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ARGUMENTATION BY FIGURATIVE
LANGUAGE IN VERBAL COMMUNICATION:
A PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVE

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June 2013

School of English
University of Sussex

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics
WORK NOT SUBMITTED ELSEWHERE FOR EXAMINATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature ______________________________
Ignis aurum probat, miseria fortes viros.

(Fire is the test of gold; adversity, of strong men.)

(Seneca: De Providentia V.9)
SUMMARY

University of Sussex

D.Phil of Linguistics

Argumentation by Figurative Language in Verbal Communication: A Pragmatic Perspective

This thesis has two goals. The first is to explain, within a pragmatic perspective, how figurative language (i.e. metaphor and irony) performs argumentation. Based on the argumentation theory (AT) of Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca (1958), argumentation is defined as the process of justifying something in an organized or logical way, which is composed of one or more claims and shows one or more grounds for maintaining them.

The second goal is to examine the hearer’s interpretation of figurative utterances in argumentation. The theoretical foundation of this discussion is based on experientialist epistemology (i.e. experientialism) and cognitive pragmatics in the form of Relevance Theory (RT).

In pursuit of those goals, I present four main innovations: First, I argue the status of metaphor should be viewed as ‘what is implicated’, rather than ‘what is said’. Second, I propose explanation of some exceptional cases of irony, which the standard RT approach does not treat, which relies on the notion of ‘incongruity’. Third, I propose integration of AT concepts within RT. Thus, this approach contributes to pursuing more economical explanation of communication as argumentation, by a single principle of relevance, but incorporating argumentative concepts such as doxa, topoi and polyphony. Finally, I apply this integrated approach to analysing real cases of commercial advertisement by metaphor or irony, or both. This includes explaining connection and overlapping, two ways in which metaphor and irony can work together.
Acknowledgements

Looking back on the past during which I struggled to write my doctoral dissertation, all processes in it remind me of the Beatles’ famous song, “The Long and Winding Road”. Doing this work in a foreign country is especially accompanied with more trials and errors, which cause big anxiety in a foreign student like me. When I came to England alone and started my PhD study, I had to first fight an uneasy mind for my precarious future and then my feeling of loneliness in a strange land. In this tough time, many people gave me their helping hand and encouraged me to keep a stiff upper lip during hardship. I believe that my work could be realized on the soil of these people’s effort and encouragement of me. It is time for me to thank these people who always stood by me whenever I found myself in times of trouble.

First of all, I would like to show my limitless gratitude to Dr M. Lynne Murphy, my supervisor, for having given me plenty of good comments and advice for improving my research. She is one of the best mentors that I have met. In fact, I know that it is not easy for an Asian student like me to specialize in pragmatics, because it requires more language intuition for English than other linguistic fields. For this reason, I had to repeat many trials and errors because of my poor intuition, pragmatic sense and English competence. In spite of these handicaps I could do this work, and my supervisor’s effort and inspiration for me are behind my achievement. I owe this achievement of mine to my supervisor. Once again, I appreciate her help and advice, from the bottom of my heart.

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language users’ different socio-cultural backgrounds and ways of thinking. For this reason, it is necessary to fully consider various possibilities of interpreting an utterance. In relation to this point, her advice was very helpful for me to rethink some examples of my dissertation.

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Dae-Young Kim
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the Study

When a speaker utters something, he or she expects the hearer to understand the utterance. When the hearer ‘understands’ the utterance, what does the hearer understand? For example, consider how the hearer reacts to the utterance in (1):

(1) My iPad performs well.

Supposing that the hearer cannot understand the meaning of (1), the hearer would attempt to gradually understand it, by using two types of questions. First of all, if the hearer does not know what iPad means, in other words, if the hearer does not know what the utterance in (1) represents, he or she would attempt to understand it, by asking the speaker What are you talking about? When the speaker responds with the answer, and if the hearer understands it, what he or she understands in this primary step is the informational contents of what the speaker has said.

On the other hand, although the hearer understands what the utterance represents, the hearer could still not know why the speaker said it in the specific situation. In this case, the hearer would ask the speaker what the utterance aims to do, by saying What do you mean by that? In other words, the hearer wants to know what the speaker who uttered (1) intends. What the utterance intends can be clarified when it is connected to other utterances:
(2) My iPad performs well; it is my office wife.

(3) My iPad performs well; but it is too expensive.

Considering (2) and (3), the speaker of (1) might intend to convey ‘I recommend that you buy an iPad’ or ‘I advise you to consider other alternatives, instead of an iPad’. Thus, if that is the case, in this second step, the speaker’s real intention is understood by the hearer; namely, for the utterance to mean something specific is that it is oriented to a certain direction of argumentation, rather than merely to convey some information to others.

In fact, ordinary language users do not only use language in order to merely convey information. They more frequently use language for the purpose of argumentation, which performs the speaker’s argument by persuading others to accept or do what the speaker intends or desires. This perspective on our ordinary language use sounds more persuasive, if we view that the ultimate goal of communication using human language is to create and develop our social relations in our communities or societies.

Considering those points discussed above, the utterance of (1) is understood in two dimensions:

1) The first understanding dimension: the hearer should understand the utterance at its representation level. In other words, the hearer should understand the objects, the events or the states described by the utterance.

2) The second understanding dimension: when the hearer understands the argumentative dimension of the utterance, it can be viewed that the hearer achieves proper understanding it. In other word, the hearer should grasp the speaker’s argumentative intention, which the speaker aims to do by the utterance.

For this reason, I argue that another task that a theory of linguistic pragmatics should fulfil is to
examine and explain the argumentative dimension of the utterance meaning.

On the foundation of this perspective, I claim that the scope of the argumentative approach should be extended to the domain of figurative language. This assumption is based on experientialist (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003) and cognitive pragmaticist (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1995) language philosophy, which views figurative language such as metaphor and irony as natural linguistic mechanisms reflecting human mental activity. If figurative language instantiates the rational speaker’s normal language use, it should be possible to treat it within the domain of argumentation. This position can be supported by the reality that even figurative language is frequently used in argumentative utterances which aim to persuade others; for example, advertisements and political speeches.

This study broadly has two purposes. One is to show, within a pragmatic framework, that these figurative utterances, in communicating the speaker’s intended meanings, perform an argumentative function (i.e. argumentation) that is intended to persuade the hearer. The other is, relating to the first purpose, to examine and explain the inferential processes through which the figurative utterances are interpreted by the hearer. These two purposes of this thesis are based on a linguistic point of view that figurative language like metaphor and irony are connected to human mental activities; namely, conceptualization connected to using metaphor and cognition connected to metaphor and irony.

Even figurative language such as metaphor and irony can perform argumentation in our ordinary language use; for example, in the cases of advertisements. An advertisement is one of the most salient cases in which figurative language performs argumentation, in that every commercial advertisement aims to persuade consumers to buy the advertiser’s specific products or services. Focusing on this point, in this study, I mainly treat the first issue of ‘how metaphor and irony perform argumentation (i.e. how the figurative utterances are used to influence the hearer). For doing this task, I rely upon real examples of metaphor and irony in ordinary language, particularly in advertisements from mass media such as television, newspapers, radio
and magazines, analysing in a pragmatic framework how such utterances are interpreted by consumers (i.e. the hearers).

The process of examining and analysing argumentation by figurative language involves two pragmatic theories: Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) and Argumentation Theory (henceforth AT). While RT (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1995) focuses on accounting for the process of human communication by a cognitive and communicative approach, AT (e.g. Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca 1958) is interested in explaining the work of human language which persuades others and brings about the changes of the world. In the process of explaining argumentation, these two theories are complementary, in that argumentation is a part of communication, and in general communication is accompanied with argumentation, as discussed in iPad example. Therefore, it is necessary to demonstrate ways in which RT is and is not compatible with AT, and to suggest ways to make these two theories more compatible with each other. I fully discuss this matter in chapter 5.

