Genealogical Analysis of the Dispositive of Humanitarianism/Trusteeship: From Colonial Administration to Peacebuilding

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Statement

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been submitted, either in the same or different form, to this or any other University for a degree.

Signature: ........................................................................................................
By using genealogy, this study analyzes the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship, which has constituted the power relationship between trustees and target societies and fields of intervention of power in international society. This dispositive has been reproduced from the colonial period to the present. However, this study does not attempt a complete history of humanitarianism and trusteeship. Its aim is to follow the formation and reproduction of power relations in international society. In this study, ‘trusteeship’ refers to a relation of inequality and a field of intervention, rather than a specific or particular historical practice. Thus, the concept of trusteeship includes various practices such as colonial administration, development assistance, and transitional administration. Equally, the category of ‘humanitarianism’ also includes practices such as protection from anarchy, relief from oppression, and freedom from poverty, which are above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. Examining IR theories which employ genealogy, this study adopts sociological genealogy as a methodology. Previous studies on new trusteeship tend to presume that new trusteeship is rooted only in liberal internationalism. However, this study argues that it is underpinned not only by liberal internationalism but
also by humanitarian discourse. Furthermore, some existing works on humanitarian intervention and new trusteeship presume that there are two kinds of humanitarianism: ‘humanitarianism separate from politics’ and ‘humanitarianism abused by politics.’ The former means that politics is just a tool for humanitarian purposes; and the latter means that humanitarian discourse is a convenient cloak for political interests. This dichotomy leads to the distinction between ‘good trusteeship embodying humanitarianism’ and ‘bad trusteeship abusing humanitarianism.’ This study aims to show that this dichotomy is highly questionable and to indicate the co-constitutive nature of trusteeship and humanitarianism. The language of trusteeship harks back to the colonial period even while the humanitarianism of today tends to reject political and colonial content. While trusteeship requires strong moral justification, humanitarianism contributes to the constitution of trusteeship when it attempts to alleviate human suffering. Although humanitarianism has represented trusteeship as universal and impartial, trusteeship has tended to expand and defend the interests of particular communities in international society. This study indicates the inherent danger of trusteeship and humanitarianism.
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Introduction

International territorial administrations in Cambodia (1992), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Eastern Slavonia (1995), Kosovo (1999) and East Timor (1999) demonstrated the unequal relationship between international peacebuilders and target societies in that the former governed the latter without democratic legitimacy. This relationship is eerily similar to the relationship between colonizers and colonized in terms of paternalism. Equally, the relationship between donor countries (developed countries) and recipient countries (developing countries) in development aid might be put in the same category. Since the colonial period, this kind of unequal relationship has been reproduced. Northern countries have demonstrated a tendency to intervene in Southern countries. How have fields of intervention of power been formed in international society? When did it emerge? What contributes to the reproduction of these unequal relations?

This study starts from the hypothesis that the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship has reproduced relations of inequality and facilitated intervention. The meaning of ‘trusteeship’ in this study is different from that of trusteeship in the historical study of the British Empire. According to Andrew Porter, the idea of trusteeship is the idea ‘of a responsibility to contribute to the protection, welfare and advancement of non-Europeans caught up in the growth of British influence and control’ (Porter 1988: 36). On the other hand, the term of ‘trusteeship’ in this study refers to a relation of inequality, rather than a specific or particular historical practice. The concept of trusteeship includes various practices such as colonial administration, development assistance, and transitional
administration. In trusteeship, trustees intervene in target societies (wards) using various tactics. However, this intervention is not just based on military power; rather, it is legitimized through manipulation of the representations of target societies. Humanitarianism contributes to this manipulation by representing target societies as suffering from pathologies, such as savageness, violence, poverty, and conflicts. I name this process 'pathologization.' By the concept of 'pathologization,' I attempt to describe a process in which humanitarianism attributes root causes of human suffering to the nature of target societies. Subsequently, humanitarianism prepares ‘prescriptions’ to address the root causes of human suffering. Trusteeship has been established in the relationship between trustees and target societies. Pathologization constitutes this relationship. And trusteeship has been embodied in the prescriptions. The concept of 'humanitarianism' thus is not just the direct relief of suffering. (However, I do not mean that humanitarianism has always contributed to the construction of power relations. Rather, humanitarianism can operate without relations of domination or undermining sovereignty when it does not have the ambition of removing the root causes of suffering and is not involved in pathologization.)

While humanitarianism contributes to the constitution of trusteeship by pathologization, trusteeship deeply influences the forms of humanitarianism. Pathologization has often been affected by the culture and socio-political systems of the powerful, who are in a position to dispense benefits to others. And when humanitarianism constitutes prescriptions for pathology, it tends to exploit power relations in international society. In this sense, trusteeship and humanitarianism are mutually constitutive.
The relationship between humanitarianism and politics has been a major question for IR theorists since humanitarian intervention started to attract their attention. Many existing works on humanitarian intervention and new trusteeship tend to presume that there are two kinds of humanitarianism: ‘humanitarianism separate from politics’ and ‘humanitarianism abused by politics.’ The former means that politics is just a tool for humanitarian purposes; and the latter means that humanitarian discourse is a convenient cloak for political interests. This dichotomy leads to the distinction between ‘good trusteeship embodying humanitarianism’ and ‘bad trusteeship abusing humanitarianism.’ This study aims to show that this dichotomy is highly questionable and to indicate the co-constitutive nature of trusteeship and humanitarianism.

Humanitarianism and trusteeship have altered their forms across space and time. In the 19th century, trusteeship was actualized as colonial administration (colonial trusteeship). Around the time of the First World War, trusteeship was internationalized (internationalization of trusteeship). In the 1940s, colonial trusteeship was transformed into development trusteeship. And in the late 20th century, it was embodied as peacebuilding (peacebuilding trusteeship or new trusteeship). Equally, in the 19th century, humanitarianism identified savageness as a pathology of dependent societies, and since the 1940s, it has interpreted poverty as a pathology of Southern countries. After the Cold War, Southern countries were represented as suffering from internal and regional conflicts. Despite the transformation of their forms, humanitarianism and trusteeship have continuously composed the dispositive which constitutes relations of inequality and facilitates intervention.
In order to prove this claim, this study traces the history of the dispositive of trusteeship and humanitarianism from the 19th century to the present, drawing on the insights of Michel Foucault’s critical theory. Foucault developed genealogical analysis for the purpose of the revelation of power relations after he realized that his archeological analysis was not suitable for this intention. As David Campbell argues, genealogy ‘seeks to trace how such rituals of power arose, took shape, gained importance, and effected politics’ (Campbell 1992: 5). The aim of genealogy is not to write ‘true’ history but to demonstrate ‘the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself’ (Foucault 1980a: 147). It is ‘to recognize the events of history, its jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats – the basis of all beginnings, atavisms, and heredities’ (Foucault 1984: 80). Thereby, it is possible to deconstruct the normative authority of universalized and naturalized power structure.

In genealogical analysis, Foucault focused on ‘dispositive.’ Dispositive was explained by himself as the following:

‘What I’m trying to pick out with this term [dispositive] is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the [dispositive]. The [dispositive] itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements.’ (Foucault 1980b: 194)
Power relations in a society are constituted not only by discourse but also by non-discursive practice. The concept of dispositive can shed light on this structure. By using this concept, this study analyzes the formation of relations of inequality and fields of intervention in international society. The main aim of this study is to demonstrate that humanitarianism and trusteeship have formed the dispositive that reappears cyclically and changes its form across space and time, reproducing relations of inequality and facilitating intervention via pathologization and prescription. However, the aim of the genealogical analysis of dispositive is not a causal analysis but to allow a reflective approach to intervention.

According to Foucault, genealogy is a ‘history of present’ which ‘explicitly and self-reflectively begins with a diagnosis of the current situation’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 119). The central concern of this study is the power relations of peacebuilding and its origin. As stated above, this study suggests the hypothesis that humanitarianism and trusteeship have comprised the dispositive that reproduced relations of inequality and facilitated intervention. This study will show that the power relations of peacebuilding are also underpinned by the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship.

The history of the relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism began in the 19th century. The dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship developed in the British Empire which possessed various colonies in India and Africa. As Ch. 2 will argue, India was a case of existing rule that subsequently required humanitarianism as justification. Its justification marked the beginning of the relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism. The Indian population was
considered oppressed by indigenous despotism and savage religion. Therefore, the liberation of the population from such oppression by modernization was suggested. After this enterprise failed in the Mutiny, the justification of colonial trusteeship changed. Instead of liberation, the protection of Indian indigenous society from ‘anarchy’ was advocated as a new justification of trusteeship.

In contrast, African colonies were not administrated by the British Empire during the 19th century, though nominally colonized on the map. However, European traders and colonists had already come to African coasts and had contacts with native people. As the slave trade and invasion of native communities by European colonists increased, the anti-slavery movement and the native protection movement began in Europe. As Ch. 3 will argue, British humanitarians such as anti-slavery activists and native protection activists attempted to put native communities under the British Empire in order to protect native people from slave traders and European colonists. They were intentionally and unintentionally strengthening British colonial rule in Africa. Thus, humanitarianism contributed to the constitution of trusteeship.

Around the time of the First World War, as Ch. 4 will argue, the legitimacy of colonial empires was undermined by accusations of the abuse of native peoples by intellectuals and politicians. However, these critics of empire did not cast doubt on the necessity of trusteeship, presuming that non-European people needed security for life and civilization. As colonial empires had abused the human dignity of native populations, the critics of empire claimed that international trusteeship was better in humanitarian terms. Moreover, humanitarians who accused colonial empires of abusing the
human dignity of native people strengthened the theology of indirect rule by linking it to incipient cultural relativism. Thus, in this period, colonial trusteeship was criticized and, at the same time, reproduced.

As Ch. 5 will discuss, during the 1940s the idea of colonial trusteeship had to be revised because it met bitter resistance from local societies in colonies and heavy criticism from outside. As a result, the idea of development trusteeship emerged in the British Empire. Development trusteeship was characterized by the discourse of ‘poverty,’ a kind of humanitarian discourse, and expected to contribute to the reestablishment of legitimacy. Subsequently, international aid donors such as the World Bank in the 1960s inherited development trusteeship and expanded their power in developing countries by using the discourse of poverty. In this way, humanitarianism contributed to the constitution of development trusteeship in this period.

Ch. 6 will analyze the process in which the discourse and practice of peacebuilding trusteeship appeared in the early 1990s. After the Cold War, Southern countries were pathologized through the notions of ‘failed states,’ ‘civil wars,’ and violence itself. All these notions were interpreted as internal to Southern countries. This pathologization led to new prescriptions such as liberal peacebuilding and responsibility to protect. These discourses of peacebuilding trusteeship were underpinned not only by liberal internationalism but also by humanitarianism. On the other hand, while the practice of peacebuilding trusteeship was also underpinned by humanitarianism, it was affected by the geopolitical interests of big powers. The peace keeping operation (PKO) in Cambodia is considered as the first case of large scale territorial administration in the 1990s. In this case,
peacebuilding trusteeship had not been conducted until the end of the Cold War because of the geopolitical interests of big powers, despite mass murder by the Khmer Rouge. However, when peacebuilding trusteeship was established in the early 1990s, it required justification through humanitarian discourse because transitional administration by the UN was undemocratic. Similarly, in the Bosnian and Kosovo cases, international peacebuilders provided governing functions in the transitional administration. These undemocratic regimes were also underpinned not only by liberal internationalism but also by humanitarian discourse. However, it did not mean that they were free from the geopolitical interests of big powers.

To tell the story of the co-constitutive nature of trusteeship and humanitarianism in this way means to argue against presumptions of previous studies on new trusteeship. It is presumed that new trusteeship has been underpinned only by liberal internationalism and that trusteeship can be classified into two categories: good trusteeship embodying humanitarianism and bad trusteeship abusing humanitarianism. This study will argue that trusteeship has to some extent been underpinned and constituted by humanitarian discourse. However, as this study will indicate, when humanitarianism contributed to the constitution of trusteeship, it was political. Humanitarianism has often been affected by the culture and socio-political systems of the powerful, who are in a position to dispense benefits to others. Therefore, it is questionable to separate good trusteeship from bad trusteeship in terms of humanitarianism.

Before proceeding, four caveats are needed. First, I do not attempt a complete history of humanitarianism and trusteeship. Rather, this study is
episodic like Foucault’s genealogy. Also, the main aim of this study is not to explore the transformation of the meanings of ‘trusteeship’ and ‘humanitarianism.’ Rather, it is to analyze the generation and development of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. Therefore, a complete history of humanitarianism and trusteeship is not necessary. Second, this study does not intend to provide comprehensive policy evaluation. Although this study will analyze the policy discourses of development and peacebuilding, it will not examine the results of these policies. Rather, my main aim is to explicate the historical constitution of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. Third, the goal of this study is not to suggest any alternative policy of new trusteeship. Rather, it aims to show how the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship has been reproduced in international society. Fourth, as stated above, the aim of this study is not a causal analysis. Rather, by focusing on the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship, this study seeks to allow a reflective approach to intervention.
Before starting the analysis, this chapter will review previous studies and establish a framework for the analysis. The first half of this chapter will show the missing link and hidden assumptions of previous studies. Debates about new trusteeship have focused on the ‘liberal internationalism’ of the new trusteeship. Not only proponents of new trusteeship but also its critics argue that new trusteeship is premised on the framework of liberal internationalism. However, this study will argue that new trusteeship is underpinned not only by liberal internationalism but also by humanitarianism. Proponents of new trusteeship tend to justify new trusteeship by referring to the humanitarian aspects of new trusteeship. Moreover, they implicitly presume that trusteeship can be classified into two categories – good trusteeship and bad trusteeship – according to its relationship with humanitarianism. This study will argue that this assumption is seriously debatable. The second half of this chapter will establish a framework for the analysis to follow the formation and development of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. It will reexamine the genealogical approach in IR studies and introduce the concepts of ‘pathologization,’ ‘prescription,’ and ‘circular process of trusteeship.’

1. A Missing Link and Hidden Assumptions in Previous Studies
1.1 Humanitarianism as a Missing Link
International peacebuilders were provided governing functions in some large-scale peacebuilding operations (transitional administration) in the 1990s. These operations are named ‘new trusteeship’ because of the unequal relationship between international peacebuilders and target societies and the supreme authority of international peacebuilders. Liberal peacebuilding theorists have argued that new trusteeship is underpinned by liberal internationalism. Liberal internationalism presumes that ‘a liberal international peace evolves through the political and economic liberalization of states combined with global trade, international cooperation and respect for international law’ (Richmond 2009: 590). Roland Paris states that:

‘A single paradigm – liberal internationalism – appears to guide the work of most international agencies engaged in peacebuilding. The central tenet of this paradigm is the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy.’ (Paris 1997: 56)

John Heathershaw also observes that peacebuilding has been premised on liberalism, although he acknowledges that there are some variations of liberal peacebuilding (Heathershaw 2008). As he states, ‘The UN’s “post-conflict peacebuilding” emerged amid a reawakening of liberal internationalist ideals in the International Community in the aftermath of the Cold War’ (ibid: 599). As Francis Fukuyama (1992) observes, the idea of liberal democracy seems to have become a dominant ideology since the end of the Cold War. He insists that there are few viable alternatives to liberal
democracy. Peacebuilding is interpreted as a vehicle of liberal democracy and a best path to worldwide peace (Doyle 1999: 62).

Several scholars critical of new trusteeship raise questions about this framework of liberal peacebuilding. They argue that liberal democracy has no universal applicability (Parekh 1993: 169; Grissom 2010; MacGinty 2010) and that liberal peacebuilding is too elitist and paternalistic (Bain 2003; Richmond 2004; Chandler 2004). However, they share with liberal peace theorists the presumption that peacebuilding is underpinned by liberal internationalism (e.g. Richmond 2009: 560-561; Pugh 2004: 47-48). Kristoffer Liden, Roger MacGinty, and Oliver P. Richmond argue that:

‘Reflecting the Western-led, international political climate after the Cold War, the various peace operations of the last two decades have sought to build sustainable forms of peace through political, social and economic liberalization. As postulated by liberal constitutionalism and internationalism, these efforts are expected to contribute to international as well as domestic peace by adding the liberalized state to a pacific union of liberal democracies. Their aim is to reproduce the (neo)-liberal (meaning a market democracy) sovereign state and a liberal normative and institutional system of government and international governance.’ (Liden, MacGinty, and Richmond 2009: 587)

Some critics of new trusteeship identify the liberalism of new trusteeship as being similar to colonial trusteeship. Mark Duffield and Vernon Hewitt (2009) state that:
While the racial and hegemonic aspects of colonialism are now routinely rejected, its liberal alter ego lives on unchallenged and continues to uncritically shape our experience of the world. Colonialism and development are different but, at the same time, they both share a liberal problematic of security.’ (Duffield and Hewitt 2009: 10)

According to critical perspectives, modernization theory, which is derived from liberalism, has defined the subjectivity of understanding of the Third World, but it is ‘lacking in empirical support and theoretical consistency’ (Jahn 2007a: 98). Also, peacebuilding based on liberal democracy maintains and strengthens the existing political hierarchy at the local, national and global levels (Richmond 2009: 562). Moreover, interventions based on an ideology of liberalism have been ‘producing enemies instead of allies and heightening insecurity instead of enhancing security’ (Jahn 2007b: 212).

However, the liberalization of target societies has not been mentioned as a primal purpose of interventions by the UN. And the focal point of the intense debate on humanitarian intervention is not liberal democratization but the alleviation of human suffering. Actually, the supporters of liberal peacebuilding nearly always make the following counterargument to critics:

‘How many lives would have been lost if not for these interventions? [...] The collapse of the peacebuilding project would be tantamount to abandoning tens of millions of people to lawlessness, predation,
disease and fear.’ (Paris 2009: 103, 108)

‘Surely the ending of armed conflict, improvements in welfare and improvements in human rights protection are indicators of “success” [of peacebuilding]?’ (Newman 2009: 46)

As this study will show later, the power of new trusteeship is derived not just from the notion of liberal democracy but from the idea of humanitarianism.

1.2 Hidden Presumptions

Those who support humanitarian intervention and the subsequent liberal peacebuilding tend to think that while politics has been the root of humanitarian disasters, a gradual universalization of moral obligation has allowed politics consistent with morality (Jahn 2012: 39). Thomas Weiss and Cindy Collins (2000: 7) state that:

“The belief that all of humanity – regardless of race, religion, age, or gender – deserves protection from unnecessary suffering is becoming a more universally accepted truth as well as a norm that occasionally guides the behavior of state-to-state and state-to-society relations.”

On the basis of this moral universality, it is argued that international citizens have a responsibility to act for suffering humanity (Falk 1992: 22; Linklater 2000: 493) and that ‘intervention can be an emancipatory instrument, at least in certain extreme situations’ (Falk 1993: 758; see Wheeler 2000: 49). However, they note that humanitarian discourse has been
abused by politics. For example, although US intervention in Nicaragua during the 1980s was named ‘humanitarian intervention,’ many commentators argue that, in fact, this was a misleading description (e.g. Weiss and Collins 2000: 4; Teson 1996: 109). Therefore, in any group of supporters of humanitarian intervention, one of the most important issues is how to judge the humanitarianism of the intervention (Wheeler 2000: 33-51). Some consider humanitarian motives as a threshold condition; others highlight a positive humanitarian outcome of intervention. In either theory, humanitarianism is represented as innocent. For these pro-intervention theorists, humanitarianism is a necessary condition to justify political power (Teson 1996: 118). It indicates that they, intentionally or unintentionally, make a distinction between ‘humanitarianism separate from politics’ and ‘humanitarianism abused by politics’. In the former, humanitarianism controls politics as a means to protect human rights. Humanitarian intervention belongs to this category. On the other hand, in the latter, humanitarianism is exploited to conceal an ugly political motivation for intervention.

This dichotomy of humanitarianism leads to a dichotomy of trusteeship. Theorists who are sympathetic with new trusteeship attempt to separate new trusteeship from colonial trusteeship in terms of the relationship with humanitarianism. While colonial trusteeship is unjust because its aim is to pursue the self-interests of trustees, new trusteeship is just because it seeks to alleviate the human suffering of others. In other words, humanitarianism is embedded in the latter. Ramesh Thakur, a political scientist and one of the authors of *the Responsibility to Protect* (2001), states that:
In the age of colonialism, most Afro-Asians and Latin Americans became the victims of Western superiority in the organization and weaponry of warfare. [...] As memories of colonialism dim and become increasingly distant, the salience of sovereignty is correspondingly diminishing. [...] The goal of intervention for human-protection purposes is never to wage war on a state in order to destroy it and eliminate its statehood, but always to protect victims of atrocities inside the state, to embed that protection in reconstituted institutions after the intervention and then to withdraw all foreign troops.’ (Thakur 2002: 300-301)

Similarly, Roland Paris (2011: 41) argues that while ‘colonialism was practiced largely to benefit the imperial states themselves, including through the extraction of material and human resources from the colonized society’, peacebuilding operations by the UN ‘have not principally been motivated by efforts to extract wealth from their host societies’. According to Michael Doyle (2006: 3), ‘multilateral peacebuilding, because of its impartial character, will not be the choice that states that seek unilateral advantages will choose.’ According to these authors, unlike colonial trusteeship, new trusteeship demonstrates a humanitarian aspect. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of ‘failed states’ has increased and uncontrolled violence has threatened human rights. Doyle argues that: “The destructiveness of civil anarchy is unacceptable both to all who suffer and to much of the international community forced to observe the suffering” (Doyle 2006: 18). Construction of states by new trusteeship is ‘the precondition for any
defensible system of human rights' (Ignatieff 2003b: 320). Thus, peacebuilding is based on human rights norms of international law (Wilde 2008: 404-405; Kaldor 2007: 188). However, as ‘colonialism is now condemned as an international crime’ (Chesterman 2005: 341), new trusteeship is likely to be criticized for its enormous power. Therefore, Ignatieff suggests good trusteeship which ‘reproduces the best effects of empire (inward investment, pacification, and impartial administration) without reproducing the worst features (corruption, repression, and confiscation of local capacity)’ (Ignatieff 2003b: 320). Similarly, on new trusteeship, Fukuyama argues that ‘This international imperium may be a well-meaning one based on human rights and democracy’ (Fukuyama 2004: 132). Doyle (2006: 3) claims that ‘we should avoid “throwing the baby out with the bathwater.”’ Thus, previous studies tend to presume that there is good trusteeship and bad trusteeship and that new trusteeship is good because it aims to protect human rights and colonial trusteeship is bad because it seeks to exploit material and human resources of target societies. This dichotomy reveals an assumption that trusteeship is counterposed to humanitarianism. While in bad trusteeship, humanitarianism is abused by trusteeship, in good trusteeship, humanitarianism is embodied in trusteeship.

Critics of liberal peacebuilding do not share this dichotomy. However, some of them seek to save peacebuilding from the yoke of colonial trusteeship. As Alex J. Bellamy suggests, ‘critical approaches demand an interrogation of whether dominant approaches to peace operations, guided as they are by liberal ideology, contribute to the promotion of human security’ (Bellamy 2005: 34). While they criticize liberal peacebuilding according to
humanitarianism, they do not deny the possibility to make an alternative peacebuilding model. For example, Richmond suggests ‘the emancipatory model’ of peacebuilding. He states that:

‘The emancipatory model [...] is concerned with a much closer relationship of custodianship and consent with local ownership, and tends to be very critical of the coerciveness, conditionality and dependency that the conservative and orthodox models operate upon. This is mainly found within bottom-up approaches, and tends to veer towards needs-based activity and a stronger concern for social justice.’ (Richmond 2005: 215)

His intention is to empower the weak by peacebuilding. In other words, he seeks to separate ‘emancipatory peacebuilding’ from colonial and new trusteeship according to humanitarianism. In this sense, he implies another dichotomy of trusteeship, whether or not his alternative model can overcome the problems of liberal peacebuilding.

Thus, liberal peacebuilding theorists tend to separate new trusteeship from colonial trusteeship in terms of humanitarianism. Similarly, some critics of liberal peacebuilding suggest another dichotomy of trusteeship which is based on humanitarianism. In this sense, humanitarianism is an important notion when we examine trusteeship.

However, contrary to the number of studies on liberal democracy, the amount of research on humanitarianism is not large. Humanitarianism is a missing link in studies on new trusteeship. While debates on humanitarian intervention address the dilemma between human rights and sovereignty,
they seldom argue about humanitarianism itself. This is understandable because humanitarian intervention aims to alleviate only the human suffering which is caused by states. Bhikhu Parekh (1997) suggests the following definition of humanitarian intervention:

‘Humanitarian intervention, as the term is used today, then, is an act of intervention in the internal affairs of another country with a view to ending the physical suffering caused by the disintegration or the gross misuse of the authority of the state, and helping create conditions in which a viable structure of civil authority can emerge.’

(Parekh 1997: 55)

As this definition implies, the humanitarianism of humanitarian intervention is concerned mainly with the ending of physical suffering such as that caused by ethnic cleansing and mass murder by central governments. However, other human suffering such as poverty is ignored. In an argument about humanitarian intervention, ‘suffering and death become a matter of humanitarian intervention only when they are caused by the breakdown of the state or by an outrageous abuse of its power’; and ‘Slow death through poverty, malnutrition, and economic and political mismanagement do not generally form part of our conception of humanitarian concerns’ (ibid.). Most theorists of humanitarian intervention are concerned only with the relationship between sovereignty of states and human solidarity (e.g. Wheeler 1997).

In the late 2000s, some scholars began to analyze the nature of humanitarianism. Exploring the history of humanitarianism from the 19th
century to the present, they understand ‘humanitarianism’ as ‘a general commitment to “prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found,” “to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being,” and to “promote mutual understanding, friendship, co-operation and lasting peace amongst all peoples” (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 12). They recognized a distinction between humanitarian ‘responses rooted in simply providing care and responses linked to broader notions of human progress’ (Calhoun 2008: 74). Michael Barnett names the former ‘emergency humanitarianism’ and the latter ‘alchemical humanitarianism’. While emergency humanitarianism ‘focuses on symptoms’, alchemical humanitarianism ‘adds the ambition of removing the root causes of suffering’ (Barnett 2011: 10). Alchemical humanitarianism has been associated with ‘broader projects of human improvement’ (Calhoun 2008: 89). This kind of humanitarianism has demonstrated paternalism, which is ‘the belief that some people can and should act in ways that are intended to improve the welfare of those who might not be in a position to help themselves’ (Barnett 2011: 12). Moreover, it is accompanied with social engineering projects to address the root causes of suffering. Barnett implies that humanitarianism and trusteeship are deeply related.

‘Humanitarian governance looks more like a rival to empire, because it is dedicated to the emancipation and empowerment, not the oppression and subservience, of those who are hanging on for dear life. But a second, more discerning look suggests that although humanitarian governance is not an empire in sheep’s clothing, it does bear some of its markings.’ (ibid.: 221)
As this study will show later, humanitarianism has sometimes contributed to the constitution of imperialism and colonialism.

While these earlier works on humanitarianism are path-breaking in that they observe the distinction between ‘emergency humanitarianism’ and ‘alchemical humanitarianism,’ there remain further questions. First of all, they do not demonstrate how humanitarianism is linked to a certain human and social model, and how it is involved in the constitution of trusteeship. According to them, alchemical humanitarianism has advocated and carried out social engineering. However, this is misleading because ‘the ambition of removing the root causes of suffering’ itself does not necessarily accompany social engineering and colonialism. Humanitarians have a desire for social engineering through colonial administration when they link a humanitarian crisis to deviations from specific human and social models. Who has decided the ideal model for humanity and society? And how has human suffering been linked with this model? As yet, there is no satisfactory explanation.

Secondly, previous research does not explain how the power of humanitarianism has worked during the long history of humanitarianism. Barnett employs the framework ‘paternalism’ to examine the power of humanitarianism; however, this framework is too simple to analyze the power of humanitarianism. He defines paternalism as ‘the belief that some people can and should act in ways that are intended to improve the welfare of those who might not be in a position to help themselves’ (Barnett 2011: 12). However, the power of humanitarianism is to contribute to the constitution of trusteeship that transforms the nature of target societies and to the establishment of undemocratic regimes in target societies. Wendy Brown
(2004: 459-460) argues that:

‘[Human rights] are not simply rules and defenses against power, but can themselves be tactics and vehicles of governance and domination. [...] the point is that there is no such thing as mere reduction of suffering or protection from abuse — the nature of the reduction or protection is itself productive of political subjects and political possibilities.’

Of course, humanitarianism can operate without relations of domination or undermining sovereignty. However, when humanitarianism contributed to the constitution of trusteeship, it functioned as a vehicle of domination and led to the deprivation of the political agency of target societies. This argument leads to crucial questions: how has humanitarianism contributed to the constitution of trusteeship and how has the relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism developed? Now, we need an effective strategy to examine the relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism. This study adopts genealogy, as the next section will argue.

2. Genealogy as Methodology

2.1 Genealogy of IR

Genealogy was invented by Nietzsche as a historical method, and improved by Foucault. Now, various IR theorists use it as their methodology. However, genealogy as methodology is highly ambiguous. Foucault
considered his strategy ‘not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life’ (Foucault 1984: 50). Therefore, there is no consensus about the way of using genealogy among the IR theorists. At first, we ought to understand why Foucault adopted genealogy. Before using genealogy as his strategy, Foucault had explored the structural rules governing discourse by archeology. On archeology he stated that:

‘Such an analysis does not belong to the history of ideas or of science; it is rather an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge was constituted: on the basis of what historical a priori [...] ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards.’ (Foucault 1973: xxi-xxii)

After Immanuel Kant suggested dichotomous world view, a sensible world and an intelligible world, this world view became the starting point for the philosophers who addressed the ontological issue. However, avoiding the ontological issue, Foucault focused on the regularity exhibited by relations among various speech acts – which he called discursive formation – and revealed discourse ‘as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault 1972: 49). Subsequently, he began to focus on the relationship between power, knowledge and body in a modern society, and adopted genealogy as his new strategy. While his archeology mainly concentrated on the strata of discourse, his genealogy focused on the techniques of power. It was because he noticed that ‘rituals of power’ such as
penitentiary and confession were a focal point where the relationship between power, knowledge, and the body were reproduced. By employing genealogy, Foucault indicated that some forms of power such as discipline and bio-power have been working in a modern society. The primal aim of these powers ‘was a “parallel increase in the usefulness and docility” of individuals and populations’ for states and capitalism (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 135). In sum, Foucault’s genealogy was associated with his concern with power.

The main aim of Foucault’s genealogy was to point out ‘on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest’ (Foucault 1988: 154-5). In addition, Foucault’s genealogy has three characteristics. First, his genealogy is a ‘history of the present’. The central concern of genealogists is the power relations and political struggles in modern society. Therefore, traits of power relations in contemporary society should be the starting point for them. This is a distinctive characteristic of genealogy. The history of the present is different from ‘presentism’ which explores precursors of the present in the past and from ‘finalism’ which presumes that history is moving to a certain end. The aim of genealogy is ‘to recognize the events of history, its jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats – the basis of all beginnings, atavisms, and heredities’ (Foucault 1984: 80). Thereby, it is possible to show the contingency and circumstantiality of the ruling discursive formation and power relations. The genealogy does not have to be comprehensive; rather, it is exemplary because its aim is to de-unify an authoritative history.

Second, Foucault’s genealogy aims to show ‘strategy without
strategists’. Power relations in a society are not constructed through individual intentions; they have no strategists (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 109). Rather, they can be formed inter-subjectively. Therefore, ‘One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that’s to say to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework’ (Foucault 1980a: 117). This requirement led to his genealogy. Genealogy aims to explore the formation of power relations which are constituted inter-subjectively. The power investigated by genealogists is generated and supported by dispositive. Dispositive, Foucault’s unique term, was explained by himself as the following:

‘What I'm trying to pick out with this term [dispositive] is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the [dispositive]. The [dispositive] itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements.’ (Foucault 1980b: 194)

By using the concept of dispositive, Foucault sought to combine the discursive domain and non-discursive domain in the analysis of power relations.

Third, Foucault’s genealogy focuses on ‘rituals of power’. According to Foucault, the genealogy ‘can account for the constitution of knowledges,
discourses and domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history’ (ibid). ‘Rituals of power’ controls individuals by constituting their subjectivity. Then, the basis on which the genealogists establish their argument is the isolation of ‘meticulous rituals of power’. Meticulous rituals of power exhibit the traits of power relations.

Nevertheless, genealogy of some IR theorists scarcely demonstrates these characteristics. Campbell (1998) uses ‘a history of the present, an interpretative attitude suggested by Michel Foucault’ (Campbell 1998: 2) as his approach. In his book *Writing Security*, he argues that ‘danger is not objective condition [...] [but] an effect of interpretation’ (ibid: 1-2) and that states have exploited security discourse for the production and reproduction of their unstable identity. Thus, his concern about the discursive power is not far from Foucault’s. But his ontological assumption is different from Foucault’s understanding. Campbell states that:

‘The world exists independently of language, but we can never *know* that (beyond the fact of its assertion), because the existence of the world is literally inconceivable outside of language and our traditions of interpretation.’ (ibid: 6)

This assumption derives not from Foucault’s theory but from the theory of Laclau and Mouffe or Derrida. As Jan Selby points out, Foucault did not think that only texts determine socio-political relations, and analyzed not only the discursive domain but also the non-discursive domain using
genealogy (Selby 2007: 326-330). This difference is reflected in their understandings of ‘rituals of power’. While Foucault recognized the non-discursive practices such as the penitentiary as ‘rituals of power’, Campbell considers narratives and writing on foreign policy as ‘rituals of power’. Following Campbell, Hansen (2006) also adopts genealogy (Hansen 2006: 53) and demonstrates the same differences from Foucault’s genealogy. Her aim is to depict how Bosnia has been represented in Western discourse. She shares the presumption with Campbell that ‘policies are dependent upon representations of the threat, country security problem, or crisis they seek to address’ (Hansen 2006: 5-6). Thus, she analyzes only discursive domains such as narratives and writing on foreign policy.

Their methodology is called Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis (Jager and Maier 2009), though its ontological presumption is slightly different from Foucault’s. Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis seems to be a mix of Foucault’s archeology and genealogy. I name such a usage of genealogy archeological genealogy. I do not argue that this methodology is wrong or unusable; rather, my argument is that it is one of a variety of genealogies. In fact, we can find various ways of using genealogy. Nietzsche’s genealogy is not the same as Foucault’s in that the latter presumes inter-subjectivity of the (re)production of power relations. Moreover, according to Gordon (1986), the Frankfurt thinkers also employed their own genealogy that was different from Foucault’s.

But how can we recognize a certain methodology as genealogy and what conditions should genealogy fulfill? Bartelson’s genealogy is much closer to archeology than Campbell’s (Bartelson 1995). He traces the usages and meanings of the word of ‘sovereignty.’ His concern is not about ‘rituals of
power’ but epistemic shifts in the notion of sovereignty; on this point, his approach is archeological. However, as he discusses, his methodology is genealogy in that his description is a ‘history of the present’ which is one of the characteristics of Foucault’s genealogy. This is because his main question is how the idea of sovereignty, which is a ruling discourse in current international society, appeared. A history of the present is the most important feature of genealogy in that it distinguishes genealogy from other historical analysis. Therefore, as long as a certain methodology contains this feature, it is possible to recognize it as a kind of genealogy.

Contrary to the archeological genealogy used by some IR theorists, other theorists demonstrate a different usage of genealogy that focuses not only on the discursive domain but also on the non-discursive domain. Der Derian (1987), one of the earliest IR studies employing genealogy, uses genealogy that demonstrates various characteristics of Foucault’s genealogy. He suggests an alternative interpretation of the history of diplomacy as genealogy of estrangement and mediation. In his work, diplomacy was defined as ‘the mediation of estranged peoples organized in states’ (Der Derian 1987: 42). He focuses on the relationship between Self and Other in diplomacy and indicates the inherent crisis of diplomacy. It is worth noting that he analyzes not only the discursive domain but also the non-discursive domain and, thereby, recognizes socio-political forces that have developed the discourse of diplomacy. His methodology is one of the successful examples of genealogy in IR studies. Also, Selby (2007)’s suggestion as to the usage of Foucault’s theoretical legacy is also important. Contrary to the genealogy of IR studies that focus mainly on the discursive domain, he suggests an alternative usage of Foucault’s theory alongside Marx. According to Selby,
Foucault was ‘an interrogator of modern liberal capitalist societies’ like Marx (Selby 2007: 326). I name this kind of usage of genealogy, and that which analyzes social economic and political forces, *sociological genealogy*. Table 1 summarizes genealogy as methodology.

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th><strong>Archeological Genealogy</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sociological Genealogy</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontological assumption</strong></td>
<td>Discourse constructs realities.</td>
<td>As well as discursive practice, social economic and political forces construct discursive formation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objects of analysis</strong></td>
<td>Discursive domain</td>
<td>Discursive domain and non-discursive domain</td>
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Table 1 Two Kinds of Genealogy

2.2 Theoretical Frameworks

Now, which genealogy should we choose? Before choosing, it is necessary to further clarify the research plan and objectives of this study. The aim of this study is to follow the formation and development of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. The main concern of this study is how the power relationship between trustees and target societies has been formed and how trusteeship and humanitarianism have mutually constituted. As stated in Introduction, by the term of trusteeship, I refer to a relation of inequality and a field of intervention, rather than a specific or particular historical practice. Trusteeship has several basic characteristics. (i) In trusteeship, the relationship between trustees and target societies is
unequal, and trustees seek to intervene in target societies by various tactics.

(ii) Trusteeship is constituted by theology and practice. By the term of ‘theology,’ I imply that discourse of trusteeship is neither neutral nor universal; rather, it is similar to religious belief. The theology of trusteeship has disguised itself as ‘scientific’ or ‘objective’ or ‘universal.’ However, it is likely to be ethnocentric and biased, as this study will show. Theology identifies trustees and target societies and defines the relationship between them. Trusteeship has been embodied in some political arrangements (practice) such as colonial administration, development, and peacebuilding.

Etymologically speaking, as Ch. 2 will argue, the words ‘trust’ and ‘trusteeship’ were applied to the relationship between the British Empire and dependent territories in the late 18th century. After that, the relationship between colonial empires and dependent territories was defined as ‘trusteeship.’ As stated in the Introduction, the meaning of this ‘trust’ or ‘trusteeship’ was ‘a responsibility to contribute to the protection, welfare and advancement of non-Europeans caught up in the growth of British influence and control’ (Porter 1988: 36). As the idea of a responsibility of civilized countries to dependent territories was developed in the 19th century, the unequal relationship between trustees and target societies was constituted. Therefore, a genealogy of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship should begin with the analysis of colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism of the British Empire in the 19th century. Ch. 2 and Ch. 3 will explore the colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism in British India and Africa in the 19th century.

As stated already, humanitarianism is deeply related to the construction of the relationship between target societies and trustees by
defining their nature, and plays a major part in the design of the political arrangements of trusteeship. Humanitarianism is not just an ideology to legitimize trusteeship but constitutive of it. As Barnett argues, humanitarianism is ‘a form of compassion’ (Barnett 2011: 10). When one observes human suffering of others, it arouses compassion for them and leads him/her to alleviate such human suffering. However, in this phase, humanitarianism does not constitute trusteeship. As this study will argue, when humanitarianism attributes the causes of human suffering to the nature of target societies, it constitutes trusteeship. Following Barnett (2011) and Calhoun (2008), this study makes a distinction between humanitarian ‘responses rooted in simply providing care and responses linked to broader notions of human progress’ (Calhoun 2008: 74) and focuses on the latter. However, I do not intend to say that humanitarianism has not changed nor that humanitarianism universally exists. As well as trusteeship, humanitarianism has also transformed. What is recognized as ‘human suffering’ is not determined *a priori*. The category of ‘humanitarianism’ thus includes various practices such as protection from anarchy, relief from oppression, and freedom from poverty, which are above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. I do not argue that humanitarianism has always contributed to the constitution of unequal power relations; rather, only when it attributes the causes of human suffering to the nature of target societies, it is involved in the constitution of trusteeship.

