missions can be found at the Petersberg Tasks which are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat force in crisis management including peacemaking. Although the EU has acquired certain military characteristics in order to deal, not only with conflicts on the doorstep of the EU, but also with international conflicts, it has still preserved its civilian character and has, in addition, enhanced its civilian assets working towards a preventive, non-coercive and soft approach to conflict.


An important reason for the evolution of ESDP was the EU’s inability to react in a timely and successful manner to the atrocities and mayhem caused by the breakup of Yugoslavia. More precisely, “The violence which engulfed former Yugoslavia from the summer of 1991 to the autumn of 1995 was a wake-up call for the whole of Europe.” At the time, the WEU was “too weak politically, too insignificant militarily and too unwieldy institutionally to be able to carry out the major responsibilities which were being thrust upon”. Moreover, NATO had failed to convince its members that it remained the key security instrument due to a self re-invention process that was going on at the time, as it sought to find its relevance in the new international security environment following the end of the Cold War. Therefore, the formation of ESDP was, to some extent, the result of the absence of suitable security organisations that could respond to the changing security environment and to new security and defence needs for Europe. Quoting Simon Duke “The security aspects of CFSP and, most notably ESDP, have been fundamentally shaped by events in the Balkans and the collective inability of the EU Member States to address a crisis on their very doorstep.”

Another shortfall identified by Jean-Yves Haine is that ESDP operations lack in structure and strategy. Haine stated that “European forces are deployed where they can be, not where they must be.” It has been noted that there is a low degree of strategic relevance in the way the EU chooses to start a mission and this comes at a cost of the mission’s actual impact. In addition, there is a gap between “what is politically possible and what is strategically necessary”. Despite the adoption of the ESS, the EU has been accused that it still lacks a comprehensive strategy over its civilian and military operations.

225 Ibid, p 8
228 Ibid
This is relevant when undertaking an examination of whether ESDP missions carry a strategic Europeanisation agenda, where the EU priorities its missions, based on Europeanisation priorities, and how it decides to use civilian and/or military missions to achieve Europeanisation objectives.

### 3.4.2 ESDP Relations with Other Security Organisations

Apart from ESDP, there are other policies and bodies that are seeking to preserve security and deter conflict in and outside the EU. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), for instance, promotes a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue and comprises all EU member states and 10 non-EU countries. Bilaterally, regionally or multilaterally, efforts are made for the promotion of dialogue according to the Barcelona process of 1995. Especially after the 9/11 events, developments in the area of ESDP are important to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The launch of the ESDP dialogue among EMP countries is aimed at enhancing the European security and cooperation.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), among other things, aims to promote security and stability by working with neighbours to address development, environment, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism issues, in line with the European Security Strategy. Based on the concept of shared values and common interests, the ENP is aiding EU and non-EU countries to co-operate and give a joint response to common challenges such as terrorism, extremism and other factors, which threaten security like migration and crime. The ENP is not, per se, a conflict-prevention policy, although the promotion of prosperity, stability and security which the EU has achieved in Western Europe can be considered to be the ultimate form of conflict prevention. The ENP is, however, a means of addressing these issues indirectly - by tackling underlying issues of governance, lack of economic development, insecurity

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and stability, in order to help avoid conflicts arising in the first place, to better manage those that do and to contribute to a climate in which they might be resolved. More generally, the ENP through its reform agenda serves to support more specific actions carried out in the context of the CFSP, such as the participation of partner countries in ESDP operations.231

The OSCE, NATO and the UN all claim a role in the preservation of peace internationally, although they are sometimes overlapping either institutionally or geographically. During the course of military and civilian operations, the EU has taken over from NATO and the UN and, in other cases, has cooperated with both organisations. Especially with NATO, the EU is on good working terms as it has access to its capabilities and resources for the purpose of conducting ESDP missions. A common denominator for these organisations is the preservation of peace and, therefore, in order to achieve the best possible result, cooperation is clearly necessary. This can test the coherence between and the ‘added-value’ of ESDP missions promoting European interests, models and standards, versus the comparative advantages, agendas, models and standards of other organisations. The relationship between ESDP missions and the work of other organisations will be considered in the case study chapters.

3.4.3 The significance of EU Enlargement for ESDP

The second pillar of the EU has benefited significantly by the new members joining the EU as a result of EU enlargement. There are several ways according to which the new EU member states have facilitated the strengthening of the second pillar and, in particular, ESDP. They have contributed both civilian and military assets to the ESDP ‘pool’, such as in their contribution and indeed leadership of ESDP ‘battle groups’ on standby to conduct ESDP missions, tangibly helping establish a stronger European security capability and identity. At the same time, the enlargement of the Union has always been concerned with expanding the zone of peace and prosperity

through binding the countries of the region together based on common interests and values, standards and through common ways of working. Furthermore, as Stefania Panebianco reminds us, “In political discourse and official documents the EU tends to depict itself as a ‘norm exporter’: the principles of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights are continuously recalled as the inspiring elements of EU foreign policy.”

Whilst not limited to the European area, the proximity of the neighbourhood and the logic of EU enlargement provide a particular focus for the export and uptake of these norms through EU foreign and security policy. At the same time, countries in the EU’s neighbourhood are incentivised to join the Union according to economic, political and security interests.

Any country seeking membership of the EU must conform to conditions set out in the Treaty on European Union, and criteria laid down by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, which were subsequently strengthened in 1995 by the Madrid European Council. These form the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ for accession to the EU. Of particular relevance here, is the first of the three criteria: 1) political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Accession negotiations revolve around the candidate’s adoption, implementation and enforcement of EU rules (or ‘acquis’) and standards across 35 fields, which include judiciary and fundamental human rights, and justice, freedom and security, where the requirement for a strong and well-integrated administrative capacity within the law enforcement agencies and other relevant bodies, and a professional, reliable and efficient police organisation is given paramount importance. The accession process entails the often long process of satisfying these requirements, and the EU has a number of frameworks and external instruments through which it encourages and assists prospective members to achieve them. The process is intrinsically one of ‘Europeanisation’

in these areas, and in this light the instruments can be seen as ‘vehicles’ for Europeanisation.

The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) launched in June 1999 was established by the European Union as a policy framework specifically aimed at drawing the countries of the Western Balkans into EU membership initially through realising stability in the region, and setting-out common political and economic goals. Linked to the SAP, the European Commission administered funding mechanisms “offering support for long-term capacity-building”.\(^{235}\) It is therefore particularly relevant to consider the Europeanisation agenda and impact of ESDP missions launched in countries covered by the SAP, and to understand the way relatively short ESDP missions are positioned to have a Europeanisation effect alongside longer-term EC Europeanisation-related capacity-building programmes.

Evidently, the crises in the Western Balkans region were a significant driver for the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the elaboration of a guiding European Security Strategy that set out the interests, values and goals of the EU in its approach to security, and the establishment of the ESDP mission instrument which was intended to provide a key vehicle for the EU to pursue those goals in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation contexts. It is no coincidence that among the first ESDP missions to be launched were conducted in the EU’s Western Balkan neighbourhood. The implementation of ESDP missions in the Western Balkan context, which combines both the security and enlargement perspectives, therefore makes for a particularly valuable context in which to apply and test Europeanisation theory.

3.5 Conclusion

Throughout the years of their operational activity, ESDP missions have geographically expanded beyond EU borders and have managed to acquire a more globally oriented character. Apart from ESDP missions that were conducted on the EU’s doorstep, among which the EU-FOR ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the operations Concordia, Proxima and EU-PAT in FYROM, the EU has launched operations in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. In the Treaty of Lisbon it was noted that the Union may use civilian and military assets on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.236

This chapter has examined the steps the EU has taken to establish, strengthen and maintain the character of its second pillar starting from the creation of the WEU, moving to the establishment of CFSP and finally developing a functional and operational ESDP. Indeed, ESDP has come a long way from being just a policy goal until it became fully operational. Although the evolution of ESDP has been recorded by many practitioners and scholars, research on actual case studies of ESDP operations is still limited. It is therefore important to assess the impact of ESDP operations on conflict through the analysis of case studies. The link between Europeanisation and ESDP is even more under-researched and therefore requires further analysis. Thus, the link between Europeanisation and ESDP will be established through the analysis of three ESDP operations in FYROM which will follow in the next chapters.

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Chapter 4

Setting the context for ESDP Interventions in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

4.1 Introduction

Whilst other international security issues such as the war-on-terror, Iraq, Afghanistan and the conflict in the Middle East were more at the forefront of the international community’s minds in the early years of the new millennium, several unresolved issues and tensions in the EU’s Western Balkan neighbourhood presented risks that could escalate into new and renewed violent conflicts and again generate instability in the region and for the EU.

It can be said that European security, however it’s defined, is intimately bound up with security in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, since the early 1990s, and as highlighted in the 2003 European Security Strategy,\(^{237}\) the Western Balkan crises have been one of the central drivers in the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and key test cases for the EU’s ability to mount effective responses to crises and to promote its values as a contribution to stabilisation and longer-term reform. At the same time, and closely linked, the Western Balkans also present significant incentives and challenges for EU enlargement. This thesis argues that both the EU’s approach to these conflicts and the process of enlargement essentially represents *Europeanisation*. EU policy towards, and action in, its Western Balkan neighbourhood, therefore provides a particularly relevant focus for assessing the extent to which ESDP missions can contribute to the transfer of EU values, principles and norms.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) makes for a pertinent case study. The young country has geopolitical importance for the EU: located

on the Union’s borders, instability in FYROM held spill-over risks in terms of spreading a zone of political, economic and social instability and violent conflict, generating refugee flows, and with its weak rule of law and border controls allowing organised crime to prosper, and criminality and illegal immigration to cross into the EU zone. Its political, ethnic and criminality connections with its neighbourhood and the EU itself have given instability in FYROM particular significance for the Union, being described by former international High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Paddy Ashdown as ‘the bomb in the Balkans’, where ‘the stakes were very high’ for the EU, regional and international community.238

Being in the EU’s backyard, and following the latter’s failure to respond proactively or effectively to the earlier crises in the region, FYROM also has symbolic importance for the ability of the Union to respond to crises ‘under its nose’, and to demonstrate its relevance and credibility as a security and humanitarian actor, responding to threats to human security. Given the increasing emphasis the EU was giving to showing it could have a distinct role and added value relative to NATO during this period, the timing of this case study is also important. FYROM can also be seen as essentially a relatively small and manageable case, that if the EU cannot act successfully to manage crises in and export European values to FYROM, it has little chance of doing this elsewhere and in more testing situations. All in all, the EU’s policy and action towards FYROM can be seen as a test for the continued implementation of the very European Union project itself.

In this context, and as established in chapter 1, the EU has deployed three ESDP missions to FYROM since 2003, one of them being the first ever military ESDP mission and the other two being police missions. Despite the fact that FYROM is not exactly distant from the EU, and indeed was a natural candidate for EU expansion with all the Europeanisation implications that that entails, the ESDP operations were conducted in the context of what were seen as outside

threats, requiring an externally-oriented EU policy response. This case history of ESDP engagement in fYROM therefore provides a valuable basis for the study of the role of ESDP missions in ‘exporting’ Europeanisation, and as such a contribution to the broader field of Europeanisation theory.

This chapter provides an overview of the country context in fYROM in which the EU conceptualised and mounted ESDP missions. It will go on to provide an overview and analysis of broader EU strategic engagement in the country relevant to the period 2003-2006 during which the three ESDP missions in question - EU Concordia, Proxima and EUPAT - were deployed to the country. It also sets these ESDP missions in the wider context of international engagement in the country during the period.

Chapter 5 will go on to analyse the extent to which these ESDP missions played a Europeanisation role in fYROM, followed by the identification of more general conclusions in the final chapter.

4.2 Contextual background on fYROM

In chapter 2 it was mentioned that it is valuable to identify a baseline against which to examine Europeanisation processes. The aim of the following two sections is to give the context and present the state that fYROM was in prior to the deployment of the ESDP operations, and to give the context in which the missions were shaped and implemented. This will help to determine the ‘goodness of fit’ or ‘misfit’ between fYROM and the EU in areas of relevance to the ESDP missions, and provide a basis for analysing whether and how the ESDP missions acted as vehicles for Europeanisation.

The roots of the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are diverse and complex. The roots of instability could certainly be traced to the 1980s, if not earlier, due to a deteriorating economic climate, unemployment, weak institutional structures, and ethnic-religious
Tensions between Serbia and Slovenia began to grow in the winter of 1990 and the pressures escalated in the summer of 1991 with the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia. Serbian nationalist sentiments and belief in a strong federal state brought tough resistance to these moves, and violent conflict broke out initially in Slovenia, and then spread to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU had showed its support to Yugoslavia by offering financial aid with the hope to help reform its economy and maintain its unity and territorial integrity. France had also proposed to deploy a WEU peace-keeping force in Yugoslavia in July 1991 but this idea received almost no support from other members.

In January 1991, the self-proclaimed Republic of Macedonia had also declared its independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, putting in place its sovereignty through a national referendum in September 1991. From then on the country pursued efforts towards international recognition by international organisations, namely the EU, NATO and the UN, and continuing its democratisation and Europeanisation process.

After the 1991 declaration of independence, the name dispute between FYROM and Greece resurfaced, bringing the strong reaction of the Greek government and its people. The dispute existed since the mid 1940s when, in the aftermath of the Second World War, Yugoslav President Tito separated the area from Serbia and renamed it from Vardar Banovina into the “People’s Republic of Macedonia” and later the “Socialist Republic of Macedonia”. Although the Europeanisation process continues on FYROM, the name dispute could potentially stall negotiations between FYROM and the EU and it might delay FYROM’s receipt of EU membership. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the EU started from a weak position to influence changes in FYROM due to the name issue, the prospect of EU accession gave FYROM a bigger incentive and made it more receptive to changes allowing for a greater impact.

of Europeanisation to be achieved. In October 2012, the Greek government initiated the reopening of the negotiation process on the name issue with FYROM and suggested an agreed framework based on which the negotiations will proceed. This action was well received in international circles but FYROM dismissed the Greek proposal.242

Although the name dispute between the two countries may have implications for the EU accession of FYROM, it does not pose a problem for the process of Europeanisation of the country through the ESDP operations. This thesis is testing the Europeanisation effect of the ESDP operations in FYROM during a specific timeframe and furthermore testing the potential of ESDP to be used as an instrument for Europeanisation. The Macedonian name dispute is an ongoing debate between the countries of FYROM and Greece. A solution to the problem will guarantee stability and peace in the region and will strengthen the bilateral relations of the two countries. Since it does not, however, have a direct impact on the Europeanisation of FYROM through ESDP operations, it will not be considered further in this thesis.