1.2 What is Argumentation?

Traditionally, disciplines like literature, philosophy and classical rhetoric have been interested in figurative language such as metaphor and irony. Particularly, the ancient Greek tradition of classical rhetoric made an especially big contribution to the study of figurative language, involving them in developing various skills of debate. In the mid 20th century, some linguists such as Toulmin (1958) and Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca (1958) opened a new horizon of studying rhetoric which focuses on the act of argumentation by advocating Aristotelian tradition (i.e. classical rhetoric). This ‘new horizon’ is called neo-rhetoric in order to distinguish it from classical rhetoric, and AT is another name of neo-rhetoric. Consequently, in this thesis, neo-rhetoric is identified with AT.
According to Amossy (2000), classical rhetoric became divided into two sides: rhetoric of figure and rhetoric of argumentation. Whereas the former has treated figurative language mainly from the perspective of aesthetics, focusing on studying how to use fine phrases by metaphor and metonymy, the latter has been interested in studying the skill of argumentation (i.e. the way of persuading others). Thus, the main target of this thesis is the rhetoric of argumentation, which is represented by neo-rhetoricians such as Perelman, Ducrot and Plantin.

This leads us to the question of how ‘argumentation’ is defined in AT. According to Bühler (1990), in general, language functions in human communication systems are 1) to express oneself, 2) to influence others\(^1\) and 3) to describe the object world. Popper (2000) adds argumentation, as the fourth function of human language, to these. Ducrot (1980, 1984) systematizes the notion of argumentation as the method for describing ‘meanings in utterance’.

Russell (1962) holds that all humans are essentially egocentric particulars, and code the world which they belong to in accordance with their individual standards and criteria. Accepting Russell’s philosophical position on human nature, argumentation can be viewed as a locus for communication where various attitudes or interests of human beings as language subjects might conflict or harmonize with one another. In this way, every utterance is always and ultimately argumentative. In my view, the act of argumentation is at the summit of the various functions of human language, in that it ultimately changes the world by drawing out another’s action, thus going beyond the simple dimension of sharing information between the speaker and the hearer.

According to Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca (1958), argumentation is a discourse skill that is employed to make addressees agree with or stand by the speaker’s position. Additionally, Habermas (1984) holds that argumentation is kind of a communicative action in which the speaker highlights a certain proposition and tries to support or reject it by showing relevant arguments (i.e. grounds), rather than a pure logical relation between different propositions.

\(^1\) This is different from argumentation in a strict sense. Although we may influence others by using our ordinary language (e.g. plea or begging), this process might not always entail argumentation based on reasonable arguments.
In different ways, Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) define argumentation as a linguistic activity in which the speaker presents his enunciation $E_1$ in order to make the hearer accept another enunciation $E_2$ from it. *Enunciation* is a term from French pragmatics, which approximately means ‘utterance’. Here, I temporarily use Anscombre and Ducrot’s term.

According to Anscombre and Ducrot (1983: 8), argumentation means that the speaker uses his enunciation $E_1$ as an argument in order to let the hearer draw a conclusion $E_2$ from it.\(^2\) For example, consider the following:

\[(4) \quad \text{It’s fine, (so) let’s go for a walk.}\]

\[E_1 \quad E_2\]

In (4), $E_1$ is an argument, and $E_2$ is a conclusion, and the relation between $E_1$ and $E_2$ constitutes an argumentation.\(^3\)

Sometimes, the role of context contributes to drawing the conclusion $E_2$ even though the speaker does not directly say it. For example, if Tom says only $E_1$ in (4) in front of his friend Jerry who has frequently taken a walk with Tom whenever it is fine, Jerry would immediately respond to Tom’s intention even though Tom does not explicitly say $E_2$; in this case, the argument $E_1$ itself may perform an argumentation.

To be brief, **argumentation** is the process of justifying something in an organized or logical way, which is composed of one or more claims and shows one or more grounds for maintaining them. The term *argumentation* can be distinguished from *argument*. An *argument* is a statement or a set of statements that the speaker uses in order to convince others that the speaker’s opinion or position about something is correct. Therefore, argumentation is the process that produces arguments, which are the units in argumentation.

\(^2\) Un locuteur fait une argumentation lorsqu’il présente un énoncé $E_1$ (ou un ensemble d’énoncé) comme destiné à en faire admettre un autre (ou un ensemble d’autres) $E_2$. (Anscombe and Ducrot 1983: 8)

\(^3\) I discuss more on argumentation theory in chapter 5.
1.3 Direction and Focus of the Study

Before I start a full-scale discussion of metaphor and irony in chapters 3 and 4, here I introduce traditional definitions of metaphor and irony. *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary* (2012) defines metaphor as ‘a figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them’. As mentioned above, historically, metaphor has been treated as a linguistic ornament, describing utterances like *Jane is an angel*, which deviate from a literal expression of the same intention such as *Jane is very nice*. In other words, from a traditional viewpoint, metaphor is a figurative use of language in which something is described in a non-literal way, as if it were a different thing. Similarly, Cruse (1986: 41) puts this as ‘metaphor induces the hearer (or reader) to view a thing, state of affairs, or whatever, as being like something else’.

*Irony*, according to the same dictionary, is defined as ‘the use of words to express something other than and especially the opposite of the literal meaning’. For instance, when a mischievous son spoilt a garden, his father might grimace and say, *Oh, my lovely son, you always do as I wish!* The father is actually very angry because of his son’s behaviour, so his utterance is completely opposite to what he really thinks and what he intends to communicate to his son; this is an expression of irony.

There is a big difference between metaphor and irony in that the former occurs at the conceptual level and depends on the inference from similarity between two different entities or experiences (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003), while the latter is elicited by the speaker’s mentioning or copying another’s statement and rejecting or dissociating himself from the opinion or the thought communicated by that statement, and the speaker indicates that he does not hold it (Wilson and Sperber 1992, Sperber and Wilson 1981, 1995). Thus, although what the speaker says and what he implicates with a metaphorical utterance are not entirely opposite to each other, what is said and what is pragmatically communicated in an ironic utterance are
generally opposite to each other.

However, despite this difference, I treat metaphor and irony together within a pragmatic perspective because of their common points:

i) Both are ordinary language mechanisms which may perform speech acts.

ii) In both metaphor and irony, there is a clash between what the speaker says and what he implicates, and both metaphor and irony involve implicated meanings that are elicited through pragmatic inferences.

iii) Both are frequently used in various advertisements, which can be one of the most salient examples of argumentation.

Any pragmatic theory will have to account for both these phenomena, as cases of implicature.\(^4\)

In particular, metaphor and irony are accounted for in RT (under the Principle of Relevance). Since, as noted in sub-section 1.1, there is a potential that AT can be compatible with pragmatic theories such as RT, it is possible to pursue a more economical approach to explaining argumentation by figurative language within the boundary of pragmatics (i.e. RT).

In order to exemplify metaphor and irony as argumentation, I introduce two pieces of advertising copy: (5) is a case of an advertising tagline for ExxonMobil in the UK, and (6) is from an advertisement for a tailor’s shop in Hawaii, which I saw several years ago.

(5) Put a tiger in your tank. ----- Esso petrol.

(6) Alas! The young owner of this shop is thoroughly insane! (Despite the highest class fabrics and the best hand-made skills, all suits are only 500 dollars each!)

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\(^4\) Recently, contextualists (e.g. Bezuidenhout 2001 and Recanati 2004), some Relevance Theorists (e.g. Wearing 2006, Wilson and Carston 2006 and Wilson 2011 *inter alia*) have argued that metaphor should be viewed as ‘what is said’, not as ‘what is implicated’. However, for various reasons I view metaphor as ‘what is implicated’, not as ‘what is said’. In chapter 3, I discuss this issue fully.
Although both (5) and (6) say ‘A is B’, they mean ‘A is C’; namely, (5) contains a metaphor (i.e. ‘Esso petrol is a tiger’) which produces another inferred meaning that ‘Esso petrol is strong and powerful’. On the other hand, (6) is a case of irony (i.e. ‘the young owner of this shop is crazy’), which overturns our common sense/belief that no advertisements would really intend to claim that the product or service provider who they are advertising is insane.\footnote{In general, the advertisements with irony are likely to be accompanied with follow-up sentences, lest consumers should misunderstand the advertisers’ real intentions. In (6), the follow-up sentence (i.e. *Despite the highest class fabrics and the best hand-made skills, all suits are only 500 dollars each!* ) prevents consumers from misunderstanding the advertiser’s real intention.}

The goal of an advertisement is to effectively convey the advertiser’s message to the consumers, and ultimately to make them want and buy the advertiser’s products or services. Given this, we might expect that literal expressions would be much more frequently used than figurative expressions in advertisements, because the latter seem more likely to be misunderstood by consumers than the former. However, reality is completely contrary to that expectation; figurative expressions are frequently used in advertisements. Suppose the advertising copy (5) consisted of a literal expression like *Esso petrol improves the performance and the fuel efficiency of your car*. Who would pay attention to this insipid copy? Similarly, if (6) were a literal expression like *This tailor’s shop sells good suits at a reasonable price*, few people would pay attention to it, because it sounds stale.

