The Gettier illusion, the tripartite analysis, and the divorce thesis

Booth, Anthony (2014) The Gettier illusion, the tripartite analysis, and the divorce thesis. Erkenntnis, 79 (3). pp. 625-638. ISSN 0165-0106

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Abstract

Stephen Hetherington has defended the tripartite analysis of knowledge(Hetherington in Philos Q 48:453–469, 1998; J Philos 96:565–587, 1999; J Philos Res 26:307–324, 2001a; Good knowledge, bad knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001b). His defence has recently come under attack(Madison in Australas JPhilos 89(1):47–58, 2011; Turri in Synthese 183(3):247–259, 2012). I critically evaluate those attacks as well as Hetherington’s newest formulation of his defence (Hetherington in Philosophia 40(3):539–547, 2012b; How to know: A practicalist conception of knowledge, Wiley, Oxford, 2011a; Ratio 24:176–191, 2011b; Synthese 188:217–230, 2012a). I argue that his newest formulation is vulnerable to a modified version of Madison’s and Turri’s objection. However, I argue that Hetherington’s considerations lend support to a different, though also radical, thesis which can meet the objection. This thesis is what I call the Divorce thesis: the theory of epistemic justification is importantly independent of the theory of knowledge.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy > BD143 Epistemology. Theory of knowledge
Depositing User: Anthony Booth
Date Deposited: 11 Sep 2013 14:52
Last Modified: 13 Mar 2017 10:55
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/46144

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