Overall, FYROM managed to largely steer clear of the inter-ethnic conflicts and wars that accompanied Yugoslavia’s initial break-up and preserved a relative level of peace and stability throughout the 1990’s. This has been widely attributed to the successful UN preventive military deployment (UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP missions) at FYROM’s borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) during this period.243 However, the nascent state was politically, economically and socially weak and unstable, with unemployment, criminal activity, social tensions between its mixed ethno-religious population and political tensions, posing significant challenges for the new government.244 The Kosovo war also added to tensions inside FYROM.

244 Hills, op cit, p 56
Tensions between the Slav-Macedonians and the Albanian minority were an issue from day one: in the referendum on independence in 1991, which led FYROM to become a sovereign state, the ethnic Albanian population (approximately twenty five per cent of the total population) largely refused to participate. This reflected and contributed to the further alienation of the Albanian population.  

4.2.1 The outbreak of conflict in 2001

Spillovers from the late-1990s conflict in neighbouring Kosovo stirred instability in FYROM, which continued after the end of the war in Kosovo. The Kosovo crisis had seriously affected relations between the Slav-Macedonian and Albanian population. At a period of serious economic problems FYROM saw an influx of more than 400,000 Kosovar-Albanian refugees. Meanwhile, the emergence and success of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) against the Serbs in Kosovo had an impact on particularly the young Albanian minority in FYROM. At the same time the KLA was operating in FYROM’s border area with Serbia and Kosovo, and this added to the insecurities on the side of the Slavic population.

Between February and August 2001, an armed conflict between an ethnic Albanian insurgent group and the national army of FYROM escalated step by step from small-scale local violence in the FYROM-Kosovo border region up to the brink of a complete civil war, affecting large parts of the country. This was alarming for the international community which was continuing to invest significant resources in consolidating the fragile peace in Kosovo next door.

As in Kosovo, there had long been distrust between the ethnic Albanian and Slav-Macedonian population. The roots of conflict between the two groups at that time grew out of a number of issues: for their part, there was a belief


among the Slav-Macedonians that the Albanian-Macedonians had visions of partitioning the country in order to come closer to their dream of a Greater Albania based on which the western part of FYROM would become part of Albania, and would also incorporate Kosovo;\textsuperscript{247} there was a dispute over group status in terms of relative proportions of the population (with some Albanians claiming their ethnicity constituted 30 or 40 per cent of the total population when the official figure was put at 22.9 per cent); language and educational rights were another source of friction, with the Slavs resisting a movement of the Albanians towards recognition of Albanian as an official language and the establishment of an Albanian language University; and the Albanians mistrusted the Slavic-dominated national institutions, complaining of discriminatory practices at the hands of, and being underrepresented in, the national institutions of government, military, police and judiciary.\textsuperscript{248} For example, only four per cent of personnel in the military were Albanian in 2000.\textsuperscript{249} Table 1 below shows the percentages of the population of all ethnic groups according to the last census which was carried out in 2002.

\textsuperscript{247} Hills, op cit, p 12
A 2002 polling survey highlighted the contradictory views between the Slavic and Albanian communities on many vital security and social and economic issues. The most significant cause of the conflict identified by 85 per cent of Macedonian-Slavs regarded “the activities of Albanian paramilitary groups still operating in Macedonia” whilst 80 per cent of Albanians cited “discrimination against minority ethnic groups in employment, education and language rights” as the most serious cause of conflict.\textsuperscript{250} Amnesty International, based on a 2002 report by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), reported that allegations of ill-treatment by the police ‘had an ethnic or racial component to them in that the victims’ minority ethnicity or Muslim faith appeared to have

been a, if not the, primary factor in the alleged ill-treatment’, and there was a climate of impunity over the behaviour of the police.”

The 1990s had seen a gradual decay, politicisation and privatisation of the institutional structure of the police. Flessenkemper highlights a number of shortcomings of the police which contributed to the growing ethnic tensions during this period. First was the lack of equitable representation of the Albanian minority in the police force resulting in ethnically biased policing and abusive as well as discriminatory practices against the Albanian community. Secondly, the policing approach was focused on public police and order rather than community policing and criminal investigation. Flessenkemper notes that this reflected the institutions’ socialist legacy, poor management, insufficient training and equipment. Furthermore, it reflected the politicisation of the police which allowed senior officials in the Ministry of Interior and the Police to use the institution for their own political and criminal interests. Additionally, effective policing was undermined by the lack of an appropriate legal framework, weak cooperation between the police and the judiciary and its over-centralised organisational culture inherited from its Yugoslav past.

According to Vankovska, during the period 1998-2002 special para-military and para-legal police units were created, such as the ‘Wolves’, the ‘Tigers’ and the ‘Lions’ that had strong political links, turning the country into a “police state”. The ethnic Albanian population commonly cited these units as being responsible for abuses. This played into the deepening mistrust, lack of national integration and weak sense of the state, which translated into a partial division of the country, with much of the Albanian-dominated western area of the country effectively becoming ethnically self-policing, and it was in this context that an armed insurgency grew.

252 Flessenkemper, op cit, p 80.
254 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, 20 June 2001, p2
The first significant incidence of violence was seen in early 2001 when clashes broke out as Slav-Macedonian troops tried to impose border controls in the smuggling village of Tanusevci in the Vitina area on the border with Kosovo, with a completely ethnic Albanian population. Insurgents were using a number of villages in the border area for recruiting and training new insurgents as well as for human trafficking and smuggling illegal goods. It was during this period that the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) first emerged, attacking Slav Macedonians and particularly the police. According to the rebels, the reason behind this uprising was their need to protect themselves against fYROM’s security forces whilst fighting for their national rights.

fYROM’s government blamed Kosovar Albanians for exporting insurgents into the country and called for NATO forces in Kosovo to seal the border. In all, the short conflict is thought to have resulted in around 200 deaths, including sixty Macedonian soldiers and police. More than 100,000 people were displaced as a result of the fighting.

The country’s inability, or unwillingness, to deal with its political, social, security and economic challenges had brought the conflict to a head. The lack of professionalism and representativeness of the police, both before the emergence of violence, and during the conflict, thus became a key element that would need to be tackled through confidence-building measures and longer-term reforms in order to bring peace. It was clear there would need to be serious improvements in police standards in order for fYROM to achieve candidate status for entry in to the European Union, which was both a clear

255 Hills, op cit, p 61
256 Ibid, p 61
257 Merlingen and Ostrauskaite. (2006), op cit, p 81
259 Ibid, p ii
261 Hills, Ibid, p 60
policy of the EU at that time, and a major incentive for the government and the Slavic community in fYROM.

The international community showed its solidarity and support. The EU ultimately took the leading role in pushing for a resolution to the conflict through diplomatic means. Through the involvement of senior EU officials Javier Solana and Chris Patten, and the subsequent despatch of a negotiator, former French Defence Minister François Léotard, alongside US Balkans expert Ambassador James Pardew, the EU sought to help broker a peace agreement that would address legitimate Albanian grievances.262

4.2.2 The Ohrid Agreement

On 13th of August 2001, the Ohrid Framework Agreement was reached in the lakeside city of Ohrid in south-western fYROM. The accord was accompanied by a separate ‘ceasefire’ agreement negotiated between NATO and the rebels. As well as addressing issues of immediate stability and underlying causes of the conflict, the Ohrid Agreement also stated upfront its intention to secure “the future of Macedonia’s democracy” and to permit “the development of closer and more integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community”.263 The agreement was signed by the leaders of the four major political parties as well as by EU and US representatives. Under the framework of the agreement was the promotion of the peaceful and harmonious development of civil society and the respect of ethnic identity and the interests of all citizens. Amongst the key principles of the agreement were:

- the cessation of violent acts, and disarmament of the ethnic Albanian armed groups;
- the development of a decentralised government ensuring the competence of all elected local officials and local heads of police;

- non-discrimination and equitable representation of all citizens ensuring they all receive equal treatment under the law;
- special parliamentary procedures with qualified majority voting for the establishment of new laws;
- respect for education and use of languages making any language spoken by at least 20% of the population official;
- expression of community identity through use of symbols;
- implementation of constitutional amendments related to the above within 45 days of the signature of the Ohrid agreement.264

The Ohrid Agreement thus marked a new beginning for the citizens of fYROM’s multi-ethnic society by stipulating the inclusion of the under-represented ethnic Albanians in security institutions and other institutions. It also presented a framework for the EU to engage closely in the implementation of the peace agreement in areas that would be directly relevant to Europeanisation, both in terms of conflict prevention, and longer-term reforms, including ones important for integrating fYROM into the European Union. Furthermore it laid the ground for the eventual deployment of the ESDP mission instrument in support of these Europeanisation dimensions.

A key relevant dimension was the inclusion of police reform as a major element to the Agreement, reflecting the need to address one of the main frictions which had led to the violent conflict. Decentralisation of authority on policing became a priority, to tackle the highly centralised control of the police which had resulted in poor performance in rural areas beyond Skopje and other larger towns.265 The Agreement invited the European Union, the OSCE, and the United States to increase training and assistance programs with the police, including in the areas of:

- professional, human rights, and other training;
- technical assistance for police reform, including assistance in screening, selection and promotion processes;

264 Idem
development of a code of police conduct;
cooperation with respect to transition planning for hiring and
deployment of police officers from communities not in the majority in
Macedonia; and
deployment as soon as possible of international monitors and police
advisors in sensitive areas, under appropriate arrangements with
relevant authorities.266

Immediately after the Agreement was signed, NATO launched Operation
“Essential Harvest” on 22 August 2001, deploying 3,500 NATO troops that
proceeded to collect and destroy the weapons of the ethnic Albanian rebels
under a voluntarily hand-over to NATO forces.267 The mission is considered to
be a success for NATO as they managed to gather a total of 3,875
weapons.268 NATO followed-up with operation Amber Fox in September 2001
which provided security for international monitors who were overseeing the
implementation of the peace plan.269 With the disarmament of their militias, the
ethnic Albanians feared reprisals from the para-military units that remained.270
The EU, NATO and the OSCE advised the government to “break up” these so-
called Special Forces, as it was feared their actions might lead to a re-
escalation of the conflict.271 From December 2002, NATO continued its
presence in FYROM with a lower profile operation named Allied Harmony,
which aimed to deter violence through its presence on the ground, whilst also
providing military advice to the country’s authorities.272 In March 2003, NATO

266 Ohrid Framework Agreement, op cit, Annex C
267 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: War on Hold, Balkans Briefing, Skopje/Brussels, 15 August
2001, p 6
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/macedonia/1357773/Macedonia-
269 NATO website, Operation Amber Fox, http://www.nhqs.nato.int/missions/amberFox/amberFox.htm,
accessed 5 April 2010
270 Partos, G. (2001), ‘Macedonian rebels fear reprisals’, BBC website, Available at:
Based on a UNHCR report, two citizens were severely mistreated by the Lions on 3 April 2002 near
Struga where they were confronted at gunpoint and beaten by 6 to 8 policemen: UNHCR, the UN
(IHF), 28 May 2002, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,FACTFINDING,,MKD,46963af9d,0.html,
accessed 25 November 2009
271 Vankovska, op cit, p 16
272 NATO website, Operation Allied Harmony,
ended the operation and handed over part of the operation to the EU marking the start of the first ever ESDP military operation.

Having attained a broader picture of the conflict, an overview of the EU engagement in FYROM will follow next. The following section will provide short overviews of the three ESDP missions undertaken in FYROM between 2003 and 2006.

4.3 The ESDP missions in FYROM

4.3.1 EU Military Operation ‘Concordia’

The ESDP military operation Concordia in FYROM was the first ever military operation deployed by the EU under the Petersberg tasks. The launch of the operation Concordia (‘Altaïr’ in French) on 31 March 2003\textsuperscript{273} represented three points of significance: first it had a symbolic meaning as it marked a new era for the EU as a security actor, second, and linked, the handover from NATO to the EU marked the ties between the transatlantic partners\textsuperscript{274} and third, through operation Concordia the EU demonstrated its commitment to FYROM and to the implementation of the Ohrid agreement. Overall, the core aim of Concordia was, “at the explicit request of the FYROM government, to contribute further to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement.”\textsuperscript{275}

The mission was initially established for six months, taking over from NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony. On 26 June 2003, at the request of the Macedonian authorities,\textsuperscript{276} the European Council agreed to extend the

\textsuperscript{273} The EU wanted to launch the mission in 2002 but was delayed due to Turkey’s opposition to the Berlin-plus agreement. This was eventually resolved in December 2002.

\textsuperscript{274} Nano Ruzin, FYROM’s Ambassador to NATO, Looking forward to a Balkan Big Mac, 1 April 2003, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-634DE999-40B236BA/natolive/opinions_20494.htm?selectedLocale=en, NATO website accessed 18 April 2010


operation under the previous terms for a brief additional period until 15 December 2003 in order to continue to consolidate stability in the region.\textsuperscript{277}

The operation had approximately 400 personnel, including 350 military personnel, from thirteen EU member states and from 14 non-EU countries, including 10 countries that were soon to become members. The operation’s Headquarters were located in Skopje, with three Regional Headquarters in Skopje, Kumanovo and Tetovo. The mission had 22 Light Field Liaison Teams (LFLT) working in the field and 8 Heavy Field Liaison Teams (HFLT) that supported the LFTLs. The Field Liaison Teams provided situation awareness in the Former Crisis Area (FCA). Two heavy platoons from France and Italy were also used for the collection of information and armed deterrence.\textsuperscript{278}

Concordia’s tasks according to the Operation Plan (OPLAN) were presence patrols, including information collecting, aiming to evaluate the security situation. Another task was the reconnaissance of the road network and other areas by helicopters and vehicles. The mission also undertook regular meetings with civilian and military authorities, international organisations, local communities, members of the parliament and numerous NGOs. In addition, the mission was monitoring specific events and was providing support to observers from the OSCE and the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM).\textsuperscript{279} As part of the disarmament process, Concordia ran 34 weapons collection points in the ‘Former Crisis Area’ (FCA) of the country, observed weapons collection, and carried out random mobile patrols and observations.\textsuperscript{280}

The EU conducted the mission in close co-operation with NATO. The EU-NATO declaration on ESDP, agreed on 16 December 2002, welcomed the strategic partnership between the two organisations, declaring that the partnership was based on effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation

\textsuperscript{277} Council of the European Union, ‘Draft Council Conclusions on Operation Concordia’, 11630/2/03 REV 2, Brussels, 21 July 2003, p. 2
\textsuperscript{279} \textit{Idem}
\textsuperscript{280} \textit{Idem}
and transparency.\textsuperscript{281} In order to demonstrate their common position on crisis management in the region, the EU and NATO had also agreed on a concerted approach on the Western Balkans where they outlined a joint strategic approach to consolidate peace in the region.\textsuperscript{282} During the operation, the EU had full access to NATO’s assets based on the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement which formed the basis for EU-NATO cooperation.

At the end of the Concordia mission, an agreement was reached between government officials and the EU to conduct a follow-up police mission that would help the country to further implement the Ohrid agreement. The ESDP mission that succeeded Concordia was code-named EU Police Mission Proxima, which was followed-up with a further police advisory mission, EUPAT.