Advertising copy must draw the consumers’ attention first before it can persuade them to purchase the advertiser’s products or services. Thus, a novel figurative expression such as metaphor or irony is more effective than a normal literal one, even though the former makes consumers spend more cognitive processing effort and sometimes causes a risk of misunderstanding. For instance, there are stories of primary school pupils in Korea who believed that a bed is not furniture because of the ironic-metaphorical advertising copy: *A bed is not furniture. A bed is science ----- ACE / SEALY BED*, which was advertised in various mass media several years ago.
Besides the characteristics of advertisements by metaphor or irony pointed out above, I discuss two more significant points in chapter 6. Firstly, sometimes irony is used in corporate advertisements, which practise the virtue of humility. As it is possible to exercise humility by downgrading one’s merits or achievements in front of others, advertisers who practise humility advertisements appeal to consumers’ emotion and win their trust and sympathy by saying *I’m nothing*, instead of *I’m somebody*. This point can be confirmed in the following examples of some commercial advertisements:

(7) We will forget everything ----- Korean Air

(8) Probably the best beer in the world ----- Carlsberg

By saying (7), Korean Air promises its customers to return to the basics and to start work with a renewed mind, in spite of its past achievements. In (8), as *Probably* does not guarantee 100% certainty, it represents the speaker’s reserved attitude toward something. Thus, *Probably* expresses the speaker’s intention which shrinks from asserting that ‘something/somebody is clearly XX’. For this reason, *probably* in (8) may suspend the advertiser’s assertion that *Carlsberg is the best beer in the world*. Consumers share the common sense/belief that all advertisers try to show the superiority or the excellence of their companies, products or services. However, in (7) and (8), ironic copy overturns this common sense/belief, in that the advertisers self-downgrade the values of their companies’ achievements or products; and this point enables (7) and (8) to be viewed as the cases of the advertisements practising the virtue of humility.

Secondly, sometimes metaphor and irony work together. I divide the interactions of metaphor and irony into two categories: *connection* and *overlap*. For example:

(9) No one grows ketchup like Heinz.

(10) A devil’s temptation ----- French Café
Example (9) is a case of connection and (10) is a case of overlap. When metaphor and irony collaborate in connection, they are connected by an explicit or implied connective (e.g. but). Suppose that the advertising copy in (9) is shown in a verbo-pictorial advertisement which metaphorizes Heinz tomato ketchup as a natural and fresh tomato. Those who see this advertisement should recognize that the given verbo-pictorial information is composed of metaphor and irony. The advertiser who utters (9) claims that the Heinz Company grows tomato ketchup, and this utterance overturns the well-known fact/knowledge that tomato ketchup is manufactured; it is therefore irony. At the same time, the advertiser guides consumers to find the visual metaphor *Heinz tomato ketchup is a natural and fresh tomato*. The connection of metaphor and irony that consumers may find is:

(11) Heinz tomato ketchup is not an industrial product (irony), **but** a natural and fresh tomato. (metaphor)

Another case in which metaphor and irony come together is overlap. This is different from connection, in that in the case of the utterance in (10), the metaphorical utterance functions as irony in the given situation, without any work of connectives. In other words, the advertiser who utters (10) metaphorizes his product as a devil’s temptation, and this metaphorical utterance is interpreted as irony at the same time, in that it overturns consumers’ common belief that ‘no advertiser would negatively express the characteristics of his products or services’. In this case of overlap, metaphor is set by the expressions of the utterance, and then serves as a vehicle to determine an ironic interpretation; Popa (2009) calls this case *metaphorical irony (or ironic metaphor)*.

In relation to argumentation as communication performed by figurative language, the three questions to consider here are:
1) Why does a speaker use an utterance "A is B" to implicate the intended communication ‘A is C’? In other words, why does the speaker use figurative language even though he could have used literal expressions?

2) How is successful communication between the speaker and the hearer achieved despite this indirectness?

3) Finally, why and how does the content of ‘A is C’ bring about a change of status between the speaker and the hearer and ultimately change the world? In other words, how is argumentation achieved through figurative language?

Reflecting on the points in those questions, this study progresses on the assumptions that figurative language, including metaphor and irony, is a normal linguistic mechanism that performs speech acts, and extends the function of figurative language to the domain of argumentation. My task in this study is to explain why these assumptions that seem natural are natural.

Metaphor and irony in advertisements can be roughly divided into two categories in accordance with how they are represented: verbal and visual (or situational). The former is given in the form of language whereas the latter involves two contrasting visual images or situations. In this thesis, I confine the scope of my study to the verbal. Therefore, summarizing what I intend here, I mainly treat the issues of representation and interpretation of verbal metaphor and irony within a pragmatic framework.

In this study, I survey the pragmatic framework including the notion of Grice’s conversational implicature (1975) and show Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance (1995) is a better ‘tool’ for explaining how consumers (i.e. the hearers) properly interpret advertisers’ (i.e. the speakers’) messages in the form of figurative expressions such as metaphor or irony.

However, this work differs from the previous works on figurative language and argumentation in five ways:
This work views figurative language as a normal language use which reflects human mental activity, not just as a linguistic ornament or deviation. This position is opposite to that of traditional semantic studies such as Carnap (1955, 1988), Percy (1958) and Frege (1980).

This work rejects the position in some previous argumentation theories which devalue metaphor, and deny or doubt defining figurative language as the method of communication (as argumentation); particularly integrated pragmatics (e.g. Ducrot 1980, 1984), as discussed in Guattari (1984). In fact, we empirically know that this position is wrong, because even figurative language (i.e. metaphor and irony) is successfully used in communication as argumentation; particularly in the cases of advertisements or politicians’ speeches whose purposes are to persuade audience (e.g. *I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat* by W. Churchill).

This work proposes a new integrated approach to argumentation and communication, by harmonizing AT and RT. For doing this task, it is necessary to extend the scope of applying RT; full-scale discussion of this matter is in chapter 5.

This work aims to explain argumentation of novel metaphor and irony, based on a pragmatic perspective, in contrast to Santibáñez (2010); he argues that even metaphor can be explained within an AT perspective, focusing on conceptual metaphor or dead metaphor, based on the cognitive linguistic approach.

This work examines and analyses the argumentative works of metaphor and irony within a cognitive and communicative approach by seeking a harmony between RT and AT. Although there are several neo-rhetoric studies which treat metaphor (e.g. Perelman 1977), they focus just on the rhetoric issues of the relation between analogy and metaphor; they are not the studies for explaining the process of argumentation by metaphor or irony, or both, within the dimension of communication.
1.4 Why a Pragmatic Approach?

When the sentence, *The Prime Minister is a real bulldog during Question Time* is uttered, it is not literally interpreted. For this reason, if we try to deal with this sentence within a semantic domain, we cannot properly interpret it. Likewise, if we think that our ordinary linguistic communication is just a matter of conventional correspondence between signs and referents, it should be impossible to believe that such a sentence could be true. However, despite this, the speaker and the hearer may succeed in using this sentence without any problem; metaphor makes this possible.

In another situation, suppose that stormy weather prevents some students from going on a picnic, and one says *What a wonderful day*. The real situation is the exact opposite to what they have said. If linguistic signs are meant to reflect the world as is, that expression should not be accepted and understandable. However, hearers generally understand this discord between what is said and what is meant by *What a wonderful day* in this situation, and understand it to implicate ‘It’s a horrible day’. How is this possible? When we know that irony is at work in that utterance, this question is solved. These two examples show that interpreting figurative utterances is possible only by pragmatic inference, which focuses not only on the compositional meanings of the sentences but also on the language users and contexts in which the sentences are used.

