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Old Age, Caring Policies and Governmentality

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Doctor of Philosophy (Social Work and Social Care)

University of Sussex

May 2013
WORK NOT SUBMITTED ELSEWHERE FOR EXAMINATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signed . . . . . . . . . . . .

Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Summary

UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX

ZOË GARRITY – PHD SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL CARE

OLD AGE, CARING POLICIES AND GOVERNMENTALITY

Through the theoretical lens of Foucault’s archaeological method, this thesis undertakes a discourse analysis to examine how old age and ageing are strategically positioned as forms of governmentality in New Labour social care policy documents. It is argued that these discourses are not directed purely at the older generation, but at everyone, at all stages of life, encompassing all aspects of everyday living. Old age thus becomes a strategy of governing the population through individual everyday lives. This hints at the way ageing is prefigured, anticipated and lived in advance.

An analytical method is developed by weaving together Foucault’s notions of archaeology and governmentality; the latter is utilised both as an analytical perspective and to provide an understanding of how people primarily act and interact in contemporary Western societies.

This analytical perspective is initially applied to an exploration of how the form and function of social policy enable ordinary practices of life to become targets of political government, making both possible and desirable the government of everyday living: governing how we ought to live in every aspect of life from work and finances to health, to personal relationships and leisure activities. The thesis progresses to explore this in more detail through a practical application of governmentality and focused discourse analysis of eight New Labour social care policy texts. The aim of the analysis is to explore what subjectivities and forms of life are possible within these discourses and therefore what these policies actually do, as distinguished from what they claim to be doing.

It is argued that the discourses that emerge in these policies act to limit and subjectify, by attempting to contain and stabilise the multitude of possibilities for
practices of living. By ostensibly aiming to create social inclusion the policies make possible vast areas of exclusion that become prime spaces of government. Thus many ways of living, ageing, and being old become untenable due to their inherent contradiction with the social values and rationalities upon which these discourses are based.

Whilst governmentality analyses have been brought to many other policy areas, this thesis makes an original contribution by: developing a governmental analysis of social policy as a form of biopolitics; by applying this analysis to the social care field; and by using policy discourses of old age and ageing to draw out significant aspects of a governmental society. In particular it explores the dispersion of many traditional boundaries, leading to the rearrangement of relations, responsibilities and subjectivities.
Introduction

Mapping the surface

‘Everything that happens and everything that is said happens or is said at the surface. The surface is no less explorable and unknown than depth and height which are nonsense . . . The philosopher is no longer the being of the caves, not Plato’s soul or bird, but rather the animal which is on a level with the surface – a tick or louse.’

(Deleuze, 1990, p.132-3)

Beginnings

To attempt to pin down where this thesis began suggests an ability to mark a moment or place of origin, a series of events that led to linear development. Rather it provides a justification for the work behind, already undertaken, so is perhaps more appropriately thought of not as a beginning, but an ending, acting not as an explanation for the developed, but as a marker of what is important for understanding the intention of the thesis: how can it and does it make sense? If this study can be thought of as having a beginning, a starting point, I would point to a rupture of thought: a confusion regarding old age. This rupture did not involve a dispute concerning whether people get old, or whether ageing happens. Or even whether one is actually aged, or instead whether ageing is something that one simply does. What I could not understand was why it seems necessary to speak it and organise structures, identities and everyday life, around it? Old age as an event that appears to shape not only institutions but people, relationships, possibilities, caused a discomfort, a fracture of understanding, which highlights a split in the lines within which this thesis, and therefore I, am enmeshed. Whilst normative discourses of old age and the social practices on which they are based, must inherently be rational: based upon values, sensibilities, knowledges that make sense to us, here at this time, in this place; to me it suggested a perverse irrationality. Irrationality- no less a form of visibility - providing a way of being able to see and so being able to speak, and to do - illuminates such a split: frayed ends that offer the possibility of travelling along other lines, in other directions, traversing alternative routes, revealing not only the potential for speaking
from other places but taking this dynamism as a way of seeing and speaking, a way of ‘doing’ research. Of course I did not stand alone in discovering this irrationality; it was already spoken of, already being lived out. These frayed ends were there for me to look upon. Yet whilst able to move along them and investigate I am enmeshed, able to see (and to speak) only from these lines of visibility and the unconcealed. The beginning cannot therefore be finally found, and it is more complex still to map the terrain of this investigation.

Initial questions that arose from recognising this irrationality given to forms of old age related to personal relationships. Viewed from a social care perspective I was struck by the effects categories of old age had on personal, especially intimate, relationships of care. Whilst the aims and scope of the thesis moved on from this matter of concern the trace it left was an understanding of the impact mundane categories, such as old age, have on forming the very boundaries within which it is possible to be, at least in this time, at this moment, in this place.

After this, or maybe before, I read Foucault (2002a, 2007a), which initially developed the way in which I was able to question these social realities and problems, and later (in conjunction with other important writings) developed the way in which I was able to question the process of research, a point I shall return to later.

Once investigation into the area deepened this initial interest in old age revealed the immense significance ageing holds for a contemporary analysis of governance. Not only does the category of old age as a description of the self retain a mostly unquestioned rationality, but ageing and old age are presented within social care policy as a defining feature of our society that bring a unique set of challenges for us as a modern population: requiring us to reconsider who we are, what we ought to do, how we should live, and how we ought to be governed. Thus this thesis is distinctive in that it tries to understand old age both as a discursive object through

1 Alongside old age, the emerging quasi-professional role of informal carers greatly interested me, particularly concerning how discourses legitimated within current carer’s legislation (C(EO)A 2004) turned personal intimate relations into versions of social contribution and economic utility, seemingly based on a work/activity ethic rather than any notion of human care. An interest that lay outside the scope of this thesis are the affects these discourses have on couples or other family members, particularly relating to alienation (from services, from each other), and whether this causes any change in the dynamics of the relationship beyond the deterioration of health.
which we can claim to know (something, someone, ourselves), and also as a
governmental technique: a reason why we should watch (ourselves and others) and be
watched, why we should tend to our selves, alter our selves, and adhere to certain
notions of the ‘social good’. Whilst my interest began with questions regarding how
the category of old age, understood as a discursive object, affected old people - how
they became defined and how this affected their personal relationships - this grew due
to the recognition that discourses of old age and ageing extend beyond the lives and
identities of old people to reach the lives of all of us: the embryo, the child, the
working age adult, as well as the retiree.

**Focus on government policy**

Just simply starting from a focus on social care and social services there would
be many ways in which to approach this set of problems, each of which would
inevitably influence the scope of the thesis. For example, I considered widening my
analysis to include policy and guidance literature from voluntary organisations
concerned with issues relating to ageing. This could have led to an interesting analysis
of whether discourses of old age were aligned with those found within New Labour
policy documents, or whether competing discourses emerged to challenge these.
Another consideration was to include documents such as assessment schedules, and
casework formats for recording interventions to analyse how these discourses function
as they become implemented in social work practice. However in order to set
achievable boundaries and avoid a superficial analysis by trying to include too many
different elements, I ultimately decided to focus on UK government social policy
documents that either specifically dealt with old age or ageing, or were important to
the governance of old age or more acutely governance through ageing.

I decided upon government policy documents to explore the issues arising from
the irrationality of forms of ageing, because policy points not only to some notion of
the social good - who we **ought to become**, what we should **aim to achieve**, and **for what reasons** - but also points to a set of problems - what are individuals currently **doing**, who are they currently **being**, and why is this just not good enough? That is, why
do certain phenomena become targets for policy strategies of intervention? Policies of
care aim to provide care, support or protection to individuals or families with perceived needs or risks that hinder them living an ‘independent’ life that the rest of the population would take for granted. Forms of support may include domiciliary care, community support and provision of community resources, and information, advice and advocacy services. Adult social care policies - which currently overwhelmingly focus on promoting independence and social inclusion - contain an inherent tension regarding whether these policies function primarily for the good of the person requiring support, or for the security of society. This questions the extent to which caring policies are based upon an ethic of ‘care’ at all, or whether other alternative value bases take priority.

As noted by Dunne and colleagues (2005) social policy is a reaction to a perceived need or set of needs. By this I am not implying that everybody agrees, that we all recognise the same needs, aspire to the same ideals and buy in to the same versions of subjecthood that policies set out. If nothing else the existence of policy stands as a sign that people do not behave in line with forms of normative rationality: an aim of policy is to encourage people to behave in ways they either could not or would not otherwise have done (Schneider and Ingram, 1990). Whilst this thesis argues for policy as an example of governmentality (Chapter 3), it does not follow that the governmental strategies found within it are effective, and due to the dynamic, circular nature of governance, they can never be total.

I singled out eight UK based policy documents, all produced by the New Labour government between the years 2001 to 2010, to analyse as part of the thesis. These are not homogenous, differing in the institutional authority producing them, their scale of application, and the activity and audiences they address. The policy documents, carefully selected and analysed, are as follows:

*National service framework for Older People* (Department of Health, 2001) (hereafter NSF)

*Opportunity age: Meeting the challenges of the 21st century, volume 1 and Opportunity age: A social portrait of ageing in the UK: A snapshot of key trends and

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2 This will be discussed in Chapter 2.
evidence, volume 2 (Department of Work and Pensions, 2005) (hereafter OA and OA vol.2)

Our health, our care, our say: a new direction for community services (Department of Health, 2006) (hereafter OHOCOS)

A sure start to later life: ending inequalities for older people (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2006) (hereafter SS)

Independence, choice and risk: a guide to best practice in supported decision making (Department of Health, 2007) (hereafter ICR)

Shaping the future of care together (Department of Health, 2009) (hereafter SFC)

Building a society for all ages (Department of Work and Pensions, 2009) (hereafter BSFA)

Building the National Care Service (Department of Health, 2010) (hereafter BNCS)

These documents were chosen because they either focus on the issue of old age or ageing as an embedded social problem, or else, they are social care orientated and relevant both to how old people are governed and are expected to govern themselves. Appendix 1 outlines the aim and focus of each policy document, indicating ways in which they both differ and encompass similar rationalities and themes.

Discourse analysis as a method

I have used these policy documents to undertake a discourse analysis derived from The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 2002a). The values of this approach will be explored in detail in Chapter 1. However what is important to make clear from the start is that, in line with the archaeological approach, these documents will not be treated as a sign of something else. That is, I will not be trying to look underneath them, to find out what happened ‘behind the scenes’; nor will I treat them as creations of particular actors, or as unique expressions of the objects of politics. The discourses analysed in the policy texts will instead be treated as able to emerge only because of

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3 See Appendix 1 for a synopsis of each policy.
the already existent mesh that make up the various lines and flows of power\textsuperscript{4}. It is these dynamic lines that are the focus of my analysis therefore, not the policy makers. The policy documents, as the data for discourse analysis, are used as a tool with which I can explore the surface, not to judge the worth or effectiveness of individual policy strategies, nor to level judgement of New Labour’s approach to ageing policy\textsuperscript{5}. Whilst recognising the differences between the policies, as outlined above and in Appendix 1, I often refer to these policy documents throughout the thesis collectively as ‘the/the these policies’ or ‘the policy documents’. This is mostly due to the need for a convenient shorthand for the collective data on which the analysis is based. But importantly, it also reflects how I have treated the various documents as constituting a similar surface upon which discourses of old age and ageing can emerge, and it is from this point that an analytics of governmentality can emerge.

Throughout my analysis in Chapters 4 to 7, I have drawn directly on sections of text from the policies, clearly separating them from my own writing by using indented quotes, regardless of word length. This is to avoid the pitfalls of summarising the text, which is likely to lose detail and add nothing (Antaki et al., 2003), and also to set apart the ‘data’ being analysed from the literature drawn upon as part of the analysis. Furthermore, I have never allowed an excerpt from the policy texts to ‘stand alone’, as if it could speak for itself, or to assume that what it says is self-evident. Instead I have endeavoured to draw out the discourses, governmental rationalities and strategies they contain, as well as some of the consequences these may bring. The policies are treated not as the originators of these, but as one mode (among many) of their existence, a surface through which it is possible for them to emerge (this matter will be explored in Chapter 3).

A key decision to be made in any discourse analysis involves which texts, and which pieces of text, to include and analyse. According to Dunne and colleagues (2005):

\textsuperscript{4} An understanding of Foucault’s notion of an apparatus (dispositif) as a tangle of lines will be discussed in Chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{5} I shall revisit my approach and set out my aims later (p.19). Here I want to focus on the ‘mechanics’ of discourse analysis.
all linguistically-based textual analysis faces issues in determining the boundaries of the text. Deciding where a text starts and finishes, in time and space, is already part of the analysis and the necessity of presenting fine-grained analysis means that inevitably boundaries have to be set (p.100)

Some of the reasons for setting the boundaries around policy texts, and for choosing these specific policy materials, have already been discussed, as well as some suggestions regarding how choosing different texts to analyse would have changed the nature of this thesis. Once the texts have been decided upon, I – the analyst – still have to make decisions regarding which sections of text to draw attention to, which are most worthy of exploration? After a close reading of all of the policy documents, I began to map out prominent and recurring themes and issues within them. I paid close attention to how people were spoken about - as individuals, communities, neighbourhoods, retirees and so on - and what relationships these implied - with the state, society, each other, themselves. This of course did not happen in isolation, but alongside and within the context of reading many other sources⁶. Some overarching themes and consistent concepts emerged which became the focus of each of the analysis chapters in turn: old age and ageing as a discursive object and governmental tool (Chapter 4); self-management and identity as both a means and telos of government (Chapter 5); rationalities of risk and decision making (Chapter 6); and the discourse of community and participation (Chapter 7). Other important governmental rationalities and technologies also emerged that fed into all the themes in some way: primarily the focus on the subject as active, participative and independent, and the relations between the collective and the individual. As such these will become recurrent foci of the analysis across the chapters.

I am aware that the methods may not adhere to other, more traditional, versions of discourse analysis which have drawn on Foucauldian theory, such as Critical Discourse Analysis (for example Fairclough, 2001), or Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (for example Willig, 2008). For this reason I refer to my approach as archaeological

⁶ This will be explored later (p.22)
discourse analysis, rooted as it is in an understanding of discourse through a close reading of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault, 2002a), as set out in Chapter 1.

**Governmentality: aims and approach**

The thesis takes a distinctive path by combining the use of archaeological discourse analysis as both a method and conceptual framework, with an analysis through the lens of Foucault’s important notion of governmentality. As will be demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 2, governmentality describes both a form of analytics, as well as a way of understanding power and relations of force within Western democratic societies: governmentality describes how power moves and functions, and how this in turn makes certain subjectifications possible. Furthermore an understanding of governmentality moves the analysis beyond a discursive understanding of what is actual to include judgements of value: not merely a description of who we are, but who we ought to be. Hence strategies of governmentality aim to change behaviours, identities, expectations and aspirations.

As noted by McKee (2009), governmentality has gained increasing popularity within the studies of social policy in the last decade. It has been used in various ways, for different purposes of analysis across diverse policy fields including crime (see for example Garland, 1997; Stenson, 2005), education (for example Edwards, 2002; Morgan, 2005), housing (for example Flint, 2002, 2012), and social work (for example Parton, 1994, 1998; Villadsen, 2008). Within the field of old age/ageing there are a few examples of studies specifically from a governmentality perspective (see for example Conway and Crawshaw, 2009; Katz, 2000), and many more using diverse aspects of Foucauldian theory (see Rudman, 2006 for a focus on discourse, and Powell and Wahindin eds., 2006, which includes applications of various aspects of Foucauldian theory, including governmentality, to ageing). The analysis of the chosen policies in Chapters 4 to 7 inevitably builds upon, echoes, and engages with some of this salient literature. However it also draws upon a wide variety of non-Foucauldian based research and literature from a diverse range of sources. These include UK and international research, empirical and non-empirical, within and outside the field of social care. Among these, for example, are sociological and psychological examinations
of risk, medical and historical literature on ageing, and various philosophical treatments of self and identity. The use of these diverse inter-disciplinary sources acts to situate the rationalities and subjectivities identified in the policy documents within wider analytical and research contexts, as well as to hold them up to criticism.

The conceptual approach to this thesis and the aims of the analysis are intimately connected. Governmentality has not been ‘applied to’ the analysis, as some kind of additional tool to add a further depth or perspective to my interpretation. Rather governmentality is central to how I have worked, the questions I have asked. As an implication it both explains and requires that the focus of analysis is on: processes of subjectification; function and not intention; and the explicit but complex links between what is spoken and what is done. Thus the main aim of this thesis is to deploy discourse analysis to explore the selected social policy documents from a governmentality perspective, to determine what they do: what subjectivities and ways of living do the discourses revealed within them make possible? These include the subjectivities considered desirable/ rational and therefore legitimised by the policy documents, but also those that are problematized. The latter are still possible forms of living but ones that come with consequences, attracting other, perhaps more authoritative forms of governance, where the relations of force can be seen to flow differently. The importance of identifying what subjectivities are possible, and which of these are desirable is to ask: Why? What function do the proposed subjectivities have regarding what individuals are expected to do, and how they are supposed to live? What do they enable and what do they constrain? This is important because when I speak of ‘individuals’ I of course mean us – you and me. Whilst I have not made personal comments in the analysis, nor based it upon personal preferences for one subject position over another, the critical edge of the work is sharpened because it comes from asking personal questions: ‘Do I want to live in this way?’ ‘Why should I?’ ‘How does it affect me?’ In order to achieve this aim, I will also endeavour to set out the ways in which policy provides a space or surface upon which governmentality becomes possible and legitimate, and simultaneously a useful place from which to map out discourses and attempt to scaffold their boundaries (in Chapter 3).

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7 An example of this will be discussed in Chapter 6 in relation to ‘unwise’ decision making.
The thesis therefore aims to conduct a grounded application of an analytics of governmentality in order to explore and demonstrate the parameters within which certain lives are made possible. The value of this analysis lies in demonstrating how the rhetoric of inclusion used within these policy documents, specifically relating to statements of well-being, independence and self-management, act to close off vast spaces of living and tighten the boundaries of self formation. Furthermore, the analysis makes the innovative claim that the positioning of old age and ageing as a problematisation of social inclusion and social security in the policy documents, works to provide a rationalisation for strategies of governance throughout the life-course and across aspects of everyday life. This thesis therefore offers novel insight into the function of the discourses present in the policy documents – how they, not simply impact upon our lives, but make our lives actual. Alongside this it creates a space within which to think otherwise: to discover and imagine what is absent in these documents, and to think what might be possible by re-evaluating the worth of the neglected spaces outside of the rationalities and subjectivities legitimated within these policies.

**Writing as researching: the creative text**

As noted at the start of this chapter, I am not separated from the discourses that the thesis attempts to analyse. Indeed I am enmeshed: caught within the multiple lines and forces that I aim to explore. To enmesh is to entangle, not only to trap but to make thought complicated (Oxford English Dictionary), as such this analysis looks not from above but along the horizon, where the view is neither clear nor uninterrupted. Whilst accepting that it is therefore impossible to see everything, or to provide a fully comprehensive analysis, it is from this perspective that it may be possible to begin to mesh at all: to thread my way through, to be involved inextricably (Oxford English Dictionary). To be caught provides at the same time the potential for movement. This thesis is part of the discourses it discusses: lines feed into it, cross over it, break out of it.

I do not, then, claim the analysis can present the Truth regarding the problematizations it explores, although it is truthful: a truthful mapping of the current
terrain, fraught with the problems that arise when mapping the surface underfoot. 

Whilst attempting to explore, understand and make claims to knowledge in this area, the analysis does not attempt to close, shut off, or find completion. Thus as this introduction marks in many ways the end of this thesis, so the conclusion will, at least in part, signify a beginning. Neither though is the analysis an interpretation or expression of my ‘self’. Guttorm (2012) describes Deleuze’s conceptualisation of the subject as, in distinction from a singular unit, a series of processes or place where thought can emerge. She explains:

So the ‘I’ who writes here is not an isolated object with a specific identity to reveal, but just a place in which the writing can emerge through and in the thoughts (books) ‘I’ have been reading.

(Guttorm, 2012, p.601)

This is not an attempt to remove my self from the text, but to understand my self in the text not as a singular voice, but as a place where ideas can be put to work.

This thesis is therefore no more than the writing. The research did not occur outside of what is written here: writing is the process as well as the product. Dunne and colleagues (2005, p.135) note that in the realist methodology paradigm the integrity of the research is thought to lie in its methodological underpinning rather than the actual text itself. However, the writing is not merely an explanation of the research, but is the place the analysis occurs or happens. Furthermore, whilst the methodology and conceptual framework of this thesis (Chapters 1, 2 and 3) are placed before the analysis chapters (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) the former did not simply lead to the latter: writing the analysis impacted upon my understanding of the methodology as much as the methodology informed the development of the policy analysis.

Writing is not therefore a response to thought: writing and thinking are inseparable (McNiff, 1998; Richardson and St. Pierre, 2005). McNiff (1998) claims that the research model that requires a researcher to establish what they will do before they do it is just not possible or even desirable for some forms of research, as creative processes are often a step ahead of the reflective mind: research results often just
‘happen’ no matter how systematic the enquiries. From this point of view research is not a logical or linear activity but a playful or experimental process, where moments of serendipity and spontaneity are expected. Writing has nothing to do with signifying, but with mapping and surveying ‘even realms that are yet to come’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p.5). Thus, recognising the primacy of writing, not just for the production of this research but as intrinsic to its process, positions research as creative: as creating.

This thesis does not intend to contain the social world, it instead aims to do the opposite: to create by recognising limitations and absences. In the words of Foucault (1989, quoted in Sluga, 2010), ‘the work of the intellect is to show that what is, does not have to be, what it is’ (p.42). The work of the thesis then, is to question the rationalities upon which the discourses of old age and the governance of ageing rest. To at times discredit them, to reveal the disharmony between their function and the stated intention, to expose that which is claimed to be natural and enduring as arbitrary and contingent. Whilst a purpose such as this will frustrate some, leaving as it must inevitably do, loose ends, its strength lies in its potential to create spaces for other (legitimate) subjectivities and ways of living to emerge, to assert themselves. A focus on function: what something is actually doing rather than claiming to do, combined with the removal of any solid ground on which to pin rationalities, demands these forms of government and processes of subjectification to be justified without recourse to naturalness or normalities dressed as common sense if they are to remain valid. Mapping the surface forces these important questions, often overlooked as too obvious, too ordinary, or unimportant, into the open:

These are questions not just about what we do but about who we will be, what sort of lives we will lead and will allow those around us to lead, and what these lives will mean. These are truly ethical questions, questions of ethos.

(McWhorter, 2009, p.432)

The questions at the core of this thesis: why speak about old age? why organise people, institutions and everyday lives around ageing? and what are the consequences
of doing this? are exactly such questions that have a prominent significance for understanding contemporary governmental practices and the parameters of legitimated life, lived as an active citizen and member of a population.
Chapter 1

Archaeology and governmentality: mapping the surface

Introduction

Foucault’s work has been accused of lacking consistency and unity, as it contains many conceptual shifts and changes with the result that earlier and later stages of his thought cannot be used in conjunction with each other unproblematically. Deleuze (1995), however, challenges the argument that the various phases of Foucault’s work lack any coherency, by attempting to show the logic behind the movement from knowledge to power, to modes of subjectification. He argued that Foucault’s thought did not evolve, ‘but went from one crisis to another’ (1995, p.104), suggesting that the movement from one topic to the next was due to the need to overcome a block or obstacle that his previous discussions had led to or come across. Therefore it is precisely this movement that draws Foucault’s work together: ‘this ability to break the line of thought, to change direction, to find themselves on the open sea, and so discover, invent, is what give thinkers a deeper coherency’ (Deleuze, 1995, p.104).

It remains important, however, to acknowledge and respect the specific sense and technical application of certain terms employed by Foucault: different terms bring with them different phases or processes of subjectification for example, and therefore do not speak of the same subject, society or state. Holding onto Deleuze’s claim that sense can be made of Foucault’s breaks and changes of direction as responses or reactions to his own work, makes it possible to see how two notions that appear in separate phases of Foucault’s work – in this case an archaeological understanding of discourse and governmentality – can be used together. Both of these concepts were developed by Foucault as ways for understanding what is possible, and therefore what is actual, at a particular point in time. An understanding of Foucault’s use of the term ‘apparatus’ will be discussed later to further clarify this important point.

The policy analysis at the core of this thesis (Chapters 4 to 7) is undertaken using the method of archaeological discourse analysis as described in The Archaeology
of Knowledge (Foucault, 2002a). This chapter begins with a detailed exploration of what discourse and discourse analysis are from a Foucauldian archaeological viewpoint, thus setting out the methodological foundation upon which the analysis rests. From this follows a discussion of what is meant by Foucault’s use of the term apparatus (dispositif): how it conjoins lines and relations of force with discourse and by doing so frames the issue of governance. Whilst governmentality as describing a particular type of society and a specific understanding of force relations, will be discussed in the next chapter, in the present one I will explore the significance of governmentality as an analytical perspective. Thus the following discussion detailing and combining the method of archaeological discourse analysis with an analysis through the lens of governmentality aims to make my methodological position explicit, setting out the position I assume myself to have taken as researcher, how I have approached and treated the policy documents considered, and the types of questions that will be most pertinent to the analysis.

Foucault, discourse, and The Archaeology of Knowledge

The Archaeology of Knowledge is described by Cousins and Hussain (1984, p.77) as a retrospective reflection and methodological synthesis by Foucault on earlier texts, and an attempt to produce a conceptual framework for analysing knowledges. It is seen as a methodological explanation or defence of, in particular, The Order of Things (Foucault, 2002c), by questioning the ‘natural’ categories, such as origins and progression, set out by total history, in order to analyse the constitution and transformation of knowledges in terms of discursive formations. Mills (2004) describes Foucault’s notion of discourse as:

something which produces something else (an utterance, a concept, an effect), rather than something which exists in and of itself and which can be analysed in isolation. A discursive structure can be detected because of the systematicity of the ideas, opinions, concepts, ways of thinking and behaving which are formed within a particular context, and because of the effects of those ways of thinking and behaving.

(p.15)
This explanation highlights two separate and key questions: what is discourse, and how can it be studied?

**Archaeology**

Analytically it is helpful to begin with the second question. Foucault presented archaeology as the analysis of discourse. Archaeology is the description of discourse, it aims to describe discursive formations rather than interpret them or look for a meaning beyond them. Archaeology ‘does not treat discourse as *document*, as a sign of something else . . . it is concerned with discourse in its own volume, as a *monument*. It is not an interpretative discipline: it does not seek another, better-hidden discourse’ (Foucault, 2002a, p.155). Through this, Foucault saw the archaeologist as studying existence: studying what is actual rather than what is possible (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p.56).

He asks crucially, how a discourse is formed and gives definition to a particular historical moment or episteme. A discursive formation is formed by a group of statements (Brown and Cousins, 1986, p.33), and it is the aim of archaeology to describe the relations between these statements (Foucault, 2002a, p.34). In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* grants to the statement the position of, what Deleuze (1988) described as, a ‘radical primacy’ (p.49). Yet what a statement is, and what it is not, proves to be a complex matter that has been greatly questioned and criticised. As explained by Cousins and Hussain (1984) a common usage for the word ‘statement’ is language. However, Foucault (2002a, p.122) claimed that in archaeology a statement is neither a sentence nor a proposition, it cannot therefore be reduced to language or logic: ‘a statement is always an event that neither language (langue) nor the meaning can quite exhaust’ (p.31). As an event, a statement has both a beginning and an end, and is thus denied an association with some kind of on-going essence. Through this Foucault is avoiding the unities and totalities associated with grammar and logic to demonstrate that instead discursive formations are ‘the principle of dispersion and redistribution, not of formulations, not of sentences, not of propositions, but of statements’ (p.121). Foucault therefore claimed that there is no structural unity of the statement because the statement is not a unit but a function – the enunciative
function (p.98). Most explicitly, he refers to the statement as a ‘function of existence that properly belongs to signs’ (p.87). A statement can therefore take the form of a sentence or proposition, although it can also take on other forms – a list or table – but it cannot be reduced to these. This therefore extends the scope of what might be analysed as statements to include, for example, computer software packages or door signs; not just the content of case notes, but also (and perhaps more importantly) their format, layout and structure; even the built environment in terms of how space is divided, charted and mapped out.

Discourse, as the formation of statements, can therefore be thought of as a practice; discourse crosses the theory-praxis divide since (discursive) knowledge is understood as a social practice – as doing something. Archaeology is ‘an attempt to reveal discursive practices in their complexity and density; to show that to speak is to do something – something other than to express what one thinks’ (Foucault, 2002a, p.230). This highlights two further points important to understanding statements: they are linked to a subject (the statement must have a material existence – it must be spoken or written for example (Foucault, 2002a, p.112), but that subject is not the origin of the statement. The relation between the statement and the subject is not one of authorship, instead the statement determines what position the subject must occupy to be its enunciator (or audience). Using discourse analysis can therefore demonstrate how certain social behaviours and practices construct and effect particular individuals and groups. Due to this discourses that emerge from the policy documents considered in this thesis are not treated as political rhetoric, or examples of a particular political party’s social ideals, but instead as the space or surface through which certain ways of being are enabled and others made either impossible or somehow unattractive.

According to Foucault, these groups of statements (which he termed positivities) that comprise discursive practice are not unities or totalities, but systems of dispersion (Foucault, 2002a, p.41). Statements cannot, therefore, be reduced to

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8 The place of the subject in discursive formations and the issue of agency will be discussed on pp.33-35.
grammatical sentences or logical propositions. Brown and Cousins (1986, p.34) argue, however, that Foucault’s definition of the statement is not differentiated enough from categories of language, and therefore his concepts remain ambiguous. Likewise Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982, p.70) suggest that Foucault is much clearer regarding the traditional methods he rejects than the principles he is trying to introduce. Typically, he is better at saying what something is not, than what it is. This ambiguity poses a problem when justifying that something is (or is not) a statement and so can be used as data within the analysis of a discourse. It can potentially leave the concept boundary-less, causing the problem of where to begin and where to finish the search for statements. This problem is exacerbated through Foucault’s (2002a) claim that although statements are not hidden neither are they immediately visible:

> It requires a certain change of viewpoint and attitude to be recognised and examined in itself. Perhaps it is like the over-familiar that constantly eludes one; those familiar transparencies, which, although they conceal nothing in their density, are nevertheless not entirely clear.

(p.124)

This suggests that a thorough search is required to ensure that statements are not overlooked through being either too obvious or too obscure.

These apparent difficulties in recognising a statement may conflict with the definition of archaeology as a pure description. Foucault’s insistent claim that archaeology merely describes discourse is to distinguish it from involving any form of interpretation. This in turn is partly due to his move away from the subject as the originator of ideas and source of meaning, as well as his commitment to discourse being understood as only surface with no hidden depth. Thus for Foucault statements must be taken at ‘face value’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p.46), there is no need to search for something beyond them. This means that in the analysis of statements no interpretation takes place, only the description of the surface. However as statements are not entirely obvious, and the limits of what is or is not a statement can be

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9 The issue of how well Foucault has distinguished the notion of the statement from linguistics is not something that I intend to explore, as I will be focusing on how the archaeology can be used. However it is important to point out the ambiguity of this concept as statements are the basic data of discourse analysis.
contested, there must be an element of choice involved in discourse analysis. Even if
the statements chosen are treated as having nothing but face-value meaning, the
choice of these statements and the exclusion of others is itself a level of interpretation
– an interpretation of what counts, of what is important in understanding this
discursive formation. This understanding of archaeology as description, based as it is
on the denial of deeper meanings, also suggests that describing the surface, which is
describing existence, is obvious and incontestable. Although this avoids the
subjectivities of hermeneutics, it appears to be in contradiction to the idea of
discourse as something that has no stability, no structure, and no overriding theories.
Thus Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) ask: ‘Must we not be able to ask: Are these
descriptions accurate or distorted? But doesn’t this re-introduce truth?’ (p.85). Yet
Foucault denies the possibility that discourse rests on a transcendental a priori. That is,
discourse is historical, contradictory and contingent, and within this truth must be
equally so.

The idea that an archaeologist can merely describe statements suggests that
the researcher plays the role of a detached spectator. However as the subject is
positioned through, and as an effect of, discourse, there appears to be no room
outside of discourse from which the archaeologist can observe. The archaeologist, as a
subject positioned by discourse, cannot help but be involved in and part of the
discourse that she or he is analysing. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) present the
problem:

the archaeologist, like Husserl’s transcendental phenomenologist, must
perform an ‘ego-split’ in order to look on as a detached spectator at the
very phenomena in which, as an empirical interested ego (or in
Foucault’s case speaker), one can’t help being involved.

(p.87)

It would therefore be misleading to present the analysis of discourse as the pure
description of a pre-existent objective reality. However, if the inability of the
archaeologist to remain detached from the discourse that she or he is studying, due to
discourse positioning the subject, weakens the notion of archaeology as description, it
also demonstrates why archaeology is not interpretation – we cannot speak outside of
discourse. To be understood within society, or the domain to which the speech is addressing, the archaeologist must remain within the rules of the discourse: ‘one is ‘in the true’ only by obeying the rules of a discursive ‘policing’ which one has to reactivate in each of one’s own discourses’ (Foucault, 1981, p.61). Therefore Foucault (1984) claimed that we need to stop asking ‘How can a free subject penetrate the substance of things and give it meaning?’, and instead focus on the question, ‘How, under what conditions, and in what forms can something like a subject appear in the order of discourse?’ (p.118). It is for this reason that Foucault wanted to avoid archaeology being associated with interpretation. Yet when using the term description it must be remembered that the archaeologist is describing a moving, dynamic discourse that she or he is actively constituted by, contributing to, and perpetuating.

**Discursive formations**

Foucault (2002a) posits four categories for the identification and analysis of discursive formations: (i) objects; (ii) enunciative modalities; (iii) concepts; and (iv) strategies. I shall deal with each of these key terms in turn as a way of showing their significance and the complicated relation between them. It was through an exploration of these categories in earlier texts that Foucault came to understand discursive formations as systems of dispersion. Brown and Cousins (1986) demonstrate that Foucault’s previous studies had shown that objects of discourse are not singular, concepts proved to form neither a coherent nor permanent system, that ‘Where a principle of unity had been sought only the fact of dispersion had been found’ (p.38). The study of discourse then, does not look for coherent unities, but neither does it accept total randomness.

Writing on the object of madness, Foucault realised that a discursive formation does not refer to a single object. He used the example of psychopathology to demonstrate that the object of madness does not remain constant throughout space and time, noting that statements from different times and different institutions do not refer to the same object: ‘we are not dealing with the same madmen’ (Foucault, 2002a, p.35.) Through this Foucault (p.36) claimed that the unity of a discourse is not based on the object itself but on the ‘space’ in which the objects emerge and are
transformed. The discourse is not formed around a stable object as the object is part of the discourse, which in fact forms the object of which it speaks (p.54): it is through discourse that the object becomes nameable, describable and manifest. It is this that archaeology aims to analyse through mapping the ‘surfaces of emergence’ of the object(s) (p.45), that is, through what the object appears, what categories are used to describe it, what status it has; which authorities, such as medicine or law, can designate it as an object, and how the object is specified, divided and classified. However, all of these elements change from period to period, therefore:

it is not the objects that remain constant, nor the domain that they form; it is not even their point of emergence or their mode of characterisation; but the relation between the surfaces on which they appear, on which they can be delimited, on which they can be analysed and specified.

(Foucault, 2002a, p.52)

This is suggestive of the way the archaeologist of discourse is very much at home with inconsistencies, discontinuities and ruptures in history. Not only do objects within a discursive formation change from period to period, ‘even within a given period the objects of a science are constantly undergoing shifts, transformations, substitutions’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p.59). Thus, contradictory objects can exist within the same discursive formation at the same time. Foucault (2002a, p.168) criticised the ‘history of ideas’ for understanding these contradictions as the basis on which discourse emerges – that is, the aim of the ‘history of ideas’ is to recreate a coherency. Instead for archaeology, ‘contradictions are neither appearances to be overcome, nor secret principles to be uncovered. They are objects to be described for themselves, without any attempt being made to discover from what point of view they can be dissipated’ (Foucault, 2002a, p.169). Of particular interest to archaeological analysis are intrinsic oppositions, which are not contradictory statements about the same object in the sense that they cancel each other out, but rather constitute

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10 An example of this may be the constant tension of ‘care’ and ‘control’ in social work practices, or within the topic of this thesis the need for an individual to be both a careful manager of risk and able to maximise the speculative capacity of the inherent uncertainties of life, as discussed in Chapter 6.
different ways of forming statements regarding the same object. Foucault (2002a) understood these oppositions as having multiple functions within a discourse: ‘they make possible the determination of new objects, they arouse new enunciative modalities, they define new concepts . . . but without anything being modified in the system of positivity of the discourse’ (p.172). Various ways of understanding old age as a discursive object will be discussed in the analysis of the policy documents (primarily in Chapter 4). It will be demonstrated how multiple objects of old age exist within the same space, often jarring with each other as they require different constitutive notions of self. These contradictions also suggest the possibility of resistance within a discursive formation: the possibility of doing otherwise, and thereby changing what is able to emerge within a formation. Such points of resistance and oppositions will be drawn out through the policy analysis within Chapters 4 to 7 by highlighting both inconsistencies within the policy documents, as well as through the literature used in their critique.

The second category referred to by Foucault is the formation of enunciative modalities, which concerns how statements referring to objects are made. If discourses were thought of as a theoretical architecture or super structure, the question ‘how are statements made?’ could be answered: ‘with signs’ (Cousins and Hussain, 1984, p.88). However, as discourse is a practice and statements are functions, for Foucault the form or way of stating is just as important as the content. In this sense the enunciative modality can be understood in terms of three questions: Who is speaking? Where is it being spoken from? What is the relation between the speaker and what is being spoken of? (Brown and Cousins, 1986, p.51). This gives importance to authority and power: that a proposition may be considered as true from one speaker, in a particular context, but may be seen as inconsequential or even ramblings from another (the authority of a Psychiatrist or a Priest to treat a mental health patient for example). Hence a subject must take up a particular position in order to make a particular statement, or to be the one addressed by a statement. This implies that only certain subjects can make certain statements. Foucault (2002a, p.56) used the example that only doctors can make medical statements: it is not a matter of who can utter a sentence, but who is sanctioned to be taken seriously, to be thought of as knowing the
truth. Whilst enabling a truth statement in some circumstances, this also points to situations where knowledge is refused, excluded or denied. Allen (2010) sets out two forms of exclusion from knowledge: firstly subjugated knowledge, which is knowledge without authority (medical diagnosis from a nurse or patient for example); secondly lost knowledge, which is knowledge that can no longer be known due to a historical change in the syntax of knowledge (medieval knowledge of witchcraft for example). The second of these exclusions must necessarily remain as an historical curio. But the first indicates the analytical utility of an understanding of the subject as an ‘enunciative function’ (Foucault 2002a, p.56) of discourse, where questions of who are given authority to speak or to know, in what situations can expose not only the identities and lifestyles legitimised, and those which policy acts to delegitimise (risky individuals or passive citizens for example), but moreover how and for what purpose?\footnote{An example of subjugated knowledge discussed in the analysis can be found in Chapter 6 regarding expert knowledge and risk assessment.}

For the archaeologist, this does not, of course, assume some individuals to have a greater understanding of reality than others. The ability to utter a statement is dependent on being able to ‘take up’ the necessary position: ‘statements position subjects – those who produce them, but also those they are addressed to’ (Fairclough, 1994, p.43). Thus the subject is not the creator of statements, but is itself the creation or the effect; Deleuze (1988) describes the subject of The Archaeology of Knowledge as a place or position, in this sense it ‘is a variable, or rather a set of variables of the statement. It is a function’ (p.55).

The denial of what is called the ‘sovereign subject’, replacing it with a notion of the subject as a function of discourse, seems to deplete the subject of any form of agency. Fairclough (1994) argues that ‘Foucault’s insistence upon the subject as an effect of discursive formations has a heavily structuralist flavour which excludes active social agency in any meaningful sense’ (p.45). The move away from the subject as creator and originator does bring ambiguity into the question of agency. However, contra Fairclough, this is not best understood as a clear cut option between an agent
free from discursive constraints, or a subject positioned by discourse and therefore completely determined. Foucault (2002a) stated that:

The positivities that I have tried to establish must not be understood as a set of determinations imposed from the outside on the thought of individuals, or inhabiting it from the inside, in advance as it were; they constitute rather the set of conditions in accordance with which a practice is exercised, in accordance with which that practice gives rise to partially or totally new statements, and in accordance with which it can be modified.