4.3.2 EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima)

The police mission Proxima was launched on 15 December 2003 after a formal invitation to the EU from fYROM’s Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, replacing the military operation Concordia. The shift from a military to a civilian operation reflected a change in the assessment of the nature of the security threats:\textsuperscript{283} with the conclusion of Concordia, fYROM was regarded stable enough not to have a military operation running on the ground. As Solana put it: “the main threat to stability is no longer armed conflict but criminality, our support must focus instead on civilian and not military instruments”\textsuperscript{284} The transition from military to civilian policing mission was, however, also a political one: as fYROM had strong aspirations to move quickly towards becoming a member of the EU, a military presence was deemed not to fit the profile of a potential EU candidate country. Hence, on 16 September 2003, the authorities

\textsuperscript{284} Council of the European Union, Article by Javier Solana, A Milestone on the Path from Conflict to European Integration, published by Dnevnik and Fakti (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) on 15 December 2003
of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia formally invited the EU to assume responsibility for an enhanced role in supporting implementation of the police reform aspects of the Ohrid Agreement through the deployment of an EU Police Mission (EUPOL PROXIMA). The transition from a military to a police mission has importance from the perspective of the Europeanisation potential of ESDP in FYROM, which will be examined in Chapter 5.

During the planning phase of the Proxima mission, the EU conducted a joint European Commission and Council General Secretariat fact-finding mission to evaluate the situation and make an assessment of the police sector before proceeding to the deployment of staff. Several actors offered their input and helped with the planning of the Proxima mission amongst which officers from the ESDP mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the preceding military mission Concordia, bilateral actors, as well as the OSCE.

The mission was backed up by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1371, having approximately 200 personnel which consisted of police experts and civilians. It also had a small-armed protection element of approximately 30 police officers to cover “exceptional situations”. This special team was established for the protection and safety of the mission’s personnel given the right to use all means possible, including weapons, should a situation require it. The scope of the mission was to aid the development of a multi-ethnic environment in the region and within FYROM’s borders. EUPOL Proxima’s overarching goal was to aid the domestic police to develop a professional culture and, at the same time, facilitate the process of cross-border crime reduction. Proxima’s mandate was to:

285 Isabelle Ioannides, EU Police Mission Proxima: testing the ‘European’ approach to building peace, in Civilian crisis management: the EU way, Agnieszka Nowak (ed), Chaillot Paper No 90, Institute for Security Studies, June 2006, p 74. Whilst it has not been possible to obtain the assessment for the purposes of this thesis, such an assessment would seem to have provided the Commission/Council with some form of baseline on which to design interventions and measure changes.
• Support the consolidation of law and order focusing on the former crisis areas;
• Support the practical implementation of the comprehensive reform of the Ministry of Interior including the police. In particular the mission aimed to improve the overall performance of the police through monitoring, mentoring and advising the country's police;
• Promote integrated border management and European policing standards;
• Support the local police in their efforts to build confidence between the police and the population;
• Support enhanced co-operation with neighbouring states in the field of policing.\(^{289}\)

Proxima was part of the European Union's overall commitment in assisting the efforts of the Government of FYROM to move closer towards EU integration as well as to support the implementation of the Ohrid agreement. Through Proxima, the EU engaged in the reform process in the areas of administration of justice, police reform, integrated border management, customs, asylum and immigration and the fight against organised crime.\(^{290}\) The character of the mission was to mentor, monitor and advise the Macedonian police force in “living up to European standards”.\(^{291}\) Despite its relatively short life span the mission aimed to build confidence between the community and the local police through the European concept of community policing, and supporting the development of a longer-term policing-strategy. Its activities included facilitating workshops for Macedonian police officers on laws relating to

\(^{289}\) Council of the European Union, European Security and Defence Policy, EUPOL Proxima/FYROM, op cit, p 5
organised crime and training on working methods in accordance with European standards and approaches.\textsuperscript{292}

Another important aspect of the Proxima mission was its efforts to improve cooperation between the police and the judicial authorities through the deployment of Law Enforcement Monitors. These lawyers were tasked with strengthening cooperation between all bodies in the criminal justice system, and monitoring the “internal control” unit:\textsuperscript{293} so as to enhance public confidence in the police. The monitors worked closely with the police assisting them in the investigation of complaints over police misconduct, and monitoring investigations undertaken by the newly established Internal Control and Professional Standards Unit in the Ministry of Interior. Their other responsibilities included monitoring the treatment of detainees in police stations with subsequent reports to the government and international organisations. The mission also sought to tackle human trafficking, through raising awareness and developing investigative skills in this area. Furthermore, the mission led the delivery of workshops and produced guidance handbooks for officers in the field that described for example the correct treatment of victims and initiatives for their support.\textsuperscript{294} Proxima also collaborated with the State Election Commission and the Ministry of Interior in preparing a plan for preserving peace and order during the April 2004 presidential election.\textsuperscript{295}

During the Proxima mission the EU also cooperated closely with the OSCE which was mandated to deal with human rights issues and was already involved in police reform activity.\textsuperscript{296} The OSCE stated that it supported the

\begin{footnotes}


\textsuperscript{294} Idem


\textsuperscript{296} Arloth, J. and Seidensticker, F. \textit{op cit}, p 45
\end{footnotes}
planning of the police mission Proxima “in a spirit of joint purpose”\textsuperscript{297} noting the close cooperation between the two organisations on police reform, the fight against organised crime and integrated border management.\textsuperscript{298}

After Proxima’s first year, the EU approached the government of FYROM with the proposal to extend the mission in order to achieve the goals set in the mandate by continuing their work on the ground, and hence deepening the impact of Europeanisation. FYROM’s government expressed concerns regarding an extension of an ESDP crisis management mission, fearing that it might become a symbolic obstacle to securing EU candidacy status,\textsuperscript{299} in effect, recognising that the requirement for such a presence was not very ‘European’. Despite some hesitation, on 1 October 2004, Hari Kostov, Prime Minister of FYROM, sent a letter to the Secretary-General/High Representative inviting the EU to take the necessary steps to extend EUPOL PROXIMA by 12 months from 14 December 2004. Since the country was aiming towards EU membership, the extended mission was presented by the government as a police reform mission and not as a crisis management mission.\textsuperscript{300} In this way, it would not be stigmatised as a country still in need of EU assistance on conflict management.

Proxima was extended under a new mandate focusing on outstanding operational needs covering three particular areas: public peace and order, organised crime and border police.\textsuperscript{301} The first period of the mission is commonly referred to as ‘Proxima I’ and the extended mission as ‘Proxima II’. Furthermore, the mission expanded its geographical area to cover the whole country whilst maintaining a higher presence in former crisis areas.\textsuperscript{302} The

\textsuperscript{297} OSCE, Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2003: Security and Cooperation for Europe, Vienna, 2003, p.18
\textsuperscript{299} Tobias Flessenkemper, \textit{op cit}, p 90
\textsuperscript{300} Idem
\textsuperscript{301} Council of the European Union, Extension of the EU police mission Proxima in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, S/0351/04, Brussels, 14 December 2004
mission continued to support the development of a professional police force through monitoring, mentoring and advising. During the extended period, the number of personnel was reduced, which was again a reflection of the government’s political sensitivities over continuing to be the target of an EU crisis management mission and the risk this could jeopardise the country’s EU candidacy. The extended operation was completed on 14 December 2005.303

4.3.3 EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT)

For the same political reasons, Proxima was not extended for a third year despite the fact that “the Macedonian policing field continued to require international guidance and assistance.”304 FYROM’s government and the EU agreed that any reforms of the police and the rule-of-law should from then on be carried out by the European Community and its instruments. However, the Commission-funded programme was not ready in time to follow-on from Proxima. In the run-up to the end of the Proxima mission’s mandated time, negotiations between the EU and the Government of FYROM led to an agreement, based on certain conditions,305 on the deployment of an EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT), conducted through the ESDP framework, to bridge the end of Proxima and the planned project funded by the EC CARDS306 programme aiming at providing technical assistance to the police at field level.307 With this agreement in place, just three days after the end of the Proxima mission, FYROM was granted candidacy status by the European Council.

304 Tobias Flessenkemper, op cit, p 91
305 These conditions include, EUPAT being presented as a reform-oriented effort rather than stabilization-oriented; not be defined as ‘a mission’; be clearly linked with the possible CARDS-funded projects; have a clear mandate with a defined end-date; not be presented as a follow-up to Proxima, but as a transitional measure before a possible CARDS-funded project is in place; and international police officers should not wear a uniform. See loannides, I. (2006), ‘EU Police Mission Proxima: Testing the ‘European’ Approach to Building Peace’, in A. Nowak, (ed.) Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way, Chaillot Paper No. 90, (Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies), p. 14.
306 CARDS will be explained later in the chapter.
Mandated for a period of six months until mid-June 2006, EUPAT was a much smaller mission compared to Proxima, consisting of 30 police advisers. Again, in line with the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the mission aimed to support the development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing.\(^{308}\) The mandate of the mission included the mentoring and monitoring of the country’s police by EU police experts on priority issues in the fields of border policing, public peace and order and accountability, and the fight against corruption and organised crime. EUPAT had its headquarters in Skopje, some mobile units spread in several areas in FYROM, and one central unit at the Ministry of Interior.\(^{309}\)

This translated into a focus on the following three areas: 1) overall implementation of police reform at field level, 2) police-judiciary cooperation, 3) development of professional standards/internal control. The mission concentrated on engagement with middle and senior levels of management in the host institutions.\(^{310}\) A new element introduced under EUPAT was a ‘consultation mechanism’ through which the mission would submit a monthly report to the government of FYROM on the progress made on police reforms and on any areas that may need further attention.\(^{311}\) The consultation mechanism aimed to bring greater transparency between the EU and FYROM’s government and to put the spotlight on areas where progress on implementing reforms was required.

The next section will briefly cover the frameworks, instruments and programmes used by the EU as part of its wider EU engagement in FYROM which had a Europeanisation dimension relevant to the period, to help place the ESDP missions’ potential Europeanisation role in their wider context.


\(^{309}\) Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP of 24 November 2005 on the establishment of an EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, \textit{op cit}

\(^{310}\) \textit{Idem}

\(^{311}\) Ioannides (2006), \textit{op cit}, p 14
4.4 Wider EU engagement in fYROM

Following the series of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, in 1996, the EU had set out a regional approach to its relations with the related Balkan countries aimed at promoting political and economic stability in the region by “establishing and maintaining democracy and the rule of law; ensuring respect for minorities and human rights; reviving economic activity.” In 1999 the EU announced the launch of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for the former Yugoslav countries and Albania, aiming to promote peace and stability, and closer political and economic cooperation between the region and the EU. The SAP, which can be seen as the overarching framework for the EU’s Europeanisation agenda in the Balkans over this period, entailed:

- the drafting of stabilisation and association agreements, with a view to accession to the European Union once the Copenhagen criteria are fulfilled;
- the development of economic and trade relations with the region and within the region;
- the development of the existing economic and financial aid;
- aid for democratisation, civil society, education and the development of institutions;
- cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs;
- the development of political dialogue.

A normative agenda was central to the EU’s approach to the Western Balkans, set out in the run-up to the 2003 EU-Western Balkans Thessaloniki Summit:

"The EU is not just an economic club, it is a Community of values related to democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, protection of

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313 Idem. As explained on p87, the Copenhagen criteria include the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.
minorities and a market economy. Sharing these values is a key part of the SAP and the basis for EU candidate status.\textsuperscript{314}

Through stabilisation-related avenues and the incentives and the process of achieving criteria for association and eventual EU integration, the SAP signified a direct ambition and framework for Europeanisation. A Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and fYROM was first adopted in April 2001. The aim of this agreement was to stabilise the country politically, economically and institutionally through “institution building and public administration reform, enhanced trade and economic co-operation, legal approximation with the Community acquis and strengthened co-operation on justice and home affairs.”\textsuperscript{315} The SAA would “help prepare the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to bring its standards and laws more closely in line with the EU.”\textsuperscript{316}

A significant development for the Europeanisation of the Western Balkans, including fYROM, was the decision to form European Partnerships which was taken at the European Council’s meeting in Thessaloniki in June 2003. The European Partnerships between the EU and Western Balkan countries, aimed to improve the stabilisation of the region by providing guidance and financial assistance. Within the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process, these partnerships would “identify priorities for action in supporting efforts to move closer to the European Union.”\textsuperscript{317} They would do so by closely monitoring the progress of each country on meeting the Copenhagen criteria, while their progress is noted in annual reports – which can be seen in essence as a measurement of Europeanisation progress.

Another EU instrument was the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) Programme which was adopted in

\textsuperscript{314} European Commission website, A milestone in the European Union’s relations with the Western Balkan countries, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/milestone_en.htm, accessed 19 June 2010
\textsuperscript{316} Idem
\textsuperscript{317} European Council, General Affairs and External Relations, 2528\textsuperscript{th} meeting, External Relations, Luxembourg 16 June 2003, p 14
December 2000 in order to support the development of Western Balkan countries including FYROM. The CARDS programme aimed to “fulfil immediate needs and develop the new organisation structure and operational capacities necessary for compliance with EU standards.” The programme supported the following:

1. reconstruction, democratic stabilisation, reconciliation and the return of refugees
2. institutional and legislative development, including harmonisation with European Union norms and approaches, to underpin democracy and the rule of law, human rights, civil society and the media, and the operation of a free market economy
3. sustainable economic and social development, including structural reform
4. promotion of closer relations and regional cooperation among countries and between them, the EU and the candidate countries of central Europe.

A subsequent development has been the introduction of the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), a significant financial instrument used by the EU for candidate and potential candidate countries between 2007 and 2013 and replacing the CARDS programme whilst uniting all EU pre-accession assistance instruments in a single framework. The aim of the IPA is “to support institution-building and the rule of law, human rights, including the fundamental freedoms, minority rights, gender equality and non-discrimination, both administrative and economic reforms, economic and social development, reconciliation and reconstruction, and regional and cross-border cooperation.” The Instrument for Pre-Accession is also helping candidate countries with the implementation of the necessary reforms to fulfill EU requirements for entry and particularly to comply with the Copenhagen criteria.

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318 Hills, op cit, p 63
as part of the process for EU enlargement. In this sense, IPA is firmly an instrument for Europeanisation as it promotes further European integration and prepares the countries receiving this aid for EU enlargement. FYROM, as an EU candidate member state, is one of the countries receiving this financial aid, including providing support building on previous EU efforts in bringing FYROM’s police up to European standards.

An additional instrument used by the EU is the twinning projects through which the EU has assisted FYROM to further increase its prospects for EU membership and further EU integration. From 2002, a twinning project has provided guidance to the strategic development of the then newly established Police Academy.