As this study will demonstrate, trusteeship, humanitarianism, and their relationship have been constituted not only through the discourse of intellectuals and policy makers but also by social practices. This dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship is composed of internal and international
laws, institutions, regulations, statements, and social practices such as colonial administration, missionary work, and humanitarian aid. Therefore, it is hard to grasp the relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism only by discourse analysis. That is why this study adopts a sociological genealogy.

In order to explore how humanitarianism defines the nature of target societies and trustees, this study introduces the ideas of *pathologization* and *prescriptions*. By the concept of pathologization, I attempt to describe a process in which humanitarianism attributes root causes of human suffering to the nature of target societies. For humanitarianism, human suffering is pathology to be repaired. When humanitarianism connects human suffering with the nature of target societies, they are represented as savage societies that cannot remove the causes of human suffering on their own. Subsequently, humanitarianism prepares prescriptions to address the root causes of human suffering. Prescriptions include administration and social engineering by external actors (trustees) such as colonial empires. Trustees are represented as saviors of the suffered by humanitarianism.

These frameworks are based on postcolonial studies which have theorized identities of colonial subjectivities, for example, Edward Said, *Orientalism*; Gayatri Spivak, *In Other Worlds*; Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*; Bill Ashcroft et al., *The Empire Writes Back*; and Gloria Anzaldua, *Borderlands/La Frontiera*. Postcolonialism focuses on culture and identity and analyzes the power structure of colonial discourse. They criticize essentialism – ‘the idea that identities and culture have their own essential features which are impermeable to others’ (Grovogui 2007: 236) because essentialism has been a part of hegemonic discursive formation in the
colonial period. For example, Edward Said (1978), suggesting the idea of Orientalism, argues that colonial societies were constructed as different and Other by a system of knowledge about the Orient. In this regime, while the West is represented as superior, original, and civilized, the Orient is represented as inferior, fake, and savage. In terms of the manipulation of identity, humanitarianism is similar to Orientalism. Orientalist discourse is associated with 'the enabling socio-economic and political institutions' and constitutes the Western 'cultural hegemony' (Said 1978: 5-6). According to Said (1993), representations of Oriental culture and colonial political power are co-constitutive. He observes that, even after decolonization, colonial discourse exists and reproduces the hegemony of Western countries. The perspective of this study is quite similar to postcolonialism. As this study will show, since the 19th century, humanitarianism has defined the nature and identity of non-European countries and constituted trusteeship. Trusteeship sought to transform the nature and identity of target societies into the Other/inferior. This structure has survived even after decolonization.

However, the approach of this study is slightly different from post-colonialism in terms of the objects of analysis. Post-colonial theorists such as Said and Stuart Hall adopt archeological genealogy and focus on culture. Their objects of analysis are meaningful artifacts including novels and movies (e.g. Said 1978, 1993; Hall 1990). On the other hand, the approach of this study focuses on socio-political institutions, laws, regulations, statements, and social practice that have constituted the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. Although I do not deny the importance of culture, the main focus of this study tends to be especially laws, institutions, regulations, statements, and social practice. The dispositive of
humanitarianism/trusteeship has (re)produced hierarchies in international society by transforming the socio-political institutions of target societies. Analysis of socio-political institutions, laws, regulations, statements, and social practice can reveal the tactics of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship.

On this point, the genealogical approach of this study is slightly different from Foucault’s as well as that of post-colonialism. This is because Foucault tried to avoid the analysis of state apparatus including judiciary and military systems. He stated that:

‘If one describes all these phenomena of power as dependent on the State apparatus, this means grasping them as essentially repressive... I don't want to say that the State isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State.’ (Foucault 1980: 122)

In his theory, state apparatus carries out repressive power, in his words, ‘the force of prohibition’ (ibid.: 119). However, what he attempted to analyze was ‘systems of power’ which produce and sustain truth and subjects (ibid.: 133). This kind of power ‘induces pleasure, forms knowledge, [and] produces discourse’ (ibid.: 119): that is, the micro level of power. Therefore, Foucault focused on prisons, schools, hospitals and factories.

However, while this study focuses on socio-political institutions, it does not intend to examine the sovereign power of trusteeship. The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between trusteeship and
humanitarianism. My hypothesis is that trusteeship and humanitarianism constitute the dispositive which produces truth and subjects in international society. This study explores how humanitarianism determines the relationship between trustees and target societies and how socio-political institutions of target societies are restructured in trusteeship. Sociological genealogy can account for the historical constitution of the ‘systems of power’. On this point, the approach of this study is similar to Foucault’s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kinds of Genealogy</th>
<th>What It Indicates</th>
<th>Objects of Analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-Colonialism such as Said’s Orientalism</td>
<td>Archeological Genealogy</td>
<td>Cultural Hegemony</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Meaningful Artifacts of Culture such as Novels and Movies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foucault’s Genealogy</td>
<td>Sociological Genealogy</td>
<td>Systems of Power that Produce and Maintain Truth and Subjects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Genealogy of this study</td>
<td>Sociological Genealogy</td>
<td>Systems of Power Constituted by Trusteeship and Humanitarianism</td>
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Table 2 Differences among Three Approaches

In order to analyze the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship genealogically, this study introduces another theoretical framework – reflexivity. By this concept, I attempt to indicate the circular process of trusteeship from pathologization and making prescriptions to criticizing and revising theology and practice of trusteeship (Figure 1). As this study will
show later, trusteeship has been repeatedly criticized and revised in each period. However, most of the critics of trusteeship have never suggested the abolition of trusteeship. This is not because they were imperialists or colonialists, but because they were humanitarians. Trusteeship has changed in response to changing power relations and norms in international society, but it has never disappeared because of humanitarianism. Humanitarianism has, intentionally or unintentionally, led to the reinvigoration of trusteeship and contributed to the regeneration of the power structure in international society.

![Figure 1 Circular Process of Trusteeship](image)

2.3 Pre-modern Trusteeship and Modern Trusteeship

When did trusteeship as an unequal relationship and a field of intervention appear and how has it survived in international society? Although the word of ‘trust’ or ‘trusteeship’ had not existed, trusteeship as an unequal relationship and a field of intervention can be found in the case of
the Spanish Empire in the 16th century. The Spanish thought that colonial administration was justifiable for the benefit of the Amerindians (Todorov 1999; Jahn 2000).

However, the theology of trusteeship of the Spanish Empire was different from the theology of trusteeship after the 19th century in terms of human and social models because episteme shifted in the late 18th century. The Scottish Enlightenment, which was deeply affected by Newton's theory and world view, assumed that the secular world had its own laws that were independent from the sacred world. Scottish philosophers strived to discover the laws that regulated the secular world. Their philosophy signified a departure from a Presbyterianism that believed that God had already decided everything a priori. For example, Adam Smith, a representative Scottish Enlightenment intellectual, argued in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, that human beings make his/her morality through communication with others in a society, though he presumed that their moral sentiments are given by God. Thus, the relationship between society and individuals began to replace the relationship between God and human beings (Dunn 1983). This shift of world view was accompanied with the new idea that human beings and societies were capable of being reformed. Philosophers like Jeremy Bentham, believing the universality of reason, ‘asserted that men could be improved by correctly socializing their instincts for pleasure’ (Ignatieff 1978: 67). Furthermore, British intellectuals in the 18th century considered ‘society’ as an autonomous entity. In *The Wealth of Nations*, Smith analyzed the characteristics of various societies and created his social development model based on the forms of production: hunting, pastoral (herding), agricultural, commercial. As Ch. 2 will discuss,
utilitarians inherited this social development model and created the new theory that society is capable of reformation.

In addition, in the 18th century, new humanitarian norms emerged. Humanitarians began the penitentiary reform movement and advocated the abolition of cruel punishments (Foucault 1977: Part II Ch. 1; Ignatieff 1978; Follet 2001). Evangelicals and liberalists cooperated in the reformation of criminal systems, though they were theoretically opposed to each other (Follet 2001). Finally, punishments involving the public infliction of physical pain to the body declined and imprisonment as the preeminent penalty emerged (Ignatieff 1978). As a result, the norm that a human body should not be injured spread in some European societies (Hunt 2007). At the same time, a variety of Scottish intellectuals considered the feeling of 'compassion' as the main nature of human beings (Fiering 1976). According to Barnett (2011: 10), ‘the actual term [of humanitarianism] began coming into everyday use in the early nineteenth century’. Thus, the episteme shifted in Europe in the 18th century and humanitarianism subsequently appeared.

The relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism began in the 19th century. As the Spanish Empire went into decline, the British Empire sought to achieve hegemonic power and developed the theology and practice of colonial trusteeship. British politicians, philosophers and missionaries had interests in British colonies and other non-European countries and were involved in the constitution of colonial trusteeship. In this process, the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship emerged.

This study identifies four distinctive ages of trusteeship: an age of colonial trusteeship from the late 18th century to the late 19th century; an age of internationalization of trusteeship around the time of the First World
War: an age of development trusteeship from the Second World War to the 1990s; and an age of peacebuilding trusteeship from the 1990s to the present. In an age of colonial trusteeship, the theology and practice of colonial trusteeship were developed in India and Africa. As the British Empire encountered serious resistance from the local people and the new idea of racism appeared in Europe, they were revised in the mid-19th century. Around the time of the First World War, colonial trusteeship was criticized by intellectuals and politicians, and internationalized as the mandate system. In the 1940s, the British Empire still had to revise the theology and practice of trusteeship because of increasing resistance from local people and severe criticisms of colonial trusteeship from within and without. The British Empire finally created development trusteeship. While development trusteeship continued even after the end of the Cold War, peacebuilding trusteeship appeared in the 1990s as humanitarian crises of the Third World were highlighted by Western countries. Figure 2 indicates these changes of trusteeship from the 19th century to the present. My intention in this study is to show that trusteeship and humanitarianism have constituted each other in all these ages of trusteeship and that a series of transformations of trusteeship has demonstrated a circular process.
Conclusion

This chapter has established a framework for the analysis of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. This framework is premised on Foucault’s genealogy. For this genealogy, traits of power relations in the current society would be the starting point. It focuses on factors in discursive domain and non-discursive domain which constitute power relations. And it hypothesizes that these power relations are not constituted intentionally. This study takes the relationship between trustees and target societies in the post-Cold War era (new trusteeship or peacebuilding trusteeship) as the starting point and considers humanitarianism as a missing link in new trusteeship. It will analyze institutions, laws, regulations, statements, and social practice which have constituted the dispositive of
humanitarianism/trusteeship from the early 19th century to the late 20th century.

The framework of this study provides the definition of trusteeship as an unequal relationship and a field of intervention and the hypothesis that humanitarianism has contributed to the constitution of the relationship between trustees and target societies. The main argument of this study is that the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship has been reproduced in international society. In order to analyze the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship, the concepts of ‘pathologization’ and ‘prescriptions’ are introduced. Pathologization means that humanitarianism would find pathology in target societies. It would transform the identity of target societies into the Other/inferior. And it would lead to prescriptions by which target societies would be governed. After trusteeship is constituted, it would be examined repeatedly. The framework of this study suggests the ‘circular process of trusteeship’ in which trusteeship would be constituted, criticized, revised, and re-constituted.
Ch. 2 Colonial Trusteeship and Humanitarianism in India:
Utilitarianism and Post-utilitarianism

The aim of this study is to analyze the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. This chapter and the next will explore the origins of the dispositive. As stated in Ch. 1, the relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism started in the 19th century. In this century, theology and practice of colonial trusteeship radically changed, responding to the territorial expansion of the British Empire in Asia and Africa. This chapter will analyze the case of British India because, as it was called the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the British Empire, it was the most important territory for geopolitical and economic reasons. As Thomas Metcalf (2007) argues, the colonial policy in India was highly influential in formulating the colonial policies for other British territories.

Colonial trusteeship in India was unique because it was a case of existing rule that subsequently required humanitarian discourse as justification. Although the idea of human suffering did not emerge explicitly, the theology of colonial trusteeship in India tended to demonstrate a discursive structure of humanitarianism. In the early 19th century, utilitarianism defined the objective of colonial trusteeship as the liberation of the Indian population from indigenous religious and political despotism. Suffering from savagism and oppression by religious and political despotism formed humanitarian discourse. This humanitarian discourse contributed to the constitution of colonial trusteeship. Thus, it marked the origins of the the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. After the Mutiny of 1857, ‘anarchy,’ which was characterized by irrational violence and interpreted as a
result of modernization, formed the new pathology of India. The protection of Indian societies from anarchy was defined as the new objective of colonial trusteeship.

Existing studies on utilitarianism and post-utilitarianism in the 19th century tend to focus on the relationship between colonial trusteeship and liberalism (Mehta 1990; Jahn 2005; Pitts 2006; Mantena 2010). They showed that liberalism legitimized colonial trusteeship by representing Indian societies as savage. While the argument of these studies is highly important, the humanitarian element of utilitarianism and post-utilitarianism in the analysis of India has been overlooked. This chapter will show how colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism were mutually constitutive in the discursive formation of British India. The first half of this chapter will analyze how colonial trusteeship in India was constituted by utilitarianism. The second half of this chapter will examine how colonial trusteeship in India was revised after the Mutiny.

1. Trusteeship, Utilitarianism, and India

1-1 Trusteeship before the 19th Century

As stated in Ch.1, trusteeship is defined as an unequal relationship between trustees and wards and a field of intervention. Etymologically speaking, ‘trust’ was a system for managing lands and goods in the 13th century (Pollock and Maitland 1898 II: 240). In the system of trust, land owners asked a third party to manage it to prevent the confiscation of their lands and goods. While the possessory right of the lands would be transferred to a third party, the property right of the land would be held by
the land owner. In Medieval England, people did not separate the lands of
the nation from the lands of the king (Pollock and Maitland 1898 I: 548). In
other words, they did not have any idea of national territory. Therefore, there
was not the idea ‘trust’ or ‘trusteeship’ in the relationship between governors
and governed. John Locke was one of the first philosophers who applied the
idea ‘trust’ to political power. In *Two Treatises of Government* (1689), he
argued that:

‘For all Power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited
by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed,
the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the Power devolve into
the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they
shall think best for their safety and security.’ (Second Treatise,
section 149)

Thus, political power was considered as based on the trust from citizens.
Theoretically, this relationship begins when someone (e.g. citizens) delegates
their political power to a third party (e.g. kings). However, in the 17th
century, this idea was accepted only by radicals because it implied the right
of revolution. According to F. W. Maitland, ‘in the course of the eighteenth
century it became a parliamentary commonplace that all political power is a
trust’ (Maitland 1900: xxxxvi).

It was Edmund Burke who applied the idea of trust to British
colonial administration in India. Before the theology of colonial trusteeship
developed, the British Empire had actually ruled Indian colonies. Until the
late 18th century, the British India Company had no political power but only
trading privileges from Elizabeth I. However, as the Mughal Empire was declining and the order of India was becoming unstable, the Company started to intervene in domestic politics and finally obtained sovereign power in India. However, in the late 18th century, the administration of the East India Company was criticized for corruption and the abuse of political power. One of the critics of the East India Company was Burke. He claimed that the principle of colonial rule of India was ‘a trust’ and it is the very essence of every trust to be accountable, and even totally to cease, when it substantially varies from the purpose for which alone it could have a lawful existence’ (Burke 1899: 439). The East India Company had never fulfilled the duties of a trustee. Therefore, he insisted that the administrative authority for British India be transferred to the British government (Whelan 1996). As Porter observes, the aim of Burke’s trusteeship was not to transform the nature of Indian societies but to protect them from the irresponsible rule by the British India Company (Porter 1999: 201). He did not consider Indian societies as savage; on the contrary, he expressed his admiration for Indian civilization. In this point, he did not pathologize Indian societies. Moreover, he did not believe in the possibility of developing society by radical reform. Although he applied the idea of trust to British colonial administration in India, colonial trusteeship as an unequal relationship was not constituted. In contrast to Burke’s views, utilitarianism pathologized Indian societies and demanded that the British Empire transform the nature of Indian societies by social engineering policies, as the following section will show.

1-2 Pathologization of India

Since Burke’s address on India, the relationship between the British
Empire and India as colonial trusteeship had developed. However, the origin of the colonial administration was mainly military conquest. The Indian population had not delegated their political power to the British government or the East India Company. Therefore, this definition of the relationship between Britain and India required theoretical substantiation. In the early 19th century, it was utilitarianism that provided the philosophical foundation for the British colonial administration in India. It was argued that India required colonial administration by the British Empire because it was suffering from savagism and despotism. This pathologization not only legitimized the colonial administration but also constituted the practice of the administration.

In the discourse of utilitarianism, India was represented as a savage society in which the population was autocratically ruled by religious and political authority. In *The History of British India* (hereafter, ‘HBI’), James Mill stated that:

‘Beside the causes which usually give superstition a powerful sway in ignorant and credulous ages, the order of priests obtained a greater authority in India than in any other region of the globe.’ (HBI: 1: 282)

In India, the religious privileged class was seizing legislative and judicial powers as well as executive power. Therefore, ‘the king was little more than an instrument in the hands of the Brahmans’ (HBI: 1: 189). The collusion of a religious privileged class and political power was considered as one of the characteristics of a savage society. Moreover, for utilitarians, Hinduism ‘is no other than that primary worship, which is addressed to the designing and
invisible beings who preside over the powers of nature, according to their own arbitrary will, and act only for some private and selfish gratification’ (HBI: 1: 330). Thus, the utilitarians observed that Indian political systems were ruled by superstition.

For utilitarians, the form of Indian political regime also marked its savageness. James Mill argued that ‘No idea of any system of rule, different from the will of a single person, appears to have entered the minds of them, or their legislators’ (HBI: 1: 175). Hindu law stated that without a king, a country would collapse into a state of anarchy (HBI: 3: 57). Although the Indian population was suffering from oppression by religious and political authority, they desired despotism and did not want any check to the power because Hinduism and their tradition made them blind to the oppression. Hence, Mill predetermined that Indian societies were suffering from indigenous despotism.

In addition to the savage political systems, indigenous socio-economic systems also contributed to the oppression of the Indian population. According to Mill, Hindu laws had serious deficiencies: inadequacy of the protection of property rights, cruel punishment, unsophisticated criminal procedure, unwritten law, and insufficient independence of judges (HBI: 1: Ch. 4). Because of these deficiencies, the Indian population was threatened with the arbitrariness of dictators and could not enjoy the protection of law. Moreover, in the land tenure and revenue systems, the Indian population were oppressed. Indian peasants (ryots) were subject to indigenous landlords (zamindars). Therefore, they did not have any economic freedom (HBI: 5: 410-419). Thus, in the discourse of utilitarianism, the majority of the Indian population was represented as having no property rights and no economic
Utilitarianism defined Indian societies as in an early stage of development by introducing the ladder of civilization in which savage societies were placed at the bottom and European countries were put at the top (Pitts 2005: 136). In On Liberty (hereafter, ‘OL’) and Considerations on Representative Government (hereafter, ‘RG’), J. S. Mill argued that society would develop from savagism to modern civilization (Jahn 2005: 603). In a savage society, people lack a discipline for cooperation with others and for the submission to laws. Therefore, they cannot comprise a nation until they learn to obey political authority. In this stage of development, despotic government was suitable for disciplining savage people and developing civilization. (RG: 212; Jahn 2005: 601-602). However, in this regime, the people were just like slaves because subordination derives only from the power of the ruler not from the will of the people, and they do not understand rules and laws yet (RG: 213). As long as the people are like slaves, civilization would cease to progress because ‘the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty’ (OL: 134). East Asian countries including India had allowed their people no liberty and individuality (OL: 139). Therefore, their civilizations were degenerating. However, J. S. Mill did not deny the possibility that a savage society would develop into a modern society. He suggested the civilization of savage societies by colonial administration. Colonial trusteeship in the 19th century was characterized by this presumption that colonization could alleviate the savagism and despotism of non-European societies. Although, in the late 18th century, Adam Smith made his own social development model in which society would evolve through the four stages of hunting, pastoral, agricultural, and toward freedom.
commercial society, he did not apply his theory to the relationship between India and Britain and neither did he argue that colonization could civilize primitive societies (Pitts 2005: 27-34).

When utilitarianism defined Indian societies as savage, Britain was implicitly and explicitly represented as civilized. Lord Macaulay, who was a utilitarian and colonial administrator, declared that: ‘the history of England is emphatically progress’ (cited in Levin 2004: 11). This image of Britishness was inherited from the previous generation of British intellectuals. For example, Adam Ferguson, one of the representative Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, stated that:

‘The genius of political wisdom and civil arts appears to have chosen his seats in particular tracts of the earth, and to have selected his favourites in particular races of men. [...] [England had] carried the authority and government of law to a point of perfection, which they never before attained in the history of mankind.’ (Ferguson 1995 [1767]: 106, 159)

However, this vision was not created only by the Scottish philosophers. As Said (1994: Ch. 2) argues, when Britain sought to rule Ireland and colonize America, similar images had already been expressed. By representing India as savage and Britain as civilized, the relationship between a trustee and target societies was constituted.

Thus, utilitarianism pathologized Indian societies as despotic and savage. It was presumed that the Indian population was suffering from
savagism and despotism. The liberation of the Indian population from these evils was considered as the main objective of colonial administration. Utilitarianism presumed that it was the British who had the necessary qualification to undertake this task because Britain was one of the most civilized nations. It is possible to classify this discourse as a kind of humanitarianism because it aimed to alleviate human suffering. This humanitarianism required practices which were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering in that it identified the nature of target societies as pathology, and suggested the colonization of India as a prescription for it. James Mill highlighted the altruistic aspect of the British colonial administration by arguing that ‘instead of yielding a tribute to England, [the colonial administration in India] never yielded enough for the expence [sic] of its own government [...] it has cost this country enormous sums’ (cited in Levin 2004: 45). This ‘humanitarian’ justification for the British colonial administration marked the beginning of the relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism.

1.3 Prescriptions

*Social Engineering*

The pathology of Indian societies was considered curable, so the utilitarians suggested prescriptions for it. In arguing for such prescriptions, the utilitarians asked the question: what made the difference between India and Europe? James Mill, in his essay ‘Education,’ attributed the cause of the difference to ‘education’ (Mill 1992a: 147). His meaning of ‘education’ was broader than just ‘teaching’ or ‘instruction.’ He defined ‘education’ as ‘the best employment of all the means which can be made use of, by man, for
rendering the human mind to the greatest possible degree the cause of human happiness' (ibid.: 141). This definition implied that education was the (re)formation of the human mind for the maximization of utility. Furthermore, he attempted to classify education into four types: domestic education, technical education, social education and political education. Domestic education meant the formation of the mind through the conduct of the family, and related to the personality and character of the individual. Technical education was primarily school education for the acquisition of moral and intellectual habits. Social education referred to how a society decides what was good for people and could provide happiness. Domestic and technical education was thought to be strongly influenced by the social norms established by social education. Political education was related to political systems that could decide what people desired. According to Mill, social education was completely dependent on political education. In other words, political education would decide the nature of society (ibid.: 181-182).

According to utilitarianism, if the difference between Britain and India was derived from political education, the reform of Indian political systems would lead to the civilization of Indian societies (Jahn 2005: 604)\(^1\). However, it was considered as dangerous to implement liberal democratic systems of government in India prematurely because the Indian population would use such free institutions to oppress others. J. S. Mill also stated that:

> 'In a barbarous state of society the case is sometimes different. [...]'

\(^1\) While J. S. Mill sought to show how political systems affect social development, he did not analyze how civilized nations achieved an advanced stage of social development (see Collini et al: 1983: Ch. 4).
When there are either free institutions or a desire for them, in any of the people artificially tied together, the interest of the government lies in an exactly opposite direction. It is then interested in keeping up and envenoming [sic] their antipathies that they may be prevented from coalescing, and it may be enabled to use some of them as tools for the enslavement of others.' (RG: 394)

In their theory, the stage of social development decided the political systems of the society. Therefore, before the introduction of civilized political systems into India, Indian societies had to be developed.

Instead of implanting representative government in India, the utilitarians insisted that civilized nations make laws to civilize savage societies because legislation based on utilitarianism was the universal vehicle of civilization. James Mill argued that:

‘how much the vices of the people depend upon the vices of the laws, and how necessarily the vices of the people diminish, as the virtues of the laws are increased. Of this no man will doubt: that the most effectual step which can be taken by any government to diminish the vices of the people is to take away from the laws every imperfection, by which, the vices, to impart to them every perfection, by which, the virtues, of the people, may receive encouragement.’ (HBI: 5: 521)

He suggested the reform of the political and economic systems of Indian societies through legislation based on utilitarianism and the liberation of the Indian population from religious authority, indigenous despotism, and
landlords. As Eric Stokes observes, ‘Mill was proposing a revolution of Indian society carried through solely by the weapon of law’ (Stokes 1959: 64).

Similarly, J. S. Mill thought that the reform of political institutions could transform the nature of savage societies. In addition to legislation, he suggested the education of Indian elites by employing them as civil servants (Mill 1990d: 63-64). In his plan, they would form a middle class and learn how to manage liberal democratic institutions of government. Furthermore, he proposed the establishment of Western judicial institutions in India. These would be an effective tool for spreading the idea of rule of law. In particular, criminal courts were considered as ‘a powerful agent of civilization’ that could improve the nature of Indian society (Mill 1990a: 152).

These ideas were based on Bentham’s philosophy. While it is debatable whether or not ‘Bentham had always dreamed of making laws for India’ (Halevy 1934: 510), he did argue that his legislation, based on utilitarianism, could efficiently govern any society in the world (Pitts 2005: 103-122). This idea deeply affected James and J. S. Mill’s philosophy. However, J. S. Mill observed that: ‘It never seems to have occurred to [Bentham] to regard political institutions in a higher light, as the principal means of the social education of a people’ (Mill 1969: 16). It means that Bentham did not examine social engineering through legislation. It was James and J. S. Mill who linked the reform of socio-political systems to the civilization of savage societies (Pitts 2005: 137). This new idea provided not only strong justification for the British colonial administration, but also the new strategy of colonial administration.

Thus, utilitarianism proposed, as prescriptions for India, the reform of socio-political institutions: legislation based on utilitarianism, the
establishment of Western educational systems, and the introduction of Western judicial institutions. These policies were a kind of social engineering because they aimed to transform the nature of Indian societies. Thus, social engineering policies were justified as an efficient tool for developing Indian societies.

**Benevolent Despotism**

In addition to the social engineering, the authoritarian colonial regime in India was justified by utilitarianism because it was better than other regimes in terms of administrative efficiency. In principle, utilitarianism was opposed to monarchy and aristocracy because such systems involved administration that was contrary to a society’s best interests. However, in a democracy, policies could not be decided quickly because the decision-making process required numerous assemblies (Mill 1992b: 7). Therefore, representative democracy was supported as a better political design by utilitarians. However, as stated above, utilitarianism argued that the introduction of liberal democratic institutions would be harmful to India because power holders could abuse their position. Rather, benevolent despotism by civilized nations could help savage societies to reach an advanced stage of social evolution. Therefore, despotic regime was justified as a political arrangement in British India.

The problem was who would take the responsibility for administration in India: the East India Company, the Parliament or the Royal Family. James Mill opposed administration by the East India Company because it was likely to lead to corruption. Also, control by Parliament could encounter problems of patronage. Instead, he suggested
administration by the British Royal Family (Mill 1810a: 156; Pitts 2005: 125-126). According to Mill, ‘A simple form of arbitrary government, tempered by European honour and European intelligence, is the only form which is fit for Hindustan’ (Mill 1810a: 155). On the other hand, J. S. Mill thought that a Council of India administration whose members were specialists would contribute to administrative efficiency. The Council would fill an important role to give administrators relevant information and advice. He highlighted the role of specialists and claimed that ‘no executive functionaries should be appointed by popular election’ (RG: 211). In his scheme, a Council was expected to prevent scandals. He wrote that: ‘The real friends of responsibility are those who would have this function exercised by a Council, who can be made responsible’ (Mill 1990b: 202). Therefore, ‘The utmost they can do is to give some of their best men a commission to look after it’ (RG: 418). In either case, Indian societies would be deprived of political agency. However, the aim of colonial trusteeship was not domination over India but the liberation of the Indian population from an indigenous despotic regime. Colonial trusteeship was altruistic and humanitarian.

Thus, in contrast to Burke’s colonial trusteeship that sought to protect Indian societies from the East India Company, utilitarian colonial trusteeship legitimized intrusive colonial policies. These included social engineering policies and benevolent despotism by the civilized nations. In this scheme, Indian societies would be deprived of political agency and their

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2 If James Mill thought that the Royal Family was better than other actors in terms of a sense of ‘honour,’ it would seem to imply that he trusted in the ‘virtue’ of the Royal Family, like Edmund Burke. Burke criticized the East India Company for corruption and a lack of virtue. He assumed that administration should be borne by the ruling class, which had the benefits of wisdom and public virtue (Whelan 1996).
identity would be transformed. India had already been ruled by the British Empire in the early 19th century not due to humanitarian concern but because of economic and geopolitical considerations. Utilitarianism legitimized such despotic colonial rule by using humanitarian discourse and advocated intrusive colonial policies. This humanitarianism was not just compassion for human suffering; rather, it pathologized target societies.

1-4 Practice of Colonial Trusteeship

Utilitarianism not only constituted the theology of colonial trusteeship but also directly affected colonial administration in India. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, there were the two kinds of colonial administrators in India: one type sought to introduce the basic British socio-political systems based on classical liberalism into Indian society according to Whig philosophy; the other tried to exploit indigenous systems and opposed those introduced from outside (Stokes 1959: 1-18; Metcalfe 1998: 1-27). Utilitarian colonial administrators were different from those administrators in that they criticized Indian civilization and advocated the abolition of traditional institutions and the westernization of Indian society according to utilitarianism.

Lord Bentinck, Governor-General in India, was a reforming colonial administrator and utilitarian. Before his departure to India, Bentinck said to James Mill as follows: ‘I am going to British India but I shall not be Governor-General. It is you that will be Governor-General’ (cited in Ghosh 1995: 22). Bentinck reformed Indian traditional customs regarding the treatment of women. He criminalized sati (a social practice in which a widowed woman would immolate herself on her husband’s funeral pyre) and
abolished other indigenous customs such as female infanticide, despite ‘the Company’s policy of noninterference with native “religious usages and institutions” established in 1772’ (Cassels 1965: 78). In the 18th century, evangelists had sought to abolish these practices, regarding them as inhumane. Therefore, they highly praised Bentinck’s actions and the Governor-General enjoyed a reputation as a humanitarian. Such reforms signified the affinity between utilitarianism and evangelism. Both agreed in asserting the liberation of the Indian population from indigenous social practices.

Another utilitarian colonial administrator was T. B. Macaulay, a Law-Member of the Governor-General’s Council since 1834. He contributed to the introduction of English education under Bentinck. Macaulay’s minutes of education stipulated the following: that English should be used as the official language instead of Persian; that English should be introduced in all educational institutions; that the colonial government should promote the translation of Western knowledge into vernacular languages and educate indigenous elites to act as a mediator between imperial government and the mass of Indian society (Macaulay 1920). His philosophy was deeply influenced by utilitarianism. His aim was to foster an educated middle class of Indians ‘who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern – a class of persons Indian in colour and blood, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect’ (Macaulay 1920: 116; Stokes 1959: 45). This English educational system attempted to liberate the Indian population from the indigenous despotic regime.

Lord Dalhousie, one of the representative reforming administrators, was also influenced by utilitarianism (Stokes 1959: 248-251; Ghosh 1978).
He justified his decision to annex the Awadh region by insisting that it would contribute to the liberation of the people in Awadh from despotism. Dalhousie explained the situation of Awadh as follows:

‘the Government of India has never taken the one measure which alone could be effectual, by withdrawing its countenance from the Sovereign of Oudh [Awadh], and its troops from his dominions. It is by these aids alone that the Sovereigns of Oudh have been enabled for more than half-a-century to persist with impunity in their course of oppression and misrule. Their eyes have never seen the misery of their subjects; their ears have never been open to their cry.’ (Cited in Hunter 1890: 172-173)

Before the annexation, Awadh had been allowed self-government by indigenous rulers according to the treaty which Robert Clive concluded with the Mughal governor of the province in 1765 (Kaye 1857-1858: 1: 113-114; Chakravarty 2005: 63). However, Dalhousie thought that the population of Awadh was suffering from despotism and misrule and that ‘the British Government would be guilty in the sight of God and man, if it were any longer to aid in sustaining by its countenance an administration fraught with suffering to millions’ (cited in Hunter 1890: 176). Finally in 1856 he decided to annex Awadh. His description of the annexation demonstrated the characteristics of utilitarianism and humanitarianism.

Thus, in practice, utilitarianism affected colonial administration. Furthermore, colonial reforms based on utilitarianism were supported by evangelists, who were typical humanitarians in the 19th century, because
these policies were humanitarian for British people.

This section has showed that utilitarianism represented Indian societies as oppressed by indigenous despotism and savagism. The objective of colonial administration was defined as the liberation of society from oppression. This pathologization exhibited characteristics of humanitarianism and justified prescriptions including social engineering policies and benevolent despotism by civilized nations. This humanitarianism required practices which were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. Thus, the discourse of utilitarianism regarding India indicated that colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism were mutually constitutive and that they comprised a dispositive which defined the unequal relationship between Britain and India.

2. Trusteeship and Post-utilitarianism after the Mutiny

In the mid-19th century, colonial trusteeship in India was challenged by Indian societies. The Mutiny by the Indian soldiers in the Bengal army of the British East India Company broke out at Meerut on 10 May 1857 and spread over two thirds of India. It shook the foundations of British India. Responding to this challenge, the theology and practice of colonial trusteeship radically changed. The British Empire began to research the causes of the Mutiny and criticized the hurried Westernization of Indian society and utilitarian colonial administration. The liberation of the Indian population from an indigenous despotic regime was no longer considered to be an objective of colonial administration, but instead to be a cause of the
Mutiny. Not only the conservatives but also the liberals observed that the pathologization and prescriptions based on utilitarianism were irrelevant in India. A new generation of colonial administrators and intellectuals attempted to understand the complexity of ‘traditional’ societies and re-pathologized India. They insisted that ‘traditional’ societies were so fragile that the British Empire had to protect them, otherwise the collapse of ‘traditional’ socio-political systems would cause ‘anarchy.’ ‘Anarchy’ was characterized by irrational violence and imagined mainly from the Mutiny in 1857. This new pathologization required a different prescription: ‘indirect rule.’ This was a new philosophy of colonial rule designed to exploit indigenous socio-political systems.

2-1 Re-pathologization of India

*Interpretations of the Mutiny*

The Indian Mutiny was deeply shocking for the British Empire. Therefore, even during the Mutiny, various explanations for it were offered. For example, G. B. Malleson published the first part of *The Mutiny of the Bengal Army: A Historical Narrative* in June 1857, only two month after the first uprising at the Meerut (Chakravarty 2005: 19). After Malleson, many more books were published: *The Indian Mutiny up to the Relief Lucknow* (1857) by J. F. Lee and Captain F. W. Radcliffe; *Complete Narrative of the Mutiny in India from its Commencement to the Present Time* (1857) edited by Thomas Frost; E. H. Nollan’s *Illustrated History of the British Empire in India and the East, from the Earliest Times to the Suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny in 1859* (1858-1860); *The Indian Empire with a Full Account of the Mutiny of the Bengal Army* (1858-1861) by R. M. Martin; and the *History of
the Indian Mutiny (1859) by Charles Ball. In this series of interpretations of Mutiny, the representation of Indian societies changed. While Indian societies were described as savage and suffering from indigenous despotism before the Mutiny, now they were represented as suffering from anarchy. For the British Empire, the Mutiny was not interpreted as Indian opposition to the British colonial rule. Rather, it was considered as a sign of ‘anarchy’ in Indian societies.

‘Anarchy’ was characterized by irrational violence and it was interpreted as the savagism of the Indian population. F. O. Mayne, British Magistrate and Collector, observed it as follows:

In the Pergunnahs [districts] the news spread like wild fire, and the villagers rose in every direction and plundered and murdered each other promiscuously. Old enmities and the long smothered wish for revenge were forthwith satisfied. Auction purchasers and decree-holders were ousted, travelers and merchandize plundered, and the servants of Government compelled to fly for their lives; and in all instance Government buildings and property of every description were plundered and destroyed. Every man’s hand was against his neighbour, and the natives reveled in all the license and madness of unchecked anarchy and rebellion, in a manner such as only Asiatics can revel in those pleasure. Tulwars and matchlocks were scarce in Bundelkund; but armed with spears and scythes, and iron-bound latties, and extemporary axes, formed of chopping knives fastened on sticks, they imagined themselves to be warriors, chose their own Kings, and defied all comers. Never was revolution more
rapid – never more complete.’ (cited by Wagner 2010: 216; see Roy 1993)

In this story, the Indian population perpetrated violence because of their barbarism. They were imagined as irrational, savage, and violent. Moreover, according to Sharpe (1991), the story that English women were raped and tortured in this Mutiny was invented and recurred repeatedly in the accounts of the Mutiny. This representation also marked the anarchical nature of Indian societies.

One of the most influential interpretations of the Mutiny was J. W. Kaye’s *History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-58* (1864-76). He attributed the cause of the Mutiny to the Westernization policies that were conducted by reforming colonial administrators such as Lord Dalhousie. Whilst before the Mutiny he evaluated the Westernization of Indian societies as a success, the outbreak of violence made him change his mind (Chakravarty 2005: 59). For Kaye, there were three factors that caused the Mutiny: the annexation of Awadh; the utilitarian revenue resettlements; and Christianization.

Many commentators presumed that the annexation of Awadh by Lord Dalhousie was one of the most important causes of the Mutiny. Kaye justified the intervention in Awadh as necessary because the native government in the province was tyrannical. He accepted the reason that Dalhousie gave when he decided to intervene. However, he criticized the manner of intervention. Kaye wrote that:

‘[intervention] would be as politic as it would be righteous, to demonstrate to all States and Nations of India, that we had not
deposed the King of Oude [Awadh] for our own benefit – that we had not deposed a righteous act on broad principles of humanity, by which we had gained nothing.’ (Kaye 1857-1858: 1: 144)

However, Dalhousie annexed the territory and acquired the revenue of the land. This annexation provoked the antipathy of various classes in India.

In addition to the annexation of Awadh, Kaye attributed a further cause of the Mutiny to the utilitarian revenue resettlements. As stated above, the utilitarian colonial policy aimed to relieve *ryots* (Indian peasants) from *zamindars* (Indian landlords). Instead of *zamindars*, the East India Company attempted to be the sole landlord (Stokes 1959: 94). However, Kaye criticized this strategy:

‘These Talookhdars constituted the landed aristocracy of the country: they had recognised manorial rights: they had, in many instances, all the dignity and power of great feudal barons, and, doubtless, often turned that power to bad account. But whether for good or evil, in past years, we found them existing as a recognized institution: and it was at the same time a cruel wrong and a grievous error to sweep it away as though it were an incumbrance and an usurpation.’ (Kaye 1857-1858: 1: 160)

He thought that the dissolution of Indian traditional communities caused anarchy.