(p.230)

This suggests that Foucault’s intention was not to remove the ability of the subject to act within discursive formations, but to highlight how the construction of knowledges, along with the recognition of discursive knowledge as social practice, situates a subject: ‘I wanted not to exclude the problem of the subject, but to define the positions and functions that the subject could occupy in the diversity of discourse’ (Foucault, 2002a, p.221.) Rather than limiting and determining individuals, an archaeology of discursive formations is instead intended to demonstrate the diversity and multiplicities of positions and functions that subjects can take up simultaneously. Therefore as Paras summarises:

The archaeological description of discursive formations was not to be understood as a set of constraints operating upon an otherwise-free speaker. These formations were a literal positivity: the site, the rules, and the relations that made meaningful speech possible in the first place.

(Paras, 2006, p.40)

The last two categories that constitute a discursive formation are those of concepts and strategies. A discursive formation can be thought to exist if there is a constancy of concepts employed within the statements (Cousins and Hussain, 1986, p.85). This constancy is not static, however. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) highlight how in The Order of Things (Foucault, 2002c) Foucault showed that, ‘concepts shift, incompatible concepts overlap, and all are subject to conceptual revolutions’ (Dreyfus
and Rabinow, 1982, p.59). Foucault (2002a) argued that the formation of concepts cannot be attributed to ‘the horizon of ideality, nor to the empirical progress of ideas’ (p.70). In line with how the formation of objects and enunciative modalities must be understood, the formation of concepts cannot be treated as a transcendent rationality, but neither can it be considered part of a social evolution brought on by a progression of ideas. There appears again to be a circularity concerning the formation of concepts, where they cannot be attributed to the intelligibility or consciousness of a subject, yet the subject is somehow more than a robotic function performing preordained roles – that is, there is no super-structure above discourse that guides its direction. This has the tone of setting up discourse up as a kind of mysterious life force in itself. However, Foucault (2002a) appears to have been motivated by what is being rejected: ‘I have not denied – far from it- the possibility of changing discourse: I have deprived the sovereignty of the subject of the exclusive and instantaneous right to it’ (p.230).

Regarding the final important term, the formation of strategies, Foucault claimed that discursive formations can be recognised through statements supporting a common theme, suggesting that discourses have ‘theoretical preferences for an emphasis upon some issue’ (Cousins and Hussain, 1984, p.89). Two points that Foucault makes concerning the theme of a discourse are that, firstly: ‘The discourse under study may also be in a relation of analogy, opposition or complementarity with certain other discourses’ (Foucault, 2002a, p.74). An example within the scope of this thesis is the prominence of concepts such as activity, participation and independence found within discourses of old age and ageing. Populations of older people are strategically framed through this combination of concepts. These concepts are also common across other discourses, such as disability, education, and those that surround finances and economy. Indeed the discourses of old age discussed in Chapters 4 to 7 at times cross over into these other areas as concepts such as activity and independence make them relevant to how old age/ageing is to be governed. This suggests that discourses are not necessarily mutually exclusive and can share similarities with other discourses. As explained by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982), this means: ‘The same theme, such as evolution, can be articulated in two different fields of objects and concepts . . . A single theme, but two types of discourse’ (p.71).
Secondly, these themes or theoretical choices are determined by, ‘the function that the discourse under study must carry out in a field of non-discursive practice’ (Foucault, 2002a, p.75). This again strengthens the link between discourse and social practice, and the notion that knowledge is practice.

Despite this clear link between discourse and social practice, the avoidance of seeking value and truth by archaeology has led to the accusation that it must therefore also be devoid of meaning and purpose:

Freeing oneself from the bureaucrats and the discursive police is surely exhilarating, but until one finds a new position from which to speak, and a new seriousness for one’s words, there is no place in archaeology for a discourse with social significance, no reason anyone should listen . . . no reason anyone should write.

(Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p.89)

This is a troubling claim as it seems true that there are limits to archaeology and it will frustrate those arguing for a particular ‘superior’ society. Indeed archaeology cannot have social significance if by that it is meant an aim for an enlightened or even more just society. However archaeology can aid social knowledge by exposing universals and natural essences as contingent (although no less real), and demonstrating how these knowledges create social practices and define what is and what is not possible within a particular context. As indicated in the Introduction, it is this that the analysis of the chosen policy documents undertaken here aims for, by questioning the reality/ies the policies take for granted, asking what it is they deny and disallow, and demonstrating what they do: what are the consequences of the subjectifications and rationalities legitimised in them? Archaeology cannot therefore call for revolution by replacing one set of truth claims with another, but it is part of an agonistic social practice (not least by being part of discourse itself) by probing and questioning what status social realities have and what practices these lead to.

Archaeology is therefore far from an objective practice. Despite the claim that it merely describes statements, the ambiguity of statements and the practicalities of having to start and stop somewhere perhaps suggest that archaeology as description
better defines what it is avoiding – the search for a deeper meaning beyond the surface of discourse. This ambiguity is carried into the description of a discursive formation as comprised of the formation of objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies, where Foucault has greater clarity over how they are not formed rather than how they are. Archaeology is therefore clearly not a systematic methodology. As has been demonstrated, it is far from a ready-made model that may be applied, and its use will require thought and consideration concerning, for example, how statements are to be selected\textsuperscript{12}. Perhaps it better represents a way of working that is not dominated by the supremacy of the subject, or ideals of unities, coherencies and progression, as a way of understanding knowledge by deconstructing hierarchies: ‘where a literary form, a scientific proposition, a common phrase, a schizophrenic piece of non-sense and so on are also statements . . . This is what had never before been attained by logicians, formalists or interpreters, science and poetry are equal forms of knowledge’ (Deleuze, 1988, p.20). These concerns should not, however, cause it to be overlooked, nor thought of as invalid. Instead, they encourage an added engagement with methodology, ensuring that the researcher is constantly immersed in the research process. It is through this rigorous and critical engagement with discourse that dynamic and stimulating discussions will enliven social policy and social work research and practice.

\textbf{Apparatuses and analytics of government}

In \textit{The Archaeology of Knowledge} Foucault (2002a) spoke of the dispersion of statements (what can be said, what can be seen) as ‘positivities’, explaining, the ‘positivity of a discourse . . . characterizes its unity through time’ by defining ‘a limited space of communication’ (Foucault, 2002a, p.142). From the mid-1970s however, the time when he began to concern himself much more explicitly with relations of power and with governmentality, instead of ‘positivity’ Foucault used the term \textit{dispositif}, generally translated as apparatus (Agamben, 2009) to refer to ‘the said as much as the

\textsuperscript{12} Some of these were raised, and my decisions set out concerning the choice of texts, in the Introduction.
unsaid’ (Foucault, 1980, cited in Agamben, 2009, p.2), or moreover the ‘network’ that exists between various elements such as discourses, institutions, languages and so on. Similarly, Deleuze (1992) describes apparatuses as machines that make one see and speak, that are comprised of lines of visibility and lines of enunciation. His description therefore fits closely with the above description of discourse:

Each apparatus has its way of structuring light, the way in which it falls, blurs and disperses, distributing the visible and the invisible, giving birth to objects which are dependent on it for their existence, and causing them to disappear.

(Deleuze, 1992, p.160)

These lines of visibility and enunciation, along with the lines of force and subjectification that, Deleuze (1992) claims, are also elements of an apparatus, create a ‘tangle’ of both the actual (historical) and the possible (new).

Whilst the term ‘positivity’ was used within the context of discourse, Foucault is clear that an apparatus concerns both discursive and non-discursive formations (Agamben, 2009). Despite this distinction between positivity and apparatus, Agamben (2009) demonstrates how the two terms hold the same function for Foucault: that is allowing an understanding of ‘the relation between individuals as living beings and the historical element’ (Agamben, 2009, p.6). He clarifies that the historical element is the set of institutions, processes of subjectification, and/or rules of power relations, thus:

For Foucault, what is at stake is . . . the investigation of concrete modes in which the positivities (or the apparatuses) act within the relations, mechanisms, and ‘plays’ of power.

(Agamben, 2009, p.6)

Whilst Foucault did not focus on relations of force in The Archaeology of Knowledge, he did elsewhere make the connection explicit. In History of Sexuality: Introduction Volume 1 (1990a) he claimed, ‘Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations’ (p.101). Therefore:

discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it.
Whilst discourse does not create force relations it sets out the field within which they become possible, and in turn is affected and shaped by these lines of force.

Lines of visibility and enunciation are discussed in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* as those that constitute the surfaces through which objects, subjects, concepts and strategies can emerge. However, it is the lines of force and subjectification that enable an apparatus to be understood as a mode of governance. Foucault (1980, cited in Agamben, 2009) set out the strategic function of an apparatus that necessarily locates it in power relations:

> the nature of an apparatus is essentially strategic, which means that we are speaking about a certain manipulation of the relations of forces, of a rational and concrete intervention in the relations of forces, either so as to develop them in a particular direction, or to block them, to stabilize them, and to utilize them. The apparatus is thus always inscribed into a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain limits of knowledge that arise from it and, to an equal degree, condition it. The apparatus is precisely this: a set of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge.

(p.2)

Thus for Agamben (2009), an apparatus designates a ‘pure activity of governance devoid of any foundation in being’ (p.11), meaning that an apparatus acts to model, control, and secure, behaviours, opinions and discourses (Agamben, 2009, p.14). Therefore Agamben (2009) argues that an apparatus has a regulatory function that must necessarily imply a process of subjectification. Here, in the entanglement of lines of visibility, enunciation, force and subjectification, an understanding of governmentality emerges, where strategic force relations collide with what it is possible to say, to know, and to do, and therefore who it is possible to be. For Deleuze (1992) this calls for a creative process to untangle these lines, ‘to distinguish what we are (what we are already no longer), and what we are in the process of becoming’ (p.164).¹³¹⁴

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¹³ An approach to research as creative was discussed in the Introduction.
Governmentality can therefore be understood as both an element and function of an apparatus so far as an apparatus is a network or collection of elements that both act to regulate through practices of subjectification, and also provide the points of resistance from which lines can break out. Alongside describing a form of social organisation and specific power relations, Foucault’s notion of governmentality has been developed as a tool for the critical analysis of political technologies and governmental rationalities in contemporary society (Lemke, 2007). These two aspects of governmentality are interrelated, as the specific characteristics and aims of an analytics of government are derived from an understanding of this particular style and tactic of organising and conducting society. However, an analytical perspective of governmentality is not a theory of power, but rather asks a particular set of questions (Rose et al., 2006). Whilst there is no one governmentality paradigm, an analytics of government tends to start from questions concerning conduct and the subject, with a focus on the relations between subjects. Dean (2010) posits four questions an analytics of government might ask of a subject: What is being acted upon? How is this substance being governed? Who are we when we govern? Why do we govern and why are we governed? Rose and colleagues (2006) add to this list, Who governs what? According to what logics? With what techniques? These questions all focus on the constitution of the subject: Who are we? Who ought we to be? Therefore, what needs to be done? According to what criteria, what end? It is with questions such as these in mind, regarding who the subject is required to be and for what purpose, that I approach the policy documents analysed in the subsequent chapters. My approach of an analytics of government is therefore an analysis of relations, and the effects of these relations:

Foucault’s general principal is that every form is a compound of relations between forces. Given these forces, our first question is with

14 Legg (2011) discusses the difference between, but compatibility of Deleuzian assemblage and apparatus (dispositif). He claims that Deleuze’s (1992) description of an apparatus is very ‘assemblage-like’, thus putting particular emphasis on its ability to disassemble and open new lines of flight, alongside its function of regulation.

15 A full discussion of society as an ‘era of governmentality’, including an exploration of how, why, and through what means society is organised and governed, is presented in Chapter 2.
what forces from the outside they enter into a relation, and then what form is created as a result.

(Deleuze, 1988, p.102)

An example of this approach within this thesis is the analysis of how discursive formations set out certain expectations of social action and care of the self that lead to certain personal identifications: how people subjectify themselves. Chapter 5 highlights this in terms of the notions of the ‘individual’ and the ‘reflexive self’: both notions stem from how people ought to behave within and because of the collective (relations within the population, the community, the family), and have the effect of producing a certain subject-hood that naturalises these relations. Of particular interest to an analytics of government then, are current social practices and how these are acted out by individual members of society, coupled with an exploration of the rationalities through which these practices are justified and normalised, or problematized and positioned as in need of some form of intervention. Conducting an analytics of government therefore sees every-day but often overlooked subjects and objects, habits and routines, as ripe for investigation. Through this the approach has the capacity to demonstrate how practices that are often treated as private and singular are instead enabled by, and contribute to, wider rationalities. Thus whilst one aim is to highlight heterogeneity of social practices rather than discover a hidden unity behind complex diversity (Rose, 1999b), an analytics of government also provides the potential for demonstrating that seemingly disparate practices are connected through one (or more) governmental rationality. In reaction to the accusation that an analytics of governmentality leads to no more than creating abstract ideal types and generalized descriptions, Rose and colleagues (2006) argue that it in fact involves an empirical mapping of governmental techniques and rationalities. Therefore far from aspiring to ideal types this form of analytics aims to emphasise the empirical, contingent and invented, and so also transitory nature of governmental thought (Rose et al., 2006).

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16 Self-care and personal development are prime examples of this, as will be discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7.
The point and focus of an analytics of government is not to distinguish ‘good’ from ‘bad’ forms of government (Dean, 2010). Since any value judgements such as these can only be understood within current governmental rationalities, we must agree with Deleuze and Guattari (1988) that ‘Good and bad are only the products of an active and temporary selection, which must be renewed’ (p.10). Instead, as noted by Dean (2010), such an analysis marks out a space to raise questions regarding government and authority without trying to formulate principles for reform. He argues this does not make an analytics of government a value neutral science, but a form of criticism. In keeping with this, Rose (1999b) presents the purpose of analysis as a way of disturbing and destabilizing current regimes, as well as making it more difficult for us to think in accustomed ways, thereby clearing a space for the possibility of thinking otherwise. The approach therefore provides not a method to follow, but an ethos of investigation and a certain way of asking questions (Rose et al., 2006). Government is an inventive activity (Rose et al., 2006), and likewise an analytics of governmentality must be recognised as a creative process:

Human powers of creativity are centred rather than marginalised, even though such creation takes place within certain styles of thought and must . . . make use of available resources, techniques, and so on.

(Rose et al., 2006, p.99)

As a form of analytics, governmentality can therefore be the untangling of these multiple lines, and so provide an understanding of the splits, breaks, and merges that make up an apparatus. We can remind ourselves here of the definition of an apparatus as the network or relations between almost anything: discourses, institutions, the environment and so on (Agamben 2009).

The following chapter will provide an in-depth discussion of governmentality as it has been understood as a form of social organisation and political power. The foundation work undertaken in this and the following chapter will then be implemented in the succeeding five chapters, firstly to undertake an investigation of policy as a function of governmentality (Chapter 3), and afterwards through a
discourse analysis of the chosen policy documents conducted through this lens of governmentality (Chapters 4-7).
Chapter 2

**Governmentality: governing individuals and populations**

**Introduction**

Governmentality is a term coined by Michel Foucault in the latter stages of his work, most notably in the 1977-1978 lectures ‘Security, Territory, Population’ (Foucault, 2007a). Its significance lies partly in the fact that it provides a semantic linking of governing (*gouverner*) with thought (*mentalité*) (Lemke, 2001). This suggests that Foucault’s concern when developing the concept was to combine an understanding of the technologies of government with the rationalities that underpin them. This relationship between the institutional social practices and rationalities of government is, perhaps, the constant within a term that has multiple usages: when using the term ‘governmentality’ Foucault spoke both of what our society is, claiming that we live in an ‘era of governmentality’ and have done since the eighteenth century (Foucault, 2007a, p.109), and also of a form of analysis – an approach to questioning and understanding this era of governmentality. The first usage is historical or developmental, the second methodological. To further complicate the issue Foucault never fully explored this area, however what has been published by Foucault on the subject has been taken up and developed by various contemporary theorists who have engaged with Foucault’s writings in order to develop analyses of social and political relations, practices and subjectivities for example, as well as to create analytical tools capable of critiquing specific governmental techniques and practices. These multifarious aims and approaches, as well as the systematic manner in which they have been scrutinised have therefore acted to further widen the scope of ‘governmentality’.

I attempt in this chapter to draw together some of the fundamental aspects of governmentality that my analyses will draw upon in the following chapters. The discussion is based on Foucault’s own description of governmentality as set out in the

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17 This was discussed in Chapter 1.
1977-1978 lecture series, but also moves beyond this to include how more recent studies in governmentality have developed and been applied to analyses of contemporary society and political life. This will include some areas of criticism and tension that have been brought to the fore by its use as a social analysis and criticism. Whilst recognising particular theorists use governmentality in different ways and for different purposes, and have extended its use beyond Foucault’s writings, I do not intend to distinguish a ‘pure’ understanding of governmentality from how it has been variously interpreted and taken up. This is mainly due to the inability to discuss Foucault’s work in isolation from post-Foucauldian thinkers, particularly in an area such as governmentality that was never formally set out by Foucault. In this sense, certain post-Foucauldian thinkers have become an essential part of the governmentality discourse and literature. However it is also because I have focused the discussion on areas that have a particular significance for the policy analysis that is developed later.

The chapter begins by introducing Foucault’s discussion of governmentality and how it is distinct from other rationalities of power, in particular detailing pastoral power and the apparatus of police. From this follows a discussion of how governmentality has become manifest in contemporary society focusing on some of the specific strategies, rationalities, technologies and subjectivities that it both requires and enables, including: the formation of population as an object of government, the requirement of individual freedom for social governance, the ‘new’ technologies that enable these, such as statistics, and the specific social relations that develop. Finally some criticisms and areas of tension are explored including the ‘overuse’ of governmentality as an analysis with which to explore contemporary society, and the room governmentality leaves for resistance and autonomous action.

**Governing societies**

Foucault (2007a) was careful to not overemphasise the distinction between the three main forms of governance that he discussed throughout his work: sovereignty, discipline and governmentality. However an understanding of the differences between these rationalities, and hence the technologies possible within them, will help to clarify
what governmentality is: what subjectivities are possible within a governmental society, what relationships look like, and what forms of social and personal action are desirable or rational.

Foucault (2007a) was clear that these three forms of government are not to be thought of as a series or succession. Society is not ruled through one form of government alone at any one time, rather it is the dominant characteristic within which different forms of government are exercised that determines whether a society might be defined as sovereign, disciplinary or governmental. Therefore forms of sovereignty may be practised within a governmental society, but sovereignty as a dominant characteristic of how society is ordered and governed represents, according to Foucault, the era ranging from the Middle Ages to the sixteenth century. To emphasise this point Foucault (2007a) claimed:

we should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and then a society of discipline by a society, say, of government. In fact we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline and governmental management, which has population as its target (p.107-8)

Sovereign and disciplinary powers are characterised by the exertion of one will, or a centralised will, over others. In this sense the sovereign exerts will over subjects, not for the good of the subjects but for the good of the sovereign (Dean, 2010). Disciplinary power may likewise be described as the exertion of a centralised will over individuals, but may come from various authorities (legal or medical for example). Foucault (2007a) saw a shift in the way society was governed in the eighteenth century: the concern was no longer one of governing individuals via a centralised apparatus that exerts its influence over a separate entity of ‘the governed’. Rather government became a dispersed and circular process. Dispersed because a single will or central authority could no longer be located – it no longer made sense to understand government as emanating from a central source as there is no point of origin to which all practices can be traced back. Circular because unlike the unidirectional status of sovereign power, where power moves from the sovereign to
the subject(s) and never in reverse, governmental power is multidirectional. This implies firstly that governance is relational – it dismisses the traditional notion of power as connected to authority and dominance and instead sees power as existing through the relations between individuals or groups. In this sense Foucault (2007a, p.122) described governmental power as an intercourse – a process of exchange between two or more individuals. Secondly, it points to a complex understanding of the relations between subjects, and between subjects and the state, where relations of force are unstable and inconsistent. It is this that led Foucault (2007a) to claim ‘government is basically much more than sovereignty, much more than reigning or ruling’ (p.76).

Whilst the contemporary act of governing tends to have taken on a solely political meaning often related to central government, Foucault (2007a) demonstrated that before the sixteenth century the concept of governing had a much broader meaning that included anything related to the control one has over oneself, as well as the control one has over others. An art of government therefore emerged, according to Foucault (2007a), in answer to the question of the proper way of managing individuals, goods and wealth for example. To highlight the inclusive nature of this form of government Foucault (2007a) likened the management of the population to the management of the family by the father – interested and involved in all aspects of life. To govern does not then have the narrow meaning of ‘ruling’, but involves a much wider interest in the population: ‘to govern’ may mean to lead, but also to follow (a path, a direction or a journey), to support, to provide for, even to care for in terms of governing a soul or relating to health.

Governing is therefore primarily concerned with codes of living conduct, and Foucault (2007a) referred to this form of government as ‘the conduct of conduct’. Understanding government as conducting conduct, as opposed for example to ruling subjects, demonstrates the main focus of government is people’s actions and how they are orchestrated. It also emphasises the dispersed character of government – we all in different ways and for a variety of reasons govern behaviour, both our own and others, there is no definitive list of the governors nor the governed:
Conduct is the activity of conducting, of conduction if you like, but it is equally the way in which one conducts oneself, lets oneself be conducted, is conducted, and finally, in which one behaves as an effect of a form of conduct as the action of conducting or of conduction.

(Foucault, 2007a, p.193)

Government is therefore a continuum ranging from the political government of the self and life itself, to the self-government of one’s life.

According to Lemke (2002), governmentality is introduced by Foucault in order to study the autonomous individual’s capacity for self-control, and how this is related to political rule. He understands Foucault’s work on governmentality as a ‘correction’ of his earlier studies where subjectivity was primarily understood in terms of docility and connected to the process of discipline. Therefore, ‘the notion of government is used to investigate the relations between technologies of the self and technologies of domination’ (Lemke, 2002, p.52). The involvement of the individual in the reflective governing process is therefore crucial as the subject must be an agent and as such able to take up the role of conductor (of oneself, of others), and the equally active role of being conducted. Unlike the docile subject that merely submits to the will of another, a governmental society assumes subjects have the ability to actively partake in their own government. The active role of the subject is considered in a governmental society to be both possible and essential, as a primary governmental function looks to the common good of the population through maximising the potential of each individual. As will be discussed in greater detail later, Foucault (2007a) discussed how ‘population’ became a distinct political reality in the eighteenth century, one important consequence of its emergence was a change in the justification of government: subjects are no longer treated as property of the sovereign or state that can be used in any way that may be advantageous to that sovereign or state. Instead subjects are expected to govern themselves and allow themselves to be governed by others for the good of the population, and therefore as members of that population, for their own good.

18 P. 58
Foucault detailed the emergence of two separate forms of power that he names as giving rise to the current art of government and governmentality. Firstly, pastoral power whose origin lies in Christianity and Christian theology, and secondly the apparatus of police as the term was understood prior to the eighteenth century.

**Pastoral power**

Pastoral power originated in the early Christian tradition. Foucault (2007a) spoke of the Christian pastorate as ‘an absolutely new form of power’ (p.183), as it enabled ways of understanding and governing the subject that had not been possible prior to its emergence. It is due to this that Foucault refers to pastoral power as the prelude to governmentality.

Pastoral power is responsible, according to Foucault (2007a), for creating the art of conducting subjects, both individually and collectively. He stressed that this art of conducting should not be confused with the methods used by the sovereign or law to rule:

> In short, the pastorate does not coincide with politics, pedagogy, or rhetoric. It is something entirely different. It is an art of ‘governing men’

(Foucault, 2007a, p.165)

An understanding of how pastoral power is fundamentally different from juridical-legal and sovereign power can be gained through studying the role of the pastor and their relationship to the congregation.

Unlike sovereign rule, the pastor is not concerned with or attempting to govern a territory, but rather a community, and as with the Christian analogy of a shepherd and his flock, this is not a static but a mobile community. The reach of the pastor is not therefore concerned with or limited by borders, it is focused on a collective of human beings. The role of the pastor may also be seen as distinct from that of the sovereign: pastoral power is a power of care (Foucault, 2007a) - its purpose is to look after the flock for the sake of the flock rather than for the sake of the pastor. Due to this and in opposition to sovereign power, which may require the sacrifice of its subjects, pastoral
power may involve the sacrifice of the pastor for the sake of flock (Foucault, 1982, p.214).

As a power of care, pastoral power must concern itself with the welfare of each individual, as well as that of the community as a whole. Despite originating in Christianity, Foucault (2007a, p.154) demonstrated that pastoral power does not limit itself to spiritual concerns, in fact it is only concerned with spiritual matters to the extent that they impact upon political, economic and social issues such as the management of lives and households, of wealth and goods. Thus this relation of personal and spiritual matters with wider social and political issues enables concern for the individual to spread into a concern for the community as a whole, and vice versa. Pastoral power, especially when focusing on the economy of the household, therefore begins to transgress, or even dissolve the distinction between public and private spheres, legitimating the advancement of government into new areas of personal life. Donzelot (1979) presents an example of this through his discussion of the policing of families, depicting a transition from a government of families in the eighteenth century to a government through families in the twentieth century. He demonstrates how this combined the removal of the sovereignty of the family over their children, and the implementation of new ways to penetrate families resistant to outside intervention

19 These altered relations within families, as well as those between family and state, characterise the modern family, Donzelot claims, as not so much an institution but rather a mechanism:

A wonderful mechanism, since it enables the social body to deal with marginality through a near-total dispossession of private rights, and to encourage positive integration, the renunciation of the question of political right, through the private pursuit of well-being.

(Donzelot, 1979, p.94)

Thus a domain previously private and expected to govern itself, save for the political effects of social status, has become not merely more susceptible to state intervention, but turned into an instrument or mechanism of political governance.

The movement of government into the private sphere became possible, according to Foucault (2007a, p.184), by the constitution of the specific subject: by individualisation. Foucault (2007a, p.183-4) claimed that the Christian pastorate constituted ‘specific modes of individualization’ through which it governed subjects. This individualisation is not related to status or birth, instead Foucault (2007a, p. 184) mapped out three modes through which it occurs: the analytical identification of merits and faults, subjection through being subjected to continuous networks of obedience, and subjectification -the production (and extraction) of an inner, hidden truth. These three modes of individualisation become the techniques used in pastoral power to govern the conduct of the community. However, in order to govern conduct through these modes, particularly in relation to the technique of subjectification, it is necessary to gain a particular form of knowledge:

this form of power cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it.

(Foucault, 1982, p.214)

The art of government that emerged out of pastoral power is therefore linked to the knowledge of the ‘truth’ of an individual, presupposing or requiring the subject to be composed of a reflective narrativity.

Foucault (1982, p.214) firmly based the emergence and practice of pastoral power within the historical period of the early Christian Church. However he argued that we need to differentiate between pastoral power as an ecclesiastical institution – which ceased to exist in the eighteenth century – and pastoral power as a function, which he claimed has moved beyond this institution (Foucault, 1982, p.214). The *functions* of pastoral power: the constitution of the specific subject, the techniques of
government through modes of individualisation that bring further areas of life into the scope of government and cause the boundary between the public and private spheres of life to be at best ambiguous, and the changed relationship between those that govern and those who are governed, are still apparent in (post-eighteenth century) modern society albeit with a change in its expression and objective. Specifically, Foucault (1982, p.215) outlined three variations of this ‘new’ pastoral power: firstly there is a change in its objective – salvation is to be sought in this world rather than through an afterlife; secondly there has been an increase, and also greater diversity, of the officials of pastoral power, for example, along with state officials such as police, officials of pastoral power may now also include welfare societies, institutions such as the family, and new authorities of medicine and economy. Lastly, the development of knowledge of subjects around two poles: a quantitative knowledge of the population, and an analytical knowledge of the individual. These movements demonstrated for Foucault (1982) that pastoral power, ‘Which had been linked to a defined religious institution, suddenly spread out into the whole social body; it found support in a multitude of institutions’ (p.215).

Apparatus of police

Alongside pastoral power Foucault discussed the apparatus of police, as it has emerged and changed since the fifteenth century, as integral to how society is governed today. In contrast to the contemporary use of the term, Foucault (2007a, p.312-313) noted that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ‘police’ referred to a community governed by a public authority as well as the set of actions that directed these communities. Therefore ‘police’ had a much broader, more general meaning relating to the governance of a community.

From the seventeenth century the meaning of police became aligned with the strength and forces of the state (Foucault, 2007a, p.313), albeit in relation to the direction of the community. Foucault (2007a, p.322) claimed that police in this era is primarily concerned with the activities of people, but only insofar as they relate to the force and strength of the state. Therefore, ‘What is characteristic of a police state is its interest in what men do; it is interested in their activity, their ‘occupation’” (Foucault,
From this Foucault (2007a, p.323-5) derived five matters of concern or objectives of police including: the number of citizens, the necessities of life (food, water), health, activities of citizens (for preventing idleness and mendacity), and circulation (of goods). These objectives can be summed up within the overriding concern of police: the coexistence of citizens insofar as this coexistence affects the state’s strength. Therefore police can be described as ‘the set of techniques that ensure that living, doing better than just living, coexisting and communicating can in fact be converted into forces of the state’ (Foucault, 2007a, p.327). Foucault (2007a, p.327) claimed this suggests a circular process of the state, where state intervention on individual lives circles back to the state as a set of forces that it can use to increase its strength which can be used to ensure the collective well-being of its citizens. Everything from being to well-being becomes a concern of the state, with the effect of creating a significant link between the strength of the state and the happiness of individuals:

This circle will pass through the life of individuals, but it will also pass through their more than just living, that is to say, through what at the time was called men’s convenience . . . their amenity, or even felicity. That is to say, this circle, with all that this implies, means that police must succeed in linking together the state’s strength and individual felicity. This felicity, as the individual’s better than just living, must in some way be drawn on and constituted into state utility: making man’s happiness the state’s utility, making men’s happiness the very strength of the state.

(Foucault, 2007a, p.327, emphasis added)

As with pastoral power, the apparatus of police legitimates the extension of governance and intervention into the personal and daily concerns of individuals. It also, however, politicises these private and personal activities – not only the practices themselves but their affective qualities – thus happiness and contentment, or lack of it, take on a political interest and thus becomes open to the investigation, regulation and intervention of the state.
This vested interest in the happiness and well-being of the population is necessarily combined with knowledge of the population. Pasquino (1991, p.113) discussing Obrecht – who he claims is the first writer in the seventeenth century to speak in the political language of the population as opposed to that of the prince – highlights the crucial role of information gathering and monitoring in order to elucidate the capacities and resources of the population and the territory. He notes this information on the population was collected on a daily basis through the registering of births and deaths, but there also existed a requirement for ‘each person to render his or her life into discourse, in order that each person can then be advised how to live a ‘Christian life’” (1991, p.113). Thus the collection of information became a task that everyone had to participate in for the security and collective happiness of the state: ‘the security and happiness of the state . . . is transformed into a great general and uninterrupted confession’ (Pasquino, 1991, p.113). Due to the circular nature of the state of police, the security and strength of the state reflects directly onto the potential happiness of individual citizens, therefore, as Pasquino (1991) notes, individual happiness, being dependent on the protection and assistance of the state is also dependent on the citizens’ ‘confession’ of their life story.

The governmental reason of the eighteenth century brought challenges to this form of intervention through the state of police. Foucault (2007a, p.348) demonstrated that a ‘new governmentality’ emerges with the economists in the eighteenth century that laid down the foundations of both modern and contemporary governmentality. The principle change or challenge by the economists regarded the role and purpose of the state: specifically the state is no longer seen as responsible for utilising and distributing well-being to the population, instead it should only intervene to regulate and facilitate well-being, ‘The state is envisioned as the regulator of interests and no longer as the transcendent and synthetic principle of the transformation of the happiness of each into the happiness of all’ (Foucault, 2007a, p.346).

This movement towards a laissez-faire approach of state governance arose from a belief in a naturalness regarding society and the population. Foucault (2007a, p.351-2) described this as population being subject to its own laws of transformation
and movement that is neither willed nor caused by the state. It is through this belief in population as a set of natural processes that population becomes an objective reality in itself, rather than a collective term for the subjects within a sovereignty or territory. Understanding population as a natural object changes how the state can intervene within it, and so also changes the role of the state. Foucault (2007a) stated within this model, ‘not only will there be no justification, but also quite simply there will be no interest in trying to impose regulatory systems of injunctions, imperatives, and interdictions on these processes’ (p.352), as such the proper way to govern must respect this naturalness which means no longer to control, but to regulate the population.

For Foucault (2007a, p.353-4) this ‘new’ governmentality led to a dismantling of the police state, dividing the apparatus of police into two: on one side the contemporary apparatus of police, with the mainly negative function of preventing disorder; on the other side is what Foucault (2007a) refers to as ‘incentive regulation’, including the economy and various forms of population management. However, what remains in this new form of governmentality is a link between individual being and well-being, and the strength of the state, or perhaps more specifically the collective strength of the population. Secondly, and related to this integral link, is the continued interest in the daily and personal lives of citizens: the activities that make up, what Foucault termed, the more than just living.

Therefore although many aspects of pastoral power and the apparatus of police are confined to their historical context, some functions that emerged through the development of these forms of power have been instrumental in creating what Foucault termed the ‘era of governmentality’. In particular these functions include the emergence of an understanding of the specific subject that enabled new forms of government to be practised upon it, requiring the development of certain knowledges, and the establishment of a different\(^\text{20}\) relationship between those governing and those governed; new areas of life falling within the scope of legitimate government; and the

\(^{20}\) Different, that is, from the relationship between the sovereign and his/her subjects, or master and servant.
establishment of a direct link between individual happiness/well-being and the strength of the collective.

**Governmental society**

Rose (1999b) points out that no universal object of ‘the governed’ exists, instead there exists ‘only multiple objectifications of those over whom government is to be exercised, and whose characteristics government must harness and instrumentalize’ (p.40). He continues that governmental practices are not therefore determined by the ‘nature’ of those being governed, that is, by their character, their passions and interests, but is instead related to how ‘the governed’ are politically objectified at any particular moment: for example as citizens, royal subjects, the public, or population. The notion of population has become significant to governmentality precisely due to its manifestation as a real and political object. Foucault (2007a, p.67) noted that the word ‘population’ existed prior to the eighteenth century only in the sense of to populate or depopulate an area, rather than as describing a specific social and political reality as it is used today. It is in the eighteenth century, Foucault (2007a) argued, that the meaning of population changed:

> with the eighteenth century economists, I think the population no longer appears as a collection of subjects of right . . . It will be considered as a set of processes to be managed at the level and on the basis of what is natural in these processes.

(p.70, emphasis added)

It is therefore important to draw out what these processes and characteristics might be, or more appropriately to determine what processes become attributed to population through the techniques of government.

Foucault (2007a, p.70) set out three modes through which the naturalness of the population became manifest. Firstly he claimed that population is not understood as a collection of subjects, but rather as dependent on a set of complex and modifiable variables, these variables or factors may include the systems of wealth and the law, but also customs and values. The second natural phenomenon of population is the
universal benefit of desire: Foucault (2007a, p.72) highlighted that although the population is made up of people very different to each other who therefore do not behave in a unified manner, according to the eighteenth century theorists who first wrote of the population, such as Mirabeau, Pierre Jaubert and Quesnay, the population as a whole was guided by one main action: desire (to pursue individual interest). The uninterrupted free-play of the desire of individuals was thought to produce the general interest of the population. Foucault (2007a, p.73) emphasised that this management of the population on the basis of the naturalness of individual desire and its link to the production of the general good, is the exact opposite to the exercise of sovereignty and the ethical-juridical conception of government. Lastly, the naturalness of the population is found through the constancy of phenomena that might be expected to be variable due to their nature being based on chance or accidents, for example the constancy in morbidity numbers, suicide rates and so on. Despite this new meaning of population as a set of natural processes or phenomena, Foucault (2007a) argued this does not exempt it from forms of intervention and regulation: ‘the naturalness identified in the fact of population is constantly accessible to agents and techniques of transformation, on the condition that these agents and techniques are at once enlightened, reflected, analytical, calculated and calculating’ (p. 71).

The population, as it came to be understood in the eighteenth century and arguably is still recognised today, includes and combines both an understanding of the ‘human species’ and ‘the public’. That is it became understood both biologically and politically. Population is therefore not a reference to a collection of subjects within a specified area, but a set of biological and cultural processes and phenomena that ‘make up’ knowledges of population as object, through which it can be governed:

The population is therefore everything that extends from the biological rootedness through the species up to the surface that gives one a hold provided by the public. From the species to the public; we have here a whole field of new realities in the sense that they are the pertinent elements for mechanisms of power, the pertinent space within which and regarding which one must act.
Population curves of normality

By defining population as dependent on a multitude of complex and modifiable variables (Foucault, 2007a), population is characterised as a morphing object that contains vast differences within it at any moment, as well as involving transformations across time. For example, many sometimes conflicting customs and value systems may exist within and constitute the population at the same time, and institutions such as law may change dramatically from one time to another. Despite these variations, population does not become broken up into a series of disconnected phenomena, on the contrary, this diversity is used to create knowledge of the population, for example through techniques that create the normal or what Canguilhem calls ‘normalisation’.

Foucault (2007a, p.57) discussed the notion of disciplinary normalisation, claiming that its purpose is to encourage conformity to a particular optimal model. Through this people become divided and classified as either normal – those who are able to conform, or abnormal – those who cannot conform. An example of this may be the traditional or medical model of disability, where an individual with a physical impairment would be classed as abnormal due to their inability to conform to the optimal model of unimpaired health and ability. Within a disciplinary system the norm is used to divide the normal from the abnormal. In this sense the healthy are divided from the sick, thus only the sick would be treated in an attempt to achieve their conformity to the norm, and to avoid the contamination of others. In contrast to this, within a system of governmentality individuals are not primarily known through acts of division. Governmentality creates a form of unity over the whole by understanding the population in relation to various distribution curves of normality. Foucault (2007a, p.62) used the example of mass vaccinations to demonstrate that within a governmental system it is the population as a whole that is treated rather than just the ‘sick’. Therefore instead of the norm being used to divide:

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21 The extension of governance over biological life has been developed by, for example, Rose (2001a; 2007) and Agamben (1998).
we have a plotting of the normal and the abnormal, of different curves of normality, and the operation of normalisation consists in establishing an interplay between those different distributions of normality and [in] acting to bring the most unfavourable in line with the more favourable. (Foucault, 2007a, p.63)

The norm is therefore secondary to, and a derivative of, the distribution curves of normality. The aim within this system is not to ensure the conformity of individuals to an optimum model, but to use the norm to determine favourable and unfavourable normality curves. For example, Foucault (2007a, p.62) highlighted that when it was discovered that infants were more vulnerable to catching and dying from small pox than other sections of the population, the problem became one of reducing infant mortality to bring it in line with the average level of mortality from small pox for the rest of the population. Thus infants are not divided from the population as abnormal in comparison to one another, but understood as an ‘outlier’ on a distribution curve of which they are a part. This highlights an important feature of the norm – that population can give itself a common denominator(s) without any reference to a point of externality (Dean, 2010). Thus the deviances and differences within a population become the points of reference through which that population becomes knowable and known, and so through which governance becomes necessary and justified.

The norm is therefore the interplay of variations, rather than a pure formal ideal. The consequence of this is the instability of any norm: distributions of normality will constantly change, partly due to the forms of governmental practices that occur to influence the ‘unfavourable’ normality curves. For example the effect of recognising the greater likelihood of infants to die from small pox than other sections of society would be an effort to counteract this. The decrease of infant mortality would change the normality curve, which would alter the norm. As the concept of what is favourable or unfavourable is determined in relation to the various distribution curves, this would also change. Advances in technology will also affect the normality curves, and in turn the norm, as Rose (2007, p.17) highlights, the norm of ageing has been significantly altered through medications such as Hormone Replacement Therapy: a treatment
commonly used to halt the effects of the menopause – traditionally known as the ‘change of life’ – aimed at, among other effects, avoiding changes traditionally associated with old age such as a drop in libido, or ageing diseases such as osteoporosis. The desired outcome of such a treatment is primarily that the body, and so life, remain as unchanged as possible.\footnote{22 This point will be further discussed in Chapter 4.}

Distribution curves created from information of the population signifies the importance of understanding members of the population as living beings. For example demographic forms of information include birth rates, mortality and morbidity rates, levels of activity including employment and education. However, the interest in this information rests in what it is thought to reveal regarding the behaviour of individuals, creating the potential for that conduct to be regulated and governed. For example, Gordon (1991, p.4-5) demonstrates how in The History of Sexuality: An introduction, Volume 1 (Foucault, 1990a) Foucault used the term biopower to designate the forms of power that are exercised over people specifically as living beings\footnote{23 Biopower as a form of governance will be discussed in Chapter 3.}, here Foucault shows how individuals’ sexual and reproductive conduct became interlinked with issues of national policy and power. Hence biological features of individuals become the object of political strategy (Foucault, 2007a) through their assimilation into various normality curves that act to position them and their behaviour within the population, and level some form of judgment regarding the favourability of their conduct.