Signifying the seriousness with which it took its political role, the EU appointed a European Union Special Representative (EUSR) to contribute to the consolidation of the peaceful political process and the full implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. The first EUSR was appointed in June 2001, two months before the signature of the Ohrid agreement, and the presence of the EUSRs in FYROM has been continuous ever since. The EUSR appointment aimed to ensure the coherence of the EU external action and to ensure coordination of the international community's efforts to help in the implementation and sustainability of the provisions of the agreement. During ESDP operations, the EUSR cooperated closely with the Head of the Proxima mission on conducting a dialogue with the authorities of FYROM regarding the police mission. In general terms, the role of the EUSR is that of a mediator between the government of FYROM and all other EU parties and international organisations on the ground. The presence of the EUSR can be seen as significant for the Europeanisation process since it gave symbolic and real political weight and practical direction to the EU’s involvement in FYROM.

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321 Twinning is an enlargement instrument introduced by the European Commission in 1998 to assist candidate and potential candidate countries with the strengthening of the administrative and judicial capacity to implement EU policy as future EU members.


323 Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP of 24 November 2005 on the establishment of an EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), op cit
Additionally, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was a CFSP instrument which promoted security and stability in the region, including FYROM. It started its operational activity in the Western Balkans in 1991 as the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) until the end of 2000 when it was renamed EUMM. According to the mission mandate it would monitor political and security developments as well as border monitoring, inter-ethnic issues and refugee returns. In addition, it would also contribute to confidence building measures in line with the EU policy of stabilisation in the region. At its early stages, the operation was the only representation of EU collective security engagement in the Western Balkans, having been launched well before the ESDP operations. The EUMM was described as a flexible instrument, adaptable to the changing developments and needs of the Balkan region. The EUMM ended on 31 December 2007.

4.5 Wider International Community Engagement in FYROM

Apart from the EU, other actors mounted significant efforts to promote stability in FYROM and aid the reform process in the country, particularly, NATO, the UN, the US and the OSCE. These actors, their agendas and influences are relevant for an assessment of the Europeanisation role of the ESDP missions in terms of the relative 'niche' of the missions and the EU, and some areas of overlap and competition notably in the area of police reform which may have affected the maximisation of the Europeanisation impact of ESDP in this case.

On the bilateral side, the US Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) (also working in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Croatia, Bulgaria) supported law enforcement reforms, focusing on developing “a community-based police service”. ICITAP sought to promote smoother collaboration between the police and justice departments to take up the fight against corruption, human

326 Idem
327 Idem
trafficking and organised crime and strengthening of the country’s borders.\textsuperscript{328} In co-operation with the ESDP mission Proxima, ICITAP conducted a workshop on “Community Policing Reform and Progress” for 90 police officers on themes such as community development, team building, consultation with community stakeholders and partners, community economic development issues, crime prevention and crime reduction issues.\textsuperscript{329} Furthermore, ICITAP held the position of deputy director of the OSCE’s Police Development Unit (PDU), which worked in close partnership with the Ministry of Interior and national police.

The OSCE played a role in fYROM in the early 1990s through its OSCE, then Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Monitor Mission established in 1992. According to the mission’s mandate, the OSCE would monitor developments in the border area with Serbia with the aim of preventing instability crossing the border into fYROM and preserving fYROM’s territorial sovereignty. With this mission, it aimed to prevent any further conflict in the region and it would do so by promoting the maintenance of peace, stability and security.\textsuperscript{330} Another reason for conducting this mission was to keep an eye on the possibility of violence breaking out and spreading from groups of ethnic Albanians and other minorities within fYROM influenced by events in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{331} The mission was involved in monitoring, police training and development and taking part in wider activities related to the implementation of the Ohrid agreement.\textsuperscript{332}

Indeed, the OSCE went on to play a significant role in police reform, through establishing a Police Development Unit to assist with the training of the police force and wider police reform. In collaboration with the Ministry of Interior, the OSCE trained 1270 police officers, some of whom went on to receive further

\textsuperscript{329} U.S. Department of Justice ICITAP Program Facilitates Training on Community Policing in Macedonia http://macedonia.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/ZOILChdvOQxPRoiRRIpl0g/Community_Policing_Training.pdf, website accessed 30 March 2009
training in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{333} The PDU aimed at ‘a new approach to policing’ focusing on community policing and providing a service to all citizens. More precisely, the PDU monitored and advised on the recruitment of new cadets in the police force, assisted the formation of Community Advisory Groups (CAGs) and supported the operation of mechanisms to deal with citizens’ complaints on police behaviour.\textsuperscript{334} As is obvious in this remit, and as noted previously, there was a close relationship between the police-related activities of the OSCE and the Proxima/EUPAT missions. The EU and OSCE shared the approach that ‘good policing’ is a crisis management and conflict prevention tool which is necessary for the consolidation of democracy.\textsuperscript{335} OSCE also contributed to conflict prevention through collaboration with the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM).

NATO played a significant role in bringing peace and contributing to stabilising the country. During 2001, the NATO military operations Essential Harvest and Amber Fox undertook the disarmament of the ethnic Albanian insurgents and provided security to international monitors who were overseeing the implementation of the peace plan.\textsuperscript{336} Later, its Allied Harmony mission further aided the improvement of the security situation by providing military advice to the country’s authorities. The EU took over from NATO with the operation Concordia in March 2003 and NATO kept an advisory role in the country. Even after the hand-over of the operation Allied Harmony to the EU, NATO remained active in assisting FYROM’s army reform process through Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Membership Action Plan (MAP).\textsuperscript{337} In particular, NATO played an advisory role on defence reforms in the context of prospective NATO membership, including assisting in border security management, aiming at the same time “to

\textsuperscript{335} Ibid, p 342.
\textsuperscript{336} NATO website, Task Force Fox, http://www.nhqs.nato.int/missions/amberFox/amberFox.htm, website accessed 2 December 2009
\textsuperscript{337} James Pettifer, \textit{op cit}, p 6
transfer certain tasks from the army to the police and, finally, it intended to logistically support the NATO KFOR operation in neighbouring Kosovo.

The UN has also played a significant role in crisis management in FYROM. During the 90s, concerned over the potential for the spillover of instability from the conflicts in the neighbouring parts of the former Yugoslavia, the UN had mounted preventative peacekeeping missions - UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP - aiming to deter threats and to monitor and report on any threats that could undermine the stability of the country, including arms trafficking. In addition, the UN has offered its offices to mediate conflicts between Slav Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. These missions are widely credited as an extremely successful example of conflict prevention.

After the stabilisation of the country, the UN shifted its assistance towards development programmes. The UN, through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has been supporting the government of FYROM in areas such as decentralisation and social inclusion, employing a multi-sectoral approach seeking to “promote global values and principles.” More precisely, UNDP has been promoting respect for human rights, gender equality, and human development. There are some completed and some ongoing projects run by UNDP in FYROM that promote the principles and values mentioned above, among which the promotion of electoral rights, the promotion of inter-ethnic dialogue, the development of crisis management from man-made or natural disasters as well as fighting corruption.

The aim of this section is to show the involvement of the international actors on FYROM at the time of the ESDP operations as well as prior to them. This is significant for two reasons: firstly because the presence of the international community may have helped to prepare the ground for Europeanisation to occur through the ESDP operations. Second, acknowledging the presence of

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340 Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, op cit, p 80
342 Idem
other actors apart from the EU is crucial for measuring the impact of Europeanisation on FYROM. As explained in chapter 2, a baseline is necessary which determines the state that the country was in before the deployment of ESDP operations and against which changes on FYROM’s domestic structure can be measured. The role of the international community will be further explained in chapter 5.

4.6. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to begin by providing a contextual background on the case of FYROM which framed the environment into which the EU conceived and launched its ESDP missions, and hence the starting point for the next chapter to examine the Europeanisation role of the missions. This has primarily focussed on the crisis situation, whilst also highlighting the linkage between crisis management, the EU integration agenda, ESDP and Europeanisation. Importantly, the conflict brought to the surface the ethno-religious problems plaguing the country, the weak governance problems, and particularly those in the rule of law sector. This chapter has also provided a summary of the objectives and framework of the missions themselves, whilst giving a wider picture of related EU engagement in the country and the relevant roles of other actors were also involved in bringing security and stability. The focus of the next chapter is to provide an analytical assessment of the extent to which the ESDP missions’ objectives incorporated a Europeanisation agenda and a detailed examination of the specific ways in which they contributed to Europeanisation.
Chapter 5

An Assessment of the Europeanisation Role of ESDP Operations in FYROM

Case Studies: Concordia, Proxima and EUPAT

5.1 Introduction

The examination of Europeanisation theory presented in chapter two noted multiple definitions, dimensions and uses of the term ‘Europeanisation’ and its conceptualisation. What we are specifically interested in here is the idea of Europeanisation as the transfer by the EU of its rules, models, values and norms to countries beyond EU borders. Under this focus, Chapter Two analysed the relevance of Europeanisation theory to the second pillar of the EU – Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the EU’s external instruments including ESDP missions – and the relationship with the process of EU enlargement process.

Chapter Three plotted some key aspects of the normative and operational development of the EU’s external foreign and security policies and strategy, the emergence of ESDP as a key crisis management tool of the EU, the typology of the missions deployed under ESDP, and gave a general assessment of their potential to act as vehicles for a Europeanisation effect from the EU to non-EU countries in which they are deployed.

Chapter Four introduced the case study context of FYROM and the ESDP missions mounted there in response to the instability in the early years of the millennium, describing also how the ESDP missions fitted with wider EU and international engagement in the country during this period. It highlighted the
two overriding and connected factors relevant for the EU Europeanisation project in FYROM – the conflict, and the issues behind the conflict that were antithetical to EU notions of Europeanness, and the goal, pertinent challenges and process of integrating FYROM into the EU. This provides for an assessment in this chapter of the extent to which the ESDP military and civilian missions – Concordia, Proxima and EUPAT - can be said to have contributed to Europeanisation in FYROM through the transfer of EU values and standards. In doing so it will also consider whether they can be said to have imparted a deep, long-term Europeanisation effect on structural changes in FYROM, or whether the impact was epidermic and short-lived, and also whether they can be seen to have contributed to a wider Europeanisation effect beyond the relatively narrow focus of their mission objectives.

5.2 Europeanisation and ESDP in FYROM: Linking theory to practice

As we have seen in Chapter Two, Europeanisation is not a process confined to EU member states as it is not “locked to the EU” but it can spread or have an impact to the ‘near abroad’ and beyond. On these lines, as Olsen observed, Europeanisation can be interpreted as “exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory, focuses on relations with non-European actors and institutions and how Europe finds a place in a larger world order.” Through the process of Europeanisation, the EU exports norms which are the European “know-how”, the European way of doing things that could be associated with European standards. In addition to European values, structures and norms, the EU promotes through its external action its principles which are: the rule of law, respect for human rights and democratic accountability. This is the dimension of Europeanisation that is employed in this thesis. The EU’s engagement on the country of FYROM is used as a case study, with a focus on engagement through the EU’s ESDP operations instrument.

344 Olsen, (2002), op cit, p 924
The EU has come a long way since the establishment of the WEU, the creation of CFSP and the incorporation of ESDP in the second pillar of the EU which gave some independence to the EU over choosing where and when a civilian or military operation will take place. The evolution of the EU into a security actor gave new impetus and capability to the Union to project itself abroad and to export its values, ideas, norms and principles to other countries. Earlier in this thesis it has been highlighted how the crises in the Western Balkans have been one of the main drivers of the EU’s efforts to develop its Common Foreign and Security Policy and the ESDP mission instrument. Yet, quoting Emerson and Gross, “The Balkan [ESDP] missions have been the most complex, since the EU’s commitment to the region’s Europeanisation is by its nature permanent, whereas missions elsewhere tend more to be based on an in-and-out model.”\textsuperscript{345} The EU’s involvement in the Western Balkans “is seen strategically as leading on through successive stages of Europeanisation to full EU membership in the long run.”\textsuperscript{346}

fYROM is an ex-Yugoslav country bordering the EU. Since the process of Europeanisation has been shown to be relevant beyond EU borders, it is logical to hypothesise that it is relevant in the case of fYROM. At the time that the ESDP operations started in fYROM, the country was not formally a candidate for EU membership. The thesis is exploring whether and to what extent the military operation Concordia and the police missions Proxima and EUPAT have succeeded in contributing to Europeanising fYROM and facilitating the country’s road to EU membership through the implementation of reforms, adapting to EU norms and policies and adopting EU principles, values and approaches, for example in the area of policing practices. As such, the military and civilian operations are considered in this case as potential instruments for Europeanisation.

\textsuperscript{345} Michael Emerson and Eva Gross (2007), ‘Introduction’ in Emerson & Gross (ed), \textit{op cit}, p 6
\textsuperscript{346} \textit{Idem}
5.2.1 Identifying the mechanisms of Europeanisation in the case study

In chapter two the mechanisms of Europeanisation were discussed through which the impact of Europeanisation can be explained and analysed. As there are several types of mechanisms, sometimes more than one mechanism may be in play at any given time. It has been noted that these mechanisms might change over the course of time. Furthermore, it is depending on the receptiveness of the country and its ability to adapt, on the ‘goodness of fit’ or ‘misfit’ between the EU and the country, and on the current situation and the particular needs of the country at that very moment. Different mechanisms of Europeanisation might therefore be relevant in order to explain the effect of Europeanisation and also how Europeanisation takes place.

Among the mechanisms found to be relevant in the case study are a soft form of Knill and Lehmkuhl’s idea of transferrable European models; a vertical type of Europeanisation, which evidently is a top-down approach; and the processes of socialisation, 347 diffusion and ‘overt diffusion’ 348 as put forward by Olsen, and Manners. These and other mechanisms will be examined in the case study analysis below.

5.2.2 Challenges of measuring the Europeanisation effect in fYROM

Michael Sahlin, former European Union Special Representative to fYROM, noted that “The dynamics for meeting European standards is not [an] exact science...”. 349 This comment hints at a number of difficulties in setting out to measure the contributions ESDP missions have made to Europeanisation in fYROM. Firstly, as it has been noted previously, the notion of ‘Europeanisation’ can be problematic generally and in this specific context in the sense that whilst the EU may have set out a vision for the role of ESDP in fYROM, and employed notions of ‘Europeanness’ in the form of standards,

347 Olsen, in Cini’s book, op cit , p 335
models, values and norms that it sought to promote in, and required to be achieved by FYROM, the definition of distinct and ‘agreed’ EU models remains under-developed in key areas, including a precise and distinct shared EU model of civilian policing.\footnote{This was certainly the case for the period under examination here, though there have been some advancements (such as on SSR).}

Secondly, the ESDP missions were only one instrument of EU engagement in the country, coming on the back of previous policy and interventions, and conducted at the same time as, and followed by, other EU programmes, some closely linked to the objectives of the missions. Thirdly, and linked to the first, a host of international actors were working in FYROM during the period in question in the areas covered by the direct scope of the ESDP missions, some of whom also promoted ‘European’ and broadly similar models, standards and values, presenting a problem for neatly disaggregating the EU’s, and ESDP missions’ distinct contributions.