In this section, I justify why I employ a pragmatic approach, in order to examine and explain argumentation by figurative language (i.e. metaphor and irony). Furthermore, the process of justifying this position naturally becomes connected to defining my stance on where the language meaning (i.e. meaning of meaning) is anchored, which claims that our ordinary language meaning cannot be understood until the relation between language users and the world (i.e. contexts) is examined. From the perspective of this thesis, I have chosen a pragmatic perspective for two reasons: one based on a linguistic viewpoint, and the other from a language-
philosophical point of view.

First, unlike syntax which treats the relation of signs to signs, and semantics as the relation of signs to the world, pragmatics comprehends our language not only in its internal structure but also in its external function, which is the relation of the functional connection among ‘language – language user – the world’ (Rhee 1997: 368-369). Therefore, pragmatics is an eclectic and practical discipline exploring the relation of signs to language users. Relatedly, Gazdar (1979) confines the domain of semantics to the study for truth-conditional sentences, and defines pragmatics in the following:

Pragmatics has as its topic those aspects of the meaning of utterances which can’t be accounted for by straightforward reference to the truth conditions of the sentences uttered. Put crudely: PRAGMATICS = MEANING – TRUTH CONDITIONS. (Gazdar 1979: 2)

In this case, what is the meaning of meaning in pragmatics? Pragmaticists (e.g. Austin 1962, Searle 1979, Levinson 1983, Leech 1983, Mey 2001 inter alia) point out that the meaning of an expression is not always fixed and its meaning is ready to be diachronically or synchronically changed in accordance with socio-cultural situations, or even personal ideas. Therefore, the meaning of an expression includes not only truth-conditional information derived from the meanings of the word and their grammatical relations but also information from the non-linguistic socio-cultural and personal situations. This point means that pragmatics accepts language users’ subjectivization in the process of meaning determination, and shows that this pragmatic language philosophy is directly connected to experientialist philosophy, which holds that language use relies on language users’ experiences. I discuss experientialism in chapter 2.

On the other hand, however, traditional semantic approaches try to treat the meaning of meaning from the viewpoint of ‘language and the world’ without considering a language user who controls ‘meaning’ in the process of interpreting an expression. One of serious weak points
in traditional semantic approaches to metaphor is that they regard metaphor not as a natural linguistic mechanism in ordinary language use, but as a linguistic deviation (e.g. Carnap 1955, Percy 1958); namely, a linguistic parasite. Bickerton (1969: 36-37) points out that the viewpoint that metaphor is a language deviation originated from three incorrect assumptions: a) Words have fixed and definite meanings. b) The meaning of a sentence is the sum of the meanings of the words that compose it. c) The interpretability of texts is independent of the mode-of-discourse.

From this point of view, metaphor seems not to be an indispensable element of linguistic communication but an optional one, which is parasitic upon normal language use. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003: 190-191), modern empirical science was suspicious of poetry and rhetoric by figurative language, and the value of metaphor became underestimated, because it was believed that metaphor is likely to distract human’s sound judgment. For example, particularly some objectivists such as Hobbes and Locke thought that it is very confusing to metaphorically say *Mary is a rose* instead of *Mary is beautiful* because as metaphor involves category mistakes (which are semantic or ontological errors in which entities of a kind are presented as though they were members of another), it is less accurate than a literal expression and more deceptive. Objectivists’ viewpoint on metaphor is due to Aristotle, who viewed the nature of metaphor as the following:

> Metaphor is the transference of the name of the thing to something else, working from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy. (Aristotle 1967: 57)

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6 Hobbes (1996) excoriated rhetoric that includes metaphor, claiming that we should always use simple and normal language, because he thought that using figurative language like metaphor slyly stimulates a man’s emotion and ultimately deceives him. Hobbes viewed rhetoric including figurative language as the most cunning enemy that our rationality should fight against. What is interesting is, however, the title of his book (i.e. *Leviathan*) is also metaphorical, and his thought defining the human world (i.e. ‘war of each against all’) is another rhetorical and metaphorical expression.

7 See Ryle (1949).
According to Aristotle’s definition, metaphor is application of the name of one object to another object, and a metaphorical meaning is produced by this transference. For this reason, Aristotle held that metaphor is unusual, indirect and vague language use, and therefore that it is not suitable for logic, which requires precision, nor for rhetoric, which pursues definiteness and persuasion. Instead metaphor is seen just as a linguistic ornament for poetic effect.

Aristotle’s definition of metaphor relies on the premise that the meaning of a word is fixed. This is connected to Frege’s principle of compositionality, which argues that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meaning of each component (i.e. word) and the function of a coupling scheme that each component has. If Aristotle and Frege were right, the meaning of a sentence or a phrase composed of several words should be simple matter of synthesizing the words’ meanings.

However, in contrast to this objectivist position, the meaning of a sentence or an utterance is rarely a simple synthesis of word meanings, but instead a sentence or an utterance usually has another meaning in accordance with the given situation. For instance, as Lyons (1995: 280-281) points out, the utterance *John is a tiger* can be interpreted as having at least three different meanings, according to the different contexts:

i) There exists a tiger whose name is *John*. (Referential meaning)
ii) John is a person whose character is brave or fierce. (Metaphorical meaning)
iii) A person whose name is *John* plays the role of a ‘tiger’ in a play about animals.

Additionally, literal sentences do not have usable fixed meanings. Because of polysemy and the vagueness of words, hearers need to consult a context in order to resolve ambiguities and fill in information to achieve reference. For example, if I say *That is a good jacket*, in some context, *good* would be interpreted as ‘warm’ and in other contexts, it would be interpreted as ‘appropriate to the formality of the occasion’ and in some contexts it would mean ‘beautiful’. Without setting a context, we could not properly interpret that literal utterance.
Similarly, there is another case that shows why the speaker’s intention and the context should be fully considered in the process of interpreting the utterance. Murphy (2003: 18) points out that ‘even within a single language user, the range of concepts that a lexical item indicates is not necessarily limited or static’. For example, the speaker X who likes rooibos tea and believes that the hearer Y does not know what rooibos tea is might say *No, I do not care for tea*, when Y asks X whether X would like to have some tea, because X knows that rooibos tea does not belongs to the set of ‘tea’ which Y intends to refer to. Thus, in this context, the sense X uses for *tea* does not include rooibos, and this is Speaker X’s intention for a proper exchange with hearer Y. However, X may refer to rooibos as *tea* in another context such as *The only tea I like is rooibos.*

Furthermore, there is a philosophical reason why I employ a pragmatic perspective. In subsection 1.1, I said that one of the purposes of this study is to explain how and why even figurative language like metaphor and irony is argumentative in our ordinary language use. Relating to this question, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) offers a significant philosophical perspective on the issue of argumentative use of human language. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the goal of language use is not always merely to conveying or sharing information. When the speaker utters something, beyond the dimension of merely conveying information to the hearer, the utterance may perform argumentation, which brings about re-establishing the social status and relation between communicators, and ultimately changing the world to which they belong. For example, consider the utterance of *I love you*. We know that this utterance does not merely show the information that the speaker loves somebody. This is a pledge to the speaker himself (i.e. ‘I confirm and swear that I love you’), a promise to his lover (i.e. ‘I will always love you’) and giving a social obligation to his lover (i.e. ‘You should believe me that I love you’) at the same time. In other words, saying *I love you* could mean that the speaker persuades the hearer to accept ‘the speaker loves the hearer’ as the truth, rather than merely conveying the information that ‘the speaker loves the hearer’.
Judging from this point, Deleuze and Guattari’s position on human language use can be a philosophical foundation, which tacitly works in every stage of explaining argumentation; thus, every discussion on argumentation of this thesis is developed on this philosophical base. For this reason, it is necessary to briefly survey Deleuze and Guattari’s language philosophy here.

Deleuze and Guattari’s language philosophy starts from Austin and Searle’s speech act theory, in that they also view the nature of human language as the acts which influence others’ mind or attitudes. However, Deleuze and Guattari’s viewpoint is distinguished from Austin and Searle’s, in that Deleuze and Guattari’s language philosophy is much more oriented towards defining the nature of language as a socio-political power relation of ‘directive’ or ‘imperative’, without classifying each category of ‘speech act’ like Austin and Searle did. This is why Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 82) views pragmatics as ‘politics of language’. For this reason, it is Deleuze and Guattari’s language philosophy which offers more persuasive perspective on argumentation, than Austin and Searle’s. Because, even though the same speech act is performed, the strength of argumentative power is to be differentiated, according to the speaker’s social status or what the social relation between the speaker and the hearer is; but this cannot be grasped by Austin and Searle’s speech act theory or communication theory like Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) standard RT.

