Electoral reform in Asia: institutional engineering against "money politics"

Hellmann, Olli (2014) Electoral reform in Asia: institutional engineering against "money politics". Japanese Journal of Political Science, 15 (SI 02). pp. 275-298. ISSN 1468-1099

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Abstract

This paper argues that the concept of intraparty competition – as opposed to interparty competition – provides the most useful lens through which to understand recent cases of electoral reform in East Asia. Various democracies in the region have over the past two decades replaced ‘extreme’ systems on the intraparty dimension with more moderate types. Pressure for reform built up as these systems were increasingly blamed for a number of social ills, such as "money politics" and economic mismanagement. The paper will conclude by arguing that the effect of electoral reform has been rather limited. In particular, particularistic strategies of voter mobilization – such as clientelism and vote buying – remain an important electoral tool for many politicians.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of Law, Politics and Sociology > Politics
Subjects: J Political Science > JQ Political institutions and public administration (Asia, Africa, Australia, Pacific Area, etc.) > JQ0021 Asia > JQ1499 East Asia Including China, Japan, Korea
Depositing User: Olli Hellmann
Date Deposited: 03 Oct 2013 14:04
Last Modified: 06 Mar 2017 22:30
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/46545

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