**Inscribed knowledge**

In order to turn the biological and personal lives of individuals into forms of political power and strategies, information of individual characteristics and certain processes and relationships need to be measured, deciphered, compared, and presented in a way that demonstrates this. This information, presented primarily in statistical and demographic forms, establishes population as an objective and distinct reality focusing on its consistencies and trends, thereby demonstrating that there are certain truths relating to population. The use of numbers and statistics to divulge knowledge of the population has been, and still is, heavily relied upon.
Foucault (2007a, p.274) noted that ‘statistics’ relates etymologically to ‘knowledge of the state’, and they still today have the function of calculating and presenting social knowledge. Hacking (1991, p. 181) details the impact statistics have had on the human sciences; specifically statistics have influenced what sort of information or knowledge is looked for and how it is expressed. For example, Hacking (1991, p.182) argues that many of our modern categories through which the population is understood are based upon the attempt to collect numerical information, giving the example that medical statistics gave rise to a need for a conclusive list of all possible causes of death.

The aim of statistics is to categorise, to find relations, similarities and discrepancies, within a certain population. Statistics therefore look for certain information: information that can be numerically expressed and is open to comparison and measurement. Rose (1999a, p.6) argues that it is the presentation of social knowledge in numerical form that causes it to become inscribed onto reality: certain phenomena such as births, rates of illness and so on, become inscribed onto reality through their presentation in the form of charts, demographic maps, reports, as these give the knowledge a material reality and truth through providing physical ‘evidence’. Inscription therefore gives ‘weight’ to the facts and figures, turning them into objective information: thus charts and maps are used as reliable and objective representations of fact, rather than as inscriptions or representations of a specific or variable reality.

Hacking (1991) outlines the history of statistics detailing its construction including how each of its founders imposed something of their own character onto it. He (1991) exclaims, ‘We still live in the shadows of these men. Our governments classify us, lodge us, tax us, according to the systems that they began’ (p.193). Therefore despite often being presented as merely uncovering and presenting objective truths relating to the nature of population, statistical information can instead be shown to be constructing the domains it is thought to merely represent in two ways (Rose, 1999b, p.198). Firstly, the creation and development of statistics has determined the specific ways through which individuals are categorised and therefore characterised: Hacking (1991) highlights for example, that ‘by law we shall die of the
causes enumerated in Farr’s nosology’ (p.193), causing it to be (legally and medically) impossible to die of something not on the medical list: old age for example. Secondly, statistics rely on information that can be measured and categorised in a numerical or similar fashion, and so tends to overlook that which cannot be gathered and expressed in this way, perhaps not recognising it as reliable or useful knowledge of the population\(^24\).

Numbers, far from objective and unbiased facts, are therefore more appropriately thought of as political judgements, as:

> political judgements are implicit in the choice of what to measure, how to measure it and how often to measure it and how to interpret the results


Lemke (2007), using a term coined by Latour, refers to these processes and products of calculation and measurement, for example scientific reports, statistical accounts, surveys and graphs, as ‘inscription devices’ stating that it is these that ‘made it possible to define problems, specify areas of intervention, calculate resources, and determine political goals’ (p.7). Therefore despite the propensity for numbers to be used to evidence a truthful understanding of population, and from this suggest a normative way of living, Rose (1999b, p.198) argues that the use of numbers as evidence instead acts to disguise the political nature of these judgements, suggesting instead that the judgments are based on what is matter of fact, or evidently natural. Thus by creating a ‘rhetoric of disinterest’ (Rose, 1999b, p.208) the use of numbers acts to hide the motivation and rationality that lead to one particular question to be asked, or a particular social phenomenon to be thought of as problematic and in need of investigation. Ruppert and Savage (2011) present a similar account of the recent use of transactional data to both identify and judge individuals. As digitalized transactional data represents people’s practices – what they have done and not what they say – they argue the analysis of such data is represented as ‘flat’ descriptions and visualisations of an objective reality. Despite the

\(^24\) This will be further discussed in relation to policy formation in Chapter 3.
treatment of this sort of data as merely waiting a neutral analysis Ruppert and Savage (2011) emphasise the possibility of it being used to misrepresent by, for example, having no way to include the circumstances behind the transaction.

Far from being politically disinterested, these kinds of inscription devices – the methods through which numbers become presented (such as reports, charts, plans, guidelines and so on) – have the aim of acting on the population in a specific and planned way. Rose (1999b) suggests that these inscription devices have the ability to produce conviction in people, thus they act as political arguments for one rationality over another. Furthermore, it is the ability to calculate and represent aspects of subjectivity that makes members of the population individually and collectively governable (Rose 1999a, p.8). The use of numbers and calculation in various forms should therefore not be understood as the mere presentation of information, but as actual techniques for the government of the population, used to map out possible spaces for government, justify particular governing programmes, and convince individuals of the need for certain practices of self-government.

Rationalities of government

The activity of government is intimately tied to specific rationalities, hence Rose (1999b) claims that government is ‘both made possible by and constrained by what can be thought and what cannot be thought at any particular moment in history’ (p.8). Thus as highlighted by Foucault (2007a) it is the belief that population is somehow ‘natural’ that inhibits any justification for imposing regulatory systems on it. More specifically, the belief (by the eighteenth century scientists and economic theorists who originally spoke of population as an objective reality,) that this naturalness rested on the universal motivation of desire to pursue individual interest (containing the belief that this desire will lead to the collective good), informs orthodox ways of acting on and governing society. This rationality inhibits forms of governing that may hinder the pursuit of individual interest, yet justifies intervention if this desire becomes stifled in some way. Lemke (2007, p.2) understands government as defining a discursive field where exercising power becomes rationalised. This demonstrates how the acts of government and governmental thought cannot be
detached from one another – orthodoxy and orthopraxy inform one another. It would be nonsensical to ask which comes first as they are part of the same occurrence— together they constitute the discursive field within which current forms of governance are performed and make sense.

Rationality is not therefore referring to a form of transcendental truth or knowledge, but to the particular thought, beliefs and values that become normative in a particular place and at a specific moment in time, enabling certain things to be done, and others to be prohibited. Thus Lemke (2002) claims, ‘In this perspective, rationality refers not to a transcendental reason but to historical practices’ (p.55): rationalities are historically specific and so can never be stable or static. Rationality can therefore be defined as that which underpins and justifies normative governmental techniques. However, as Rose (1999b, p.275-6) points out, although governmental technologies are related to a particular rationality, this rationality is not straightforward – it does not have the coherence of a single origin, but may instead come from many places, giving the examples of philosophical doctrines, conceptions of power and justice, and notions of social reality.

It is therefore important to pinpoint specific rationalities if governmental practices are to be recognised and analysed. This is emphasised by Lemke (2007) who notes, ‘political rationalities provide cognitive and normative maps that open up spaces of government ’ (p.7), suggesting that rationalities outline or mark out the boundaries of the reality in need of government, making it knowable and therefore open to intervention. For example, the general purpose of social policy is to advocate certain changes or institutionalise procedures and rules, these are underpinned by governmental rationalities that describe and map out the reality to be governed (older people, retirees, the socially isolated and so on), and through this justify any call for intervention (Rose, 1999a, p. xxii). Due to this Rose (1999b, p. 28) argues that every project of rationalisation is at the same time a strategy to intervene and regulate.

**Governmental technologies**

Governmentality can therefore provide a fruitful analysis of how society is currently organised and managed. Of specific interest are technologies that
demonstrate a preference for governing from a distance, the central position of freedom and free choice, and the particular purpose and aim of governance – how it justifies itself.

**Governing from a distance**

The contemporary state, often characterised as neo-liberal, leads individuals without assuming responsibility for them or becoming too involved in their lives (Lemke, 2001, p. 201). Rose (2001, p. 6), discussing the nation’s health, notes that the state is no longer expected to fulfil society’s needs, but rather to act as a facilitator: the state aims to enable individuals to fulfil their own needs rather than directly intervene. The question of how it is decided what these needs are remains an area of contestation however. The conviction that governing from a distance, with as little direct intervention as possible, is a superior form of governance arises in relation to a belief in some kind of ‘naturalness’ regarding the population (Foucault, 2007a).

Therefore:

The basic principle of the state’s role, and so of the form of governmentality henceforth prescribed for it, will be to respect these natural processes . . . intervention of state governmentality will have to be limited . . . [therefore] It will be necessary to arouse, to facilitate, and to *laisser faire*, in other words to manage and no longer to control through rules and regulations.

(Foucault, 2007a, p.352-3)

Governing from a distance becomes a necessary technology when the population is assumed to be a natural and independent phenomenon, as this inhibits justification for direct intervention regarding its daily government. Government must instead take on the role of enabling these natural processes to continue and develop, intervening only to avoid stagnation.

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25 Such areas of tension will be discussed throughout Chapters 4-7.

26 Authoritarian interventions are still abundant in society however, as will be discussed later (p.73).

27 Webb (2007) argues that social workers in Victorian England were for the first time able to regulate from a distance due to home visits and the spatial importance of ‘home’.
Responsibility therefore rests upon the individual to conduct themselves in ways that benefit society as a whole, with the aid of the various forms of life management that make up health and social care policies. Statements of active citizenship and social obligation contribute to the constitution of this discursive field, rationalising this version of social relationships. In an attempt to explain how individuals come to behave in ways in keeping with this dominant rationality (or view themselves or become judged by its standards), Rose (1999b, p.48) presents the notion of ‘translation’ as the forging of alignments between the objectives of the authorities that aim to govern, and the personal projects of the organisations, groups, and individuals that are its target. This suggests a top-down movement regarding governmental rationalities, where the intentions of central government and public bodies become filtered and dispersed into the daily lives of individuals through various social structures and the way society is organised. Rose (1999b, p.51) explains this using the example of the notion of enterprise in the 1980s which underpinned the critique of the social welfare state. He demonstrates how this became translated into specific strategies to reform policy, such as the restructuring of social security benefits, and reorganisation of universities and hospitals. This transition in thought, where individuals’ needs ceased being the direct responsibility of the state instead becoming the prime responsibility of the individual and, perhaps, the immediate community, can be demonstrated in more recent policy in the move from institutional to community based care in the 1990s, and more recently still the move from directly providing services to providing the funding for individuals to purchase their own services through personal budgets and the strategy of ‘personalisation’ (see Ferguson, 2007) - in the 2000s. Individual members of society therefore live much of their life through structures and organisations based upon a particular notion of society, but they may also come to take on board the values associated with ‘enterprise’, for example, and thus expect certain forms of conduct both from themselves and others.

28 An understanding of human behaviour as market relations has been put forward by neoliberal economists such as Becker (1981) who analyses human relations as rational and utility maximising. This takes the notion of internalising the values of enterprise further as even personal relationships are thought to be internally calculated in terms of utility.
Governing a population is not as straightforward as this may suggest however. The existence of organisational structures due to certain governmental rationalities may certainly encourage individuals to live their life in accordance with social norms in many instances. But governing at a distance requires more than this. To be able to successfully govern from a distance it is necessary to be able to rely on the initiative and voluntary active participation of individual members of the population, and for this to happen individual members of society must want to behave in certain ways due to: justificatory beliefs held regarding their role in society; expectations of what society should be like (the good society); values or ideals that they hold dear; or simply that they believe it to be in their best interest. Rose (2007, p.27) uses the term ‘ethopolitics’ to describe how these desires are used as governmental rationalities and technologies that regulate conduct and encourage self-government. He claims:

In the politics of our present, notably in the revival of communitarian themes, the ethos of human existence – the sentiments, moral nature, or guiding beliefs of persons, groups, or institutions - has come to provide the ‘medium’ within which the self-government of the autonomous individual can be connected up with the imperatives of good government.

(Rose, 2007, p.27)

Knowledge of how individuals determine the standards and boundaries of their own conduct- through personal and moral codes for example – is used to inform governmental techniques. Therefore what individuals consider to be the ‘right’ way to behave, and hence the type of personhood to aspire to, can be utilised by the political state as tools of social regulation. The personalisation agenda in social work is an example of this where the values of choice and control expressed by the Independence Living movement, originating from the 1970s, became usurped by a market based neoliberal discourse which held onto the values of choice and control, but dropped the emphasis on rights and interdependence in favour of responsibility and independence (Ferguson, 2012). The values that the personalisation agenda is currently based upon make it difficult to argue against or reject, as Ferguson (2007) asks: who would be
against choice in health and social care services? But what is offered under the umbrella of ‘choice’, and equally important, what is not offered, combined with the responsibility to make the most of the choices on offer, act to regulate personal identities and lifestyles.

State regulation and self-government - consisting of the monitoring of one’s own conduct against social and personal standards, values and expectations- whilst remaining two distinct forms of governance, are not fully separate or independent from each other. Rather external governmental techniques are often devised around and rationalised using social and personal values and expectations; in return these values and expectations may be forced back onto the population in the form of civil responsibilities using more or less subtle or coercive technologies.

Dean (2007) details the vital connection between the state and civil society for enabling and rationalising contemporary liberal rule. In particular he (2007, p.113) claims that state regulation specifically employs the techniques and agencies located within civil society, therefore liberal forms of government are not limited to parliament and judiciaries, they can equally be found in aspects of civil society such as economics, biomedicine, and the social sciences for example. He argues from this that ‘the liberal fear of governing too much is not so much a fear that the population is being governed too much but that the state is doing too much of the governing’ (Dean, 2007, p.113). The movement towards outsourcing social care services and encouraging service users to find and purchase (even commission) their own services in order to meet needs decided upon by social workers (as opposed to self-defined needs) is an example of this. Governmental regulation under liberal rule uses the forms of regulation already found in civil society in two ways. Firstly through adopting and adapting the processes of civil society: Dean (2007, p.115) gives the example of the market and how devolved budgeting, contracting out of services, and performance management systems have become common place in public organisations. Secondly, as discussed above, governmental regulation aims to replicate the patterns of values, expectations, and forms of conduct thought to exist in civil society independent of state administration and regulation. Some of the social values cited by Dean (2007, p.117) that are reproduced by liberal governmentality are self-responsibility, community, and
independence – values that have come to form the basis of much current social care policy.

Dean (2007) describes this form of government as being possible through two interrelated and simultaneous movements: the unfolding of the political sphere into civil society, and the enfolding of civil society into the political sphere. This, he argues (2007, p.116) is demonstrated through the linkages, networks and partnerships of state organisations with the commercial, local and voluntary sector – hence what was traditionally contained within the political sphere has been extended into other/all sections of society. Dean (2007) claims that at the same time features of civil society become ‘folded’ back into the operations of the state (as demonstrated above), thus civil society becomes political.29

It is this interrelation of civil society with the state and political sphere that has enabled and required government from a distance. Enabled because questions of regulation and government have become dispersed into all areas of social life; and required because the social and cultural values that have been taken up by the state and used in the governance of the population are often not tenable with direct intervention, but instead necessitates the use of liberal freedom, such as choice, responsibility and personal autonomy.

Regulation through freedom and choice

The regulation of the population therefore requires the voluntary participation of its individual members, which rests on the assumption that they are - or can be - free to make decisions and act on these. It is within governmentality then that liberal freedom becomes not only compatible with, but essential to, governance and regulation.

29 The analysis in Chapters 4-7 focuses on the way that many ‘everyday’ traditionally private features of life have taken up a political significance that is thought to have a direct impact on the collective strength of the population as a whole. Thus the choice of leisure activities: a passive individual activity such as reading or participative and collective one such as volunteering or belonging to a community group, become politically charged choices with collective consequences in the policy documents studied.
But what is meant by freedom? Achieving freedom, or being considered free, does not require some kind of social emancipation. It is not related to a social condition at all, but to personal characteristics: freedom refers to an individual’s ability to act in an autonomous fashion. Therefore being free does not necessitate social structural change, but instead for each person to act on themselves - their ‘self’ - to ensure that they attain a form of personhood compatible with autonomous action. Thus, as Rose (1999a) claims, ‘Achieving freedom becomes a matter not of slogans nor of political revolutions, but of slow, painstaking, and detailed work on our own subjective and personal realities’ (p. 257-8). Understood as a personal attribute, strategies of self-government aim to ensure each individual makes their potential for freedom a reality. Individual freedom thus requires activity or reflection-in-action: it is not enough to know that one is free, one must constantly use and demonstrate this freedom – people must make decisions and choices for themselves and act on them.

It therefore becomes possible for members of society to be governed because of their freedom rather than in spite of it. As Rose (1999a) argues, society does not aim to impose lifestyles on individuals through coercive measures (at least not ideally), individuals have much more control over their lives:

Rather than being tied rigidly into publicly espoused forms of conduct imposed through legislation or coercive intervention into personal conduct, forms of life, types of ‘lifestyle’ are on offer, bounded by law only at the margins.

(p.230)

In the absence of coercive measures as a primary tool of government, it is the ideal of individual freedom that is used to regulate. Individuals are encouraged to make choices, and these choices become the object of governmental intervention. This is what Foucault (2007a, p.353) referred to as ‘incentive regulation’, where the population is managed through, for example, economics or the social sciences - through taxes, monetary incentives, housing mortgages and expert advice, rather than controlled through compulsion.
Governing the population through the regulation of freedom and choices ensures individuals retain responsibility for their actions or decisions:

As the choice of options for action is, or so the neo-liberal notion of rationality would have it, the expression of free will on the basis of a self-determined decision, the consequences of the action are borne by the subject alone, who is solely responsible for them.

(Lemke, 2001, p.201)

One of the incentives for the individual to conform to expectations and standards of behaviour is that any consequences, whether good or bad, become their responsibility – what Lemke (2001, p.202) refers to as the ‘price-tag’ of social participation. This also reflects an ethical shift from a collective responsibility to an individual responsibility for social problems.

An issue arising from this, as pointed to by Dean (2007, p.96) is that it is often hard to distinguish between the ‘soft’ powers of governing through freedom and the ‘hard’ powers that ensure that freedom, especially as it is clear that many members of the population need coercing into freedom (that is, into a way of life based around autonomous action). It is due to this lack of clarity that Dean (2007) argues liberal rationalities and authoritarian measures are not incompatible:

the limited sphere of the political (‘the state’) and the different conceptions of what is exterior to it (‘civil society’) interlace to turn the injunction to govern through freedom into a set of binding obligations potentially or actually enforceable by coercive or sovereign instruments.

(p.111)

The purpose of government

Regulation within a governmental society is primarily rationalised using schemata and performances about the well-being of the population. Although the population, in whatever form it has been understood, has invariably always been the target of governance, it has only fairly recently become used to justify governance. For
example, in a sovereign society regulation of the population would have been rationalised by the benefit to the sovereign. Whilst being a vague and currently ubiquitous term, the intention when invoking the well-being of the population is actually very specific: just as freedom is conceived in terms of individual actions and qualities, the well-being of the population requires maximising individual ‘potential’, which is assumed to lead to individual fulfilment. Therefore although the population is conceptualised and governed as a whole (collectively), the purpose and benefit of regulation speaks to the individual – of personal fulfilment, individual well-being, a secured personal future. Again, the effective regulation of all is essential to each individual’s chances of happiness and personal flourishing. Governmental technologies and techniques that reflect commonly held values, for example those of liberal freedom, self-determination and democracy, become both acceptable and desirable (Dean 2007, p.116). A large proportion of regulation therefore acts to enable a ‘free’ lifestyle focused on self-interest.

**Contradictions and critiques**

**Authoritarian rule in a governmental society**

The focus so far has been on how the population is governed through its behaviour and conduct in opposition to the coercive and disciplinarian forms of government thought by Foucault to be characteristic of eighteenth and early nineteenth century European societies (see for example Foucault, 1995; 2001). However, Dean (2007) has criticised what he considers to be the over exaggeration of governmentality in understanding contemporary society, arguing that despite sovereign power being considered as an outmoded form of power it actually still plays a key role in social governance (2007, p.15), albeit in ways where it has become dispersed and delegated, in contrast to its traditional association with a centralised State. Furthermore, Dean (2007, p.94) continues, if governmental practices are to be understood as heterogeneous and existing in multiple fields, we cannot assume they are all conducted via governmentality – the government of conduct – but must also expect other forms of power to be in operation. For Dean this means that far from
side-lining sovereign and disciplinarian power, we should instead seek to understand governmentality in relation to them.

The assertion that authoritarian forms of power are still very much in operation in contemporary society leads Dean (2007) to claim that an understanding of society as neo liberal or advanced liberal is no longer fully appropriate, instead we should think of ourselves as existing in an authoritarian liberal society – that is, a society where liberal values and authoritarian means coexist within the same space. This suggests that we need to move away from an understanding of the government of individuals through regulated choices (as advanced liberalism is defined by Rose, 1996, p.41) and re-imagine government as coercive. This section will examine this claim by considering where and how authoritarian powers are implemented, and to what extent we can continue to analyse social governance as governmentality.

The obligation of freedom

As noted by Dean (2010) any form of government through freedom will always entail, at some level, a division of those able and willing to take up the responsibilities of freedom, and those who are not. Those considered to not be exercising their freedom responsibly, or at all, will ultimately attract some form of government intervention. One aim of government, then, is to coerce people into accepting their freedom and the responsibilities and obligations that accompany it. It is instructive here to revisit the notion of the apparatus of police; Foucault (2007a) notes that the apparatus of police has in modern times been divided into two separate roles, both with the combined function of governing a community: incentive regulation (which may include economic incentives or penalties, and governance through ethopolitics), and the negative function of the maintenance of order. This second function of government may be easily demonstrated through the police establishment and penal system, but is also, Dean (2007) suggests, more subtly and intricately woven within everyday governmental technologies, and therefore encompasses a wider domain than the penal and judicial arena alone. Therefore he suggests the two functions of police have not been clearly separated, and so the maintenance of order is not confined to the overtly authoritarian powers of the police and legal systems.
The rhetoric of obligation can provide a demonstration of this. Dean (2007) considers the realm of social assistance, where help is regularly conditional, continually assessed and always at risk of being withdrawn, to be a particularly useful example:

the establishment of institutions and markets to provide for the long-term unemployed or the single parent is accompanied by a fundamental threat to the life and dignity of the individual. Behind the agreements which the unemployed or the single parent must contract into in return for subsistence is the threat of an ultimate sanction, a withdrawal of assistance and thus a withdrawal of the means of life.

(Dean, 2007, p.104)

Thus the concept of ‘choice’ in relation to self-government sits astride the threat of sovereign violence: individual members of the population become obliged to make certain choices, and for those who make the ‘wrong’ choice the threat of violence may become a reality. Dean (2007, p.127) further demonstrates how many contemporary liberal political programmes are situated within the various languages of compulsion, giving the examples of the moral claims of community, the obligations of citizenship, the rhetoric of social inclusion, and the maintenance of social order. Thus sovereign force enters into everyday governance in a decisive way.

Dean (2007, p.136) defines sovereign power as the right to use legitimate violence, and it is within this that we can perhaps understand the existence of sovereign powers within governmentality apparatuses. The existence of coercive and authoritarian practices within the government of the population cannot be in doubt: from the explicit use of force in the penal system or psychiatric unit, to the more subtle but perhaps equally coercive practices of the therapy room or of expert advice. However, it is precisely the conception of the subject as free and autonomous, coupled with the expectation and cognition of life as comprised of individual choices, which legitimizes coercive practices. Crucially it is the justification of sovereign violence that has undergone a transformation (Dean, 2007). The important difference - what enables us to speak of even sovereign practices as instances of governmentality, is that the very act of compulsion is understood as something the individual has done to, or
chosen for, themselves – they knew the consequences and therefore are considered to have chosen their current situation by default (by their lack of action, or erroneous action). Similarly instances of coercion are often thought to be no more than a rational individual making a rational choice. Thus the pensioner in poverty is not viewed to be the subject of an external form of violence (a system that withholds vital resources), but as an autonomous individual who, through their own irresponsible mismanagement, such as lack of forward thinking in planning a private pension scheme, must reap the consequences of their actions.

This presents governmentality as paradoxical – where a governmental rationality based on freedom legitimises authoritarian technologies. However as previously noted\textsuperscript{30}, Foucault (2007a) did not intend the different forms of government to be thought of as linear and necessarily distinct from one another - the governance of the population through an understanding of the subject in conjunction with liberal freedom may restrict the use of some forms of authoritarian rule in certain situations, but can legitimate them in others.

Decision making

Sovereignty is similarly prominent in contemporary society, Dean (2007, p.189) claims, through the prevalence of the sovereign decision in liberal government\textsuperscript{31}. According to Dean (2007, p.189) a sovereign decision is a decision on the exception, for example an exception may include when it is possible to take life without it being considered as homicide. The sovereign decision has become delegated in this instance as although it is the legal state that has ultimately made this possible, through abortion laws for example, it is passed to doctors to decide upon its legality in specific instances, and ultimately left to the mother to make the final decision. Another form of the sovereign decision may be the power to decide what counts. For example, the ability of individuals to govern themselves through their freedom is dependent upon the initial decision of what constitutes freedom and what types of freedom are to be

\textsuperscript{30} P.46.
\textsuperscript{31}Contrary to Foucault’s understanding of the sovereign decision being connected to a centralised power, Dean’s premise that sovereign power has become dispersed and delegated suggests a significantly different set of consequences for this claim.
encouraged – as will be discussed later certain types of freedom, such as the freedom to not participate, are often not legitimated\textsuperscript{32}.

Dean (2007) insists that certain situations need to be understood as sovereign decisions, as the problematic and at times flimsy language of choice is often inappropriate. He argues that understanding social governance through the government of freedom and choice alone lacks gravity in certain cases – those concerning life and death matters for example. Therefore, alongside the issue of whether and in what ways the sovereign decision exists within contemporary governance, it must also be questioned whether the consumer related language of choice that has to some extent dominated the current analytics of government, is sufficient for analysing the multifarious situations, events and conduct that constitute the government of the population.

As already mentioned, there are countless examples of explicit authoritarian forms of rule and sovereign decisions in contemporary liberal government. However, I am interested in discovering whether such instances exist in the day to day, non-extraordinary examples of governance that focus not on exceptional events but rather the mundane forms of time-related life management. Dean (2007, p.189) argues that sovereign decisions on the exception are present in every normalising power through which governing carves out the individual, and therefore plays a functional role in the daily governance of life. One example given by Dean (2007) to demonstrate this is the decision on the exception as supported by expert knowledge of the human sciences, which aims to govern individual conduct by acting on particular aspects of the self:

\begin{quote}
Such an order thus interweaves the governmental powers and practices that seek to shape the conduct of such autonomous or free individuals located within civil society with a mass of sovereign exceptions which define the space of various kinds of treatment, from training, therapy and discipline to punishment and imprisonment. In these cases, the exception is not a result of a generalised political crisis but something defined through the singular bodies of knowledge, observations and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{32} This point will be raised at multiple points in the analysis of the policy documents, for example in relation to risk taking behaviour in Chapter 6.
practices. These identify and act upon such things as problematic personal conduct from being workshy to bullying . . . from the deadbeat dad to the drug trafficker.

(p. 190)

Although Dean (2007, p.189) clarifies that we should not think of the sovereign decision as having a privileged loci, such as the state, this still begs the question of where this power comes from and how it moves, as even this dispersed conception of the sovereign decision suggests the existence of a primary source, whether that be an individual, group, or institution, and a unidirectional movement. If we are considering the day to day government of the population however, this understanding of power neglects the relational aspect implied within a governmental understanding, where an individual must decide, speak and exist within a set of discursive boundaries that may be governed and reinforced by others: peers, experts, and so on. That is, this understanding of the sovereign decision perhaps suggests an independence or autonomy that is not there.

Rose (2001, p.9; 2007, p.73), discussing the biomedical field, suggests an alternative understanding of decision making based around a pastoral set of power relations. He refers to this as ‘new’ pastoral power highlighting that it entails a relational aspect based upon the dynamics of the guided and guider (Rose, 2007, p.29, 74). He claims that it is not state administered, but rather:

takes place in a plural and contested field traversed by the codes pronounced by ethics committees and professional associations, by the empirical findings generated by researchers, the attitudes and criteria used by employers and insurers, the tests developed and promoted by psychologists and biotech companies, the advice offered by self-help organisations, and even one might add, the critical perspectives contributed by religious organisations and sociological critics. 

(Rose, 2001, p.9)
This presents the process of decision making as an intercourse, or process of exchange, which acts to highlight the complex nature of the movement and uniqueness of the outcome. There are certain hard and complex decisions that it would be unsuitable to understand in terms of the government through choice, due to the simplistic and superficial connotations the concept of choice often holds – often related to consumer market options. However, even difficult, emotional and life changing decisions are subject to governance understood as the relational and circular power that has the conduct of the population as both its target and telos. Individuals are not left alone to make difficult decisions – even though they may have the final say – but are instead advised, mentored, counselled, filled with information and facts, and taught new languages through which to understand their predicament and justify their decision (Rose, 2007, p.29). It is the development of new micro-technologies that manage communication and information, Rose (2007) claims, that causes this new pastoral power to blur the boundaries of coercion and consent, as:

They transform the subjectivities of those who are to give consent or refuse it through discursive techniques that teach new ways of rendering aspects of oneself into thought and language, new ways of making oneself and one’s actions amenable to judgment.

(p.74)

Dean is right to highlight an over-reliance on the doctrine of the government of choice in the social governance literature, and to criticise that this may naively lead to the assumption that this is the only form of governance or even the best form of governance: as has been seen the most liberal values may themselves call for the use of authoritarian means to ensure their survival. This emphasises Dean’s (2010) concern that the government through choice should not be thought of as a safeguard against authoritarian rule, or a more enlightened form of government. Finally, although the use of the word ‘choice’ can help to highlight how life events and situations once thought natural and beyond our influence have moved into the realm of human manufacture and control, it may also at times misrepresent the gravity of the decision or situation. A governmental understanding of decision making on the other hand
portrays the interaction and subtle technologies of governance that come into play, therefore rather than assuming individual decisions appear *ex nihilo* individual decision makers can be recognised as specific subjectivities equipped with the techniques and languages to understand and act on their situation.

**Freedom and counter-conduct**

Whilst governmentality for the first time conjoins the possibility of autonomous action within social governance without contradiction, it also suggests the possibility of refusal and resistance: the possibility of governance includes the threat of acting otherwise either through apathy or explicit refusal. The questions, how might resistance be possible within governmentality? and if so what could it possibly be? have been a source of concern and criticism however. McNay (2009) clearly sets out this dilemma:

> If individual autonomy is not the opposite of our limit to neoliberal governance, but rather lies at the heart of disciplinary control through responsible self-management, what are the possible grounds upon which political resistance can be based?

(p.56)

She continues that the experimental process of self-formation that Foucault sets out as a form of resistance is uncomfortably close in structure to governance through individualisation (and self as enterprise), and therefore questions its ability to pose a threat to normalised hierarchical power structures.

Contrasting governance and resistance has been deemed unhelpful within governmentality (Valverde, 2010), partly because autonomy and heteronomy should not be thought of as polar opposites: they instead make each other possible. For example the relational aspect of power as understood in governmentality demonstrates governance as potentially enabling as well as constraining (Thompson, 2003) - governance can open up a field of possibilities, although will simultaneously close off others. Whilst demonstrating the complex relationship between governance and resistance, this clouds the issue of when and how someone can truly resist.
Cruickshank (1999), for example, demonstrates that participatory democratic discourse is preoccupied with subjects who do not rebel against their inequality, and consequently fail to act in their own interests, thus even those that may be considered normative discourses invoke resistance as a governmental technique. Cruickshank (1999) explores how ‘empowerment’ has been used by both the political left and right as a governmental technique; she argues that it cannot be said that one use is clearly liberatory and the other repressive: they are both instances of governance, where similar practices are utilised for different (yet equally normative) rationalities. She describes what Foucault (1993, cited in Lemke, 2001) referred to as the ‘contact point’ that constitutes governance:

> The line between subjectivity and subjection is crossed when I subject myself, when I align my personal goals with those set out by reformers – both expert and activist – according to some notion of the social good.

(Cruickshank, 1999, p.92)

This suggests rationalities and goals hold more importance for identifying resistance than the means and practices employed.

For Foucault resistance, like power, is dispersed and circulates within the social nexus (Brenner, 1994). He clearly regarded power and resistance as sharing an intimate relationship, stating:

> Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. . . Their [power relations’] existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations.

(Foucault, 1990a, p.95)

Just as power cannot within this context be conceived as possessive, hierarchical, or as a power ‘over’ others, resistance should not be reduced to revolt, mere sabotage (although may of course include this), or be emancipatory. Resistance is not the
reverse of power. In *Security, Territory, Population* (2007a) Foucault began to speak of resistance in terms of counter-conduct to demonstrate the similar functions it shares with the governance of conduct, highlighting that the aim of counter-conduct is not to stop governance – Foucault believed such a notion to be merely an abstraction (Foucault, 2002b), but to change governance: both how ‘I’ am governed and how ‘I’ am to govern myself. Governance can have a creative capacity, and similarly the aim of counter-conduct is not to destroy, but to produce viable alternatives – to push at the boundaries set by normative discourses. Thus Foucault’s concern was to neither contrast nor reconcile autonomy with heteronomy but to imagine how current practices of governance can be utilised to create new modes of existence (Thompson, 2003).

Foucault (2007a) detailed examples of counter-conduct to pastoral power in the early Christian Church to demonstrate that counter-conduct does not rely on foreign strategies, but can make use of marginalised ‘border-elements’ (Death, 2010). In this instance, strategies such as asceticism and mysticism, whilst familiar to Christianity, went against the rationality of pastoral power that required continual subordination to the pastor, and so constituted, according to Foucault (2007a) counter-pastoral power. Thus the techniques and practices currently used to make us governable subjects also have the capacity to forge new kinds of radical subjectivities. Thompson (2003) notes that *The History of Sexuality: The use of pleasure, Volume 2* (Foucault, 1990b) and *The History of Sexuality: The care of the self, Volume 3* (Foucault, 1988b) aimed to demonstrate the possibility of this by investigating the use of (sometimes familiar) disciplines and practices to fashion the self. What are rejected through counter-conduct are often not the practices themselves but the goals they work towards and rationalities they employ. The issue is not therefore whether to be governed or not, but concerns ‘the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this price’ (Foucault 2007b, p.75). For Foucault (2002b) then, counter-conduct must question established rationalities.

It is this that prompted Foucault (1982) to suggest:
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be . . . We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries.

(p.216)

Thus for Foucault, counter-conduct demands the refusal of what is given, and the experimentation with what may be possible (Thompson, 2003). It is important therefore that counter-conduct does not become normalised (Davidson, 2011), it must remain dysfunctional or nomadic by pushing and attempting to transgress discursive boundaries. As Brenner (1994) notes, resistance is not a coordinated system, but a multiplicity of points or entanglements, and must therefore remain fragmented, disjointed, spontaneous\(^{33}\). Counter-conduct therefore needs to remain temporally limited and nomadic: an instance of resistance must necessarily pass, move on, or locate itself/become located elsewhere in order to remain resistance. Counter-conduct must occur, can only occur, where it can push, flex and carve normative discursive boundaries to enable new visibilities and enunciations to emerge. Thus whilst McNay (2009) raises an important question regarding whether Foucault’s notion of self-formation can be seen as an example of the discourse that forms subjects into autonomous individuals, rather than its challenge, the answer must lie in the intended goal of the similar practices of self that would be employed. Crucially, rather than fulfilling a subject position aimed at managing the self according to some normative notion of the ‘social good’, self-formation as counter-conduct would possess no intended goal other than to resist or open up new forms of life\(^{34}\). However, as has been demonstrated in this section technologies of self are not clearly demarcated from technologies of domination. From this point of view, self-formation as an instance of

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\(^{33}\) Brenner (1994) takes issue with this however, claiming that it demonstrates Foucault holds a totalistic view of power.

\(^{34}\) I recognise that there are many criticisms that have been levelled against Foucault’s aesthetics of self, including ethical relativism and anarchy. A full discussion of Foucault’s ethical phase of his work is beyond the scope of this thesis, however it is clear that Foucault did not consider self-formation to be an invitation to ‘do anything’, and that it is intended as a way to provide alternatives to fascistic forms of life (Thompson, 2003).
counter-conduct would be possible because it is an ‘available’ agonistic practice that can be mutated for use at, and on, the borders. Whilst differences in practices, stemming from alternative rationalities, may be subtle, their social and political impact has the potential nonetheless to be fundamental.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has brought to the fore the centrality of aspects of governmentality crucial to the analysis of the formation and function of social policy as a space of governance. Specifically, detailing how power shifts and functions within governmental apparatuses, and the type of subjectivities both possible and necessary within its forms of rationality. Whilst I will not always explicitly re-state the relations of power, formation of subjectivities, or the specific understanding of individuals and society/individuals in society, throughout the following chapters, these notions are implicit and provide the basis through which policy will be understood and the specific policies analysed. The following chapter will extend this discussion of governmentality by looking specifically at the formation and function of social policy as a space of everyday governance, in effect, highlighting policy itself as an example of governmentality: governance of individual conduct through the management of everyday life. Beyond this, the chosen policies will be analysed through this lens of governmentality, providing examples of governmental society: its various techniques, rationalities, and subjectivities. It will also discuss how these have been and can be displaced through forms of counter-conduct\(^{35}\).

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\(^{35}\) Many examples of counter-conduct occur throughout the policy analysis chapters (Chapters 4-7), where certain lifestyles challenge, upset, or somehow disrupt those put forward as normative in the policies.
Chapter 3

Social policy as the biopolitics of security: conducting the conduct of everyday life

Introduction

Social policy, according to Lavalette and Pratt (2001), is concerned with the analysis of access to life enhancing and life sustaining resources. In Foucauldian terms we can see how policy reproduces the care of ‘all living’ as the very foundation of biopower. This preoccupation with forms of ‘life itself’ is central to Foucault’s thesis about the exercise of modern power. Here power is not a deduction but production: ‘It exerts a positive influence on life, endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it’ (1990a, p.137). Biopower compliments the right to ‘take life and let live’ under sovereign power with a power to foster and multiply life. With this novel form of modern power, Foucault maintains ‘Now it is over life, throughout its unfolding, that power establishes its dominion’ (p.138). Areas of thematic focus and justification for social policy are therefore varied and comprehensive since, as argued in Chapter 2, private and public spheres of life are no longer distinguishable, all areas become significant to the analysis of sustaining, fostering and enhancing life.

As will be shown a main concern of social policy lies not in the exceptional circumstances of life, what Agamben (1998) calls ‘bare life’ but in the mundane everyday practices encountered by all: what we ought to do with our money; how to optimise our health; calculating how to spend our leisure time; relationships with family and neighbours; planning our working life; enhancing our expectations and aspirations. In short, policy entails a governance of everyday living: of how we ought to live based on a synthetic notion of life as plenitude. Policy is therefore inclusive, not only in its scope but also in its intended audience. As Agamben (1998) points out the modern biopolitical order does not exclude anything – not even in the form of ‘inclusive exclusion’ (p.188). The specific policies analysed in the subsequent chapters are a prime example of this – whilst they have been chosen for analysis because they relate to the topic of ageing and later life, they reproduce the multiplicity of strategies
of biopower in that they are aimed at everyone\textsuperscript{36}, treating the population as an interconnected network where the movement of all parts are integral to the security of the whole\textsuperscript{37}. Thus, as will be demonstrated in the analysis that spans Chapters 4 to 7, issues such as antenatal health and the saving habits of children become significant to policy relating to old age. Children and their parents are therefore decisively included within the reach of policies aimed at later life.

Whilst social policies are often analysed as a way of understanding government priorities and ideologies, or evaluating social conditions and how they should be altered, O’Malley and colleagues (1997) claim a strength of governmentality analysis lies in its provision of analytical instruments for a critical engagement between theory and political practice. This is an important reminder that thought experimentation is (discursive) practice, not something separated from it. O’Malley and colleagues (1997) elaborate:

> the approach [of governmentality] is concerned with how government is thought into being in programmatic form, how the practitioners of rule ask themselves the question of how best to govern, what concepts they invent or deploy to render their subjects governable in certain ways, and how government constantly reforms itself in light of failures and evaluations. This is sharply distinguished from the more familiar historical and sociological approach of examining rule through the observation and documentation of ‘what actually happened’ . . . or of ‘what government is really about’ (the concealed interests or underlying mainsprings explaining governance).

(p. 501-2)

Policy can therefore be thought of as having a creative capacity: of inventing and creating spaces of discursive emergence. But it can also be limiting and constraining: fixing boundaries, regulating and closing off possibilities. Studying policy has the

\textsuperscript{36}This will be more fully discussed in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{37}There exists an inherent tension here with the emphasis put on the individual in these governing discourses. However contradictory discourses seem to unproblematically exist within the same space when having different scopes (Valverde, 2010).
potential to locate where and what the boundaries are; where and under what circumstances new vectors occur and spaces may emerge. The focus of Chapter 4 through to Chapter 7 is to pinpoint with some accuracy where these shifting boundaries are currently settled, how they have been fixed, and what function they continue to fulfil.