According to Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 75-89), the nature of human language is summarized as *mots d’ordre* (i.e. order-words or words of ordering). They use the term to refer to the imperative function which is inherent in language; thus, they claim that a statement not only gives an order but also produces an order. In Deleuze and Guattari (1987), a brief explanation of *mots d’ordre* is given:
We call *order-words*, not a particular category of explicit statements (for example, in the imperative), but the relation of every word or every statement to implicit presuppositions, in other words, to speech acts that are, and can only be, accomplished in the statement. Order-words do not concern commands only, but every act that is linked to statements by a ‘social obligation.’ Every statement displays this link, directly or indirectly. Questions, promises, are order words. … Language is the set of all order-words, implicit presuppositions, or speech acts current in a language at a given time.

(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 79)

The following example can be used to illustrate their position:

(12) If you fail in this matter … (subjunctive sentence / an assumption)

We cannot understand the speakers’ ultimate meaning of that example given above just by synthesizing each grammatical component. In other words, the speaker’s ultimate meaning of that example can be only understood in a given situation or a specific context. Recalling the main purpose of human communication, that viewpoint sounds persuasive, in that human communication is a process of recognizing others’ intentions and responding to them, rather than just decoding others’ language signs. For instance, supposing that a Mafia boss said (12) to his henchmen, this utterance implicates a very strong command or menace implying that ‘if you fail this matter, you shall die; so you must risk your necks’. Thus, this is an indirect discourse as well because the Mafia boss’s utterance contains a strong message of ‘order/command’ that his henchmen must succeed in the task. Furthermore, in (12), without any (pragmatic) information about the speaker’s social status and the relation between the speaker and the hearer, why the Mafia boss’s utterance in (12) more strongly moves the hearer than that of a five-year

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8 The terms *direct discourse / indirect discourse* are Deleuze and Guattari’s: *discours direct / discours indirect*. The basic notions of these terms are the same as those of ‘direct speech act / indirect speech act’. However, I temporarily use Deleuze and Guattari’s terms here while I explain their language philosophy.
old child’s could not be explained; this is not a matter of mere communication.

As has been discussed so far, a pragmatic approach to ordinary language use provides us with enough background notions on explaining how human language performs argumentation in communication. Once we view figurative language like metaphor and irony as normal language use, this pragmatic language philosophy can be applied to explaining them, since it involves understanding the meanings in our ordinary language as ‘use in accordance with given situations’, rather than a simple relation between coding and decoding relations between word and world. Without a pragmatic approach, there might be no way to grasp and explain the aspects of human language that have been discussed so far.

1.5 Organization of the Study

In order to make the arguments outlined above, the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the nature of metaphor within a philosophical perspective. In the first step, I focus on experientialist alternative (i.e. experientialism), which Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003, 1999) develop. This is a third epistemology, which seeks an eclectic position between objectivism and subjectivism. In this stage, it is significant to highlight experientialism, in that the purpose of this chapter is to set my philosophical foundation for explaining metaphor. In this thesis, I develop my position on metaphor by employing RT as an explanatory mechanism, on the base of experientialism as an epistemological ground.

Furthermore, I examine three philosophical viewpoints on metaphor (i.e. substitution viewpoint, comparison viewpoint and interaction viewpoint), and discuss some explanatory problems of each viewpoint. Finally, I introduce the third inferential way of abduction, which was developed by Peirce (1958). The virtue of abduction is that it enables language users to discover something new from the well-known facts, which is more closely connected to the
process of interpreting metaphor than other inferential ways such as deduction or induction. Abduction (as a semiotic inference) can be replaced with the cognitive process of eliciting implicature by RT. This potential is discussed in chapter 5.

Chapter 3 covers two tasks: one is to survey various linguistic approaches to interpreting metaphor, pointing out their explanatory problems with respect to the pragmatic viewpoint taken here. First of all, I survey some early generativists’ and semanticists’ viewpoints on metaphor such as Chomsky (1965) and Matthews (1971), and discuss their explanatory problems. Furthermore, more detailed discussions on metaphor within a pragmatic point of view, particularly in RT, are also developed in this chapter.

The second task of chapter 3 is to introduce and discuss some recent relevant issues on metaphor. This is done by dividing the discussion into two parts again. One is to discuss what the status of metaphor should be defined as: Is metaphor ‘what is implicated’ or ‘what is said’? Although the position of ‘metaphor as what is implicated’ has generally been accepted in some pragmatic approaches, it is not shared by contextualists such as Bezuidenhout (2001), Recanati (2004), some Relevance Theorists such as Wearing (2006), Wilson and Carston (2006) and Wilson (2011), and some non-Gricean theorists such as Romero and Soria (forthcoming) and Nogales (2012). However, for various reasons, I argue that (novel/creative) metaphor is much closer to ‘what is implicated’ than ‘what is said’.

The second recent issue discussed in chapter 3 is the potential that RT and cognitive linguistics (henceforth, CL) can complement and be harmonized with each other, as is suggested in the articles by Gibbs and Tendahl (2006) and Tendahl and Gibbs (2008), and in Wilson’s (2011) response. I highlight and compare those two positions on metaphor, and tap the possibility of harmonizing them.

The topic of chapter 4 is irony. I examine the nature of irony and explain how the speaker’s irony is properly interpreted by the hearer, by the RT approach. In relation to this task, I explore some relevant researches on irony such as Leech (1983), Clark and Gerrig (1984), Gibbs (1986),
Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989), Giora (1995), Dew, Kaplan and Winner (1995), Culpeper (1996), Seto (1998), Utsumi (2000), Curcó (2000) and Lee (2002). Furthermore, even though RT well explains most prototypical cases of irony (‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’), this theory cannot explain some exceptional uses of irony (e.g. non-echoic irony) and echoic non-irony. So that RT can cope with those exceptional cases of irony in a different way, I propose an alternative approach to explaining irony, within the boundary of RT.

Chapter 5 explores the interconnection between cognitive pragmatics (i.e. RT) and AT. In this process, I make the theoretical foundation for treating argumentation within a cognitive and communicative approach, by justifying how some argumentative concepts and non-linguistic argumentative conditions which are introduced by AT can be adapted into the domain of RT. This matter needs to extend the scope of applying RT to explaining argumentation, because RT focuses on explaining the process of the hearer’s interpreting the utterance, not argumentation. For this reason, I expect that my approach and proposal by a single principle of relevance may contribute to more economically explaining argumentation, which has been regarded as a case of speech act complex by some argumentation theorists (e.g. Kienpointner 1987).

In chapter 6, I demonstrate how argumentation by figurative language is realized, by analysing some real cases of English and Korean verbal advertisements from various mass media such as newspapers, magazines, television, billboards and so on. A commercial advertisement is one of the most salient examples which show the speaker’s argumentation, in that every commercial advertisement aims to stimulate consumers’ purchasing motivation and behaviours. Furthermore, in this chapter, I propose the way of analysing some cases of interactions or collaborations by metaphor and irony, in which they are connected to or overlap with each other.

Chapter 7 offers a brief summary and conclusion.
Chapter 2

Philosophical Foundation for Recognizing Metaphor

2.0 Introduction

This chapter mainly deals with epistemological issues concerning metaphor. Language philosophy has been interested in metaphor since Aristotle, and philosophical perspectives on metaphor have influenced linguistic approaches to explaining metaphor. For this reason, it is meaningful to discuss some philosophical positions on metaphor here.

The purpose of this chapter is to set a philosophical foundation for developing my position on explaining metaphor before fully discussing linguistic accounts for metaphor in the next chapter. In relation to this task, I highlight how experientialism (in contrast to objectivism and subjectivism) recognizes metaphor as a normal language use that reflects human thoughts and conceptualization. Thus, this means that my further discussion of metaphor is based on experientialist epistemology.

Additionally, this chapter surveys three previous philosophical viewpoints (i.e. substitution viewpoint, comparison viewpoint and interaction viewpoint) on the nature of metaphor, and discusses some explanatory problems which individual approaches have. This is directly connected to the necessity of employing pragmatic accounts for metaphor, which I discussed in chapter 1.