The third cause of the Mutiny was Christianization. As in the abolition of *sati*, utilitarians and missionaries were the conspirators in
colonial education. They criticized Hinduism as savage superstition and sought to westernize the Indian population (Porter 1999: 231). Kaye thought that such a policy created ‘a new generation [of Indians] ... not to be satisfied with absurd doctrines or captivated by grotesque fables’, while ‘the whole [religious] hierarchy of India saw their power, their privileges, and their perquisites rapidly crumbling away from them’ (Kaye 1857-1858: 1: 181, 183). As indigenous religious systems had supported the order of Indian societies, the liberation of the Indian population from religious customs contributed to the growth of ‘anarchy.’

As well as Kaye’s interpretation of the Mutiny, W. W. Hunter’s account of the Mutiny also demonstrated the profound shift in the pathologization of India. Hunter served as a Bengal civil servant and published his own ‘Annals of Rural Bengal.’ After taking office as director-general of statistics to the Government of India, he conducted a census. It covered roads, railways, manufacturing, commerce and newspapers throughout India. In his book, *The Indian Empire* (1893), Hunter summarized the causes of the Mutiny, including two that Kaye did not mention. The first was a rumor that ran through the Native army ‘that the cartridges served out to the Bengal regiments had been greased with the fat of cows, the sacred animal of the Hindus; and even with the lard of pigs – animals which are unclean alike to Hindu and Muhammadan’ (Hunter 1893: 489). It signified the misunderstanding and indifference of the British Empire regarding local religions. The second was the restriction of ‘the higher posts in its service to natives of education, talent, or proved fidelity’ (*ibid.*: 488-489). According to Hunter, this policy led to widespread dissatisfaction.
Thus, the Mutiny was represented as the sign of the anarchical nature of Indian societies. ‘Anarchy’ was characterized by irrational violence. Colonial administrators and intellectuals interpreted the Mutiny as a result of utilitarian colonial policies, hurried Westernization, and misunderstanding of Indian societies. The liberation of the Indian population from religious and political despotism was severely criticized as a cause of ‘anarchy.’ However, by making this argument, Indian societies were re-pathologized as suffering from ‘anarchy.’

New Philosophy for Pathologization

Utilitarianism could no longer provide the theoretical foundation of colonial trusteeship. Instead, a new philosophy for colonial trusteeship was created by Henry Maine, a jurist and a professor of law in Cambridge and a law member of the Viceroy’s Council in India.

In his books, Ancient Law (hereafter, ‘AL’) and Village-communities (hereafter, ‘VC’), he proposed a model of ancient society and applied it to India and Europe. According to him, the East was certainly full of fragments of ancient society (VC: 7). In order to explain the nature of ancient society, Maine introduced the idea of ‘family’ which ‘is the type of an archaic society […] but the family here spoken of is not exactly the family as understood by a modern’ (AL: 69). He argued that: ‘We must look on the family as constantly enlarged by the absorption of strangers within its circle, and we must try to regard the fiction of adoption as so closely simulating the reality of kinship’ (AL: 69). Finally, the families construct village communities (the clans and tribes) (VC: 9; Lectures on the Early History of Institutions (hereafter, ‘LEH’): 70). In the families, various rights such as property rights belonged
to the community. The members of the family were not free individuals but restricted by traditional social systems.

In the next stage of social development, the families would dissolve in ‘The movement of the progressive societies’. In this process, ‘The Individual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take account’ (AL.: 79). In the modern society, ‘all these relations arise from the free agreement of Individuals [...] only contract gives its legal validity’ (AL.: 85). In this sense, the societies evolve ‘from Status to Contract’ (AL.: 86). The village communities in India were in the stage of primitive societies and the process of feudalization would begin (VC: 66-67; LEH: 85). In this process, ‘blood-hood’ by which a body of men is held together would disappear and ‘territory’ would bind them together (AL: 56-57). This ‘transition from one state of society to another in modern India [was] not sudden but gradual and slow’ (LEH: 289-290).

If the development of society was too rapid, Indian socio-political systems would disintegrate and lead to grave consequences for the stability of imperial rule. Maine stated that:

‘The result is the immediate decline [of a peasant proprietary], and consequently bitter discontent, of the class above them, who find themselves sinking to the footing of mere annuitants on the land. Such was the land settlement of Oudh, which was shattered to pieces by the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, and which greatly affected its course.’ (VC: 70)

Thus, he provided new philosophical foundation for pathologization of India.
Indian societies were represented as in the early stage of development and exceedingly fragile. Therefore, the British Empire had to prevent them from disintegrating. The protection of the Indian population from ‘anarchy’ replaced the liberation of them from despotism as the main objective of colonial administration and constituted colonial trusteeship in India. This discourse also marked the origins of the relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism because the idea of anarchy was closely related to human suffering. As the danger of ‘anarchy’ was highlighted, discursive formation of colonial trusteeship was strengthened. This humanitarianism required practices which were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering.

This new philosophy considered laws not as a vehicle of civilization but as a tool to prevent ‘traditional’ societies from dissolving. Maine argued that: ‘Law is stable; the societies we are speaking of are progressive.’ Therefore, a society needs the agencies by which ‘Law is brought into harmony with society’ (AL: 20). Legislation in India had two paradoxical effects. On the one hand, legislation would replace the native law. He stated that:

‘the apparently inevitable displacement of native law and usage by English law, when the two sets of rules are in contact, is a phenomenon which may be observed over a great part of India at the present moment.’ (VC: 18)

On the other hand, legislation would ‘give a solidity and a rigidity to native usage which it does not naturally possess’ (cited in Lyall 1893: 298). In order to control the transformation of Indian societies, he suggested as his

As a colonial administrator, he made various laws such as the law on marriage. However, he sometimes failed to implement his ideas of laws. For example, his legislation on marriage was opposed by Shia and Sunni Muslim groups. Therefore, he had to adopt a special law to appease critics of the legislation. Also, the bill on contract, which Maine proposed, was disapproved by the Governor-General because it might result in the exclusion of native people from agricultural contracts and cause further rebellions like that of 1857 (Otter 2007: 103).

While Maine’s legislation seemed to be ineffective, as Karuna Mantena (2010: 161) states, ‘For policymakers, Maine’s work drew attention to the crisis of native society and provided a theoretical framework through which to understand its origins and consequence’.

2.2 New Prescriptions

As a prescription for ‘anarchy,’ the idea of indirect rule was created. This new colonial strategy aimed to create and solidify Indian ‘traditional’ socio-political systems. This shift of colonial strategy was represented by the Queen’s Proclamation that was read by Lord Canning as the Governor General on 1 Nov 1858. It declared that:

‘We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge to enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain
from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure ... we will that generally, in framing and administration of law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages and customs of India.’ (Cited in Philips, Singh, and Pandey 1962: 11)

The British Empire abandoned the utilitarian strategy and began to focus on indigenous religious and political systems. However, this new colonial policy was not to respect the difference between Britain and India. Rather, it sought to manipulate the difference through the construction of ‘traditional’ institutions. Indirect rule was not ‘Non-Regulation system’ in which the British Empire arranged an alliance with native states and entrusted internal administration to ‘traditional’ rulers. As Mahmood Mamdani aptly describes, indirect rule was a ‘decentralized despotism’ (Mamdani 1996: 37). Furthermore, as Thomas Metcalf (1998) argues, the ideology of indirect rule was ‘to create a simulation of the Middle Ages, in which its institutions remained apparently intact even as they were fundamentally altered to suit the requirements of the new order’ (Metcalf 1998: 80).

Thus, indirect rule attempted to unilaterally constitute local ‘traditional’ institutions by manipulating the symbolic and cultural constitution of Indian societies. In this sense, it was a kind of social engineering policy and another form of despotism. This new prescription was legitimized to protect Indian societies from the danger of ‘anarchy.’

2·3 Practice of Colonial Trusteeship

The idea of indirect rule was highly influential in British colonial
administration in the late 19th century. For example, the imperial assembly in 1877 was based on the idea of indirect rule. It declared that the British Empire was the top of the ‘traditional’ hierarchy of Indian native countries. A central planner for the assembly was Lord Lytton, who was appointed viceroy and governor general in 1876. His strategy was to direct ‘the native aristocracy of the country, whose sympathy and cordial allegiance is no inconsiderable guarantee for the stability [...] of the Indian Empire’ (Lytton to Queen Victoria, 21 April 1876, cited in Cohn 1992: 188), and to ‘place the Queen’s authority upon the ancient throne of the Moguls, with which the imagination and tradition of [our] Indian subjects associate the splendor of supreme power’ (ibid.: 187-188). Lytton thought that traditional and symbolic rituals should be employed because ‘they [Indian aristocracy] are easily affected by sentiment and susceptible to the influence of symbols to which facts inadequately correspond’ (Lytton to Salisbury, 11 May 1876, cited in Cohn 1992: 192). Also, as Trevithick observes, this strategy was ‘an economical method of rule’ (Trevithick 1990: 563). Actually, Lytton wrote that ‘the cost of the Assemblage will really be very moderate, and the effect of it may save millions’ (Lytton to Morley, 29 Oct. 1876, cited in Trevithick 1990: 563).

The assembly was held at an historic site outside Delhi, the Old Mughal capital in which the planners ‘constructed a temporary city of tents and canvas’ (Cannadine 2001: 46). Finally, the assembly demonstrated that the native chiefs were put under the control of the British Empire. Lytton’s private secretary, O. T. Burne, reviewed the assembly as follows:

‘[The imperial assemblage] brought the native chiefs into line, caused
them to realize clearly for the first time that they were under one
Sovereign, induced them to offer from that moment their personal
services and troops to the Government, and effected generally a
change in tone and feeling towards the British Empire, which has
from that period onwards been of great benefit.’ (Burne 1907: 222)

In addition to the assembly, Lytton planned to construct several
systems for the manipulation of Indian aristocracy: an Indian Privy Council
and a College of Arms. The College of Arms was the system that aimed to
re-organize the Indian aristocracy on the basis of the British knighthood
(Metcalf 1998: 77-78; Cohn 1993: 190). Likewise, the Indian Privy Council
was proposed to legitimize the Viceroy (the Governor-General) in India.
Bernard Cohn argues that:

‘Lytton’s intention was to arrange the constitution of the privy
council “to enable the Viceroy, whilst making parade of consulting
native opinion to swamp the native members, and still secure the
prestige of their presence and assent”’(Cohn 1993: 190).

Although the ideology of indirect rule pretended to respect the
difference between India and Britain, there is no doubt that it was little
more than despotism. Traditional institutions created by the colonial
government were imposed on the Indian population. The westernized natives
were considered those ‘who represent nothing but the social anomaly of own
position’ (Lytton to Queen Victoria, 16 Nov. 1876 cited in Cohn 1992: 192),
though they had been thought to be useful agents of modernization before
the Mutiny. Furthermore, Lytton imposed severe restrictions on the Indian press and the employment of Indian as public servants (Moore 1999: 432).

Not only the conservatives but also liberals adopted the idea of indirect rule. While liberals did not deny the gradual development of Indian societies like conservatives, they attempted to prevent the disintegration of indigenous socio-political systems. Lord Lyall, who was ‘Maine’s most respected intellectual successor’ (Mantena 2010: 165), was a liberal colonial theorist. His understanding of India was strongly influenced by Henry Maine. He highlighted the importance of the traditional society and advocated its protection (Lyall 1907a: 260, 263). In a similar observation to that of Maine, Lyall also claimed that traditional societies were so fragile that the British Empire ought to protect them (Lyall 1907a: 216, 219). It was dangerous to allow the disintegration of them without any understanding of ‘how the void which they will leave can be filled up’ (Lyall 1907a: 264). He endorsed Maine’s opinion that it was wrong to assume that ‘political institutions could be imported like steam machinery, warranted to stand any climate and to benefit every community’ (Lyall 1893: 290). Therefore, in India, the construction of Westernized socio-political systems would endanger the stability of Indian societies.

3 The Ilbert Bill crisis in 1883 was the event which made a clear distinction between liberalism and conservatism. A point of contention was to what extent despotism could be allowed in Indian colonies. C. Ilbert submitted the bill which aimed the expansion of equality before the criminal law to the Indian population and this bill stirred up controversy. On the one side, a conservative administrator, J. F. Stephen, strongly opposed it because ‘[the British government of India] is essentially an absolute government, founded, not on consent, but on conquest’ (cited in Stokes 1959: 288). On the other side, the liberal administrators such as Lord Ripon, W. W. Hunter and Lord Lyall supported the bill because ‘equality before the law’ was leitmotif for liberalism.
The idea of indirect rule exploited indigenous symbolic and cultural institutions to subject Indian societies to the British Empire. There is no doubt that indirect rule was nothing but despotism. Not only conservatives but also liberals supported this colonial strategy because they agreed in the pathologization of Indian societies. Indian societies were represented as suffering from ‘anarchy.’ This new pathologization redefined the objective of colonial administration as the protection of the Indian population from ‘anarchy’ and reconstituted colonial trusteeship. ‘Anarchy’ was characterized by irrational violence and interpreted as a sign of the savageness of the Indian populations. This discourse had characteristics of humanitarianism because it considered ‘anarchy’ as a kind of human suffering. However, this humanitarianism required practices which were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. It imagined that, in the state of ‘anarchy,’ the Indian population would commit murder, plunder, and rape. Thus, after the Mutiny, colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism were mutually constituted. And the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship was reproduced.

Conclusion

Colonial trusteeship in India was a case of existing rule that subsequently required humanitarian discourse as justification. Although the idea of human suffering did not emerge explicitly, the theology of colonial trusteeship in India demonstrated a discursive structure of humanitarianism. Moreover, this kind of humanitarianism was not just compassion with human suffering; rather, it identified the nature of target societies as pathology. In the early 19th century, utilitarianism observed that
the Indian population was suffering from savagism and oppression by indigenous religious and political despotism. Compassion for savage and oppressed peoples in India seemed to be a kind of humanitarianism. It pathologized Indian societies and defined the objective of colonial administration as the liberation of the Indian population from indigenous religious and political despotism. Hence, it marked the origins of the relationship between colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism. After the Mutiny of 1857, ‘anarchy,’ which was considered to be caused by modernization, formed the new pathology of India. ‘Anarchy’ was characterized by irrational violence and interpreted as a sign of the savagism of the Indian population. Because of their nature, Indian societies would easily descend into a state of ‘anarchy.’ Therefore, the British Empire ought to protect them from ‘anarchy.’ Hence, the protection of Indian societies from anarchy was defined as the new objective of colonial administration. These pathologizations constituted the unequal relationship between Britain and India, and moreover, prescriptions such as social engineering and benevolent despotism. Thus, in the 19th century, the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship was formed and reproduced.
Ch. 3 Colonial Trusteeship and Humanitarianism in Africa:
The Anti-slavery Movement and the Native Protection Movement

In the analysis of the theology and practice of colonial trusteeship in India, the previous chapter showed the origins of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. This chapter will explore the theology and practice of colonial trusteeship in Africa in the 19th century. The theology of colonial trusteeship in India identified ‘oppression’ and ‘anarchy’ as unignorable human suffering. Similarly, the theology of colonial trusteeship in Africa also acknowledged ‘slavery,’ ‘anarchy,’ and ‘invasion’ as human suffering. Philip Curtin (1963) calls the mid-19th century ‘the age of humanitarianism,’ showing that humanitarian discourse was deeply related to the colonization of Africa. In the 19th century, unlike British India, there were not large African territories over which the British Empire had effective control. Humanitarianism, in this context, required practices above and beyond the direct relief of suffering and to a certain extent constituted colonial trusteeship before the British Empire began to rule African colonies.

This chapter will analyze two humanitarian movements in Africa: the anti-slavery movement and the native protection movement. The former aimed to eliminate the slave trade between Africa and Western countries, and, in doing so, called on the British Empire to colonize Africa. The latter sought to protect African native people from European colonists and place African native communities under the control of the British Empire. These movements directly influenced colonial trusteeship. As the next chapter will discuss, the development of native welfare and anti-slavery was recognized as one of the duties of trustees by the European powers in the Berlin Congo
Conference (1884-1885) and the Brussels Conference (1890). Analyzing humanitarian movements in the 19th century, Brian Stanley (1990) observes that:

‘Evangelical Christians remained as staunchly committed to the causes of liberty for the gospel, freedom for the slave, and protection for the native. [...] But those same concerns were now drawing them more frequently and more enthusiastically into the advocacy of explicitly imperial solutions.’ (Stanley 1990: 132)

As many historians have shown, humanitarians had often adhered to ‘imperial solutions’ (Curtin 1964; Ward 1969; Dachs 1972; Stanley 1990; Temperley: 1991; Porter 1999 and 2004). However, there remain some questions to be answered: how and why did humanitarianism constitute colonial trusteeship? Humanitarianism has not always constituted colonial trusteeship. This chapter will demonstrate that, as in the case of utilitarianism and post-utilitarianism, when humanitarianism pathologized African societies, it justified colonial administration as a solution.

The first section will examine how the anti-slavery movement pathologized African societies and justified colonial administration in Africa. The second section will analyze how the native protection movement pathologized native African countries and advocated the territorial expansion of the British Empire.

1. Anti-Slavery Movement and Empire

Until the mid-19th century, the anti-slavery movement had not
sought any imperial solution to slavery problems. However, after the emancipation of slaves in 1833-1834, the anti-slavery movement began to denounce the nature of African societies and advocate colonial rule in Africa. This section analyzes the transition from the early anti-slavery discourse to the later discourse by examining the pamphlets by William Wilberforce and T. F. Buxton. Wilberforce was a leader of the anti-slavery movement and Member of Parliament for Yorkshire. Buxton was Wilberforce’s successor as the leader of the parliamentary movement and a member of Anti-Slavery Society.

1-1 ‘The War of Representation’ and W. Wilberforce

In the late 18th century, the abolitionists’ argument against slavery had been accepted by many intellectuals and missionaries. For example, the productivity of slavery was questioned by Adam Smith and his followers (Drescher 2002). However, as the beneficiaries of plantation economies had exerted strong influence on the Parliament, slavery and its trade had not been illegalized. The early anti-slavery activists such as Thomas Clarkson and Granville Sharpe aimed to organize the networks of the anti-slavery movement and to mobilize public opinion. The anti-slavery movement gradually gained support from transatlantic religious networks such as the Quakers and the Methodists because missionaries regarded the slave trade as a sin against religion (Porter 1999: 202).

The controversies over the Atlantic slave trade between abolitionists and anti-abolitionists turned the representation of slaves and African natives into a battlefield. This is what Catherine Hall terms a ‘war of representation’ (Hall 2002: 107). On one side, those who supported slavery
and the slave-trade dehumanized slaves and African natives; whilst on the other, abolitionists publicly advocated recognizing slaves and African natives as ‘human.’

When Wilberforce published his pamphlet in 1807, *A Letter on the Abolition of the Slave Trade Addressed to the Freeholders and Other Inhabitants of Yorkshire* (hereafter, ‘LAST’), his aim was to persuade politicians and public opinion that African natives and slaves were ‘human.’ British society had treated slaves as objects, and any laws in the British Empire had not recognized slaves as having a legal personality. Wilberforce stated in the pamphlet:

‘Surely, however, the rejection of the proposition [on the abolition of the Slave Trade] shews, that they not only do not themselves regard the Negroes as entitled to the consideration and treatment due to a human being, considered as such, but that they cannot even persuade themselves that he will be regarded as entitled to them by the world in general.’ (LAST: 170)

The recognition of the personality of slaves and African natives was indispensable for the anti-slavery movement because public compassion for slaves and African natives required the humane treatment of slaves and African natives. For Wilberforce, the dehumanization of slaves and African natives was ‘the grand master vice of the colonial system’ (LAST: 172).

In addition to the humanization of slaves and African natives, Wilberforce sought to demonstrate various immoral aspects of the slave trade. First, the slave trade had caused tribal wars in Africa because African
people tried to capture and sell each other as slaves to buy Western commodities. The wars had destroyed native communities and as a result, the morals, habits and manners of African societies had declined. Second, the treatment of slaves was cruel and inhumane when they were shipped to the colonies such as West India. In fact, ‘the average mortality on board the Slave ships was very considerable’ (LAST: 98). Third, the slave trade had obstructed the progress and prosperity of Africa. Without the slave trade, communication with Europe would have brought ‘the blessings of religious and moral light, and social improvement’ to Africa (LAST: 41). Moreover, according to Wilberforce, the slave trade had endangered the morality and manners not only of African societies but also of British society (LAST: 339).

However, the missionaries’ representation of slaves and African natives was biased. The idea of ‘human’ to which Wilberforce and other missionaries referred meant Christians and heathens who had the potential for conversion. Previously, Spanish missionaries, such as Las Casas, in the 16th century, had recognized Amerindians as potential Christians and ignored their identity (Todorov 1984). British missionaries too were likely to ignore the identity of slaves and African natives. The argument by Samuel Pearce, a member of the Baptist Missionary Society, demonstrated this ‘indifference.’ He claimed that ‘[a] Christian’s heart ought to be as comprehensive as the universe. The Asiatic, the American, the African – all are our brethren’ (Hall 2002: 295). Furthermore, the missionaries confirmed the ‘savageness’ of Africa by presuming that Africa was ruled by ignorance and superstition. Wilberforce wrote that:

‘When men began to question the soundness of that logic, which
grounded the right to carry off the natives of Africa into slavery, on their state of barbarism and ignorance; and still more, when it was resorted, that even granting the premises, that the Africans were thus dark and savage: the conclusion of a Christian reasoner ought naturally to be, that it was the duty of mere favoured nations to civilize and enlighten, not to oppress and enslave, them.’ (LAST: 90)

Nevertheless, he did not develop this policy of civilization and Christianization of African societies because he considered slave trade to be the most serious obstacle to the progress of Africa. His chief aim was not to civilize Africans but to abolish slavery and its trade. Appealing to the House, he published a pamphlet just days before the crucial decision on the Slave Trade Abolition Act (1807) in the House of Lords (Hague 2008: 351). In this pamphlet, the root cause was attributed to slave traders and planters. On this point, his pathologization of Africa was inchoate, although African people and slaves were defined as ‘uncivilized’ and ‘savage.’ In his description, the representation of whiteness was split into the civilized and the savage. Analyzing the discourse of missionaries in the early 19th century, Hall (2002: 113) argues that:

‘Britishness and whiteness, in the discourse of the missionaries and their allies, should mean order, civilization, Christianity, domesticity and separate spheres, rationality and industry. When it carries another set of meanings, it was deeply disturbing: white people then became “savages”, uncultivated and uncivilized.’
As Wilberforce represented the British and white people as perpetrators of the problems of slavery, the civilization of Africa was not considered to be a solution to the problems.

Even after the Slave Trade Abolition Act was passed, Wilberforce did not stop the ‘war of representation.’ He continued to advocate the suppression of illegal slave trading and the liberation of slaves. In 1823, Wilberforce published a new pamphlet, *An Appeal to the Religion, Justice, and Humanity of the Inhabitants of the British Empire, in Behalf of the Negro Slaves in the West Indies* (hereafter ‘ARJ’). This pamphlet focused on the terrible conditions of slaves and the laws oppressing slaves in West India. It claimed that: ‘The slaves were systematically depressed below the level of human beings’ (ARJ: 9). It was not planters and masters but the systems of slavery that allowed the oppression of slaves. These systems rested on the prejudice that slaves and African people were not ‘human’. Wilberforce denounced the prejudice against slaves and Africans:

‘The Proofs of the extreme degradation of the slaves, in the latter sense, are innumerable: and indeed it must be confessed, that in the minds of European in general, more especially in vulgar minds, whether vulgar from the want of education, or morally vulgar,... the personal peculiarities of the Negro race could scarcely fail, by diminishing sympathy, to produce impressions, not merely of contempt, but even of disgust and aversion.’ (ARJ: 9)

The prejudice among many European people and the discriminatory laws against slaves were mutually constitutive. These formed the systems of
slavery.

Wilberforce suggested two prescriptions for the problems of slavery: the abolition of the slave trade and legislation to protect slaves. The abolition of the slave trade would prevent the planters from easily buying slaves from slave traders and simply letting their slaves die. The planters ‘would be forced to improve the condition of their slaves’ (ARJ: 26). The legislation to protect slaves would not only secure the slaves’ lives but also improve their social conditions (ARJ: 9). However, when Wilberforce’s approach reached its limits in the 1820s, the strategy of the anti-slavery movement radically changed.

1.2 Security, Civilization, and Colonization: T. F. Buxton and Anti-Slavery Expedition

According to Andrew Porter, ‘From 1823 [humanitarians] increased demands for direct imperial intervention, even in colonies with their own Legislative Assemblies, to secure improved conditions for the slaves’ (Porter 1999: 202). In this period, the relationship between the anti-slavery movement and the British government was deepening. On the one hand, the missionaries needed help from the British government to emancipate all slaves and suppress illegal slave trading. As stated above, even after criminalizing the slave trade, the volume of the trading did not decrease and the conditions of slaves did not improve. On the other hand, it was difficult for politicians to ignore the anti-slavery movement because petitions from the latter to Parliament considerably increased. In this situation, T. F. Buxton, the Member of Parliament for Weymouth since 1818, succeeded to the leadership of the parliamentary movement on anti-slavery. He took over
from Wilberforce in 1821 (Hague 2008: 474-475).

The 1830s was the heyday of the anti-slavery movement. According to Porter, ‘Slaves in Britain’s colonies were emancipated as from 1 August 1834; subject to varying periods of “apprenticeship” to their former masters, all would be completely free in 1840’ (Porter 1999: 204). However, even after the emancipation of slaves, the slave trade did not disappear. Therefore, Buxton had to re-examine the structure of the slave trade and try to find a remedy. In 1837, new ideas for the abolition of slave trade came to him and he approached the government to put his plan into practice (Temperley 1991: 9). These plans were published as a pamphlet in 1839 called *The African Trade and its Remedy* (hereafter ‘ATR’). This publication had a great impact on public opinion and Parliament.

*Pathologization of Africa*

In this pamphlet, Buxton focused not on consumers but on providers of slaves. He wanted to explain how the slaves were being provided and who was doing the providing. He argued that African people were selling each other as slaves. According to him,

‘The parent – debased and brutalised as he is – barters his child; the chief his subject; each individual looks with an evil eye on his neighbour, and lays snares to catch him, – because the sale of children, subjects, and neighbours, is the only means as yet afforded, by European commerce, for the supply of those wants which that commerce has created.’ (ATR: 7)
Africans were represented as cruel and greedy. They were so demoralized and degraded that they waged tribal wars as soon as slave trade ships arrived at the coast (ATR: 79). Villages were broken, and the survivors were carried off and sold to slave traders. Now, Africa was in a state of anarchy (ATR: 84).

Why were they so cruel that they could sell and kill each other? Buxton identified cruel traditions and customs that forced Africans to kill each other. He observed that:

‘Many slaves are killed at their various “customs,” [...] the decease of a person is announced by a discharge of musketry proportioned to his rank, or the wealth of his family.’ (ATR: 233-234)

Buxton concluded that ‘in the present state of things, human life and human suffering are very very lightly regarded’ in Africa (ATR: 226).

However, according to Buxton, even if Africans were moralized, uncivilized Africans would have nothing to sell but slaves. Buxton explained, ‘The pursuit of man, therefore, is to him not a matter of choice and selection, but of necessity, and after any interval of constrained abstinence he will revert to it as the business of his life’ (ATR: 278). Although African soil was remarkably fertile, they did not know how to avail themselves of their own resources. However, even after they learnt the required techniques, commerce could not develop because Africa was thought to be in a state of anarchy and security was not guaranteed. The civilization of Africa, thereafter, required the construction of security as well as the provision of agricultural techniques.
Thus, Buxton pathologized African societies by reasoning that the slave trade continued because of the savageness of Africans. Humanitarianism required him to identify the root causes of this humanitarian crisis; it was concluded that the causes of the problems lay in the savage nature of African societies. This humanitarianism required what was above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. While Buxton's aim was merely to find the primary causes of slavery, in the process he pathologized African societies. This pathologization, as the next section will show, contributed to the constitution of colonialism.4

Establishment of Security

Buxton tried to find a solution to the root causes of slavery and the slave trade. Before suggesting his prescriptions, in his pamphlet, he examined the fruitless efforts that had been made for the suppression of slave traders. In 1835, Britain and Spain concluded the Anti-Slavery Treaty. It authorized British vessels to arrest suspected Spanish slave traders and bring them before the mixed commissions which were established at Sierra Leone and Havana. Moreover, Spain was required to supervise Spanish traders (Lloyd 1949; Ward 1969). Nevertheless, ‘there is no diminution in the Spanish Slave Trade’ (ATR: 211). The Anglo-Spanish agreement that was referred to as a model for an anti-slavery treaty had been ineffective. Even if Britain could conclude similar agreements with other powers, such as

4 According to Curtin (1964: 289-342), an ‘attitude of cultural chauvinism’ was a general tendency in British thought about Africa. Specialists such as missionaries, explorers, and traders were likely to attract public attention by giving sensational examples. However, their knowledge of Africa contained errors and these errors ‘had become “common knowledge”’ (Curtin 1964: 342).
Portugal, it could not abolish the slave trade (ATR: 219).

However, this does not mean that he thoroughly denied the possibility and validity of suppressing slave trade by using the British Navy; rather, he suggested strengthening and deploying the Navy on the coast of Africa from Gambia to Angola (ATR: iii and Ch. I in Part II). Moreover, Buxton suggested Fernando Po as the naval base to suppress the slave traders, and Sierra Leone as the foothold for the civilization of Africa (ATR: 347, 365). Thus, his plan advocated the deployment of the navy and the colonization of African coasts. This arrangement of the imperial squadron was considered the first ‘preparatory measure’ in his plan (ATR: 299).

It is not surprising that some other missionaries such as J. Sturge strongly opposed Buxton’s plans. This was because most missionaries principally disliked the employment of armed force (Curtin 1964: 316). Of course, ‘Unlike Palmerston, Buxton was no advocate of gunboat diplomacy’ (Temperley 1991: 32-35). However, the use of force seemed to be the means to an end to achieve the ‘great objective’ for Buxton. Furthermore, he ‘disclaim[ed] any disposition to erect a new empire in Africa’ (ATR: 453). Clearly, he was in a dilemma into which humanitarians had often drifted when humanitarian objectives required the use of force.

The second ‘preparatory measure’ suggested by Buxton was to conclude ‘treaties with native powers interior’ (ATR: 299). In this plan, associated native chiefdoms would suppress the slave trade in their own territory, prevent the slave traders from carrying through their dominions, and provide the facility and protection for the transport of legitimate merchandise. This plan would lead to the expansion of colonial rule in Africa. Buxton supported the opinion of General Turner, a governor of Sierra Leone,
as follows:

‘a sovereignty which I will procure from the natives, if approved of, at a small expense; and I will establish and maintain the British flag on them, which will cause them to be considered British waters, and give us the power to exclude all nations from them [...] I informed them that the only condition upon which I would grant them effectual security would be the giving up for ever the Slave Trade, making over to me for the King of England the sovereignty of their territories, acknowledging the laws of England, laying down their arms in the present war, and agreeing never to undertake any other without the consent of the government of Sierra Leone for the time being.’ (ATR: 402)

Thus, Buxton proposed the use of the imperial squadron to regulate the slave trade, the construction of navy bases in Africa and supported for the acquisition of the sovereignty of African territories by the conclusion of the treaties with native chiefs.

*Social Engineering through Cultivation, Christianization, and Civilization*

After suggesting the ‘preparatory measures,’ Buxton argued for his main policies such as the encouragement of legitimate commerce and agricultural cultivation in Africa (ATR: 6). Why were legitimate commerce and agricultural cultivation important? As stated above, Buxton thought that three factors contributed to the continuation of the slave trade: immoral traditions and customs, tribal wars and the anarchical state of much of the
continent, and the uncivilized nature of people that meant they were unable to exploit the resources in Africa. It was supposed that legitimate commerce and agricultural cultivation would remove these root causes of slavery. He claimed that:

‘How then shall we undeceive her chiefs, and convince them, that it is for their interest that the Slave Trade should cease? This we must do for Africa: we must elevate the minds of her people, and call forth the capabilities of her soil.’ (ATR: 281-282, emphasis in the original)

For him, the sound expansion of commerce and agriculture would enable Africans to use their own resources and to improve their morality. In particular, Buxton assigned high priority to agricultural cultivation because it would provide the commodities to sell (ATR: 338). Moreover, the development of agriculture would indirectly contribute to the elevation of the native mind. For Buxton, agriculture was ‘obviously one of the first arts to which we ought to direct their attention.’ It would bring African people ‘into a condition of life most favourable for the reception and spread of Christianity’ (ATR: 483). He thought that agricultural cultivation would prepare the ground for missionary work, and concluded ‘that Christianity will meet the necessities of the case, and will prove a specific remedy for the moral evils of Africa’ (ATR: 511).

Agricultural cultivation would lead to Christianity and this, in turn, would lead to the civilization of Africa. Buxton referred to Reverend William Ellis’ opinion: ‘True civilization and Christianity are inseparable; the former has never been found but as a fruit of the latter’ (ATR: 507). As Brian Stanley
(2001: 176) claims, ‘The substantial majority of the mission thought in the English evangelical tradition from the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries and was fully committed to the priority of Christianity over civilization’. Thus, in Buxton’s plan, cultivation, Christianization and civilization would improve the nature of African society. Buxton clearly summed up this social engineering plan as follows:

‘Let missionaries and schoolmasters, the plough and the spade, go together, and agriculture will flourish; the avenues to legitimate commerce will be opened; confidence between man and man will be inspired; whilst civilization will advance as the natural effect, and Christianity operate as the proximate cause of this happy change.’

(ATR: 511)

Buxton raised another important point about missionaries and colonial administrators conducting social engineering projects in Africa. He wanted to know who the instructors of cultivation were to be (ATR: 491). His plan suggested that Africans were to be brought up as the agents for the social engineering projects. In the mid-19th century, Western missionaries attempted to create an African middle class and African missionaries in several regions such as Niger (Ajayi 1965: 17). Moreover, he advocated that the agency for these social engineering operations be protected by imperial force (ATR: 514). Thus, social engineering projects were likely to be

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5 However, in the late 19th century, as racism was widespread in many European societies, African missionaries were excluded from colonial administration (Ajayi 1965: 235).
accompanied by greater use of armed force because of the security problem.

In conclusion, Buxton suggested two kinds of anti-slavery policies: the establishment of security by the deployment of armed force and the colonization of Africa, and social engineering policies such as agricultural cultivation, Christianization and civilization. These plans were based not on geopolitical ambition but on humanitarian concern.

Buxton strived to put his plan into practice by petitioning politicians and the government of the day. Finally, his plan led to the Niger Expedition. As stated above, he planned to colonize West Africa. Buxton’s plans raised considerable interest and enthusiasm among the public. The Edinburgh Review reported in January 1841:

‘a new hope has been opened for Africa – a new opportunity [...] of bringing into cultivation some parts at least of this vast, neglected Estate, to the great benefit of the world: that it lies with England to improve this opportunity.’ (‘The Niger Expedition,’ Edinburgh Review, January 1841, vol. 72, p. 456)

In April 1841, the Niger Expedition was carried out after careful preparation. However, 40 of 145 British explorers died of fever, and eventually the survivors had to be withdrawn from the Niger (Gallagher 1950; Temperley 1991). The expedition was a complete failure. However, even after this tragedy, the colonization of Africa by the British Empire did not stop. The effort to make treaties with African rulers continued and ‘Forty-two anti-slave-trade treaties of this kind were in effect by 1850’ (Curtin 1964: 468). British informal empire gradually expanded in West Africa.
As explained above, Buxton’s objective was not the expansion of colonial territories in Africa. Rather, inspired by humanitarian motives, he just strove to eliminate the slave trade. The use of imperial squadron and the colonization of Africa were means to achieve his humanitarian objective. Although I do not intend to say that only the anti-slavery movement laid the foundation for colonial rule in West Africa, the activities of missionaries such as Buxton based on humanitarianism either intentionally or unintentionally contributed to the expansion of colonial rule in West Africa. Their humanitarianism required practices which were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. Also, as the next chapter will discuss, the abolition of slavery and the slave trade was recognized as an objective of colonial administration by European countries in the late 19th century. Thus, the anti-slavery movement constituted the discourse of colonial trusteeship.

2. Native Protection Movement and Empire

Another representative humanitarian movement in the 19th century was the native protection movement in colonies such as South Africa. Missionaries vigorously advocated the protection of natives from European colonists by the British Empire. The aim of this movement was not merely the protection of natives by the expansion of the British colonial territories. Rather, it sought to transform the natives into British subjects by social engineering policies because the natives could not enjoy their rights in the British Empire unless they had obtained a legal personality and literacy in the imperial legal systems. This section analyzes the discourse and practice
of two representative missionaries who led the movement, John Philip and John Mackenzie.

2-1 Protection of Khoisan and Xhosa, and John Philip

In 1819, John Philip was nominated as a Director of the London Missionary Society and sent to supervise the missionary work at the Cape Colony. There, he found that:

‘[Khoisan people] were violently dispossessed of every portion of their territory, deprived of every means of improving their condition as individuals, and, under various pretexts, fixed by law in a state of hopeless bondage in the land of their forefathers.’ (Research I: 2)

In the summer of 1825, he started a campaign to protect the Khoisan people and sought to influence colonial policy. In 1828, his pamphlet, Research in South Africa: Civil, Moral, Religious Condition of the Native Tribes was published.

Protection of Khoisan by the British Empire

This book was devoted to revealing the hopeless situation of the Khoikhoin (called ‘Hottentots’ in the book) and the San (called ‘Bushmen’ in the book) (Research I: 2). He argued that the number of Khoisan (Khoikhoin and San) was decreasing because of oppression and depredation by European colonists. Moreover, the attacks by the colonists ‘had a deteriorating influence on [Khoisan] character, in the course of one hundred and fifty years, during which time they had been driven from the most fertile tracts of
country, and deprived of that independence to which they were passionately attached’ (Research I: 5). Philip claimed that the natives were ‘in a worse condition than the slave’ (Research I: 159). In such a situation, Khoisan societies could not improve and were in decline.

Philip’s aim was not to denounce European colonists who were oppressing the natives, but to revise the political and legal systems of South Africa which were described by him as ‘the system of cruelty and injustice’ (Ross 1986: 107). This system was composed of some impartial colonial laws such as the ‘Hottentot Code’ set by the Ordinances of 1809 and 1812, and the excessive power of the European colonist governments without any restraints or checks. The Ordinance of 1809 had been expected to strike at the root causes of this problem and to be a ‘Magna Charta of the Hottentots’ (Research I: 172). The report continued, ‘The very reverse is the case: it legalizes those [unjust] claims [by the European colonists], and it consigns the Hottentots and their posterity to universal and hopeless slavery’ (Research I: 172). Subsequently, the Ordinance of 1812 was adopted, but it was also cruel because it allowed the children of Khoikhoin to be slaves (Research I: Ch. 9).