Just to map out the main objective of this stage of the analysis, the focus of this chapter is to undertake an exploration of policy itself, within the methodological and conceptual context laid out in the previous two chapters. It begins by linking contemporary social policy-making to biopolitics, where biopolitics is understood as governance over living beings and, more specifically, their subjectivities. In marshalling the Foucauldian framework a case will be made for understanding the logic of security as a prime concern of contemporary biopolitics and a prominent feature of everyday life. The chapter will then turn to a more detailed exploration of policy as a space of (in)visibility, one that can be both creative and destructive, concealed and revealed. Lastly, the form and function of policy will be analysed through a discussion of the instruments and techniques used in policy-making. The Foucauldian analysis of policy tools is in no way meant to be exhaustive, instead it will focus on three devices and techniques, all concerned with measure and value, that were found to be prominent in the policies chosen to be analysed: (i) quantifying numerical data and statistics, (ii) devices and strategies of inclusion, and (iii) the reproduction of subjectivity as it is deployed as a tool in the policy process.

**Biopolitics: securing life**

Biopolitics was described by Foucault (2004) as a non-disciplinary power applied to living beings. As ‘the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of political strategy’ (Foucault, 2007a, p.1). He clarifies that this technology of power does not individualise (like disciplinary power) but is instead addressed to a multiplicity. It deals with:

- a new body, a multiple body, a body with so many heads that, while they might not be infinite in number, cannot necessarily be counted.
Biopolitical apparatuses may still speak of and to the individual, and act on individual bodies, but the individual is primarily of interest only as an element of the multiplicity. To convey this preoccupation with the ceaseless dispersion of multiplicity as the multiplicity of forms of life, Foucault (2004) continues:

The mechanisms introduced by biopolitics include forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures. And their purpose is not to modify any given phenomenon as such, or to modify a given individual insofar as he is an individual, but, essentially, to intervene at the level of their generality.

Measure is a performativity of value and through this the population becomes a living and so governable entity, with intervention becoming a necessity through generalising strategies and the creation of normalities. The population is treated by biopolitics as a specific political, economic and scientific problem, one that can be summed up as concerning the optimisation of life (Rose, 2007), where ‘life’ has come to mean the life of a species: people connected not through laws and cultures, but primarily as sharing a biological connectedness – which, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, is a notion strongly reflected in contemporary social policy.

The biopolitical apparatus of modern societies is therefore aimed at securing life. The logic or rationality of security has become pervasive in everyday life and language, as security awareness becomes an inevitable consequence of a risk averse society (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Valverde, 2010). However in contrast to an understanding of security as protection, Dillon and Lobo- Guerrero (2008) suggest that biopolitical techniques can be most clearly understood as various ways of securing life and of being secured. These authors (2008) claim that for Foucault biopolitics is an apparatus of security, confirming: ‘when one says biopolitics one says security, albeit in a certain way’ (p. 266). This ‘certain way’ relates to governmentality in that the aim of security is to promote, optimise and regulate life – to secure life rather than to
protect it (Foucault, 2007a). In some ways this resembles a sort of ‘holding in place’ or anchoring. Thus as Valverde (2010) points out, much of what happens today in the name of security is not concerned with the problematic of sovereign control over subjects, but instead consists of rearranging objects and reshaping spaces. An example of this, given by Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008), is the collection and use of various types of information via shop loyalty cards (personal data, transactional information and preferences et cetera) as a biopolitical technique to secure individuals as on-going customers. They continue that most people readily subject themselves to many everyday security practices: for example insurance, pensions, investments.

Foucault (2007a) discussed the strategic use of space as an issue for apparatuses of security in relation to the government of the movement of grain within the market town. Whilst this historical example is not overly applicable to contemporary society, it aimed to highlight firstly how security is exercised over a whole population: movement was enabled, influenced or restricted in terms of the general well-being of the town; and secondly security as a matter of circulation: it was the actual movement of grain alongside other products that became the focus of government. Current examples may include the collection and use of various forms of knowledge – including the example of the loyalty card as discussed above, and more generally the increase in the use and analysis of transactional data as a means of identifying and understanding individuals and populations (Ruppert and Savage, 2011) - and circulation through the movement of people and communications. Thus contemporary biopolitical mechanisms of security no longer operate in closed spaces, but across ‘planes of movement’ (Lentos and Rose, 2009, p.233). The issue of movement here is key: Foucault (2007a) is clear that security is not the exhaustive surveillance epitomised by the panopticon. Rather it requires movement based on relations between subjects – what Foucault (2007a) refers to as freedom:

An apparatus of security . . . cannot operate well except on condition that it is given freedom, in the modern sense the word acquires in the

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38 The Active at 60 policy strategy also piloted a smart card that awarded loyalty points for using local transport, redeemable at local retailers, with the aim of increasing activity and securing community involvement (Mowlan et al., 2012, OA).
eighteenth century: no longer the exemptions and privileges attached to a person, but the possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things.

(p. 48-9)

Thus biopolitical strategies that are exercised in the regulation of space and time can be understood as dynamic practices of governmentality.

Biopolitics, with its concern for the sustenance and optimisations of life, renders life governable. This means, as Cruickshank (1999) demonstrates, that it is ‘possible to act not only upon the body, by force, but also upon the subjectivity (soul) of human beings’ (p. 39). Subjectivity, as well as the target of government, also then becomes a strategy of biopolitical forms of modern power. Lentos and Rose (2009) claim that social government is the government of a certain type of insecurity felt by people living in contemporary societies: for example illness, old age, divorce or unemployment, suggesting there is a need to govern security through inducing states of insecurity with the aim of responsibilizing individuals into action: ‘that is to say, by ensuring the vigilance, preparedness and pre-emption required to secure security’ (Lentos and Rose, 2009, p.235). Governance therefore materialises in the spaces where personal interests become aligned with collective interests:

biopower, through the administration and regulation of life and its needs, enacts the good of all society upon the antisocial bodies of the poor, deviant, and unhealthy. It seeks to unite the interests of the individual with the interests of society as a whole.

(Cruickshank, 1999, p.39-40)

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39 Ferguson (2008) argues that responsible citizenship has become a central and defining concept for both New Labour and Conservative policy agendas. This political focus on responsibilization spans across and draws together policy initiatives in social welfare, civic engagement and community cohesion (Whiteford, 2010). The reach of responsibilization is not confined to individual citizens however, rather the concept appears to hold a more encompassing social and moral significance. Barnett (2003) for example, hints towards the ubiquity of this concept by demonstrating how the principles of responsibilization are being applied to public agencies as much as to individual citizens. The issue of responsibilization will be revisited throughout the following chapters.
In order for subjectivity to become governable, and for life to secured and optimised, there is a need for certain types of expert knowledge - for subjectivity to become knowable. For government to solve ‘social problems’ – events or situations that are rationalised as hindering rather than maximising life – it must first have a certain kind of specialised knowledge that is ‘measurable, specific, and calculable, knowledge that can be organised into governmental solutions’ (Cruickshank, 1999, p. 40). Hacking (1990) demonstrates how this type of knowledge became both possible and desirable through, what he refers to as, the ‘enumeration of people’, which can be traced back to the nineteenth century where the idea of human nature gave way to that of ‘normal people’ commonly expressed in terms of probability. These normalising ‘laws’ of probability, he claims, become self-regulating as most people would actively avoid being deemed pathological. Thus, as shall be demonstrated later, the expert and professional knowledge used to govern constitutes the subjectivity that is to be acted upon. Hence:

The systematic collection of data about people has affected not only the ways in which we conceive of a society, but also the ways in which we describe our neighbour. It has profoundly transformed what we choose to do, who we try to be, and what we think of ourselves. (Hacking, 1990, p. 3)

Following this example given by Hacking it becomes conceivable that our neighbour is recognized primarily as a category, a ‘single parent’, an ‘ethnic minority’, or a ‘Manchester United fan’ with the same level of equivalence as we see them as John or Jane from next door. Whilst the expert knowledge to be collected and mobilised may be presented as merely descriptive, this belies the dynamic relationship it holds with the formation of subjectivity. Description can suggest something static and finished, yet knowledge must be recognised as movement, and as such both constitutive and affective. Hacking (1990) demonstrates this by indicating the need for someone to be ready and willing to read laws into numbers, noting the differences in East and West Europe during this time of how these emerging numbers were understood. In parallel

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40 Chapter 1 discussed how description of discourses does not lead to objectivity, or refer to something static. To describe something that is moving means that the description can never be finished.
to ‘the taming of chance’, a conception of pure irregularity also arose indicating that in spite of the natural or normal status attributed to numerical laws, contradictory discourses emerged within the same space creating various ways of understanding life.

**Policy as a space of (in)visibility**

Petersen (1999) claims that policy is often viewed as a reaction to real and objective conditions. Volume 2 of OA, which consists of ‘evidence’ (mostly statistical and demographic information) detailing who old people are and what they do, is itself an example of this viewpoint, as quantitative information is used to point to the necessity for the overarching rationalities set out within OA (rationalities that are equally present throughout all the policies analysed) as well as its specific strategies. However, as Petersen (1999) points out, from a governmentality point of view policy is not reactive but *productive*. That is, policy is not responding to social problems but constituting them by framing and defining the boundaries of citizenship.

A need for quantifiable ‘evidence’ on which to base policy making has become prominent in recent years (Richards and Smith, 2004). Pawson (2002) notes that the policy cycle revolves more quickly than the research cycle, however, meaning that ‘real time’ evaluations often have little impact on policy making. Instead policy-makers have turned increasing to systematic reviews, studies that draw together the conclusions of already existing research, to provide relevant evidence. Whilst Boaz and Pawson (2005) demonstrate that using systematic reviews to provide a certainty regarding ‘what works’ is a false expectation, Young and colleagues (2002) question the extent to which policy informs research rather than research informing policy. To this end they suggest that the core beliefs of policy-makers are unaffected by information, rather: ‘policy change is driven by external factors, not by ideas and analysis’ (p.218). Despite the problems and complexities involved with quantifying human behaviours, evidence-based policy has been presented as producing the best form of inclusive,

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41 Boaz and Pawson (2005) compare five systematic reviews regarding youth mentoring, noting the differing viewpoints, incompatibilities and contradictory advice they espouse. They claim these mixed messages are due to the immense complexity of evaluative questions that need to be, but are often not, addressed in reviews.
balanced and informed policy making, as, ‘All relevant evidence, including that from specialists, is available in an accessible and meaningful form to policy makers’ (CMPS, quoted in Richards and Smith, 2004, p.115)\(^{42}\). Whilst everyday constraints such as time limits question the reality of achieving what this implies (Minouge, 1997), more fundamental issues also need to be addressed. Murray and colleagues (2008) point to the vast influence ‘evidence-based’ information has on everything from academic institutions to policy and practice. However, rather than viewing this information as inclusive they claim on the contrary it excludes and so limits what is visible in the first place:

EBHS [evidence based health services] limits not only what can appear within our visual field but also how it will appear and how that evidence will be framed.

(Murray et al, 2008, p.273)

Whilst evidence-based research is only one tool used in policy-making, the function its use has is to verify the ideals and strategies within the policy, to suggest a certain truth regarding its subject matter (who old people are in the case of OA for example) with the intention to exclude or render other versions invisible\(^{43}\). The danger here is that what has not been included or considered is assumed to be irrelevant or non-existent rather than the more likely case that it lies outside the interests of the research, that it is a form of knowledge not easily collected or presented in such forms (mainly, but not exclusively, numerically based), or (or maybe therefore) it lies outside what is visible to the researchers and policymakers. Thus whilst the information and evidence presented in quantifiable form in policies may appear comprehensive it instead structures a field of visibility, and ignores what might lie beyond this\(^{44}\).

Bowker and Star (2000) discuss the role invisibility of classifications and standards play in the ordering of human interaction, and demonstrate that standards

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\(^{42}\) See also Gray et al (2009) who detail the hierarchy of evidence in health and social science based upon the level of objectivity the evidence is perceived to maintain.

\(^{43}\) Boaz and Pawson (2005) argue, for example, that the problem with systematic reviews is the tendency to view them as definitive.

\(^{44}\) I am not interested here to start a debate regarding Evidence-based Policy/Practice, but to highlight the function this form of information has regarding the authority of policy to claim to know.
and classifications are often difficult to see – people are often very good at ignoring both. They highlight the political processes involved in constituting the dialectic of the visible/invisible within a system, claiming that:

the spread or enforcement of categories and standards involves negotiation or force. Whatever appears as universal or indeed standard, is the result of negotiations, organisational processes, and conflict . . . someone, somewhere, must decide and argue over the minutiae of classifying and standardizing.

(Bowker and Star, 2000, p.44)

Invisibility as well as visibility is often fought for and highly contested. As boundaries become fixed subjects often strive to remain within them, whether to avoid the classification of being pathological as suggested by Hacking (1990), or perhaps to adhere to the rationality of responsible citizenship.

This reveals a vital function of policy as the need to motivate: to invoke action. It has been suggested that the aim of policy is precisely to enable people to do what they otherwise would or could not (Schneider and Ingram, 1990). This is reflected through the significant shift in social security being linked to independence rather than protection (Culpitt, 1999; Foucault, 1988a): policy-driven assistance must come in the form of enabling and aspiring change from within subjects and hence, at least primarily, focuses on rational self-government as the optimal form of social governance. Thus active citizenship and self-government are prominent policy solutions to various social problems such as poverty, crime (Cruickshank, 1999), and as will be demonstrated in later chapters, the social problem of ageing. Unproblematically setting participative citizenship up as a form of self-government and the solution to social problems, however, obscures how citizens and social subjects are brought into being to begin with (Cruickshank, 1999). In accordance with this, Cruickshank (1999) argues that democratic citizenship should not be viewed as a solution to political problems but instead as a strategy of government.
Policy therefore should not be thought of as only restricting and constraining, it can also have a constructive and creative capacity - creating a space for certain subjectivities to emerge and be accepted (i.e. rational, responsible and independent citizens) (Biggs, 2001), and relies on subjects being willing to engage with this freedom up to a limit. The issue is that whilst strategies of government deployed encourage and depend upon subjects taking up this creative capacity, it provides room only to be a specific something other to what you are, but denies the justification to be anything other. Thus as far as policy provides the space for certain ways of life to be visible and therefore possible, it simultaneously obscures that which lies beyond them.

Policy tools and techniques of governance

Analysing policy documents should not stop at a concern with their aims and strategies. As Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007) claim, policy is a socio-political space engineered through the tools and techniques used as much as through its aims and context. They argue, ‘every instrument constitutes a condensed form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it’, continuing, ‘instruments at work are not neutral devices: they produce specific effects, independently of the objective pursued’ (p.3). It is the tools, techniques and strategies used in policies, rather than their content and arguments, that constitute the political function of policy. Whilst there are many different tools and techniques employed within various social policies, this section will discuss three devices and techniques particularly prominent in the policies analysed in this thesis. They are: firstly, forms of quantification, secondly, tools relating to the inclusion of everyone in the policy process, and finally forms of subjectivity as it is used as a resource within policy.

Quantification

The vast majority of ‘evidence’ and information presented in the policies studied takes a numerical form with the function of quantifying people and their circumstances, aiming to make life manageable and knowable. These are often depicted as quantifiable data through a variety of graphs and charts as well as
statistical information being incorporated into the written text, highlighting differences between age categories, establishing normalities, or to indicate future predictions. The aim of such probabilistic statistics is to reduce the ‘abundance of situations’ so that complex life events and situations can be summarised and suggested action rationalised (Desrosieres, 1998, p.13). One effect of trying to understand life through the calculating performativity of statistical data is, therefore, the limitation of possibilities: all life must be knowable, and so capable of being optimised; thus forms of life that cannot be grasped via this type of knowledge are treated as non-existent and rendered invisible.

In these policies, quantifying people according to certain characteristics and trends tends to lead to their classification according to other categories. For example, various attributes such as age, employment, and marital status, become indicators of levels of dependency, risk of reduced physical or mental health, or financial insecurity. These classifications provide a spatial-temporal segmentation of the world (Bowker and Star, 2000), and as such produce the space through which subjectivity can become visible, representable and come to know itself. Paradoxically this process often remains invisible to the extent that many classifications are too ordinary and ubiquitous to notice (Bowker and Star, 2000). In places where traditional classifications are queried in the policies – for example when the question ‘what is meant by old?’ is asked in OA vol.2 (p. 3), the actual classification of ‘old’, as distinguished from ‘children’ and ‘adults’, or ‘young’, is never challenged. The question has the function of opening a discussion about who old people ought to be today, it is never suggested that such a classification is untenable or defunct. The category of ‘old age’, even in this case, is treated as natural and therefore remains ignored: it is effectively a non-question. On the contrary, the use of numerical data throughout the policies, for example to express the probability or the proportion of older people experiencing isolation, or needing health and social care and living in poverty, is done to provide contrast with the rest of the population. It is done to indicate their

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45 Annex D of SS for example provides a chart with the aim of guiding policy readers in identifying where excluded older people live based on age, ethnicity, deprivation of area, income and house tenure (p.115-6). Further examples from the policies will be explored throughout Chapters 4-7.

46 This will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4.
difference, and therefore verify the existence of old age, confirming the truth of such classifications. The insertion within the main policy text of text boxes presenting statistical information as ‘Key Facts’ (see for example SS, p. 38, 40), is an example of how these data are used to claim some form of knowledge over subjects – to subjectify, even though the subject categorisation is recognised as changeable and therefore at least partly constructed (OA vol.2, p.3 – see example above and further discussion in Chapter 4). Data are therefore assembled within the policies in ways that inscribe subjectivity (Rose, 1999b), setting expectations and standards of who to be and how to live based on life stage and age.

The use and function of numerical data in the policies exposes a normative assumption that numbers are somehow neutral. Instead, as has already been argued, they are inherently political. The presentation of numerical data rarely exposes the discursive rationalities from which they emerge, yet these formalised rationalities are a vital part of the function these data serve. For example, as Rose (1999b) argues, ‘the relation between numbers and politics is reciprocal and mutually constitutive’ (p.198), highlighting that numbers are not just ‘used’ for political effect, but have the capacity to constitute the domains of which they are part – numbers ‘act on’ politics. This is exemplified through classifications leading to ‘standard setting’: once the category of old age is embedded in the social order, who and what old people are and old age is, become inevitable points of focus for government. Various devices are used in the policies to justify the move from presenting data on what can be known about old age, to claims regarding what subjects (of all ages) ought to do. Firstly quantification, presented as factual - which within a discursive formation that values numerical data above all else becomes synonymous with being truthful (Porter, 1995) – can be used as a way to make decisions without any decision making process being apparent:

A decision made by numbers (or by explicit rules of some other sort) has at least the appearance of being fair and impersonal. Scientific objectivity thus provides an answer to a moral demand for impartiality and fairness.

47 See Chapter 2, p.63.
The success of numbers to be used to import authority – or perhaps the expectation for standards to be rationalised through numerical data - explains the immense and constant use of statistical information in the policy documents\(^{48}\). Hacking (1990) has written extensively on the history of the ‘avalanche’ of printed numbers, and notes that the success of probability can be seen through it now being considered an essential component to ethical decision making, primarily due to the expectation for decision making to be considered impartial.

For the information presented within the policies, whether numerical or otherwise, to fulfil this function it must be believable - have authority. The appeal to expertise is one device used to create this, through the commissioning and use of research for example\(^{49}\), but also by being seen to seek opinion, both expert and that of the ‘citizen public’. In line with New Labour’s aim of inclusion (Larsen et al, 2006; Levinas, 1998), the policies studied here make a point to identify the variety of external stakeholder bodies included in the policy process (for example SS, p.113; OA p.x-xi). Alongside the authority bestowed by the scientific and technical rationality of quantitative data, the inclusion of a variety of expert sources creates authority through a form of democratic consensus (Borraz, 2007), which in essence aims to depoliticise the process by claiming impartiality through agreement\(^{50}\). Whilst consensus strengthens the dominant technical rationalities, it simultaneously blocks the emergence of alternative discourses.

**Tools of inclusion**

Authority is also developed in the policies through inclusive devices that suggest a consensus amongst the population or ‘the public’, for example through the constant use of ‘us’ and ‘we’ in the policies to refer not to the government or New

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\(^{48}\) This is particularly evident in SS and OA.

\(^{49}\) For example ELSA – The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, an on-going research into old age (defined as 50+). This research programme is funded primarily by various government departments and provides the majority of the (quantitative) information used in SS defining who old people are and what they do.

\(^{50}\) Porter (1995) notes that the ability to reach consensus has often been construed as objectivity in science.
Labour, but to everyone (for example OA, p.3). Particularly powerful illustrations of this are the allusion to a consensus of values and aspirations suggested by a box filled with bullet points entitled ‘the public’s priorities’ (OHOCOS, p.15), or references to the public’s point of view (OHOCOS, p.79). Flint (2003), discussing housing policy, claims the reference to ‘people’s attitudes’ is an example of how ‘ethopower’ is worked into governing discourse, through which policy is presented as a recasting of the ‘natural’ beliefs of the majority of the people. The utilitarian principle of rule by a majority consensus might seem reasonable when the main sources of knowledge act to generalise and normalise. Ethopolitics, according to Rose (2007), attempts to shape the conduct of people by acting upon their beliefs and values. It requires individuals to first of all judge and consequently act upon themselves in order to improve themselves. There is a clear example of this inclusive discourse coupled with references to shared values in OA:

In the years after 50 we all want three main things:

- the opportunity to continue in our career . . .
- to play a full and active role in society . . .
- to keep independence and control over our lives . . .

(p.3)

The automatic inclusion of everyone in this quote clearly identifies what it is that individuals are expected to judge themselves against if they wish to remain part of the ‘we’.

Participatory policy tools, such as focus groups, surveys, deliberative democracy forums, stakeholder engagement consultations and self reporting questionnaires, are a dominant feature in the policy process. As mechanisms of social engineering they work to justify the reference to some kind of consensus, which is graphically visualised in the policies by a multitude of quotes from various consultations and participatory groups. These mostly do not form part of the main text but surround it and interrupt it, in the margins, at the head of the page, or breaking up the main text within coloured boxes. Whilst each quote is attributed to an individual,
often just referred to as ‘focus group participant’, ‘consultation response’, ‘service user response’ or ‘individual respondent’ (SS; BNCS; BSFA), it is clear that they are intended to be representative - to be exemplars of commonly held beliefs and values, and thus to create generalisations and normative agreements. Any quotes that question or challenge established order serve a purpose of highlighting a need for a change in policy direction (for example the proposal of the National Care Service) or to indicate an unavoidable tension (how limited resources ought to be prioritised).

The policy tools discussed so far all aim to work not on structures but rather on forms of subjectivity. Thus the tools function not to create social inclusion, but to discursively form citizens who will create the conditions for their own inclusion (Finlayson, 2003). As well as through analysing the tools and techniques that are present in the policies, this becomes equally apparent when considering what is absent. There is little focus upon legislative change for example (the abolition of a compulsory retirement age perhaps the exception here), and no mention of strategies that might significantly alter social or economic structures. Instead the focus tends to be on making minor adjustments to service delivery or service structure – for example an emphasis on joined-up working in the Link-Age Plus project (SS), or on altering how services are delivered through the promotion of Individual Budgets (see for example Ferguson, 2012, on the personalisation agenda in social work). These do not aim to affect social structures but instead the behaviours of individuals, specifically to encourage participation and self-management. Such devices therefore instil ‘the capacity to act as a certain kind of citizen with certain aims’ (Cruickshank, 1999, p.4). This inclusive approach became characteristic of New Labour’s (and more widely social democracy’s) solution to the perceived problem of social exclusion, with the aim of bringing as many groups as possible to identify with the state (Biggs, 2001). Thus as Cruickshank (1999) explains, to govern first requires citizens to have the desire, the interest, and the will to participate and act politically.

Subjectivity as a policy tool
This desire is promoted and developed in the policies partly through an appeal to responsible citizenship as has been already noted\textsuperscript{51}, but also by attempting to tap into subjectivity. In contrast to quantitative knowledge of generalities and comparisons, this knowledge aims to identify the individual, to govern precisely via particularity of the self\textsuperscript{52}. This is done through the use of narrative within the policies: of narrativity – the use of a story (Biggs, 2001). SS explicitly uses this technique as each chapter starts with a short narrative outlining an individual’s life in keeping with the theme of the relevant chapter. Using life stories to introduce the policy aids each individual’s identification with the policy strategies, personalising strategies that to many may seem otherwise distant and beyond their influence and control. Quoted responses, as discussed above, have a similar function of bringing an inclusive and personal element to policy construction. But beyond these, narratives are also used to demonstrate individual lives as simultaneously the reason for specific policies, and its solution. Examples of this include quotes from service users or their families and carers detailing how certain policy strategies have improved their lives (for example BNCS, p.6, 42, 76), and the many case studies featured in the policies demonstrating successful solutions (for example OHOCOS, p.101, 131). Whether these case studies are written as a narrative by a service user, or a description of a service, they function to demonstrate the possibility of success: to highlight how any life, notwithstanding any problem has potential. Personal life stories are therefore used to develop a connection between individual and collective success:

Narratives bring people to see that the details of their private lives and their chances of improving their lives are inextricably linked to what is good for all of society.

(Cruickshank, 1999, p.90)

These policies therefore strategically deploy subjectivity as a policy tool, as well as focusing on it as a target. Their narrative devices aim to create an enabling

\textsuperscript{51} And will be further explored in the following chapters, particularly Chapter 7.

\textsuperscript{52} Boltanski and Chipello (2005) demonstrate this through their investigation into the continuing strength of the ‘spirit’ of capitalism as the belief that the pursuit of individual interest serves the general interest. They argue that the ‘spirit’ of capitalism must coincide with people’s moral experiences and suggest models of action they can grasp. As such it must speak to the individual.
atmosphere, providing the incentive and will to act. The call within ‘Third Way politics’ then was to invest in human capital in order to promote autonomy and the development of self, which is understood to be ‘the medium of expanding individual responsibility’ (Giddens, 1998, p.128). The subject, individualised and known through its narrativity, must then, be responsible and accountable. In a similar way Shore and Wright (2000) claim audit technologies are agents for new kinds of subjectivity—specifically the self-managing individual who must render him or herself auditable. They discuss ‘audit’ as a technology that aims to measure performance, and to render visible. Auditing technologies, as technologies that monitor and evaluate the progress of individuals relating to the success they are making of their own life course (measured of course against how it contributes to social order or the collective success), can be found throughout the policies analysed here in the form of various self assessments and retirement planning tools for example. Shore and Wright (2000) highlight the importance of the inclusion of these tools in the formation of the policies by indicating that audit technologies refashion the way people perceive themselves and their relations, resulting in the transformation of identities. Thus it is not merely that lives have become open to audit, but that people become identified, and identify themselves, as comprised of a subjectivity that can be known and understood through evaluating its present by assessing its past, measured against an already known (desired) future outcome. Shore and Wright (2000) note that this process is often presented as empowering by enabling self-management, but that this conceals the hierarchical relationships and coercive practices that audit cultures rely upon. By rendering an individual’s life visible, and furthermore measurable (and so accountable), audit technologies enable subjectivity to be utilised as a resource – life understood in terms of its narrativity cause it to become a utility.

This focus on enabling and self-development appeals to the personal, connecting an individual identity with a collective responsibility through the very act of its individuation. However, it simultaneously makes the assumption that subjectivity contains some kind of latent potential. Subjectivity is not only useful by managing and

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53 These tools of self-management will be discussed in Chapters 4-7.
54 This will be discussed at multiple points in the policy analysis, primarily in Chapter 5.
monitoring itself, there is also the assumption that each person has something innate to offer if only it can be realised:

People are born with talent and everywhere it is in chains . . . Every person liberated to fulfil their potential adds to our wealth. Every person denied opportunity takes our wealth away. People are the contemporary resource that matters

(Blair, 1999, quoted in Finlayson, 2003, p.83)

Life, the formation of the self, is understood here as following a single linear and striated trajectory that needs to be known in order to be realised, which is reflected in the many policy tools found within the documents analysed that aim to know, assess, and from this develop the individual. What is called for is some kind of personal liberation, for us to follow our individual path to self-fulfilment and personal flourishing. Here we can make the link with the previous discussion of discursive practice dealt with in Chapter 1. Strawson (2004) argues that there is widespread agreement that people see, live, and experience their lives as a discursive narrative, and moreover that this is mostly seen as a good thing: necessary for a good ethical life, as it brings with it a presupposition, he argues, that it is necessary for life to be purposeful, or fully developed. He defines a narrative as a conventional story containing a developmental and temporal coherence and unity. From this point of view narrativity is looking for, or trying to create, some kind of order and unity, not merely as a chronology but as a way of finding coherent iterative patterns throughout the life-course. Whilst many people may experience their lives in this way, Strawson (2004) points out that for others ‘living well’ does not involve this reflective narrative project: self-understanding may be experienced as osmotic or systemic rather than as a narrative (p.448). The problem with believing in, or presenting the self as, a narrativity as how we ought to be, or simply as how we (all) are is that it may:

hinder human self-understanding, close down important avenues of thought, impoverish our grasp of ethical possibilities, needlessly and wrongly distress those who do not fit their model
Whilst closing down possibilities, closing off ways of life, the implementation of subjectivity as a narrativity in the policy documents has several different governmentality functions. Firstly the appeal to the individual to assess, evaluate and plan their life-course with the suggestion that they each have a potential they must aim to fulfil, responsibilizes each person, tying their personal life (and their successful management of it) to the social order. Secondly, and connected to this, is a focus on future orientated behaviour as necessary for governance: being able to see where you want to go (or at least should be going), and knowing how you will be getting there, as opposed for example, from understanding life as an unknown adventure, or full of radically unconnected events. Lastly, the idea of a self as a linear, rational and coherent unit is utilised when redefining who old people are: urging individuals to see old age as a continuation of active citizenship is a crucial governmental tool in these policy documents.\(^{55}\)

**Conclusion**

Whilst touching on some areas that will be further explored and developed in the analysis of the chosen policies in the chapters to come, this chapter has taken the construction of policy itself as a subject matter that needs to be explored within a governmentality perspective that draws on the archaeological method of discourse analysis. The aim of the chapter has been to demonstrate how policy documents are an importance surface upon which discursive rationalities of government not only emerge, but are shaped, framed and brought into being. The authority of policy documents to make claims to knowledge indicate that this is not an area abstracted from practice: policy documents are a means through which the visible is structured, how its light becomes refracted. Not only are policies implemented, they are also only possible because of the already existing discourses of which they are a part, of which they demonstrate: they are not non-sense – they make sense – and as such contain the rationalities within which it is possible to act and to be.

\(^{55}\) This is discussed in Chapter 4.
At this point it is worth mapping out the direction of the argument taken in the forthcoming chapter. The aim of the following four chapters is to hone in on some detailed analysis of the chosen policy documents as set out in the Introduction. Using the strategy set out in Chapters 1 and 2 the material will explore aspects of these governmental rationalities, to find the discursive boundaries, framing devices and to determine what their function is: what do they allow, what do they hinder, what do they do? In brief, Chapter 4 introduces the problem of old age and ageing as a discursive object and instrument for the government of the population by identifying how the category of old age has changed in recent years, and focuses on how old age is discursively reproduced in the policy documents. Chapter 5 explores the focus given in the policy documents to the individual person, extending the debate started in this chapter regarding the use of subjectivity as a resource used by policy. Chapter 6 draws upon the extended reference to risk in the policies to analyse how people ought to be governed, looking specifically at the relationship between the service user and the expert, and how the individual is called to simultaneously take up the expert role by managing uncertainty in order to maximise their selves. Finally Chapter 7 discusses the use of discourses of community as governmental spaces used in the policy documents that require participative citizens. The self as a resource is once again highlighted here as not only are individuals expected to be self-reliant, this is presented as a solution to social disorder.

56 And expanded upon in Appendix 1.


Chapter 4

Old Age, Ageing Populations and Policy

Introduction

The issue of ageing has become increasingly prominent in social policy in two distinct but interrelated areas. Firstly, policy strategies have focused on how the individual ages – what it is that they do, and how old people are or ought to be treated and located in contemporary society. Secondly the problematic of an ageing population has been developed within policies that frame it as both a potential threat and a potential opportunity, but either way as an inevitable phenomenon that needs to be actively managed and prepared for. The category of old age, traditionally taken as having an obvious and natural reality, can therefore be understood as a novel space through which the governance of individuals throughout the life-course becomes rationalised and necessary. What old age is thought to be makes certain forms of behaviour and consequently certain strategies of governance both possible and desirable; at the same time governmental practices focused on old age influence the possibilities of what old age can be, both as object and as a form of subjectivity. Thus policy initiatives strive to define and redefine old age in an attempt to regulate behaviour and set ethical standards pertaining to a fulfilling life; simultaneously, these governmental practices are used to demonstrate the nature of old age or prescribe that old age encompass a particular set of lifestyles. The category of old age has therefore been made relevant to all both as individuals required to prepare for ageing at the earliest opportunity, and as situated members of an ‘ageing population’. Hence, as we shall see, old age becomes a prominent and important concept to ensure the security of society and the well-being of the population at large.

The following four chapters will use the governmentality perspective to conduct a discourse analysis of eight UK health and social care policies produced by the New Labour government between 2001 and 2010. The analysis will therefore be
specific to the UK context, however worldwide references will be used both in order to highlight normative values, whilst at the same time indicate global similarities.

An understanding of life divided into different phases or ‘life cycles’ due to lived years appears so entrenched within these policies that the category of old age is repeatedly called upon, used, and assumed to have an obvious existence. Yet alongside this, its relevance to understanding or providing knowledge of an individual is questioned and its use criticized. The discourse of old age and ‘old people’ as a targeted policy population are at the forefront of contemporary social policy, presented as creating new challenges for society, and so demanding new strategies to manage these. The need for specific ‘old age’ policies such as NSF, OA, and SS, which all take the issue of ageing and the older population as problematic and in need of address, is therefore justified. Furthermore, in line with the view that old age is not just a problem for older people and older peoples’ services, generic health and social care policies including OHOCOS, SFC and BNCS also pinpoint ageing as a significant potential problem that needs active management in order for the social care system to ‘cope’ and therefore for society to prosper. For example:

We must set out a new direction for health and social care services to meet the future demographic challenges we meet.

(OHOCOS, p.9)

weaknesses in the system are put under further strain by the growing pressures from changes in life expectancy

(SFC, p.9)

Paradoxically however, age is dismissed as being an unhelpful and even irrelevant category in relation to social care:
We must . . . develop policies and services that respond to need rather than simply to chronological age.

(OA, p.ix)

This creates a situation where despite the issue of age taking centre stage, the usefulness and importance of age as a category is being destabilised and questioned within these polices. Furthermore, a desirable outcome in terms of policy targets is for the category of old age to continue to disintegrate:

Age should come to mean less as older people are recognised for the contribution they can make to our economy

(OA, p.75)

This chapter will discuss where the category of old age in Western societies has come from, what form it currently takes, and how the characteristic of age has come to be associated with the object of population. From this I will start to analyse how policy is using age as a governmental tool. In particular I will begin to explore how old age becomes redefined in the policies, paying particular attention to the relevance it attributes to activity and independence. I will endeavour to demonstrate how old age is presented within the policies as a specific category and population that can be governed, whilst simultaneously undermining the extent to which older people can be differentiated on the basis of age. Thus the boundaries of this category and population start to breakdown and disperse, yet at the same time individuals are encouraged to identify themselves with, and find meaning in the categories of ‘older person’ or ‘being in later life’ in order to successfully manage their lives.
Old age and policy

Defining what old age is, and importantly what it is not, is greatly emphasised in the policies, particularly in OA which openly broaches the question. Specifically there is a desire to distance ‘old age’ from association with decline, dependency and passivity:

In the past, older people have often been treated as dependent and a drain on society. The reality is that so many contribute a huge amount as grandparents, volunteers and in numerous other ways.

(OA, p.30)

The reality that the policies are concerned to emphasise is that the image of old age as dependent and in need, if it was ever true, is now outmoded. Furthermore this view of old age is discriminatory, as it is:

ageist attitudes that perceive loss of function, ill health and decline in health to be inevitable and irreversible impacts of the ageing process.

(SS, p.30)

The implication is that the relationship between old age and decline is no longer morally applicable to today’s old people – it misrepresents who old people are and therefore unfairly discriminates against them. Even under new age discrimination laws, for example, an employer can still force an individual to retire at 65 if they have ‘good reason’. This association of old age with loss of function or general decline is long standing. This matter is highlighted by Bourdelais (1998) who claims that although old age has always been identified as a specific stage in life, it was not until the end of the seventeenth century that it became a measurable socio-demographic category that
created a threshold relating to whether men could be called upon to bear arms. He argues that the negative image of the over 60s caused by this threshold conformed to already existent attitudes in European societies. In the twentieth century this was reflected in the institutionalisation of a formal and compulsory retirement age which fitted in with the premise of disengagement theory - that the withdrawal of older people from work and social roles was an inevitable and beneficial process (Powell, 2001). This process, according to its advocates, matched the natural process of ageing: ‘The (disengagement) process is graded to suit the declining biological and psychological capacities of the individual and the needs of society’ (Bromley, 1966, quoted in Powell, 2001, p. 3). There were of course critics of this view of old age in the post war years – Powell (2001) notes that Havinghurst and Albrecht, in 1953, argued disengagement was not a natural process associated with cognitive or physical decline, and therefore any roles lost due to age ought to be replaced by new ones. However, the institutionalisation of retirement and pensions, alongside the rise of specific older peoples’ services and residential homes, mapped out old age as something differentiated from adult life in general, and old people as in need of allowances and specialised help purely on the grounds of age (Katz, 1996). The justification for the differentiation between old age and adult life was therefore based on knowledge of the nature of older people. However the need for this differentiation, and to set old age as a distinct socio-demographic category, was related to state security: the threshold of 60 years was originally set for ‘old age’ for fear that those over this threshold would be unable to fight effectively for their country. Later advocates of disengagement theory in the twentieth century saw retirement, in terms of disengagement from work and social duties, as reflecting the natural decline in old age and therefore commensurately necessary for ensuring that society did not decline too. Similarly, Phillipson (1982) details the flexibility of the compulsory retirement age throughout the twentieth century. He argues that despite the consistency of the retirement age, the pressure for older people to give up work and retire, or to continue working into retirement years varies depending upon the current economic condition. In this sense the old are used as a cheap reserve of labour when needed, but are expected to withdraw from the labour market when jobs are scarce, making retirement function to the needs of capitalism. Thus the definition of old age and its
construction into a socio-demographic category is intimately related to the perceived needs of Western society.

Arguments abound both within policy and in wider social gerontology research that this view of old age, and therefore of older people, is neither true nor acceptable for contemporary society as:

society has changed and attitudes have changed. Retirement is no longer seen as preparation for decline . . . the attitude that too often wrote people off as ‘elderly’ has given way to one that demands that older people are seen as having individual needs . . . Older people should no longer be seen as a burden on society. They are a vital resource of wisdom, experience and talent.

(NSF, p.2)

According to Bourdelais (1998) the use in Europe, since the eighteenth century, of 60 as the threshold for old age has led to the belief that it is an immutable category. However, he argues that:

during the misleading continuity of categories, often unconsciously accepted, realities have changed. Neither the thresholds nor the connotations have budged, and yet everything else has evolved: the sexagenarian’s health, their place in the generational chain, their economic resources and lifestyles.

(p. 128)

This view is strongly portrayed within contemporary policies too. Those adults over the threshold of 60 today are incomparable to previous generations of ‘pensioners’ - to be old today implies a different lifestyle and different identity:
We are not just living longer; we are living differently. We are healthier, more active, more conscious of our rights as consumers, better educated, and more willing to try new experiences than ever before.

(OA, p.31)

Two potential strategies for reconfiguring old age become apparent- one suggested by Bourdelais, the other mapped out within the policies. Firstly, to move the threshold of old age so that people do not become associated with the traditional characteristics of old age until perhaps at 70 or 80 (Bourdelais, 1998). Secondly, to leave the threshold of ‘old age’ intact, but attempt to redefine what old age is to take account of increased abilities and the expectation of continued activity and participation in later years. It is this second route that is taken within the policies, demonstrated through the attention given to the redefinition of old age coupled with the continued attempt to understand old age and older people by gathering information concerning those aged 50 and above.

In contrast to old age being conceived as a burden on society, the policies are quite clear that longer lives are a positive development:

The fact that we are living longer is a cause for celebration – a tribute to human progress, to the success of the welfare state and the genius of medical science.

(BSFA, p.5)

The threshold of old age is still spoken about in the policies as starting at around 60 (or the gendered threshold of 65 where related to men’s statutory retirement age), and sometimes those aged 50 are included due the trend of ‘early retirees’, as well as in order to gain knowledge of the next generation of older people (OA vol2, p.3).
Therefore ‘old age’ is held on to as a relevant category, and ‘old people’ are continuously described and measured as a knowable and relatively cohesive group despite the many references to the differences and diversity within this group.