Finally, I introduce inference by abduction examined by Peirce (1958). Unlike deduction or induction, abduction contributes to discovering something new (i.e. ‘case’) from well known facts (i.e. ‘rule’ or ‘result’). I discuss abduction because this allows me to argue that the hearer’s
finding the conclusion (i.e. ‘case’) of the metaphorical utterance is achieved by abduction.

2.1 Metaphor as an Experientialist Meaning

Experientialist epistemology (i.e. experientialism) holds that language users understand something new, by projecting their old experience to their new experience, and human language use is based on language users’ experiences. Before experientialism, two epistemological positions were objectivism and subjectivism, which are in extreme opposition, on the matter of how language users recognize the world and the truth.

Objectivism holds that there is a single criterion for recognizing the truth in all processes of our exploring it, and this viewpoint assumes that objective and fixed meanings independently exist, regardless of language users’ way of recognizing the world. However, we must ask whether objectivity in a strict sense can exist. Existentialist philosophers such as Heidegger (1996) have been suspicious of strict objectivism; their question is that assuming that objectivity exists, who really judges and decides whether or not it is objectivity.\(^9\) From this point of view, ‘objectivity’ is just the total sum of thoughts or conclusions elicited by each individual subjective entity. Thus, Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003: 186) call objectivists’ belief the myth of objectivism.

On the other hand, subjectivism views that language users recognize the truth in a relative way. Thus, subjectivism denies that every value is determined by something that really exists, because what we can recognize is just our own sensory perceptions of entities, not the entities

\(^9\) Even in the world of natural science which had been believed to be most objectively accomplished, the objectivist stance is problematic. For example, Kuhn (1996) argues that science is not always objectively or reasonably progressed. According to his relativist viewpoint on science, natural science is just a process of premising a paradigm already approved by scientists and solving the problems shown by it. Therefore, most sciences are works based on a paradigm, and giving up the paradigm is the same as denying that they are sciences.
themselves. However, this relativist viewpoint is likely to bring about the fallacy of radical relativism, which may neutralize and reject human rationality, all objectified knowledge (or experiences) and their universality (Bernstein 1983: 8). Furthermore as radical relativism from subjectivism makes it impossible to hold any common and universal criterion which judges ‘meaning’, ‘truth’, ‘rationality’ and ‘values’, this viewpoint might deny even the basis of communication. Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003: 188-189) call this epistemological problem of subjectivism *the myth of subjectivism*.

In this situation, objectivism may seem like the only alternative for surmounting radical subjectivism (or relativism). However, Putnam (1981) points out that this dichotomous way of thinking is one of the most serious problems confronting the contemporary philosophy, and emphasizes the necessity of a new epistemological viewpoint which can resolve it.10

Between this extreme opposition of those two sides, Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003: 192-194) argue that objectivity or subjectivity are not the only option. Instead, they present experientialism as a third eclectic alternative in epistemology. Their experientialist philosophy accepts both the subjective position that there cannot be any absolute truth in the world and the objective position that fairness and impartiality should be sought in the process of recognizing the truth. Experientialism holds that our experience takes place in two dimensions: one is the primary experience in the physical dimension, and the other is the secondary experience in the mental and abstract dimension. These two dimensions are not independent; they continuously interact. Thus, our experience is not a flat recognition within one of these two, but a product of multi-faceted and complex interactions between them.

Experientialism is oriented to the philosophy of ‘body’. According to experientialism (e.g.

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10 In a strict sense, Putnam has been classified as one of the philosophers of empiricism who stand by externalism. However, he gave up his early position which entirely supported extreme causal theory. Instead, he suggested a new stance, what is called, ‘internal realism’, which partially accepts the viewpoints from internalism. Like experientialism, Putnam’s internal realism is estimated as his eclectic attempt for neutralizing the utmost opposition between those two sides.
Lakoff and Johnson 1999), all philosophical theories and concepts as the products of abstract thoughts have physical grounds, and they are shown by metaphorical extensions. Thus, the philosophy of the body in Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and Johnson (1987) is an attempt to return the notion of ‘body’ to the original place, which was distorted or ignored by objectivism extremely claiming the abstract and disembodied nature, rather than emphasizing the exclusive priority of ‘body’. From a viewpoint of this philosophy of ‘body’ all human experiences are embodied. The claim that ‘all human experiences are embodied’ does not mean that only physical (direct) experiences are valid and indirect experiences are not. On the contrary, this viewpoint can be regarded as comprehending indirect experiences through the base of physical experiences, because it holds that indirect experiences acquired by symbolized means can be concretely recognized by embodiment of ‘body’.

Noh (2008) takes a similar position. According to him, the experiences of a human as an embodied existence can be divided into two categories. A human directly interacts with the objects outside him, through his body. Noh calls it natural experience or non-symbolic experience, and I view it as experientialists’ notion of physical experience. However, there exists different experience of complex type, which is based on natural experience but is beyond it. Symbolization is a very broad and comprehensive action which characterizes these different experiences. The experience extended by symbolization contrasts with natural experience, and Noh calls it symbolic experience. Furthermore, this symbolic experience may be ultimately regarded as a type of indirect experience in a broad sense, in that this experience is acquired by symbolized means, and these symbolized means can be formed by the processes of education or socialization. Here, Noh (2008) emphasizes that the nature and the structure of the sign are the matters which should be explained by the ways of human experience, rather than the matter being accounted for by the function of the sign itself. In other words, although every existence in the world can be experienced in not only non-symbolic but also symbolic ways, the way of experiencing it is related not to the world but to the sign users themselves. From this point of
view, explaining the nature of the sign or symbolization should be a part of accounting the structure of human experience, rather than explicating the truth in the world. Judging from Noh’s viewpoint on human experience, there is no experience in the disembodied dimension, and this view implies that the experientialists’ notion of physical experience itself already includes the dimension of indirect experience as well.

Experientialism has been particularly addressed to metaphor because, Lakoff and Johnson argue, the human conceptual system is essentially metaphorical, and metaphor combines rationality as the objective representation with imagination as the subjective representation. In other words, metaphor involves an imaginary understanding, but this is based on rationality, which Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003) call imaginative rationality. Moreover, Lakoff and Johnson argue that elucidating the ignored metaphorical part in human thought demands a very new explanation of the process of our recognition, and this task is important enough to require the whole changes of philosophical notions, instead of partially revising a specific traditional theory. Thus, their theory of metaphor requires a (comparatively) new understanding on the traditional themes of philosophy.

Noh (1999) points out some philosophical entailments of experientialism, and I here summarize his discussions that specifically concern experientialism and metaphor. Firstly, experientialism does not agree with a traditional dichotomy between metaphorical meanings and literal meanings. However, in spite of denying this traditional dichotomy, the metaphorical-literal distinction itself is not totally refuted; because there still exist some literal meanings. In relation to this point, Lakoff (1987, 1993) claims that literal meanings exist only in the dimension of concrete and physical experiences which are very restricted, and metaphorical understanding is necessary in the dimension of abstractness and emotion, which is beyond the dimension of physical experiences. According to the experientialist viewpoint (e.g. Lakoff 1987), language users understand something new by metaphorically projecting their old experiences to their new experiences, and there is a systematic correspondence between a target
domain (of the speaker’s abstract experiences) and a source domain (of something concrete) of conceptual metaphor. This means that concepts (i.e. meanings) in the source domain correspond to those in the target domain. Experientialists call this conceptual correspondence mapping. If metaphor is understood as mapping between those two different domains, there is no absolute distinction between metaphorical meanings and literal meanings. Instead, this distinction can be something relative in this structure of mapping. In other words, the meanings in the source domain are relatively metaphorical for those in the target domain. For example, when Tom’s marriage has gone on a reef is uttered, and a conceptual metaphor like MARRIAGES ARE JOURNEYS works in it, only some of the meanings in the source domain (i.e. JOURNEYS) are mapped to target domain (i.e. MARRIAGES), according to the given utterance situation. In this utterance, ‘reef’ is one of the conceptual elements which are composed of the concept JOURNEY, and the speaker identifies ‘the problems of Tom’s marriage’ with ‘reef’, under the work of a conceptual metaphor MARRIAGES ARE JOURNEYS. On the contrary, if there is no problem in Tom’s marriage, the speaker would say Tom’s marriage has gone on a cruise by identifying ‘the good condition of Tom’s marriage’ with ‘cruise’, under the work of the same conceptual metaphor MARRIAGES ARE JOURNEYS. However, the speaker’s metaphor uses shown above are based on the literal meanings of reef and cruise, and he metaphorically extends their concrete literal meanings to their abstract figurative meanings, according to the given utterance situations. This is why experientialists argue that it is useless to make a strict distinction between metaphorical meaning and literal meaning. This point is connected to experientialist philosophy, which refutes the myth of objectivism holding that meaning is objective and independent of use.