Fourthly, these challenges are compounded by the lack of available detailed mission objectives or reporting on the activities and achievements of the ESDP operations individually, overall, and vis-à-vis those of other actors, and by the absence or at least unavailability of a formal baseline assessment for the mission. Another challenge is that, as with much empirical testing of theoretical frameworks in practical contexts, the EU and ESDP mandates and reporting do not themselves apply the specific term ‘Europeanisation’ in their objectives or post-action impact measurement. The researcher must therefore undertake a somewhat interpretive process to extract and assess Europeanisation intent and effect.

\textbf{5.2.3 Methodology}

For the purposes of the analysis undertaken here, and building on the general policy vision of the EU embodied in CFSP, ESDP and the accession process described in Chapter 3, a number of reference points are used relating to Europeanisation intent and effect. The first is that of the language contained in
statements and documents, official and non-official, related to the strategic policy frameworks for EU engagement in fYROM, in particular the SAA and the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The second is statements and reporting concerning the ESDP missions specifically. Furthermore, Europeanisation developments related to the intent of the ESDP missions will be considered in relation to the ‘baseline’ position of fYROM at the point of the conflict in 2001, the Ohrid Peace Agreement and the first ESDP intervention.

Interviews were undertaken in Skopje, Brussels, Maastricht and the UK with European Council, Commission and Member State officials, Government of fYROM advisers, international academics and others. Surveys, observations and primary and secondary documents have also served as a basis for this analysis.

5.3 An analysis of the Europeanisation contributions of ESDP missions Concordia, EUPOL Proxima and EUPAT

The following sections will analyse the Europeanisation framing of the ‘vision’ for the missions and their symbolic and practical Europeanisation contributions, including in relation to a number of cross-cutting areas. Further on, each individual area where there was a Europeanisation framing and effect as a result of ESDP missions will be explained and analysed.

5.3.1 Analysis of the Concordia operation

The nine-month Concordia military mission incorporated a number of tasks, including deterrent patrolling, reconnaissance, situational awareness reporting and liaison activities with the local civil and military authorities, international organisations, community actors and the general population. Along with other international actors on the ground, and following-on from NATO’s disarmament operation, Concordia acted as an observer in the process of illegal weapons surrendering, destruction, and registration of legal arms, as
part of the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement.\textsuperscript{351} In addition, it provided support for civilian international community observers. The nature and relatively short life span of the Concordia mission might suggest it could have only very limited, if any, relevance as a vehicle for Europeanisation in fYROM. There are, however, certain important aspects of the mission that deserve attention, some of which were largely symbolic, others more concrete and practical.

Concordia was established in line with the objectives of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and in close partnership with the country's authorities. From the outset, the vision for the operation was framed in, and within, distinctly Europeanisation ‘terms of reference’, both in relation to crisis management and addressing the causes of conflict, and in relation to the adoption of longer-term reforms necessary on the road to EU membership. A European Council meeting pointed that “the full implementation of the Framework Agreement as an essential requirement for further progress towards integration into European structures”,\textsuperscript{352} and furthermore that the success of the Proxima mission would be measured by the successful implementation of the Ohrid agreement and the SAA.\textsuperscript{353}

At the launch ceremony for the Concordia operation, fYROM's president Boris Trajkovski stated that “The more of EU we have in Macedonia, the more of Macedonia there will be in the EU.” In the same speech, Mr Trajkovski proposed that “The presence of the EU Forces in Macedonia is also another sign that we all belong to the community of shared values of democracy, rule of law and market economy.” He went on:

\begin{quote}
In this context, the arrival of the EU Forces in Macedonia for me symbolises three important things: the first is that this mission will support the strengthening of our own capabilities, so that we are
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{353} Council of the European Union, 5454/04, op cit, p 6.
in a position to ensure lasting peace and stability. The second is the confidence that we have in the European Union. The third is the ambition of this country to establish closer links with the European Union in all areas. Our ambition is full membership in the Union, and I would like to see this mission, and our joint efforts in promoting stability, as a step in that direction...to tackle the security risks and sources of instability that stand as threats to our security and to increase the capacity of the institutions of the country in the protection and promotion of the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.  

At the same ceremony, Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, also identified a direct role for the Concordia operation in facilitating the longer-term agenda of FYROM’s accession to the EU: “My dear friends, there is a long but beautiful journey towards the EU that lies ahead. There will be undoubtedly obstacles and this mission here will help you overcome some of the initial ones”. Solana’s speech identified the ESDP intervention as representing a new phase in EU-fYROM cooperation that would now cover all fields – political, economic and security, with both actors having a shared interest in making the best possible use of all instruments. Furthermore, it was noted that “Its presence will stimulate enhanced dialogue on security matters between FYROM and the EU. This will reinforce existing co-operation in developing the security sector and assist the country in its efforts to develop its own standards in line with European practices.”

Through the launch of the military operation Concordia, the EU could be seen as demonstrating its political commitment to FYROM and its population. Ilija Talev from the Center for Research and Policy Making in Skopje suggests that Concordia signaled EU presence and interest in the country; in doing so it also demonstrated the credibility, through military capability, of an organization (the

355 Ibid
356 Ibid
EU) that was hitherto largely seen in FYROM as ‘all talk and no action’.

At the ground level Talev has argued that Concordia “...had a strong psychological effect on the population”. The visibility of the mission on the ground, an important element of its monitoring and deterrent effect, gave the EU a certain profile 'among the people'. The tangibility and visibility of its presence provided a real ‘interface’ between the EU and the country. The mission can also be said to have conveyed a positive normative character of the EU: the mission did so through its role in promoting dialogue amongst the conflicting parties, and, as identified by Colonel Pierre Augustin, the mission’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and French representative in the Concordia mission, through its reputation for impartiality. Furthermore, Augustin identified the constant contact between the operation’s personnel and all the ethnic communities as pivotal in restoring public confidence.

Through its primary focus on immediate stabilisation objectives, the mission helped to control existing conflict and prevent further violence while at the same time building confidence and creating the stable security environment necessary for the initiation and implementation of the reform elements included in the Ohrid Agreement and EU accession requirements. Furthermore, it has been argued that as Concordia “...helped build stability and confidence [it was also important in]...persuading the ethnic Albanians to remain engaged politically [emphasis added].” This sees Concordia not only as a contributor to immediate security and technical reforms, but indirectly as a promoter of peaceful democratic politics in the unstable post-conflict period. In addition, the operation provided an element of security for civilian EU programme and diplomatic engagement which themselves had a Europeanisation agenda and which, it could be argued, would have had less

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357 Interview with Ilija Talev, Analyst at the Center for Research Policy Making in Skopje, noted interview, 14 April 2009
358 Ibid
359 Interview with Klm Freidberg, Head of Section for Europe, Council of the European Union, General Secretariat, noted interview, 30 September 2009
traction, or secure space within which to operate, without the EU mounting a military mission to lay the ground for its softer, wider and longer-term engagement.

At this key moment in FYROM’s history then, Concordia played an important part in generating a tangible sense of the EU being a credible and relevant actor in FYROM; it contributed to maintaining and strengthening the case in the eyes of the Government of FYROM, the country’s elites and citizens for implementing the Ohrid peace accord, and pursuing EU membership and the standards and values that that entailed. As such, Concordia was a positive contributor to the ‘receptiveness’ of FYROM to Europeanisation. The symbolic and normative aspects of Concordia provided important foundations for a practical Europeanisation effect to occur through the activities of the mission itself. Furthermore, Concordia laid the ground for the follow-up Proxima and EUPAT missions to contribute to Europeanisation. Overall, though relatively small in scale and duration, it can be concluded that the military operation Concordia acted both as a direct vehicle for Europeanisation, but on balance played a more important enabling role for a wider, deeper and longer-term process of Europeanisation. It is clear that the notion of Europeanisation transfer was more or less overtly at the heart of the vision for Concordia, and this set the tone for the two further ESDP missions that followed.

5.3.2 Analysis of the Proxima and EUPAT police missions

The Concordia military operation came to an end with the reduced risk of ethnic violence, with the mission having successfully completed its primary task of overseeing the disarmament process. The EU again turned to its ESDP instrument to continue its role in supporting the further implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, combined with the objective of supporting FYROM in adopting the reforms necessary under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Furthermore, the nature of the mission shift reflected a transition

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362 See Chapter 2 of this thesis for a discussion of receptiveness to Europeanisation.
from the role of ESDP for short-term crisis management (Concordia) into a focus on the qualitative improvement of the police in line with the Security Sector Reform aspect of the Petersberg Tasks – through the follow-on EUPOL Proxima and EUPAT missions.  

The police mission Proxima was launched to support the consolidation of law and order focusing on the former crisis areas, and to “monitor, mentor, and advise” the police and Ministry of Interior in undertaking reforms, promoting European policing standards, strengthening border management, helping build confidence between the police and the population, and enhancing policing cooperation with neighbouring countries. As Kim describes, this constituted support aimed at developing an efficient, well-trained, professional, and multi-ethnic police service.  

The objective of the six month EUPAT mission which succeeded Proxima was to further support the development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing, with police experts monitoring and mentoring the police and Ministry of Interior in the areas of border policing, public peace and order and accountability, the fight against corruption and organised crime, focusing on middle and senior management levels. EUPAT was concerned in particular with implementation of police reform in the field, police-judiciary cooperation, and the implementation of professional standards and internal control. EUPAT was designed as a “bridging operation” before the European Commission launched its police reform project under the CARDS programme which aimed to provide technical assistance at field level. Due to the high degree of overlap between the objectives and continuity between Proxima and EUPAT, the assessment

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363 Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, (2008), op cit, p 81  
364 Council of the European Union, European Security and Defence Policy, EUPOL Proxima/FYROM, op cit, p 5  
366 Eva Gross, (2007b), op cit, p 139
below largely considers the two missions together as a combined ESDP civilian policing-focused intervention.\textsuperscript{367}

On the launch of Proxima, the EU again set out a distinctly Europeanisation vision, stating that “The promotion of European standards of policing in FYROM is part of the EU’s wider strategy of supporting the process of reform, including institution building, administrative and judicial reforms and fight against organised crime and corruption, all of which are essential for the development of a stable and democratic state.”\textsuperscript{368} At the opening ceremony, Javier Solana stated that “Proxima is part of the wider Stabilisation and Association Process aimed at strengthening the rule of law and the mission will support [FYROM’s] efforts in moving closer towards the EU.”\textsuperscript{369}

Islam Yusufi, Associate at the Cabinet of the President of Macedonia, where he covered NATO and EU integration portfolios has argued, that, “Despite the initial perception that the mission would be purely operational in character, Proxima has become a critical engine for institutional change in the country. It became proactive in setting the police reform agenda, particularly in strengthening the law enforcement system in the country, while staying within the bounds of its mandate.”\textsuperscript{370}

At the end of the mission, Solana stated that “Proxima has been instrumental in supporting the further development of a police service based on European standards.”\textsuperscript{371} An interviewee teaching at the Police Academy in Skopje cites the major reform impacts of the ESDP missions as the education of the police force, implementation of a community policing approach, re-orientation of the

\textsuperscript{367} It is noteworthy that interviewees for this thesis, and the great majority of secondary sources, commonly fail to specify, disaggregate or compare the roles of Proxima and EUPAT, tending to talk more generally about ESDP efforts on peace.


police as a service for citizens, measures taken against corruption, and noticeably better communication between citizens, local authorities and the police.\textsuperscript{372} According to an EU analyst, “arguably, today without Proxima we would not have been able to achieve such an enormous progress with the integrated border management, creation of a border police, introduction of biometric passports, police reform, improved police capacities to combat organised crime etc.”\textsuperscript{373} Such assessments support the view that the ESDP police missions successfully contributed to the Europeanisation agenda of the EU and FYROM.

The following analysis examines in more detail some of the different ways the missions contributed to the process of Europeanisation in FYROM.

5.3.3 Europeanisation of FYROM's policing concept

Proxima directly contributed to the implementation of the commitment made in the Ohrid Agreement to ‘ensure that police are aware of and responsive to the needs and interests of the local population’\textsuperscript{374} (the wording of which was heavily influenced by the EU and framed in such European terms). The code name of the mission - ‘Proxima’ - itself reflected the European model of proximity policing, or community policing, with the idea that the police should be a community service to citizens.

The commander of the mission, Bart d'Hooge, highlighted that one of the roles of the mission was to advise on how to actually get people back to the police stations:

“For example, what we noticed when we were looking at the Macedonian police was that they have a bunker mentality,” he

\textsuperscript{372} Interview with Rade Rajkovcevski, Junior Assistant at the Police Academy in Skopje, Noted interview, 23 April 2009
\textsuperscript{373} Interview with Ilija Talev, \textit{op cit}
said. "It is police stations where police officers in camouflage uniforms, bullet-proof vests and Kalashnikovs are - and that is not very welcoming for people to report a crime."  

In helping to de-militarise the police sector and present a new civilian (and less threatening) character, the mission symbolically led by example: other than a relatively small number of armed protection officers, the mission personnel did not carry weapons. Another key aspect of the ‘proximity’ approach taken by the mission was the physical co-location of mission personnel with national police officers within police stations, and with police and officials within the institution of the Ministry of Interior. 

Proxima mission staff actually included a senior national legal adviser from FYROM’s MOI, and a seconded permanent liaison officer from the team of the National Director of the government’s National Safety Bureau; furthermore, Proxima’s activities were jointly programmed with MOI officials. These ways of working represented an important way in which Proxima promoted national ownership of the Europeanisation efforts, and through direct, daily and intensive interfaces that provided maximum opportunities to diffuse European values, norms and behaviours as well as technical expertise.

Under its Confidence Building project activity, Proxima supported Community Advisory Groups (CAGs), previously initiated by the OSCE, aimed at bringing the police, municipal structures and local communities together and stimulating dialogue to help resolve local problems related to the police and the safety of the citizens, such as the possession of small arms. The concept was first established in the former crisis regions and it is being established throughout the country. 

References


377 Flessenkemper, in Merlingen and Ostrauskaite’s book, op cit, p 86


creation of a professional police service and encouraging the building of trust and confidence between the locals and the police. More precisely, Proxima continued the OSCE’s work, creating thirty-six new CAGs across the whole country, whereas they had previously been confined to the former crisis regions. The Community Advisory Groups were highlighted in the final Proxima mission report as one of the true successes of the mission. They can be seen as a key part of the efforts to influence the transformation of the police as a professional and accountable public service in line with the EU policing model and standards.

The Proxima mission’s Press and Public Information Office can be understood as an important part of the mission’s capacity for promoting EU policing and wider principles. The final mission report notes that the Office sought to support free and open media access to the mission, including through communication products in local languages. Website, brochures, press conferences and events were used to provide information to the citizens. PROXIMA also cooperated with fYROM’s Ministry of Interior on a public information campaign aimed at reaching out to the entire population with the message of ‘Police close to the people’.