Why had such discriminatory laws been adopted in South Africa? According to Philip, it was because of ‘The barbarizing effects of uncontrolled authority on minds in least danger of being corrupted by its influence’ (Research I: 383). He claimed that European colonists controlled the colonial government and legislation, and their power and authority were not under the control of an independent body. Without any controls or checks, the power and authority would collapse and be exploited in the wrong way (Research II: 312). The colonists have at the moment a larger interest in
oppressing the natives than in improving them. In this situation, justice and humanity had nothing to expect from the colonists (Research I: 356, 385). Thus, as long as the colonial administration was corrupt, the oppression of the natives by the colonists would continue. Philip claimed that the decline of the Khoisan would lead to the corruption of a whole community of South Africa because a community was like a human body (Research I: 387). He wrote that: ‘if one member suffers, all the members of the body suffer; and, if one member is diseased, all the body is affected by its sympathy with this particular member’ (ibid).

While the colonial laws put the natives ‘in a worse condition than the slave’, these laws could afford a clue to the construction of fairer systems because they stated that the natives ‘are to be treated in their persons, in their properties, and in their possessions, the same as other free people’ (Research I: xxvi-xxvii). Khoisan ‘has a right to a fair price for his labour; to an exemption from cruelty and oppression; to choose the place of his abode and to enjoy the society of his children’ (Research I: xxvi). Thus, the legal systems were not only a tool for the oppression of the natives, but also potentially a tool for resistance by indigenous people. According to Philip, now the missionary stations in South Africa were the only places where the natives could be provided protection, and where they could claim an exemption from the most humiliating and degrading sufferings. He claimed that these institutions were not enough to secure the rights of Khoisan; therefore, the British government ought to afford the natives the protection of equal laws (Research I: xxx). The British Empire, Philip thought, should be a guardian of rights and justice in South Africa.

However, the indigenous people were assigned some duties in return
for protection. They had to dedicate all possible efforts to the civilization and industrialization of themselves. Philip wrote that:

‘I stated to [the native people], that it was vain to attempt to plead their cause, [...] that the world, and the church of Christ, looked for civilization and industry as proofs of their capacity for improvement, and of the utility of our labours: that the men of the world had no other criterion by which they could judge of the beneficial effects of missions.’ (Research I: 213)

The operations of the missionaries included not only a petition for the intervention in South Africa by the British Empire, but also the conversion of the indigenous people into British subjects who would obey the Empire and work as labor in capitalist economy. In Philip’s plan, the natives were required to be separated from their traditional sources of authority. By the propagation of Christianity and civilization by missionaries, the indigenous people would gradually change their preferences, morals, norms, and nature. As a result, traditional sources of authority and social systems would break down and European socio-economic systems would be introduced. New industry and agriculture, which would produce products for the Empire, would grow. Trade with the Empire would expand. Finally, the native people would ‘become the ally and friend of the colonial government’ (Research I: 340). Philip stated that missionaries would conduct social engineering policies in local communities before the British Empire would extend to these communities (Research I: ix).

His aim was not to colonize Khoisan territories but to protect them.
This humanitarian objective justified not only the colonization of these territories, but also the social engineering policies. It was because the integration of the natives into the British Empire required the social engineering of the indigenous communities.

What the British Empire had to immediately provide to the natives was civil and political rights. Without civil rights, people could not secure their property and nor could they arrange any future plans for commerce and industry. The development of industry needed the protection of civil rights. However, ‘civil liberty cannot be secured without political liberty, consequently political liberty becomes almost equally essential’ (Research I: 374). According to Philip, the native people had never enjoyed any political and civil rights in South Africa. Therefore, he demanded that the British Empire intervene in South Africa to protect the rights of the natives (Research I: 326-327).

The function of laws, according to Philip, was not only the protection of native rights, but laws that would change the nature of the natives. Philip argued that:

‘Bad laws generate bad morals, and good laws generate good morals. [...] While equitable laws and their impartial administration elevate the standard of morals, raise the tone of thinking, exalt the character of a country, and increase the patriotism of a people, they generate the principles and love of justice in the heart of a great and effective part of the population. [...] Agriculture and commerce can never flourish, unless private property is respected, and the laws which guard the possessions of individuals are the first principles of
industry.’ (Research I: 381-382)

The legislation by the British Empire would transform the natives into the docile citizens of the Empire. This idea was highly similar to utilitarianism (see Ch. 2 of this study).

In addition to legislation, he suggested the introduction of laissez-faire economics. Following Adam Smith, Philip thought that a laissez-faire economy would give the natives a fair price for their labor, and their masters would gain more work than at present, and this increase of value to their masters would contribute to the development of South Africa (Research I: 327; Ross 1986: 96). Combining Malthus’ theory with Smith’s theory, he argued that if the British Empire protected the rights of the natives and relieved them from oppression by European colonists, the amount of labor would increase and this would bring prosperity to South Africa (Research II: 324).

Thus, Philip suggested prescriptions based on enlightenment philosophy as well as Christianity. As Ch. 2 indicated, enlightenment philosophy such as utilitarianism had a strong affinity with Christianity. In this century, when humanitarianism attempted to identify the root causes of the humanitarian crisis and make prescriptions, enlightenment philosophy and Christianity were invoked.

In 1828, Philip’s many years of hard efforts achieved success. T. F. Buxton brought a motion before the House of Commons on 15 July 1828. It stated that:

‘This House humbly solicits His Majesty to cause such instructions to
be sent to the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, as shall most effectually secure to all the natives of South Africa, the same freedom and protection as are enjoyed by other free people of that Colony whether English or Dutch.’ (cited in Ross 1986: 109)

After two days, a reforming Governor-General, Bourke enacted the Ordinance 50 which declared the equality of the natives in South Africa. Philip hailed this new law as a significantly important step towards the relief of the natives. On 11 July 1836 at the Aborigines Committee, he showed his appreciation for the Ordinance, stating that:

‘I was confident that the Ordinance would produce a benefit, but the success of the experiment, the elevation to which the people were raised by that Ordinance, went even beyond my most sanguine expectations.’ (Report of the Select Committee on Aborigines 1836 Part I: 642)

While it is controversial how Philip influenced the promulgation of Ordinance 50 (Ross 1986: 110-111; Lester 2001: 31-35), there is no doubt that this legislation fulfilled his vision.

Protection of Xhosa by the British Empire

After this achievement, Philip went on a journey to the eastern frontier in 1830 (Ross 1986: 118). This journey turned his attention to the problems of the relationship between the Xhosa (then called ‘Kaffir’) and the Cape Colony. While the Khoisan were potential citizens of the British colony,
the Xhosa had their own country outside. The relationship between the Xhosa and the British Empire was quasi-international. When the war broke out between the Xhosa and European colonists in December 1834, the British Empire began to pay attention to the frontier problem of the Cape Colony. Before then, the Xhosa had suffered from the ‘patrol system’ by European colonists. In this ‘patrol system,’ European colonists plundered the Xhosa’s cattle. In addition, in 1819, the Xhosa lost a large area of their land because of an invasion by European colonists. Furthermore, in 1833, they were forced to migrate to the east. This eventually led two Xhosa groups to invade the Cape Colony in mid-December 1834. The Cape Colony started to fight back under the direction of its commander, Sir Harry Smith and eventually expanded its territory. The new territory was named the Province of Queen Adelaide, and Smith was appointed as the governor of the new Province.

Immediately after this incident, Philip sent T. F. Buxton and Rev. J. Ellis (Secretary of the London Missionary Society) letters telling them that the war had resulted from the patrol system by European colonists and had caused the expulsions of the Xhosa from their land (Ross 1986: 139). However, the result of the war was ambivalent for Philip. The cause of the war was evil, but the extension of the Colony might become an important step in the civilizing of the Xhosa (Galbraith 1963: 115; Ross 1986: 140-141). While Philip expected enlightened administration by the Cape Colony, the outcome was the opposite of what he hoped. John Galbraith (1963: 121) argues that:

‘The state of Queen Adelaide Province was thus the force at Smith’s
disposal and the exhaustion of the tribes, rather than upon the enlightened character of Smith's measures or the power of his personality.'

When the British government established the Select Committee on Aborigines, the chairman from 1835-1837 was T. F. Buxton. Philip suggested an alternative frontier policy to the Committee that was composed of two parts. The first suggestion was the introduction of international law into the frontier problem. Before the committee, he stated that:

‘[Questioner] What would you recommend for the protection of the colonists from the aggressions of the Caffres [Xhosas]?’

‘[Philip] I think a system of international law introduced on the frontiers of the country, would prove the most efficient and best protection that the colonists could have; the system containing for its basis the principles of justice.’ (Report of the Select Committee on Aborigines 1836 Part I: 677)

For Philip, the protection of the Xhosa was more important than that of European colonists. As one of the most serious issues was the patrol system by European colonists, Philip considered the introduction of international law a remedy for this problem. The international law between the Xhosa and the Cape Colony would settle the frontier line, and prevent European colonists from plundering the cattle and land from the Xhosa. He stated that:
'One of the first steps towards the establishment of amicable relations with the tribes on the frontiers of the colony will be the abandonment of the commando and patrol system.' (ibid.: 628)

However, the questioner asked Philip whether the Xhosa could understand and observe a system of international law. In other words, it was the question of whether they could have legal personality. Philip clearly stated that ‘I think the Caffres [Xhosas] are quite capable of understanding a system of international law, and of appreciating it’ (ibid.: 677). Before Philip began to address this issue, various missionaries had already worked amongst the Xhosas. In fact, as Alan Lester observes, ‘The [Aborigines] Committee could not fail to point out that those Xhosa chiefs who had assisted the British in the recent war were those most under the influence of the colony’s missionaries’ (Lester 2001: 111). The social engineering in the Xhosa’s territories had already been conducted by the missionaries.

The second suggestion for the frontier problem was the employment of the Griqua and other tribes. The Griqua were living on the northern frontier. According to Philip, they ‘are a people already made to our hands, and who may, by a just and liberal policy, be retained, as they have been, the cheapest and best bulwark of the colony’ (Report of the Select Committee on Aborigines 1836 Part I: 608). The missionaries had practiced social engineering projects by the propagation of Christianity, and transformed their customs such as polygamy (ibid.). The Griqua themselves ‘looked forward to their country being received into the colony, as the only remedy to the evils to which they have been exposed’ (ibid.: 625). Thus, the missionaries succeeded in establishing the foundation of imperial rule. Furthermore,
Philip insisted that the Empire employ the Griqua as its agency for diplomacy with other savage tribes (ibid: 625). As argued above, for Philip, one of the functions of missionaries was the social engineering of native societies to make them the agents of the Empire. In *Research in South Africa*, he summarized his strategy in the following way:

‘While the missionaries have been employed in locating the savages among whom they labour, teaching them industrious habits, creating a demand for British manufactures, and increasing their dependence on the colony, there is not a single instance of a tribe thus enjoying the labours of a missionary making war against the colonists, either to injure their persons or deprive them of their property.

Missionary stations are the most efficient agents which can be employed to promote the internal strength of our colonies, and the cheapest and best military posts that a wise government can employ to defend its frontier against the predatory incursions of savage tribes.’ (Research I: 228)

This was the colonial strategy that was suggested by a representative humanitarian in the 19th century. His aim was to protect the Xhosa from European colonists. This humanitarian objective required practices which were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering, that is, the social engineering of Xhosa society because the Xhosa had to obtain a legal personality in the system of international law. Furthermore, the conclusion of the treaty would require the imperial agency that could help the Empire to negotiate with other savage tribes. Thus, in South Africa, humanitarianism
constituted colonial trusteeship. At the same time, the power relations between the British Empire and the native communities were reflected in humanitarian discourse as humanitarians sought to employ the power of the British Empire to alleviate the human suffering of the native people.

2.2 Establishment of a Crown Colony in South Africa and John Mackenzie

Bechuanaland and Missionaries

In the late 19th century, one of the places where missionaries had actively operated was Bechuanaland on the northern end of the Cape Colony. The missionaries strived to prevent Transvaal, a Boer republic, from annexing Bechuanaland. This struggle had begun in the 1840s when the London Missionary Society began expanding into the northern Tswana chiefdoms (Chirenje 1976: 404). David Livingstone set up a mission station there in 1844. According to Anthony Dachs, he ‘deliberately directed his efforts to the north to occupy the interior before the Transvaal settlers could “enter their claims to the exclusion of those of missionaries” [...] For him “pre-occupation was the only remedy”’ (Dachs 1972: 649). Responding to the expansion of missionaries, Boers strived to impede the operations of missionaries such as Livingstone.

The propagation of Christianity by missionaries had gradually penetrated into the native societies. Christianity undermined traditional authorities which had played a role as both a religious head and a political leader. For example, rainmakers were criticized as a mere fraud by the missionaries. New technology such as irrigation also encroached upon the authority of rainmakers. The decline of religious authority was necessarily accompanied by the reduction of political authority. As a result, some native
communities were in danger of breaking up (Dachs 1972: 649; Chirenje 1976: 406-410). As John Philip hoped, the missionaries had continued social engineering projects in South Africa and encroached upon traditional native communities.

After Livingstone, John Mackenzie led the humanitarian movement in South Africa. When the Boers began to invade the territories given to the natives, Mackenzie realized that only intervention by the British Empire would stop them (Comaroff and Comaroff 1985: 7) and realized the necessity of the construction of a new imperial order in South Africa. He had two aims: to form the unified community in which the natives and European colonists could enjoy equal rights; and to establish a Crown Colony over the whole of South Africa.

Since 1868, Mackenzie began to advocate for British rule over Bechuanaland. While Gladstone rejected the territorial responsibility in Bechuanaland and the extension of the Empire in South Africa in 1880, after four years, the Convention of London of February 1884 declared that two tribes in Bechuanaland, Mankoroane and Montsioa, would gain independence from Transvaal and become a British Protectorate. In the same year, a military expedition under Colonel Warren was conducted to implement the Convention of London and expel the Transvaal invaders (Mackenzie participated in this expedition). In 1885, the British Empire established a Protectorate over Kwena, Ngwaketse and Ngwato in Bechuanaland, and proclaimed the region south of the Molopo River to be integrated into the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland. While this extension was not only a response to Mackenzie’s agitation, but also the result of German expansion in South-West Africa (Dachs 1975: 152;
Comaroff and Comaroff 1985: 9; Zins 1997), there can be no doubt that humanitarian discourse contributed to the justification of the colonization. However, Mackenzie was not satisfied with the expansion of the British Empire because the antagonism between European colonists and the indigenous people was growing, and the Boers did not stop expanding into the native land.

'Special Measure' for South Africa

The book published by Mackenzie in 1887, *Austral Africa: Losing It or Ruling It*, proposed his plan of a new order for South Africa. In this book, Mackenzie highlighted the unique characteristics of South Africa as a colony. While natives in South Africa, unlike Australia, had not died out due to the invasion of European settlers, there were vast lands where new European immigrants could settle and rich mineral deposits to develop industry as in Australia. On these points, South Africa was different from India, Canada, and New Zealand as well as Australia. Therefore, it was not possible to employ 'a cut and dried scheme, which shall be similar to the method of our government of Canada, or of India, or of Australia' (AA II: 472-473).

Despite the vast lands, the current situation did not allow the residents to coexist because the Boers 'would seize all the land of the natives, disqualify them from owning an acre of it, and only allow them to remain on it as vassals, in practical servitude on account of their colour' (AA II: 425-426). They attempted to move northward 'to obtain cheaper and better land, and secure an easier and pleasanter life, from the pastoral farmer’s point of view' (AA II 426-427). Mackenzie claimed that:
‘[I]f the new and most promising work [...] of regulating the growth and development of the European civilisation, and of protecting and governing the natives in South Africa, is to be conducted successfully under the control of Her Majesty’s Government, special measures must be devised for the purpose.’ (AA II: 472-473)

As ‘special measures,’ he suggested a dual political system: ‘the local self-government of certain European communities and the personal or paternal government of native territories by the Imperial Government’ (AA I: 6). In this system, the imperial government would play the role of a mediator to enable the European colonists and the natives to coexist. The first of all, the imperial government would protect the native territories them from the Boers. The government of the European community ought to ‘restrain its subjects from open menace and violence against those who were under the Queen’s protection’ (AA I: 376). Mackenzie claimed that ‘Our only danger was the Transvaal’ because ‘the Afrikanders [Boers] regarded [the natives] as born to be their servants, and as their natural enemies’ (AAI: 369; AAII: 453).

Second, the development of unoccupied territories was also considered a duty of the imperial government. For Mackenzie, the unoccupied territories belonged to the imperial government. Therefore, the imperial government should develop them. A part of them would be distributed to the European colonists; and the rest would be allocated to the natives (AA II: 472-474). In the case of the native territories, local administrators would be posted from the imperial government. The imperial government would re-educate the natives as its subjects. The government of the native territories, in his plan, would deny traditional customs and sources of authority. The traditional
native chiefs would not possess the jurisdiction over their people (AA I: 413). The natives would be gradually and peacefully separated from their chiefs, and, instead, put under the authority of Her Majesty’s Government. The imperial government would dissolve the traditional territorial systems (AA II: 488). The natives would be prohibited to sell their lands freely. Thus, the imperial government would have complete control of the native territories. The native laws would not be adopted; instead, the common law of the Colony would govern the territories (AA II: 431). The government would educate the natives to understand the common law and enjoy the civil rights and privileges (AA II: 432). Mackenzie argued that:

‘No doubt paternal government is best for a country where these people predominate. To them it represents the kingdom superseding mere tribal control. Local native councils, local territorial government, central control by the Imperial Government, the police and the army chiefly South African; there is no real difficulty in the future management of the country.’ (AA II: 456)

As this statement implies, benevolent despotism by the British Empire was considered the best political arrangement to civilize the natives.

His dual political system required some revisions of the imperial administrative institutions. It was necessary to separate the High Commissionership of South Africa from the Governorship of the Cape Colony (AA II: 478, 479). He suggested that: ‘the High Commissioner would be the supreme officer of the Crown in South Africa, and the Governor the Cape Colony would be an officer exercising that office only’ (AA II: 474). In addition,
Mackenzie proposed the confederation of South Africa. Thus, in this new imperial order, the Executive of the British Empire would supervise both the self-government of European communities and the paternal government of native communities.

In sum, Mackenzie suggested that the British Empire transform the natives into the imperial subjects by social engineering policies. This process necessarily would dissolve the traditional native socio-political systems. Dachs argues that:

‘Mackenzie, at the head of the Bechuanaland missionaries, aimed openly at weakening “the communistic relations of the members of a tribe among one another, letting in the fresh, stimulating breath of healthy individualistic competition; and slowly, but surely and in the general tribal interest, to supersede the power and influence of the chiefs by an evidently helpful Queen’s Government”.’ (Dachs 1972: 651; see Comaroff and Comaroff 1985: 12-14)

After publishing his book, *Austral Africa*, he continued to call for the British government to extend the protectorate to the inner regions of South Africa (Mackenzie 1975: 232-235). However, as Dachs argues, ‘the final dream of a full Crown Colony continued to the last to elude the efforts and achievement’ (Dachs 1975: 154). The imperial order dreamt of by Mackenzie might not have empowered the natives but it did strengthen the Empire. However, it is not open to doubt that his idea was derived from humanitarianism. His humanitarianism required practices which were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering and, as in other cases, constituted colonial trusteeship. And
the power relations between the British Empire and the native communities were reflected in humanitarian discourse.

**Conclusion**

This chapter showed that, in the 19th century, humanitarianism constituted colonial trusteeship in Africa, and that the unequal relations between the British Empire and target societies were reflected in humanitarian discourse. I do not intend to say that the expansion of the British colonies in Africa was based only on humanitarianism. Rather, the conclusion of this chapter is that humanitarianism intentionally or unintentionally not only contributed to the legitimization of colonial trusteeship in Africa, but also helped to determine the nature of target societies and designed the political arrangement of colonial trusteeship. Humanitarianism did not maintain a critical distance from the power of the British Empire; on the contrary, humanitarianism required the power of the British Empire to alleviate human suffering, though it does not mean that all humanitarians in this period tend to constitute colonial trusteeship. Thus, the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship was formed.

As this chapter indicated, there were two types of discourse structure of humanitarian trusteeship. The anti-slavery movement in the 19th century recognized not only slave traders but also Africans as the supporters of slave trade because the latter were providing slaves to markets. The humanitarians observed that the African people were so savage that they assailed other African villages to capture and sell the people as slaves and claimed that they lacked morality and agricultural technology. For this
pathology, cultivation, Christianization, and civilization were suggested as prescriptions. These policies, which aimed to transform the nature of African societies, required the colonization of Africa. The activists of the native protection movement considered European colonists to be the main culprits of the humanitarian problems in South Africa. While they advocated the protection of the natives by the imperial government, they claimed that the natives ought to be transformed into imperial subjects if they hoped to enjoy civil and political rights in the British Empire. Therefore, as in the anti-slavery movement, social engineering policies were required.

On the one hand, the discourse of the anti-slavery movement pathologized target societies as anarchical and suggested social engineering to transform the nature of target society. On the other hand, the discourse of the native protection movement considered European colonists a threat to the security of the natives. However, the protection of the natives by the imperial government required the native societies to adopt westernized socio-economic systems. In either case, humanitarianism led to the imposition of social engineering policies and colonization on Africa.
Ch. 4 Internationalization of Trusteeship: Empire and International Organization

The previous chapters indicated the co-constitutive nature of the relationship between colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism and the formation of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship in the 19th century. This chapter will show that internationalization of trusteeship was led by humanitarianism around the time of the First World War. The legitimacy of colonial trusteeship was challenged by various intellectuals and politicians who argued that imperialism would bring on war and that colonial administration had abused indigenous peoples. However, these critics of empire did not cast doubt on the necessity of trusteeship, presuming that non-European people needed civilization and security for life. They suggested international trusteeship as an alternative to colonial administration by empires, claiming that the former was better than the latter in terms of humanitarianism. The internationalization of trusteeship was accompanied by the re-pathologization of non-European countries. At the Paris Peace Conference, the mandate system, a kind of international trusteeship, was established.

There are many existing works on the mandate system. William Roger Louis has analyzed the beginning of the mandate system in his research (Louis 1965; 1967; 1969). While he elucidates the historical context of the B mandates (ex-German colonies in Africa), he barely analyzes that of the A mandates (ex-Ottoman Empire’s territories). As this chapter will show, the mandate system was invented as an alternative not only to colonial empires but to dynastic empires such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire and
Ottoman Turkey. Michael Callahan (1999; 2004) examines the influence of the League of Nations supervision on the colonial administration in the B mandates, using many primary sources, and shows that the League of Nations succeeded supervising the imperial administration in the B mandates to some extent. However, his focus was not on the social engineering aspect of the mandate system but on its influence over diplomats and bureaucrats and, as a result, the power of the mandate system over local societies remains to be analyzed. In contrast, Anthony Anghie (2002) refers to the social engineering aspect of the mandate system, but he rarely analyzes what had happened in the mandate territories.

The first section of this chapter will explore how colonial trusteeship was internationalized around time of the First World War and what role humanitarianism played in this process. The second section will analyze how different the mandate system was from colonial administration by examining the practice of the former.

1. Internationalization of Colonial Trusteeship

Around the time of the First World War, colonial trusteeship was gradually internationalized. In the late 19th century, two international conferences were held. The general acts of these conferences defined the obligations of trustees and constituted the unequal relationship between European countries and non-European countries. Subsequently, the scandal of the Congo Free State and the South African War occurred. They severely undermined the legitimacy of colonial empires and inspired British intellectuals to suggest internationalization of colonial trusteeship.
Furthermore, during the First World War, the Soviets and the US denounced the colonialism of European countries. As a result, in 1919, the League of Nations was established became a new agent of colonial trusteeship. Also, in this period, dynastic empires such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire were collapsing. Therefore, European countries sought to construct new regional order. International trusteeship was thought to be a prescription for anarchy in these regions. This section will show that these two contexts for the internationalization of trusteeship were related to humanitarianism.

1-1 Two Conferences on Africa: Dawn of International Trusteeship

In 1884-1885, the Berlin Congo Conference was held. The duties of trustees such as the development of native welfare were defined by the general act of this conference. However, the main objective of this conference was not to internationalize trusteeship but to re-stabilize international relations in Europe. In the late 19th century, European order became unstable due to strong colonial competition. Russia, Austria, Italy and Britain sought to enlarge their influence in Eastern Europe and the Near East. France, Italy and Britain tried to acquire the territories of North Africa such as Tunis and Egypt. In 1878, Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War and sought to rule the Balkan region, but other European powers strongly opposed it. In 1881, France conquered Tunis and, in 1882, Britain occupied Egypt. Germany and Belgium were not indifferent to Africa. Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of the German Empire, assembled a conference on the colonial division of Africa to re-stabilize the international relations – namely, the Berlin Congo Conference.
In this conference, there were three main issues: (i) freedom of trade in the basin of the Congo and Niger; (ii) freedom of navigation in the Congo and Niger; (iii) clarification of the requirements for colonial acquisition (Louis 1971: 193). In addition to these, the problem of slavery was also suggested as an important issue (Miers 1988). Britain basically supported freedom of trade and the establishment of the International Navigation Commission which would supervise the application of acts in the basin of Congo. However, it strongly opposed the supervision of the basin of the Niger because they feared that they would lose the lower Niger, earlier colonized by George Goldie and his company. Although Germany under Bismarck was allied with France on colonial issues before the conference, now he decided to compromise with Britain and accepted their assertion. Therefore, Britain also accepted the articles on the Congo and the Niger in return. As a result, the International Navigation Commission of the Congo was established (Articles 8, 17-24), and the freedom of trade and navigation in the basin of the Niger and Congo River was declared (Articles 13-25, 27-33).

Apart from the main issues, Britain actively employed anti-slavery diplomacy and advocated the construction of the international institutions to prevent slavery. However, as other countries opposed this idea, the Berlin Act just stated the prohibition of slave trade and the development of native welfare (Articles 6 and 9). After all, ‘no machinery was established for enforcement of the declarations, no common action was agreed upon, and no concrete measures were suggested’ (Miers 1988: 337). As William Bain (2003: 63-74) observes, this Act marked the dawn of the internationalization of trusteeship. However, most of the articles of the Berlin Act were not implemented. In fact, the International Navigation Commission of the Congo
was never founded by any of the Western countries.

In contrast to the Berlin Conference, the Brussels Conference (1890) was held because of petitions by the Anti-Slavery Society. They demanded that the British government show leadership of the anti-slavery movement and urge other countries to address this issue. Subsequently, the British government asked the Belgian King Leopold II to assemble a conference (Miers 2003: 20). The general act of this conference embodied the idea of trusteeship and humanitarianism which the anti-slavery movement constituted in the 19th century. According to Suzanne Miers, it declared that:

‘the best means of attacking the slave trade on land was by establishing colonial administrations, controlling the trade routes, constructing road, rail and water communications, and telegraph systems, and protecting trading companies and missionaries of all denominations’ (Miers 2003: 21).

Furthermore, it defined the establishment of the international supervisory machinery (bureaux in Brussels and Zanzibar) to exchange ‘information on the slave traffic and on the antislavery legislation of signatory powers’ (Miers 1998: 19). Thus, this conference internationalized colonial trusteeship which had been constituted by humanitarianism in the early 19th century.

1.2 From Colonial Empires to an International Organization

Despite the legitimization of colonialism by international law, the legitimacy of colonial empires was challenged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. There were three crucial events which undermined the legitimacy
of colonial empires: the scandal of the Congo, the South African War, and the First World War. The scandal of the Congo revealed the cruel nature of colonial administration and appealed to humanitarianism as in the anti-slavery movement. The South African War inspired some intellectuals such as J. A. Hobson to notice the possibility that the current political economic systems of colonial empires would cause inter-imperial wars and formulate a theory of imperialism. The First World War was interpreted by Western radical thinkers as resulting from severe competition amongst the colonial empires. However, most of the critics of colonial empires did not deny the necessity of trusteeship. Therefore, as an alternative to colonial administration by empires, international trusteeship was proposed.

The Scandal of the Congo: Cultural Relativism and Trusteeship

In the 1900s, the scandal of the Congo Free State sent shock wave through the European countries. The Belgian King Leopold II, a governor of this African state, exploited indigenous people to produce rubber and ivories and cruelly abused them. The ‘atrocity pictures,’ that showed boys who had had their hands cut off, appeared in pamphlets and strongly appealed to European public opinion (e.g. Morel 1904). Edward Grey stated that: ‘No question has so stirred the country for thirty years’ since the Bulgarian Horrors in which Bulgarian rebellions were brutally suppressed by the Turkish forces in the late 1870s (Taylor 1957: 119). The Congo Free State was created through the bilateral treaties between the Congo International Association founded by King Leopold II and each European state in the Berlin Congo Conference. King Leopold II, who was considered to be a philanthropic monarch by other European diplomats, became the ruler of the
Congo. However, he was not a philanthropist but a cruel dictator. The Berlin Congo Conference did not develop native welfare but rather led to mass murder in the Congo.

While the Aborigines Protection Society engaged in agitation against the atrocities of the Free State, a British journalist, E. D. Morel, bitterly and strenuously fought against the Free State and led the Congo reform movement as a new leader of humanitarians. Using his Quaker network, he waged a campaign against the Congo Free State (Louis 1968; Cline 1980). He ‘viewed the anti-Congo crusade as the last chapter in the history of the abolition of slavery’ (Louis 1965: 31). However, he did not suggest liberation of the Congo from European powers because he presumed that the native population ought to be provided protection from Western influence. Morel, adopting incipient cultural relativism, considered the Europeanization of Africa to be harmful to African natives.

This cultural relativism was advocated by Mary Kingsley, an explorer of Africa and a writer. Morel was friends with Kingsley and learned incipient cultural relativism from her. As P. B. Rich argues, Kingsley was highly influential intellectual in left-wing political circles and ‘one of the first English social anthropologists as well as an early propagator of the concept of “indirect rule”’ (Rich 1986: 31; and see Porter 1968: 150-154). She criticized the Europeanization of Africans:

‘I am aware that there is now in West Africa a handful of Africans who have mastered white culture, who know it too well to misunderstand the inner spirit of it, who are men too true to have let it cut them off in either sympathy or love from Africa [...] That
handful of African men are now fighting a hard enough fight to prevent the distracted, uninformed Africans from riding against what so looks like white treachery, though it is only white want of knowledge; and also against those “water flies” who are neither Africans nor Europeans, but who are the curse of the Coast – the men who mislead the white man and betray the black.’ (cited in Rich 1986: 32)

She argued that Africans had to develop ‘along their own line.’ Morel and other critics of colonial empires supported such a paternalistic idea. African societies were redefined as fragile societies threatened by Europeanization. This argument strengthened the colonial philosophy of indirect rule.

Furthermore, it had eerie similarities to South African politician Jan Smuts’ legitimization of the racial segregation policy in South Africa. In several of his speeches, Smuts showed his recognition of the value of native political systems and insisted that they ought to be preserved from European influences because such political systems were their ‘highest good’ (Smuts 1944: 40-41). He claimed that:

‘the British Empire does not stand for assimilation of its peoples into common type, it does not stand for standardization, but for the fullest freest development of its peoples along their own specific lines. This principle applies not only to its European, but also to its Asiatic and its African constituents.’ (Smuts 1944: 78)

The idea of development ‘along their own specific lines’ was similar to
Kingsley’s cultural relativism. However, South Africa was different from West Africa because in the former multi ethnicities were living within the same country. How was it possible to protect the native political systems from European influences? The prescription made by Smuts was racial segregation policy. He argued that:

‘We have realised that political ideas which apply to our white civilisation largely do not apply to the administration of native affairs. To apply the same institutions on an equal basis to white and black alike does not lead to the best results, and so a practice has grown up in South Africa of creating parallel institutions — giving the natives their own separate institutions on parallel lines with institutions for whites.’ (Smuts 1917: 88)

Mahmood Mamdani aptly observes that ‘neither institutional segregation nor apartheid was a South African invention. If anything, both idealized a form of rule that the British Colonial Office dubbed “indirect rule”’ (Mamdani 1996: 7). It is not surprising that John Harris, a follower of the Kingsleyite school, ‘supported the South African Natives Land Act on the grounds that it entailed a separation of African and white land holdings as opposed to a complete segregation of the races’ (Rich 1986: 39).

Despite the fact that his argument was similar to indirect rule, Morel did not support the colonization of Africa because the Congo Free State showed the cruel nature of European colonial rule. Instead, he suggested international administration of the Congo as an alternative to administration by colonial empires (Morel 1906: 201-202, 205-206). His aim
was not to civilize African societies but to protect their right to soil because ‘he believed that alienating land from Africans reduced them to slaves while safeguarding their right to the soil guaranteed them prosperous development as free men’ (Louis 1965: 30-31). In his scheme, Africans would cultivate their soil and freely trade their commodities. It was characterized by a kind of laissez-faire. On this point, his vision was different from the missionaries of the anti-slavery movement. For Morel, internationalization of colonial trusteeship meant an international protectorate to secure economic freedom of Africans. Although this plan was not implemented, the idea of internationalization of colonial trusteeship reappeared during the First World War.

*The South African War: Imperialism and Trusteeship*

The South African War (1899-1902) seriously damaged the legitimacy of the British Empire. This war erupted between the British Empire and the two independent Boer republics, embroiling various African tribes. As J. A. Hobson described in *Psychology of Jingoism* (1901), British public opinion was bitterly divided over this war. Many British people became jingoistic and severely oppressed the critics of the war. In this war, the British Empire engaged in a hard fight and attacked not only soldiers but also civilians. Despite its humanitarian diplomacy in the late 19th century, the British Empire caused a humanitarian crisis in this war.

The South African War seriously influenced British intellectuals and led them to produce a theory of imperialism. Hobson, in *Imperialism: a Study* (1902), analyzed two aspects of imperialism: economic structure and political structure. According to him, financial circles had carried out foreign
investment of surplus capital and colonization. The British internal
economic structure had inequitable distribution of wealth and thereby
contributed to the production of surplus capital. Surplus capital would
facilitate colonization of non-European countries and lead to destabilization
of inter-imperial relations. Imperialism was beneficial only to the financial
circles. However, the mass of people had supported imperialism because of
the manipulation of mass media by the financial circles.

In addition to the economic analysis, Hobson denounced the political
aspects of imperialism in Part II of the book. Imperialism could not expand
democracy around the world but it could export despotism. Moreover, it
would erode British democracy. Although imperialists had advocated that
surplus population needed colonization for immigration, the increase of the
European population was not so rapid and the immigration from Europe into
colonies did not rise. Also, imperialists argued that colonization had
contributed to the protection of human dignity of the natives and facilitated
the Christianization of them. However, it had already been indicated that
such opinions were a fallacy in the scandal of the Congo. Thus, the
legitimacy of colonial administration was denied in terms of security and
humanitarianism.

However, he did not deny the necessity of colonial trusteeship and
justified it by presenting two reasons. First, he predetermined that native
people could not develop their natural resources on their own and therefore
needed help from civilized nations to utilize them. He wrote that:

‘the resources of the tropics will not be developed voluntarily by the
natives themselves. [...] We cannot, it is held, leave these lands
barren: it is our duty to see that they are developed for the good of the world. White men cannot “colonize” these lands and, thus settling, develop the natural resources by the labour of their own hands; they can only organize and superintend the labour of the natives.’ (Hobson 1938: 227; see Porter 1968: 230-231)

This idea was justified by ‘a supreme standard moral appeal, some conception of the welfare of humanity regarded as an organic unity’ (Hobson 1938: 233; Long 1996: 19). It is obvious that Hobson is known to have been influenced by utilitarianism and Herbert Spencer’s organic social model. Second, without colonial trusteeship, ‘private adventurers, slavers, piratical traders, treasure hunters, concession mongers’ would exploit and abuse the natives (Hobson 1938: 230-231; Porter 1968: 230-231). As Ch. 3 observed, this justification of colonial trusteeship had been provided by anti-slavery activists since the early 19th century. However, while the missionaries considered colonial trusteeship by the British Empire to be the best prescription, Hobson did not think so. Instead, he suggested ‘genuine international council […] which shall accredit a civilized nation with the duty of educating a lower race’ (Hobson 1938: 239). Thus, the theory of imperialism justified colonial trusteeship by an international organization. This vision of international trusteeship was shared by other radicals such as Ramsay MacDonald (Porter 1968: 189).

*World War I: Wilsonianism and Trusteeship*

As Arno J. Mayer (1969) argues, the period around the time of the First World War was marked by ideological struggle which was launched by
Lenin. Colonial problems were one of the most important issues. Lenin severely criticized Western countries for colonial competition as well as secret diplomacy by disclosing secret treaties. Adopting Hobson’s theory of imperialism, he argued that colonial competition among Western countries would cause inter-imperial wars and it would provide a favorable opportunity for revolutions (Lenin 1939). The political leaders among the Allies had to respond to this ideological challenge.

US President Woodrow Wilson demonstrated his vision for the postwar world in his address on May 27, 1916. An international society, he insisted, should achieve ‘an equality of rights’ that would ‘neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those who are powerful and those that are weak’ (Wilson 1982: 533-537). And international and internal political arrangement should be constituted on the basis of ‘the consent of the governed’ (ibid). These principles were recognized as Wilsonianism. However, while he denounced imperialism and colonial competition, it was not clear whether he intended to apply these principles to dependent territories. Erez Manela (2007: 25) observes that:

‘he [...] did not exclude non-European peoples from the right to self-determination as a matter of principle. Rather, he envisioned them achieving it through an evolutionary process under the benevolent tutelage of a “civilized” power that would prepare them for self-government.’

His understanding of US duty to the Philippines demonstrated his idea of colonial trusteeship. He regarded the Philippines as a dependent territory
which required gradual civilization and insisted that it be supervised by the US to prepare the Philippines for self-government (Curry 1952; Manela 2007: 28-29). Before the outbreak of the First World War, Wilson declared that:

‘We regard ourselves as trustees acting not for the advantage of the United States, but for the benefit of the people of the Philippine Islands. Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for their independence, and we hope to move towards that end as rapidly as the safety and the permanent interests of the Islands will permit. After each step taken, experience will guide us to the next.’ (cited in Curry 1954: 439-440)

Thus, Wilson shared the idea of colonial trusteeship with other European politicians. Therefore, he had never demanded that colonial empires grant independence to dependent territories. However, as he renounced colonial competition among European powers, he refused to support the partition of ex-German colonies and the territories of the former Ottoman Empire among the allied powers. During the war, German colonial administration was severely criticized and, as the next section will explain, the Ottoman Empire had also lost its legitimacy in international society. Therefore, it was seen as undesirable to return these territories to Germany and Ottoman Turkey. That is why Wilson strongly insisted on the internationalization of colonial trusteeship at the Paris Peace Conference.

In the US, George Louis Beer, a member of the ‘Inquiry’ which was an
informal organization to study plans for the peace settlements under Wilson, suggested his international trusteeship plan during the war. He was one of the few Americans who were well informed about the colonial issues because he was a historian of the British Empire (Louis 1963).

In Britain, as Wilson did, intellectuals and politicians on the left, mainly Labor party members, criticized colonial competition and advocated international administration of colonies. They warned of the perils of imperialism and criticized colonial atrocities in terms of humanitarianism (Louis 1967: 87). Moreover, various intellectuals, following Hobson, denounced the relationship between financial circles and imperialism. For example, in his book, *The War of Steel and Gold* (1918), H. N. Brailsford argued that a ruling class ‘regards Empires as a field for the careers of its sons, and with finance which treats it as a field for investment’ (Brailsford 1918: 93). It was not for the profits of the majority of British people and colonized people. Brailsford warned that imperialism would lead to arms competition and war. Leonard Woolf, one of the main authors of Labor Party policy on the colonial issue, also claimed that imperialism since the 19th century had had an ‘economic motive’ (Woolf 1920: 22).