Secondly, experientialism rejects Reductionist Semantic Theory. Reductionism holds that the whole can be clearly defined by the elements in the sub-levels; for instance, the componential analysis approach by Nida (1975) reflects this position. Furthermore, reductionism holds that all meaningful propositions should empirically be verified, and it should
be possible for them to be restored by empirical propositions; logical positivism (Frege 1980, Carnap 1988) represents this position. This tendency of reductionism is connected to objectivist epistemology, which holds that meaning is disembodied, objective, compositional and independent of human understanding.

However, experientialism holds that it is impossible for semantic extension by metaphorical mapping to be restored by empirical propositions. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003: 202-203), their new metaphor theory makes it clear that semantic extension by metaphorical mapping cannot be explained by ‘the Building-Block Theory’, which views that meanings are all compositional, and the world is made up of building blocks: definable objects and clearly delineated inherent properties and relations.

Unlike reductionism, experentialist semantic theory (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1999) advocates that meaning is based on one’s experience within one’s human body (i.e. an embodied mind), and semantic theories should be studied with the human as the central figure; namely, it is necessary to consider language users’ ways of understanding situations and contexts. This position, which accepts subjectivization in the process of meaning determination, is exactly connected to a pragmatic approach to language, which I discussed in chapter 1.

Finally, **experentialism holds that metaphor creates new similarities between two objects rather than just describing them.** It was traditionally said that the main function of metaphor is finding the objective similarities between two entities and exposing them. According to experientialism, however, unknown or overlooked similarities between two entities can be newly discovered by the speaker’s novel metaphor. For instance, *Jane is Tina Turner* may not always be interpreted as ‘Jane sings very well’. In accordance with the speaker’s experience or knowledge and the specific context with which he is faced, this metaphor could mean ‘Jane succeeded in making a comeback after divorce’ or ‘Jane used to be beaten by her husband’. Of course, *Jane is Tina Turner* can be used and interpreted with any of
these meanings, because language users as egocentric particulars\textsuperscript{11} (who codify the world and its entities by their own standards or criteria) are likely to differently conceptualize the same entity. In this case, we see that unknown similarity is discovered by language users. In fact, any entity in the world might share some similarities with any other.

What is important for conceptualization is, however, by what the similarities understood and accepted in our cognitive system are determined. Specific similarities between individual views of the reality, so to speak, can have their own meanings only in the specific contexts, and metaphorical projection plays a very important role of deciding the contexts. From experientialists’ point of view, we understand something abstract in accordance with our physical experiences, so it is inappropriate to say that recognizing the similarities shown to us is equal to just discovering ones which already exist. On the contrary, new similarities between two things compared in the speaker’s metaphor could be created, according to the nature of our metaphorical projection, and this point is closely connected to the process of subjectivization as one of the important notions in CL (i.e. Cognitive Linguistics), which claims that language users participate in the process of meaning determination, and this cognitive process brings about the semantic extension.

The points discussed above supports the argument that experientialist epistemology is compatible with the pragmatic language philosophy, which holds that explaining the meaning of \textit{meaning} depends on studying language users and their language use.\textsuperscript{12} Although pragmaticists (particularly, Relevance Theorists) have not explicitly stated that they accept experientialism, agreeing with pragmatic position on meaning might be identified as tacit acceptance of an experientialist epistemology. Considering this point, experientialism may have a status of a universal epistemology which can commonly be applied to any linguistic theory (including

\textsuperscript{11} See Russell (1962).

\textsuperscript{12} Judging from this point, Tendahl and Gibbs’ (2008) position that CL and RT can be harmonized and complementary does not accidentally appears. For this position, Wilson (2011) suggests some preconditions for harmonizing these two sides. I discuss this issue in chapter 3.
cognitive pragmatics such as RT) that accepts subjectivization in the process of meaning determination, rather than an epistemology specific only to CL.

In this thesis, I develop my position on recognizing metaphor, based on experientialism. In the next section, I discuss how experientialist epistemology works in ordinary language use; for instance, polysemy is one of the most salient examples, which verifies that experientialism really works in the process of human conceptualization and ordinary language use.

2.2 The Evidence of Experientialist Meaning: Metaphor and Polysemy

When language users have an experience X, they might express it with a word $X_1$, and if they later have another experience $XX$ which is similar to X, they might understand it by the previous experience X, and might use the extended meaning of $X_1$ in order to express their new experience $XX$. In this process of semantic extension of a word, the word becomes polysemous, and this process of creating polysemy is evidence that supports experientialism in that polysemy is typically realized by the processes of figurative semantic extension such as metaphor or metonymy. As I focus on metaphor in this section, I discuss only the points relevant to metaphor.

*Routledge Dictionary of Language and Linguistics* (1996: 918) defines polysemy that ‘One speaks of ‘polysemy’ when an expression has two or more definitions with some common features that are usually derived from a single basic meaning’. According to Murphy (2010: 84), ‘if a single lexeme has two distinguishable senses associated with it, then we say that it is a polyseme or it is polysemous’. Similarly, Lakoff (1987: 416) defines polysemy as the case in which ‘there is one lexical item with a family of related senses’. Additionally, Taylor (1989: 99) holds that ‘polysemy is the association of two or more related senses with a single linguistic form’. Although each semanticist seems to have his/her own definition of polysemy, there is a
common agreement that polysemy is a motivated semantic phenomenon in which a single lexical item has a set of similar uses (cf. Lyons 1977, Palmer 1981, Saeed 1997, Cruse 2000). Consider the following examples:

(13) a. Tom fully opened his mouth in order to have a big piece of walnut pie.

   b. Jerry saw Tom’s banana boat floating into the mouth of the Mississippi River.

   c. Tom knows that Jerry has a big mouth.

   Whereas mouth in (13a) literally means ‘a part of a face’, in (13b) it is used with an extended meaning of an ‘entrance of the river’. In the case of (13c), mouth can be both literally (i.e. ‘a part of a face’) and figuratively (i.e. ‘talkativeness’) interpreted; interpreting it depends on the context in which the hearer is operating. Therefore, the process of this semantic extension from (13a) to (13b) is closely connected to the cognitive action of realizing that food is to a mouth what ships are to the canals of the river. Moreover, there is a cognitive relation between a ‘mouth’ and ‘talkativeness’, in that when (13c) is figuratively interpreted, the knowledge (i.e. experience) that ‘the human mouth is the organ for speaking’ is connected with ‘talkativeness’.

   In relation to this point, Ullmann (1957, 1962) explains polysemy by metaphor in terms of similarity and analogy. For instance, a metaphorical utterance like New Orleans is the heart of jazz music is possible by identifying the fact that ‘a human heart is in the centre of the body’ and ‘it plays a very important role in human life and health’ with the fact that ‘New Orleans is the centre of jazz music’. However, in projecting ‘heart’ to ‘New Orleans’, even though there are many more differences of the properties than similarities between them, only one or a small number of similarities between the two is emphasized by the metaphorical comparison. Thus, the claim that metaphorical expressions which highlight the minimum number of similarities between two different entities are possible gains its ground, because there are more differences than similarities between those two.
Experientialist linguistics (i.e. CL) holds that a linguistic theory should study and describe human mind or human language, on the basis of human physical experiences; this viewpoint is a basic but significant starting point for explaining polysemy. According to Frisson, Sandra, Brisard and Cuyckens (1996), polysemy is a central concern of CL, because polysemy is regarded as a linguistic phenomenon which shows the semantic extension by cognitive process.

