Externalism, internalism and logical truth

Besson, Corine (2009) Externalism, internalism and logical truth. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2 (1). pp. 1-29. ISSN 1755-0203

[img]
Preview
PDF - Published Version
Download (153kB) | Preview

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist–internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internalism and externalism about natural kind nouns are second-order logics; second, that an internalist second-order logic is a free logic—a second order logic free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns, while an externalist second-order logic is not free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns—it is existentially committed.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Depositing User: Corine Besson
Date Deposited: 03 Oct 2013 15:29
Last Modified: 08 Mar 2017 11:36
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/46526

View download statistics for this item

📧 Request an update