An economic model of whistle-blower policy

Heyes, A and Kapur, S (2007) An economic model of whistle-blower policy. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 25 (1). pp. 157-182. ISSN 8756-6222

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Abstract

“Whistle-blowing” is an increasingly common element of regulatory enforcement programs and one that is encouraged by recent legislation in the United States and elsewhere. We examine how responsive regulators should be to whistle-blower tip-offs and how severe should penalties be for wrongdoers detected in this way. Competing psychological theories as to what motivates employees to become whistle-blowers are operationalized as alternative behavioral heuristics. Optimal policy depends upon the motives attributed to whistle-blowers—which of the theories you subscribe to—but is not in general characterized by maximal penalties nor routine pursuit of complaints, even when pursuit is costless. (JEL K42, K32)

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of Business, Management and Economics > Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic theory. Demography > HB0071 Economics as a science. Relation to other subjects
Depositing User: Catrina Hey
Date Deposited: 11 Oct 2013 11:24
Last Modified: 11 Oct 2013 11:24
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/46653
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