These communications activities can be said to have had three positive Europeanisation dimensions. The first is demonstrating transparency and accountability of the mission, and of the EU itself. The second is that it helped “facilitate the impact [of the mission] towards the public”, communicating the role of the mission and its cooperation with the authorities and citizens, including through holding events during Europe Day celebrations which provided “a great opportunity for the Mission to get closer to the people.” These public communications activities therefore had a positive demonstration effect that built local confidence directly in relation to the EU’s approach to

380 Isabelle Ioannides, The EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima) and the European Union Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, p 192 in European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009), Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds), EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2009
policing – serving all citizens, including minorities, accountability and visibility, and the EU’s values more broadly. In Europeanisation theory terms, this represents an example of ‘overt diffusion’. Public confidence in the mission and the approach and objectives it was there to achieve can be said to be important for the receptiveness of FYROM to the Europeanisation of the police and reforms in other areas relevant for European integration. The third and direct Europeanisation contribution through the mission’s communications activities was through the cooperation with the MOI public information campaign, which saw the FYROM authorities directly emphasising to its own population the change towards a public service function for the police, as promoted by Proxima. In fact Proxima deliberately took a background role in the campaign to ensure the local police and authorities were most visible in order to maximise the contribution to confidence-building, and stimulate public expectations of the police reform process.\(^{383}\) The mission therefore promoted national ownership, sustainability and accountability for implementing the community policing concept, with demonstration effects for other areas of good governance.

Proxima’s assistance to the MOI included developing a number of operational guidelines, such as on crime investigation, working routines, and training concepts, incorporating European standards and approaches, and was also involved in training workshops for Macedonian police officers.\(^ {384}\) In addition, Proxima also advised and mentored a multi-gender and multi-ethnic Working Group created by the MOI to develop a Mission Statement for the police.\(^ {385}\) These all provided important platforms for the mission to diffuse European approaches into specific areas of practice within the MOI and the police.

### 5.3.4 Supporting the development of multi-ethnic policing

Proxima and EUPAT contributed to implementing the Ohrid Agreement’s elements on pursuing representative proportions of ethnic Albanians in the police force and seeing multi-ethnic policing occurring in the former crisis

\(^ {383}\) Ibid, p3
\(^ {384}\) Ioannides, Police Mission in Macedonia, in Emerson and Gross (ed), op cit, p 109
areas as a key part of improving the confidence of the population in the police. For example, Proxima officers were involved in monitoring the performance of multi-ethnic police units. This provided important direct insights into the technical progress of reforms on the ground, the integration of the different ethnicities within the police, and the perceptions of Albanian citizens, all of which was noted in progress reports, creating pressure for change. As well as relating to a European model of policing that serves all citizens, and as such addressing one of the key drivers for the preceding conflict, this represents a contribution to the wider Europeanisation agenda of inclusion of minorities in society and the state.

5.3.5 Human Rights

Respect for human rights has been noted as a core element of Europeanness, and the diffusion of human rights as a key Europeanisation objective within the EU’s foreign and security policy. It features in the European Security Strategy, and as a core requirement of the EU membership criteria. Even so, at the time of the ESDP missions in FYROM, human rights tasks were not explicitly included as a category of ESDP civilian mission tasks generally, even if de facto performed by missions as a natural part of their role.\textsuperscript{386}

Given the centrality of human rights issues in the conflict and the challenges FYROM faced in its stabilisation and EU accession, it is notable that 'human rights' were not explicitly mentioned or emphasised in the mandates of the ESDP missions. Yet according to the head of the Proxima mission, Brigadier General Jürgen Scholz, Proxima had a strong human rights focus which embraced the human rights tasks of monitoring and capacity-building, specifically through the mission’s establishment of Law Enforcement Monitors. He argued that the human rights aspect found expression in the planning of the operations and in the work of the mission, and that human rights knowledge was taken into consideration in selection of personnel and was

included in the police training. Similarly, Scholz argues that, though again not specified in the mission tasks, EUPAT also actively contributed to establishing a human rights culture.  

Human rights promotion can be said to have been embedded in the philosophy, mandates, activities and impacts of the FYROM missions, through preventing violence (and the threat to the right to life), monitoring, mentoring and advising human rights-related law enforcement, and promoting non-discrimination in policing. Therefore, the missions played a role in top-down Europeanisation of human rights practices, including through overt diffusion via the physical presence of the ESDP missions and social learning processes between the mission and its personnel, and FYROM’s institutions and personnel, including military, police, relevant ministries, and interactions with civil society and the general population.

5.3.6 Elections security: supporting peaceful democratic normalisation

Alongside human rights, the promotion of democratic principles and processes, including the holding of free, fair and peaceful elections, is another important universal value of the EU, and of the Europeanisation agenda of EU external policy and action relating to security strategy and integration. It was not included explicitly in the mandate or tasks of the mission, but Proxima offered and undertook a monitoring and advisory role alongside the local police in support of security around the Presidential election in 2004. The election period passed largely peacefully, unlike previous elections. Whilst minor, Proxima therefore played its part in the peaceful democratic normalisation process. The contribution of the police missions to governance decentralisation can also be seen in this light (see below).
5.3.7 Europeanisation of the approach to border management

At the time of the missions, the EU was in the process of refining an agreed approach to border management for the EU itself and in its external action (including crisis management and accession and neighbourhood instruments). The ‘Integrated Border Management (IBM)’ model was intended to promote the safe movement of persons and goods across borders while preventing illegal migration, human trafficking, arms and drugs smuggling. The EU “actively encouraged the countries in the Western Balkans to take up the EU’s border management model”, and it was included as an element of the EU-fYROM Stability and Association Agreement and in the Ohrid Agreement. fYROM officially adopted the approach in 2002.

The Proxima mission has been cited as contributing considerably to the wider EU effort to promote implementation of the IBM model. The deployment of ESDP mission personnel to fYROM’s border crossings was part of their mentoring, monitoring and advising remit. Co-operation between fYROM’s military and police in border management had previously been very poor, and it was suggested that there was a necessity to transform the existing military surveillance system into “a professional law-enforcement agency of specialised and dedicated border police.”

In line with the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the Final Document of the Ohrid Border and Security Management Conference, new legislation was adopted that transferred responsibility for securing the border from the Ministry of Defence to a new civilian Border Police, in line with European practice. Proxima personnel advised on institutional restructuring, supporting moves towards redefining roles and responsibilities along the lines of EU approaches, including through supervising the replacement of military units serving at

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390 European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of WEU, ESDP and the future of the Western Balkans – reply to the annual report of the Council, Appendix 1, ESDP operations in the Western Balkans, 3 June 2009
391 Hills, op cit, p 62
392 FYR Macedonia Answers to the European Union Accession Questionnaire, op cit, p. 13
border posts. Through the physical deployment alongside indigenous personnel they also contributed via social learning to diffusing an EU ethos to border policing, including to building trust between the (mostly) ethnic Albanian population in the border areas and the state security agencies. Furthermore, the strengthening of border management and reduction in threats of violence and criminality associated with the previously weak state control of the border areas, improved neighbourhood security, stability and cooperation – important objectives of Europeanisation.

A 2007 Stability Pact assessment judged that fYROM had made good progress since 2003 on strengthening its borders and through the adoption of a national IBM strategy and action plan although more work was needed on the implementation of existing legal frameworks and on the alignment of these with EU standards.393

5.3.8 Contribution to wider Security Sector Reform (SSR)

During the ESDP missions in fYROM, the EU managed to indirectly assist fYROM’s government with the implementation of security sector reform in areas that were not explicitly covered by their mandate: in principal, for example, they were not mandated with supporting reform of the Macedonian army, but “the events of 2001 and the subsequent ESDP mission in the country acted as catalysts for reform” of the military.394 This mainly occurred through “informal processes and interaction”395 between the missions and the country’s military, and indirectly through, for example, promoting the demilitarization of the police. Police missions Proxima and EUPAT have also facilitated SSR reform in fYROM with the promotion of integrated border management and the creation of an effective border police as well as with increasing police cooperation with neighbouring states and between the police

393 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Working Table III: Security, Briefing on the Ohrid Process on Border Security and Management to the COWEB, 18 January 2007, Mr Pieter Verbeek, Director of the Stability Pact Working Table III, p 2
394 Interview with Ilija Talev, op cit
395 Idem
and the judiciary.\textsuperscript{396} As such, whilst having a primary focus on the police, the Proxima and EUPAT missions provided a platform for the EU to spread its principles, values, standards and best practices in wider security and rule of law areas, through social learning and overt diffusion.

\textbf{5.3.9 Capacity to promote EU governance models and principles}

Whilst not commonly highlighted as an EU ‘model’ or ‘principle’ of good governance, or as a distinct aspect of Europeanisation, the promotion of horizontal administration coordination and policy across government does appear to be at least an implicit dimension of the EU’s external Europeanisation agenda. The development of a holistic sectoral, cross-government approach to SSR by the EU is directly relevant here. Also FYROM’s centralised, personalised and politicised government and security structure presented an institutional structure antithetical to the EU model of good governance.

Relative to other multilateral entities involved in police reform in FYROM, Proxima has been described by the International Crisis Group as “one of the most effective advisory mechanisms…”, where its impact on police and ministry officials’ methods, practice and coordination was based on the leverage generated by FYROM’s incentives for EU membership, providing the mission with consistent working-level access.\textsuperscript{397} Its strength came from its ability to collaborate closely with government departments while, at the same time, convincing them to cooperate with each other. This was achieved through regular meetings with government officials from the public prosecutor’s office and the Ministry of Interior, facilitating the communication between the two, and in so doing, promoting the focus of the law enforcement authorities around a common objective. In addition, the introduction of Law


\textsuperscript{397} International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Wobbling Toward Europe, op cit, p 9
Enforcement Monitors by the mission improved cooperation between the police and the judicial authorities.  

5.3.10 Contribution to decentralisation

Proxima helped the government of FYROM to set in motion and implement several institutional reforms with wider impacts, among which the mission has contributed to the decentralisation process, a key aspect of EU democracy principles. Proxima personnel deployed not just in the capital Skopje but also other larger cities as well as smaller towns, villages and the borders, where it promoted and supported the decentralisation of policing authority and mindset. In line with the national Police Reform Strategy and Action Plan, it encouraged the strengthening of municipalities to take on more responsibility for policing and to be more accountable to the population at the local level. During the police mission Proxima, it was decided that the police would be decentralised to eight regional centres in Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Ohrid, Bitola, Stip, Kumanovo and Strumica. This gave greater independence to regional centres rather than the central police department to make decisions on local police-related issues.

The decentralisation process resulted in the creation of stronger borders and a tighter security for the citizens of FYROM as well as for neighbouring countries. Furthermore, decentralisation has also helped the government to consolidate the law and to transfer structures from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Interior resulting in better coordination between the two departments.

5.4 ESDP as a flexible vehicle for Europeanisation in FYROM

On the completion of Proxima, Solana noted that the EU’s relationship with FYROM was moving from ‘post-crisis stabilisation to pre-accession integration’. More precisely, he noted: “I think this evolution shows how far the country has
come. It also illustrates the EU's ability to adapt its different tools to specific situations, with specific needs. We began by taking over a military operation, continued with an ESDP police mission, the ending of which we mark today, and will follow up with EUPAT and the European Commission projects.  

On 17 December 2005, 3 days after the completion of the Proxima mission, FYROM was granted the status of a candidate country for EU membership. With the granting of candidacy status, it was an oxymoron for FYROM to remain a recipient of such a ‘crisis management’ EU intervention as Proxima had been. The softer and scaled-down terms of EUPAT represented a more politically appropriate and acceptable mission to both the Government of FYROM and the EU. Not only did EUPAT allow for a continued presence and Europeanisation contribution through ESDP, but it acted as a valuable bridging mechanism between the police reform aspects of Proxima, and the beginning of a delayed European Commission-funded CARDS police reform project still under preparation.

As such, and taking into account the transition from the military Concordia operation also, ESDP’s flexibility in this case demonstrates how the ESDP mission instrument provided an avenue for Europeanisation over a period of time and in a range of areas, through changing security and political circumstances. Adaptability provided scope for some EU continuity through the period of ESDP engagement despite the relatively short periods of each mission individually.

As noted above, the offer of support from the Promixa mission to advise and monitor security arrangements for the 2005 Presidential election appears to be an example of an existing ESDP presence on the ground flexibly and opportunistically responding to needs and opportunities within its broad mandate to contribute to Europeanisation in a particular way.

400 Council of the European Union, Statement by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, on the occasion of the ceremony marking the end of the EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, S406/05, Brussels, 9 December 2005
401 Interview with Islam Yusufi, Counsel for Foreign Policy at the Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Macedonia, International Policy Fellow at the Center for Policy Studies, Budapest, Hungary, noted interview, 23 April 2009
5.4.1 Timeframes and depth of Europeanisation effect

Alice Hills has argued that Proxima’s aim to help fYROM develop a police force equivalent to European standards would fail due in part to the mission’s short life span.\(^{402}\) The fact of the matter is that deep and politically sensitive institutional reform was necessary, and more time would clearly be needed in order for the EU to aid fYROM’s government with its police reform, beyond the deployment of the ESDP missions. Yet, despite the fact that Proxima had a relatively short life span, it does not necessarily mean that the results it produced were short-lived or superficial. The Head of the Proxima Mission stated that whilst much remained to be done, and given it was always going to require more than the two-year period of the mission for the required complete reorientation of the police force, Proxima did indeed bring huge improvements in the work of fYROM’s police.\(^{403}\) International Crisis Group concurred, reporting that Proxima had “produced visible results…” in the short time scale.\(^{404}\)

Given the model of staffing ESDP missions, based mainly on short-term seconded uniformed personnel from Member States, such missions are likely to face the problem of mission personnel frequently rotating, affecting continuity, including understanding of the reform context, and undermining the chance they have to make a deep Europeanisation impact. Even so, according to one analyst, EU police officers were generally in fYROM for at least a year giving them enough time to adapt and learn about the situation the country was in.\(^{405}\) Flessenkemper on the other hand points to a lack of continuity in mission personnel and programmes between the end of Proxima I and the beginning of Proxima II resulting in a two month delay.\(^{406}\) Nevertheless, the extended mission became fully operational very quickly and continued the work that was started during the first year of the mission. fYROM continued to

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\(^{402}\) Hills, op cit, p 66-67

\(^{403}\) Jürgen Scholz, cited in Jana Arloth and Frauke Seidensticker, op cit, p45


\(^{405}\) Interview with Ilija Talev, op cit

\(^{406}\) Tobias Flessenkemper, op cit, p 91
require international assistance even after the end of the extended mission but the country’s government was determined to end this “symbolic burden”.\textsuperscript{407} Even though the EUPAT mission provided a valuable degree of continuity, the head of the Proxima mission, Jürgen Scholz, has argued that if Proxima had been extended further it would have had the chance to make a deeper impact.