Despite this, in the one place where ‘old age’ is explicitly defined it is related to experience and attitude rather than an encompassing socio-demographic category. In answer to the question ‘what do we mean by “old”?‘ (OA vol.2, p.3) we are told:

- Perceptions of ageing and old age depend on where you stand . . .
- Many people would agree, therefore, that old age is a state of mind rather than a fixed chronological point.

(OA vol.2, p.3)

This hint towards a cultural relativity reproduces aspects of the postmodern obsession with difference and diversity as hallmarks of social progress. OA then presents what it considers to be ‘key evidence on ageing today’ (OA vol.2, p.3) by measuring the living conditions and activities of those over a fixed chronological point. This inherently contradicts its definition of age as subjective, although perhaps more realistically demonstrates how old age is relevant to social policy: as data and forms of information. Alongside this it highlights the reliance of policy knowledge on the creation of categories and thresholds, even when these categories do not match with the stated understanding of the concept.

Presenting old age as a state of mind rather than a fixed and inevitable point in time serves the purpose of making old age mutable and therefore, importantly, a process open to human control and intervention. Thus old age is no longer an inevitable part of life, but a category both capable of being, and in need of, shaping and developing. The biological status of an individual is therefore not a reprieve from governance but the reason it is necessary.
Vincent (2006) discusses the rise of bio-gerontology and its connection to the construction of old age as something both manageable and even avoidable. He quotes Aubrey de Grey (2002), an influential albeit controversial ageing geneticist, who describes ageing as a pathology that can be overcome:

Aging is a three-stage process: metabolism, damage, and pathology . . . Interventions can be designed at all three stages . . . intervention to remove the accumulating damage would sever the link between metabolism and pathology, and so has the potential to postpone aging indefinitely . . . ways exist in all cases, implying that indefinite postponement of aging – which we term ‘engineered negligible senescence’ – may be within sight.

(Quoted in Vincent 2006, p.685)

Here with this engineering perspective ageing is not understood as a natural process but a failure in the biological mechanisms of self maintenance (Vincent, 2006); therefore old age is differentiated from youth only by its ‘risk status’ regarding its susceptibility to disease. In this sense old age loses its relevance as a meaningful category in terms of what makes a way of life or life situation acceptable: for example ‘there is no meaningful boundary between cancer as a disease and cancer as linked to age-related failures of cellular regulation’ (Vincent, 2006, p.688). This verifies the policy insistence that it is need and not age that is important: it is not age but risk factors and risk management that become relevant – old age is merely an increased risk status. As Castel (1991) points out, under these systems of risk assessment, ‘the new preventive policies primarily address . . . no longer individuals but factors, statistical correlations of heterogeneous elements’ (p. 288). However, effective preventative strategies will ensure the best chance of remaining healthy no matter what an individual’s age:

Carefully considered preventative services will work to stop decline and improve life chances.
Decline is no longer considered a natural process, as asserted by advocates of disengagement theory for example, but caused by a lack of effective services, hence biological existence becomes used to simultaneously justify and neutralise political judgements and decisions.

By holding the position that ill health and disability are not an inevitable part of becoming older (NSF, p.107), the policy strategies set out within the documents analysed focus upon the manageability of ageing, setting ageing up as a process that can and should be managed – not a natural, that is, inevitable process at all. The perceived increase in health related risks in old age, and the accompanying social consequences they bring such as increased risk of social exclusion and isolation, ensure that the over 60s become prime targets of life management strategies. Here again the contradiction surfaces where despite holding onto the claim that old people are not a homogenous group, and should have access to health and social care services based on their needs rather than their age, blanket policies are created that target the group ‘older people’, defined by their chronological age, and based on knowledge of the increased risk status of this group as a whole. For example:

*We are commissioning 46 national governing bodies of sport to help create a world leading community sport system including plans to encourage the over 50s to participate in sport.* Physical activity currently decreases with age and at the moment the fitness industry is not taking full advantage of the market opportunities demographic change represents.

(BSFA, p.23)
We have also launched a programme of free swimming for people over 60.

(BSFA, p.23)

Older people are included as part of the population at large by understanding their activity levels as in decline in comparison to younger adults, and this decline is regarded as problematic. Thus older people are not divided from ‘adults’ in general but measured against the overall norm or average. Within this, not only is there the implication that older people ought to be active, but that they should also be able to ‘keep up’ with younger generations, yet they are simultaneously targeted as a group differentiated by their (chronological) age and not by their personal experiences or attitude to age. Therefore, whilst being defined through characteristics knowable due to their statistical age, they are targeted because there is no reason for this differentiation – decline is not inevitable and so is not an excuse for inactivity.

Therefore, whilst becoming older is an inevitable part of life, something to be celebrated and a sign of success, ageing - in terms of decline or failures of self-maintenance, is neither. Good self-management becomes the key to avoid ageing into old age, or at least to put it on hold for as long as possible. Ageing in terms of decline is no longer a natural or inevitable process, but a problem that requires both professional and medical intervention, and a proactive approach from individuals - hence the importance that ‘old age’ can encompass activity and old people remain active agents, rather than passive recipients. It is even suggested that old people ought to remain active in order to prove the truth that old people are active:

if we want other people’s perceptions to change, we also need to challenge outdated assumptions in ourselves as we grow older.

(OA, p.4)
This implies that older people need to behave in a way that shows they are not ageing – that they are not in decline, in need of assistance, and do not need to ‘rest’. In this way ‘old age’ is redefined in order to break down the differentiation of lifestyles and expectations between old people and younger adults, hence the similarities in lifestyle, desires and capabilities have been highlighted in the policies:

Just like the rest of us, older people want to enjoy good health and remain independent for as long as possible.

(NSF, p.i)

Older workers, at least up to the age of 70, are as productive in most jobs as younger workers

(BSFA, p.32)

The issue of presenting old age as an extended youth has been criticized by some as ageist and a sign of the value society attributes to youth culture (Andrews, 1999). What it also does however, is rid ‘old age’ of its otherness and makes it mainstream – old age is a period not to be shunned as something that concerns others but has nothing to do with you, but to be prepared for. The challenges brought by old age are relevant to everyone, and can be effectively managed by everyone. Old age no longer signifies passivity and withdrawal, but that there is something to be done and progressively achieved.

**Ageing population and policy**

The idea of an ageing population is not new: the notion was first used in 1928 in France in relation to concern for the population’s future (Bourdelais, 1998). Preceding this, Bourdelais (1998) also notes the importance of Jacques Bertillon, the French statistician and demographer, who in 1896 compared an ‘older population’
with a living being and therefore capable of taking on the attributes of an ageing declining body. Thus the association of the population with old age carried a warning of its decline in strength and vigour. Current social policy recognises that an ageing population is not only a recent concern, but sees the current situation as unique in that an ageing population is no longer a future threat, but a current operationalized reality:

More of us are living longer than ever. This is not a new phenomenon – life expectancy has been growing steadily for over a century, but the UK has just passed a demographic tipping point. In 2007 for the first time in the UK there were more people over State Pension age than children; an ageing society is no longer coming tomorrow – it is here with us today.

(BSFA, p.7)

Relating the issue of old age to not only individual ageing but also the characteristics of society, of which we are all a part, ensures that all members of the population – regardless of their actual age – become part of the problem of ageing. In turn they are all required to be part of the solution, both as responsible citizens with obligations to others, and as individuals whose desire is assumed to be the maximisation of their own life potential. Some of the challenges that are claimed to arise with an ageing population are not presented as problematic for the current generation of old people, but for future generations. Examples include poverty in old age and the pension crisis – the current generation of old people are thought to be relatively well off in comparison both to previous generations of old people and to the current population in general (Gilleard and Higgs, 2009; OA vol.2, p.18). In this sense many governmental strategies aimed at managing an ageing population are targeted at working age adults, or even younger. Gilbert (2006), for example, claims that discourses are being deployed to change people’s future expectations concerning work
and pensions provision, citing the Child Trust Fund as a form of encouragement to develop a saving habit early on in preparation for financial security in later life.

Thus the concept of ageing, and its presentation as problematic on both an individual and collective level, provides the rationality through which governmental technologies concerning how individuals ought to conduct their everyday lives - from finance and work, to health and social participation, reaches out across all life stages and geopolitical situations. What may seem a rather singular issue of age becomes an all-encompassing vision of society that demands a specific form of active citizenship, and that each individual takes on a specific persona in keeping with this. Hence policy calls upon everyone to be involved in preparing for an ageing population:

we must create an environment where our later years can be a time to be enjoyed. This is not just an issue for people already approaching later life. It affects everyone, not only because we are all getting older, but because we will all increasingly interact with, look after and learn from the greater numbers of people who are in their later life.

In the presence of such a shift in the age of our population we must adapt as a society

(BSFA, p.6)

All individuals must prepare for their own old age, but this personal preparation is understood as part of the collective adaptation to an ageing population which demands that individuals change their attitude regarding who older people (including themselves) are, and take on board a new mentality and set of expectations regarding the role of older people in society:

57 The concept of ‘body maintenance’ (Featherstone, 1991) presents an example of this, where the body is treated as something that can be endlessly repaired if regularly attended to throughout the life cycle. But furthermore this ability to maintain the body implies the moral duty to do so, lest the disorganized uncared for body serves as a reflection of the ‘self’ (Piqueras, 2007).
For **individuals** . . . A personal responsibility rests on each one of us to plan and provide for a different life-course that is also better.

For **business**, a changing customer base offers new markets. But the workforce is changing too . . . Employers have a huge role to play in enabling society to adjust effectively to a new balance of life.

For **all of us**, dealing successfully with demographic change means shedding outdated stereotypes and changing mindsets about retirement and the process of growing older.

(OA, p.v-vi)

Part of the rationality here relies on the value of inclusion: ensuring not only that ageing is not sectioned off as an ‘older people’s’ problem, but also that old people become and remain fully integrated in mainstream society by continuing to play a similar role to that expected of working age adults.

As discussed in Chapter 2, understanding subjects as individuals who collectively make up a population determines what sort of demographic information becomes relevant and important for understanding people; it also presents a specific relationship between individuals, and between individuals, scientists and the state. A connection between the individual and the collective is assumed and relied upon in order to rationalise the need for both social and self-government, and is used as a governmental technology. For example, in the policies the happiness and security of each individual is presented as intimately tied to the actions of others– the extent to which others strive to lead or succeed in leading fulfilling lives. The same applies vice versa: an individual’s success at achieving a good life quality adds to the overall quality of society:
As well as rights, older people are citizens and as such have responsibilities like all of us to contribute to society. They can do this in many ways, not least by taking sensible steps to look after their health.

(OA, p.xvii)

The significant link between an individual’s lifestyle and the economic stability of the population (and so of each individual) is also highlighted:

It has been estimated that improving life expectancy by just one year each decade, could generate a 14 per cent saving in spending on health care and an 11 per cent saving in spending on benefits between 2007 and 2025.

(BSFA, p.15)

A cycle of decline in quality of life and health is devastating to the individual and costly to the state.

(SS, p.30)

Thus the individual is included in a collective so far as her or his actions impact upon it, yet ultimately remains a single unit individually responsible for her or his present and future\(^{58}\):

The challenge is also for each of us as individuals to take responsibility for our own lifestyles and aim for a healthy and fulfilling old age.

\(^{58}\) This will be further explored in Chapter 7.
This notion of the category of the individual is also demonstrated through the information collected concerning them: individuals become known through the collective knowledge of the population, yet they are ultimately detachable from it and accountable as a singular subject. Thus much of the information regarding individuals that is presented in the policies is based on characteristics generated through quantitative aggregates: statistical averages, standard deviations, percentages and estimates (OA vol.2 is itself an example). These aggregate or generalised characteristics are then used as gauges against which individuals are measured and can measure themselves, and are used to decide upon any necessary lifestyle changes. Therefore as well as creating knowledge of risk factors, actuarial predictions and individual risk status as already discussed, aggregate knowledge of the population is used to incite individual lifestyle changes. For example:

The broad picture is that the years after retirement are largely healthy and can be made even healthier through relatively simple preventative measures.

(OA, p.9)

This tactic is deployed to justify governmental technologies aimed at specific individuals to produce a lifestyle focused on active participation:

there is a need for a range of interventions later in life such as ensuring that older people are targeted with **active ageing opportunities** in the same way as younger age groups.
They are governmental in the sense that they are targeted interventions aimed at mobilising a particular type of conduct that will ultimately prevent unwanted outcomes and possible burdens to society. Knowledge of the population as a whole and of specific populations within this, is used to determine acceptable levels of health, finance, social participation and so on for everyone, and thereby is used to justify what can be expected of individuals. Although, as noted by Rose (2001), programmes that have taken the ‘nation’s health’ as their object have been prevalent for some time, the rationale behind this is no longer concern for the strength of the state compared to other nation states (as in the capacity to bear arms), but rather concern for the population both in economic and moral terms. Thus concern for the health and life quality of individuals is based on the economic stability and sustainability of society, as well as the concern to reduce inequalities by providing equality of life chances:

Our aspiration is to achieve a world-leading employment rate of 80 per cent, including a million older workers. If we achieve this, the ratio of workers to non-workers in the economy would be about the same in 2050 as it is now. Society can thus grow older, and sustain its economic capacity.

(OA, p.xv)

Every one of us will have different needs and expectations as we get older. This strategy reflects that, and aims to give people the tools and the encouragement they need to prepare more effectively for later life.

(BSFA, p.6)
Diversity of policy strategies is therefore assumed to be necessary to cater for the
diversity of life situations and levels of need, thereby ensuring equal opportunity to all
to live a healthy and fulfilling later life. This ‘celebration of difference’ demonstrates
the uniqueness of a governmental society in that it is the well-being of the population
that is both the rationalisation for and the target of governmental technologies\textsuperscript{59}.

Whilst highlighting the social impact of ill health and increased need, the
policies are clear that an ageing population does not necessarily equate to a declining
population, but should instead be met with optimism:

As this snapshot of research has shown, getting older in this new
millennium is the start of a new road, not the end of a road.

\textit{(OA vol.2, p.38)}

However this is based on the immediate action by all members of society, as discussed
above. Specifically this new society must embrace activity, responsibility and
independent living.

\textbf{Activity and independence}

The redefinition of old age within these policies is primarily linked to the social
role of older people, both in terms of what they take from contemporary society:

\textbf{FACT 1:} People often have the greatest need for public services in their
later years

\textit{(BSFA, p.38)}

\textsuperscript{59} This has been discussed in Chapter 2, and will be further explored in Chapter 5.
and in terms of what they may be expected to contribute. The aim is therefore to find ways of decreasing the demand on services from older people by increasing health and making preparations for self-support, and simultaneously increasing the variety of ways in which old people can contribute and participate as consumers, workers and volunteers. Thus this logic of advanced capitalism is part of the reason for the policy argument that age is an irrelevant category for understanding a service user group, or for providing health and social care services: age alone should not tell us anything about an older person’s capabilities and lifestyle. With this in mind, OA (volumes 1 and 2) reworks the ‘dependency ratio’ to take into account the newfound link between old age and activity:

[the dependency ratio] is usually defined as the ratio of those aged under 16 or over State Pension Age, to those aged 16 to State Pension Age . . . though there is no reason why we should see older people as necessarily dependant – many keep economically active beyond traditional retirement ages.

(OA vol.2, p.8)

It continues,

the current population can only consume the output produced by the current population . . . So, the problem of sharing limited output is not really determined by the number of older people, but by the proportion of the population that is productive.

(OA vol.2, p.8)
The problem of an ageing population is therefore not thought to be well characterised by focusing on old age, but by potential high levels of inactivity:

More important than the simple numerical relationship between those above and below certain ages is the ratio between active and inactive in our society.

(OA, p.7)

The separation of the inactivity ratio from categories of age has two significant thrusts. Firstly it emphasises the disintegration of the boundaries of old age, in terms of its differentiation from other life stages by specific lifestyles or expectations. Secondly and concurrently it sets the expectation of a continued productionist economic contribution in old age.

The well-being and security of the population is therefore related to levels of individual activity. Alongside the concerns of economic activity demonstrated via the inactivity ratio, other forms of activity are equally expected. Consumerism, for example, is framed as a desirable form of activity in old age, but currently problematic:

older people- especially those over 75 – tend to spend less of their income the older they get.

(OA vol.2, p.20)

Hence the Department for Work and Pensions has commissioned research to investigate the ‘problem’ (OA vol.2, p.20). Consumerism becomes desirable precisely
because it is seen as a form of social action and, importantly, social participation. So as well as helping to sustain the economy, being a consumer, along with other forms of participation, is argued to be beneficial to individual health and well-being; this in turn will have a positive effect on society in terms of increased independence of the individual and less reliance on support.

The question of activity as presented in these policies goes beyond economic activity and the crude capitalist imperative, however. Health is also important as both a form and an aim of active ageing, as highlighted in WHO’s (2002) definition:

[active ageing is] the process of optimising opportunities for health, participation, and security in order to enhance quality of life as people age. Active ageing applies to both individuals and groups. It allows people to realise their potential for physical, social and mental well-being throughout their lives and to participate in society according to their needs, desires and capacities, while providing them with adequate protection, security and care when they require assistance.

(Quoted in Walker, 2009, p.84)

Walker (2009) sees WHO’s definition as providing an important contribution to discourses of active ageing by refocusing away from employment to consider the wide range of factors that contribute to well-being, in particular the link between employment, health and participation. Thus well-being is not only reliant on individual and social economic security, but also on an individual’s health and social inclusion. Furthermore, Walker (2009) claims that the emphasis on the link between participation and well-being is derived from scientific evidence of their interrelationship and the beneficial effects on health of positive well-being. By way of evidence he (2009) cites SS, pointing in particular to the ‘cycle of well-being’. This proposes a relationship where increased participation leads to increased ability and

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60 Blakie (1999) claims that retirement has become conceived as primarily a form of leisure, and so it is now a period characterised by more than simply being non-productive, although alongside this it could be argued that productivity has also been reconfigured.
opportunities; these in turn lead to increased personal health and well-being and onwards to increased participation (SS, p.32), with the note that:

The positive effects on health of positive well-being have been found to be even larger than the effects from body mass, smoking and exercise.

(SS, p.32)

The scientific evidence cited to verify this is an article by psychologists Levy and colleagues (2002), which examined ‘Longevity increased by positive self-perceptions of age’. They found that those with more positive self-perceptions of ageing lived 7.5 years more than those with less positive self-perceptions of ageing. Self-perceptions of ageing were measured by asking participants to agree or disagree with 5 statements: Things keep getting worse as I get older; I have as much pep as I did last year; As you get older you are less useful; I am as happy now as I was when I was younger; As I get older things are better than/worse than/ the same as I thought they would be (Levy et al, 2002, p.263). It is not difficult to cast some doubt on the validity of these findings as sufficient basis for robust evidence based policy. Individuals’ responses to five ready made statements according to fixed response categories can provide only a simplistic understanding of their perceptions of their lives and of old age; in addition, the measures of outcomes used were not well-being but simply survival and longevity. What this research has neither explored nor verified, therefore, is any link between well-being, health and participation – as implied in SS. Instead this research argues for a link between internalised social stereotypes and life expectancy, thus the article concludes by highlighting the impact of stigmatisation of old age on longevity (Levy et al, 2002). Although longer life may indicate a healthy life, this is not automatically true, and although well-being is at least partly associated with self-perceptions of ageing in the policies, there is nothing in this research that links well-being to activity and participation as implied in the ‘cycle of well-being’ (SS, p.33) and reiterated by Walker (2009).
Katz (2000) argues that this association is too often assumed in gerontology research:

The association of activity with well-being in old age seems so obvious and indisputable that questioning it within gerontological circles would be considered unprofessional, if not heretical.

(p.135)

He continues that despite being a relatively recent 'keyword', this notion of 'activity' has already helped to shape our understanding of later life. In this sense activity and participation have become not only options for the current population of older people but essential for general well-being and a good life quality:

Greater active participation, stronger social roles and empowerment can have a positive impact on the individual, improving well-being and health. In the ELSA research commissioned, lack of physical activity was found to be a significant factor in three of the seven domains of exclusion . . . Poor mental and physical health can affect participation in wider social, leisure and civic activities.

(SS, p.45)

Having a role and active participation are significant protective factors against loneliness and social isolation, and are important for quality of life.

(SS, p.62)

Activity is thus more than just a lifestyle choice - it is presented as key to maintaining relationships, staving off isolation, and is associated with good mental and physical health. Hence general well-being depends on being active – physically, economically,
and socially - and so also requires individuals to take on an active persona: to become proactive in terms of planning and managing later life.

The strong link between activity, health and well-being, and the responsibility of each individual to lead a healthy, full and independent life for the sake of others as well as themselves, ensures that an active lifestyle becomes a moral obligation. Katz describes how Ekerdt (1986, cited in Katz, 2000) saw the construction of a ‘busy ethic’ in retirement to be akin to the ‘work ethic’ as a form of moral regulation of the population. Rose’s (2001) concept of ethopolitics is useful here, whereby:

the ethos of human existence – the sentiments, moral nature or guiding beliefs of persons, groups, or institutions – have come to provide the ‘medium’ within which the self-government of the autonomous individual can be connected up with the imperatives of good government . . . ethopolitics concerns itself with the self-techniques by which human beings should judge themselves and act upon themselves to make themselves better than they are. While ethopolitical concerns range from those of lifestyle to those of community, they coalesce around a kind of vitalism: disputes over the value to be accorded to life itself: ‘quality of life’, ‘the right to life’ or ‘the right to choose’

(p.18)

What individuals do, or do not do, in terms of preparing for and living later life, becomes subject to a moral judgement, where levels of independence and the fulfilment of social obligation denote the ethical status of the individual. Thus a responsibility to lead a healthy and fulfilling life through activity and participation is made clear:

longer life is a blessing where the extra years are fulfilling and active. They should not be years of inaction and exclusion. A personal responsibility rests on each one of us to plan and provide for a different life-course that is also better.
The primary responsibility for keeping active and participating in society lies with older people themselves.

However, it is clear that only certain types of activity are included and valued as forms of active ageing. Katz (2000) notes that many activity studies indicate as appropriate, normal and healthy activities for older people those that coincide with middle-class family orientated conventions. By contrast, activities such as drinking, sexual preferences and gambling tend not to be included, yet could feasibly be significant activities in an individual’s life. Biggs (2001) echoes this, claiming that the ‘astonishing absence of diversity’ (p.313) in the policies exposes the assumption that everyone has the same set of personal and social priorities. This dominance of the active lifestyle, and belief in its supremacy, makes other approaches to old age as a specific life stage untenable. That later life might, for example, be a time for contemplation and turning inwards or just for resting is effectively disallowed.

Furthermore the polarisation of activity, health and good life quality with decline, ill-health and poor life quality has been continued through the creation of the constructs of the Third age and Fourth age as a way of understanding different phases of old age. Laslett conceptualised the Third age as a life phase where older people are able to seek self-fulfilment beyond the constraints of work and child rearing; this is only ended by the Fourth stage, characterised by frailty and decline (Higgs et al, 2009). Higgs and colleagues (2009) highlight that the creation of health as a social responsibility may lead to the situation where an older person’s health determines their social status: as either agentic and fulfilled ‘Third agers’, or as inactive and dependent ‘Fourth agers’ – the latter assumed to bring with it a low quality of life. This reasoning also suggests that the young/active-old/passive dichotomy is actually still in place but in a different guise and with an altered purpose and target.
Activity is promoted as a positive value and of significant importance as it is considered essential to enabling independence, which itself is perhaps the overriding value and aim in the policies. The assumption is made in the policies that independence is fundamentally positive, necessary, and something that all members of the population strive for:

Just like the rest of us, older people want to enjoy good health and remain independent for as long as possible.

(NSF, p.i)

People will be helped in their goal to remain healthy and independent.

(OHOCOS, p.4)

we all want . . .

- to keep independence and control over our lives as we grow older, even if we are constrained by the health problems that sometimes affect the final years.

(OA, p.3)

In contrast to these assertions made in UK New Labour policy, Plath (2009) demonstrates that independence is not a universal aim of social policy. Comparing ageing policies from Australia, Denmark, India and UK she found that the principle of promoting independence was not adopted by all. Rather dependence is viewed as unproblematic in that social support is considered an entitlement in Denmark, or even as advantageous – familial dependence is desirable in Indian policy. In this light, Plath (2009) raises the question: ‘When policies promote independence, from what are older people being encouraged to be independent?’ (p.220).
Public and familial support are clearly presented as undesirable and a sign of dependency in the policy context analysed here:

Older people wish to remain healthy, active and independent of the need for support from services and their families.

(NSF, p.14)

The economic logic at stake here is that remaining active and healthy is necessary for an individual to stand alone ‘independently’, and not need to rely on either public services or their personal relationships for support. However, Plath (2009) claims there is a ‘conceptual difficulty’ with the notion of independence, in that no person is completely independent: reliance upon the support of others is a common human state in all life stages. The aim of making individuals independent to the extent that they no longer require any form of support from family or other personal relations may therefore be both impossible and arguably undesirable.

Not all social care support is assumed to be encouraging dependence however. Rather policy strategies work to refocus health and care services on enabling independence:

‘Care and support’ describes the activities, services and relationships that help people to be independent, active and well throughout their lives, and participate in and contribute to society.

(SFC, p.29)

Support that enables independence is therefore not only acceptable but a right:
everyone in the country should be able to expect:

1. The right support to help you stay independent and well for as long as possible and to stop your care and support needs from getting worse.

(SFC, p.10)

The kind of support promoting independence rather than enforcing dependency focuses on prevention: life planning, remaining in general good health, early intervention services to manage care needs with minimal intervention\(^{61}\). In this sense the support on offer is framed in terms of ‘that bit of help’ (SS, p.27), and so seen as ideally providing minimal assistance to enable the individual to remain the primary agent and in control at all times. Only certain forms of dependency are therefore framed as problematic: whilst social dependency is to be avoided, dependency on medical and technological aids is often considered enabling - itself a form of independence (Higgs et al, 2009).

This indicates that the importance of independence is not linked to support as such, but to agency. Dependence on mechanisms and networks of support that encourage an individual to play the role of an active agent, making their own life decisions and consequently remaining responsible for these life choices, is actively encouraged. It is forms of support that position the individual as the passive recipient that are to be avoided, those that construct an active consumer seeking out and creatively using the forms of support available proves to be a desirable goal.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that the paradox of old age then, is that its boundaries are simultaneously fixed and dispersed through the attempt to use it as a governmental tool that rationalises both what old age is, and the technologies and processes we should all subject ourselves to. Old age is both something solidly defined: pertaining to activity and social participation; yet also meaningless: it should not be

\(^{61}\) This will be discussed in Chapter 6.
used to signify a difference from the rest of the population. These conflicting notions of old age manage to sit side by side within the policy documents as they both adhere to, and emanate from, a rationality that subjectifies the older person as independent, active and responsible for their continued contribution to society. Thus the contradictory definition of old age is intimately connected to the perceived needs of society. Due to this, old age becomes a reason for all life to be managed, and a reason for us all to be governed in line with this rationality in our everyday lives: the problem of ageing becomes the problem of social activity. Old age therefore provides an example of how a singular issue pertinent to governance becomes dispersed into many spheres of life: health, work, family relations, leisure, and translates into a responsibility for us all to plan for our futures by taking care to manage our lives today. This discussion will be taken forward in the next chapter to focus on how subjectivity is both framed within and utilised by governmental strategies within these ageing discourses.
Chapter 5  

**Governable identities and the limits of the self**

**Introduction**

The governmentality rationalities and technologies displayed within the policies chosen for analysis in this thesis rest upon an assumed reality of self that can be moulded, worked upon and changed. At the same time the self appears to remain as a universal phenomenon due to the tightly tailored boundaries within which this work is to be done – that is, all ‘selves’ are expected to work towards the same goal in similar ways, being motivated by similar desires and necessities. Therefore despite the implied flexibility, ideas of a mutable and potentially unlimited self are not problematized within the policies: even with the portrayal of unending lifestyle choice, its flexibility is constrained within rigid boundaries. It is however, this specific understanding of the self as capable of, and in need of, formation that rationalises and makes necessary the policy response to old age and an ageing society. This in turn causes certain social concepts and realities to become prioritised in relation to the problem of old age: such as risk, community, life quality and well-being, along with the associated social actions of responsibility, participation and fulfilment.

This chapter will explore the discursive boundaries and possibilities of the self set out within these policy texts to determine both how the self and associated notion of identity are configured and deployed. Drawing on the Foucauldian perspective, this will focus upon both the ways individuals become governable, and govern themselves, as well as determining what the limits of individual possibilities might be: what and where are the constraints of the self? Three significant characteristics of the individual will be discussed: the individual as essentially reflexive; the self as a resource; and individuality.

**Transition and reflexivity**

Chapter 3 of BSFA is entitled:
HAVING THE LATER LIFE YOU WANT

(BSFA, p.17)

In order to obtain the later life you want people need to:

think about their aspirations for later life and prepare accordingly.

(BSFA, p.17)

The presentation of old age as a lifestyle choice requires thought and preparation from the individual. It is suggested that each individual’s later life will be and ought to be unique to the extent that it should be tailor made – reflecting both their aspirations and perhaps also the effort they have put into realising these. The portrayal of life as something to be chosen and formed by the individual is expressed by Giddens (1991) as endemic of our current society:

Each of us not only ‘has’, but lives a biography reflexively organised in terms of flows of social and psychological information about possible ways of life. Modernity is a post-traditional order, in which the question, ‘How shall I live?’ has to be answered in day-to-day decisions about how to behave, what to wear and what to eat

(p.14)

Adams (2006) discusses how the notion of a reflexive self has been formed in relation to increased exposure to others and diversity, brought about by changes in communication and technology. However, he demonstrates that an array of social theorists whose work varies widely, have gravitated towards this reflexive understanding of the self, and refers to ‘extended reflexivity thesis’ to capture this.
This view of the self as reflexive assumes that nothing can be taken for granted – no lifestyles are essential or fixed, with the result that every decision is counted as a deliberate expression of self and lifestyle.

With later life presented as an array of lifestyle choices, help is offered in the form of presenting the choices available (as well as their consequences), and providing the information and advice to enable good decision making. Hence it is claimed people want services that:

- help them to make choices and take control of their health and well-being by understanding their own health and lifestyle better

(OHOCOS, p.15)

Pre-retirement courses are also made available to encourage individuals ‘to make the most of later years’ (BSFA, p.19):

“Pre-retirement education helps to encourage people to consider options . . . and provides up to date information and signposting.”

(Response to Preparing for our Ageing Society: A Discussion Paper, BSFA, p.19)

Having the later life you want therefore seems largely dependent on knowing what your individual possibilities are, both by understanding one’s self better, as well as ensuring access to the most current and relevant information.

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62 The policy strategy of information and advice will be further discussed in Chapter 6.
Despite the apparently endless paths open to the formation of the older self and later life, Adams (2003) notes the persistence of a centred subject upon which this uncertainty and fragmentary choice is based:

> While on the one hand the world is dissolving into a malleable and ‘open’ backdrop, the rational, choice-making, bounded individual remains, is expanded even, at the core of selfhood.

(p.224)

Thus whilst there is a sense that individuals choose who they want to be, and what life they want to lead, these choices are assumed to be made by a relatively consistent self who uses a reflexive knowledge of themself to make a decision based on an evaluation of best outcomes. It is due to this that Adams (2003) critiques the ‘extended reflexivity thesis’ for equating reflexivity with an innate rationality that will always guarantee the ‘best’ outcome.

The emphasis in these policy strategies on being aware of self and lifestyle as a deliberate manifestation of the will, does not mean that individuals actually do behave in a reflexive manner the majority of the time. Bauman (2004) for example, argues that the question of identity only arises when ‘belonging’ becomes an issue – that is, it is only those who feel or are made to feel that they do not belong that begin to ask questions regarding their identity and way of life. This suggests that for at least some, if not most of the time, individuals do not consider their self reflexively, in that they may not consider their self at all. Old age however, has commonly been understood as a transitional point in life, rather than a continuation (Rudman, 2006), and so is often thought to bring with it these questions of belonging in relation to identity and lifestyle.

Later life is understood in these policies precisely as a time of major life transitions:
The period between the ages of 50 and 70 is a time of significant life transitions for many people – the departure of grown up children from the household, the move from full-time employment to a reliance on retirement income, more leisure time, and later on, bereavement and possibly the onset of poor health.

(OA vol.2, p.14)

The effect of these life transitions is that individuals have to re-evaluate their role and therefore dispositional aspects of identity. The view of old age as a transition into a somehow different life brings with it the need to make sense of your ‘self’ in relation to this life:

many people have said that after retirement they were viewed differently, that they suddenly didn’t belong or felt like they no longer had a respected role. The things that defined their identity and self-esteem, for example work and family roles, disappeared and left a hole that was not filled.

(SS, p.98)

The transition from working age and middle age into old age is presented here as fundamentally a transition of self and identity, characterised by a loss or change of social and personal roles, and subsequent loss of identification with certain groups and individuals. The suggestion is that something basal has changed which has caused a destabilisation in self-knowledge. The task ahead then (or ideally to be prepared for in advance), is to fill the hole by actively carving out a suitable identity for oneself. Identity and sense of self are being explicitly associated with an individual’s personal and social roles and activities.
A tension has been highlighted between continuity and change in relation to the self. In contrast to identity as the continuity of self-sameness (Bendle, 2002), the self is presented within these policies as in need of transformation in order to adhere to the new social and personal roles an individual will find themselves in during later life. Andrews (1999) criticises this view of later life for treating old age as presenting a chasm between a younger and older self, typified in a mind/body split. He argues old age needs instead to be understood as a continuity of self, claiming: ‘We are still the same people who we have always been, but more deeply so’ (Andrews, 1999, p.31). Whilst recognising change, this argues change is perhaps better understood as an extension or development of the current self, where old age is:

a time of ongoing personhood, neither the retardation or complete cessation of development, nor a radical transformation of self from ‘us’ to ‘them’.

(Andrews, 1999, p.31)

This understanding of old age and older people as not essentially different from individuals of working age, is in keeping with the ethos set out in the policies. As explored in Chapter 4, the policies redefinition of old age is actively opposed to the idea that old age brings with it a radical transformation of an individual – rather an individual is expected to remain an independent and valuable active citizen.

However, it is suggested in the policies that this continuation of selfhood will not just happen. Instead it is precisely to enable the continuation of this active and independent self that a transformation and re-evaluation of self is deemed necessary: hence the portrayal of the loss of social and personal roles as a hole that needs to be filled. The importance of having defined roles is apparent:

People’s sense of self worth and identity is, in part, determined by the roles they fulfil such as grandparents, carers, employees or voluntary workers.
This relational approach to social being suggests that the loss of roles caused by life events such as retirement and the changing dynamics of family life therefore become a threat to the consistency of a meaningful identity. The consequences of this are made clear: alongside putting into question an individual’s self worth, loss of meaningful roles is also coupled with the risk of social isolation (SS, p.56, 58).

The strategies and interventions put forward within the chosen policies focus on ensuring individuals are equipped for the task of re-evaluating their knowledge of themselves: via self-assessments to identify lifestyle risks followed by specific health and social care advice (OHOCOS, p.7); web-based self-assessment and diagnostic tools relating to careers advice, coupled with guidance and information on jobs and training (OA, p.23). What is clear is that whatever else might change in order to reach the desired goal, that goal is for the self to remain active and independent through the reflexive task of acquiring self-knowledge, and using this to maximise life quality. Identity must alter only to the extent that an individual remains able to identify themselves with a legitimate social role. The presentation of the self as mutable and in need of constant evaluation is precisely to preserve the consistency of the self, and enable it to continue its status of belonging.

In order to realise this, the tools offered by the caring policies are designed to encourage individuals to observe themselves and generate information about themselves. According to Callero (2003), the reflexive process precisely describes the uniquely human capacity to become an object to oneself, and it is due to this objectification of the self that its limitations become formed. Thus whilst the idea of a reflexive self contains the assumption that nothing can be taken for granted, that all lifestyles and paths are options, the necessity to, and responsibility of making these choices bears down on the importance of attaining the ‘right’ information about one’s self, and the need to re-evaluate this at appropriate intervals. In this sense reflexivity can be understood not as a sign of the freedom of an individual to carve out their own lifestyle, but instead as the parameters within which she or he must make sense of her
or his self. It is within the boundaries of reflexivity that the individual must act (Adams, 2003). This is akin to Foucault’s description of practices of self, where the individual is not supreme in being able to form her or his life in any way:

these practices [of the self] are nevertheless not something that the individual invents by himself. They are patterns that he finds in his culture, his society and his social group.

(Foucault, 1988, cited in Oksala, 2005, p.165)

An important difference between Foucault’s development of practices of the self, and the construction of a reflexive self in the policies examined here, is that the portrayal of the self as reflexive in the policies focuses on the achievement and maintenance of a certain goal: that is of the formation of a particular type of self (rational and self-determining for example) that lives and understands itself in a very specific way (actively and responsibly). Thus as highlighted by Adams (2006) reflexivity becomes the perfect self-management tool, ensuring the constant regulation and surveillance of the self. In contrast to this, the very purpose of practices of self for Foucault is to avoid an end goal by constantly finding ways to be other to what you are (Foucault, 1982).

The self as a resource

Alongside an understanding of the individual as a perpetual reflexive project, the individual is also presented in the policies as something that can be used to the advantage of society as a whole: not in terms of their capacity to fight for and defend the country, but rather by the capitalist economic gains of realising maximum outcomes from limited resources. The aim and rationale of social care and support relates specifically to ensuring individuals give what they can:

the right care and support, with choice and control, is essential to ensuring that everyone can make the most of their chances in life, and that no talent is wasted.

This point was more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2.
Expressed within these policies is the fear that old age currently causes individuals to lapse into a sedentary unproductive lifestyle that has proved to be detrimental for capitalist society:

- a lower than average proportion of people over 50 are employed and fewer of them have qualifications. People with low skills are less productive and more likely to be claiming benefits. We cannot afford this waste of potential for the individual and for society.

We recognised that too many people were suffering from the combined effect of problems such as poverty, unemployment, poor housing, ill health and discrimination . . . We also recognised that this waste of human potential was bad for society as a whole.

Despite the overtly socio-economic terms within which this waste of potential is described, the policy aims are focused on the individual older person - specifically on their future self and what it is possible for them to become:

One challenge is to unlock the potential for older people to play an even greater role.
The strategies set out therefore aim to increase opportunities for individuals to grasp, and ensure these individuals are in a position to seize them:

We will take steps to ensure that older people are able to maximise their potential, unhindered by prejudice.

(OA, xvii)

Greco (1993) demonstrates the expectation for individuals to take care of themselves by regulating their lifestyle and moderating their behaviour, claiming that a failure to do this constitutes a personal failure of the individual. To be healthy and maintain a healthy lifestyle therefore requires a level of self-mastery. This implies that those who do not grasp the opportunities offered have somehow not only let down society by not contributing to the extent expected, but have also failed to become the person they ought to be, or are capable of becoming. Frey and Stutzer (2009) note however that relying on individuals to make the ‘right’ preferences is valid only if individuals act in a fully rational way, however the realities of decision making show that in fact they do not:

To the extent that these effects occur [i.e. irrational behaviour], individual choices do not reflect true or normative preferences . . . and expanding people’s opportunities will not necessarily increase their utility.

(p.308)
Increasing opportunity does however responsibilize those irrational behaviours and sets a precedent for optimising the possibilities of an individual self for the sake of all\(^{64}\).

Policy strategies such as these reconstitute subjectivity as a form of social investment, that is, resources and services are modelled and justified with the intention that any investment in the individual will be paid back through their contribution to, and participation in society. As life has meaning only as a form of social and economic utility, individuals are obliged to engage in techniques of self-fulfilment or personal growth as part of their active participation in society (Culpitt, 1999; Rose, 1996). The expected form of our social contribution is made clear:

> The challenge is also for each of us as individuals to take responsibility for our own lifestyles and aim for a healthy and fulfilling old age. (OHOCOS, p.17)

These responsibilities laid upon old people sound positive, coinciding with their best interest: to be healthy, fulfilled, and to continue to have new opportunities in life. To not do what is required to have these would therefore seem nonsensical. However the issue of individuals failing to optimise their selves is not new - Cruickshank (1999) argues that participatory democratic discourse is preoccupied precisely with those individuals who fail to act in their own interest, and who choose not to participate even though free to do so. This must be at least partly due to the lack of true variety regarding lifestyles and ways of ageing (as discussed in Chapter 4 for example), causing the opportunities to not be as tempting or personally relevant as they are presented. Regardless of this, it results in making the subtleties of an individual life a public concern:

\(^{64}\) The issue of ir/rational behaviour and decision making will be discussed further in Chapter 6.
Self-fulfilment is no longer a personal or private goal. . . Hence, the solution to the current ‘crisis of governability’ is discovered in the capacity of citizens to act upon themselves, guided by the expertise of the social sciences and social service professionals.

