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Logical knowledge and ordinary reasoning

journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 15:58 authored by Corine BessonCorine Besson
This paper argues that the prominent accounts of logical knowledge have the consequence that they conflict with ordinary reasoning. On these accounts knowing a logical principle, for instance, is having a disposition to infer according to it. These accounts in particular conflict with so-called ‘reasoned change in view’, where someone does not infer according to a logical principle but revise their views instead. The paper also outlines a propositional account of logical knowledge which does not conflict with ordinary reasoning.

History

Publication status

  • Published

File Version

  • Published version

Journal

Philosophical Studies

ISSN

1573-0883

Publisher

Kluwer

Issue

1

Volume

158

Page range

59-82

Department affiliated with

  • Philosophy Publications

Full text available

  • No

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2013-10-03

First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date

2013-10-03

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