5.5 Europeanisation in fYROM through wider EU engagement

Europeanisation is a long-term and, one could say, a never-ending process. The EU has started this process in fYROM firstly with the SAA and through valuable financial assistance, and later with the granting of candidacy status and the start of negotiations for EU membership. ESDP operations had their share in the Europeanisation process as they contributed to stabilising and securing the country, creating the right conditions for fYROM to focus on the important task of getting the country up and running.

The European Union described Operation Concordia as “one component of its larger and multi-faceted commitment to Macedonia, which includes economic assistance and EU-association benefits. In a ‘lessons learned’ document, former Concordia Commander Major General Pierre Maral, highlighted the importance of the integration of the operation into a wider strategy, “enlightened by a coherent political vision”.\textsuperscript{408}

In terms of security, the SAA between the EU and fYROM highlighted the need for a common view on security and stability in Europe based on the CFSP.\textsuperscript{409} Through the SAA, the EU is seeking to promote solidarity between the two parties, laying the groundwork for a strong and smooth cooperation in the area of security. The notion of Europeanisation is implicitly embedded in the wording of the agreement, in terms of promoting European standards and policies in all areas, including that of security. The SAA is a long-term EU

\textsuperscript{407} Idem
\textsuperscript{408} http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine05/version_us/retex/art18.pdf
\textsuperscript{409} Council of the European Union, Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part, 26 March 2001, Brussels, Article 7, p 11
approach to the stabilisation and security of FYROM with the scope of achieving long-term and permanent outcomes.

The EU has assisted FYROM with other twinning projects to further increase its prospects for EU membership and further EU integration. A 21-month EU-funded twinning project was started in April 2007 aimed at developing the Public Internal Financial Control system (PIFC) in line with the *acquis communautaire*. More precisely, FYROM is cooperating with the Dutch Ministry of Finance on implementing reforms in the financial sector in order to develop a stable financial management and control system. The project was characterised by Erwan Fouéré, the Head of the European Commission Delegation in Skopje as “an exceptional model of cooperation between EU and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and a significant step in the country’s preparations for EU accession.” Another 15-month twinning project, managed by the European Agency for Reconstruction and financed under the CARDS programme, was decided in 2008 to “build the country’s capacity in improving the labour market as part of the overall preparations for joining the EU.” So far, FYROM is successfully collaborating with representatives from Slovakia on this project aiming to harmonise laws in compliance with EU legislation in order to achieve a smooth accession to the EU. Overall, twinning projects are highly important as they offer the opportunity to EU candidate countries to collaborate with existing EU member states on policy reforms and gain valuable insights into the EU modus operandi prior to accession. This section proves that the EU throughout the years plays a catalytic role in the Europeanisation of FYROM. This thesis, however, is not about the internal/domestic Europeanisation dynamics in FYROM as it explores whether and to what extend ESDP missions could be a vehicle and a potential instrument for Europeanisation.

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410 Twinning is an enlargement instrument introduced by the European Commission in 1998 to assist candidate and potential candidate countries with the strengthening of the administrative and judicial capacity to implement EU policy as future EU members.


5.6 The role of the wider international community

Clearly, the ESDP missions, and EU instruments more broadly, were not alone in aiming to diffuse values, norms, standards and models in FYROM in the areas of security, policing, human rights, democracy and decentralisation. As described in Chapter 4, NATO and the OSCE, and to a lesser extent the UN, were also key actors. Given the degree of overlap and commonalities, as well as the different timeframes during which these actors were engaged, it is important but at the same time challenging to disaggregate the specific Europeanisation-related impacts of the ESDP missions versus other actors. It is useful to briefly consider the ESDP missions in relation to aspects of NATO and OSCE involvement.

5.6.1 NATO

According to Balkan specialist James Pettifer, “the challenge for the EU ‘Proxima’ police mission will be to kick start the stalled process of reform within the police and to develop an integrated security and police strategy that overcomes the instinctive suspicion of the ethnic Albanians for non-NATO controlled initiatives.” Despite the fact that the EU’s presence with the ESDP operation Concordia was generally welcomed in the country, the EU was sometimes seen as indecisive and not particularly proactive. For example, reportedly, the EU military personnel were not well respected by the Slav-Macedonian troops. On the other hand, Americans, through the country’s collaboration with NATO, were seen as more practical and, hence, achieved a better reputation.

Some factors that contributed to the negative perceptions towards the EU were its perceived weak role in the Bosnian crisis, a general lack of confidence towards the EU in comparison to NATO, and the lack of experience in working

413 Ibid, p 10
with the EU prior to the ESDP missions.\footnote{414 Interview with Dr. Nano Ruzin, Ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia in NATO, Candidate for Presidential Elections 2009 and Professor in the University of Skopje, noted interview, 24 April 2009} Furthermore, according to a UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) official, there is a historical connotation to the pro-NATO sentiment in fYROM associated for example with positive perceptions of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.\footnote{415 Interview with an FCO official, 24 July 2009} Especially after 2004 when the US recognised fYROM under its constitutional name, there was a noticeable favouritism towards NATO which was largely seen as a US-led organisation.\footnote{416 Interview with Ilija Talev, \textit{op cit}}

These factors may have had some implications for the \textit{receptiveness} of fYROM to Europeanisation via the ESDP missions. Yet, whether the ESDP missions in reality were differentiated from NATO in the perceptions of fYROM’s government, police and military establishment or general population, especially coming immediately on the back of the NATO missions, is open to question. An alternative perspective has been put forward by another interviewee who suggested that the civilian population saw both the ESDP and NATO missions equally as a “foreign presence”, and that the only difference in the eyes of the civilian population was the uniforms.\footnote{417 Idem}

The cooperation of EU officials with NATO was successful in general terms, although it has been suggested that sometimes information was not appropriately shared between them.\footnote{418 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: No Room for Complacency, \textit{ibid}, p 8} As a result, contradictory messages were sometimes given to the government, creating incoherency and confusion.\footnote{419 \textit{Idem}} The presence of ‘one too many’ international actors in the security field possibly led to a lack of coordination, confusing the government of fYROM over which strategy and models it should follow. For example, a fundamental disagreement has been identified between NATO and the EU on the required model for the reform of fYROM’s border management during the course of the ESDP missions, with NATO stressing a military presence, in
view of the unresolved status of Kosovo and the risks of that conflict again spilling across the border, whilst the EU pursued its model which saw border management as an inherently civilian task.\textsuperscript{420}

5.6.2 The OSCE

In the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP adopted in 2004, it was noted that the EU would try to reinforce its working relations with the OSCE in training and civilian crisis management whilst exploring the possibility of establishing a framework for co-operation.\textsuperscript{421} Biscop gave a different view on the ESDP–OSCE relationship when he claimed that with the leading presence of the EU in the Western Balkans during the early and mid-2000s, the OSCE was often overlooked.\textsuperscript{422} In addition, having the OSCE, the EU and NATO as global actors in crisis management and peacekeeping operations, there is certainly some degree of competition between the three. He also added that the EU decided to deploy missions where the OSCE had a long-term presence (Western Balkans), ignoring in this way the OSCE’s involvement in the region, resulting to the latter being “pushed off the stage”.\textsuperscript{423}

There are, however, certain similarities between the EU and the OSCE in the way both organisations approach security through their operations. They are both sharing common values and principles such as human rights, the rule of law, democratic values and good governance. As previously established, the EU in the ESS has identified five key threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state failure, regional conflicts and organised crime. The OSCE in its ‘Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century’ has also identified terrorism and organised crime, including inter-State and intra-State conflicts, discrimination and intolerance as

\textsuperscript{422} Sven Biscop, The EU, the OSCE and the European Security Architecture: Network or Labyrinth? Paper for Presentation at the Helsinki Monitor Conference, OSCE’s Future After 30 Years, Vienna, 9 September 2005
\textsuperscript{423} Idem
key threats to security. In the Draft Assessment report on the EU’s role vis-à-vis the OSCE, it was clearly stated that the EU would continue to support the OSCE based on the same core values and principles that both organisations share. There is clearly room for both to play an important Europeanisation role.

5.7 Wider CFSP Europeanisation benefits of ESDP missions in FYROM

ESDP engagement also contributed to Europeanisation beyond the immediate domestic benefits it produced within FYROM, through what can be seen as a ‘round-about’ Europeanisation effect. Writing before the instability that brought about the deployment of the ESDP missions, Kapoutsis noted that, in general terms, FYROM’s army doesn’t possess the necessary operational capabilities in order to comprise a credible military power in the Western Balkans, as more reforms and institutional restructuring are needed in both police and army to bring them up to European standards. Such standards would represent requirements that needed to be fulfilled by FYROM in order to be a participant in ESDP missions, where readiness to participate in CFSP is a requirement of EU membership, including contributing personnel to ESDP missions, and demonstrating and delivering the values and objectives of the EU through those personnel in the missions. Valuable experience was gained by FYROM officials and security personnel in working with EU officials and police and military in the course of the missions. The government of FYROM itself has noted that the experiences gathered in the course of the deployment of the missions represented an ‘added value’ in terms of the development of the country’s own capacities and capabilities for participation in EU and other civilian and military crisis management operations in responding to a questionnaire that formed part of the accession-readiness assessment.
process, the Government of FYROM stated that, “The Republic of Macedonia will continue to upgrade its civilian and military operational capacities to be able to actively participate in the ESDP in the course of its accession to the EU. In this regard, the lessons learned from the first EU Military Mission – Concordia and the EU Advisory Police Mission – Proxima will certainly be helpful.”

Indeed, less than a year later, FYROM military and civilian personnel participated in the ESDP military operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, signifying from the perspective of FYROM’s Ministry of Defence, the “progress from [being] a consumer of the first EU military operation (Concordia 2003) into an active contributor to the ESDP.”

In 2007, a unit for ESDP was established in FYROM’s Ministry of Defence, further demonstrating the country’s commitment to, and ‘institutionalisation’ of the European Union’s Security and Defence Policy. Civilian and military professionals from FYROM have been recipients of the EU’s ESDP Training Programme for SAP countries, through which the EU is aiming to raise awareness on ESDP history, policy, structures and operations among individuals with the potential to achieve high-level positions in the institutions of ESDP. This provides a further vehicle for stimulating the Europeanisation of FYROM’s security structures and outlook.

Whilst untested in this thesis, FYROM’s participation in ESDP missions holds the potential for a further Europeanisation effect to be returned to the domestic sphere. For example, as Echeverria has argued, the cooperation of countries in international civilian and military peacekeeping missions can increase

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429 FYR Macedonia Answers to the European Union Accession Questionnaire, ibid, p 3
awareness and experience of the benefits of improved civil-military relations, and moreover that:

“...multinational military cooperation contributes to an improved professional ethic and civilian control, simply as a result of operating in close contact with armed forces and civilians from other regions and cultures, as well as with non-governmental organizations, in peace-building, aid and assistance tasks. An additional positive side-effect of such joint participation in peacekeeping operations is the implicit re-training of armed forces...The natural spin-off of participation in peacekeeping would be that armed forces would gain in prestige and in the trust placed in them by national civil societies.”\(^{432}\)

The practical experience of working with the EU in the course of the Concordia and Proxima/PAT missions also provided a further basis for FYROM to align its position with the EU on foreign and security policy issues more broadly. This alignment was firmly expressed in the Government’s response to the European Union Accession Questionnaire:

“The fundamental human and civil rights and freedoms, the rule of law, humanism, social justice and solidarity, respect for the widely established norms of international law, are among the basic values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia. These values, along with the principles of promotion of international cooperation, preservation of peace and strengthening of international security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the international law, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, are also fundamental principles of its foreign policy...Based on the concurrence of these fundamental values

and principles, the Republic of Macedonia fully accepts the objectives and principles of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Hence derives the readiness of the Republic of Macedonia to actively and unreservedly support the foreign and security policy of the Union in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.\footnote{FYR Macedonia Answers to the European Union Accession Questionnaire, op cit, p253.}

5.8 Conclusion: a summary assessment of ESDP’s Europeanisation effect in FYROM

This case study on the role of ESDP missions in FYROM has provided for an examination of the ways in which through its operations on the ground, ESDP contributed to Europeanisation of the country. The basis for a Europeanisation agenda in FYROM from the EU’s perspective was its European location and geographical proximity on the border of the existing EU, which provided a natural reason for the EU to seek to export European norms, values and institutional models with a view to preparing the recently independent country for future EU accession. Closely connected, the country’s proximity to the EU combined with the risks of instability which could spill-over into the EU area and impact on wider regional EU security and foreign policy concerns, gave the EU a strong incentive to intervene to prevent an escalation of the conflict and to move the country towards peace and control over its borders. As examined previously, the diffusion of its values, and approaches to democracy and good governance, human rights, and ethnic inclusion are at the heart of the EU’s approach to conflict prevention. Furthermore, EU enlargement and the ‘carrot’ of EU membership was understood as probably the single most influential incentive for implementation of the Ohrid peace agreement and the reforms necessary to bring longer-term stability.

On FYROM’s side, it was generally in the interests of the government and the population to be receptive to Europeanisation. The country was searching for
its new identity after independence, whilst its economy was in a poor state, and a future in the European Union offered significant benefits for the security of that identity, the successful consolidation of statehood, and for economic prosperity. Also, under what was seen as responsible leadership, the country’s elites generally showed a positive inclination towards seeking a peaceful resolution of the conflict and moving forward, and they were therefore broadly welcoming of EU assistance and advice, including in the normative field. Furthermore, it was politically expedient for all parties to be seen to cooperate with the EU on security and reforms in the eyes of their domestic audiences, although this may have been more symbolic rather than an interest in the real substance of implementation. The population were also broadly receptive to the EU and the Europeanisation agenda, as they had a common interest in joining the EU, with all the benefits this would bring, and avoiding a serious conflict like neighbouring Kosovo had seen.

The conflict presented a number of factors that were relevant to the deployment of the EU’s ESDP mission instrument, and their Europeanisation potential. Firstly, the fragile peace following the Ohrid Agreement required international supervision to prevent renewed violence and build confidence. This represented a classic crisis management context which ESDP missions, and the Petersberg Tasks on which they are based, were intended to address, and as such it provided a specific new entry point for the EU to promote Europeanisation through its ESDP instrument. The peace agreement incorporated a role for the EU in assisting with the longer-term reform of the police, where abusive, discriminatory and generally ineffective policing had been one of the key issues that had brought the conflict to a head. These police reform needs, within what remained a fragile post-conflict stabilisation context, fell within the scope of the Petersberg Tasks and the ESDP instrument. Furthermore, through its involvement in shaping the Ohrid Agreement, the EU effectively deliberately designed a Europeanisation role for the ESDP mission instrument. The ESDP missions were the perfect and very practical and intensive instrument to take advantage of FYROM’s post-conflict receptiveness to change.
As the above analysis has highlighted, both the EU and FYROM subsequently framed the ESDP missions in Europeanisation terms, in particular in relation to their role in supporting the alignment of FYROM with the requirements of EU accession. This went beyond the formal stated mandates of the missions, and beyond the formal remit of ESDP and the explicit scope of the Petersberg Tasks, but demonstrated in this case study a strong Europeanisation export vision for ESDP on the EU side, and a downloading vision of the missions on the part of FYROM.