International trusteeship was thought by critics of empires to be a solution to colonial competition among Western countries. Hobson, in his book, *Towards International Government* (1915), proposed the establishment of an International Council with power to control colonial development in order to prevent frictions among colonial states and inhumane abuses of the natives (Hobson 1915: 141-146). Other left-wing intellectuals such as Woolf also proposed international government of colonial development (Louis 1967: 87). However, they did not believe blindly that the international government
would be a solution to colonial problems. Woolf stated that ‘internationalization is by itself no solution of the African problem’, but ‘The substitution of any form of international control for national ownership would be the sign and symbol that the notion of ownership and exploitation had given place to that of trusteeship’ (Woolf 1920: 364).

While they seemed to achieve consensus about the need for internationalization of colonial trusteeship, they were divided on the way of internationalization. There were two kinds of internationalization of colonial trusteeship: ‘international control by sovereign powers’ and ‘administration by an international state’ (Louis 1967: 90-91). Morel, MacDonald, and Webb supported the latter. Morel, in his book, proposed the internationalization and neutralization of ‘non-colonizable’ Africa ‘between the 18th Parallel of Lat. N. and the 15th Parallel of Lat. S.’ (Morel 1917: 21). As a result of the division of opinion among the left-wing intellectuals and politicians, the Labor Party’s ‘Memorandum on War Aims’ just stated that ‘With respect to these colonies, the Conference declares in favour of a system of control, established by international agreement under the League of Nations’ (cited in Kellogg and Gleason 1919: 361).

Some of the right-wing intellectuals also supported the internationalization of colonial trusteeship. The Round Table group including Philip H. Kerr and Lionel G. Curtis proposed an international supervisory system of colonial administration (‘Windows of Freedom’: 25-26). While they argued that Africans required the tutelage of civilized nations because of their savagism, they thought that colonial administration by the European empires without any supervision would cause the abuse of indigenous people like the scandal of the Congo. Since the late 19th century,
they had suggested the idea of Empire Federalism in which white settler colonies would be integrated into an imperial federation. For them, the British Empire was a model for the League of Nations (Kendle 1975; Bosco 1996). Therefore, although they belonged to the conservative ranks, they were not suspicious about the idea of an international organization.

Thus, while the left-wing intellectuals and some of the right-leaning intellectuals criticized colonial empires because of humanitarian and security concerns, no one denied the necessity of colonial trusteeship. Rather, they strengthened the pathologization of Asia and Africa. As many Victorian intellectuals and politicians did, they considered colonial administration to be the best means for the civilization and protection of natives. Instead of colonial trusteeship by empires, they suggested international trusteeship. While humanitarianism undermined the legitimacy of colonial empires, it protected the legitimacy of trusteeship.

1-3 From Dynastic Empires to an International Organization

As stated at the beginning, internationalization of trusteeship was suggested as an alternative to dynasty empires such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. During the First World War, a South African politician, J. C. Smuts, proposed his mandate plan to reconstruct the regional order of dynastic empires. This plan was adopted by President Wilson and institutionalized as the mandate system under the League of Nations. His main concern was security and minority problems in this region. However, at the Paris Peace Conference, only the territories of the Ottoman Empire were placed under the mandate system. This arrangement was motivated not only by geopolitical interests of Western
countries but also humanitarian concern because a considerable number of Armenians, in the Ottoman Empire, were slaughtered during the war. This humanitarianism required not just the direct relief of suffering but the colonization of the territories of the Ottoman Empire.

*Smuts’ Mandate System*

J. C. Smuts was one of the foremost politicians in South Africa, who contributed to the acquisition of self-government of South Africa on the imperial stage, joining the British Imperial War Cabinet, and being sent to conduct diplomatic and truce negotiations. Directed by Lloyd-George, he drafted a scheme for a League of Nations. His report received support in the Cabinet and was later published as the *League of Nations: a Practical Suggestion* (1918). Thereafter, Wilson expressed his admiration and adopted it into his draft of the League of Nations.

The idea of a mandate system comprised the core of his suggestion. For Smuts, one of the most urgent tasks was the reconstruction of the regional order in the former dynastic empires such as Austro-Hungary, Ottoman Turks and parts of the Russian Empire. He argued that:

‘In the place of the great Empires we find the map of Europe now dotted with small nations embryo states, derelict territories. Europe has been reduced to its original atoms. [...] Europe is being liquidated, and the League of Nations must be heir to this great estate.’ (Smuts 1918: 10-11)

He thought that instability of dynastic empires, especially Austro-Hungary,
mainly contributed to the outbreak of the World War rather than colonial competition among European countries. As dynastic empires had sought to control the nations of the empires by oppression, it had bred their discontent and finally led to the explosion of nationalism. As the First World War indicated, the nationalism of the East and Central European nations would disturb international order. Smuts’ mandate plan aimed to control the nationalism of newly-independent nations by constructing the new order in the former empires. He claimed that oppression would be replaced as an administrative principle by British-style liberalism. It was presumed that the liberation of the nations of these regions from oppression would contribute to the stability of the regional order.

Smuts’ report was comprised of three sections: part A ‘the Position and Powers of the League,’ part B ‘the Constitution of the League,’ and part C ‘the League and World-Peace.’ It suggested 21 articles for the League of Nations covenant. Article 4 through 7 suggested basic institutions: Article 4 stipulated that the administration authority of the former dynastic empires would be vested in the League of Nations; Article 5 defined the delegation of its authority to some civilized countries as ‘mandatary’; Article 6 stated that the mandatory state shall be laid down by the League of Nations; and Article 7 specified open door policy and non-militarization. In the Paris Peace Conference, this series of plans was institutionalized as the mandate system, though it was radically different from the original plan. It is worth noting that in his plan, newly-independent countries would form the economic union and be put under measures for arms control (Igarashi 2009). In other words, this mandate plan attempted to regionally administer the newly-independent countries of the former empires. The function of the
League of Nations was defined as ‘reversionary of the Empires’ (Article 9)

In this plan, the League of Nations was composed of three institutions: ‘a General Conference... of all the constituent States,’ ‘the Council of the League of Nations’, whose permanent members were the Great Powers, and the ‘Courts of Arbitrations and Conciliation’ (Smuts 1918: Part B). Smuts assigned the greatest power, including the authority to carry out mandates, to the Council of the League of Nations. This institutional design was adopted when the allied powers established the League of Nations.

Thus, Smuts’ mandate plan was different from the context of the criticism of colonial empires. He recognized Austro-Hungary and the League of Nations by analogy with the ‘British Commonwealth of Nations’ (Smuts 1917: 29-32). As he experienced, South Africa had gradually developed from colony to more independent dominion in the British Empire. For him, the British Empire was not incompatible with self-determination, but rather it helped the dominions to develop into self-governing states (Smuts 1917: 9). Smuts explained the unique nature of the British Empire in his speech:

“This Commonwealth is peculiarly constituted. It is scattered over the whole world. It is not a compact territory. [...] We are not a State. The British Empire is much more than a State. I think the very expression "Empire " is misleading, because it makes people think that we are one community, to which the word “Empire” can appropriately to applied. [...] But we are a system of nations. [...] We are far greater than any Empire which has ever existed, and by using this ancient expression we really disguise the main fact that our
whole position is different, and that we are not one State or nations
or empire, but a whole world by ourselves, consisting of many nations,
of many States, and all sorts of communities, under one flag. We are
a system of States, and not a stationary system, but a dynamic
evolving system, always going forward to new destinies. [...] I prefer
to call [the British Empire] “the British Commonwealth of Nations.”’
(Smuts 1917: 29-32)

Therefore, the British Empire ought to be a political model for the regions of
the former dynastic empires. When he negotiated a truce with
Austro-Hungary as a representative of the Allies, he recommended that
Austro-Hungary follow the British Empire (Lloyd George 1933: 2460-2480).
Also, he designed a League of Nations by analogy with the British Empire.
He defined the British Empire as a precursory system of the League of
Nations.

‘People talk about a league of nations and international government,
but the only successful experiment in international government that
has ever been made is the British Empire, founded on principles of
freedom and equality, it has continued to exist for a good time now,
and our hope is that the basis may be so laid for the future that it
may become an instrument for good, not only in the Empire but in
the whole world.’ (Smuts 1917: 13)

Thus, he thought that the British Commonwealth embodied a principle of
liberalism and that it would provide a good political model for the former
dynastic empires and international society. The reform of European order according to British-style liberalism would lead to the liberation of European people from despotism and oppression and a lasting peace of the world (Smuts 1917: 74, 110).

Smuts’ mandate plan seemed less paternalistic than other international trusteeship ideas which were proposed by critics of colonial empires. However, his political visions constructed excluded ‘Others’: the indigenous people in South Africa; India and Egypt in the British Empire; and dependent territories in international society. First, his plan was not for the colonies but only for the former dynastic empires because he predetermined that non-European countries were too savage to stand alone (Smuts 1918: 14). Second, while Smuts was one of the founding fathers of the League of Nations, he established a racial segregation system in South Africa which would develop into apartheid. Third, while he advocated the autonomy of dominions such as South Africa and Australia, he strenuously opposed the suggestion that India and Egypt be granted dominion status as South Africa (Smuts 1966: 273). Moreover, Smuts planned to reform the British colonies in Africa on the lines of South Africa by facilitating European settlements and dreamed of building a confederation composed of the British African colonies (Smuts 1944; Hyam 1972: Ch. 2).

Thus, he was a founding father of the mandate system. Smuts suggested his mandate system as an alternative to dynastic empires. He thought that a mandate system could reconstruct the regional order of the former empires and prevent newly-independent countries from oppressing minorities and waging wars. His main aim was the liberation of European people from oppression and despotism and the re-stabilization of European
order. On this point, his concern was deeply related to humanitarianism.

*Armenian Problem in the Ottoman Empire*

Although Smuts sought to apply his mandate plan to the former empires, his main concern was for Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, in 1919, while the territories of the former Ottoman Empire were placed under the mandate system, the countries of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire gained independence. This was because the Allies applied the principle of self-determination not to the Arab regions but to East European countries.

During the First World War, the Ottoman Empire had been described as cruel despotism by European countries. As the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire started in 1916, this biased representation of the Ottoman Empire was strengthened. The despotism of the Ottoman Empire was legitimizing its own dissolution (Dodge 2003: 44).

Moreover, the Ottoman Empire had carried out the compulsory migration and massacre of Armenians since 1915. A number of public and private organizations including newspaper companies and Christian societies reported the inhumane treatment of Armenians and sought to support the victims. Britain and France criticized the Ottoman Empire in terms of humanitarianism. While they were already fighting against the Ottoman Empire, the US was reluctant to touch this humanitarian problem because they maintained neutrality. Although Henry Morgenthau, US ambassador to Turkey, strived to change the policy of the Wilson government, the President had never decided to intervene in the Armenian problem (Power 2002: Ch. 1). However, there can be no doubt that this humanitarian crisis legitimized the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Lloyd-George wrote
in his memoirs:

‘There was not a British statesman of any party who did not have it in mind that if we succeeded in defeating this inhuman Empire, our essential condition of the peace we should impose was the redemption of the Armenian valleys for ever from the bloody misrule with which they had been stained by the infamies of the Turks.’ (cited in MacMillan 2001: 189)

Even the British Labor Party declared that ‘The Conference condemns the handing back to the systematically violent domination of the Turkish Government any subject people’ (cited in Kellogg and Gleason 1919: 360).

However, French and British policies toward the Ottoman Empire were motivated not only by humanitarianism but also by blatant imperialism. In 1916, the secret Sykes-Picot agreement on the partition of Arabian provinces was concluded between Britain and France. Lloyd-George’s remark on the region during the Peace Conference demonstrated British imperialism:

‘Mesopotamia... yes... oil... irrigation... we must have Mesopotamia: Palestine... yes... the Holy Land... Zionism... we must have Palestine: Syria... h’m... what is there in Syria? Let the French have that.’ (cited in Macmillan 2001: 392)

As the Sykes-Picot agreement was revealed by Lenin after the Russian Revolution, British and French imperialism was challenged by the US, the
left intellectuals, and public opinion.

Thus, while humanitarianism legitimized the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, geopolitical interests demanded the colonization of the Arab regions. Because of the ideological competition between Lenin and the Allies, the colonization of these regions was not a realistic option. However, for European politicians, Arab countries were not yet quite ready for self-government. Humanitarian crisis in the Ottoman Empire was interpreted as evidence for this assertion. As internationalization of trusteeship seemed a better option for European politicians, they adopted the plan to put Arab countries under the mandate system in 1919.

1.4 Establishment of the Mandate System

Before the Paris Peace Conference, President Wilson prepared his draft of the Covenant. While he applauded and adopted Smuts’ mandate plan, he sought to apply it not to the former Austro-Hungary but to Arab regions of the former Ottoman Empire and the ex-German colonies in Africa and the Pacific. Furthermore, the British ministers did not support the application of the mandate system to Austro-Hungary.

At the Paris Peace Conference, Wilsonianism and old-fashioned colonialism clashed. The US and other Western countries were bitterly divided over the ex-German colonies. The colonial empires such as Britain and France demanded the annexation of them, ignoring their war aims which were announced during the war. The British representatives suggested their own mandate plan in which mandate territories were classified into two categories: ‘vested territories’ and ‘assisted states’ (Miller 2002: 106-107). The former seemed to be the ex-German colonies where
slavery, forced labor and trade of alcohol would be prohibited; and the latter seemed to be the former Ottoman territories where the will of inhabitants would be respected. However, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand strongly hoped to annex the ex-German colonies such as German South-West Africa, New Guinea and German Samoa. However, Wilson bitterly opposed such annexation and asserted that all the ex-German colonies must be controlled under the mandate system. After the negotiations stalled, Smuts proposed a revised mandate plan in which the territories were classified into three categories (A, B, C type mandates) and Wilson accepted this proposition. Although Australia and New Zealand were reluctant to agree to this plan, it was decided to establish the mandate system as the majority of the representatives supported it.

Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant stipulated three kinds of mandate territories: A type mandate was for ‘communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire’ which ‘have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone’; B type mandate was for communities, such as Central Africa, which were still in the ‘stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory’; C type mandate was for communities, such as South-West Africa and South Pacific Islands, ‘which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory’. 
While the mandate system was based on colonial trusteeship, it was novel for two reasons. First, as the mandate system classified dependent territories into three categories, ‘it introduced the concept of “stage of development” into the literature of international organizations’ (Rist 2010: 61). Characterizations of dependent territories changed from ‘barbarism’ or ‘savageness’ to ‘immature’ or ‘not yet quite ready for self-determination.’ It implied a unilinear model of social development. Second, at least on the face of the Covenant, as the definition of A type territories stated, achievement of self-government was defined as the long term goal of the mandate system.

2. The Mandate System and Colonial Administration

While mandate territories were placed under the League of Nations, they were actually administrated by colonial empires as mandatories. Moreover, the mandate territories were limited to the ex-German colonies and the former Ottoman Empire territories, and the jurisdiction of the Permanent Mandate Commission was restricted to supervision of colonial administration. The League of Nations’ sphere of influence was quite small. How different was the mandate system from colonial administration?

This section will examine the practice of the mandate system by analyzing two mandate territories: Tanganyika (B type mandate) and Iraq (A type mandate). In this period, the idea of indirect rule was still a ruling theology of colonial trusteeship. Tanganyika was a laboratory for indirect rule because its second governor was Donald Cameron, who elaborated the colonial philosophy of indirect rule. The analysis of Tanganyika will show how the mandate system was different from colonial administration. On the
other hand, Iraq was the sole case in which a target society gained independence during the mandatory period. This section will examine whether or not the A type mandate respected self-determination of target societies.

2.1 Tanganyika: a Laboratory for Indirect Rule

As other East African colonies such as Kenya did, Tanganyika confronted the problem of European settlement. The governor had two choices: one was to follow the example of Kenya where the white settlers were allowed to have strong power and rule the national economy; another was to follow the example of Nigeria whose administration principle was indirect rule. ‘In 1921 the Colonial Office agreed that Tanganyika should be a “black man’s country” on broadly West African lines’ (Roberts 1986: 672). In 1925 Donald Cameron, the second governor of the British mandate of Tanganyika, stated that:

‘Everyone, whatever his opinion may be in regard to direct or indirect rule, will agree, I think, that it is our duty to do everything in our power to develop the native on lines which will not Westernise him and turn him into a bad imitation of a European – our whole education policy is directed to that end. We want to make him a good African.’ (cited in Chidzero 1961: 118)

According to this principle, the governor introduced a dual legal system: English law and ordinary courts for European settlers and native law and native courts for natives (Chidzero 1961: 58-59).
Cameron developed Lugardian indirect rule in his administration. While he learned a lot of lessons from Nigeria and its governor Frederick Lugard, his administration was slightly different from Lugard’s in that he, in some degree, accepted gradual modernization of the natives. Margery Perham observed that: ‘In the six years of this governorship he [Cameron] introduced the Nigerian system, but in a form adapted to the different conditions and the different racial stock of East Africa’ (Perham 1967: 94).

Cameron defined his colonial administration policy as follows:

‘The system of “native administration” [...] known as “Indirect Administration” [is] based on several principles, [and] is designed to adapt for the purposes of local government the tribal institutions which the native people have evolved for themselves, so that the latter may develop in a constitutional manner from their own past, guided and restrained by the traditions and sanctions which they have inherited, molded or modified as they may be on the advice of British officers. It is an essential feature of the system that [...] the British Government rules through these native institutions which are an integral part of the machinery of government (just as the administrative officers are an integral part of the government) with well defined powers and functions recognized by the Government and by law, and not dependent on the caprice of an executive officer.’ (cited in Dougherty 1966: 210)

Thus, the administrators of Tanganyika adopted indirect rule as their administrative principle because they were trained in British colonies.
According to the principle of indirect rule, the indigenous people were administered through the native authorities. However, the top of the administrative structure was a British governor who was appointed by the Crown (Dougherty: 1966 213). In this system, the governor had executive power and legislative power. Although there was the Executive Council and the Legislative Council, the governor could ignore their recommendations (Chidzero 1961: 50). Moreover, as Callahan observes, ‘By merging judicial and executive power, the colonial state was able to penetrate much deeper into African society, to reorder local communities into often artificial cultural categories, and to form static definitions of “native rule” and African “customary law”’ (Callahan 1999: 141).

For example, the determination to alienate the native land signified the governor’s despotic power. The mandate system defined the protection of the native land rights and the mandatory states had no ownership of land. Therefore, the alienation of land by the government was basically prohibited. However, the governor actually had discretion over land. Cameron justified the alienation of land for European enterprise as long as it would be beneficial to Tanganyika as a whole (Chidzero 1961: 226). In fact, in the late 1940s, the Groundnut Scheme, which was an early colonial development project, was conducted not in the British colonies but in Tanganyika (see Ch. 5 of this study).

Thus, the legal and political systems of Tanganyika were marked by two features of colonial administration: the imposition of native systems and the despotism of the British governor. On this point, B type mandate was not different from colonial administration in terms of administrative principles and practice.
2.2 Iraq: Constructing an Informal Colony

When the British Empire started the administration of Iraq, the colonial officials had little knowledge about Iraqi society (Yaphe 2004: 20, 24). Their image of Iraq was influenced by their bias against the Ottoman Empire, Orientalist discourse and the experiences of British India. They assumed that the Ottoman Empire was despotic and corrupt, and therefore politicians and officials trained under the Ottoman Empire must also be corrupt (Dodge 2003: 64, 66). Orientalist discourse predetermined the nature of the urban-based population and the rural population by applying the urban-rural division to Iraqi society. The urban-based population was imagined as corrupt because of capitalism, European influence, and the administration of the Ottoman Empire (Dodge 2003: 71-73). On the other hand, the rural population was recognized ‘as the noble bedouin, untouched by all that was negative about the modern day’ (Dodge 2003: 69-70). As Dodge argues, the ‘Orientalist discourse through which the British perceived Iraqi society robbed the majority of the Iraqi population of agency’ (Dodge 2003: 67).

Following this distorted image of Iraqi society, the British Empire inaugurated legal and land reform. The regulations which the British Empire introduced divided the Iraqi population into two categories: the city dwellers who were subject to the Iraqi civic law based on Ottoman codes, and the tribal population who were subject to the tribal regulations (Dodge 2003: Ch. 5). On land reform, they sought to find indigenous community units and owners or leaders to collect tax. However, it took time to decide the administrative policy in Iraq because several departments, especially the
India Office and the Arab Bureau of the Foreign Office, competed in the administration model of Iraq (Yaphe 2004: 21-22; Dodge 2003: 129). Finally, according to Yaphe, ‘The tone was set by British administrators sent out from the India Office who sought to model Iraq on Britain’s imperial style of rule in India’ (Yaphe 2004: 22). They attempted to identify ‘natural’ leaders in traditional communities and constructed autocratic government (*ibid.*: 25).

The imposition of socio-political models ‘did ontological violence to Iraqi society’ (Dodge 2003: 129). Moreover, local municipal councils ‘were headed and run by British officers; Iraqi council members had responsibility only for public health and sanitation, parks, trade, assistance to the poor, and road building’ (Yaphe 2004: 27). In addition, the British Empire exercised a despotic power through air strikes on many villages in order to oppress rebellions (Dodge 2003: Ch. 7). Moreover, even after Iraq was granted independence, the British Empire controlled it by sending civil and military advisers and experts to Iraq and exploiting Iraqi military bases and facilities (Stanfield 2007: 49; Balfour-Paul 1999: 501).

Thus, mandate administration in Iraq was characterized by social engineering and despotic rule as in other colonial territories. On this point, the mandate system helped to create an informal colony of the British Empire.6

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6 ‘[I]n contrast to the situation in Iraq,’ according to Yoav Alon (2005: 222), ‘by the second half of the 1920s British officials had developed a better understanding of Transjordanian society’. They exploited the tribal political systems to maintain law and order. The Legislative Council established by the British Empire introduced indigenous leaders into the imperial administration structure (Alon 2005: 223; Cleveland and Bunton 2009: 213-215). As a result, the British Empire succeeded to manipulate and strengthen the tribal order and norms.’
Both cases of the mandate system demonstrated principal characteristics of colonial administration. First, in these territories, colonial administrators sought to exploit indigenous socio-political systems. It did not mean that they respected self-determination of target societies. This strategy was based on the colonial philosophy of indirect rule. Second, these cases demonstrated the despotic tendencies of colonial administration. They had despotic administrative structures. Moreover, in Iraq, the British Empire employed military power to suppress rebellions. Thus, the mandate system was hardly different from colonial administration. It means that the mandate system was a part of colonial trusteeship.

Conclusion

This chapter examined internationalization of trusteeship in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In this period, while the legitimacy of colonial empires and dynastic empires was challenged, the necessity of colonial trusteeship was accepted by critics of empires. Humanitarianism was playing an important part in internationalization of colonial trusteeship, as well as security concerns. Humanitarian crises in colonial empires and dynastic empires undermined the legitimacy of these empires. However, it was argued that dependent territories had to be supervised by civilized nations in terms of humanitarianism. In this process, the pathologization of non-European societies was strengthened by critics of empires. While Wilsonianism created the idea of ‘the rights to self-determination,’ it represented dependent territories as uncivilized and constituted a unilinear model of social development. Furthermore, incipient cultural relativism
sought to solidify the indigenous nature of non-European societies. This argument was marked by a typical essentialism. In either discourse, non-European societies were deprived of their political agency and described as requiring the supervision of civilized nations. Thus, the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship was reproduced.

International trusteeship was suggested as a solution to colonial problems, although there was no consensus about an institutional design of internationalization. At the Paris Peace Conference, the mandate system was established to administer the ex-German colonies and the territories of the former Ottoman Empire. However, the practice of the mandate system was not different from colonial administration because the administrative regimes of the mandate territories were despotic and because the administrators of the mandate territories conducted social engineering policies as in other colonial territories. Thus, the mandate system was a part of colonial trusteeship.
Ch. 5 Development Trusteeship since the 1940s

The previous chapter showed that humanitarianism was playing an important part in the internationalization of colonial trusteeship around the time of the First World War and that this process was accompanied by the re-pathologization of dependent territories. During and after the Second World War, as this chapter will show, the legitimacy of trusteeship was challenged. As a result, the theology and practice of trusteeship changed from indirect rule to development trusteeship. As in other periods of the history of trusteeship, humanitarianism contributed to the reconstitution of trusteeship. The dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship did not disappear in spite of the crisis of trusteeship.

This chapter will analyze the relationship between development trusteeship and humanitarianism by tracing the history of development trusteeship from British colonial administration in the 1940s to the development policy of international aid agencies such as the World Bank in the 1980s. In the 1940s the British Empire, which was under internal and external pressure, began to invoke the idea of poverty, as a kind of humanitarian discourse, in order to reconstruct the legitimacy of colonial trusteeship. In the late 1960s, international aid agencies such as the World Bank took over the projects of the modernization of non-European countries from colonial empires. As in the 1940s, the discourse of poverty was playing an important part in the construction of the new regime of development trusteeship.

Although there are a variety of studies which find the origin of development in colonial administration (Lee 1967; Havinden and Meredith
1993; Cowen and Shenton 1996; Cooper 1997), they do not analyze development policy after decolonization. Other scholars, who adopt a historical approach in the analysis of contemporary development policy (Escobar 1995; Jahn 2007), do not analyze the relationship between colonial trusteeship and humanitarianism. This study will show the historical continuity between colonial administration and contemporary development policy.

This chapter is composed of two parts. The first part of this chapter analyzes how and why the British Empire shifted from indirect rule to development trusteeship in the 1940s, and what happened in practice after that. The second part examines how international organizations such as the UN and World Bank took over development trusteeship in the late 1960s, and how they sought to transform the socio-political institutions of developing countries.

1. Emergence of Development Trusteeship since the 1940s

Development trusteeship was the antithesis to indirect rule in that the former sought to make target communities move along the transitional path which the Western powers predetermined, while the latter sought to protect or create indigenous ‘traditional’ institutions. On this point, development trusteeship seems to have been a revival of colonial trusteeship before indirect rule. However, development trusteeship was different from colonial trusteeship, as advocated by utilitarianism, because it reflected a new state model in which the government actively intervened in society and the market by planning economic policy and maintaining the standards of living of its population through welfare programs (Lewis 2000: 24-80).
Development trusteeship aimed to develop colonial communities by investing ample capital, constructing infrastructure, and developing agricultural techniques, health systems and educational institutions. The policy target of development trusteeship was mainly economic institutions although it actually affected socio-political institutions, and was unilaterally planned and imposed by the government of the British Empire and later the headquarters of international organizations.

This new state model appeared in the late 19th century. The journalist, J. L. Garvin stated in 1904 that:

‘Economic progress no less than the political presentation of it must largely depend upon the conscious purpose and efficient action of the state itself. Government, in a word, should be the brain of the state, even in the sphere of commerce’ (cited in Cowen and Shenton 1991: 146).

Around the time of the First World War, new liberals such as J. A. Hobson insisted that the government intervene in the market in order to prevent the gap between rich and poor from widening (Long 1995: Ch. 3). However, they were supporting indirect rule as colonial policy. Ironically, at the time, an advocate of colonial development policy was Joseph Chamberlain, who was neither a liberal nor a socialist (Cowen and Shenton 1991; Havinden and Meredith 1993: Ch. 4). As Colonial Secretary from 1885 to 1903, he ‘pressed hard for imperial action to improve colonial economies’ (Fieldhouse 1999: 81). However, the British Treasury deterred his attempt to obtain public funds for development in the colonies because they believed ‘that limited capital
resources were better spent in the metropole, and [...] development would disrupt colonial societies’ (Cooper 1997: 65). These ideas arose around the time of the Second World War. ‘A New Philosophy of Colonial Rule,’ Lord Hailey’s address to the Royal Empire Society in 1941, marked a turning-point. It stated that ‘the position of the Colonial Office would become more and more to resemble that occupied by British departments of state “which are actively concerned in protecting and developing the standards of life of our population”’ (Lee 1967: 17). In this new philosophy, the colonial administrator would not protect or invent ‘traditional’ institutions; rather, he would westernize the local institutions and population through social engineering. In the 1940s, this ‘new philosophy’ of trusteeship would become the consensus in the British Empire.⁷

1·1 Shift from Indirect Rule to Development Trusteeship

Three factors led to the shift in British colonial policy from indirect rule to development trusteeship: the rise of the discourse of poverty from the late 1930s onwards; internal and external criticism of British colonial policy; and the shortages of resources such as food, raw materials and dollars as a result of the Second World War.

⁷ As this chapter will demonstrate, the shift from indirect rule to development trusteeship occurred in the 1940s. However, some researchers highlight the changes of colonial administration in India during and after the First World War. For example, in this period, the British India government began to intervene in the Indian economy by reconsidering its traditional laissez-faire policy (Tomlinson 1979: Ch. 3) and launched new social development policies such as the introduction of primary education (Aspendren 2009). While these changes were precursory cases of development trusteeship, they did not affect the colonial philosophy of indirect rule. As Ch. 4 showed, the India Office developed indirect rule in Iraq after the First World War. The shift of the theology of trusteeship had not occurred until the 1940s.
The Rise of the Discourse of Poverty

In the 1930s, as Frederick Cooper (1996, 1997) highlights, riots and strikes in the British colonies shocked colonial administrators and politicians. These events led to new pathologization of dependent countries – the discourse of poverty. The discourse of poverty contributed to the rise of development trusteeship. In 1935, strikes and riots broke out in Northern Rhodesia and the West Indies. Subsequently, in 1937 and 1938, riots erupted in the West Indies again, and in 1938 strikes occurred in the sugar plantations of Mauritius. In 1939, strikes in the Gold Coast and general strikes in Mombasa took place. In order to investigate this series of riots and strikes and find a remedy, the British government established the West Indies Royal Commission. This commission submitted a report on the series of riots and strikes. It ‘was so critical that it was suppressed until the end of the war – it saw disorder as the result of unremedied legitimate grievances and called for metropolitan efforts both to increase production and employment and to remedy the miserable state of social services’ (Cooper 1997: 66-67). Thus, the British Empire recognized the deficient state of the social policies in its colonies as a main cause of disorder. Therefore, the remedy would be the improvement of social service by the colonial government. Capitalism had extended its reach over all the African colonies, and the labor market had rapidly grown. Thus, indirect rule was no longer relevant to the African colonies. It was no longer possible to confine natives to ‘traditional’ institutions. Rather, it required a welfare state to improve standards of life.

The Royal Commission’s report marked the new pathologization of
dependent territories by the Empire. Poverty, caused by malnutrition, primitive agricultural methods, and inadequate education and health provisions, was considered to be the pathology of the British colonies. For example, in 1945, Rita Hinden, a leading intellectual of the Fabian Society, declared that ‘The poverty of Africa is a challenge. [...] Nor do we seek to deny the wretchedness of African conditions or our responsibility for improving them’ (Hinden 1945: 51). She classified the African people into two types: the peasants and the wage-earners. The former had no ‘Modern ideas of crop rotation, the use of fertilizers, proper irrigation, [and] machinery’. As they had only primitive agricultural techniques, they could not produce a large amount of agricultural produce. Moreover, they had to sell their products to powerful trading firms and could not obtain adequate money. The wage-earners were also ‘ignorant, easily exploitable, poor in the weapons of self-defense’. The wages were ‘miserably inadequate’ (Hinden 1945: 52-53, 56-57).

Similarly, Arthur Creech Jones, ‘the most influential Colonial Secretary since Joseph Chamberlain’ (Porter and Stockwell 1987: 9), argued in 1945 that: ‘Labour recognises that the fundamental social problems of colonial regions are ignorance, poverty and disease’ (Jones 1945a: 111). This diagnosis was shared with the Conservative party. C. E. Ponsonby, as a representative of the Conservative party, stated that ‘All political parties are agreed on the necessity of insuring freedom from want and freedom from disease’ (Ponsonby 1945: 118). Thus, the poverty of the British colonies provided the British Empire with new reason to intervene in colonial societies. ‘Poverty’ was considered to be unignorable human suffering in this period. The alleviation of poverty was a kind of humanitarianism. This humanitarian discourse was not just compassion for the suffering of Others;
rather, it attributed the causes of poverty to the nature of Others. This pathologization contributed to the constitution of relations of inequality and required practices were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering.

A prescription for the pathology of Africa was ‘development and welfare’ policy which would be based on ‘planning from above’ (Hinden 1945: 60-61). As stated above, Lord Hailey’s new philosophy that the government and state ‘are actively concerned in protecting and developing the standards of life of our population’ became the new strategy of trusteeship. Not only the Conservative party but also the Labor party denied the democratic idea of colonial development that ‘changes must come from the people themselves’ (Hinden 1945: 62). They presumed that Africans were so ignorant that they could not develop on their own and demanded that the British Empire educate and train Africans, cultivate soil, plan economic policy, protect laborers and peasants from powerful firms, and construct infrastructure such as roads (Jones 1945a: 112). It required ample capital which the private companies could not provide, but only government could inject (Hinden 1941: Ch. 19).

In addition to the riots, the fall of Malaya in 1942 also contributed to the constitution of new pathology of dependent territories. Japanese troops attacked and occupied the British colony in Malaya. This was a shock to the British Empire because it could not believe that an Asian army could defeat a European army. Some European people were likely to presume that ‘Asian’ was inferior to ‘European’ in terms of physical ability (Wolton 2000). Moreover, that the local population refused to cooperate with the British Empire also challenged the legitimacy of colonial trusteeship. Margery Perham, one of the most influential intellectuals on colonial administration,
stated in the *Times* as follows: ‘The Malayan disaster has shocked us into sudden attention to the structure of our colonial empire.’ She continued that:

‘elsewhere peasants and workers, almost if not quite so ignorant and backward as those of our colonies, have fought as men fight only for a cause they recognize as their own. This forces us to ask the long-range question whether British rule does develop that solidarity which society needs for health in peace as well as for strength in war.’

(Perham 1967: 225)

She called the British people’s attention to the welfare of dependent territories. The Second World War revealed that the British Empire had hardly improved the well-being of the colonized societies.

The colonial administrators proposed the construction of colonial welfare systems not only because of their humanitarian concern, but also because of their geopolitical concern. The British Empire aspired to local cooperation and sought to alleviate disorder and resistance in its colonies. Colonial development was an attempt to ‘buy continued acquiescence in alien rule’ (Fieldhouse 1999: 227). The idea of ‘partnership’ signified how hypocritical colonial development of the British Empire was. In the 1940s, a variety of intellectuals and politicians suddenly began to advocate the idea of ‘partnership' instead of ‘trusteeship.’ Lord Hailey, on the fall of Malaya, addressed the House of Lords as follows:

‘No-one can deny that the sentiment of trusteeship has played a great and most beneficent part in the development of our system of civil
administration in the Colonies, but [...] trusteeship has today a new and more positive meaning for us. [...] And there is another point. The use of the term is irritating to the colonial people. It was intensely unpopular in India. It is becoming equally unpopular in the Colonies, for it has implications on which it is unnecessary to enlarge but which, if I were a native of the Colonies, I should equally resent [...] let it be said that our contract of partnership involves the progressive increase of the share which the junior partners have in the conduct of the undertaking.’ (cited in Hinden 1949: 146)

In addition to Hailey, Harold Macmillan, a leading Conservative politician, and Oliver Stanley, then a Secretary of State for the Colonies, also supported the idea ‘partnership’ (Hinden 1949: 147-148). According to J. M. Lee, ‘By the middle of 1943 several ministers at the Colonial Office had erected this suggestion into a “principle of partnership” ’ (Lee 1967: 18). However, Hinden aptly pointed out the following:

‘[The British colonial administrators and politicians] give pretty names to their policy – they may call it benevolent paternalism, trusteeship, or partnership, and inspire it with the most noble of intentions; but they remain blind to the one over-riding fact that, in the eyes of the colonial peoples, all that they do remains alien domination’. (Hinden 1949: 168)

The idea ‘partnership’ was nothing but hypocrisy. Colonized people could not have any political agency. The British Empire had never allowed the
Africans and Asians to decide their economic and political policies. Not only the Conservative party but also the Labor party presumed that ‘economic and social development had to preceded political independence’ (Gupta 1975: 310). Although British colonial administrators and politicians had oppressed educated natives according to the dogma of indirect rule in the late 19th century, they suddenly changed their minds and required ‘suitably qualified local candidates’ as a condition of political autonomy (Porter 1987: Doc 58).

*Internal and External Pressure*

The second factor which caused the shift from indirect rule to development trusteeship was internal and external criticism and pressure. As in the late 19th century, British intellectuals seriously criticized British colonial administration, although they still supported the idea of colonial trusteeship in this period. In 1940, the Fabian Colonial Bureau was established as a department of the Fabian Society by Arthur Creech Jones and Rita Hinden. The strategy of this organization was different from that of the previous generation of intellectuals of the left. The new critics of the British Empire demanded that the imperial government deliberately plan colonial development and intervene in local societies with ample capital and advanced technology. As stated above, the welfare state model was applied to colonial administration. In the *Fabian Colonial Essays* (1945), A. C. Jones highlighted the importance of state functions such as the construction of infrastructure, the control of industrial development and the regulation of employment in colonies (Jones 1945b: 15-17). Margery Perham, who had a strong connection with A. C. Jones (see Lewis 2000: 93), also advocated the application of the welfare state model to colonial administration. She argued
that:

“The so-called welfare state of today, even in a social democracy like Britain, now controls almost the whole life of society; it runs the major utilities and industries; it manages and allocates the entire national income and it applies science and the art of administration to the betterment of the standard of living – the golden calf of the modern world. [...] Most colonial societies need them as much or even more, because there is much more to be done and done quickly if they are even to start to catch up with the rest of the world’ (Perham 1949: 337).

These criticisms from the left-wing seemed to influence British colonial policy because the Labor party had been in power from 1945 to 1951. Thus, the internal pressure against the colonial administration contributed to the shift of the British colonial policy.

In addition to the internal criticism, the pressure from without, especially the US, was also important. As the Ch. 4 explained, the US did not support European colonialism at the Paris Peace Conference. Similarly, during the Second World War, the US brought pressure on the British Empire to change its colonial policy. Therefore, the British Empire had to revise the theology and practice of colonial trusteeship. However, the US did not desire the immediate independence of colonies because it presumed that non-Western countries were still savage and because it was reluctant to change the balance of power by decolonization in the Cold War. As a result, even after the Second World War, most of the British colonies could not
achieve independence and the supervision by the international organization did not expand. Only the mandate territories were taken over by the Trusteeship system under the UN. Furthermore, the US and the colonial empires concluded the article regarding ‘non-self-governing territories’ (Article 73 of the UN Chapter XI). This article approved the universality of trusteeship as a responsibility of civilized countries by declaring that:

‘Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories.’

By stipulating the responsibility of the colonial empires, this statement reconstituted the relations of inequality between civilized countries and dependent territories, although it meant neither the establishment of international supervision systems nor international administration systems.

Thus, in the 1940s, the legitimacy of colonial trusteeship was challenged by internal and external criticism. By defining the objective of colonial administration as the alleviation of poverty in the British colonies, the British Empire attempted to reestablish the relations of inequality between civilized countries and dependent territories – that is, the relationship between trustees and target societies.
Shortages of Resources

The third cause of the shift of trusteeship was directly related to the geopolitical interests of the British Empire. The Second World War exhausted the people and the resources of Britain. Therefore they were suffering from shortages of food, raw materials and dollars. The British colonies were expected to provide a satisfactory solution to this problem. Minister for Economic Affairs Stafford Cripps stated in his speech:

‘Tropical Africa is already contributing much, both in physical supplies of food and raw materials and in quite substantial net earnings of dollars for the sterling area pool. The further development of African resources is of the same crucial importance to the rehabilitation and strengthening of Western Europe as the restoration of European productive power is to the future progress and prosperity of Africa. Each needs and is needed by the other.’