(Cruickshank, 1999, p.89)

In order to maximise potential and live a life of fulfilment, individuals must be enterprising. In line with this, the distinction between service providers and consumers is being deliberately disbanded:

We want to encourage those working within the [care] sector to be innovative and develop new approaches within employee-led social enterprises. For example, we will encourage those currently using services to consider new ways of providing services themselves – either individually or through mutual solutions such as collective commissioning.

(BNCS, p.107)

Within this framework the traditional role of caring ‘staff’ will become obsolete:

For example, care workers will need to work with people as expert partners, to help them to achieve what they want to achieve.

(SFC, p.74)

Social support is here described as a partnership, joining an individual with the aim of enabling them to develop and realise their aspirations. Whilst the service user is positioned as the one who decides upon what is to be aimed for, as will be discussed
later\textsuperscript{65}, the goals of social care are not so unlimited - they instead must coincide with the overriding aims of independence and activity.

In developing this notion of the individual self as a market, Foucault (2008) traced the emergence of the relation between subjectivity and enterprise in his discussion of the ordoliberals - a group of German thinkers from the 1930s-1940s. At this time, Foucault argued, the notion of enterprise became so generalised it began to encompass subjectivity itself (McNay, 2009). Arising from this is the use of the market economy to understand non-market relations:

A conventional liberal understanding of the role of the state is principally one of intervention to mitigate social inequalities and injustices thrown up by the operation of the market economy. In their desire to reduce such overweening intervention, the ordoliberals rejected the idea that social rationality can be used to correct market dysfunctions, arguing instead that economic rationality should be used to correct social dysfunctions.

(McNay, 2009, p.57)

Many strategies within the policies clearly follow this, where social and personal relations are measured and valued within the schema of an economic rationality, a market. This has been extended within the policies, as shown below, where lives are not only measured against market rationalities, but are expected to themselves become (successful) markets: to become fulfilled and remain productive by approaching old age with an entrepreneurial spirit, and within a consumerist network. Thus individuals must first know what they need (by utilising rational decision making), and then have the knowledge, ability and creativity to fulfil this need. Social care services are therefore based upon the use of the market to fulfil personal needs, requiring the individual to play along in this role. Strategies range from relying on the individual’s role as consumer to know how to ‘fix’ their situation, to positioning the service user as concurrently the designer and provider of the service:

\textsuperscript{65} In Chapter 6.
Shop4support is a unique shopping experience used by Harrow Council. The service is an online shopping forum that enables care users to search for and purchase clearly priced products and services. It enables people to see the range of services on offer, and to then put together their own shopping baskets and mix and match the services they need.

(BNCS, p.114)

Rather than seeing people as passive recipients of care and support, our vision sees them as citizens who are involved in designing the services that will help them live their everyday lives.

(SFC, p.32)

The priority of individual choice and control, exemplified through personal budgets for example, rests firmly on the expectation of the individual to be enterprising and innovative:

This has made a real difference to people’s lives, by allowing them to decide what is most important to them and find innovative ways of meeting those care needs.

(SFC, p.35)

This reconfiguration of subjectivity as enterprising focuses on the pluralisation of individual differences through a consumerist market matrix (McNay, 2009). The issue of using individual differences as a form of governance will be explored further in the next section.
Focusing on the improvement of individual selves and lives, rather than altering socio-economic structures, has the consequence of politicising happiness, causing concepts such as ‘well-being’ and ‘quality of life’ to become commonplace within the policies. These concepts are mostly used as obvious everyday realities in need of no explanation: shown, for example, through the creation of ‘well-being services’, designed to keep older people independent (BNCS, p.14; OA, p.43). Similarly OA states there is a statutory duty to promote the well-being of older people (p.71). Despite the current ubiquity of these terms, they are relatively recent additions to health and social policy and politics – Shah (2006) notes the term ‘quality of life’ did not make it into dictionaries until 1978, and although ‘well-being’ has a longer history it is only recently being taken seriously as a political concern. The perceived existence and political importance of well-being and quality of life is therefore something distinct to our current time, where they have become posited as significant justifications for particular policy strategies whilst being simultaneously used as governmental strategies.

A general movement has occurred – primarily in economics – that views happiness as something that can be (and perhaps should be) measured (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). According to Bruni (2010) whilst interest in happiness is not new the methodology used to analyse and study it is: today it is considered to be empirically measurable. This has meant that questions concerning whether we ought to be striving for happiness, and how this can be achieved, have become answerable not so much through spiritual and philosophical deliberation, but by scientific exploration. Layard (2005) confirms:

Until recently, if people said they were happy, sceptics would have held that this was just a subjective statement. There was no good way to show that it had any objective content at all. But now we know that what people say about how they feel corresponds closely to the actual levels of activity in different parts of the brain, which can be measured in standard scientific ways.

The Journal of Happiness Studies, first published in 2000, is an example of this, where its stated aim is concerned with the scientific understanding of subjective well-being.
However, this view conflicts with alternative research knowledge of the effect cultural influences play on an individual’s willingness to claim they are happy, or understand themselves in terms of happiness and well-being. Frey and Stutzer (2002) highlight the differences between the value placed on happiness in the USA and Japan, claiming that this impacts on the tendency for individuals to claim to be happy or not from these two regions. They conclude from this that well-being measures are not suitable for cross-cultural comparison, but it could also be suggested that well-being measures would be illogical and meaningless outside of cultures that put a high value on individual happiness. In cultures that value individual happiness, positive emotions are often treated as a sign of both personal and social success (Carlisle et al., 2009), their measurement therefore become a significant form of knowledge of the social wealth. Joshanloo (2013) notes the general culture-free stance of much of the current literature on happiness however, and through detailing the perspectives of five Eastern traditions regarding happiness demonstrates how Eastern life practices and values are often incompatible with Western conceptions of well-being. At the heart of many of these differences lies the emphasis on individualism in the Western tradition, leading to virtues such as autonomy, self-determination, and personal positive regard to be used as indicators of happiness in research. In contrast, in Eastern traditions happiness is understood as mostly relational and collective, encompassing virtues such as harmony. Contra to the emphasis on individual happiness, the values upheld within some Eastern traditions may call for self-sacrifice for the happiness of others. Furthermore negative emotions are often viewed as contributing to spiritual development, and so happiness-unhappiness cannot be so clearly dichotomised into good-bad categories (Joshanloo, 2013). This acts as a reminder that although well-being and any feelings of happiness are treated as if located within the individual as a singular unit (and therefore researchers look to individual brains to find it, for example), they must in fact be built into a social nexus within which they can be given form and meaning.
One reason for the policy interest in well-being may be, as suggested by Layard (2005), that it is a motivational device: we seek to feel good. This makes the assumption, as mentioned previously, that individuals act rationally and always in their ‘own interest’ which, as already noted, has been contested. Using well-being as a motivational device for individuals to live independent lives is clearly a strategy in the policies:

Better health and participation can become self-reinforcing to improve well-being and boost resilience factors that prevent a negative cycle of decline in quality of life.

(SS, p.31)

A focus on well-being covers many areas of life: health, income, personal and social relationships, specifically with the intention of promoting independence and active ageing:

Promoting well-being, independence, choice and accessibility underpin our strategic approach to all services used by older people. We want to achieve a society where increasingly diverse older people are active consumers of public services, exercising control and choice, not passive recipients of them.

(OA, p.xviii)

From this it is clear that achieving and maintaining well-being requires the individual to be doing something:

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68 In line with Eudaimonic well-being, Layard (2005) notes we seek to feel good not moment to moment, but overall.
not making the most of opportunities can result in inactivity and loneliness, reducing an individual’s well-being.

(BSFA, p.17)

This activity of maintaining a happy and fulfilling life – making the ‘most’ of your life - consequently becomes a consuming activity an individual must perform, as Baudrillard (1998) describes:

Modern man spends less and less of his life in production within work and more and more of it in the production and continued innovation of his own needs and well-being. He must constantly see to it that all his potentialities, all his consumer capacities are mobilised. If he forgets to do so, he will be gently and insistently reminded that he has no right not to be happy.

(p.80)

Chapter 2 highlighted this as a feature of a governmental society, where the state becomes interested not just in the basic survival of the population but in the way individuals’ live their lives: in all their activities insofar as they impact upon the security of the population, thereby legitimating the extension of governance into the personal daily concerns of individuals. To reiterate this point, Foucault (2007a) stated:

police must succeed in linking together the state’s strength and individual felicity. This felicity, as the individual’s better than just living, must in some way be drawn on and constituted into state utility: making man’s happiness the state’s utility, making men’s happiness the very strength of the state.

(p.327)
This ‘better than just living’, which may today be called ‘quality of life’ or ‘well-being’ is therefore utilised in the policy texts as a governmental tool, which does not aim for the personal happiness of each individual, but instead requires each individual to find happiness through continual self-development and social participation.

Well-being, or happiness, has therefore become an essential and expected part of life. However, as Baudrillard (1998) suggests the happiness required is not that of inner enjoyment that needs no outward signs: the policies are clear, well-being is not linked to inner peace or contentment, but must be found through activity, participation, having and making choices, and taking control. Thus the policy concern with well-being is explicitly linked to the aim of mobilising individuals so that their daily lives can be socially and economically productive in retirement and old age.

Ward and colleagues (2012) highlight the specific impact this may have on older people, arguing that basing policy strategies upon a relation of well-being with independence, activity and participation may lead to the severe neglect of care and caring relationships — an aspect their research found to be of prime importance for well-being in their older participants. They argue:

> definitions that emphasise physical health, people’s capacity to plan and set goals, and to be active within their communities, may exclude from any hope of being well those people for whom old age is accompanied by illness, a reduction in physical horizons because of mobility problems and who, because of advanced old age, are focused on being well in the present rather than planning for the future.

(Ward et al., 2012, p.8)

Rather than promoting the well-being of older people then, the policy strategies aimed towards well-being examined here, based as they are upon market conceptualisations of productivity and potential, instead act to hinder the possibility for at least a significant section of older people to be and live well. This is compounded by the severe neglect of relational and collective aspects of well-being, where meaningful

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69 Alongside informal carer relations, Ward et al. (2012) include human interaction as a potentially significant care relationship, such as face to face contact and friendships.
interaction is understood not primarily within a framework of ‘care’ but conversely as a form of active citizenship.

**Individuality**

The NSF begins by criticising the rigidity within which health and social care has previously been constrained:

> In the NHS, the one-size fits all world of the post war years has survived for too long.

*(NSF, p.2)*

The issue with a ‘one-size fits all’ approach to care is that it is at odds with the diversity thought to be inherent to individuals. In recognition of this the evidence presented in OA Volume 2:

> challenges the stereotyping of older people as a homogenous group, with uniform needs and aspirations

*(OA vol.2, p.3)*

It therefore focuses on diversity even within a social group (originally constructed around an assumed similarity): individuals both need different things, and want different things. In sum:

> Each of us is unique

*(ICR, p.12)*
This focus on uniqueness inevitably emphasises how individuals differ from each other, suggesting no need, solution, or way of life can be replicated.

The emphasis on individual diversity expressed within these polices, asserts that difference is not only a reality, but also a value. It is not just that each individual is different to every other, but that these differences are intrinsic to what make up the individual – the defining points of a self. Social care support services must respect and promote this individual diversity. Personalised services – those tailored to individual needs – therefore become paramount as:

“Personalised care and support is the key to upholding an individual’s human rights.”

(Stakeholder response to the Consultation, BNCS, p.145)

Understanding difference as a value society ought to cherish has caused the prioritisation of difference to become commonplace in social theory and social policy, highlighted by the prevalence of identity politics, and associated rights based discourses. Webb (2009) argues that the neo-liberal celebration of difference and diversity has transferred across to social work as a ‘right to difference’, indicating that the aim of social care support and services is to promote and enable difference, to the detriment of recognising and utilising sameness – something he asserts is vital for sustained social justice and political change. For Badiou (2001) this emphasis on difference is both shallow and dishonest, as only differences that conform to a certain identity are actually tolerated. He uses the example that immigrants only become acceptable within society to the extent that they seek integration to demonstrate this, concluding: ‘(which seems to mean, if you think about it: [they are tolerated] only if they want to suppress their difference)’ (Badiou, 2001, p.24). Despite valuing diversity, this suppression of difference can be demonstrated in the policies, where the diversity
of individual needs and aspirations is emphasised and valued only insofar as they are useful for encouraging the self to conform to a particular identity which, as has been argued, is characterised by the necessity to be both constantly active and independent. For example, whilst recognising in principle the ‘right’ of an individual to choose ‘unwisely’ (ICR, p.21), in practice it appears this choice would not be supported:

whilst the individual is entitled to live with a degree of risk, the local authority is not obliged to fund it.

(ICR, p.22)

Therefore whilst later life is presented as unlimited lifestyle options, for those who need assistance at least, the choices are severely constrained by structural conditions such as eligibility criteria and funding priorities, designed and constructed around specific value systems and political agendas. Thus an individual’s lifestyle choice is tolerated to the extent that it matches the identities and legitimate lifestyles already set out within these.

The ‘right to difference’ is promoted in the policies via the extension of choice, and putting service users back in control of the services they use. The ‘right to difference’ therefore translates into a ‘right to choose’ coupled with personal responsibility for your own life course: choice and control are vital to the ‘individual’:

Personalisation means that systems and those working within them treat each person as an individual; choice and control are critical elements in moving towards more personalisation in health and social care.

(ICR, p.18)
Ferguson (2007) claims that the personalisation agenda is based upon a flawed conception of those who most use social care services. He notes that the most commonly shared characteristic of social work service users is poverty, continuing that the combination of poverty with multiple discrimination, lack of (financial and social) resources, and often mental and/or physical impairment means that the typical user of social care services is not best thought of as a choosing individual shaping their own life. By contrast the choices open to them will often be of an extremely limited nature.

The limit of choice, however, marks the limit of our individuality by constraining our ability to act upon ourselves, to carve out our own lifestyle, and so to be self-determining. The issue of whether every person wants this choice and control is raised to some degree:

‘You can give people control of it and you can also give people the right to control how much control they have over it. That might seem a funny point, but it is also important. People do not always want complete control but they want some control’

(Quote in SFC, p.39)

Yet whilst there is some recognition that not all individuals want control over all aspects of their life, it is clear that being in control is the desired state and should be aimed for:

People should be in control of their own care and support as far as possible.

(SFC, p.48)
Thus choice is positioned as a value (OA, p.iv), and maximum control over one’s own life is desired, creating an expectation of active independence. Whilst it is acknowledged that not everyone will want full control, this is presented as less than ideal. However it is also still described as a form of control: being able to choose the extent to which you are in control of your life is itself an exercise of self-determination and as such an expression of your individuality.

Personalisation and person-centred care have taken centre stage in the policies as a way of fulfilling the diversity of needs, as well as treating individuals as the responsible, self-determining subjects they ought to be. Individual budgets play a key role in this:

older people are still often treated as passive recipients rather than active consumers with their own views about their needs. Our purpose in the next years must be to transform that picture . . . That is why I particularly welcome the proposals here for individual care budgets. This shows how services can extend to some of the most vulnerable the benefits of choice and control over their own lives that the rest of us take for granted.

(OA, p.iv-v)

The value of individual budgets lies in the provision of the greater choice they are claimed to enable, and the central position they place the individual. It has also been asserted they are both more economical and effective at meeting needs than traditional services (Glasby et al, 2009), however ‘need’ is here being understood as something that is self-evident rather than itself an issue of contestation. The focus of the proposed National Care Service, alongside the aim of providing free social care, is to create a:
system [that] is personalised and flexible enough to support people to live their lives the way they want to. . . [where] needs are supported through personal budgets and services and support in line with the principles behind the right to control.

(SFC, p.100)

Who decides upon what these needs are in the first place is not discussed (although as disclosed in ICR, local authorities decide what ‘needs’ will be eligible for funding), neither is it recognised in the policies that there could be disagreement over what an individual might ‘need’. However, it is the ability to be, and remain, in control of one’s life that is focused upon as the main problem, and is attended to by the various policy strategies. Thus, personalisation:

extends beyond being offered a tailored package of care. It means shifting control to the individual and enabling them to identify how needs will be met.

(BNCS, p.91)

Whilst individual budgets are valued because of the flexibility they allow, and the opportunity to tailor care to the diversity of individual needs, at the same time assessments, eligibility criteria and funding levels become standardised in a universal system. The standardised single assessment process is expected to be able to discover the whole range of needs that might be encountered (NSF, p.30). Beyond this it is claimed that care reforms will develop a universal system:

which empowers people to live their lives the way they want to.
This implies the policy strategy of standardisation will both promote and enable a diversity of lifestyles rather than constrain and homogenise. There appears therefore to be a tension between the particularisation and diversity required to cater for individual needs, and the standardisation deemed necessary to create a system seen to be fair, as well as providing or imposing standards and ways of measuring need and success. This tension is noted in BNCS:

There were concerns that a standard assessment risked pigeonholing people’s needs, and might conflict with the moves to personalisation of services.

(BNCS, p.59)

However this concern is not resolved or discussed further. The contradictory coexistence of standardisation and universal services with personalisation demonstrates the complexity with which the self must understand itself and others: as unique, solitary, and related to others only via points of difference; yet simultaneously through spaces of normalisation – knowing what categories and groups one can be assigned to, and how one measures up in relation to others. Once again, whilst choice and control are presented as paramount to the individual and their lifestyle, this choice and control must exist within the parameters of already existent categories and definitions of self and lifestyle.

Despite the constant reference to the ‘individual’ in the policy texts, what an individual is, and to what extent this term can be used as a way of understanding the self needs to be questioned. Discussing Deleuze’s concept of the ‘dividual’, Bogard (2008) describes the individual subject as the product of the Modern era: encompassing the associated liberal notions of rights and duties. Explaining Deleuze’s
(1995) description of individuals being produced via a ‘mold’, Bogard (2008) highlights the inappropriateness of the static and contained form of the individual for the contemporary demands on the self. The notion of the individual in particular refers to a self that is both authentic and irreducible (Williams, 2005) – as has been demonstrated with the emphasis on uniqueness in the policies. Deleuze (1995) questions this however with his concept of the dividual: the self of the control society that is endlessly reducible and continually modulating. Bogard (2008) distinguishes the two:

The dividual is a more flexible form; it is programmable, updatable, rewritable, and renewable. Individuals are ‘molded’ or fixed forms (persons, human beings, or corpses), but dividuals are settings within adjustable parameters, that is, within numerical characteristics of a population, like credit scores or risk ratings.

(p.197)

Bogard (2008) clarifies that when we see a human being, we still ‘see’ an individual: a unique self-determining subject, characterised by liberal notions of human rights and social duties. We see a dividual when that same subject becomes understood within networks of information: sequences of numbers or letters (as when a self becomes a chain of DNA information), or through various profiles (risk assessments for example). In this sense the person is not an individual, unique and distinguishable from all others, but information plotted out within wider parameters, understood and assessed in relation to others, and because of this required to constantly transmute. The proposed standardisation of assessment and eligibility provides an example of this:

In the future, we propose that everyone will be assessed in the same way.

(SFC, p.54)
Hence, rather than finding ways to understand the uniqueness of each individual, a standard assessment will ensure that the same information is routinely collected; information that can be broken down, fragmented, used to create risk profiles, categorise areas of high need et cetera. Through this the individual becomes lost, and in its place appears a mass of information that can be used and reused in a variety of ways to understand and judge not only the ‘individual’ it was collected from but also others. Deleuze (1995) claims through this that there is no longer a duality of individual and mass: only individuals and data, where separateness becomes less apparent. For example:

Dividuation does not separate you from other individuals (like, e.g., the dividing walls of the prison, the school, or the office), but from other points along the parameter, and from other parameters that comprise your multiple connections to distributed networks (your health information, voting records, web surfing habits and so on).

(Bogard, 2008, p.197)

Dividuals are separated from others only in the same way as they are separated from past and future selves. Thus whilst we are expected to behave as individuals by acting as if we are the creators of our futures, individuals become governable via dividuation: through being reduced to information and data that can be used both to plot a person within certain parameters as well as used to create these parameters to begin with. Thus nothing authentic or irreducible remains.

**Conclusion**

Through this analysis of the techniques of governmentality it has been argued that whilst reflecting contemporary notions of a reflexive self, this flexibility assumed by the self in the policies marks the parameters within which the individual is expected to make sense of and manage her or his life. Therefore alongside the responsibilizing anxiety created by the prospect of unlimited choice regarding how it is possible for us to live our lives, the expectation that we can all rationally discover our optimal path provides the constraints within which these choices must be made. This focus on the
individual, and the need to recognise, respect and enable diversity, appears to stand in stark contrast to the forms of knowledge presented in the policy texts regarding how people are known, and what is important to know about them: primarily as points plotted within collective data, of which sense can be made only by its relation to other points. As has been suggested, dividuation perhaps provides a more suitable concept for understanding the subject within these governmental techniques, and makes more sense of how individuality and standardisation have been paradoxically brought together in the policies. The focus on the individual as a singular and linear unit then, reveals its function of making the individual life responsible for the collective security, albeit within the context of utilising collective knowledge of the population. Furthermore this responsibility must present itself through the future-orientated behaviours only possible within this conception of the self as singular and linear. The following chapter will further explore this responsibilization specifically through the requirement to navigate and balance personal risk-avoidance and risk-taking.
Chapter 6

Risk Rationalities and Responsible Decision Makers

Introduction

Risk rationalities have become commonplace in the structure and formation of social policy. Two rationalities of risk can be identified within these policies which situate problems and present solutions that are at times in tension with each other. Firstly, risk understood within a rationality of preparation through which strategies and technologies of future orientated behaviour emerge, including forms of prevention and insurance; and secondly a rationality of opportunity and productivity, where decision-making within an uncertain world becomes strategized as key to a successful future. Constructing social and personal problems (and their solutions) within these risk rationalities has the result that they focus on and contain specific features: indicating what is to be sought after (valued), what is in need of change (problematic), and what type of subject is required to achieve this. This chapter attempts to analyse how apparatuses of risk within the policies map out a specific terrain within which individuals are required to monitor and manage their lives in relation to ageing. Specifically this involves paying particular attention to future events with the aim of minimising risks, thereby avoiding the problems associated with developing needs (such as dependency for example). It is shown how this impacts upon the ageing subject, which becomes responsibilized by the ubiquitous problem of exclusion and the assumption that individuals are rational decision makers. Yet despite the culture of risk avoidance and aversion, risk taking is expected of individual subjects through the requirement to show independence in decision making and seize opportunities. As will be shown, this creates a tension between the requirement for the individual to be a sovereign decision-maker, yet to simultaneously make choices within the already existent parameters of this risk apparatus.

Exclusion
The problem of ageing is presented in these policies as primarily an increased risk of social exclusion. The concepts of social exclusion and inclusion are firmly entrenched in both British and European government policy (Levitas, 2006). Yet ‘social exclusion’ has been used to present perceived problems of society, and suitable policy solutions, in multiple ways, indicating that a reference to social inclusion or exclusion alone does not reveal the content or direction of the policy. Levitas (1998), for example, outlines three discourses that, briefly, are concerned with: i) redistribution, primarily concerned with poverty; ii) the moral underclass, centred on the moral and behavioural delinquency of the excluded; iii) social integration, focused on paid work as the route to inclusion. Social exclusion is therefore described as an individual experience, it is an individualized risk associated with identity and personal lifestyle. Social stability and security become threatened by this social exclusion of the individual however, due to the burden of increasing and on-going need:

Avoidable illness matters to individuals and their families but it also matters to society and the economy. We all bear the costs of days lost at work and expenditure on avoidable care.

(SS, p.18)

(OHOCOS, p.31)

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Levitas (1998) argues that New Labour policy features a mix of the second and third social exclusion discourses: redistribution from rich to poor has been abandoned as a way of tackling poverty in New Labour policy, with the focus instead centred on increasing employability (rather than jobs) by tackling problem behaviours and lifestyles.
Once the social consequences of individual lives have been established, the full threat to social order becomes apparent: analysis undertaken to measure the extent of exclusion experienced by older people took account of seven dimensions (all relating to ‘good life quality’) including: social relationships; participation in both cultural and civic activities; having access to basic services (shops, health services); feeling safe in your neighbourhood; having a bank account and savings; and being able to afford household utilities and an annual holiday (SS, p.18). Using this framework 49% of older people are thought to be experiencing exclusion on at least one dimension (SS, p.19). This signals the breadth of this threat, calling for us all to be vigilant as the risk becomes located in our own lives, rather than contained externally in others. This definition of social exclusion concurrently brings personal relations, such as friendships, and seemingly trivial lifestyle choices, such as attending the cinema, to take on a social and political importance related to the collective security of the population.

Several risk discourses can therefore be identified that focus on two interrelated consequences: the personal repercussions of exclusion and dependence on the individual’s quality of life, countered by specific strategies to combat this; and risk understood and tackled collectively through knowledge of populations and the rhetoric of shared responsibility. In light of these tensions three broad strategies of management can be identified within the chosen policy texts that encompass both individual and collective responses to risk: (i) a focus on prevention; (ii) the need for increased information and effective communication; and (iii) the importance of choice within an expanded market. These strategies target a subject expected to navigate the risks identified within the policies through both responsible self-management and a sense of social obligation or duty.

**Prevention**

Contrasting with influential theories that claim fear and anxiety, caused by an increase in actual or perceived risks, dominate our lives (Beck, 1992; Furedi, 2002), there is evidence to suggest that reaction, to some risks at least, is better characterised by apathy. Hood and colleagues (2001) demonstrate and endeavour to explain the
surprising lack of regulation, and apparent public concern, for various risks, and the
over regulation of others. A general lack of concern was also found in a qualitative
study conducted by Hawkes and colleagues (2009) that focused on risk and worry in
everyday life. They (2009) found that a prominent category to emerge from the
analysis was the lack of worry reported, that ‘Participants were often keen to stress
that they were not the worrying kind’ (p.218), and ‘that the media ‘tried’ to make
them worry about certain topics, but that they did not succumb to this’ (p.218). This
apparent lack of concern in relation to certain sorts of risk may explain the effort
within the policies to depict exclusion as a personal and social problem. The aim of the
policy strategies is to motivate and mobilise individuals into action. It has already been
demonstrated (in Chapter 4), that risk avoidance in old age does not and should not
involve avoidance (to participate) or inactivity – as would be the apathetic response,
but instead requires being active: actively preparing. An older person should not, for
example, stay at home to avoid falls, but actively prepare for the eventuality by
remaining fit, adapting the domestic environment, and so on. A plethora of
safeguarding techniques already exist that aim to protect individuals from the
traditional burdens of old age, enabling them to continue to enjoy life and contribute
to the state’s prosperity. The need to motivate and convince individuals to act is
demonstrated through presented evidence of a general lack of preventative behaviour,
which therefore increases the risk of future exclusion:

**FACT 1**: 7 million people are estimated to be under-saving for
retirement – this means they will not be able to fund their aspirations
or, in the most extreme cases, may find themselves living in poverty in
retirement.

**FACT 2**: Only 17 per cent of men and 13 per cent of women between
the ages of 65 and 74 meet the Chief Medical Officer’s
recommendations for physical activity of 30 minutes on five or more

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71 This research used diary entries and unstructured interviews to determine what the main worries and
perceived risks in the participants’ lives were, as well as the extent to which participants thought about/
worried about these risks (Hawkes et al, 2009).
days a week. Yet people who are physically active reduce their risk of developing major chronic disease by up to 50 per cent and the risk of premature death by between 20 and 30 per cent.

(BSFA, p.17)

This is an appeal to be concerned about the future, to worry about its effect on your personal lifestyle, to recognise the gravity of the potential risk. The strategies suggested are based on a conception of old age as a period of life that needs planning if it is to be successful, thus the problem of exclusion is the result of a personal failure to prepare. It is therefore implied that exclusion is not due to a lack of welfare or social concern for individuals, but is rather an individual failure to prepare for and suitably manage their own life.

Preventative services

There is a clear focus on preventative services in the policies, directly linked to the problems arising from the ageing population:

We must set out a new direction for health and social care services to meet the future demographic challenges we face. We must reorientate our health and social care services to focus together on prevention and health promotion.

(OHOCOS, p.9)

Despite the root problem being old age, the risks of ageing are presented as a concern to us all requiring the involvement of the whole of health and social care:

a key principle is that issues relating to older people need to be:
• Embedded in the normal planning and management structures of local agencies – older people’s issues should not be ghettoised in separate ‘older people’s departments’ or in social services

(OA, p.70)

Similarly, it appears that it is never too early to prepare for old age as even actions in utero are presented as important for successful ageing:

Prevention begins by building good health and a healthy lifestyle from the beginning of an individual’s life. We are strengthening the provision of antenatal, postnatal and health and early years services, including through our proposals for the new NHS ‘Life Check’.

(OHOCOS, p.46)

Thus it is never too soon for an individual to be concerned about the impact of their current lifestyle on their ability to manage old age. As discussed in Chapter 4, this demonstrates how old age is treated as a specific category when relating to the lifestyles of older individuals and the challenges it raises for social welfare, yet its solution involves the dispersion of the problems of ageing throughout all life stages and all public services. Due to this, antenatal services and early years education become important elements in managing the risks of old age and an ageing population.

One specific aim of preventative services is to stop need, and so the threat of exclusion, from developing in the first place:
We will do more to stop people developing care and support needs in the first place. We will also help to prevent people’s condition getting worse once they have a care and support need.

(SFC, p.50)

Most illnesses are avoidable.

(OHOCOS, p.16)

‘Need’ is presented here as both undesirable and unnecessary. It is claimed that it is possible to stop physical needs from developing, with the implication that not requiring help or support from others is a normal, achievable and desirable state. Furthermore, by targeting members of the population before a ‘need’ has even developed means everyone can be subjected to interventions and risk management technologies, for example mid-life health checks, accessible online self-assessments, participation in community activities, and universal services to support good health and well-being in the general population (BNCS). Problematizing need results in a problematization of dependency. Culpitt (1999, p.148) argues that neo-liberal welfare discourse constantly portray welfare negatively by warning against the dangers of dependency, and claims this is played out through discourses of risk reduction and social exclusion amongst others. In relation to social exclusion Culpitt (1999) highlights the subjectification of social problems, through their location in the self: ‘Dependency . . . is related not only to poverty, youth, ill-health etc. but to the ‘problem’ of having poverty, youth and ill-health as an expression of the self’ (p.149). It is not the need-in-itself which is focused upon but how this need becomes manifest as an individual feature of the person, for example:

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72 These are services designed for people who do not have the level of ‘need’ that would enable them to access the proposed National Care Service. Their scope is wide including employment, care and support, health, housing, volunteering, education and leisure and are aimed at the ‘general population’ (BNCS, p.78).
Poor health can have a major impact on well-being and the ability to remain independent. However, there is evidence to suggest that older people only feel that their independence has been compromised if their ability to exercise control and choice over their daily living is lost.

(SS, p.40)

Here the issue is not presented as the ill health, but how ill health impacts upon the character of an individual, affecting both their relationship to society, and their capacity to independently control their daily lives, it is therefore not the ill health that becomes the focus and target of risk reduction strategies, but the individual regarding how they manage their ill health. Fraser and Gordon (1994), through their genealogy of dependency, demonstrate that various forms of dependency were at one time an acceptable way of ensuring proper hierarchical subordination. However, in what they term post-industrial use, all forms of adult dependency are to be avoided as it has become symptomatic not of a person’s economical standing or socio-legal status, but of their moral or psychological strength: ‘dependency in this sense is an individual character trait like lack of will power or excessive emotional neediness’ (p. 312). Despite illness and physical infirmity being ordinary and everyday occurrences, the need for support is associated with a flawed character. The policy focus on the prevention of needs therefore acts to responsibilize and moralise the individual, hence strategies focus not on state interventions but lifestyle management.

Preventative lifestyles

People are responsible for taking good care of themselves throughout their lives, and for knowing when to ask for extra help.

(SFC, p.82)
Taking care of yourself, and knowing when help is needed to retain a suitable level of independence requires knowledge: knowing what signs to watch for, being aware of what needs will require support to stop them spiralling. To aid this, many policy initiatives centre on the production of self-knowledge in order to enhance successful self-care:

To help people take control over their health and the steps they need to take to improve it we are currently piloting the NHS Mid-life LifeCheck. This is an online health and lifestyle assessment for people aged 45-60 focusing on factors including smoking, healthy eating, alcohol use, physical activity and emotional well-being.

(BSFA, p.19)

Access to interactive online tools will enable individuals to enter information about themselves and allow them to review their options . . . about retirement.

(BSFA, p.20)

Self-knowledge is paramount to successful preparations for later life. Situated knowledge of the individual is required to determine possible futures and discover suitable life strategies for avoiding undesirable futures, and as an individual’s health or future security can never be assured this requires a continual habit of ‘watching’ to respond to personal and environmental changes (Greco, 1993). This knowledge needs to be actively created, however knowledge of the self is not gained through a process of inner contemplation, but is instead found in demographic information – do they belong to any ‘at risk’ groups?; and specialist knowledge – medical categories or diagnoses, financial options and so on. Self-knowledge is not, therefore, simply knowledge of the self, but knowledge of where the self is positioned within a network
of collective and collected self-knowledges. Knowledge of others is then essential for preventing a later life of exclusion, or alternatively, knowledge of the self must at the same time be knowledge of the collective.

The importance and value of demographic knowledge of a population is demonstrated through measuring the success of healthy lifestyle promotion in terms of the proportion of the population that take up ‘flu vaccinations, or are screened for breast cancer (OA, p.56) for example. Alongside showing the proportion of a population vaccinated against ‘flu, this demographic information more importantly evidences to the extent to which individuals are active in their own self-care – itself a preventative factor:

Key to this project is the notion that older people’s active citizenship is a form of prevention in itself.

(SS, p.33)

Self-care therefore necessitates social activity focused on an individual responsibility for current and future lifestyles, both requiring the active collection of self-knowledge. The development of a health or social care need will always, therefore, be tainted with a suspicion of a lack of adequate effort or motivational ability:

If the regulation of lifestyle, the modification of risky behaviour and the transformation of unhealthy attitudes prove impossible through sheer strength of the will, this constitutes, at least in part, a failure of the self to take care of itself – a form of irrationality, or simply a lack of skilfulness.

(Greco, 1993, p.361)

Due to this Greco (1993) links the individual ‘duty to be well’, with the necessity of self-mastery for good health. Good health requires control of the self: ill health is
problematized not for the physical incapacity it may bring, but the decline in independence that it signifies.

**Information and Advice**

Self-knowledge and self-care, essential for successful life management, require input from public services as a point of contact for information and advice. The accepted and expected role for government, as discussed in Chapter 2, as a body that administers and manages the population, steering rather than rowing, focuses on the production and distribution of information, support and advice. The aim to govern the population through information and advice giving implies the assumption of a particular type of subject: specifically the rational or prudential actor (Kemshall, 2010), which becomes responsible for the management of risk (or lack of it) via rational decision making.

**Accessible information**

The risks of ageing are presented as having their origins in a lack of knowledge:

> Many people currently do not prepare well because they underestimate how long they will live or do not know how to access the right information and advice.

*(BSFA, p.17)*

This deficit model suggests that ignorance and flawed calculations are the cause of insufficient preparations, coupled with an inability to access the information and advice to correct this. This implies that with the correct knowledge of the self, and some guidance in collecting and understanding this, individuals will make satisfactory preparations for later life and so avert the risk of exclusion. The individual is therefore

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73 As discussed in Chapter 2, Dean (2007) argues that individuals and populations are also governed by authoritative and coercive forms of power dependent on the status they hold and what the situation is. For the government of everyday life management however, as is the focus of the policies being analysed, a governmental approach based on ‘governing from a distance’ dominates.
treated as a rational actor by policy makers, thought to be driven by personal and individualised preferences (Taylor-Gooby, 2008). Arising from this, the logical role for central government is to provide accessible information and support on risk assessment and management, to enable individuals to effectively manage themselves by striving towards their personal aspirations. It is made clear in the policies that this is what individuals expect, and so is in keeping with how the population wants to be governed:

People want to keep themselves well, and take control of their own health. This came through clearly in our consultation. People asked for more help to do this, through better information, advice and support.

(OHOCOS, p.31)

‘Many of us are trying to muddle through the system without any help or guidance’

National Pensioners Convention, response to the engagement process

(SFC, p.43)

Justifying strategies and interventions as manifestations of a collective consensus, and treating the targets of the strategies as independent rational citizens, unites governmental discursive strategies with public desires. This retains the ideal of the subject as an independent sovereign of her or his future whilst setting the parameters within which these futures will develop. The key to ‘good’ and acceptable governance then is to set the boundaries within which individuals can get on with it themselves:
Public bodies can and should do more to support individuals and give everyone an equal chance to become and stay healthy, active and independent.

(OHOCOS, p.25)

‘We are not here to dictate to people about their lifestyle, just to give them information on other options and advice’

(Case study, OHOCOS, p.37)

The provision of information and advice therefore become key governmental strategies, essential for individuals to age successfully. As well as being one of the six key aspects of the proposed National Care Service (SFC, p.47), strategies based on information and advice form the basis of many policy initiatives including the proposal of an ‘information prescription’ for those with long-term needs:

- to signpost people to further information and advice to help them take care of their own condition.

(OHOCOS, p.114);

the development of an interactive ‘one stop shop’ to help those in mid-life to plan ahead (BSFA, p.8), and an ‘Active at 60’ package – an initiative to use smart card technology to bring together access to various services and entitlements (Mowlam et al., 2012), aimed at:

[providing] people approaching their 60th birthdays with information about their entitlements and opportunities such as the free swimming initiative launched this year.
These strategies demonstrate the many opportunities already available to enable successful preparations for later life, whatever their current life stage or personal circumstance. Any failure to do so must therefore be an individual failure to grasp these opportunities.

Petersen (1999) notes that ignorance is often seen by experts as a deficit in need of correcting by more and better information, continuing, ‘There has been little apparent recognition of the fact that public ignorance is actively constructed and few efforts to understand what lay people’s apparent ignorance might reveal about their relationship to science’ (p. 135). Similarly, Giddens (1991) suggests that modern forms of expertise are understood as a combination of specialisation and training, meaning that expertise is thought to be available to everyone with the time and resources to attain it. Ignorance due to inaccessible information is therefore unnecessary and a major obstacle to self-management, hence policy initiatives focus on the development of easy and simplified access to information and services (OA, p.59; SFC, p.10), making it both convenient to access and understandable to everyone. By connecting the need to be informed with an individual’s ability to manage themself, the onus is on the individual to take part in this pathway of knowledge. Rather than being looked after, or having their needs managed by someone else, those who make the effort to be informed become partners in their care, and experts of themselves:

People who need services are often the experts in their own care

(SFC, p.9)

Furthermore, not only will knowledge of her or himself aid an individual’s own self-management, it will also enable others to better understand and care for themselves:
The Expert Patients Programme (EPP) provides training for people with a chronic condition to develop the skills they need to take effective control of their lives. Training is led by people who have personal experience of living with a long-term illness.

(OHOCOS, p.112)

Understanding service users as having, or ideally attaining, expertise of their needs changes the relationship they have with services and workers:

Care workers will need to work with people as expert partners, to help them achieve what they want to achieve.

(SFC, p.74)

The aim then, is for individuals to become ‘partners’ in the management of their needs through gaining expert knowledge of their individual circumstances and using this information to plot a path to the attainment of the/their desired future. However, a problem noted by Petersen (1999) is that, ‘What empirical evidence exists suggests that there is likely to be a significant mismatch between expected rational practices of the self and subjects’ participation in preventative behaviours’ (p.139).

Knowledge production

Alongside accessibility, a specific duty of government is the production of the information needed for self-management. Information needs to be produced in order to know what services and resources are needed, and how they need to be targeted:
There is . . . clear evidence that simply offering routine physical checks, such as cholesterol testing, to everyone in the population is not an effective way of identifying people at risk of disease and ill-health.

(OHOCOS, p.31)

Instead:

The best way of empowering people to take charge of their own health and well-being is to focus on the major risk factors that may affect their health

(OHOCOS, p.31)

Knowledge of the self here relies upon the assessment of individual ‘risk factors’ and categorising the individual accordingly. Through this self-knowledge becomes directly linked to specific knowledge of the population. In an attempt to highlight the diversity of risk rationalities and the logics on which they are based, Dean (2010) describes ‘epidemiological risk’ as that concerned with rates of morbidity and mortality across a population. Based on a preventative ethos, this specific risk rationality acts to screen and observe population characteristics in order for individuals to better screen and observe themselves. In this way the generalised risk of ageing can be personalised and made specific so that each individual can target their own weaknesses, lifestyles can be tailored to personal needs, and interventions can be targeted to ensure maximum benefit.

The mapping and targeting of populations is suggested as a current example of good governance. This information is claimed to be necessary for highlighting gaps in service provision, alongside, and perhaps more importantly, identifying groups who are not so effective at managing their own needs:
The Director of Adult Social Services and the Director of Public Health will carry out regular needs assessments of their local population. This will ensure that PCTs and local authorities have a better understanding of their local populations and the challenges they face in tackling health inequalities. They should already be mapping and targeting at-risk populations as part of their community strategies (OHOCOS, p.166).