The transition from a military ESDP operation, to an ESDP police mission, to an ESDP police advisory bridging mission in preparation for EC follow-on programming, was a natural progression that fitted the changing security and political context, and demonstrated the adaptability of the ESDP mission model. This adaptability made ESDP relevant as a vehicle for Europeanisation over a period of time and through a range of different diffusion entry points.

The practical, on the ground, operational nature of the ESDP missions, with significantly greater numbers of EU personnel than involved in purely political or Commission programmes it should be noted, gave the EU a substantial and visible presence it would otherwise not have had. This gave a symbolic impetus to the EU’s Europeanisation agenda, as well as a physical means to transfer it. The face-to-face interaction of EU mission personnel and ethos with national actors can be seen as a major forum for social learning during the period covered by ESDP engagement.

Concordia’s primary Europeanisation contribution was a facilitational one, which came through its contribution to stabilising the security environment, building confidence among the population, and helping provide the political space for reforms and laying the ground for subsequent Europeanisation processes, including through the follow-on ESDP missions and Commission activity.
In view of its longer-time frame and reform-related mandate, Proxima had the deepest and most direct Europeanisation impact, contributing significantly to the transfer of EU policing approaches, EU models of good governance, institutional organisation and inter-agency cooperation in FYROM’s justice and security sector, and promoting human rights (such as inclusion of ethnic minorities), democracy and accountability. The distinct Europeanisation contribution of the EUPAT mission is less obvious, partly due to its short timeframe, partly due to a lack of evidence, which is also linked with the blurring of its activities with the preceding Proxima mission. The fact that EUPAT was a scaled-down mission in terms of numbers of personnel and a narrowing of Proxima’s remit, would suggest it had a lower Europeanisation impact than Proxima, but it did permit continuity of the EU’s interface with FYROM on policing, and therefore ‘squeezed’ the maximum possible Europeanisation potential from ESDP.

More specifically, the EU, through the ESDP, has been effective in demilitarising the police sector and present a new civilian character, influencing the transformation of the police as a professional and accountable public service in line with the EU policing model and structures. In addition, it pursued the inclusion of representative proportions of ethnic Albanians in the police force with the aim of developing a multi-ethnic police force in order to improve the confidence of the population in the police. Furthermore, the EU promoted human rights and democratic principles and processes through fair and peaceful elections and it further promoted the EU’s integrated border management model for the safe movement of persons and goods across borders. Last but not least, the EU through the ESDP operations contributed to a wider security sector reform in the region, promoted EU governance models and contributed to decentralisation of policing resulting in stronger borders and tighter security for all citizens.

Social, political and operational learning through the experience of working with the ESDP missions also contributed to the roundabout Europeanisation effect of transforming FYROM into a contributor to ESDP and therefore ESDP
missions’ Europeanisation effects elsewhere, constituting an important contribution to the longer-term alignment of fYROM into the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Generally, the changes which the ESDP missions were involved in represent long term structural changes that would take many years to be fully Europeanised in fYROM. Even so, the assessment undertaken here makes it reasonable to conclude that within their short mandates the missions played an important substantive and far from superficial part in the Europeanisation of the security and justice sector in fYROM, and at the same time contributed beyond the sector to wider and longer-term Europeanisation of fYROM’s domestic sphere, including inculcating norms relevant to wider domestic good governance, and the country’s external outlook.

However, it has been argued that a temporal extension of the Proxima mission (beyond Proxima II) would have allowed it to have a deeper impact and manage to achieve the ambitious aims set by Proxima I.434 The hesitation that fYROM’s government showed with regards to the EU’s proposal to extend the Proxima mission might have cut short the effect of Europeanisation through the overt diffusion which came through the physical presence of the EU on the ground. The decision of fYROM’s government to agree on the extension of Proxima I allowed the EU to continue its Europeanisation effect.

Proxima’s initial geographical scope was limited to crisis areas only. Only later did it extend to national scope, which meant it could have had wider Europeanisation relevance sooner. Nonetheless it must be recognised that the fact that its geographic scope was expanded was another example of how the mission developed its relevance beyond the narrower purely crisis-response focus.

Of course, ESDP was not the only EU or international mechanism operating in fYROM during the period which had a Europeanisation-related role. NATO and

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434 Flessenkemper, op cit, p 90
the OSCE in particular were the two main actors on the ground assisting fYROM with restructuring and reforming the country prior, during and after the conflict. To some extent there was an overlap of responsibilities and competition between the organisations. The OSCE has a long-standing relationship with fYROM and has been on the ground assisting the government to stabilise the country since the early 1990s. NATO is regarded by the political elite as the strongest security organisation and has always been on the top of the government’s agenda since the country is aspiring to join the Alliance in the near future. The EU has also been on the ground since the early 1990s with the EU Monitoring Mission and with many Commission programmes helping to bring the country closer to the EU and achieve deeper integration. However, after the 2001 conflict, the fact that there were many actors on the ground caused a certain degree of confusion and an overlap of responsibilities, especially between the OSCE and the EU. This might have undermined the ability of the ESDP missions to maximise the Europeanisation effect on fYROM. From a research perspective, this overlapping certainly makes it more challenging to identify distinct attribution of effect from ESDP missions in relation to other actors.

Overall, Proxima has generally been regarded as having been a successful mission. The benchmarking system Proxima reportedly established was a political tool that facilitated the implementation of reforms in fYROM and encouraged the government to accept and adapt to the reforms. In Proxima’s final mission report it was noted that according to the benchmarking system, Proxima “has implemented 87.1 % of its planned programme activities and has reached its desired end state.” However, assessing the benchmarking system, and its relevance to the establishment of Europeanisation-related objectives, baselines and achievements has not been possible due to the fact it has not been released. Furthermore, it is also not clear that the mission had a robust way to measure changes attributable to its activities specifically. The process of measuring and attributing change in areas such as Proxima’s contribution to the increased confidence between the public and the police.

was noted in the mission’s final report as a particular difficulty.\textsuperscript{436} The lessons learned that were released by the EU for this mission provided limited information or demonstration that the transformative Europeanisation potential and achievements of the mission had been reviewed, and lessons identified in terms of weaknesses and ways to strengthen the conceptualisation, design, implementation and measurement of this and other missions’ achievements in Europeanisation terms.

\textsuperscript{436} \textit{Ibid}, p 12
Chapter 6
Conclusions

6.1 Revisiting the research question and overview of findings

This thesis has set out to address a relatively under-researched area of Europeanisation theory, in terms of the link between the ‘export’ dimension of Europeanisation and the EU’s external crisis response instruments, specifically ESDP. It has aimed to determine whether, how, and to what extent, the ESDP civilian and military mission instrument and specific missions have evolved to act, or have the potential to act, as as vehicles for Europeanisation in countries beyond the EU’s borders.

Chapter Two has examined the development of common characteristics which have formed the notion of ‘Europeanness’, and explored the theory of Europeanisation in order to identify its relevant dimensions for this thesis, defining ‘Europeanisation’ as the export of European values, principles, ideas, norms and institutional models and approaches beyond the geographical borders of the EU, by the EU, and identifying potentially relevant forms and mechanisms of Europeanisation, such as diffusion. It also identified some of the approaches and challenges to measuring Europeanisation processes, before considering the relevance of Europeanisation to the Second Pillar of the EU, to EU enlargement, and the role of the EU’s external instruments, and introduced here the relevance of ESDP missions.

In order to understand whether and how ESDP missions have such a potential built into them to act as vehicles for Europeanisation, Chapter Three analysed the evolution of European Union security and defence policy, the importance of the crises in the Balkans and other factors for pushing along those developments, the emergence of a distinct EU approach to security, and establishment of the EU’s operational military and civilian mission instrument.
The thesis finds that the historical background to the formation of a European identity, and the evolution of the European Union as a normative project and regional and global actor aimed at peaceful conflict management at the same time as having an ambition to export its ethos beyond EU borders, has produced an instrument for external action in the form of ESDP that in many respects reflects the notion of common EU values and approaches.

The thesis went on to explore the research question in-depth in a specific country case study context where ESDP missions have been deployed – that of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM). Chapter Four set out the context for the deployment of the missions in fYROM and provided an overview of the missions. fYROM was chosen as a basis for research due to its combination of a number of characteristics of interest and precise relevance for testing the research question, namely that it represents a new European country emerging from crisis, on the EU’s border, a logical target for incorporation into the EU, and having itself an ambition for EU membership, and as a recipient of both civilian and military ESDP missions as well as wider EU and international interventions. Chapter Five analysed the extent to which the missions incorporated Europeanisation dimensions, their Europeanisation contributions, and their strengths and weaknesses in this regard. The case study research found that the military operation Concordia, in contributing to the country’s security and political stabilization and providing a visible and symbolic EU presence, provided a valuable niche entry point and platform for Europeanisation. The follow-on Proxima and EUPAT civilian operations were found to carry a more direct Europeanisation agenda and effect, playing an important role in transferring the EU’s approach to addressing causes of conflict, exporting European values, norms and models of policing, border control, human rights and wider norms of good governance, and contributing as part of the EU’s wider efforts to promoting the integration of fYROM in the EU.

On the basis of the research findings, this thesis concludes that the framework for ESDP operations does have an embedded intention and potential to be a
vehicle of Europeanisation beyond the EU’s borders, able to transfer European values, principles, ideas, norms and institutional models and approaches. This is more or less explicit in the EU policies which ESDP has been charged with delivering – both in broad policy terms – such as the high-level European Security Strategy, and in the political and operational framing of mission mandates and objectives ESDP operations are given in particular cases, taking the ESDP missions in fYROM as an example.

The research has also shown how ESDP can be a flexible instrument for Europeanisation in transitional security and political environments, and this adaptability can be used to maximize the Europeanisation contribution of the missions in terms of scope, depth, length of time, and in relation to other EU instruments.

6.2 Further maximising the Europeanisation potential of ESDP

Despite these findings, there seems to be limited appreciation and attention in EU circles – in Brussels, Member States or at the mission level - to the extent to which the ESDP instrument is or can be a transformative Europeanisation instrument. This is found in the culture, at least in the case studies considered here, of not setting precise Europeanisation objectives for missions at the operational level, or measuring and evaluating Europeanisation impact in reporting from missions. As one European official has put it, “In the EU we normally focus discussions on achievement of mission mandate only, not on the transformational change we achieve, although they are more or less linked at least implicitly.” For example, there is no evidence that the missions in fYROM were given precise objectives, or their success measured according to the extent to which they contributed to the country’s progress towards meetings the EU’s criteria for future membership of the EU (the Copenhagen Criteria).

437 Peter Hedling, (peter.hedling@consilium.europa.eu), 23 September 2009. RE: Europeanisation and ESDP in the FYROM. Email to Theodora Klountzou (t.klountzou@sussex.ac.uk).
The research therefore highlights the value for the EU of more deliberately, consistently and systematically conceptualising the ESDP mission instrument through a Europeanisation lens, and designing and measuring the success of missions and undertaking missions lessons learning in Europeanisation terms, as a way to maximise the transformative potential of the instrument as part of wider EU strategy and set of interventions to pursue normative, security and political objectives in its neighbourhood and the wider international sphere. This would take ESDP beyond being a simple operational and more limited tool to an even more strategic instrument, and, as Jean-Yves Haine has suggested, ESDP “From a tool of crisis-management in the Balkans [to a]…device to enhance Europe’s role in the world.”

To do so would require greater EU consensus around the precise standards, models and approaches that ESDP missions are charged with delivering, and defining these and clearly articulated transformative objectives and targets in mission documents and reporting. The very process of doing this is itself one of progressive horizontal Europeanisation among EU member states.

The research also suggests that recipient countries of ESDP missions, or those facing the potential deployment of missions, can also benefit from having a greater understanding of the possible Europeanisation role of ESDP missions in their country, which they may view as positive or negative, open or hidden. As the case of FYROM has shown, political elites have been sensitive to the symbolism of hosting ESDP crisis missions, which shows that there may be limits and resistance to a deeper and more explicit Europeanisation role for ESDP missions, compared with other less ‘intrusive’ forms of EU engagement. Even so, for nations committed to addressing drivers of conflict and instability, establishing democracy and the rule of law, the particular nature of ESDP missions in terms of military, policing and justice assistance can deliver a specific, intensive and early avenue of EU support and partnership in what is

commonly the most difficult and pressing area requiring attention. A greater understanding of the strategic transformative potential of ESDP missions could help recipient countries to ensure they, and the EU, maximise this contribution to the fullest extent.

**6.3 Valuable avenues for extending the research**

Although this thesis has tested the research question in only one country case study, there is potential and value for further research with regards to the transferability of the EU values, ideas and norms through ESDP operations in other country settings – in places where there may be a call on ESDP missions in the future, as well as after missions have been completed. Whilst this thesis identified particular Europeanisation objectives, receptiveness on the part of the ‘receiving’ country (fYROM), and impacts that are clearly linked to the fact that fYROM represents an EU enlargement perspective, ESDP’s Europeanisation potential in, and countries’ receptiveness to Europeanisation through ESDP missions may also prove relevant to countries well beyond the EU neighbourhood where there is not this opportunity or aspiration to join the EU. The case study research model could be applied to current and future ESDP missions elsewhere in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

Whilst it has not been possible to explore further through this thesis, the uniformed nature of military and policing EU ESDP mission personnel perhaps gives them a specific means of connecting with recipient country interlocutors (political, but particularly police and military personnel) as well as communities, which non-uniformed EU civilian, especially Commission-led interventions do not possess. This may provide an important different and additional means by which such EU missions can diffuse European values, standards and approaches, and would be worthy of further research which could help guide decisions on the types of mission, the use of uniformed or uniformed personnel, and the sequencing or combination of ESDP and Commission-led interventions in particular places at particular times.
Furthermore, whilst the case study missions and country context examined through this thesis has focussed attention on the Europeanisation dimensions of ESDP policing and military missions, further case study research could usefully examine the extent to which other types of ESDP missions – such as justice-focussed missions and counter-terrorism-related missions – have or could carry a Europeanisation agenda, how they have performed in this regard (including their mechanisms of Europeanisation transfer), and how their Europeanisation impact could be maximised.

At the same time, this research can contribute to deepening and further testing the area of Europeanisation theory concerned with export dimensions of the theory, and suggests there is academic value in more in-depth examination of the Europeanisation aspects of EU external instruments, including civilian and military operations other case study contexts, including, in countries well beyond the EU’s neighbourhood. This can also help deepen the theory through understanding the different mechanisms of and receptiveness to Europeanisation in different regional, political and social contexts.

This thesis serves to demonstrate the value of applying theoretical approaches from the academic sphere to the conceptualisation and design of policy and practice. In this case, Europeanisation theory has proven to be a useful lens through which EU policymakers and practitioners can view ESDP interventions.
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