(cited in Porter and Stockwell 1987: Doc 44)

Thus, the British Empire attempted to make their colonies produce raw materials and earn US dollars by selling agricultural products from the colonies to the US. As Porter and Stockwell observe, the task of colonial development and the task of reconstructing the Empire merged (Porter and Stockwell 1987: 42). This self-interested motivation was not inconsistent with humanitarianism. According to Cripps, the empire and its colonies ‘[e]ach needs and is needed by the other.’ Furthermore, colonial development and the reconstruction of Europe were important for America’s new world
order. The US sought to strengthen the capitalist Western bloc against the communist Eastern bloc. In order to do this, European economies needed to have access to raw materials and markets in Asia and Africa (Wood 1986: 42). Thus, development trusteeship aimed to exploit the resources of Asia and Africa for the reconstruction of the British Empire.

This section has explored three factors which led to the rise of development trusteeship. Among these factors, the discourse of poverty was the most important in the shift of trusteeship. This humanitarian discourse required practices which were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering and helped the British Empire to restore the legitimacy of colonial administration, although it could not stop the decolonization movement. Due to humanitarian concerns, even the intellectuals of the left supported the colonial development projects. The geopolitical motivation was highly important, but without the discourse of poverty, it was impossible to launch the new social engineering projects. However, I do not intend to say that development trusteeship was normatively good; rather, in the 1940s, humanitarian discourse reconstituted trusteeship by re-pathologizing dependent territories as suffering from poverty.

1.2 Failure of Development Trusteeship

As the theology of trusteeship shifted from indirect rule to development, the practice of trusteeship also changed in this period. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940 marked the starting-point of development trusteeship in practice. Although the Colonial Development Act had already been introduced in 1929, the 1940 Act was not just an extension
of the 1929 Act but innovative in two respects. As D. K. Fieldhouse (1999: 86) aptly summarizes, ‘First, it included “welfare”, thus accepting that Britain should subsidize current expenditure in the colonies; secondly, payments did not have to be approved for colonial administration by the hard-headed Advisory Committee, as had been necessary from 1929.’

The most important problem was how to use the funds from the 1940 Act. In 1941, the Colonial Ministry established a committee on post-war reconstruction in the colonies to decide to make such a decision. Its chair was Lord Hailey, who was a leading intellectual on colonial administration and published *African Survey* in 1938. In addition to him, this committee included W. Arthur Lewis, Charlotte Leubuscher, Sir William Beveridge, and C. K. Meek. Lewis was a West Indian economist. After earning his Ph. D at the London School of Economics in 1940, he worked for the Fabian Society to formulate the colonial policy of the British West Indies. Later, he became one of the most influential economists in development studies and received the Nobel Prize for economics. In this committee, he stated that:

‘The economic development of the colonies deserves to be carefully planned and as carefully controlled. Unless British colonial administration takes this to heart, it will not attain those new standards of trusteeship which the modern world demands.’

(Havinden and Meredith 1993: 216-217)

Due to the intensification of the Second World War, the colonial development project was interrupted and the debates of this committee did not have immediate influence.
After the Second World War, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1945) was passed. The colonial development project was launched again. Subsequently, the British colonies initiated the ten-year plans and made the allocation of the funds from the 1945 Act. They would spend the funds for mainly improving agriculture, education, medical provision and water supply networks (see Havinden and Meredith 1993: 256). In 1941, Hinden analyzed African colonies and gave a prescription as follows:

‘The intense poverty of colonial areas, even at their most prosperous, is directly due to lack of capital. Through lack of capital the colonies have been deprived of the fundamental public services on which all economic progress is based. Communications and transport either do not exist at all, or are expensive and inefficient; water supplies are inadequate; electricity or any other power supply has barely begun to be developed; drainage systems are expensive toys confined to European settlements; hospitals and schools cannot hope to deal with more than a fraction of the community.’ (Hinden 1941: 187)

Thus, she thought that the lack of capital was part of a vicious circle of poverty in Africa. In other words, the investment of ample capital could improve agriculture, industry, and social services such as education in Africa. The 1945 Act and the subsequent colonial practices corresponded with her plan. Even in the 1950s, the capital resource transfer was regarded as the most effective development strategy (Thorbecke 2000: 16). From 1947 to 1956, the public expenditure for colonial development rose from £150 million to £581 million (Havinden and Meredith 1993: 260). The British Empire was
no longer so restrictive over spending.

In the 1930s, scientists sought to collect detailed statistics on African societies. The Colonial Office utilized statistics and expert knowledge on Asia and Africa. Before that, the strategy of colonial administration depended on local administrators' initiative, and the budget was strictly limited by the Treasury. Missionaries and journalists were the main groups providing information on the colonial territories to the British public. The *African Survey*, published in 1938 by Lord Hailey, implied a new trend of colonial administration which relied on scientific research and statistics. This literature was a result of the African research project launched by J. C. Smuts and P. H. Kerr (Hailey 1957: Preface). They sought to comprehensively acknowledge the diversified conditions of Africa. The *African Survey* included extensive information about Africa from ethnography to agriculture, law, and colonial administration systems. This project aimed to dissect developing areas and continued even after the colonial empires dissolved. Furthermore, in the same year, a separate Social Services department at the Colonial Office was established. This department’s officials had responsibility for social service issues such as public health, labor conditions, and housing. This new department brought external experts into the decision-making process of the colonial administration (Ittman 1999). Thus, development trusteeship began to be practiced by experts on the basis of scientific data.

However, the colonial development projects in the 1940s did not succeed. First of all, as Cooper (1997: 78) states, ‘in 1955, nearly a third of the [Colonial Development and Welfare] funds appropriated in 1945 and 1950 remained unspent, mostly because the system was so clogged that
spending more was “physically impossible,” even though the original appropriation was regarded as modest in relation to the colonies’ needs.’ Second, some colonial development plans were so extemporaneous that they could not achieve any results. The Tanganyika Groundnuts Scheme (1946-1954) was a typical instance of the failure. It is even now cited as a classic development failure in the development studies’ literature. This plan was proposed by the United Africa Co., a subsidiary of Unilever Ltd, and implemented by the Ministry of Food. Its aim was to alleviate Britain’s acute oil and fat shortages. The Ministry of Food accepted this plan without pilot schemes or agricultural experiments. Furthermore, the proposers did not research the characteristics of East African climate and calculated the cost erroneously. One of the members stated that: ‘It was all guess work, and our guess was as good as anybody else’s’ (cited in Havinden and Meredith 1993: 282). When they introduced this plan, they soon realized that the original plan was impossible to implement and had to be re-examined. By 1953 it was obvious that it would not alleviate Britain’s oil and fat shortages and would not develop Tanganyika. Due to the misunderstanding of the local conditions, the project completely failed. This kind of failure would be repeated even after the 1960s.

Finally, in the 1950s, the British Empire realized that colonial administration could not bring benefits. They ‘could in most cases get little more economically out of a colonial rule than out of a cooperative postcolonial relationship’ (Cooper 1997: 79). In the 1960s, the colonial empires disintegrated in the decolonization movement and newly independent countries required development aid. In a world where the US was hegemonic, America and international organizations such as the UN and the World
Bank began to conduct development trusteeship instead of the colonial empires.

2. Development Trusteeship by International Organizations since the 1960s

In the 1940s, the British Empire created the theology of development trusteeship and implemented it. This new theology regarded ‘poverty’ as a pathology of target societies and justified social engineering policies including Westernized educational systems, construction of health institutions and development of infrastructure. Even after the colonial empires dissolved, development trusteeship did not disappear. International organizations substituted for the colonial empires in reconstituting the relations of inequality between trustees and target societies and conducting the practices of development trusteeship.

2-1 Emergence of Multilateral Development Systems under US Hegemony

Development Trusteeship by the US

Around the time of the Second World War, the multilateral development system was constructed under US hegemony. Unlike the British Empire, the US had only a few formal colonies. Therefore, they had a different context of development trusteeship. As usually explained, the beginning of the international development system is the Marshall Plan in which $ 12.4 billion was provided to Western Europe by the US from 1948 to 1951. During the Second World War, the US government thought that a dollar shortage of European countries would be a fatal obstacle to the reconstruction of post-war economics. The aid from the US was not only for
the reconstruction of Europe but also for the expansion of US exports (Wood 1986: 35-36). In fact, in February 1948, the *US News and World Report* observed that:

‘The foreign aid program also may promise an easier way of keeping U.S. business active and of getting rid of surpluses. Most industrial orders will be for heavy goods – machinery, trucks, tractors, electrical equipment – a sector of industry that the New Deal never could revive until the war. Foreign outlets for surplus grains and fruit and cotton may prove more effective than relief stamp programs at home.’

(cited in Wood 1986: 36)

As stated above, the British Empire also worried about a dollar shortage. Therefore, they decided to make their colonies dollar earners through their raw material exports to the US. Thus, the British Empire and the US shared common interests in developing the British colonies. Supporting the reconstruction of post-war Europe meant sacrificing Asian and African self-determination. As Robert Wood observes, ‘There were potential dangers from the US point of view in legitimating the European countries’ reliance on their colonies’ (Wood 1986: 48). My point is that the Marshall Plan contributed to the reconstitution of trusteeship.  

In addition to the Marshall Plan, President Truman’s Four Points (1949) was also important because it stipulated the theology of development

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8 It is controversial whether the Marshall Plan facilitated Western Europe’s post-war economic recovery. Recent scholars suggest that there is little evidence to prove the effectiveness of the Marshal Plan (Reichilin 1995: 40). However, this section does not explore this point.
trusteeship. Truman’s Four Points assumed that the Eastern Communist countries were the enemies of the US and suggested four strategies for the Cold War: the first point declared full support for the UN; the second point was to facilitate Western Europe’s economic recovery; the third point suggested the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and the fourth point proposed technical assistance for developing countries. This statement was path-breaking in several respects. First of all, it adopted the adjective ‘underdeveloped’ instead of ‘colonies’ and ‘dependencies.’ ‘Underdeveloped’ implied a more vertical relationship between developed areas and developing areas (Rist 2008: 72-75). Second, although the British Empire sought to provide technical assistance and capital investment to their colonies, this statement suggested not empire-internal but international aid.

Despite the uniqueness of the statement, it shared several characteristics with colonial development. First, this statement demonstrated the same pathologization as colonial development. It stated that:

‘More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.’ (The Inaugural Address of United State president Harry S. Truman, delivered on January 20, 1949: para. 45)

Like the British Empire, the US found ‘poverty’ as the pathology of
developing countries. As in the 1940s, the pathologization based on humanitarian discourse still functioned as the strong justification of development trusteeship. Furthermore, the prescriptions in this statement were not different from those of colonial development: technical assistance and capital investment.

*Emergence of Multilateral Aid Regime*

As Wood (1986: 69) summarizes, ‘The 1950s were a period of the dominance and diversification of bilateral aid programs of the advanced capitalist countries’. On the other hand, ‘The 1960s were marked by the emergence of new forms of multilateralism, largely either under the auspices of, or modeled after, the World Bank’. In 1946, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, so called the World Bank) was founded. The primary objective of this organization was to ‘provide or otherwise stimulate long-term, low-interest-rate loans for reconstruction and for the development of capital-poor areas’ (Oliver 1975). The establishment of the International Development Association (IDA) in the World Bank in 1960 ushered in a multilateral aid era. Before that, developing countries could rarely receive loans from the World Bank because of high market rates. According to Catherine Gwin, ‘IDA activities are confined to a group of 60 “IDA countries” – mainly in Africa and South Asia – which have a low GDP per head’ (Gwin 1997: 205). In the 1950s and 1960s, the number of new independent countries drastically increased and they formed a strong pressure group in the UN. Therefore, their request for the establishment of new development agency was hard to dismiss.

While the establishment of the multilateral aid regime, especially
IDA, embodied the hopes of newly independent countries, it was thought to be a part of security strategy by the US. In the 1960s, the US launched economic development programs in developing countries, especially Latin American countries. In the 1950s Latin American countries ‘made clear the importance of industrialization in the consolidation of democracy and asked the United States to help with a program of economic transition’ (Escobar 1995: 29). However, the US ignored this request. After the US faced various crises of the third world including communist revolutions, it had to change its policy in developing countries. As Michael Latham (2000) argues, the officials and policy makers thought that economic development would weaken the communist forces. In order to help the developing countries fulfill the preconditions of development, the US addressed institutional building and social engineering (Latham 2000: 69f). Thus, the US development policies in the 1960s were based on geopolitical considerations.

In addition to the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was also one of the main actors in the multilateral aid system. Although the establishment of UNDP was in 1966, two organizations which made up the UNDP were created before the 1960s. The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) was established in 1949 and the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) was founded in 1958. The main function of UNDP was not to lend loans but to provide technical assistance to developing countries. They helped with the reconstruction of infrastructure in Macedonia after an earthquake in 1963, supported the creation of the Indian Institute of Technology in 1950s, helped with the construction of a civilian administration in Libya in the 1950s and in Democratic Republic Congo in the 1960s, and ‘established training centres
for civil aviation personnel – from aircraft mechanics to air traffic controllers – in every region of the world’ (Murphy 2006: 83, 85, 93, 94). In addition to UNDP, there are some aid agencies of the UN such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) established in 1945; and the World Health Organization (WHO) founded in 1948.9

Thus, in the 1960s, a new international aid regime was created. While it was based on the requests from developing countries, it was a part of the US security strategy in the Cold War.

2-2 Re-finding Poverty and Enlarging Power since the late 1960s

Thus, the multilateral aid system had demonstrated the continuity of colonialism from the beginning. In the late 1960s, international aid agencies vastly enlarged their power in the development of developing countries. Re-finding the poverty of developing countries was the most important tool to strengthen the power of international aid agencies as in the 1940s.

Re-finding Poverty

Before beginning the analysis of the process in which the international aid agencies enlarged their power, it is better to explore the theology of development trusteeship in the 1950s. In this period, ‘the idea that growth and inequality were inseparable’ was powerful (Ravi 2000: 89). Arthur Lewis presumed that ‘inequality is necessary to generate the surplus required for the accumulation of capital’ (ibid.). Similarly, Simon Kuznets

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9 However, correctly speaking, WHO was not a new organization because it took over the Office International d’Hygiène Publique in Paris (1909) and the League of Nations Health Organization (1923). FAO and WHO have also addressed poverty problems in developing countries.
suggested that growth would lead to income inequality at the first stage in which the population move from the agricultural sector to other sectors, but after this movement was completed, income inequality would fall again. Thus, poverty was not regarded as a main target of the development trusteeship in the 1950s and the early 1960s. International aid agencies presumed that poverty would be resolved by ‘trickle-down effect’ or appropriate income distribution (e.g. UN 1962). Therefore, they sought to increase national income and employment in developing countries.

However, although developing countries recorded impressive economic growth, poverty was not eliminated. This means that the assumption of economists and aid agencies were questionable. Therefore, ‘a group at the newly founded Institute for Development Studies at the University of Sussex, including Dudley Seers, began talking about poverty as part of development’ (Finnemore 1997: 208). Economists and aid agencies offered new observations: that the gap between rural and urban incomes was too large to narrow naturally; that the excessive rates of population growth were a severe obstruction to economic growth and the alleviation of poverty; and that advanced technology contributed not to creation of jobs but to labor saving (Streeten 1979: 29).

The World Bank shifted its approach after Robert S. McNamara was inaugurated as the bank’s president in 1968. The Nairobi Speech, which he delivered in 1973, marked this policy shift. He stated that:

‘I emphasized the need to design development strategies that would bring greater benefits to the poorest groups in the developing countries particularly to the approximately 40% of their populations
who are neither contributing significantly to economic growth nor sharing equitably in economic progress. [...] In the twelve months since our last meeting, we in the Bank have given high priority to further analysis of the problems of poverty in the developing countries and to an evaluation of the policies available for dealing with them.’ (McNamara 1973)

Now, the target of development policy was the poorest groups who could not receive the benefits of economic growth. He acknowledged that economic growth would not resolve poverty problems and distinguished two kinds of poverty: relative poverty and absolute poverty. The latter ‘is a condition of life so degraded by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition, and squalor as to deny its victims basic human necessities’. The alleviation of this kind of poverty should take priority over equality. However, it could not be measured by conventional criteria such as GNP. Therefore, ‘Adopting this kind of a socially oriented measure of economic performance would be an important step in the redesign of development policies’. This new approach was called ‘basic needs approach’ which focused on natural and social needs such as food, habitat, health and education. It was adopted not only by the World Bank but by some UN Organizations (see the 1975 Dag Hammarskjold Report on Development and International Cooperation). The ILO developed this idea in the 1970s with assistance from UN and the World Bank.

Adopting this new policy, McNamara launched a comprehensive reform of the World Bank. First, he drastically enlarged the organization. According to Bereket Selassie, ‘By 1971 the total staff exceeded 2,500, reaching 4,100 five years later and 6,300 by 1981. McNamara’s presidency
was responsible for a sharp increase in the number of the staff—perhaps his greatest impact on the Bank’ (Selassie 1984: 42). Moreover, he sought to increase the volume of Bank lending: while the total loan amount in 1969 was $1,399 million, the amount in 1981 was $8,809 million. Furthermore, the increase of IDA was considerable: the credits amount in 1969 was $385 million, but the amount in 1971 was $3,482 million (see the World Bank 1971, 1981). Lancaster observes that:

‘[A]t least since the McNamara presidency, there has been pressure within the Bank – on individual staff, divisions, and regions – to fulfill notional lending quotas by country and region. This pressure to lend has been especially strong when and where the Bank has sought to expand its lending rapidly’ (Lancaster 1997: 172).

McNamara addressed not only quantitative, but also qualitative reform. As Martha Finnemore observes, ‘He proposed expanding education lending to all levels of education, emphasizing fundamental illiteracy problems as well as more advanced technical training’ (Finnemore 1997: 212). He also highlighted the nutritional and agricultural problems of developing countries. The share of agriculture, rural development and education of total World Bank lending was significantly increased. Agriculture and Rural Development increased from 8.2 percent in 1968 to 30.6 percent in 1981. The share of education also increased 1.2 percent in 1968 to 5.9 percent in 1981 (The World Bank 1981: 12).

*Power of Development Trusteeship*
As stated above, the World Bank enlarged its organization and strengthened its influence on developing countries by increasing lending loans. Although expanding lending loans might be based on humanitarian concern, it contributed to the dependence of some developing countries on international aid. Although the nominal policy target of development trusteeship was socio-economic institutions, it also severely affected socio-political institutions in target societies. These social engineering effects are classified into three categories: (i) pathologization of target societies; (ii) misapplication of standard policy package; and (iii) undemocratic tendency and disempowerment.

(i) A Unilinear Model of Development

James Ferguson (1990) shows that the Thaba-Tseka Development Project by the World Bank and FAO in Lesotho from 1975 to 1984 represented the people and society in Thaba-Tseka district in a different way from their actual status. The World Bank stated that:

‘In spite of the fact that Lesotho is an enclave within highly industrialized South Africa and belongs with that country, Botswana, and Swaziland to the rand monetary area and the Southern African Customs Union, it was then virtually untouched by modern economic development.’ (cited in Ferguson 1990: 25)

The society of Thaba-Tseka was imagined by the World Bank and FAO as a traditional peasant society which had no modern technology and as an independent community totally isolated from large-scale markets. However,
this district was actually ‘a producer of cash crops for the South African market’ and ‘a reservoir exporting wage laborers in about the same quantities, proportionate to total population’ (Ferguson 1990: 27). Target societies were read on a linear scale from tradition (developing) to modernity (developed). According to this unilinear model of development, the international aid agencies, without any detailed social research, pathologized the target societies of development trusteeship.

(ii) Misapplication of Standard Policy Package

Such incorrect representation has sometimes led to the misapplication of standard policy package. The World Bank and FAO conducted a livestock and range management project in which local stock owners were forced to convert to purebred stock and commercial practices. However, ‘livestock is culturally constituted [...] as kind of property that is not to be unnecessarily converted into cash, it is usually sold only in response to dire need or personal emergency’ (Ferguson 1990: 182). Therefore, the local stock owners refused to follow the project. Yet, the aid agencies interpreted this resistance as ignorance due to a lack of education (Ferguson 1990: 186).

Also, the World Bank and FAO sought to switch the local production from ‘subsistence’ crops to cash crops for the market. Therefore, they constructed infrastructure such as roads in expectation that the local community would obtain access to large-scale markets and sell the cash crops to the market. However, they had not been completely isolated from large-scale markets. Roads did not empower local farmers because ‘Instead of providing a channel for the export of agricultural surpluses, the new road
only lowered the price of cheap imported food, making it harder than ever for a local farmer to profitably produce for the market’ (Ferguson 1990: 230).

The aid agencies were likely to prepare a standard policy package before analyzing local society. This kind of mistake can be found in other development cases. The following episode in Zimbabwe is one of the cases.

‘In Zimbabwe, in 1981, I was struck to find local agricultural “development” officials eagerly awaiting the arrival and advice of a highly paid consultant who was to explain how agriculture in Zimbabwe was to be transformed. What, I asked, did this consultant know about Zimbabwe’s agriculture that they, the local agricultural officers, did not? To my surprise, I was told that the individual in question knew virtually nothing about Zimbabwe, and worked mostly in India. “But,” I was assured, “he knows development.”’ (Ferguson 1990: 258)

Wade (1982) also indicates similar mistakes by the development agencies by the analysis of India’s Irrigation Reform by the World Bank and its social impact. According to him, the World Bank’s approach to Indian canal systems did not suit the local environment and did not satisfy the needs of local population. He concluded that:

‘Perhaps the major single weakness of the Bank’s approach is methodological: the package is to be applied more or less uniformly everywhere, with little research being done to match the ingredients against the environments into which they are to be introduced’ (Wade
The Vakolori Irrigation Project in Nigeria in the 1970s was even more disastrous because it caused many casualties. A large scale irrigation project on the river Sokoto was proposed by the FAO in the 1960s. The construction of the dam was conducted from 1975 to 1982 (Adams 1988: 317). Without a socio-economic survey, the contractors carried out the expropriation of farmland to construct canals, drains, roads and service centres. Local farmers lost not only farmland but also village water sources. According to W. M. Adams, ‘In August 1978 the first serious action by farmers complaining about non-payment of compensation occurred’ and ‘In September 1979, [...] confrontations between farmers and the contractor increased’ (Adams 1988: 324). In response to such resistance, the government severely oppressed the local people and caused many casualties.

Thus, the misapplication of standard policy package tended to change the socio-economic institutions of target societies and sometimes led to the suppression of the weak. In some cases, poverty reduction as a main goal was not achieved: on the contrary, the weak were driven into a more difficult situation.

(iii) Undemocratic Tendency and Disempowerment

As colonial trusteeship had affinity with authoritarianism, so too did development trusteeship by the international aid agencies. While the British Empire sought to bolster colonial despotism by advocating development trusteeship, the international aid agencies did not have any formal colonies or overseas territories. Instead, the international aid agencies tended to
strengthen the local undemocratic regimes of developing countries, and to make them economically and politically dependent on international aid.

According to Ferguson (1990: Ch. 7, 236-241), the Thaba-Tseka Development Project contributed to the centralization of Lesotho. At the beginning, the international donors planned to devolve some of the authority to the district level and increase popular participation in decision-making process on development. However, the central government bitterly resisted this plan and prevented it from being realized. On the contrary, by building a road to link Thaba-Tseka from the capital and by helping the establishment of a new district administration, the central government of Lesotho became stronger than before.

Doug Porter (1995) also demonstrated the undemocratic tendency of development trusteeship by analyzing the Zamboanga del Sur Development Project (ZDSDP) which was launched by the Philippine-Australian Development Assistance Programme (PADAP) in 1974. The ZDSDP mid-term evaluation team commented that: ‘it is desirable that centralization of service facilities should be encouraged. [...] It should be an objective of (project) planning to encourage such centralization’ (cited in Porter 1995: 78). Porter observes that:

‘Consequently, the authority of centralized institutions was enhanced, first at the provincial level and logically then nationally through the National Council of Integrated Area Development, then chaired by President Marcos’ (Porter 1995: 78).

Not only Australia but also Japan contributed to the undemocratic regime
under Ferdinand Marcos. In 1986 when the Marcos regime was defeated, the scandal that Marcos had received substantial kickbacks of Japanese loans to the Philippines was uncovered (Lancaster 2007: 123; Potter 1996: 132). Moreover, during the Cold War, the US also provided a lot of aid to the undemocratic regimes in South Vietnam and South Korea to counter the communist parties. Development aid to undemocratic regimes enabled local elites to ignore the welfare of their citizens because necessary resources had not come from their citizens but from international aid agencies. According to William Reno, these phenomena can be found in some African countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo (Reno 1999: and see Lancaster 1999). Thus, development trusteeship has strengthened undemocratic central governments of developing countries.

Moreover, it has made the developing countries economically and politically dependent on international aid. In the 1960s, international aid moved from programme assistance to project aid. The latter required a more specific statement of objectives and led to more precise monitoring and evaluation by the donors. These kinds of project aid demanded a lot of resources from recipient countries. Above all, the recipient countries had to provide local staff as counterparts to aid agencies, and they were required to submit a massive number of reports to donors (Morss 1984; Brautigam and Knack 2004). As a result, the local governments were deprived of their resources to provide basic service to their citizens. Elliot Morss (1984: 468) observes that:

‘the most important difference between development assistance in the 1970s and earlier decades was not the emphasis on the rural poor
and “participatory” approaches but instead the “institutional destruction” effects of donor and project proliferation.’

Thus, development trusteeship has severely changed the local political institutions by strengthening the undemocratic regimes and weakening the recipient governance capacity. Therefore, it has led to the disempowerment of the citizens of the recipient countries.

3. Structural Adjustment and Good Governance in the 1980s and 1990s

In the 1980s, the World Bank and IMF launched structural adjustment when many developing countries, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, faced severe economic crises. Although conditionality had been added to international aid before the 1980s, it was less intrusive than structural adjustment.

The discourse of structural adjustment pathologized African countries by attributing economic crises to domestic politics of African countries. This pathologization underpinned the intrusive policies of the World Bank and IMF. In 1981, the World Bank issued ‘Report on Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action’ (so called ‘Berg Report’), which provided the theoretical foundation of structural adjustment policies. It presumed that ‘domestic policy issues are at the heart of the crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (the World Bank 1981: 121). In this report, the World Bank highlighted internal factors and underestimated external factors. According to it, ‘past trends in the terms of trade cannot explain the slow economic growth of Africa in the 1970s because for most countries [...] the
terms of trade were favorable or neutral’ (*ibid.*: 19). These internal factors meant inefficient economic policies of African countries. Local governments were criticized for wasting limited human and financial resources.

Therefore, as Mosley and Weeks (1993: 1583) observe, ‘The purpose of the policy packages was to remove economically damaging government interventions in markets, especially those for foreign exchange, credit, agricultural commodities, and labor’. Structural adjustment included large-scale institutional reform such as ‘currency devaluation, trade liberalization, deficit reduction, elimination of controls on prices, wages, and interest rates, and a host of other economic policy changes’ (Lancaster 2007: 44). John Williamson, an economist who coined the term ‘Washington Consensus,’ argued that the policy packages of structural adjustment ‘seems to me to be in some sense the economic equivalent of these (hopefully) no-longer-political issues’ (Williamson 1993: 1330). Some theorists considered structural adjustment to be ‘universal convergence’ (*ibid.*: 1329). For them, politics seemed to be an obstacle to efficient economic policies. Williamson argued that ‘political mafia’ had damaged public policies (*ibid.*: 1330). William Clausen, World Bank President during 1980-1986, stated that: ‘the Bank is not a political organization, the only altar we worship at is pragmatic economics’ (cited in Williams and Young 1994: 93). Furthermore, in the preface to the ‘Berg Repot,’ he argued that the policy packages derived not from political and ideological considerations but from considerations of efficiency.

Despite the apolitical rhetoric of the World Bank, according to David Gordon, structural adjustment had implicit political strategy. He argued that: ‘first, gain leverage over recipient governments through the carrot and
stick of conditionality; second, use that leverage to diminish the role of the state; and, third, shift influence over policy decisions from politicians to technocrats’ (Gordon 1996: 1528). Therefore, some African officials resisted the reforms by international aid agencies because they recognized such intrusive policies as a kind of colonialism (Lancaster 1997: 169).

Moreover, structural adjustment was severely criticized for undermining the welfare of vulnerable groups – ‘poor nutrition, less accessible health care, and declining educational opportunities’ (Cornia 1987: 35). As the Berg Report implied, the policy packages of structural adjustment tended to underestimate the importance of basic needs (Loxley 1983: 201). Thus, the discourse of structural adjustment was slightly different from the theology of development trusteeship in the 1960s in that the former focused on economic efficiency and growth rather than poverty. However, the discursive structure of pathologization and prescriptions was still reproduced.

In the late 1980s as the Cold War ended, the Western countries began to pathologize not only the economic policies but also the governance of developing countries. As David Williams and Tom Young (1994: 89) observe, ‘whether it was viewed as a success or a failure the experience of adjustment lending led the Bank to take account of political factors such as interest group pressure and government legitimacy as somehow important’. The World Bank report, *Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, argued that:

‘Underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance. [...] Because countervailing power has been lacking,
state officials in many countries have served their own interests without fear of being called to account. In self-defense individuals have built up personal networks of influence rather than hold the all-powerful state accountable for its systemic failures. In this way politics becomes personalized, and patronage becomes essential to maintain power.’ (The World Bank 1989: 60-61)

This report acknowledged ‘poverty’ as an important problem of development unlike the ‘Berg Report.’ It admitted that: ‘The economic crisis of the early 1980s diverted attention from basic needs programs. This was a mistake; every effort should be made to protect basic needs expenditures in times of recession’ (The World Bank 1989: 45).

This new pathologization led to the idea ‘good governance’ as a new conditionality. The US added demands for multiparty elections and democratization in exchange for aid (Harrison 2004: 21; Lancaster 2007: 84). Although the World Bank was reluctant to address governance reform, they adopted ‘good governance’ as a new approach, recognizing that effective public institutions for markets were important for economic growth (Craig and Porter 2003: 57). As Lancaster observes, ‘They did not push any particular types of political organization – like democracy’ (Lancaster 1997: 187). However, they demanded accountability, transparency, and the rule of law as the conditions of aid projects. As Mick Moore (1995: 94) argues, ‘At the ideological level, the emphasis placed by donors on the inadequacy of the governance arrangements of aid recipients comes close to a denial of the assumption of the fundamentally equal status of all states in the international state system’.
Since the 1980s, development trusteeship has become more intrusive than ever. However, as this chapter showed, development trusteeship had already conducted social engineering policies since the late 1960s. Furthermore, when the discourse of poverty reconstituted development trusteeship in the late 1960s, the international aid regime established a solid foundation for its power.

**Conclusion**

This chapter explored how development trusteeship emerged and developed and what role humanitarian discourse played in this process. During the Second World War, the legitimacy of colonial trusteeship was challenged. Using the discourse on poverty, the British Empire re-pathologized colonized societies and, as a result, development trusteeship emerged. In this period, ‘poverty’ was considered to be unignorable human suffering. In this sense, the discourse on poverty was a kind of humanitarian discourse. After the Second World War, hegemonic transition from the British Empire to the US changed the regime of development trusteeship. Due to the dissolution of the colonial empires, development trusteeship was established between developed countries and developing countries. In the 1960s, a multilateral aid regime emerged because of pressure from the Third World and the security strategy of the US. Despite the transformation of the regime, the discourse of poverty enlarged the power of international aid agencies, as in the 1940s. Developing countries were re-pathologized as suffering from poverty. Although international aid agencies have sometimes
failed to grasp the nature of target societies, this pathologization justified social engineering policies for recipient countries. These policies tended to affect the socio-political institutions of target societies. Both intentionally and unintentionally, development trusteeship tended to strengthen undemocratic governments of developing countries and sometimes weakened the basic capacity of the governments of recipient countries.
As previous chapters showed, colonial and development trusteeship and humanitarianism were mutually constitutive. This chapter will argue that peacebuilding trusteeship after the Cold War was also in part constituted by humanitarianism and moreover that humanitarianism was to some extent affected by the power structure of international society.

As stated in Ch. 1 of this study, a fundamental debate relating to peacebuilding concerns its ‘paradigm’ (Paris 1997) or ‘framework’ (Richmond 2009). Paris and some other theorists argue that the conduct of peacebuilding operations has been shaped by liberal internationalism. The notion of liberal internationalism assumes that internal and international peace ought to be based on ‘a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy’ (e.g. Paris 1997: 56; Heathershaw 2008). In practice, many mandates of peacebuilding operations called on international peacebuilders to construct liberal democratic institutions such as multi-party systems. While it is controversial whether liberal internationalism is appropriate as the ‘paradigm’ or ‘framework’ of peacebuilding, not only supporters of liberal peacebuilding but also its critics presume that peacebuilding operations have embodied liberal internationalism (e.g. Lidén, MacGinty and Richmond 2009; Richmond 2009: 560-561; Pugh 2004: 47-48).

However, this chapter will indicate that peacebuilding trusteeship was likely to be underpinned and constituted not just by liberal internationalism but by humanitarianism, in particular, when international peacebuilders were provided with governing functions. ‘Failed states,’ ‘civil wars,’ and ‘genocide’ were considered to be unignorable human suffering in
the post-Cold War era. These notions formed the new pathology and led to new prescriptions such as responsibility to protect (R2P), human security, and liberal peacebuilding. In practice, the authority of international peacebuilders has often been underpinned by humanitarian discourse, although humanitarianism has been affected by geopolitical considerations.

The first half of this chapter will map out the discourse of peacebuilding trusteeship. The discourse of new pathologization is composed of various representations such as ‘failed states,’ ‘civil wars,’ and ‘genocide.’ They are interpreted as internal to southern countries and linked to the ‘new barbarism’ (Duffield 2001: 109-121). The root causes of these problems are found in the tribalism, ethnicity, indigenous culture, and unique political economic systems of southern countries. The second half of this chapter will turn to practice. It will indicate that, in practice, peacebuilding trusteeship has been rooted not only in liberal internationalism but also humanitarianism. This chapter will focus mainly on the cases of Cambodia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The name ‘new trusteeship’ has been applied to these cases because international peacebuilders exercised executive and legislative authority. As these regimes of peacebuilding trusteeship were undemocratic, international peacebuilders needed to justify them by humanitarian discourse.

1. Theology of Peacebuilding Trusteeship after the Cold War

The theorization of peacebuilding trusteeship was inaugurated in the late 1990s. However, the pathologization of southern countries began in the early 1990s. Some southern countries were represented as ‘failed states,’
‘collapsed states,’ and ‘fragile states.’ Civil conflict was considered to be a cause and effect of state failure. It was called ‘new wars’ and interpreted as the pre-modern form of fighting by some commentators. Moreover, the root causes of these conflicts were attributed to the tribalism, ethnicity, indigenous culture, and unique political economic systems of southern countries. This new pathologization led to new prescriptions such as liberal peacebuilding. These prescriptions were contradictory to the principle of sovereign equality. Hence, some theorists and practitioners tried to deconstruct the sovereignty of southern countries by humanitarian discourse.

1·1 New Pathologization: ‘Failed States’ and ‘New Wars’

‘Failed States’

Since the late 1980s, the notion of ‘weak states,’ ‘quasi states,’ ‘failed states,’ and ‘collapsed states’ has been used to represent some southern countries. As well as researchers of development studies, IR theorists tend to use these terms when they analyze developing countries. The meanings of these terms are so varied that they cannot be used as a coherent analytical framework. However, these notions constituted new pathologies of peacebuilding trusteeship.

As Jonathan Hill states, ‘Despite differences between these works [on ‘failed states’] in focus and emphasis, they are united by a variety of shared assumptions’ (Hill 2005: 139). One of the main assumptions is related to governing functions of sovereign states. When theorists use terms such as ‘failed states,’ they predetermine the main functions of sovereign states and argue that some developing countries fail to fulfill these functions (Jackson...
Although there exists no consensus about the main functions of sovereign states, theorists, who use the terms such as ‘failed states,’ tend to problematize human suffering in ‘failed states.’ For example, Robert Jackson, in his book *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, states that:

‘Every government can guarantee [human] rights at least in principle because it requires only responsible and resolute conduct. Failure to protect human rights accordingly is misconduct and indefensible everywhere. [...] Since most Third World states are not only underdeveloped but also authoritarian and therefore unconstrained domestically, they are inclined to deny human rights. Serious and frequent human rights violations are not likely to occur in successful democracies.’ (Jackson 1990: 46)

He identifies human rights protection as a duty of sovereign states and argues that many Third World states (‘quasi-states’) have failed to fulfill this function (also see Jackson 2000: 296). In his book, *Collapsed States: the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, William Zartman (1995: 5) argues that ‘[collapsed states] can no longer perform the functions required for them to pass as states’ and that ‘the basic functions’ of the state include decision-making, legislation, and maintenance of social order. Although this definition does not refer to human rights, Francis Deng, in the same book, claims that:
‘the collapse of the state is associated with humanitarian tragedies resulting from armed conflict, communal violence, and gross violations of human rights that culminate in the massive outflow of refugees and internal displacement of the civilian populations.’ (Deng 1995: 207)

In the early 1990s, ‘failed states’ was considered to be a kind of humanitarian crisis. Similarly, Jean-Germain Gros (1996) highlights human suffering in ‘failed states’ in order to confirm the seriousness of ‘failed states.’ At the beginning of his article, he states that:

‘Whether it be ethnic genocide in Rwanda, its cleansing counterpart in the Balkans, anarchy in Somalia, or Haitian “boat people” heading towards south Florida, events in failed states cannot be ignored at least not long before calls, faxes and electronic communications urging politicians to “do something” start pouring in.’ (Gros 1996: 455)

These theorists ask why these countries failed. Zartman and Gros suggest similar scenarios of state failure. According to them, at first, a regime loses ‘its ability to satisfy the demands of various groups in society’ (Zartman 1995: 8) because it failed to achieve economic growth or because population growth damaged environmental conditions (Gros 1996: 460-464). It would deepen the ethnic divisions of this society (Gross 1996: 464-465). While the regime would oppress the opposition groups due to its authoritarianism and militarism, it could not develop its resources to unify
the society (Zartman 1995: 8). Finally, this state would collapse and the state of anarchy would emerge. Jackson argues that, although Third World countries had little capacity for self-government and did not actually constituted nations, the right to self-determination and decolonization movement allowed them to become independent states (Jackson 1990: 40-47). These theorists attributed the causes of state failure mainly to internal factors of southern countries.

The notion of ‘failed states’ was used in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report and some literatures by the members of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). For example, according to R2P, the first principle for military intervention is: ‘large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation’ (ICISS 2001: xii). Writing in 1994, Gareth Evans, foreign minister of Australia from 1988 to 1996 and co-chair of the ICISS, analyzed Third World countries by using the notion of ‘failed states’ and stated the following:

“Throughout what has been called the “zone of conflict,” which includes the former communist states, much of sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Central and Latin America and South Asia, a downward spiral of economic decline, often exacerbated by official corruption and mismanagement, has created governments that are at or near the point of collapse and that are being challenged, often violently, by their own citizens. Economic decline has hastened the process of national disintegration, and vice versa. The combination has led in
extreme cases to the “failed state” syndrome evident in Rwanda, Somalia, and elsewhere.’ (Evans 1994)

As shown later, the deconstruction of sovereignty by the ICISS and other theorists and practitioners was premised on the notion of ‘failed states.’