Mapping an ‘at-risk population’ gives it a physical and objective reality – it makes the assumption the population already exists; the job of local government is to locate it so that it can be made subject to the appropriate services and interventions. The job of the expert then, is to describe the size and shape of this population, and through this identify which individuals belong to it: that is, to identify which individuals are falling short of effective self-government (Rose, 1999b).

When the aim of risk management is to prevent ‘unwanted’ futures, the techniques used aim to turn generalised demographic knowledge into personalised risk factors, with the intention that individuals will act in their own best interest. However, there are situations where a broad knowledge of population characteristics is not seen as helpful to their prevention:

**Funding options**

Our care and support needs in life and old age are inherently uncertain. Two in three women and one in two men will develop high care needs during their retirement. But some people will need no care and support at all.

(SFC, p.14)
Here, rather than being used to map and target, knowledge of the development of needs across the population only highlights the uncertainty and unpredictability of the situation - *some* individuals will be affected, but we cannot know who:

> At the moment . . . although there are risk factors which can make it more likely that someone may need some care later in life, there is no way of knowing whether a particular person will need care at all, or how much it might cost.

*(SFC, p.98)*

The aim here is not to prevent, but to encourage all members of the population to accept equal responsibility for the social and economic impact of these needs, through the inherent uncertainty of their own personal future. This emphasis on unknowable futures rationalises practices aimed at spreading the burden of the risk, making sense of managing the economic risks of an ageing population through social insurance schemes for example *(SFC, Chapters 5-6).* According to Ewald (1991) insurance posits risk as collective: it functions by socializing risk, thereby making each person part of the whole. This requires a further level of preparation on the part of the individual as Ewald (1991) elaborates:

> To provide for the future does not just mean not living from day to day and arming oneself against ill fortune, but also mathematizing one’s commitments. Above all, it means no longer resigning oneself to the decrees of providence and the blows of fate, but instead transforming one’s relationships with nature, the world and God so that, even in misfortune, one retains responsibility for one’s affairs by possessing the means to repair its effects.

*(p.207)*
Whilst the focus on unknowable futures appears to be in contradiction with an understanding of risk as manageable through preparation and increased knowledge, both of these rationalities of risk rely on responsibilizing the individual for managing and preparing for the future. Whether risk is knowable and can be planned for, or uncertain and so requiring some form of insurance as protection, successful ageing and the security of the collective are presented primarily as dependent upon an individual’s ability to create for themselves a future characterised by independence (physical, emotional and financial) and activity.

Despite the requirement for individuals to be aware of any risk factors that may inhibit them from ageing successfully, it is not up to individuals to determine what these factors are. Individuals are encouraged to take responsibility for managing, and even assessing risk, but not to decide what constitutes a risk. In ICR individual perception of risk is spoken of as a hindrance to actual knowledge of risk, therefore:

\[
\text{a perceived risk needs to be tested and assessed to see if it is real.}
\]

(ICR, p.9)

Here a two-fold conception of risk is revealed: perception of risk ‘which may or may not be real’ (ICR, p.10), and real risk – that which has been assessed. An individual’s knowledge of what risks, if any, are relevant to them is therefore necessarily dependent on expert knowledge and guidance. Even self-assessments require that the individual self-diagnose against a set of already determined risk criteria and categories. Slovic (1999) highlights how risk has tended to be dichotomised: where experts are thought to be dealing with real risks – objective and rational, and the public as relying on perceptions of risk – distorted by the influence of emotion. He endeavours to demonstrate the complex and judgemental nature of expert risk measures and assessments, for example by listing nine different ways that mortality risks are often expressed dependent on who the information is being produced for, and for what purpose. Whilst maintaining that there does indeed seem to be a difference in the way
experts and the public understand and assess risk, the former understanding risk as synonymous with probability of harm and the latter with more qualitative information and uncertainty, Slovic (1999) dismantles the suggestion that one understanding is more neutral or ‘reliable’ than the other, rather both versions are constructed around what is thought to be relevant and useful within the context of the situation.

By considering risk as real only when it has been assessed, what is shown to be important is some form of consensus to agreed norms and standards. Hence the individual is not to be left alone to assess, diagnose, and act on his or her own needs, but must do this only within the nexus of already existing knowledge and consensual understanding. This points to the continual tension of the need for the ‘expert other’ by individuals tasked to be masters of their own future (O’Malley, 2000).

**Supported decision making**

The practice of supported decision making aims to stabilize this tension through making expert input the foundation upon which individuals can take control of their situation:

Individuals need information, signposting and support, so that they can take control and make informed choices about their care and treatment.

(OHOCOS, p.111-112)

This suggests the ability to make advantageous decisions is only possible through the consumption of expert knowledge and guidance. The individual is in control of her or his future not by looking only to her or himself for guidance on how to navigate the future, but conversely by seizing the opportunities made available in the form of information of services, activities and entitlements; knowledge of risk factors and their individual application via assessment and diagnosis; and tailored support and guidance to make sense of these risks in relation to a specific life.
Within this there is a clear link between information and good decision making:

Empowerment can be achieved through the simplest approaches such as providing the information to make good decisions

(SS, p.30)

Good, clear information to help people make informed choices . . . will ensure the best possible outcomes.

(ICR, p.21)

The necessity of information for decision making, as implied above, reflects the idea that individuals make decisions based on an assessment of the consequences of possible alternatives (Loewenstein et al, 2001), suggesting that decision making is both a rational and cognitive activity. This assumption has been challenged by some psychological research that claims not only is decision making an emotive activity, but too much information can actually hinder an individual’s ability to make ‘good’ decisions (Finucane and Holup, 2006). Damasio (1996) studied the impaired decision making skills of brain damaged patients whose ability to experience emotions had been affected, whilst their cognitive faculties remained intact. He demonstrated that in contrast to decision making as a rational cost-benefit analysis, emotions and feelings are enmeshed in the networks of human reasoning and are therefore a necessary component of good decision making. Furthermore, research by Loewenstein and colleagues (2001) suggests that decisions are not made by considering anticipated or possible future emotions, but through the experience of the immediate emotions at the moment of decision making. Through this they claim that decisions are not based on a consequential analysis but on ‘gut feelings’, and suggest this explains why reactions to risk often depart from what would be considered as the ‘best course of action’. What a policy strategy based around the provision of information fails to take
into account therefore, is the situated response of the individual to a standardised service, and the complexity of influences in decision making. Echoing this, Kemshall (2010) argues that policy makers have a tendency to work from a normative and instrumental view of risk rationality whereas practitioners operate from a situated rationality. With the role of government as responsible for providing equal opportunity through accessible information, and the individual’s responsibility to utilise this effectively to ensure good decision making, bad decisions will signify either the need to generate more information or the irrationality of the individual – assuming them to be unable or unwilling to correctly weigh up the benefits. Thus whilst the rational-consequential perspective does not work hard to understand situational decision making, it does provide an effective framework through which the individual is responsibilized by making their actions a direct consequence of their (deliberative) will. The value of self-determination is therefore made clear.

Miller (2009), discussing the influence of modernist assumptions that underpin various risk rationalities in organizational risk research, points out the priority given to decisions over actions, arguing the logic that decisions cause actions neglects the impact practices may have on risk and responses to risk. This priority of cognition over action is demonstrated within the policies in terms of how the relationship between decision making and risk taking is presented:

It is . . . for the older person to determine the level of personal risk they are prepared to take when making decisions about their own health and circumstances.

(NSF, p.27)

Levels of risk are perceptions, and a judgement about an acceptable level of risk should be a joint decision.

(ICR, p.11)
Here decision making is presented as the cause of any risk taking. Risk is to be managed and controlled via a kind of thinking machinery and iterative deliberation. Actions are the measured outcomes of these deliberations, therefore any actual risk taking is not – or should not be - a spontaneous act, or indicative of a chaotic situation, but the result of informed decision making and so a deliberate and meaningful act. Thus even risk is caused not by individuals doing, but by individuals thinking:

The possibility of risk is an inevitable consequence of empowered people taking decisions about their own lives.

(ICR, p.8)

In reaction to this Miller (2009) claims that ‘action is not reducible to thinking’ (p. 165), instead pointing to the ‘particularity, social embeddedness and evolution of situated practices’ (2009, p.165). This complex understanding of action accepts a multitude of factors as relevant to the manifestation of an act, and so consequently suggests an action does not have a single source, as is implied by the idea of the cause-effect relationship that decision equals action. Thus rather than imagining an act to be the end result of an individual will, action is disengaged from the individual as a primary source, and therefore also disengaged from the effects of cognition. This is contrary to the techniques in the policies that intend to govern individual lifestyles through emphasising the relationship between current choices and future consequences:

- Help people understand their responsibilities and the implications of their choices, including any risks
People need to be fully informed about the potential consequences of the choices open to them, so that they can take into account any risks involved and manage them.

(ICR, p.5)

Furthermore, a duty of government and individual practitioners is to ensure individuals approach their lives in relation to an understanding of themselves as a responsible decision maker:

They may need help to do this, so practitioners need to ensure that people have accurate and appropriate information in a form that they genuinely understand, in order to make their best decisions.

(ICR, p.5)

Whilst it is indeed possible to make an ‘illegitimate’ decision, this leads to the warning that it is ‘impossible to over-emphasise the importance of keeping accurate records of discussions that take place about areas of choice’ (ICR, p.19). This is a reminder that decision making leads to accountability, bringing with it a value-judgement on the character of the individual: their lack of wisdom, care or judgement, failure to take advice, and so on.

Despite such warnings individual decision making is something greatly encouraged in the policy documents analysed. ICR explains itself as:

a means of raising the debate about risk and shifting the balance away from risk-aversion towards supported decision making.

(ICR, p.5)
The focus on supported decision making is framed within the context of a re-evaluation of risk. In particular an appraisal of the tendency to assume risk is best avoided, mainly because:

> avoiding risk altogether would constrain the choices people can make.

(ICR, p.1)

**Decision making and risk taking**

Two key strategies in the policies appear to collide – the desire for responsible risk management, and the need for individuals to be exposed to various choices, coupled with the willingness to grasp the opportunities this brings. Governance therefore turns into a delicate balancing act of providing a proliferation of choice and options through encouraging innovative services and relying on the logic of the market to fulfil needs, whilst maintaining a risk management strategy based on regulation and standardisation. The task of the individual to create their future through the selection of these innovative services turns the individual into a risk taker whilst the state remains a risk manager:

> There is an important distinction between putting people at risk and enabling them to choose to take reasonable risk.

(ICR, p.22)

Whilst still in need of management, risk is to a large extent essential for enabling self-management and providing the possibility of a successful old age.

**Innovation and fulfilling need**
Local Authorities are set with the task of commissioning and encouraging innovation to ensure there are enough services to allow for individual choice, and that these services reflect the needs of their local population:

As people begin to have greater choice over the care they receive, they will need to have a range of services to choose from. . . . local authorities are best placed to make sure that there is a wide range of services available in their area and to encourage new services.

(SFC, p.12)

Local authorities must be able to innovate at the local level to ensure that the right services are available in their local area.

(SFC, p.32)

Individual budgets epitomise this ideal of choice provided by the marketization of services, assuming individuals can pick and choose those to best fulfil their needs. More than this, service users become accredited with a ‘consumer power’ through which they not only influence, but are responsible for the strength and quality of the services provided:

The more people have the right to choose, the more their preferences will improve services.

(OHOCOS, p.17)

Thus government may be considered to have a duty to create the space and conditions for different services to appear, but the quality and appropriateness of these services
is related to the choice of individuals: individuals are expected to use their consumer power to ensure that the services they support through their custom are those that fulfil their needs. This strategy of service provision demonstrates the extension of the market as a solution not just to economic problems, but also to personal, social care and health needs.\footnote{This was discussed in relation to Foucault in Chapter 5.}

Presenting social and health care needs as in need of the market in order for them to be met relates the successful provision of need with the ability to be self-determinate: consumables ‘seem to put us in control. It is we, the consumers, who draw the line between the useful and the waste’ (Bauman, 2004, p.95). Applying free market principles to social and health care needs suggests their solution is merely a matter of good decision making; this acts to oversimplify complex personal and social issues, and places responsibilities onto individuals without also giving them the ability to control outcomes. For example:

Whilst the social work of direct payment may have intended to promote self-determination and transformation of care, such decisions are both structurally and organisationally constrained, giving ‘poor people constrained choices’ but ‘nevertheless requiring them to make wise choices with the limited resources they have’ (Gray, 2008, p.185).

(Kemshall, 2010, p.1253)

Smart (2003) suggests that, ‘through the cultivation of needs and the provision of means for their satisfaction, consumption comes to constitute a significant means of social control’ (p.48). Although the notion of social control may underplay the subtlety of the power relations at work here, Smart does bring attention to the issue that what is conceived of as ‘need’ is not itself freely chosen by individuals. Despite being presented as an unproblematic and obvious reality, what is considered as ‘need’ relates specifically to issues of social and political value, thus as has been seen, the notion of need in these policies relates to the issue and problematization of dependency and social exclusion. Leading from this, the choices available to older people - in terms of policy strategies, services, and forms of information and advice -
are derived from this particular understanding of need and the related aim of independence. It is therefore the ‘need’ to be and remain independent and included that prioritises preventative and participatory services across the life course. This could be turned on its head however, and instead it could be asked whether it is the ‘need’ for people to participate in the economy that brought about strategies of inclusion and the related ‘risk’ of exclusion.

Creating choices for the fulfilment of this specific understanding of ‘need’ demonstrates the limited nature of choice. There is not freedom to choose anything at all (exclusion is not a legitimate choice\(^7\)), rather choice is selecting between similar preventative services with the aim of social inclusion. Jameson (1991, cited in Smart, 2003) therefore questions whether we can be thought of as choosing at all:

market as a concept rarely has anything to do with choice or freedom, since those are all determined for us in advance, whether we are talking about new model cars, toys or television programs: we select among these, no doubt, but we can scarcely be said to have a say in actually choosing any of them.

(p.87)

This distinction between selecting between, and freely choosing highlights the necessary place for the ‘individual’ in the policies, in contrast to the networks and collectivities that make up rationalities of risk and need, and the associated strategies of choice. From this it can be queried why is it so necessary to relate a choice to a specific individual when judgments regarding risk are deemed best dealt with in terms of consensus and standardisation?

Whilst individuals are charged with the task of making decisions relating to personal risk assessments and risk management strategies, this must be set within the context of some form of consensus regarding both what risk is, to what extent it is acceptable, and how it is best managed:

\(^7\)The possibility of making an unwise decision will be discussed later.
the Better Regulation Commission’s report on risk calls for a redefinition of society’s approach to risk management to recognise that, within the right circumstances, risk can be beneficial, balancing necessary levels of protection with preserving reasonable levels of choice and control. In response, the government is setting up a citizen’s forum to debate what should be the right balance between rights and responsibilities.

(ICR, p.1)

This requirement for a collective approach to risk management (and the claim that one already exists) is coupled with a belief that individuals should not be left alone to manage their risk:

There were concerns that some of the proposals, principally those relating to direct payments and individual budgets, might expose people in some situations to unmanageable levels of risk via potentially unregulated and under-trained workforce . . . There is now a need for standardised procedures for identification of risk and appropriate responses among team members.

(OHOCOS, p.85)

Turner (1997) refers to this standardisation of services as a form of risk management in terms of the ‘McDonaldisation of society’: ‘McDonaldisation reduces uncertainty and unpredictability . . . [it] removes surprises from everyday life by an extension of instrumental rationality to production, distribution and consumption’ (p.xviii). Thus whilst the individual may be conceived as a risk taker, the state remains a risk manager, affirming the rationality that the role of services may at times be to help people put themselves at risk, but never to put people at risk – remaining at all times a step away from the choice.
However, the need for a consensus regarding acceptable risk, and for standardising and regulating services is posited here not as a way of avoiding risk, but rather as a way of encouraging and enabling risk taking behaviour. Thus risk is not something to always be avoided, but instead something that is necessary to live a fulfilled life as an independent subject.

**Responsible risk takers**

Risk minimisation, through its tendency towards encouraging inactivity, brings with it risks of its own:

‘The focus on keeping everything safe results in a huge waste of people’s potential’

(ICR, p.10)

not making the most of opportunities can result in inactivity and loneliness, reducing an individual’s well-being.

(BSFA, p.17)

Accepting a certain amount of risk is therefore necessary to enable individuals to maximise their potential and well-being. Here risk is related to the risks associated with activity and being productive, rather than the risk of inactivity which, as will be seen, is not an acceptable risk.

O’Malley (2006) discusses the creative force of uncertainty, demonstrating that navigating an unknown future brings with it not only the possibility of harm, but also many potential benefits:

We may take for granted that uncertainty focuses on avoiding or minimising harms, as in the taking of precautions on the basis of
‘common sense’. But equally, as in the case of speculative investment, uncertainty may be creative, generating profit and wealth.

(O’Malley, 2006, p.19)

The example of speculative profit highlights that instances exist where it is the ‘not knowing’ that provides the potential for beneficial outcomes. In this sense an individual’s potential is presented as an unknown future that needs to be discovered through a speculative attitude to risk taking in daily life:

‘Life is about risk, we take risks every minute of the day. We must not let it inhibit us, we must use it to guide us and make us think, but it should not restrict our ability to lead our lives to the full.’

(ICR, p.10)

Risk is here presented as something to be exploited and manipulated, as a tool for managing the future. Through this O’Malley (2006) demonstrates that discourses of uncertainty reject attitudes and policies where risks are abhorred and instead, ‘regards the future as waiting to be formed by the power of will and imagination. In such ways, uncertainty is made to appear as a technology of liberation’ (O’Malley, 2006, p.71). This equation of risk-taking with choice, and leading from this, personal independence and fulfilment and consequently social stability, once again requires the individual to take on the characteristics and values of the entrepreneur: ‘flexibility, imagination, acuity and inventiveness’ (O’Malley, 2006, p.59). As was discussed in Chapter 5, it is by having flexibility of both mind and identity that an individual will be able to keep on top of their changing needs, and thereby ensure they do not waste their potential.

The acceptance of uncertainty and its ability to maximise individual potential does not legitimate any risky decision or future however. In accordance with the supremacy of the individual to decide it is stated:
a person’s wishes should not necessarily be over-ruled by someone who
thinks they are making an unwise decision

(ICR, p.19)

However it is clear that unwise decisions will remain unsupported decisions:

the local authority remains accountable for the proper use of its public
funds, and whilst the individual is entitled to live with a degree of risk,
the local authority is not obliged to fund it.

(ICR, p.22)

Along with pointing to the ultimate prioritisation of safety over speculation – risk
taking being encouraged only if it coincides with certain aims, rather than as a good in
itself – it is clear that even the entrepreneur must adhere to the regulation of the state
and the collective consensus regarding ‘acceptable’ and ‘reasonable’ risk, as the
theoretical right to make decisions is thwarted by the actual inability to act on them.
The alternative is to choose to be outcast from the system and ‘go it alone’, taking full
responsibility for the consequences of the decision (assuming the capacity to act on
the decision): however the hope is that the weight of the responsibility of isolated
decision making, and the threat of violence in the form of withdrawal of services
(Dean, 2007), is enough to stop any ‘unwise’ decisions from being acted on.

The role of the entrepreneur and the associated acceptance of risks is therefore
only an appropriate subjectivity and lifestyle if it produces a certain future(s). In
keeping with this O’Malley (2006) positions the rise of the entrepreneur within the
neo-liberal state as a reaction to the ‘risk-free’ welfare state, and the desire to move
away from welfare ‘dependency’ towards self-reliance through exposure to market
forces, suggesting that the move away from risk aversion is due to an association of safety with inactivity and dependency. Therefore although the neo-liberal figure of the entrepreneur epitomises the type of subjectivity individuals are required to take up in order to manage their uncertain futures – characterised by adaptability, innovation and ambition - it is clear that individuals must use their enterprising skills to adapt in certain ways, and strive for certain aims:

when we are invited to reinvent ourselves, and to embrace uncertainty, there is a certain paradox invoked. The future is certain to be uncertain in specific ways . . . the shape of the future is given to us by government. Our inventiveness can only be judged in a positive light to the extent that we adapt to it; and so the limits of this new freedom are revealed.

(O’Malley, 2006, p.177)

Whilst individuals are to approach their future later life as something in need of personal preparation and creation, the success of this creation will be judged against the avoidance of the various forms of social exclusion – meaning that successful risk management will result in an independent and active self, where any needs are met with effective strategies of self-care and enterprise. Thus the fluidity of this subjectivity must first of all fit within the more rigid boundaries of the active aged.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, problems are therefore set out within these policies, and solutions presented, using rationalities of risk that expect decisions and behaviours to focus on future-orientated planning for later life. It has been shown in this chapter that within this the individual is presented as, or expected to be, necessarily adaptable and innovative due to both the inherent uncertainty within which this planning must occur, and the need to optimise this uncertainty through a speculative approach to lifestyle. The successful navigation of this uncertain future therefore requires a self-determinate individual and a sovereign decision-maker that is willing to demonstrate her or his rational approach to life planning by making use of the nexus of consensus on risk management and expert information. The assumptions that life unfolds in line with
this linear cause-effect relationship, and that people’s behaviours can best be understood as based upon rational action, means that an investigation within the policies into the possibility or suitability of these strategies of intervention are non-existent. Thus whilst ensuring each individual is alone responsible for their successful future (later) life (and therefore by implication the collective strength and happiness of the population), the actual possibility of this demand is less clear. The following chapter will explore community as a space within which these expectations occur, through utilising statements of belonging and obligation. It is within the discourses of community and citizenship that management and care of the self become intimately tied to the strength and prosperity of the state, blurring the distinction between the technologies of self and apparatus of domination. Within these, individual lives begin to alone bear the weight of global problems and injustices.
Chapter 7

Participatory citizens and the discourse of community

Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 1 on Foucault’s archaeological method, discourse is not limited to linguistics and language. Alongside other inscription devices, such as charts and tables, as examples of statements, understanding discourse as more than language allows it to be recognised topographically as something both temporal and spatial: physical or non-physical boundaries, timescales and time tables, town, road or housing planning can all potentially be statements that make up a discursive formation as they shape, structure and organise the space within which it is possible to live, to act, and therefore also to govern the conduct of people. In the case of community these may include boundaries that mark out a neighbourhood, or the physical centrality or dispersion of community and local services (the Link-Age Plus pilot project that focuses on grouping services together in a physically accessible – that is central - position is an example of this (SS, p.9)). This Foucauldian conception of a discursive formation as a spatial and temporal structuring or organisation, enables an understanding of community as a physical surface upon which certain subjects and strategies become possible. This does not mean that community is inert: the simultaneous function of community as a discursive and governmental strategy acts as a reminder that discourse be treated not as theory, but as a practice.

Community is a recurrent theme throughout the policies analysed in the thesis, reflecting the belief in community as a key value in Third Way modern rhetoric. Despite this reliance in the policies on the notion of community as essential to social governance, it is not explicitly stated within them what community is. Delanty (2003) sets out the diversity of worldviews, value systems, and lifestyles that exist within the notion of community, which acts as a reminder that a reference or appeal to community does little on its own to indicate the values, ideals and expectations it is intended to encompass. For example, a closed community, such as the Amish
community, may actively stifle attempts of individuality and creativity (Delanty, 2003), whereas other versions – community as set out within the policies investigated here as an example – attempt to turn these into social values. Therefore, whilst not explicitly described or argued for, the implicit characteristics attributed to community within the policies reveals a particular and specific space within which individual subjects are required to conduct themselves, and through which it is possible to legitimate certain forms of governmentality. Community can therefore be analysed as a governmental space (Flint, 2003) – a place within which it becomes possible and acceptable to govern a certain population.

As will be demonstrated, community is used in the policies as a device through which certain social behaviours and social relationships become desirable and rationalised, and therefore promoted; whereby particular forms of citizenship are able to manifest, and others become problematized. Concurrently, community becomes a technology of governance – providing the techniques and devices through which individual citizens can be directly acted upon: through the creation of community groups and projects, the structuring of community based and locally commissioned services, or via the claim to be taking action in the name of community, for the benefit of community.

Community is spoken of in the policies as both currently existing, yet also in need of creation and development. An important question in view of this, raised by Rose (1999b), is: ‘if community, in so many guises and forms, is proposed as a solution, what is it in our welfare democracies that it is seen as a solution to?’ (p.173). This chapter will attempt to answer this question through an exploration of how and why community receives such an important status. Beyond this, the chapter will turn to explore the construction of participatory citizens – a subject position vital for the functioning of community as set out in the policies. It will be demonstrated that a significant requirement of the participatory citizen is the duty to act on the self, causing actions of self care and social action to become indistinguishable. Through this it will be seen that notions of the individual, and the values of independence and self-determination, far from becoming diluted within an ideal of community life, become necessary for the citizen to fully contribute to society.
Community as a space of government

The local

Despite virtual and non-spatial communities becoming more prevalent, it is clear that in discussing community the policies are concerned with the more traditional notion of neighbourhoods or ‘the local’ as embedded geographical space:

We want to build inclusive communities that meet local needs

(SS, p.8)

This emphasis on local community is used to suggest that older people have an increased interest in community matters. For example, the statement that:

Older people are likely to have spent much of their lives within the same community.

(SS, p.85)

is based on knowledge that older people tend to move less, and are therefore more likely to spend their lives in the same geographical area. What is not acknowledged is that this does not in itself indicate that an older person has a long membership to a community, as even if the person remains static the ‘community’ around them may not. As Phillipson (2007) recognises, whereas some people may relocate as a way of electing to belong to a particular community, others who lack the ability to make this choice may become alienated as the community changes around them. Thus although a person may spend the majority of their life in the same place, they may not feel themselves to be a long term member of the local community, and so the community may not hold any significance for them.
Beyond this, whilst there is an assumption that local neighbourhoods naturally turn into communities, there is no indication as to what will hold the community together at a local level, therefore it is not fully explained why the local is significant over and above national government. Any justification that individuals should belong to and contribute to their local community is grounded in a national social duty:

Our society is based on the belief that everyone has a contribution to make

(OHOCOS, p.204)

Local communities are relevant only to the extent that resources are often available on a local rather than national level. The argument is that:

Services need to be designed locally, so that they can respond to what people need in an area, reflect local circumstances and encourage innovative approaches to service delivery.

(SFC, p.122)

This way of organising social services and community resources is based on the assumption that it makes sense to understand individuals within their geographical locality, rather than through other markers. Structuring society and social welfare by placing significance on the local does not lead to a greater focus on the individual however, rather it carves out a space within which the individual can become actualised, and so through which it becomes possible for them to act, and be acted upon. There are not thought to be any overriding differences between the people that live in one community or locality, than another: difference lies only in the make-up of the local population: how many of each ‘type’ of individual does the local area need to
cater for. In fact despite the desire for local flexibility, and belief that local solutions will be the most effective, there is at the same time an anxiety regarding the need to recognise sameness, and from this the need for national fairness. This concern with fairness is expressed through endorsing national consistency, as is demonstrated and addressed in the proposed UK National Care Service:

For the first time, there will be nationally consistent eligibility criteria for social care, enshrined in law . . . If someone moves to another part of England, their assessment will be portable, meaning they will be able to take the results of their assessment with them.

(BNCS, p.71)

Community, as it is presented within the policies, is not therefore used to represent specific ideals or values, nor of a particular way of life – all of which are justified on a wider national basis and used to argue for the need for this national consistency. Local community instead creates a space within which it is possible to act with authority in order to govern mundane, every-day activities. For example, ‘the community’ is deemed to have a vested interest in the level of socialising in the over 65s:

sectors of society are not capitalising on the potential of longer lives . . . In an average day more volunteering and socialising is currently done by people aged 45-64 than by people over 65, there is a huge potential for communities to benefit from increasing this.

(BSFA, p.15)
The requirement for individuals to work on their selves as a form of community contribution will be discussed later.\textsuperscript{76} What it is important to initially highlight is how the notion of community acts as both a reason and a means for governing the mundane and traditionally private aspects of living, such as socialising and leisure activities.

According to Amin (2005), the social has come to be redefined as community by New Labour. He notes 25 years ago policymakers would not have considered that issues such as local poverty could be dealt with locally, they instead would have been seen necessarily as an issue for central government. As has been demonstrated, maintaining a role for central government remains an important strategy in the policies, expressed as the need to ensure all social citizens are treated equally, and so fairly. However, the need to maintain this national element is explained as enabling further flexibility. The problem caused by localisation is explained thus:

Existing local authority boundaries create geographical barriers for people receiving care and support. Eligibility for care and support differs between authorities and care is not easily ‘portable’

(SFC, p.54)

Standardised assessment will solve this:

Once they have an agreement about their level of need, they will be able to take it with them wherever they go in England (it will be ‘portable’). They will not need to be reassessed unless their needs change.

(SFC, p.54)

\textsuperscript{76} P.217 and 224.
The influence of central government is maintained to ensure the individual is positioned as in control of their lifestyle and future life-course. Yet whilst the assessment of needs become standardised in order to make them portable, how these needs are met are still subject to local decision making: the assessment may remain the same but the services available will be variable.

Neo-liberal agendas therefore challenge the assumption that it is necessary to govern centrally, criticising this style of thinking for stifling entrepreneurship and growth (Amin, 2005). In contrast, local governing is deemed imperative for enabling the entrepreneurial spirit:

Local authorities must be able to innovate at the local level to ensure that the right services are available in their local area

(SFC, p.32)

Due to this reliance on the local for dealing with social welfare issues, Amin (2005) argues that ‘the local has been re-imagined as the cause, consequence, and remedy of social and spatial inequality’ (p.614).

The emergence of community as a discursive space within which citizens can be governed can therefore be contrasted to previous welfarist policy; for example, Jenson and Saint-Martin (2003) note that one function of the old welfare state was to protect people from the market, whereas the current social investment state (a term coined by Giddens and taken up by Third Way politics (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003)) aims to facilitate the integration of people into the market as part of its social policy. This highlights a radical break in the tradition of social policy that marks the construction of new forms of citizenship and social relations, and the creation of new technologies and strategies through which these can be governed. Rose (1999b) describes community,
as it is spoken of within Third Way political strategies, as the ‘third space’. He claims that the different versions of this third space have one paradoxical feature in common:

On the one hand, the third space they [Third Way strategies] identify appears as a kind of natural, extra-political zone of human relations . . . On the other, this zone is identified as a crucial element in particular styles of political government, for it is on its properties and on activities within it that success of such political aspirations and programmes depend. This third space must, thus, become the object and target for the exercise of political power whilst remaining, somehow external to politics and a counterweight to it.

(Rose, 1999b, p.167-8)

The post-political presentation of communities as both natural and beyond politics is utilised in the policies to the extent that their existence is unquestioned: neighbourhoods exist, and individuals and social problems can be understood and solved best by utilising this local knowledge. A leap occurs when the physical reality of a geographical space ‘neighbourhood’ becomes spoken about as an entity in its own right that has the ability to act:

Families and communities need to look out for, and lend a hand to, their relatives and neighbours.

(SFC, p.82)

effective cultural change must come from communities themselves

(SS, p.6)

These quotes are common examples of how community is described within the policies: as a self reliant collective will that can act with a single intention. Presenting
community as an agent means it can be not only the site, but also the subject of government.

Rose’s (1999b) claim that community has become an extra-political zone whilst simultaneously being a target for political power highlights the extension of legitimate governance into all areas of private, family and social life. As discussed in Chapter 2, Dean (2007) describes how this is possible through the double movement of the unfolding of the political sphere into civil society, and the enfolding of civil society into the political sphere. Through these simultaneous movements what was previously contained in the political sphere - traditionally the public sphere of centralised government – has been extended to all other sectors of society: the ‘third sector’ being a prime example, but this is also demonstrated through all aspects of general lifestyle management:

For many older people participation in community and civic life are part and parcel of everyday life.

Older people may be involved in the community in a variety of ways – participating in leisure, learning and volunteering activities.

(SS, p.64)

The dispersion of political power into local areas, coupled with the expectation of participation, allows the political to spill over into all aspects of life: for example, political concern is no longer confined to matters of compulsory level education, but now includes learning in its entirety including the post retirement years; not only work and employment but also leisure time is a subject of policy intervention, and therefore considered a matter of social strategical importance.

Boundaries of belonging
Cohen (1985) notes that ‘community’ generally implies its members have something in common which distinguishes them significantly from any outside group, therefore community encompasses both similarity and difference at the same time. Whilst this is a logical definition of community and fits well with traditional conceptions, it does not fit with how communities are spoken about within these policy documents. As has been demonstrated above, community is not comprehensively separated from society, it is instead understood to be a facet of, or extension of ‘the social’. Thus whilst there is an ‘inside’, there is no legitimate outside: the outside is not a cohesive group (an alternative community), but a fragmentation of community itself, and therefore a threat to common social values. Belonging to your community means being a social citizen. Thus as previously discussed (in Chapter 2, p.60), a governmental society seeks to implement unity and order rather than division.

It is within this notion of community that the policy emphasis on inclusion can be understood, for example:

All adults and their carers should be included in the life of the community

(SFC, p.60)

The Sure Start approach . . . is part of building inclusive communities where older people themselves are leading the change.

(SS, p.9)

Community is used here not to signify difference from others, but to provide an integrated model of social life: to encourage individuals to be active, participatory, and
promote a sense of civic responsibility. Community inclusion then, focuses not so much on who you are, but on what you do:

Services should support people to take greater control over their own lives and should allow everyone to enjoy a good quality of life, so that they are able to contribute fully to our communities.

(OHOCOS, p.111)

The needs to be met by services are here revealed to relate not to an internal psychological understanding of the person, but rather must strive to meet what is ‘needed’ for social participation and interaction. To not ‘do’ is itself a sign of social exclusion, and it is precisely those individuals who become a target for policy intervention:

Although the majority of older people lead socially engaged lives, our concern is with those older people excluded through barriers to participation.

(SS, p.62)

Rose (2001b) describes this opposition of social exclusion and inclusion as a new technology of welfare, using the example of poverty to demonstrate how this approach understands, and so attempts to remedy, social problems:

This transforms the problem of poverty into one that has less to do with material or cultural resources than with a lack of belongingness and of the responsibility and duty to others generated through connections to the responsibilizing circuits of moral community.
This suggests that the emphasis on community is used not to single out similarities within the group in contrast to the differences of others outside, but is rather an attempt to instil a sense of civic obligation into all individuals. For example, the ‘vision’ of community based care set out in OHOCOS is based precisely on the value of making individuals responsible:

There is solid evidence that care is less effective if people feel they are not in control. A fundamental aim is to make the actions and choices of people who use services the drivers of improvement. They will be given more control over – and will take on greater responsibility for – their own health and well-being.

(OHOCOS, p.13)

Thus community is used within the context of the policies as a governmental device that obliges individuals to take responsibility for social issues, and therefore consequently implies individual lives are accountable for the quality and rigour of social security.

Rose (2001b) claims this sense of responsibility is fostered through ‘ethopolitics’, which denotes the space of political strategy and technique that acts on an individual’s responsible self-management in combination with the management of their obligation to others. He further explains:

Although contemporary proposals for governing behaviour through ethics differ, each seeks a way of acting on the ethical formation and self-management of individuals to promote their engagement in their collective destiny, in the interests of economic advancement, social stability, and even justice and happiness . . . The stake has to be generated in the community-based ethic that shapes the values that
guide each individual. This is to be accomplished through building a new relation between ethical citizenship and responsible community fostered, but not administered, by the state.

(Rose, 2001b, p.4)

Rose (2001b) therefore argues that contemporary community constitutes a moral field, whose members are treated as ethical creatures: individuals that become regulated through bonds and relationships forged from an understanding of how one’s own self management affects the fate of the collective. This aids the answer concerning what problems community is presented as a solution to: the maintenance of social security and prosperity, more specifically presented as the social problems of dependence and inactivity.

Active ageing, social participation and self care

Social engagement and active citizenship

The creation of the active citizen is necessary if community is to provide a viable solution to the perceived social problems of dependency, non-production and inactivity. Of primary importance in the move from a national centralised, to a localised and dispersed power is the requirement for citizens to take control:

Social care and primary health care services are embedded in our communities. They are part of the pattern of our daily lives. We will shift the whole system towards the active, engaged citizen in his or her local community and away from monolithic, top-down paternalism.

(OHOCOS, p.19)

Rather than seeing people as passive recipients of care and support, our vision sees them as citizens who are involved in designing the services that will help them live their everyday lives.
Instead of being mere recipients, a great importance is placed on individuals becoming citizens within the policies, by being responsible for the design and delivery of community and social care services alongside actively using and consuming them. Being active in the process, it is claimed, will bring the individual citizen more control and choice over their lifestyle. Individual budgets are a clear example of this, as it is argued they have the ability to:

extend to some of the most vulnerable the benefits of choice and control over their own lives that the rest of us take for granted.

(Scourfield, 2007, p.116)

Whilst presented within the language of choice and control, and therefore assumed to provide only benefits and a higher quality lifestyle to the individual, Scourfield (2007) exposes the policy of direct payments as an ethopolitical governmental device, that works precisely through the linking of the freedom of the individual to create their own lifestyle, with the responsibility they owe to society to manage this well. Scourfield (2007) describes this as the managerialization of the self, where functions and responsibilities previously performed by the state become increasingly taken on by the individual. He argues this process:

requires that the service user not only manages themselves but that they also become the manager of public funds, they agree to present their records for inspection and audit and, with the inputs they have been allocated, they assume responsibility for achieving agreed outcomes.
Thus, whilst based on a rhetoric of freedom, choice and control, eligibility for individual budgets or direct payments is based on a contractual market relationship where, whilst offering the user of care services the ability to employ their own services, they are at the same time constrained by the need to provide proof that they are fulfilling the needs decided upon by state services. Rather than being in a position to control their own life, the role played by the service user of direct payments is perhaps more akin to middle management. This leads Scourfield (2007) to claim that in direct payment policy:

There is no shift in political power; what direct payments can do though, is release in people who would not otherwise have the opportunity, the ‘inner manager’ or awaken the latent entrepreneur.

(p.116)

Alongside questioning the extent to which individual budgets and direct payments provide a ‘better’ more ‘progressive’ form of social care provision, this critique demonstrates how the organisation of social care, and the roles it provides for citizens, acts as a governmental strategy. Cruickshank (1999) argues that whilst democratic citizenship is often put forward as a solution to political and social problems, this assumption obscures any awareness of how citizens are brought into being; she argues citizenship is less a solution and more a strategy of government: ‘To govern, then, means first to stir up the desire, the interest, and the will to participate or act politically’ (Cruickshank, 1999, p.82). The emphasis on encouraging and increasing social engagement in the policies is clear, and is linked directly to the issues surrounding old age and an ageing population to the extent that old age is no longer viewed as a reason for lack of engagement, and the growing elderly population is treated as an untapped social resource (as discussed in Chapter 4). Hence the role taken up by central government focuses on ensuring participation is feasible:
Our vision is to encourage, at a local level, informal structures that enable older people to participate and take on roles where they are valued.

(SS, p.54)

Individuals become a resource in their own right, and thus social care services are framed in terms of investment: services are not justified on the basis of a duty of care and kindness to each other, but rather in economic terms of investment and contribution (Becker, 1981). Understanding human and social relations as a form of capital or investment has become a dominant view within social policy globally since the 1990s. Example of this include The World Bank’s (1995) ‘Investing in People’, which argues that investing in people must happen in conjunction with economic policies, giving examples from countries including Bangladesh, Hungary, Mexico and Tanzania; and Midgley’s (1995) discussion of social development that argues economic and social objectives must be integrated for social development. Within this he argues social development is not concerned with individual need, but with the well-being of the population. Policies that aim to invest in human capital therefore focus on three strategies: i) learning as vital for future economies and societies (with a focus on preschool and early years’ development); ii) assuring the future rather than attempting to alleviate current problems – as an attempt to break the ‘cycle of poverty’; iii) a belief that successful individuals enrich our collective future and thus investing in individual success is beneficial for the whole community (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2006, in Gray, 2013). This conflation of economic investment and social care is evident in the policies. For example, under the heading ‘The case for social care reform – the wider economic and social benefits’ (BNCS, p.52), investment in social care is seen as vital in order to:

Provide support to those in need so they can contribute fully as active citizens, for example through participation in the labour market,
volunteering and/or caring for others. People using services work, vote, volunteer, care for family members and children and contribute to society and to social capital in myriad ways – and greater investment might enable them to do so to an even greater extent.