The UN has not explicitly employed the term ‘failed states’ or ‘collapsed states,’ but it has problematized the collapse of state institutions. Boutros-Ghali’s *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* (1995) states that:

> ‘[One of the features of civil conflicts] is the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos. Not only are the functions of government suspended, its assets are destroyed or looted and experienced officials are killed or flee the country.’ (Boutros-Ghali 1995: para. 13)

Thus, the notion of ‘failed states’ has been used by many theorists and practitioners.

‘*New Wars*’

According to the accounts of ‘failed states,’ civil conflicts would occur during and after the process of state failure. These are considered to be both the cause and effect of state failure. In the same report, Boutros-Ghali states that: ‘One is the fact that so many of today’s conflicts are within States rather than between States’ (*ibid.*: para 10). ‘New war’ is another key term of new pathologization. Various scholars such as Donald Snow, Mary Kaldor,
and Chris Allen call civil conflicts after the Cold War ‘new wars’ and link them to ‘failed states’ (Snow 1996: 93-119; Kaldor 1999: 91; Allen 1999: 379-380). As in the case of ‘failed states,’ each theorist does not hold the same line of argument. However, it is possible to generalize the characteristics of ‘new wars’ because theories on ‘new wars’ share some arguments. First, in ‘new wars,’ the distinction between combatants and civilians is blurred. Because of state collapse, combatants are poorly organized. Private armies and warlords are fighting, in addition to the (ex-) national army. Second, they deliberately target civilians. Therefore, civilian casualties are increasing as a proportion of all casualties in conflict. Third, warfare tends to be brutal. Mutilation, torture, and rape are used as tactics. Fourth, the conflicting parties rarely have a political ideology. Instead, combatants are likely to be mobilized by religion or ethnic nationalism.

Some commentators interpret these characteristics of ‘new wars’ as ‘new barbarism.’ Robert D. Kaplan argues in his article ‘The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet,’ as follows:

‘West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and social stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real ‘strategic’ danger [...] throughout West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world: the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war [...] [In Africa] the threat is more elemental: nature unchecked.’  (Kaplan 1994: 5, 10)
He considers conflicts, anarchy, and violence to be the irrational and criminal response to environmental and economic pressures such as overpopulation and epidemic. He implicitly suggests dichotomies between civilization/barbarism, society/anarchy, and Western countries/African countries. This essentialism was shared by Michel Ignatieff, one of the R2P report authors. He explores civil wars in the 1990s in his book, *Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and Modern Conscience* (1998). He argues that laws of war (international humanitarian law), which seek to protect fundamental human rights, were created in modern Europe, and that non-European societies do not respect these laws. He identifies as the most serious problem of civil conflicts how to teach Islamic extremists to respect international humanitarian law. He states that contemporary civil wars are becoming more savage than before (Ignatieff 1998: 109-163). The cruel nature of ‘new wars’ is attributed to the nature of Islamic extremism. Contemporary civil wars are placed on the boundaries of Western civilization. These discourses form the ‘new barbarism’ account. Duffield criticizes it, as follows:

‘new barbarism tends to emphasize one aspect of this racial discourse: the notion of a primordial, innate and irrational cultural and ethnic identity [...] For new barbarism, the anarchic and destructive power of traditional feeling and antagonisms is usually unleashed in times of change when overarching political or economic systems are either weakened or collapse. (Duffield 2001: 110).

Other theorists see ‘new wars’ not as a reversion to barbarism nor as
essentially irrational, but as a rational response to changing economic conditions since the 1980s (Keen 1998; Reno 1998; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Allen 1999; Kaldor 2001). In the 1980s, economic crises began in developing and post-communist countries. In communist countries, the highly planned economy tended to fail. As the state structures of these countries gradually weakened, competition over resources became intense. Similarly, many developing countries faced debt crises because of the failure of development policies and the loss of Cold War sponsorship. Structural adjustments undermined the fragile state structures of these countries. Finally, the patron-client relations which supported central governments collapsed. Various political actors such as warlords sought to secure exportable natural resources and sometimes challenged central governments. Ethnic and religious identities were exploited to recruit the population into militias. This kind of explanation argues that ‘new wars’ are rooted to the nature of the regimes of developing countries and the dark side of globalization. Conflict, even its brutality, is interpreted as the rational tactics of political actors in developing and post-communist countries.

Thus, ‘failed states’ and ‘new wars’ were considered to be new pathologies of southern countries in the post-Cold War era. Southern countries were represented as anarchical, violent, and brutal, whether or not commentators saw these pathologies as rational response to the changing conditions after the Cold War. Human suffering, caused by conflicts, violence, and anarchy, was considered to be a grave symptom. As this chapter will show, both ‘new barbarism’ accounts and ‘rational response’ accounts agree that new trusteeship tends to alleviate this kind of human suffering. This discourse of new pathologization was similar to the discourse of colonial
trusteeship in the 19th century. As Ch. 2 and 3 of this study showed, ‘anarchy,’ which was characterized by violence and savagism, formed the pathologies of Indian and African societies in the 19th century. Thus, new pathologization after the Cold War demonstrated a similar structure to pathologization in the 19th century.

1·2 New Prescriptions

*New Trusteeship*

In the 1990s, as human suffering in ‘failed states’ and ‘new wars’ was pathologized, new trusteeship in which external actors such as the UN govern target societies was proposed as a prescription by some theorists and practitioners. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner (1992-1993: 7) insist that: ‘the emergence of additional failed states suggests the need for a more systematic and intrusive approach.’ They propose three options: governance assistance, delegation of governmental authority, and direct U.N. trusteeship (*ibid.*: 12-18). The first option is a kind of development policy and less intrusive than other options. The second option, delegation of governmental authority, would be applied to ‘those states that have already failed’. In this scheme, local societies would delegate certain governmental functions to the UN and have a veto on decision-making. Helman and Ratner see PKO in Cambodia as an example of this scheme. In the last option, ‘local authorities would turn over power to the United Nations and follow its orders, rather than retaining a veto’. This scheme would be applied to ‘failed states.’ However, new trusteeship seems to be inconsistent with the principle of the sovereign equality. Helman and Ratner argue that ‘failed states’ cause serious human misery and that only new trusteeship could alleviate this
kind of humanitarian crisis. In this study, the second and third options can be identified as new trusteeship, while the first as development trusteeship.

Not only Helman and Ratner, various commentators, who analyze ‘failed states’ and ‘new wars,’ justify new trusteeship as a prescription (Krauthammer 1992; Lyon 1993; Mazrui 1994; Pfaff 1995). They argue that ‘failed states’ could not be ignored because of human suffering and that new trusteeship by the UN or developed countries would be the most effective option to reconstruct the existing anarchical condition of ‘failed states.’ It is presumed that some (post-) conflict societies do not have an ability to manage their own government and parliament.

Why should post-conflict societies be governed by international peacebuilders such as the UN? Why would assistance for elections without transitional administration be an inappropriate option? Some theorists argue that democracy would be harmful to post-conflict societies. Analyzing ‘collapsed states’ in Africa, Marina Ottaway concludes that:

‘[democratization] encourages the conflicts that exist in a collapsing state to manifest themselves freely, but without the restraint of the checks and balances, and of agreement on the basic rules, that regulate conflict and make it manageable in a well-established democratic system.’ (Ottaway 1995: 235)

Roland Paris also argues that ‘democratization and marketization are inherently tumultuous transformations that have the potential to undermine a fragile peace’ (Paris 2004: 7). According to him, before liberal democratization of post-conflict societies, international peacebuilders should
establish ‘effective administration over the territory’ (IBL approach) (*ibid*.: 187). This includes a constitutional court, a reliable police force, electoral rules, the legal framework for a market economy, and other liberal socio-political systems (*ibid*.: 205). In his scheme, until local conditions are ready for elections, international peacebuilders would administrate the territory. In other words, the construction of liberal democratic systems requires undemocratic political arrangements. Gareth Evans, who wrote the R2P report with Ignatieff, also supports Paris’ IBL approach (Evans 2008: 160-163).

This prescription is premised on the notions of ‘failed states’ and ‘new wars.’ As Charles Call (2008: 1504) observes, the idea of ‘failed states’ implies that ‘state and state institutions were rediscovered’ by theorists and practitioners. The destruction of state institutions provides the urgency for new trusteeship. In the introduction of *At War’s End*, referring to Kaplan’s *the Ends of the Earth*, Paris states that: ‘From Africa to Central Asia, internecine violence and collapsing states became an unfortunate but familiar feature of the post-Cold War political landscape’ (Paris 2004: 1). Moreover, following Snow (1996) and Ignatieff (1997), Paris recognizes ‘the revival of “premodern” forms of fighting’ as a serious problem in the 1990s (*ibid*.: 1). This implies that he might share essentialism with Kaplan and Ignatieff.

Other theorists, who criticize the essentialism of the ‘new barbarism’ account, also tend to support new trusteeship. For example, although Kaldor sees that new trusteeship has a difficult problem regarding legitimacy, she justifies international protectorate as an effective political arrangement for (post-) conflict societies such as Bosnia because local civil societies could not
develop in the places where gangs and warlords control security sector (Kaldor 1999: Ch. 6). According to her, elections should be preceded by the reconstruction of rule of law. Otherwise, extreme nationalists would seize the government by elections and violence. She counters the essentialism of the ‘new barbarism’ account by proposing political economic analysis of ‘new wars,’ but she does not deny the necessity of new trusteeship. Similarly, in his essay on ‘new wars,’ Edward Newman accepts the possibility that new trusteeship is unavoidable (Newman 2004: 187).

As Ch. 2 of this study discussed, in the 19th century, British intellectuals and colonial administrators argued that democracy would cause anarchy in India and that benevolent despotism by civilized nations would be necessary. Similarly, in the late 20th century, some theorists on ‘failed states,’ ‘new wars,’ and peacebuilding argued that the introduction of democracy would be harmful to post-conflict societies and that new trusteeship would be an effective political arrangement for post-conflict societies.

Re-examining Sovereignty

However, after decolonization, new trusteeship could not be easily justified because this political arrangement was inconsistent with the principle of the sovereign equality. Therefore, in the early 1990s, theorists and practitioners began to reexamine the idea of sovereignty. The R2P report is one of the most important literatures. According to Gareth Evans, some new theories on sovereignty and security paved the way for the idea of R2P (Evans 2008: 32-37): ‘the right to intervene,’ ‘human security,’ ‘sovereignty as responsibility,’ and ‘individual sovereignty.’
(i) The Right to Intervene

In 1987, the notion of ‘the right to intervene’ (droit d’ingerence) was proposed by Bernard Kouchner, who was co-founder of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and would serve as the first UN Representative in Kosovo. When he worked for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Biafra during the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), he saw numerous Biafrans killed by deliberate starvation. The Red Cross kept neutral and was reluctant to interfere in local politics. Kouchner was shocked by this response to the situation and decided to break with the ICRC (Allen and Styan 2000: 829). As Cornelio Sommaruga, President of ICRC from 1987 to 1999, argues, ‘Humanitarian action is not designed to resolve conflict but to protect human dignity and to save lives’ (Somaruga 1997: 184). This traditional approach of the ICRC seeks to prevent humanitarianism from underpinning trusteeship by avoiding pathologization of conflict societies. However, Kouchner criticized it for ignoring mass murder. Hence, his new approach focused not only on humanitarian assistance but also on political solutions. The notion of ‘the right to intervene’ aimed to redefine the implementation of political solutions to humanitarian crises as a legal right. As Kaldor (2007: 25) states, ‘he was able to promote his ideas in the United Nations, and after the Gulf War pushed for the droit d’ingerence to help the Kurds in northern Iraq’. However, as Evans observes, ‘the concept remained so inherently one-sided, not in any way acknowledging the anxieties of those in the global South who had all too often been the beneficiaries of missions civilisatrices in the past’ (Evans 2008: 33).
(ii) Human Security

The concept of ‘human security’ was suggested in the Human Development Report 1994 by the UNDP. The idea of ‘human security’ sought to make individual human suffering a fundamental issue of security. It was presumed that issues of state security had dominated international relations; therefore, individual human suffering was likely to be separated from security issues. Human security implies that political solutions should be applied to human suffering and that these political solutions include new trusteeship. *The Final Report of the Commission on Human Security 2003* suggested the idea of ‘responsibility to rebuild’ in post-conflict societies (which was originally proposed in the R2P report). It gave a top priority to ‘establishing institutions that protect people and uphold the rule of law’ (*The Commission on Human Security 2003*: 68). Kaldor also argues that ‘institution-building, including the rule of law’ is one of the human security policies (*Kaldor* 2007: 194).

(iii) Sovereignty as Responsibility

The notion of ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ was proposed by Francis Deng, former Sudanese diplomat and the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons from 1992 to 2004, with other colleagues at the Brookings Institution such as William Zartman. This notion claimed that (i) sovereignty is accompanied by responsibilities for the population; (ii) if governments fail to preserve life-sustaining standards for citizens, they should call for help and the international community must provide assistance; (iii) if governments do not discharge the responsibility and refuse the involvement of international community, the responsibility...
would be transferred to the international community and, in this case, international organizations ought to intervene in the countries. The idea of ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ was premised on the notions of ‘failed states’ and ‘new wars.’ In *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*, they state that:

> ‘The premise is that internal conflicts are the principal source of human suffering, gross violations of human rights, and massive destruction of civilian lives and productive capacity. [...] Those who suffer the humanitarian consequences of conflict fall into a moral vacuum left by the state’s failure, deliberate or imposed, to fulfill its normal responsibilities.’ (Deng et al. 1996: xii)

This argument was important for new trusteeship because it sought to reconstruct sovereignty, in particular, of southern countries, although they did not argue about new trusteeship.

(iv) Individual Sovereignty

Reconstruction of sovereignty had already been suggested by some theorists and practitioners before Sovereignty as Responsibility and R2P were proposed. In the Report of the Secretary General (1991), Javier Perez de Cuellar stated that:

> ‘The principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or systematically
violated with impunity. [...] [This principle] would only be weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty, even in this day and age, includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the name of controlling civil strife or insurrection.’ (1991: 12)

His successor, Boutros-Ghali, also advocated re-examining sovereignty because ‘The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, [...] has passed; its theory was never matched by reality’ (UN 1992: para. 17). He stated that: ‘It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world’ (ibid.). Robert Cohen, who later joined the Brookings group, wrote in 1991, that ‘sovereignty carries with it a responsibility on the part of governments to protect their citizens’ (Cohen 1991: 17).

The idea of ‘Individual Sovereignty’ by Kofi Annan also aimed to reconstruct sovereignty. His article in *Economist* proposed two concepts of sovereignty. It stated that:

‘State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not least by the forces of globalization and international cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty – by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and subsequent
international treaties – has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of human rights. When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.’

(Annan 1999: 49-50)

Thus, he opposed ‘Individual Sovereignty’ (human rights) to ‘State Sovereignty.’

(v) Responsibility to Protect

As these reports showed, in the late 1990s, the dilemma of humanitarian intervention was considered to be a big issue. Therefore, Annan made an appeal for international consensus about humanitarian intervention. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established by the Canadian government in 2000 to answer this appeal. The final report of the commission was written by three members of the commission: Gareth Evans (Co-chair), Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur (Bellamy 2009: 38). The R2P is based on the redefinition of sovereignty as responsibility (ICISS 2001: 13). Like Sovereignty as Responsibility by Deng et al, it argues that sovereign states have responsibility to protect their citizens from a devastating catastrophe such as mass murder, ethnic cleansing, rape, massive displacement and genocide, and that if they fail or refuse to protect their population, the responsibility would be transferred to international society.

The R2P report is important for peacebuilding trusteeship because it aims to construct the legitimacy of peacebuilding trusteeship by defining
post-intervention obligations as ‘responsibility to rebuild.’ It justified transitional administration of ‘failed states’ under UN authority by separating it from colonial trusteeship. How different are they? The ICISS claims that: "failed states" are quite likely to generate situations which the international community simply cannot ignore' (ICISS 2001: 43). According to them, humanitarian crises and security problems, which ‘failed states’ would cause, can justify transitional administration. They presume that transitional administration was different from colonial trusteeship in terms of humanitarianism. Furthermore, they suggest that: ‘the suspension of the exercise of sovereignty is only de facto for the period of the intervention and follow-up, and not de jure’ (ICISS 2001: 44). According to them, while trusteeship is accompanied with the violation of de jure sovereignty of target societies, transitional administration was not. However, this claim means that the sovereignty of ‘failed states’ could be manipulated by interveners. In their theory, failed states do not have de facto sovereignty because they failed to fulfill their responsibility. At this moment, the failed states lose their de jure sovereignty. However, when external actors begin peacebuilding operations and assume de facto sovereignty, the failed states suddenly regain de jure sovereignty. In sum, while states lose de jure sovereignty if they are regarded as ‘failed states’ by international society, the failed states can regain de jure sovereignty as long as the interveners exercise de facto sovereignty. It means that the sovereignty of target societies can be manipulated by powerful interveners. As Mamdani argues, “the responsibility to protect” is a right to punish [“failed” or “rogue” states] but without being held accountable – a clarion call for the recolonization of “failed” states in Africa’ (Mamdani 2009: 300).
Annan adopted the idea of R2P into his report ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’ (2005). It states that:

‘I urge Heads of State and Government to [...] Embrace the “responsibility to protect” as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and agree to act on this responsibility, recognizing that this responsibility lies first and foremost with each individual State, whose duty it is to protect its population, but that if national authorities are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect civilian populations, and that if such methods appear insufficient the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter, including enforcement action, if so required.’ (Annan 2005: 22)

Thus, the idea of R2P influenced the policy discourse of the Secretary General. Furthermore, in 2005, *World Summit Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly* also adopted R2P. In addition, *the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of the UN* (2004) redefined sovereignty as responsibility to protect the welfare of its own peoples (UN 2004: para. 29).

*Lessons’ from the Rwandan War*

Those who support new trusteeship have often referred to ‘lessons
from Rwanda.’ ‘Rwanda’ means that the UN failed to protect Tutsi and pro-peace Hutu during the Rwandan War in 1994. It is repeatedly invoked to argue for Darfur, Libya, and other cases. Some theorists, policy makers, and humanitarian aid agencies sought to draw several lessons from the Rwandan case.

The first lesson from this war, which pro-intervention theorists insist on, is that ‘genocide’ in progress can be stopped only by humanitarian intervention. Kouchner seeks to underpin the idea ‘right to intervention’ by highlighting mass murder such as in Rwanda. He states that:

‘Can we dream of 21st century where the horrors of the 20th will not be repeated? Where Auschwitz or the mass exterminations that took place in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge and later in Rwanda and Kosovo cannot happen again? The answer is a hopeful yes—if, as part of the emergent world order, a new morality can be codified in the “right to intervention” against abuses of national sovereignty.’

(Kouchner 1999: 4)

Similarly, the R2P report argues that only intervention could prevent the recurrence of ethnic cleansing such as in Rwanda. It claims that:

‘We want no more Rwandas, and we believe that the adoption of the proposals in our report is the best way of ensuring that. […] The most compelling task now is to work to ensure that when the call goes out to the community of states for action, that call will be answered. There must never again be mass killing or ethnic cleansing. There
must be no more Rwandas.’ (ICISS 2001: viii, 70)

However, as Mamdani argues, France and the US had intervened in Rwanda. The former created a safe zone and the latter supported the Tusti-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (Mamdani 2009: 67). Moreover, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda had operated to aid the implementation of the Arusha Accords since 1993. Pro-new trusteeship theorists insist that larger scale intervention should have been conducted during this war.

The second lesson is drawn by humanitarian aid agencies. According to Barnett, ‘For the aid world, there is before Rwanda and after Rwanda’ (Barnett 2011: 213). Some aid agencies began to create the uniform standards of humanitarian action in order to improve the quality of the assistance. Sphere was an example of this movement. Originally, Sphere means Standards Project for Humanitarian Relief. According to Peter Walker and Susan Pardin (2004: 104), ‘many of the initiators of Sphere were involved in the Rwanda [multi-donor] evaluation.’ It is considered to be a catalyst for the birth of Sphere. This project aims to ‘elaborate technical standards, which agencies should seek to implement’ (ibid).

Other aid agencies reexamined the neutral principle of humanitarian assistance. For example, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) had to redirect their strategy after the Rwandan war because many members of CRS had operated in Rwanda. As Barnett observes, ‘CRS began to move toward a position that involved tackling the root causes of injustice and the violation of human rights that are essential for human dignity’ (Barnett 2011: 203-204). Like CRS, some humanitarian NGOs such as CARE became engaged in peacebuilding trusteeship (ibid: 198-212).
The third lesson is related to the use of force in peacebuilding trusteeship. Some theorists and practitioners argue that, even after the conclusion of peace agreements, international peacebuilders ought to use their force to prevent ‘spoilers’ from breaking agreements. Since 1999, the UN had examined the lessons from Rwanda in various reports such as ‘Report of the Secretary-general to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ (S/1999/957), ‘Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda’ (S/1999/1257), and ‘Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects’ (so called, ‘the Brahimi Report’) (A/55/305–S/2000/809). The Brahimi Report argues that:

‘In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so. Genocide in Rwanda went as far as it did in part because the international community failed to use or to reinforce the operation then on the ground in that country to oppose obvious evil.’ (Article 50)

This report suggests that ‘mandates should specify an operation’s authority to use force. It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly, but able to pose a credible deterrent threat’ (Article 51). According to this report, peacekeeping operation has become a ‘complex operation’ in which ‘peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining’. The employment of force would be required in a complex operation even after the
conclusion of peace agreements because ‘spoilers’ might break peace agreements. This recommendation seems to be inconsistent with the neutrality principle of traditional PKO. The ‘genocide’ of the Rwandan War is mentioned to justify it.

The Rwandan War offered several ‘lessons’ to theorists, policy makers, and aid agencies. Despite the differences between these ‘lessons,’ they indicate that humanitarianism tended to underpin peacebuilding trusteeship after the Rwandan War.

1-3 After 9/11: New Trusteeship and Geopolitics

This section has explored the theology of new trusteeship, in particular, in the 1990s. The theology of new trusteeship was composed of the notions of ‘failed states,’ ‘new wars,’ ‘responsibility to protect,’ and other humanitarian discourses. Those elements of the theology focused on human suffering and violence in southern countries. Some theorists argued that some southern countries returned to ‘barbarism’ because of ‘state failure’ and ‘new wars.’ Other theorists, criticizing the essentialism of this ‘new barbarism’ account, sought to analyze the political and economic mechanism of civil conflicts in the 1990s. Although their approaches were different, they jointly constituted new pathology of southern countries. ‘Failed states’ and ‘new wars’ were considered to be central causes of humanitarian crises. This pathologization led to new trusteeship as a prescription. It was argued that the introduction of democracy would be harmful to post-conflict societies because it would cause conflicts without functional state institutions. Therefore, international peacebuilders should administrate post-conflict societies until liberal state institutions are constructed. Although this
administration would be temporal, it is likely to be undemocratic and inconsistent with the principle of sovereign equality. Therefore, many theorists and practitioners sought to redefine sovereignty, in particular, of southern countries according human rights. In their discourse, sovereign states have responsibility to protect their citizens from human suffering such as mass murder, ethnic cleansing, and rape. If they could not discharge this responsibility, they would be deprived of their sovereignty. In this case, international peacebuilders could administrate these countries and construct liberal state institutions. As stated in previous chapters, humanitarianism tended to constitute colonial trusteeship in the 19th and 20th century. Similarly, after the Cold War, humanitarianism contributed to the constitution of new trusteeship.

The discourse which was explored above was rooted in humanitarianism. However, after 9/11, ‘failed states’ were represented as threats to the security of Western countries and therefore new trusteeship was supported by geopolitical concern. British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw stated in his speech in 2002, as follows:

‘For as well as bringing mass murder to the heart of Manhattan, state failure has brought terror and misery to large swathes of the African continent, as it did in the Balkans in the early 1990s. And at home it has long brought drugs, violence and crime to Britain’s streets.

State failure can no longer be seen as a localized or regional issue to be managed simply on an ad hoc, case by case basis. We have to develop a more coherent and effective international response
which utilizes all of the tools at our disposal, ranging from aid and humanitarian assistance to support for institution building.’

The US National Security Strategy of 2002 stated that: ‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones’ (The US 2005: Ch. 1). Not only policy discourse but also theoretical discourse tended to change. For example, Francis Fukuyama argued that failed states have become sources not only of poverty and human rights abuses, but also refugees and terrorism (Fukuyama 2005: 125). As Morten Boas and Kathleen Jennings observe, ‘failed states [...] are characterized by an inability to control territory, borders, and internal legal order and security, and lack the capacity or will to provide services to the citizenry’ (Boas and Jennings 2007: 477). Therefore, these countries such as Afghanistan were considered to be a hotbed of terrorists. As Duffield argues, state-building was employed as a part of the Western strategy which aimed to contain immigrants, refugees, and terrorists in southern countries (Duffield 2007: 198-200). Thus, after 9/11, the geopolitical concern of Western countries supported new trusteeship which was constituted by humanitarianism in the 1990s.

2. Practice of Peacebuilding Trusteeship after the Cold War

This section explores practice of peacebuilding trusteeship by analyzing the cases of Cambodia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Cambodia was the first case in which international peacebuilders were provided governing functions in the 1990s. In Bosnia and Kosovo, international peacebuilders exercised supreme authority to impose their policies on local societies. Thus,
these cases were identified as typical ‘new trusteeship’ cases. This section will show that practice of peacebuilding trusteeship was constituted not only by liberal internationalism but also by humanitarianism. As liberal peacebuilding theorists such as Paris (2004) argue, peacebuilding trusteeship in these cases was premised on liberal internationalism. However, when international peacebuilders sought to implement peace agreements, they have sometimes constructed undemocratic regimes in post-conflict societies such as Cambodia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In these cases, peacebuilding trusteeship is inconsistent with the idea of liberal democracy. Therefore, international peacebuilders, as this section will indicate, tend to use humanitarian discourse in order to underpin peacebuilding trusteeship. However, I do not mean that peacebuilding trusteeship has been constituted only by liberal democracy and humanitarianism. Rather, peacebuilding trusteeship and humanitarianism were strongly affected by geopolitical interests. When humanitarianism contributed to the constitution peacebuilding trusteeship, it was likely to be political.

2-1 Cambodia

As stated above, in Cambodia, international peacebuilders were provided governing functions, although they were not elected by local societies. This political arrangement was underpinned by humanitarian discourse, as well as liberal democracy. Although the Khmer Rouge was not criticized in the Paris Peace Agreement, the policies by the Khmer Rouge and its results were represented as pathologies of Cambodia. The Peace Agreement stated that the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was expected to prevent this past from recurring.
However, as this section will argue, peacebuilding trusteeship in Cambodia was severely affected by the geopolitical interests of big powers.

**Background**

The civil conflict in Cambodia was led by the Vietnam War in the 1960s. Cambodia received a large influx of Vietnamese communists who sought neutral sanctuary. In 1969 the US, under Richard Nixon, launched extensive airstrikes against the border areas of Cambodia. In 1970, civilian and military officials overthrew the government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who had been the premier since 1957. The Lon Nol government came to power and enjoyed US support. As Vietnamese and Cambodian communists and US and South Vietnamese troops spread across the country, Cambodia became another battlefield for the Vietnam War. Therefore, the Lon Nol government lost control of the countryside. Subsequently, the Khmer Rouge rebels defeated the Lon Nol government and seized the capital in 1975. Kiernan (1996: 16) argues that:

‘Although it was indigenous, Pol Pot’s revolution would not have won power without U.S. economic and military destabilisation of Cambodia which began in 1966 after the American escalation in next-door Vietnam and peaked in 1969-73 with the carpet bombing of Cambodia’s countryside by American B-52s. This was probably the most important single factor in Pol Pot’s rise to power.’

During the late 1970s, the Khmer Rouge was perpetrating mass murder. Approximately 2 million people were systematically killed by this
regime. The US, now under Jimmy Carter, began to notice what was happening in Cambodia. According to Kenton Clymer, ‘Even before Pol Pot took over Cambodia, the [US] government had substantial evidence of Khmer Rouge brutality’ (Clymer 2003: 247). However, the US did not protest against it, although Carter placed the defense of human rights at the center of his foreign policy. It was because the US attempted to maintain its relationship with China (Power 2002: 126-127; Clymer 2003: 255-256). In December 1978, Vietnam invaded the country, and installed a new government in Phnom Penh. Although its motivation was not humanitarianism, this intervention stopped the mass murder by Khmer Rouge. However, the US did not support this intervention. Rather, then National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski claimed that: ‘we must maintain diplomatic pressure to get Vietnam to remove its forces from Cambodia’ (Clymer 2003: 256). Therefore, when the Chinese armed forces invaded Vietnam in 1979, the US made no criticism. The US did not want Vietnam to be strong because it was supported by the USSR. As Clymer observes, ‘everything was examined from a geopolitical standpoint’ (Clymer 2003: 258). Until the end of the Cold War, the US had resisted investigation of mass murder and never expressed even diplomatic criticism of the Khmer Rouge (Kiernan 2002).

As the structure of the Cold War collapsed, Western countries, the Soviet Union, China and other neighboring countries began to address the Cambodian problem. In 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev advocated the resolution of the Cambodian conflict in his speech. After Vietnam withdrew from the country in 1989, the Paris Conference on Cambodia was co-chaired by France and Indonesia. However, this negotiation failed because the conflict
parties and their international backers could not agree on main issues such as power sharing (Leifer 1992: 144). Even in 1989, the US and China still supported the Khmer Rouge and its allies. In 1990, after various negotiations and meetings, big powers such as the US, China, and Vietnam accepted the need for compromise. Finally, the permanent members of the UN Security Council and regional parties adopted a peace plan that ‘the UN would exercise “direct control” over the five areas of civilian administration – foreign affairs, defense, security, information, and finance – critical to a “neutral political environment’ for a free and fair elections’ (Song 1997: 70-71).

The plan of UN transitional administration was proposed by a US Democrat congressman Stephen Solarz and Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in order to resolve the power-sharing problem. Evans, who would become a member of ICISS in the late 1990s, was a lawyer who had ‘a firm belief in the centrality of international law in effective global governance’ and ‘placed great faith in the United Nations as an agent of justice and a facilitator of world peace’ (Gurry 1995: 17). In the US, the Bush administration was criticized for its foreign policy toward Cambodia, in particular, its ‘indifference to genocide’ (Doyle 1995: 24). Furthermore, in February 1990, ‘the House voted 413 to 0 to urge the Bush administration to drop the “quadripartite government” option in favor of a “United Nations – supervised interim administration” option’ (Haas 1991: 255). However, this plan seemed to serve US and Chinese geopolitical interests because it would deter the Vietnamese-installed Cambodian regime and help the Khmer Rouge return to power (Song 1997: 74).

In October 1991, the warring factions and eighteen countries signed
a peace treaty at Paris. In February 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 745, by which United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established. It stated that UNTAC was expected to ‘contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace in Cambodia, to the promotion of national reconciliation, to the protection of human rights and to the assurance of the right to self-determination of the Cambodian people through free and fair elections.’

*Peacebuilding Trusteeship in Cambodia*

UNTAC was the first transitional administration by the UN in the 1990s. The UN trusteeship system (a successor to the League of Nations mandate system) was not an option because it could not be applied to a member state of the UN because of Article 78 of the UN Charter (Commonwealth of Australia 1990: 12). UNTAC was a kind of peace keeping operation. However, in this operation, international peacebuilders had governing functions.

In order to separate UNTAC from colonial administration and the UN trusteeship system, the Supreme National Council (SNC), which would include representatives from all the factions, was established. According to ‘Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict’ (hereafter, the Paris Peace Agreement), The SNC enshrined ‘the sovereignty, independence, national unity of Cambodia’ (Article 3). The SNC delegated to the United Nations ‘all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this Agreement’ (Article 6). This political arrangement aimed to make clear that the authority of UNTAC was premised on the consent of Cambodian society.
However, Uch Kiman, Cambodian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated that:

‘The first and most obvious feature of UNTAC was that it was a serious impingement on Cambodian sovereignty. This was probably the most bitter pill which we all had to swallow.’ (Kiman 1995: 62)

As he stated, although the SNC had *de jure* sovereignty, it did not have *de facto* sovereignty because it did not undertake governing functions and merely gave its authority to UNTAC. The Peace Agreement stated that the SNC could provide advice to UNTAC. However, UNTAC did not have to comply with it if there was no consensus among the members of the SNC (Paris Peace Agreement: Annex 1, Section A, 2-a). Prince Sihanouk was also entitled to offer advice to UNTAC, but it had to be consistent with the Peace Agreement. Furthermore, this agreement stated that: ‘In all cases, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative will determine whether advice or action of the SNC is consistent with the present Agreement’ (Annex 1, Section A, 2-e).

The UNTAC mandate of the Peace Agreement was broad and ambiguous. Annex 1 of the Agreement stated that:

‘UNTAC will exercise the powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this Agreement, including those relating to the organization and conduct of free and fair elections and the relevant aspects of the administration of Cambodia.’ (Section A, 1)
UNTAC was provided executive powers. The Peace Agreement stated that: ‘all administrative agencies, bodies and offices acting in the field of foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security and information will be placed under the direct control of UNTAC’ (Annex 1, Section B, 1). It ‘had the right to issue binding directives on an ad hoc basis’ to control administrative agencies (Suntharalingam 1997: 95). Furthermore, the Special Representative could ‘install in administrative agencies, bodies and offices of all the Cambodian Parties United Nations personnel’ and ‘require the reassignment or removal of any personnel of such administrative agencies, bodies and offices’ (Annex 1, Section B, 4).

In addition, UNTAC could legislate in terms of election and human rights. It had the authority to adopt an electoral law and a code of conduct regulating participation in the election and to suspend or abrogate provisions of existing laws which were inconsistent with the objects and purposes of the Peace Agreement (Annex 1, Section D, 3-b). Also, it drafted the penal code to re-educate the Cambodian society to respect human rights (Doyle 1995: 38).

Furthermore, UNTAC exercised judicial powers. In order to protect human rights, UNTAC ‘can call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such other steps as are appropriate for the prevention and suppression of such violations in accordance with the relevant international instruments’ (‘Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia’: Article 5-4). According to J.M. Sanderson, Force Commander of UNTAC, in practice, UNTAC found there was not an effective justice system. Therefore, peacekeepers moved beyond self-defense to a form of enforcement (Sanderson 1995: 72). In January 1993, the UNTAC Military Component and
International Civilian Police (CIVPOL) were provided the power to arrest. And the Office of Special Prosecutor, ‘who had the authority to issue warrants and prosecute cases before the Cambodian courts,’ was established (Ibid.: 73).

Thus, UNTAC had executive, legislative, and judicial powers. On this regime, Kiman wrote that:

‘We had to accept the “Akashi Protectorate” and referred to the position held by H.E. Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, [...] as that of a “Viceroy”.’

(Kiman 1995: 62)

These strong powers of UNTAC were underpinned not only by liberal democracy but also by humanitarian discourse. The Peace Agreement stated, at the beginning, that ‘Cambodia’s tragic recent history requires special measures to assure protection of human rights, and the non-return to the policies and practices of the past’. In addition, ‘Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia’ also mentioned it (Article 3-2). Although signatories failed to refer to the Khmer Rouge and its mass murder, they had to mention ‘the policies and practices of the past’ to justify UNTAC. Electoral assistance was expected to facilitate the protection of human rights. In an Australian Peace Proposal, it was argued that:

‘There is universal acceptance of the need to ensure in Cambodia a non-return to policies and practices of a recent past. The primary
means of guaranteeing such a non-returning will be the holding of free and fair elections whereby the people of Cambodia can freely determine their future and choose their own leaders.’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1990: 89-90)

As stated above, the US and China were supporting the Khmer Rouge even in the early 1990s. Therefore, the Paris Peace Agreement could not criticize its mass murder. Nevertheless, it could not avoid mentioning ‘the past.’

Even Solarz, in his article, sought to justify UNTAC by employing humanitarian discourse, although the US foreign policy seemed not to be premised on humanitarianism. He argued that the most important objective of US foreign policy toward Cambodia was to ‘prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power and encourage Cambodian self-determination’ (Solarz 1990: 112, 115).

Despite its humanitarian discourse, the exit strategy of UNTAC seemed to indicate the geopolitical considerations of international peacebuilders. The Security Council Resolution 745 decided that UNTAC should not exceed eighteen months. Although the liberal democratization of Cambodian society seemed to be incomplete, UNTAC identified elections as a deadline for the operation. As stated above, for the US and China, UNTAC was a means to deter the Vietnamese-installed Cambodian regime.

The ‘genocide’ by the Khmer Rouge led to pathologization of Cambodia. Humanitarians such as Evans advocated peacebuilding trusteeship to alleviate this human suffering. At the same time, peacebuilding trusteeship by the UN served the US and Chinese geopolitical interests. The US seemed to exploit humanitarian discourse to justify this
political arrangement. Peacebuilding trusteeship was constituted by both sides.

2.2 Bosnia-Herzegovina

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, international peacebuilders were provided governing functions as in Cambodia. They removed many local officials by using their supreme authority. This undemocratic regime was underpinned not only by liberal democracy but also by humanitarianism. The notions of ‘exclusive nationalism,’ ‘ethnic cleansing,’ ‘mass murder,’ and ‘new wars’ pathologized the former Yugoslavia. This pathologization contributed to the constitution of peacebuilding trusteeship as a prescription for several regions of the former Yugoslavia. However, peacebuilding trusteeship in these regions was not free from the geopolitical interests of big powers. This section will analyze the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) which has governed this region.

Background

The Yugoslav Wars were caused by a multiplicity of factors and an exact cause is difficult to identify. Although nationalism has often been regarded as a primary cause of the wars, the challenging economic conditions in Yugoslavia and the manipulation of ethnic identity by opportunistic politicians were also contributing factors (Ignatieff 1994; Woodward 1995; Kaldor 1999). For example, Slobodan Milošević, the first President of Serbia, had little in the way of a serious political philosophy; ‘his only evident interest has been his own power’ (Judah 1999: 5). He repeated incoherent and contradictory statements to achieve political power. Before the outbreak
of the wars, nationalists increased in power in the republics of Yugoslavia; as a result, Slovenia and Croatia began to claim greater autonomy within the Yugoslav confederation, while Serbia sought to strengthen the federal authority. When Slovenia and Croatia decided to claim independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991, a series of wars resulted. While the war in Slovenia soon ended, the conflict in Croatia, where a lot of Serbian people were living and opposing independence, intensified. After the secession of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia was achieved, Bosnia and Macedonia began to seek independence. While the Bosnian Serbs declared their own Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 1992, the referendum on Bosnian independence supported independence. Subsequently Bosnia was recognized as an independent country by the European Community and the US. Soon after independence, Yugoslav armed forces launched attacks against Bosnian settlements.

In the Bosnian War, Western journalists and humanitarian NGOs sought to report from Yugoslavia and attempted to show the actual conditions of concentration camps. According to Bridget Robinson, ‘In August 1992 an ITN news team, led by reporters Penny Marshall and Ian Williams, and Ed Vulliamy of the Guardian, “discovered” detention centres run by the Bosnian Serbs’ (Robinson 2004: 388; see Gutman 1993: 44-49). The pictures of camps in Omarska and Trnopolje reminded many Western people of Nazi death camps of World War II and strongly appealed to their sense of morality. A British aid worker observed that: ‘For six months, we have seen Sarajevo systematically being destroyed without the world getting very upset. Now a few pictures of people being held behind barbed wire, and the world goes crazy’ (cited in Holbrooke 1998: 36). There was little doubt that reports by
Western journalists determined the direction of humanitarian discourse. *Newsday*’s Roy Gutman was one of the leading journalists in the Bosnian Wars and the first reporter to enter the concentration camp in Manjaca (Hansen 2006: 179-184). His book called *A Witness to Genocide* received the Pulitzer Prize, and is often cited as an important source on ‘genocide.’ It described mass murder in Bosnia by using analogy with the Holocaust (Gutman 1993: 36-40, 174-180).

As well as journalists, some human rights groups went to the Balkans to document atrocities. They also contributed to the pathologization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, Human Rights Watch dispatched field missions there in 1991 and the following year published their report, *War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina*. The introduction of this report stated that: ‘The findings in this report and the reports from Bosnia-Herzegovina by independent news media, provide *prima facie* evidence that genocide is taking place’ (Helsinki Watch 1993: 1). Furthermore, they called on the UN Security Council to ‘exercise its authority under the 1951 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to intervene in Bosnia-Herzegovina to prevent and suppress genocide’ and ‘to enforce the prohibition of “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions by establishing an international tribunal at the highest level to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate and punish those on all sides who have been responsible for war crimes on the territory of the former Yugoslavia’ (ibid). Although these appeals did not argue about peacebuilding trusteeship, they constituted the discursive foundation for it. Their assertion was that ‘genocide’ was taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, armed intervention by Western countries was indispensable to the protection of human rights. One of the
members of Human Rights Watch stated that:

‘The organization had never called for military intervention, and we couldn't bring ourselves to do so. Yet we could also see that the atrocities would not be stopped by any other means.’ (cited in Power 2002: 258)

On the other hand, many political commentators and policy makers regarded this region as an important place in terms of geopolitics. They placed Bosnia ‘in the heart of Europe’ (Robinson 2004). The Bosnian population was represented as belonging to ‘Us’ (the West). Therefore, that Europe failed to deal with the humanitarian crisis was damaging confidence in Europe. In the Independent newspaper, Ignatieff (1995) claimed that:

‘They were so like us, both the killers and the victims, good Europeans one and all. [...] We could have stopped it. [...] The obstacle, so our leaders told us, was ourselves.... it is hard to see why anyone should believe in this united Europe, if its already formidable institutions proved unable to stop ethnic cleansing two hours from Brussels.’

Bosnia was imagined as their geopolitical heartland by European countries. Similarly, in the New York Times newspaper, Richard Perle, an American neo-conservative theorist, with Richard Burt, claimed to use NATO air power against tactical targets in Bosnia and Serbia (Perle and Burt 1994). According to them, if the US and its allies ignore humanitarian crisis in
Bosnia, it would damage the credibility of the US and the NATO allies. They wrote that: ‘If NATO proves incapable of acting with resolve, it will soon become irrelevant in the post-cold-war world’ (ibid). Furthermore, in Wall Street Journal, nuclear weapons strategist Albert Wohlstetter and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also called on the US and NATO to conduct a military campaign in Bosnia (Thatcher and Wohlstetter 1993). They argued that the Bosnian War would destabilize Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, and ultimately Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria. Thus, armed intervention in the Bosnian War was considered to serve the geopolitical interests of Western countries.

While the Bush administration was reluctant to be involved in this conflict, the Clinton administration decided to intervene. Since 1995, the US had begun mediating peace negotiations and exerting pressure on the Serbian representatives by NATO’s air strikes. With the help of NATO, Croatian forces succeeded in the annexation of Serbian residential areas by expelling Serbian people. Finally, in mid-1995, the fighting in Croatia ended. In Bosnia, the UN created ‘safe areas’ such as in Srebrenica to protect civilians, but completely failed to protect them. After this event, ‘Srebrenica’ has been referred to in numerous documents to justify humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding trusteeship, as well as ‘Rwanda.’ The massacre in the safe areas led NATO to increase air strikes against Serbia, and consequently drag the Serbian representatives to the negotiating table. In late 1995, the ceasefire went into effect and the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Accord) was concluded.
Peacebuilding Trusteeship in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR) was the main organization of transitional territorial administration in Bosnia, working with the United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (UNMIBH). As in the Cambodian case, international peacebuilders publicly exercised authority that transcended local democratic decision making. The OHR was established in 1995 according to the Dayton Agreement, and even now continues to operate with the EU. The OHR is not an organization of the UN but consists of international representatives.

The mandate of the OHR is not only to monitor the implementation of the peace settlement but also to reconstruct the overall socio-political systems. The institutions of the OHR cover all major elements of socio-political systems: the Political Department, Economic Department, Human Rights/Rule of Law Department, Legal Department, Anti-Fraud Department, Media Development Department, Military Cell, and the OHR-led inter-agency Reconstruction and Return Task Force. Furthermore, the OHR obtained final authority over decision making in Bosnia when the Peace Implementation Council endorsed the High Representative’s authority to remove public officials from office and to impose laws at the PIC meeting in Bonn in December 1997 (the so called ‘Bonn powers’). International peacebuilders assert this authority when they ‘deal with what the OHR deemed specific and concrete threats to the implementation of the peace’ (Knaus and Martin 2003). In practice, the OHR has often exercised this authority, and thereby the High Representative imposed various legislation such as the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina and dismissed more than 180 officials and politicians (Knaus and Martin 2003; Parish...
The civil service reform was a typical case that demonstrated the intrusive nature of the OHR. The OHR sought ‘to create a professional, meritocratic civil service’ and ‘strengthen the central government vis-a-vis other actors in the state’ (Zaum 2007: 107). The OHR asked the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (a joint initiative of the OECD and the EU which provides the European neighborhood countries with support in the public administration reform) to produce a reform proposal of the civil service system in Bosnia. Subsequently, the working group, composed of international officials and representatives from the local government, prepared the draft law. Although this draft of the law was bitterly opposed by the local politicians who wanted to keep their control over the administration, the OHR achieved the civil service reform by accepting some compromise with them. The Law on Civil Service stated that civil servants were subject to a review process by the Civil Service Agency. The OHR kept the High Representative’s right to appoint the first head of the Civil Service Agency (ibid.: 111). Thus, the OHR sought to transform the whole structure of local civil service.

In order to legitimize the strong power of the OHR, reference to the human rights violations and the bloodshed in Bosnia was often made. PIC Bonn Conclusion, which provided a legal basis for Bonn Power, recognized human right violations as one of the most serious issues in Bosnia. It stated, at the beginning, that ‘the protection of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina is still inadequate’ (Section I). Furthermore, the fourth high representative, Paddy Ashdown, who was widely regarded as having adopted a heavy-handed approach, stated that:
‘the one event that could change that calculation in favour of blood would be to return to the old Karadzic/Milosevic plan to divide Bosnia – what started it all back in 1992. [...] It is always more difficult, especially in the Balkans, to defend the preservation of multi-ethnic spaces and resist the creation of mono-ethnic ones. But to do otherwise is always folly and nearly always ends in blood.’

(Ashdown 2008)

Moreover, he represented the Bosnian people as corrupt and ignorant (Ashdown 2007: 108, 113) and justified the policies imposed from Europe (ibid.: 114).

Not only administrators of the OHR but also some theorists justify this undemocratic regime. As stated in the first section of this chapter, Mary Kaldor considers an international protectorate to be an effective political arrangement for Bosnia because local civil societies could not develop in the places where gangs and warlords control security sector (Kaldor 1999: Ch. 6). Bart Szewczyk also justifies the Bonn Powers by referring to human rights protection. He argues that:

‘the Bonn Powers help maximise values of human dignity by overcoming internal deadlock within the Bosnian political structures, and thereby avoiding anarchy and chaos, being applied in a non-discriminatory manner against all violators of the Dayton Agreement, and protecting human rights as immutably enshrined in the Constitution.’ (Szewczyk 2010: 42)
In contrast to UNTAC, the OHR has governed Bosnia for more than 15 years. For Western countries, in particular, EU countries, the Europeanization of Bosnia is important because it would contribute to the stabilization of European order. In fact, the High Representative of the international community has also been EU Special Representative in Bosnia Herzegovina since 2002. EU has allocated a large amount of resources to the peacebuilding in Bosnia. The geopolitical interests of Western countries have kept peacebuilding trusteeship in existence.

In the Bosnian War, numerous reports on mass murder, ethnic cleansing, rape, and other violence led to the pathologization of the former Yugoslavia. Many humanitarians insisted on humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding trusteeship to address the root causes of the Bosnian War. At the same time, by geopolitical strategists, humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding trusteeship were considered to serve the geopolitical interests of Western countries. As stated above, peacebuilding trusteeship in Bosnia-Herzegovina was undemocratic. Therefore, it was underpinned not only by liberal democracy but also by humanitarian discourse.

2.3 Kosovo

Since 1999, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had governed Kosovo. As in other new trusteeship, UNMIK exercised supreme authority and underpinned it not only by liberal democracy but also by humanitarian discourse.

Background
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia did not end in 1995. Since 1998, the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia had heated up. The historical background of the Kosovo war was also complicated like other wars in this region. Kosovo, which had belonged to Albania in the 19th century, had been integrated into Serbia in 1913, and subsequently the resistance by Kosovar Albanians began. Even after the integration into Yugoslavia, Kosovar Albanians had not demonstrated their loyalty to Yugoslavia. By 1974, Kosovo could have ‘its own assembly, police force and local government, and all the prerogatives of the other Yugoslav republics such as Croatia or Slovenia’, but formal status as a republic (Judah 1999: 8). However, everything changed after Milosevic became Serb President in 1989. He sought to abolish Kosovo’s autonomy. During the Bosnian wars, adopting a passive resistance strategy, Kosovar Albanians did not start a violent separatist movement because they did not have enough power to fight against Yugoslavia. However, as the European Union (EU) recognized the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, comprising Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo at the end of the Bosnian War, Kosovar Albanians shifted their strategy. Since 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had intensified its guerrilla war, attracting broad support from Kosovar Albanians.

After the conflict worsened, the US and the European countries sought to intervene in Kosovo. As in the Bosnian case, the stories of ethnic cleansing and massacre pathologized Kosovo. Because numerous reports on human suffering were appealing to public opinion, Western governments obtained support for armed intervention in Kosovo (O’Loughlin and Kolossov 2002: 581-582). Just before NATO began air strikes on Kosovo, Clinton sought to legitimize this campaign by referring to the Holocaust.
‘Sarajevo, the capital of neighboring Bosnia, is where World War I began. World War II and the Holocaust engulfed this region. In both wars, Europe was slow to recognize the dangers, and the United States waited even longer to enter the conflicts. […] Do our interests in Kosovo justify the dangers to our armed forces? […] I am convinced that the dangers of acting are far outweighed by the dangers of not acting – dangers to defenseless people and to our national interests’ (Clinton 1999b: 517-518).

‘What if someone had listened to Winston Churchill and stood up to Adolf Hitler earlier?’ (Clinton 1999a: 491).

Geopolitically, Kosovo was important for European security. Then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher thought that ‘deterioration in Kosovo would likely “bring into the fray other countries in the region – Albania, Greece, Turkey”’ (Power 2003: 446). NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was interpreted as a sign of the expansion of NATO to East Europe. Therefore, it was not surprising that NATO countries could not overcome Russian opposition to the intervention in the Security Council. Russia had strong interest in this region, even though Kosovo had little to do with Russia’s security concerns before NATO decided to intervene.

Finally, in March 1999, NATO intervened in Kosovo without UN authorization. Subsequently, Russia and NATO countries achieved a compromise, and on 9 June 1999 the Security Council adopted the resolution 1244 which established NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

**Peacebuilding Trusteeship in Kosovo**

Like the OHR, UNMIK has strong authority in transitional administration. According to Alexandra Gheciu, ‘More broadly, UNMIK has exercised significant productive and coercive power over the Kosovars, in the name of promoting the norms of democracy, human rights and the rule of law’ (Gheciu 2005: 122).

The mandate of UNMIK was: the establishment of law and order as well as security and freedom of movement throughout the whole territory of Kosovo; the establishment of a functioning administration; the protection of the Serbs and trust-building among the communities. Although the future status of Kosovo was unclear, international society achieved the consensus that Kosovo ought to reach an international standard such as international laws on human rights. In order to do that, UNMIK had not only to supervise the management of local political institutions but also to perform administrative functions including enforcement of law and to provide basic public service until they establish new socio-political institutions in Kosovo. Following the Report of the Secretary-General published on 12 July 1999 (S/1999/779), Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Bernard Kouchner, who insisted on the idea of ‘right to intervene,’ stated in the first regulation the following:

‘All the legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo including the administration of the judiciary is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary General.’
Moreover, as in the OHR, the Special Representative ‘had the power to make and revoke the appointments of all the officials within the UNMIK structure, and was even granted the unprecedented “final authority of interpretation” of Resolution 1244, and hence of UNMIK’s mandate’ (Gheciu 2005: 126-127).

Moreover, UNMIK has stayed in Kosovo for more than 10 years. As stated above, for Western countries, Kosovo is a geopolitically important place. Therefore, even after Kosovo has been recognized as an independent state in the UN, UNMIK has continued to operate in Kosovo. Like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo is actually an international protectorate.

In order to underpin the authority of UNMIK, international peacebuilders used humanitarian discourse. The Security Council Resolution 1244, which established UNMIK, stated, in the introduction, that its aim was to ‘resolve the grave humanitarian situation’ and that UNMIK was established ‘to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo’ (Article 21). Furthermore, international peacebuilders claimed that both Serbians and Albanians were obsessed with not only the legacy of an authoritarian past but also had a strong ethnic bias and, therefore, they might cause another ethnic conflict. Michael Steiner, who was the head of the UNMIK from 2001 to 2003, stated that:

‘Transforming Kosovo into a place where all its people can live in security and dignity is not only essential for the sake of minority communities [...] It is essential for the long-term stability of the Balkans and of Europe itself. To achieve this transformation, we need
to help Kosovars to make European standards their own.’ (Steiner 2003)

Kouchner also sought to justify intervention and new trusteeship by humanitarian discourse. He claimed that:

‘The charge of “human rights imperialism” against local cultural norms is also not a valid argument against the right to intervene. Everywhere, human rights are human rights. Freedom is freedom. Suffering is suffering. Oppression is oppression.’ (Kouchner 1999: 4)

In practice, UNMIK sought to prevent ethnic fighting from taking place at strategically important places in Kosovo. Therefore, international peacebuilders sharply restricted the freedom of movement. This strong action against the local population was also underpinned by human rights norms (UNMIK/REG/1999/2; Carlowitz 2004: 310).

Thus, peacebuilding trusteeship in Kosovo was undemocratic as in other peacebuilding trusteeships. Therefore, international peacebuilders sought to underpin the transitional administration not only by liberal democracy but also human rights norms. However, as well as humanitarianism, the geopolitical interests of Western countries contributed to the establishment of peacebuilding trusteeship in Kosovo.

**Conclusion**

This chapter analyzed peacebuilding trusteeship after the Cold War. It indicated that peacebuilding trusteeship was, theoretically and practically,
underpinned and constituted not only by liberal internationalism but also humanitarian discourse such as human rights norms. On the other hand, humanitarianism relied on the power relations in international society when it sought to alleviate severe human suffering.

The notions of ‘failed states,’ ‘new wars,’ and violence itself formed new pathology of southern countries. They highlighted human suffering in southern countries. These notions seemed to be neither neutral nor objective but political. In this context, humanitarianism required practices which were above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. The pathologization of conflict societies led to new prescriptions such as liberal peacebuilding. Many theorists and practitioners sought to underpin peacebuilding trusteeship by referring to ‘failed states’ and ‘new wars.’ Moreover, they sought to deconstruct the idea of sovereignty, in particular, of southern countries. Thus, the theology of peacebuilding trusteeship was premised on humanitarian discourse. However, after 9/11, new pathologies and prescriptions were integrated into the security strategy of Western countries.

In practice, this chapter analyzed the cases of Cambodia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In these cases, international peacebuilders were provided governing functions. However, as they were not elected from local societies, these regimes of peacebuilding trusteeship were undemocratic. They were inconsistent with liberal internationalism. Therefore, they were underpinned not only by liberal internationalism but also by humanitarian discourse. However, the practice of peacebuilding trusteeship was influenced by the geopolitical interests of Western countries.
Conclusion

By using a genealogical approach, this study has analyzed the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship from the early 19th century to the present. This concluding chapter will bring the findings of this study together and consider some of the theoretical, conceptual, and practical implications of my argument and analysis. The discussion is divided into four parts, dealing with: (i) the relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism; (ii) the power of trusteeship and humanitarianism; (iii) the theoretical implications for humanitarian intervention, development, and peacebuilding; and (iv) the possibility of justifying trusteeship.

The Original Puzzle

Before summarizing the findings of this study, I would like to restate the original ‘puzzle’. It is that the language of trusteeship harks back to the colonial period even while the humanitarianism of today tends to reject political and colonial content. Ignatieff (2001: 173)’s argument about humanitarianism demonstrates this tendency.

‘What should our goals as believers in human rights be? Here my slogan would be the title of the justly famous essay by my old teacher, Judith Shklar, “Putting Cruelty First.” We may not be able to create democracies or constitutions. Liberal freedom [in some societies] may be some way off. But we could do more than we do to stop unmerited suffering and gross physical cruelty. That I take to be the elemental priority of all human rights activism: to stop torture, beatings,
killings, rape, and assault and to improve, as best we can, the security of ordinary people. My minimalism is not strategic at all. It is the most we can hope for.’

Although he describes his approach as ‘minimalism,’ this minimalism can lead to the establishment of undemocratic regimes in post-conflict societies by international peacebuilders. As this study showed, humanitarianism has contributed to the constitution of trusteeship and trusteeship has required moral justification since the colonial period. As a result, the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship has repeatedly been reproduced.

In this study, the concept of ‘trusteeship’ refers to a relation of inequality, rather than a specific or particular historical practice. It is the wider concept which includes various practices such as indirect rule, the mandate system, development assistance, and transitional administration. Similarly, the category of ‘humanitarianism’ also includes practices such as protection from anarchy, relief from oppression, and freedom from poverty, which are above and beyond the direct relief of suffering. As Ch. 1 argued, this study established a framework for the analysis to examine the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. It is based on ‘genealogy’, by which Foucault focused on the dispositive of power relations in a society. The concept of ‘dispositive’ means the system of relations that can be established among various elements such as laws, institutions, regulations, statements, and social practices. Foucault argued that a dispositive underpinned power relations in a society. Genealogy as methodology can be classified into two categories: archeological genealogy and sociological genealogy. While the former focuses on the discursive domain, the latter analyzes not only the
discursive domain but also the non-discursive domain. Employing the latter, this study investigated the discursive domain of trusteeship and humanitarianism (e.g. discourse of intellectuals and policy makers) and the non-discursive domain of trusteeship (e.g. social practices such as missionary work and humanitarian aid). As a framework, this study introduced the ideas of pathologization and prescriptions. This framework provided the hypothesis that humanitarianism contributed to the constitution of trusteeship by pathologization and prescription, and that the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship has been repeatedly examined and revised.

Relationship between Trusteeship and Humanitarianism

As Ch. 2 analyzed, British India in the 19th century was a case of existing rule that subsequently required justification. Utilitarianism, presuming that the Indian population had been suffering from despotism, constituted the moral justification of existing rule. The liberation of the Indian population from indigenous despotism and savagism was defined as the objective of trusteeship. It is possible to regard this objective as a kind of humanitarian discourse because it aimed to alleviate suffering of others. However, this humanitarianism was not just compassion with suffering, but it pathologized Indian societies. The pathologization of Indian societies led to social engineering and benevolent despotism by civilized nations. Thus, while existing rule in India required humanitarian discourse, humanitarian discourse underpinned the objectives and political arrangements of colonial trusteeship. Even after the Indian Mutiny, colonial trusteeship did not disappear because Indian societies were re-pathologized and the objectives of trusteeship were redefined. The protection of Indian societies from anarchy
replaced the liberation from despotism as the objective of trusteeship. This was an origin of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship.

In the case of Africa, humanitarianism constituted colonial trusteeship before the British Empire began to rule Africa. Slavery and the slave trade were considered as grave human suffering by humanitarianism. While the early anti-slavery movement did not pathologize African societies, the successors of the movement ascribed the root causes of slavery and the slave trade to the nature of African societies. Cultivation of soil, Christianization of Africans, and civilization of African societies were advocated as prescriptions for the pathology, in addition to the suppression of slave traders by the Royal Navy. These social engineering policies were expected to transform the nature of African societies. Moreover, these policies required the colonization of Africa. Similarly, the native protection movement also called on the British Empire to put African societies under its control. The aim of this movement was to protect Africans from the invasion of European colonists, but it required Africans to become imperial citizens. While the early anti-slavery movement did not pathologize African societies, the successors of the movement ascribed the root causes of slavery and the slave trade to the nature of African societies. And the westernization of African societies and social engineering policies were advocated. The cases of India and Africa showed that trusteeship and humanitarianism were mutually constitutive and that they formed the dispositive of power relations in international society.

This co-constitutive relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism continued even after the 19th century, although the form of trusteeship and humanitarianism changed. While humanitarianism has
critically reviewed the theology and practice of trusteeship, it has never
denied the necessity of trusteeship. Rather, it has reproduced trusteeship in
international society. And the relations of inequality in international society
have to some extent been reflected in humanitarian discourse. When colonial
trusteeship was internationalized around the time of the First World War,
dependent territories were re-pathologized by humanitarianism, although
the legitimacy of colonial empires was challenged. Non-European societies
were represented as uncivilized and inferior to Western civilization. Wilsonianism described them as uncivilized, presuming a unilinear model of
social development. Incipient cultural relativism sought to solidify the
indigenous nature of non-European societies according to essentialism. While these pathologizations seemed contradictory, both discourses constituted colonial trusteeship.

During and after the Second World War, developing countries were
represented as suffering from poverty and requiring intervention of civilized
countries. This re-pathologization led to the creation of development
trusteeship. Even after the transition from British to American hegemony
and the emergence of multilateral aid regimes, the discourse of poverty
performed the function of expanding the power of aid agencies. In
development trusteeship, undemocratic regimes of developing countries were
strengthened and social engineering policies were legitimized.

During and after the Cold War, as humanitarian crises of conflict
societies were considered as human suffering and to be alleviated,
peacebuilding trusteeship was created. Peacebuilding trusteeship was likely
to be similar to colonial administration in that it attempted to introduce new
socio-political institutions into post-conflict societies and legitimized
undemocratic administration by international peacebuilders, although the period of the mandate was predetermined.

As stated in Ch. 1, trusteeship has been reproduced by humanitarianism through the critique of previous forms of trusteeship. It has formed a circular process. In the mid-19th century, British colonial administration in India was challenged by the local societies. As a result of the Mutiny, colonial trusteeship was radically revised. Utilitarianism, Christianization, and radical westernization were criticized for causing anarchy, and another humanitarian discourse was created to pathologize India. Around the time of the First World War, the legitimacy of colonial empires was undermined by accusations of the abuse of native peoples on the part of intellectuals and politicians. However, because of their humanitarian concern, they supported colonial trusteeship. They argued that, without supervision by civilized nations, uncivilized countries would be invaded by European traders. Therefore, internationalization of colonial trusteeship was advocated. During the Second World War, the previous form of colonial trusteeship, which denied radical modernization of dependent territories, was criticized for overlooking the poverty of these territories. A new colonial strategy, development trusteeship, was expected to alleviate malnutrition, inadequate education, poor standards of hygiene, and other social problems. During the decolonization movement, the violations of the right to self-determination began to be considered a kind of human suffering. This extension of humanitarianism challenged the legitimacy of colonial trusteeship. However, developing countries were still pathologized due to human suffering such as poverty and civil conflicts. Therefore, new types of trusteeship were required. After decolonization, development and
peacebuilding trusteeship were designed to coexist with the right to self-determination of target societies although the latter’s freedom was clearly delimited. Thus, humanitarianism stands in an ambivalent but intimate and constitutive relationship to trusteeship: while it has contributed to the legitimacy of trusteeship, it has also at times provided the grounds for its critique and reform. In conclusion, the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship reappears cyclically and changes its form across space and time, reproducing relations of inequality and facilitating intervention via pathologization and prescription. If this study is correct, then the development of humanitarianism will entail the development of new forms of trusteeship. However, I do not argue that any kind of humanitarianism leads to trusteeship. As stated in Ch. 1, this study focuses on humanitarian ‘responses linked to broader notions of human progress’ (Calhoun 2008: 74). I do not deny the possibility that humanitarian ‘responses rooted in simply providing care’ (ibid.) does not constitute trusteeship. If humanitarianism could cautiously avoid the pathologization of target societies, it might not constitute trusteeship.

Also, this study showed that geopolitical interests cannot be separated from humanitarian concerns in the discourse on trusteeship. In British India, the expansion of colonial rule seemed to be caused initially mainly by economic interests. In Africa, although humanitarians were lobbying for the colonization of Africa, the British Empire did not engage in extensive colonization until geopolitical interests were found in Africa. Development trusteeship was constituted as a part of the security strategy by the US. Peacebuilding trusteeship was not conducted until the geopolitical situation changed due to the end of the Cold War. While
geopolitics has affected humanitarianism, humanitarianism has helped Western countries to pursue their geopolitical interests. Geopolitics cannot constitute trusteeship without humanitarianism, but humanitarianism cannot implement trusteeship without geopolitics. Thus, humanitarianism tends to be not neutral but political.

The co-constitutive relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism, which this study showed, challenges the presumption of existing works. As stated in Ch. 1, previous studies distinguish between good trusteeship and bad trusteeship in terms of humanitarianism. Good trusteeship embodies humanitarianism and bad trusteeship abuses humanitarianism. However, this dichotomy is highly questionable because humanitarianism and trusteeship are mutually constitutive. Humanitarianism constituted trusteeship in the colonial age. After decolonization, colonial trusteeship was denied. However, humanitarianism did not cast doubt on the legitimacy of trusteeship. Humanitarianism legitimizes trusteeship as ‘lesser evil’ even though it helps trustees to pursue their geopolitical interests. Therefore, humanitarianism cannot provide any standard to separate good trusteeship from bad trusteeship. The genealogical analysis of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship tells us that it is important to highlight the ideological role of humanitarianism.

Not only the distinction of trusteeship but also the dichotomy of humanitarianism is also debatable. Existing works presume that there are two kinds of humanitarianism: ‘humanitarianism separate from politics’ and ‘humanitarianism abused by politics.’ However, as Jahn (2012) observes, the separation of politics and morality in theory was created to legitimize violations of sovereign equality principle. This study shows that, in the
discourse on trusteeship, it is difficult to separate geopolitical interests and humanitarian concern. While humanitarianism redefined geopolitical interests, geopolitics distorted the recognition of humanitarian crisis. Moreover, power relations in international society have been reflected in humanitarian discourse even when geopolitics had no influence. Thus, humanitarianism is neither universal nor neutral.

*Power of Trusteeship and Humanitarianism*

In addition to the co-constitutive relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism, this study revealed the power of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship. Dependent territories, developing countries, and post-conflict societies were excluded from the politics of trusteeship and humanitarianism. Those whose have documented this suffering that I have used for this study were mainly Western people. There was a boundary between observers and observed. Observers pathologized target societies through humanitarian discourse. Subsequently, target societies were put under trusteeship and thus excluded from decision making. Trustees sought to transform the identities of target societies through social engineering policies and integrate them into the power structure of trustees. When target societies raised rebellions against trustees, they were suppressed by armed force. While Bain (2003) argues that a central feature of trusteeship is paternalism, this study highlights other characteristics of trusteeship: authoritarian tendencies and the manipulation of identity.

In the 19th century, Indian and African societies were colonized and deprived of their political agency. The British Empire unilaterally changed not only their socio-political systems but also their cultural identities.
Colonial social engineering policies such as legislation and education aimed to make the Indian population docile bodies for the British Empire. Although Indian societies resisted colonial rule with the Mutiny of 1857, it was severely suppressed and interpreted as a pathology of Indian societies. Even through violent resistance, Indian societies could not regain their political agency. Similarly, in Africa, missionaries and colonial administrators sought to transform the nature of African societies by cultivation, Christianization, and civilization. African people were observed, investigated, and reconstituted as quasi-subjects of the British Empire. Even after the colonial strategy of indirect rule was adopted, colonial rule in India and Africa was despotic. Indian and African societies were re-organized into ‘traditional’ political entities.

In the early 20th century, colonial trusteeship was internationalized. However, the power structure of colonial trusteeship did not change. Although the legitimacy of colonial and dynastic empires was challenged, colonial trusteeship was still supported. Even in the mandate territories that were supervised by the League of Nations, colonial despotic regimes were established and, at worst, armed force was employed to suppress local resistance. As in other British colonies, the mandate territories were administrated by colonial administrators who believed in the theology of indirect rule. Therefore, the socio-political systems of the mandate territories were reconstituted according to ‘traditional’ institutions.

Wilsonianism and the right to self-determination undermined the legitimacy of colonial trusteeship after the First World War. These new norms finally changed the form of trusteeship in the 1960s. As stated above, in the post-colonial era, trusteeship has been re-constituted not to infringe
the right to self-determination. However, a hierarchy of international society has been reproduced by social engineering policies of trusteeship. The manipulation of identity has been allowed in international society even after decolonization. Development trusteeship did not recognize the political agency of target societies. Rather, target societies were defined as those whose pathological symptoms required social engineering. Their socio-political institutions were reformed according to the Western socio-political model. Their conduct was monitored and controlled. Since the 1950s, international aid agencies have repeatedly revised their development theory. Developing countries have been re-pathologized each time. Donor agencies did not administrate target societies directly. However, as Ch. 5 showed, development aid had the power to reform the socio-political institutions of target societies. Some of the target societies were not empowered but rather experienced a growing dependence on foreign aid. The hierarchy that separates trustees and target societies was reproduced.

Peacebuilding trusteeship demonstrated a more colonial power structure than development trusteeship. It aimed to reconstruct nation-states by recreating the socio-political institutions of target societies, especially the security sector. However, its long-term goal was to integrate post-conflict societies into the Western-centered international order. As the native protection movement sought to transform African people into good imperial citizens, peacebuilding trusteeship aimed to embed target societies in the Western-centered order by transforming them into liberal democratic states. In the late 1990s, peacebuilding trusteeship became large scale and peacebuilders obtained extensive authority to impose their policies on target societies. In such undemocratic regimes of peacebuilding trusteeship, the
local population could not get involved in the decision making process because pathologization deprived them of their political agencies. Those who committed ethnic cleansing were regarded as those who lacked the ability to manage liberal democratic systems.

As Brown (2004) argues, humanitarianism has been implicitly and explicitly linked to certain socio-political systems such as liberal democracy and free market economics. Humanitarianism has just sought to alleviate human suffering, but pathologization and prescriptions have been biased. When humanitarianism simply provided care for people suffering serious violence, it scarcely pathologizes target societies. However, when humanitarianism addressed the root causes of human suffering, it has been shaped in its particular forms of pathologization and prescription by the culture and socio-political system of the powerful, who are in a position to dispense his benefits to others. That is, humanitarianism tends to be political.

In terms of sovereignty, trusteeship changed after decolonization. However, in terms of power structure, trusteeship did not change even after decolonization. The relationship between colonized and colonizers has been transformed into that between developing countries and donors and that between post-conflict societies and international peacebuilders. These relationships have been reproduced by the discourse of pathologization and prescriptions. However, I do not intend to say that trustees have always succeeded in the transformation of dependent territories and post-colonial countries. As various studies point out, development and peacebuilding trusteeship have hardly achieved their goals (e.g. Duffield 2007; Etzioni 2007; Li 2007; Egnell 2011).
Theoretical Implications on Humanitarian Intervention, Development, and Peacebuilding Trusteeship

These results from the analysis of the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship provide several theoretical implications for humanitarian intervention, development, and peacebuilding. First, when we examine the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, we need to analyze not only the legitimacy of intervention but also the legitimacy of peacebuilding trusteeship. Many previous studies focus only on the phase of armed intervention in conflict societies when they examine the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention (e.g. Wheeler 2000). However, when humanitarianism constituted humanitarian intervention, it also tended to constitute peacebuilding trusteeship. The objective of humanitarian intervention is not only to stop serious human rights violations such as ethnic cleansing but also to prevent the recurrence of such human suffering. As this study revealed, when humanitarianism addresses the root causes of human suffering, social engineering is justified. The power of trusteeship is to transform the identity of target societies. Not only the invasion of sovereignty but also the manipulation of identity is an important issue for humanitarian intervention. Therefore, when we examine the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, we need to analyze the subsequent peacebuilding trusteeship after armed intervention.

Second, since decolonization, direct rule by trustees has been permitted only when it was believed that there was no other means to remove the root causes of human suffering. In other words, transitional administration is an exception of trusteeship after decolonization. After the
First World War, Wilsonianism undermined the legitimacy of colonial rule. In the 1940s and 1950s, the alleviation of poverty was employed to reestablish the legitimacy of trusteeship. However, in the 1960s, as dependent territories achieved independence from colonial empires, the direct rule of developing countries could no longer be justified through the discourse on poverty. Development trusteeship presumed that human suffering such as malnutrition, inadequate education, and poor standards of hygiene were not considered an imminent danger which required the transitional administration of target societies. However, even in the post-colonial period, direct rule of post-conflict societies by international peacebuilders has been conducted. Transitional administrations such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, were justified by serious human suffering such as mass murder and ethnic cleansing. This kind of human suffering has often been caused by the security apparatus of the state. Therefore, humanitarianism required international peacebuilders to deconstruct the state apparatus in post-conflict societies. Moreover, politicians and bureaucrats of post-conflict societies were also pathologized. International peacebuilders sought to reeducate politicians and bureaucrats and, during the reconstruction of state apparatus, they directly administrated post-conflict societies in their place. However, it is still highly controversial whether or not mass murder and ethnic cleansing can justify direct rule by international peacebuilders.

Third, while the ideas of ownership and partnership are suggested for the reform of development and peacebuilding trusteeship, they do not reduce the hierarchical divide between trustees and target societies. Since the 2000s, ownership and partnership have been key words to revise the policies of development and peacebuilding. As Ch. 5 argues, the idea of
partnership was suggested by colonial administrators as an alternative to the idea of trusteeship in the 1940s. However, this did not change the theology and practice of trusteeship. This study demonstrates that partnership in colonial trusteeship meant the creation of useful agencies for trustees. Ownership and partnership in new trusteeship may not empower target societies but foster useful collaborators for Western countries. Spivak (2005: 132) argues that:

‘Colonialism was committed to the education of a certain class. It was interested in the seemingly permanent operation of an altered normality. Paradoxically, human rights and “development” work today cannot claim this self-empowerment that high colonialism could. Yet, it is some of the best products of high colonialism, descendants of the colonial middle class, who become human rights advocates in the countries of the South.’

In the early 19th century, utilitarianism argued that the British Empire would create the middle class in India. In the late 19th century, the British colonial administrators exploited indigenous ‘traditional’ authorities as their agents. How different are the ideas of ownership and partnership from colonial strategy in the 19th century?

*Reform or Revolution?*

This final section examines the possibility of justifying trusteeship. Even after the deconstruction of the relationship between trusteeship and humanitarianism, should we accept the legitimization of trusteeship by
humanitarianism? As this study revealed, humanitarianism is a source of the power of trusteeship. However, I do not deny humanitarianism itself though I accept the fact that it is neither universal nor neutral. Foucault also did not deny humanitarianism, but rather proposed ‘a repoliticisation of humanitarianism so that its relationship to sovereignty can be problematised’ (Campbell 1998: 519). The implications of this study are similar to this proposition. As long as we are human beings, compassion is a usual response to human suffering. If one refuses to accept any standards or norms, one would be a nihilist. Or, if one criticizes the dispositive of humanitarianism/trusteeship for oppressing someone, one implicitly adopts humanitarianism as his/her standard. The most important implication of this study is that we should recognize the potential danger of trusteeship and humanitarianism. Foucault stated that:

‘My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism’ (Foucault 1984: 343).

My position is similar to Foucault’s. Humanitarianism easily leads us to justify despotism and oppression. Therefore, we should be careful about the possibility that humanitarianism justifies everything as being the ‘lesser evil.’ Trusteeship is likely to be accompanied by the oppression of the local population. Moreover, it has not corrected but reproduced the unequal distribution of political and economic power in the world. Before accepting
the legitimization of trusteeship by humanitarianism, we have to reexamine what trusteeship has achieved.

One of the most acute problems of trusteeship was to reproduce a hierarchy that divides between trustees (Western countries) and target societies (developing and post-conflict societies). In this structure, targets societies are deprived of their political agency. They are observed, investigated, and prescribed. If one compares this inequality with human suffering such as ethnic cleansing, one might choose the former as a lesser evil. However, I am not convinced by this narrative. The dichotomy between inequality (at worst, benevolent despotism) and anarchy (at worst, genocide) is a part of hegemonic discursive formation.

I do not intend to advocate revolution, but rather would like to suggest a reform of trusteeship. In order to deconstruct the hierarchy between trustees and target societies, this study makes two suggestions. First, before the pathologization of target societies, Western countries should find their own pathology. For example, in the 19th century, European countries bought and sold uncountable numbers of slaves in Africa. Their participation in the slave trade changed the nature of indigenous slave systems and devastated social conditions. Also, as capitalism expanded through the actions of missionaries, traders, and colonial administrators in Asia and Africa, it created new types of poverty such as unemployment by dissolving traditional socio-economic systems. In the late 20th century, arms smuggling, human trafficking, speculation in food-prices, and the exploitation of natural resources are conducted by Western countries. They have contributed to civil wars and poverty in developing countries. While Western countries have pathologized dependent territories and developing
countries, they have created a new pathology for these countries.

Second, in development and peacebuilding trusteeship, complete liberal democratization of target societies would entail considerable costs. International aid agencies and peacebuilders have aimed to transform target societies into liberal democratic countries. As utilitarians argued, liberal democracy requires more than liberal democratic state institutions. Therefore, international aid agencies and peacebuilders tend to conduct large scale social engineering by constructing undemocratic regimes in target societies. However, new trusteeship does not guarantee the success of social engineering projects because local actors might resist these projects. In practice, international peacebuilders try to find a compromise with local actors (Ginty 2010; Veit 2011). Now, this kind of compromise is considered a failure of the project. Whether or not compromise with local actors is a better option, complete liberal democratization of post-conflict societies seems to be neither realistic nor justifiable in terms of morality.

In studies on development and peacebuilding, much jargon has been created, for example, the phrases ‘structural adjustment,’ ‘good governance,’ ‘security sector reform,’ and ‘stability operations.’ While these concepts seemed to be new, in the history of trusteeship, they were not necessarily new. They presumed that the reform of socio-political institutions could transform the nature of target societies. This presumption was created by utilitarians in the 19th century. In future, even words like ‘development’ and ‘peacebuilding’ might seem out of date, if not disappear altogether. However, trusteeship can hardly be abolished as long as humanitarianism exists. Humanitarianism will continue to constitute trusteeship, though I do not argue that all kinds of humanitarianism contribute to the constitution of
trusteeship. This study did not suggest that we be rid of the circular process of trusteeship development, but rather that we gradually reform the power structure of trusteeship. The answers of this study are neither nihilism nor revolution but prudence and reform.
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