(BNCS, p.52)

Engagement and participation in communities and society therefore translates into the achievement of citizenship, and it is this participatory citizenship that is positioned as the goal of social care: whilst it is argued that a benefit of participation is that it leads to good health (SS, p.32 for example), the requirement of good health is grounded on this expectation to remain socially active. For example:

Our aims for promoting health and well-being in old age are:

- to promote higher levels of physical activity in the older population;
- to reduce barriers to increased levels of physical activity, mental well-being and social engagement among excluded groups of older people

(OHOCOS, p.30)

Whilst life course events associated with old age, such as a decline in health, retirement, family moving away and death of a partner, are listed as reasons for poor social participation (SS, p.58), it is argued that poor participation for older people is not inevitable (SS, p.61). As was demonstrated in Chapter 4, it is the reality of poor social engagement and participation amongst some of the older population that requires the need for policy intervention, as this falls short of what is required for a successful old age.
The expectation for all individuals to participate, regardless of social status, has been pinpointed as a particular feature of contemporary society. In discussing the ‘active society’, Walters (1997) suggests that the reordering of social space post-welfare, has caused the fight for rights to participate – often initiated by marginalized groups – to be turned into obligations to participate, bringing with it not so much increased social freedoms than further mechanisms of control. His focus on the labour market highlights how groups previously within the welfare state held outside the role of paid worker, such as mothers of young children and the retired, have since been integrated into it through a general expectation of employment. Hence the welfare categories of the unemployed and the non-employed (those who would not be expected to look for work) have made way for the categories of the active and inactive: we are now all potential employees. The constant references to flexible retirement and the value of older people in the work force are a reminder of this:

Our long term aim is to consign fixed retirement ages to the past.

(OA, p.20)

Older people and disabled people in employment make a significant contribution and are often highly skilled and experienced members of the workforce. We want to make sure that there are no barriers to them remaining in employment if they so choose.

(SFC, p.60-61)

Whilst increased flexibility appears to present the chance of a better life, this is not necessarily the case. Walters (1997) suggests that the initial victories of, for example, the women’s movements regarding the demonstration of masculinised norms in employment and welfare, quickly turned into obligations that often did little to help their social circumstances:
The demand for a right to meaningful work is translated [in the ‘active society’] into the obligation to search for, and accept what is often low-paid employment, or participate on public training schemes.

(p.226)

Remaining socially active and engaged extends beyond paid employment to include other forms of contribution however. Volunteering and caring for family and friends are common examples of the existing contributions of the older population, often backed up with a monetary equivalent of these human relations of care (SS, p.61) to demonstrate their economic worth. Biggs (2001) claims these work-like activities are presented as a form of social therapy – seen as providing as many benefits to the individual involved as to society at large, whilst ‘simultaneously draw[ing] older people back into the mainstream’ (Biggs, 2001, p.311). The re-branding of human activities, such as caring, into forms of social contribution, rather than intimate personal relationships, indicates the need for these everyday personal and traditionally private activities to be understood within the rationality of productive activity and social contribution. The Nobel Laureate for economics Heckman (2000), writing in the US on ‘Policies to foster human capital’, concludes that the most sensible policy – if concerned with acquiring the greatest return from the initial investment – should aim to increase non-cognitive skills (as opposed to IQ type intelligence) and social attachments as early as possible. Personal skills, including self-discipline and self-motivation, are therefore positioned as forms of social investment that should be cultivated, and so have value, only when there is an economic interest to do so:

The best evidence supports the policy prescription: invest in the very young and improve basic learning and socialisation skills; subsidize the old and the severely disadvantaged to attach them to the economy and the society at large.

(Heckman, 2000, p.8)

Whilst thought in this field has taken different routes in Europe and the US, common elements emerge from the positioning of human lives as a social investment that are
evident in the UK policies analysed here: markedly the concern with social exclusion over and above social justice; the focus on the future over the present – aiming to prevent future ills rather than solve current problems; and the belief that investment in personal development is the best form of security (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003).

As discussed previously (Chapter 5) this demonstrates a significant shift in the intended aims of social care: no longer is it concerned with the *protection* of individuals, but rather with their *enablement*. Thus the welfare of the subject becomes not a reason for the existence of social care, but a resource used by social care for the protection and advancement of society.

In light of the expectation for all citizens to demonstrate their inclusion in society through some form of contribution, the role of consumer has taken on a status equal to that of the worker. Hence creating the need for a market is an important form of social activity:

> One of the most obvious ways in which older people are involved in their communities and neighbourhoods is through the use of local services and amenities.

(SS, p.89)

Service users are by default consumers, and are therefore seen to hold some form of social power or influence:

> older people are still often treated as passive recipients rather than active consumers with their own views about need.

(OA, p.iv)
Lie and colleagues (2009) refer to the ‘consumer-citizen’, a conception of citizenship where citizenship is achieved through partaking in various forms of economic activity beyond the traditional worker role. Activities may include, for example ‘purchasing power’ or consuming leisure resources. This is developed further by Flint (2003) who emphasises that within this: ‘Conduct is rationalized as the ability of subjects to create the means for their own consumption’ (p.614). Ensuring financial security would be an important aspect of this – either through employment or suitable financial planning for retirement years - but just as vital is for the older person to ensure they are physically capable, and that they have access to the necessary resources.

**Active ageing**

The policy of active ageing is used throughout the policies as a strategy for the prevention of the social exclusion of older people, by ensuring their continued engagement. In this sense, as discussed in Chapter 4, ‘activity’ is used to encompass an array of self-care behaviours from physical exercise to political involvement. There is a great deal of discussion regarding the types of activity deemed most useful (participative and collective regarded the most beneficial (SS, p.63)); as well as the reasons active ageing ought to be a major policy concern. These include a citizens’ right to participate, and the argument that activity, including physical activity along with all forms of social engagement, brings only benefits to the individual concerned and so also society at large (as discussed in Chapter 4). Furthermore it is claimed that this right to participate is indeed desired by older people:

> Repeatedly throughout our consultation older people have told us that they want to contribute, to be part of society, and to have a role.

(SS, p.68)

That active ageing is indeed desired by older people, or even beneficial for them, has however been contested.
Clarke and Warren (2007) conducted in-depth biographical interviews with 23 people, aged between 60-93, in order to research their attitude to age and ageing; they considered this against active ageing policy. They concluded that the rich diversity of the responses deeply contrasted with the overly materialistic frameworks of productivity found in much public policy for older people. They found from the responses that, ‘disengagement and dependency are not necessarily the negative and passively experienced states that are commonly described’ (Clarke and Warren, 2007, p.481-2). Thus whilst the older people in the study remained active in their own eyes, this was often within individual activities that do not necessarily require engagement with others: reading, completing a crossword, listening to music or cooking. Whilst these activities pass the time for the older people interviewed in a way that enabled them to enjoy their lives, they are a world away from achieving the levels of productivity and sense of collective duty built into the policy agenda of active ageing, where the goal is not merely individual happiness, but the utilisation of individual happiness to further the stability of society (as discussed in Chapter 5). Thus whilst Clarke and Warren (2007) conclude:

The current emphasis in policy encourages older people to engage as citizens in local communities and wider society (DWP 2005 [OA]; WHO 2002). Engagement need not, however, be so ambitious.

(p.483)

they are treating policy as something designed to further the best interest of the individual alone, rather than recognising the role policy plays in setting up contractual social relationships (for example, SFC, p.104).

An understanding of policy as setting up social relationships is demonstrated by the link made between the need to be active for both continued self-responsibility and self-management:

longer life is a blessing where the extra years are fulfilling and active. They should not be years of inaction and exclusion. A personal
responsibility rests on each one of us to plan and provide for a different life-course that is also better.

(OA, p.v)

As noted earlier, for an individual to ensure they do not become socially excluded they must acquire the resources necessary for social activity, insurance and contribution. Hence to age actively implies the individual will have these resources in place, or that they will at least have the ability to access them. This need is based upon the overarching aim of constituting independent citizens:

we now need truly to embed in all policies directed towards older people the values of active independence, quality and choice that we have championed in other areas.

(OA, p.iv)

The policy desire for active ageing, in terms of how this fits with the desired values and structure of society, as has been demonstrated, does not, however, mean that active ageing is actually achievable for all older people.

Ranzijn (2010) also recognises that active ageing does not refer to any activity, but specifically implies participation. Using Aboriginal elders as a case study he asks whether it is possible for all older people to live up to the expectations of active ageing policy. His critique rests on the lack of diversity within this view of ageing:

Active ageing policy as currently conceived is problematic because of its narrow focus on only a few aspects of the ageing experience – physical

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77 Despite this research being conducted in Australia, and critiquing active ageing policy against a unique native Australian culture, Ranzijn (2010) demonstrates the transferability of his debate through highlighting both the pervasiveness and consistency of active ageing policy across Western countries, as well as suggesting the values and worldview of Aboriginal people are not so dissimilar from those of other cultures that make up the UK population.
health, independence, and productivity. In this conception, the process of ageing is defined on only two dimensions: (ill)health and (in)dependence (p.717)

This policy strategy is problematic for those who do not understand their life, and therefore their ageing, within these values of good health and independence. This is the position Ranzijn (2010) claims Aboriginal elders find themselves in, as their culture jars with the individualistic foundations of ‘active ageing’ which values independence, autonomy and self-reliance above and beyond anything else; Aboriginal culture instead focuses on interdependence, mutual reliance, kinship and reciprocity. Beyond this, he argues that the biological process of ageing itself, and death, are important aspects of the life-cycle and therefore not treated as problems to be solved. Thus the productive elements of active ageing are often alien and therefore unachievable for Aboriginal elders if they are to ‘age well’ – that is, age according to the traditions set out by their own culture. The paradox of active ageing policy then, is that it has been developed as a solution to the ever present problem of ‘white’ social exclusion, yet its very implementation risks marginalizing those unable or unwilling to take up these values as their own. Thus as Ranzijn (2010) highlights, whilst active ageing policy goes to great lengths to recognise the diversity of old people, diversity of ageing is not considered.

Self-care as social participation

The value of independence, achieved through responsible self-management, is therefore currently an unavoidable requirement of active ageing, and consequently of fully contributing to society and so fulfilling the expectations of a social citizen. It is clear in the policies that older people are expected to be responsible for themselves and that this specifically refers to responsibility for their own self-care and reliance:

The challenge is also for each of us as individuals to take responsibility for our own lifestyles and aim for a healthy and fulfilling old age.
Older people have the responsibility to look after themselves, often with the help of their families, and to choose healthy and active lifestyles that reduce the risk of disease and harm wherever possible.

Cruckshank (1996; 1999) describes self-help as a typically liberal form of government that works through the maximisation of citizenship. Whilst the language used in the policies refers to self-care and self responsibility the essence of self-help and self-care are similar: both an expectation of self-reliance alongside an assumption that the individual is fully responsible for their life course. The power thought to be held by the individual for shaping their life course is demonstrated here:

There are clear links between choosing to live a healthy lifestyle and minimising the chances of certain types of care need arising. Physical and mental wellbeing are key to reducing the risk of some conditions, including dementia and mobility problems later in life.

The focus on choice and lifestyle implies that individuals are –at least mostly – in control of what happens to them during their lifetime, as well as the quality of their life: physical and mental well-being are positioned as primarily dependent on making the right choices, and not social circumstances beyond the control of the individual. It is due to this that individuals can be held responsible for their (ill)health: even the onset of dementia is linked to unwise lifestyle choices, for example. Whilst links may have been found between certain lifestyles and the probability of developing
dementia, it cannot be assumed that lifestyle is a product of personal choice. Biggs (2001) notes that an understanding of older people as able to choose between leisured lifestyles is a particular Third Way notion that specifically acts to make the older person into a participant of civil society. As discussed in Chapter 5, the assumption of a reflexive self able and required to make constant lifestyle choices, has the function of positioning the subject as an individual in control of her or his future. However whilst the focus remains on an individual’s influence over their life, important social factors not immediately within the individual’s control, or factors that require a collective or structural response, remain undiagnosed and ignored. Leading from this, McNay (2009) argues that neo-liberal conceptions of the entrepreneurial self erodes the notion of the public domain. This results in the instillation of a paradoxical compulsion of responsibility, where individuals are forced to assume responsibility for affairs which not only are they not responsible for but within which, have extremely limited powers to affect changes. Presenting the social effects of global events as related to personal belongingness through the discourses of social inclusion and exclusion (Rose, 2001) places the cause and solution firmly with the local and/or individual. This, however, severely misrepresents the scope of insecurity faced by many individuals: for example recent changes in standard employment - where zero hour, part-time, or fixed-term contracts are the norm – highlight that it is perhaps unrealistic to expect individuals to be solely responsible for their financial security throughout retirement years.

This focus on lifestyle as choice related to an individual’s attention to self-care, emphasises the connection forged between acting on the self through strategies of self-care and self-development, and the collective interest or ‘social good’. This connection turns the maintenance of good self-care from a personal matter into a social duty:

As well as rights, older people are citizens and as such have responsibilities like the rest of us to contribute to society. They can do this in many ways, not least by taking sensible steps to look after their health
By encouraging certain behaviours that require the individual to monitor and alter their self in order to fit with the social roles open to them\(^7\), Cruickshank (1999) argues that the self is made into a terrain of political action:

\[
\text{a terrain that carries new political possibilities for self-government. In that case, acting upon the self is also a manner of acting politically (p.6)}
\]

Thus social participation and acting in the interest of the collective is not hindered by self-interest and an overriding concern with individuality, but actually depends on it. Hence the tension is that participatory discourses are preoccupied with those who fail to act in their own self-interest (Cruickshank, 1999), and who therefore fail to maximise their self for the benefit of all.

**Conclusion**

Contemporary Western democratic life has been suggested as a time and place of increasing connections and networked flows (Amin, 2005), where boundaries give way to globalisations. It is within this that Amin (2005) questions why we still think of certain places as spatially enclosed? The utilisation of ‘community’ in the policies to refer to a local neighbourhood or a certain geographical space is an example of this, yet, as has been argued, this severely underplays and ignores, the multiple and complex consequences global and national events have on local and individual issues. The focus on the supremacy of individual action as something all powerful: providing the solution to social problems, allows the conflation of the values of mutual care and belonging, traditionally associated with communitarianism, with those of self-reliant individuality, self-determination, and self-interest. This enables policy to act as a form of social contract, where both self-care and social strength and security become

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\(^7\) Examples of such behaviours have been discussed throughout Chapters 4-7, and include obtaining knowledge of the self through various forms of assessment or knowledge of population trends; expectations and interventions based upon planning for future life concerning finances or health; and being responsible for living actively.
dependent on appropriate participative behaviour. This intricate relationship between self-care and social participation becomes epitomised in strategies of Active Ageing in the policies, which, whilst presented as nothing but positive for the older person through promoting mental, physical, and financial well-being (and thus can only be beneficial to society as well), has the effect of narrowing and limiting possibilities open to subjectivity (who is it possible to be?), as well as ageing and the life-course more generally (how is it possible to live?) Discourses of community and participative citizenship, by aiming to organise limited spaces of social inclusion, also then make up the spaces of social exclusion: versions of life presented as dangerous (to social security and so to all individuals as members of the population) due to nothing other than their non-compliance with the underlying values of human utility and independent self-reliance.
Conclusion

Plotting the parameters and future directions

Introduction

A significant and defining purpose of this thesis is its aim of rethinking the subject. Rather than accepting as obvious or necessary the subject that is spoken of, and to, in the policy documents, I have attempted to demonstrate where this subject must begin and end, to mark out the space it can occupy, and from this expose the limitations and restrictions imposed, by the discourses found within the policies, on ways of living, ageing and understanding the temporal self. The dominant discourse that has emerged within this study is that of the ‘active’ subject: an independent individual required to participate in society for the good of society, containing an undercurrent assumption that this simultaneously amounts to a person’s own good. Of corresponding importance is what Lessenich (2011) terms the subjectivation of the social, where social responsibility is handed over from the collective – such as public institutions – to the individual, through the creation of an ethical relationship that moves individuals into a position where they become responsible for society as a whole.

According to Lessenich (2011), analyses of the contemporary Western welfare state have not been a popular theme within the governmentality approach, and where analyses of the ‘active’ society do exist, they have primarily focused on how the subject becomes activated through an economic rationality, neglecting the equally prevalent social rationality: a logic that requires self-management for the sake of society. The analysis undertaken here hopefully goes some way to redress this imbalance by considering the subject presented within the selected social care policies from multiple angles. Furthermore the thesis has taken an innovative approach by combining two aspects of Foucauldian theory that are not often brought together: an archaeological understanding of discourse and governmentality, to provide a novel contribution to the analyses of ageing and social care policies and the impact these may have on our lives and our selves. One important insight this perspective has offered is how the apparently singular policy issue of old age and later life becomes multiplied to encompass the government of everyday living across all life stages: the
government of old age is thus more appropriately conceived of as the governance of the population through ageing.

As was promised in the Introduction to this thesis, the analysis as it has progressed therefore leads to ethical and political questions: Who should we be? How ought we to live? Whilst I have not attempted to provide comprehensive alternative answers to these questions, I have attempted to ask and began to answer: What are the justifications given for the normative discourses that answer these questions (how are they rationalised)? And what are the consequences? I have not sought to reveal some kind of ultimate aim of these discourses, but have instead attempted to pinpoint the crux of what they do and how they lead to restrictions. But equally, using the analysis as a form of criticism and counter-conduct, I have sought to find spaces and travel along other lines, where the above questions might reveal different, but not exclusive, answers.

This concluding chapter will, firstly, discuss the main themes that have emerged within the thesis. I will then turn to explore some developments within current governmentality literature and how they relate to this study. Finally I will suggest some areas of possible future development and exploration.

Recurrent themes

Whilst the Chapters 4 to 7 each discussed a different theme, several concepts and processes have cut through the entire thesis. These may be grouped into three strands: i) the subject as active and independent; ii) the self as singular, linear and future orientated; iii) the relations between individuals and the collective and connected to this, responsibilization. I will briefly discuss and summarise each strand below.

Activity and independence

The thesis has demonstrated that independence is an overriding concern within the policies, thought to be necessary for successful ageing, ensuring the continued security of an ageing population, and it is therefore the primary value upon which social care is based. Although not overtly defined in the policies, independence
assumes or implies activity both as a description of the self and as an ethos of life. Independence and activity, pursued as fundamental aims, therefore become concepts with which the worth and success of our lives and the lives of those around us can be measured.

Activity refers to a specific set of activities. Whilst in some ways its reach is broad and encompassing, demonstrated by WHO's definition of active ageing as including concern for physical, social and emotional well-being (Walker, 2009), the type of activities desired and encouraged are restricted to those that are socially participative, ideally collective (SS, p.63), and measurable through some form of outward value or product: volunteering, consumer related activities, community involvement or group activities, and so on. Activity must therefore have a purpose beyond the individual: it must be socially useful.

Activity is discussed in only positive terms in the policies, presented as necessary for both personal well-being and social strength (as expressed by the activity-inactivity ratio for example, OA). Thus the diverse self-care behaviours required within the policy documents to be conducted by the active subject – from physical exercise, to engaging in leisure activities, to political involvement – are only problematized in regards to how they can become achievable for all citizens, couched in the language of social exclusion. The alienating effects of these strategies have been discussed elsewhere, including the paucity of ways of living/ageing when ageing must be active (Biggs, 2001), and the fundamental incompatibility of active ageing with certain cultural worldviews (Ranzijn, 2010), as a couple of examples.

This aim of promoting independence and participative activity determines the forms of social care services on offer. Those geared towards maintaining independence: prevention, early assessment and life planning; and continuing independent living when care or health needs arise: the push towards individual budgets for example, denoting a movement in social care from concern with protection to one of enablement (enabling continued activity and social contribution).

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79 Levitas (1998) claims there is a hierarchy of activity evident in New Labour policy with paid employment the most desirable and valued, followed by unpaid voluntary community involvement, with unpaid domestic work and ‘private’ family activities the least valued.
It also however, acts to govern the parameters within which individuals must make sense of themselves and their lives. Thus activity – understood as useful participation in the collective – is not intended to merely describe what we do, but more importantly to connote who we are: what our future lives look like has already been mapped out, but this future must be forcibly brought into being by oneself. We are not therefore constructed as beings active within a collective, but active beings required to manipulate our potential for the stability of the collective.

So, my argument has been that the focus on independence, achieved through outward activities as an expression of this active self, arises due to the value placed on agency and self-determination used to signify a singular sovereign unit that is able to orchestrate their own life with minimal outside influence.

A singular, linear and future orientated self

I argued in Chapter 5 that the policies’ portrayal of the self as reflexive - mutable, transient, and so in need of management - did not translate to an ability to become anything. Instead the possibilities of the self are constrained by the assumption that it is essentially singular, linear and future focused. The potential of a flexible self is therefore cut short by the requirement, expectation or assumption that it is the present actions of an individual that construct their future, and furthermore, that a successful future is created through rational decision making and action. Therefore despite the future being prioritised over current concerns (with social care strategies focusing on the prevention of future ills rather than solving current problems for example), the future is used as a vehicle for the governance of the present. This concern with the future acts to moderate and modify what we do today. Still more significantly, it organises our relationship to our own life-course, by ensuring we are accountable for present and future problems. This creates a governmental strategy with two interrelated strands. Firstly, our current conduct is managed through both the expectation that it has a direct effect on any future situation and the responsibilizing pressure of achieving a good life. Secondly, current problems are marked as a sign of a previous failure of self-management, necessitating and justifying intervention to help bring about the changes required. Thus as explored in various
places in this thesis, social problems appear as malfunctions of individual life
management that become ‘social’ problems only due to the impact individual lives
have on society as a whole: a problem for society, not of society.

Constructing people as individuals, as unique from and separated from those
around them, whose life has coherency only within an isolated, forward focused life-
course, is vital for these future orientated governmental strategies to operate.
Constituting subjectivity as a narrativity personalises this, linking the intricacies of a
personal life to the social advantage, or conversely its insecurity. I have argued in the
thesis that, contrary to its presentation in the policies, understanding or experiencing
the self as a narrativity is not essential: it may feel natural or make sense to some, but
this does not make it a necessary element of humanity, nor a helpful one. A problem
following from this version of the self is the inadequacy with which it can respond to
uncertainties, and its disregard for the impact external events and global forces have
on the life-course and personal futures. The influence of global economics on daily
lives is an example of this: recent global economic activities, outside of local or
individual control, have had wide-reaching and disastrous effects on, for example,
private pensions, job security, health and social care services and government benefits.
Individual action, rational decision making, even measured risk-taking, could not have
protected or prepared an individual from having their life redrawn by these events. Yet
the self that is constructed within these policy documents - built upon an ability to
plan, prepare and have the power to bring about a certain future - is not designed to
make sense of, or counter events of which they can have no control and limited
knowledge, yet are capable of rending their lives apart.

Furthermore this focus on the individual self coincides with an expectation that
personal development is the most effective form of social security. Thus despite
personal lives and futures being inseparably woven in with events of which individuals
themselves are often not part and have no knowledge, the insistence (and myriad
strategies based upon the notion) that working on the self to reveal its potential will
create a safe personal and collective future, is severely inadequate in its conception
and response to the interplay of factors that contribute both to social ills and personal
needs.
Responsibilizing relations between the individual and the collective

The dynamic and complex relationship between an individual and the population has recurred as a primary issue through the thesis. Initially I demonstrated how the traditionally personal concerns of later life and being old translate into both a reason for and a strategy of population governance, and that furthermore, the construction of old age – who an old person is thought to be – cannot be detached from the perceived needs of society. This mutually constitutive relationship highlights the impossible position of a subject as a sovereign singular unit. Since an individual is required to understand and act upon itself by gaining knowledge of the collective, the individual cannot be known in its isolation but conversely only through its measurement against mass data. This is suggestive of a causal connection between individual and collective fates: the welfare of individuals and society is taken to be circular as individual behaviour and well-being are presented as having a direct impact on the overall welfare of the population, which in turn impacts upon (and is used as a sign of) individual happiness. Thus whilst dependent on the appropriate behaviour and life management of others for their own well-being, individuals are simultaneously positioned as solely responsible for their own successful ageing.

Some of the consequences arising from this understanding of individuals as concurrently self-determining and responsible for the fate and fortune of the collective population (of which they are inevitably a part) have already been noted in this concluding discussion, including a significant ethical shift from a collective responsibility to an individual responsibility for social problems. These strategies that act to responsibilise individual life management have, then, the effect of containing and constraining ways of living, ways of understanding the life-course, and how it is possible to develop a sense of self.

I have argued throughout the thesis that whilst many of the governmental strategies and policy interventions claim to promote and respect diversity and difference, they act instead to homogenise, demonstrated through the emphasis on standardisation. Limiting ways of ageing, being old and managing life will inevitably lead to the alienation of many: those unable or unwilling to live their later life in line
with active independence, or unable to view themselves or their lives as a linear narrative, unfolding toward an ideal future. Alongside the possibility of making services both inappropriate and inaccessible, this results in personal and public relationships – those between family members, neighbours, citizens – being structured and evaluated primarily in terms of their social and economic utility. That is, the only subjectivity open to people within the policies is one that understands relationships in regards to what they (can) produce. The inability or unwillingness to participate and develop personal and social relations in line with the policies’ complex subjectivity of an ‘individual within a collective’, leads to the moralisation of an individual’s role in contributing to a failure of society: an individual is not merely socially passive but inconsiderate, selfish, awkward, incapable, irrational, a burden. Thus the bending or breaking of the boundaries set within these policies by an individual ageing, being old, or conducting their life in ways that do not adhere to the underlying normative rationalities, becomes reconfigured as an individual imposing limits on others by contributing to social insecurity.

This is troubling because difference becomes associated with dangerousness - dangerous to social stability and security for example: living according to alternative values and standards that conflict with normative rationalities is problematized on the grounds of their difference and incompatibility. Despite the claims in the policies to value difference, and to demonstrate this through aiming to deliver person-centred and needs-led care, the thesis has shown that this is possible only within a very limited framework, where diversity means selecting amongst practices that stem from the same rationalities and value base. As I argued in Chapter 2, however, genuine respecting difference must allow difference of values, rationalities and goals – a different foundation and aim, not merely multiple ways of achieving the same end. Without this, discourses of individuality and governmental strategies that utilise diversity, in effect pare down and impoverish life.

**Developments in governmentality: biopolitics and the study of life**

Biopolitics has taken on an increasing prominence both within and alongside governmentality literature. It has been taken up and advanced in a variety of ways,
opening new developments in the possible directions of governmentality analyses, whilst also generating some criticisms concerning its analytical limitations. Of prime concern is the way ‘life’ has been used and conceptualised by governmentality studies, including the apparent neglect of both existence and non-human relations and nature.

Lemke (2011) claims two strands of how biopolitics has been utilised can be distinguished: i) focused on as a mode of politics, where the central questions are: how does the object of enquiry function and what counter forces does it mobilize?, and ii) as an interest in the substance of life, concerned with enquiries into the meaning of life within the current, or a particular, political technical network. This thesis is clearly situated within the first of these strands where, similarly to Foucault (Lemke, 2011), biopolitics has been understood as a facet of governmentality and therefore focused upon human individuals and populations. Lemke (2011) accuses this approach of being short-sighted to the realities of contemporary lives as it ignores problematizations of nature and the environment (and arguably also technology) and the role these have in the production of the human species. Furthermore, Lemke argues the emphasis on human bodies and associated conduct of human behaviour, paints an overly simplistic understanding of the boundaries between the human and non-human. He elaborates:

A new biopolitical level is clearly present both beyond and beneath the levels of the individual and the populace; it is grounded in an expanded knowledge of the body and biological processes. Within this altered representational regime, the body is less a physical substrate or anatomical machine than an informational network.

(2011, p.172)

Whilst there are places in the thesis, including for example the discussion of dividuals in Chapter 5, that have analysed how the person is reconstructed and known through data, this was considered within the analytical perspective suggested by the first strand delineated by Lemke above, and so did not take the opportunity to explore the relationship between human and non-human. Instead, the analytical perspective was

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80 Lemke (2011) details the wide spectrum within which biopolitics has been utilised, discussing the different approaches of Agamben (1998), Esposito (2008) and Hardt and Negri (2000).
used to extend an understanding of the function of this reconfiguration and its political effects. This approach is wholly in line with my stated aims and intentions for the thesis, but it does expose a gap in the scope of the analysis with important questions concerning this type of ‘life’ – how it enables a person to live and impacts upon social care relations and practices – left as yet unexplored.

This simultaneously highlights an avenue worthy of future investigation in social care policy and practice analysis, and one that is perhaps urgently needed if we agree with Parton’s (2008) representation of the movement of social work and social care away from the ‘social’ and towards the ‘informational’. Parton argues that social work now operates primarily on the terrain of the ‘informational’, where social workers are expected to think and operate in ways similar to (and also by utilising) the database: gathering, generating, storing and monitoring information about individuals. He argues the significance of this shift lies in how it structures what it is possible to know; he claims that it is causing the embodied subject to disappear leaving in its place only ‘a variety of surface information’ (2008, p.263), leading to what Haggerty and Ericson (2000, in Parton, 2008) have termed the ‘decorporealized body’. At the very least, Parton suggests, this demands that the interrelationship between the social and the technological is rethought within social work and social care policy and practice, as the ‘actor’ and ‘network’ can no longer be considered as separate.

This focus on life – specifically questioning what exactly is this life that is being governed or analysed - is thought by Fassin (2011) to be missing from the governmentality approach. He argues that governmentality is not about life at all, only populations, but that the question of life – of existence and being alive - cannot be side-lined when studying and analysing dominant rationalities detailing how we can and ought to be living. Firstly, Fassin notes, questions of life cannot be separated from questions of inequality. The question of inequality was not explicitly broached in this thesis but I endeavoured to provide a sound argument exposing how the discourses within the policy documents work against the establishment of a diverse range of ways of living, and act to both problematize and attribute blame to the individual for being ‘in need’, ‘at risk’, ‘a risk’, or in some form of distress. Fassin goes on to draw on Canguilhem to demonstrate that the question of life goes beyond the issue of multiple
lifestyles, to the very question of existence: he gives the example that the average life span is not a biological norm but an example of how collective choices – various decisions made within health and social care, employment and social security, or humanitarian aid – allow some people to live less long than others. He continues:

Within this new problematization, the issue is not to grasp how life is fashioned, regulated and normalized – what governmentality is about. It is to comprehend, through a very different and almost inverse approach, the complex, uncertain and ambiguous articulation of life at the heart of our systems of values and actions, of our moral and political economies.

(2011, p.196)

For Fassin this requires a focus on ‘being alive’ rather than on ‘living beings’ (p.197), leading to an investigation into the sort of life that is being taken for granted in the governing process.

These developments and criticisms highlight significant areas in need of further exploration in order to gain an understanding of the lives and relations at the heart of current social care policies and practices. The recent configurations of biopolitics have indicated a need to take a step back to analyse the very substances we assume ourselves to be dealing with in social care. This may be vital considering that social work and social care are at their most basic, concerned with life and the living, and especially in light of current directions within the field as explored by Parton (2008). It might well be suggested that whilst the ‘embodied person’ is thought to be paramount within social care and social work, the technologies and strategies of care employed do not reflect this.

**Future research directions**

Alongside the issues of life itself, discussed above, two further areas outside the scope of this study, or following on from it, suggest themselves as both interesting.

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81 Fassin (2011) discusses two pieces of his own research regarding the administration of refugees in France and the management of AIDS in South Africa, to argue that currently physical existence or ‘being alive’ has the optimal value in these societies.
and worthwhile to investigate. Firstly, researching over a period of years policy that was in place at the start of this study, necessarily means that I am researching the past: New Labour are now in opposition to the Coalition Government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. A health and social care White Paper *Caring for our future* (DH, 2012) has already been published by the Coalition proposing changes to the care and support system. Its opening paragraph of the Foreword states:

> We all want to live a full and active life, to live independently and to play an active part in local communities. Supporting people to live this way is a central ambition of the Coalition Government

(DH, 2012, p.3)

This preliminary glance suggests that the Coalition Government has not brought with it a radical shift in the discourses or governmental strategies discussed in this thesis. Reading on, strategies similar to those found in the New Labour policies are put forward in the White Paper including a focus on information and advice, concentration on care markets to fulfil care and support needs, expanding the take up of personal budgets and Direct Payments, and a focus on well-being and independence as a preventative strategy. But of course a thoroughgoing and nuanced analysis would be needed in order to explore any changes. Charting the implementation, developments and changes in this policy arena would provide an interesting comparison to, and extension of, the thread of this thesis.

The second area of interest, related but beyond the scope of this thesis, would be to study from a governmentality perspective, the form and nature of relationships of care (both formal and informal) within social care interventions, strategies and technologies. As was briefly discussed in the Introduction, this thesis partly stemmed from an interest in what happened to ‘caring relationships’ when they became part of technologies of social care. Primarily this was based upon a premise that caring relationships, understood within social care policies and practices, are rationalised through a utility ethic and not an ethic of care. There are many implications for social work and social care services if this is the case, regarding what services are being, or

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82 P.13
should be, provided: who should be helped and how? The questions raised in the discussion on biopolitics above concerning the substance of ‘life’, seem to be particularly prominent for this issue: what ‘life’ is being assumed? what forms of ‘being alive’ are prioritised? and who or what is, in turn, sacrificed- allowed to live less long or in an impoverished state? Such a study could be conducted as a discourse analysis of policy or other key documents. But it would also provide a fruitful opportunity to apply governmentality analysis to an empirical study, examining the vital face-to-face micro-technologies within daily social care practices such as assessment, the provision of information and advice, and procedures of record-keeping.

Concluding reflections on the contribution of this study

Governmentality has provided a rich and useful form of analysis enabling the function and consequences of policy processes and strategies concerned with ageing and later life, to be explored in a revealing, original and useful manner. Furthermore, distinctively combining governmentality with an archaeological discursive approach has allowed this thesis to demonstrate and emphasise the practical nature and application of this form of analysis of power relations.

There is much that this thesis does not do. In particular, for example, it might fall prey to McKee’s (2009) criticism that governmentality analyses rely too heavily on discursive analysis of key documents, creating a disconnection between the study of specific mentalities of rule and the social relations in which they are embedded. Certainly, approaching non-textually based forms of research using an analytics of governmentality would be an interesting and worthwhile endeavour: there are many levels and points of access to studying the conduct of conduct, and applying this to a micro-politics of individual or group relations, or social care practices and interventions, would provide another dimension both to understanding the uses and scope of governmentality as a form of analysis, alongside the processes and functions of the relations under analysis.

However, whilst recognising a textual analysis can only offer knowledge on a facet of life, specifically related to the form and area of analysis (much in the same way as an empirical study would be limited), social relations do not exist in isolation from
the mentalities of rule under analysis, and furthermore, a discursive approach allows their connections to be studied.

Drawing on these aspects of Foucauldian theory has enabled a distinctive and fresh contribution to the analyses of the impact social care policies, related to ageing, have on everyday lives. Significantly this study has demonstrated the scope and reach of this form of government: extending beyond those entering or living in old age, and also beyond those who already in some way ‘use’ the care system. Concurrently, ageing policies cause us to be judged and governed not only by our current situation but, significantly, as constantly potential sources of non-production and inactivity. The governmental technologies found within the policies therefore succeed in their aim to be inclusive, universal and continuous. But they also indicate a need for future exploration, to determine whether the rationalities on which they rest are able to provide a tenable ethical foundation for social work and social care practices.
References


Department of Health (2006) *Our health, our care, our say: a new direction for community services*. TSO.


Department of Health (2009) *Shaping the future of care together*. TSO.

Department of Health (2010) *Building the National Care Service*. TSO.

Department of Health (2012) *Caring for our future*. TSO.


Appendix 1

Policies

The eight key policy documents analysed in this thesis were all published by the New Labour government between the years 2001-2010. They were produced by a variety of Departments and take different problems and audiences as their target. Below I have set out a synopsis of these policy documents to provide some background details of their self-stated purpose and aims. Within this I will demonstrate their heterogeneity regarding their origin and intentions alongside highlighting their points of connection arising from the shared rationalities from which the various strategies emerge.

National service framework for older people (2001) (NSF)

Produced by the Department of Health, NSF is the first policy of the New Labour government directed specifically at services for older people. It focuses on services within both the NHS and social care, so whilst much of the policy discusses health related issues such as hospital care, falls and strokes, it also introduces significant directions for social care including person-centred care, active living and a focus on the local in terms of service delivery. It sets out to support independence, promote good health and start a culture change to abolish discrimination in older people’s services (p.i), primarily by claiming to place the needs of older people at the centre of services. The need for a new and comprehensive strategy for older people’s services is situated within a vision of a mobile society that needs to keep up with new concepts of old age and demographic change (p.2).


Produced by the Department of Work and Pensions, OA constitutes the first interdepartmental social policy focused on dealing with the ageing population as a social and economic problem. Its scale and remit therefore extends beyond issues of
social care, to include the related areas of work and finances, public services, housing and so on, as areas of concern and consequence. As an example of how it views the issue of ageing as affecting all aspects of personal and social life, its major government partners include (but are not limited to) the Departments of: Culture, Media and Sport; Education and Skills; Health; Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; Transport; Trade and Industry; Home Office; Social Exclusion Unit. It aims to set out a ‘coherent strategy’ (p.xiii) focused on dealing with the changing demographic across society, and is therefore directed at businesses and individuals alongside the public sector, and future policy-makers. Two of the three priorities it sets out focus upon changing the roles and responsibilities of the older population: higher employment rates by changing the workplace to make it more accessible for older workers, and strategies to enable older people to play a ‘full and active role in society’, (p.xiii), termed ‘Active Ageing’. Significantly the third priority relates to enabling everyone to maintain independence and control over their lives, alluding to its preventative ethos.

Volume two uses a variety of research and statistics to determine what life is like for the current generation of old people, and suggests future trends to predict what life may be like for the next generation.

OA positions itself as an important keystone not only for older people or older people’s services, but for identifying the direction we, as a whole society, should be heading: namely the promotion of activity (participation) and independence. The scale and scope of the policy is therefore wide reaching both in the domains it attempts to govern, as well as the audience it aims to influence.

Our health, our care, our say: a new direction for community services (2006) (OHOCOS)

Produced by the Department of Health, this policy presents a reform of health and social care for the whole nation, specifically developing the use of community services and setting out the need for this change. Whilst not focused solely on old age or later life, it positions itself as a response to current demographic changes (p.1). An ageing
population is linked with health problems such as obesity to demonstrate the new challenges that arise specifically for health and social care that will need to be met with ‘profound change’ (p.4).

Whilst the scope of the policy is therefore smaller and has a narrower area of reform than OA, the strategies and values devised to achieve these are perhaps unsurprisingly similar: to promote health and independence; to increase choice and accessibility (allowing individuals control over their lives); and a focus on prevention and support to enable this.

_A sure start to later life: ending inequalities for older people (2006) (SS)_

A report by the Social Exclusion Unit (ODPM), SS focuses on the older person in society. Unlike OA which looks at the effects an ageing population has on society, SS details the problems encountered by older people in society, leading to their ‘exclusion’, and contains strategies to combat these. Tackling material aspects such as poverty and housing, as well as relational and emotional issues such as cultural attitudes to ageing and isolation, the main strategies of SS are focused on the individual: promoting opportunity and increasing well-being, again through centralising activity and independence.

_Independence, choice and risk: a guide to best practice in supported decision making (2007) (ICR)_

Produced by the Department of Health, the scope of this document differs from the others detailed here as ICR is a practice guide for those involved in supporting adults using health and social care services. ICR therefore has a narrow intended audience and purpose, and its content reflects this. It has been included as it responds directly to the claims in OHOCOS that people want choice and control in their lives, by giving advice regarding how this can and should occur in social care services. Alongside this it touches upon the tension inherent in social care between self-determination and care
framed in terms of protection. This document sets out expectations of the individual, of lifestyle(s), and of social relations within social care services.

Shaping the future of care together (2009) (SFC)

Produced by the Department of Health, this Green Paper focuses on the provision of care and support, in particular suggesting the formation of a National Care Service (NCS). Again, whilst SFC is not solely interested in old age, the need for a reform of care and support services is attributed to longer lives and demographic change, coupled with an expectation for more choice in later life. Thus the values the NCS would be based upon coincide with those found in the other policies detailed here: support to remain independent and increase well-being; strategies to encourage/enable activity; emphasis on preventative, support-based care.

Building a society for all ages (2009) (BSFA)

A follow-up from OA, BSFA is produced by the Department for Work and Pensions, and so similarly aims to set out changes that need to be made in/by society to ensure its security and prosperity against the challenges brought by an ageing population. The scope of the policy is equally as wide as OA, including economy, public services, community, and redefining ageing; and its strategies similarly focused on prevention and future planning.

Building the National Care Service (2010) (BNCS)

BNCS, a White Paper following on from SFC produced by the Department of Health, details how a National Care Service could be possible, and why it is a necessary reform. Central to the argument for the need for a NCS is the ageing population. BNCS is set out as the product of a National debate regarding how ‘we’, as its members, want society to be organised in light of the social and economic challenges longer lives bring
and the expectation of comprehensive welfare and expanded choice based upon market principles. This policy therefore details how (in this case the primarily economic) issues of old age become folded back onto the population as a whole. Expectations of civic responsibility are therefore emphasised in this policy.