CL pursues a new approach to studying polysemy, by accepting Wittgenstein’s (1953) notion of ‘family resemblance’ and Rosch’s (1975) notion of ‘prototype categorization’, and viewing that polysemy forms a structure of family resemblance with priority given to a prototypical example (Cuyckens and Zawada 2001). Langacker (2004) represents the CL position on polysemy as the following:

Cognitive linguists recognize polysemy as the usual state of affairs. Lexical and grammatical elements tend to have a variety of familiar and conventionally established values, or ‘senses’, often centered on a prototype. New senses arise as extensions from the prototype (or from other established senses) to extent that specific interpretations — originally due to speaker’s interpretive efforts in context — recur with sufficient frequency that they become ‘enriched’ in the minds of individuals and conventional within a speech community.

(Langacker 2004: 26-27)

For the purpose of examining the CL approach to polysemy, it is necessary to introduce some notions of family resemblance and prototype categorization.

Wittgenstein’s (1953) ‘family resemblance’ holds that a category is not structured by a set of common criterial properties which are satisfied by all members in the category, but is instead a complicated network of family resemblance in which various similarities are shared among the members of the category in an overlapping and crisscrossing way. Thus, family resemblance explains that by what way the meanings of a polysemous word are connected with each other.

Rosch’s (1975) prototype categorization is another key to explaining the relation between
experientialism and polysemy. This theory claims that a concept is basically represented by a **prototype**, which has been theorized as either an abstract set of common properties which the category members have or the most prototypical (idealized) example of a **category**.

According to prototype categorization, the borders between different categories are fuzzy, the status of each member in the category is not equal, and a prototype exists in a category (Rosch: 1975, 1991). For example, the most prototypical member (i.e. the prototype) in the BIRD category is robin, and other members like eagle, crane, and pelican are less prototypical than robin, but they are more prototypical than penguin or ostrich because penguin and ostrich cannot fly although they have other properties shared within the BIRD category. Thus, according to this position, human categorization is not arbitrary, and develops from the central examples of a category to the marginal ones.

Furthermore, a prototypic-based sense is extended from a physical and concrete domain to differently physical, abstract or cognitive domains. This tendency is closely connected to by what way human experience is extended. In relation to this point, Evans and Green (2006) holds that human experience is unidirectionally extended from something concrete to something abstract. This tendency reflects egocentric distance. For example, the examples in (8) show the cognitive process of semantic extension from *mouth* as ‘facial organ’ (i.e. something concrete) to *mouth* as ‘talkativeness’ (i.e. something abstract).

In sum, polysemy can be significant evidence which shows that experientialist epistemology really works in language users’ mind. In other words, the developing way of polysemy reflects language users’ cognitive activity, which aims to understand a new experience by metaphorically (or metonymically) mapping their old experience to it. This cognitive process is not arbitrary, but evolves following systematic way, as discussed above.
2.3 Philosophical Approaches to Metaphor

As discussed in chapter 1, Aristotle viewed that the meaning of a word is fixed, and metaphor is something deviant from normal language use. This position on metaphor had been accepted by objectivists and traditional semanticists (e.g. Carnap 1955, Frege 1980) for a long time, since Aristotle.

However, in the twentieth century, Aristotle’s fixed idea of metaphor began to be changed by Richards (1936) and Black (1962, 1979, 1981), who approached it more systematically. Richards (1936) views metaphor as a matter of thoughts, rather than language at the word level. According to Richards (1936), therefore, metaphor is not a deviation from normal language use but a ubiquitous principle of thinking. Here, Richards (1936: 93) explains the principle of metaphor use:

In the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction.

Richards labelled these two thoughts of different things as tenor and vehicle.\(^{13}\) Tenor is an underlying idea (i.e. an original idea) that the speaker intend to express, and vehicle is a linguistic expression whose usual meaning is applied in a figurative way to the tenor (i.e. a subsidiary idea). For instance, in the metaphorical sentence *John is a wolf*, the tenor is John’s personality and the vehicle is *a wolf*, which denotes an animal whose properties are ferocity and greed. In this case, *John is a wolf* means ‘John is fierce and greedy’ as a result of the interaction between tenor and vehicle. According to Leezenberg (2001: 95), the subject in Richard’s notion of interaction is not the extension of tenor and vehicle but their sense or intension, or more

\(^{13}\) These two notions have been differently termed in different works: Black (1962) used *principle subject* and *subsidiary subject*, Black (1979) *primary subject* and *secondary subject*, and Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003) *target domain* and *source domain*. 

comprehensive thoughts or opinions related to them.

Developing Richards’ viewpoint on metaphor, Black (1962, 1979, 1981) held that metaphor actively proposes the similarities between two different objects, going beyond merely expressing those similarities. Furthermore, Black classified previous philosophical theories of metaphor into three types in accordance with how they hold that metaphor works: 1) the Substitution Viewpoint 2) the Comparison Viewpoint and 3) the Interaction Viewpoint into which Richards’ and Black’s view falls.

The following discussion reviews some traditional approaches that have attempted to explain the essence of metaphor within a philosophical domain. These approaches are mainly connected to how metaphor is interpreted. I briefly survey those three viewpoints on metaphor and their explanatory problems, highlighting Searle (1979), Johnson (1981), Levinson (1983) and Leezenberg (2001).

2.3.1 Substitution Viewpoint

In chapter 1, I introduced Aristotle’s definition of metaphor, which views metaphor as the matter of transference. The Substitution Viewpoint which originated from Aristotle’s notion of ‘transference’ holds that metaphor is used in place of an equivalent literal expression; that is, a metaphorical expression whose form is $A \text{ is } B$ is an indirect way to intentionally convey another meaning, ‘$A \text{ is } C$’. For example, (14a) is a metaphorical expression intentionally used to transmit the meaning of (14b).

(14) a. The Gaza Strip is a warehouse of explosives in the Middle East.
   b. The Gaza Strip is a very dangerous place in the Middle East.
Thus, according to this viewpoint, the speaker substitutes a metaphorical expression *a warehouse of explosives* for the literal expression *a very dangerous place*. In the process of interpretation, the hearer should in turn substitute *a very dangerous place* in place of *a warehouse of explosives* in order to understand (14a).

However, this viewpoint has several problems (Chong 2004: 116). Firstly, though this approach focuses on the point that a literal meaning can be replaced by a metaphorical one, it does not mention any difference between a literal meaning and a metaphorical one; if both (14a) and (14b) express the same meaning, it is useless for the speaker to produce (14a) as metaphor, since it only introduces the possibility that the indirect expression will confuse the hearer. Secondly, it does not consider the relation between metaphor and the context in which it is used; for instance, consider the following:

(15) a. Man is a wolf.
   b. Man is fierce.
   c. Man is greedy.
   d. Man is fierce and greedy.

Not everyone who meets (15a) always interprets its meaning as (15b). (15a) could be understood as (15c) or (15d) as well, and sometimes other meanings (e.g., ‘cruel’, or ‘wild’) could arise in other contexts, according to the difference of knowledge, thoughts, emotions or intentions between the speaker and the hearer.

For that reason, it is not reasonable to believe that a metaphor used by the speaker is always substituted for the same fixed, literal expression by the hearers. For example, if someone says *His five-year old son is a politician*, the connotation of *politician* in America might be very different from that in England. This word could very negatively mean ‘a corrupt political hack’ in America, whereas it might be used with a more neutral meaning in England.
Thus, Americans might have to use the metaphor, ‘His five-year old son is a statesman’ to distinguish the child as ‘a skilled diplomat’, rather than ‘a sly schemer’. In this way, a metaphorical expression reflects socio-cultural assumption which indicates that metaphor is closely connected to our conceptual system.

2.3.2 Comparison Viewpoint

According to Gibbs (1992), Ortony (1993) and Winner and Gardener (1993), in the Comparison Viewpoint, metaphor is a mechanism that expresses the similarity and underlying analogy between topic and vehicle. For understanding a metaphorical expression within the Comparison Viewpoint, it is necessary to compare its topic and vehicle, and find the similarities between them. Topic and vehicle here are similar to tenor and vehicle in Richards (1936): topic is a topicalized noun phrase in a sentence, and vehicle is a compared object through which the hearer can grasp the meaning which the speaker intends to express.

This comparison process is the essence of the Comparison Viewpoint, and involves discovering the common properties among each objective and extensional feature which both topic and vehicle have. Considering the process of interpreting (14) in accordance with the Comparison Viewpoint, some common properties between man (i.e. topic) and wolf, (i.e. vehicle) are discovered, and then the meaning ‘Man is fierce and greedy’ is elicited. Furthermore, a metaphor whose typical form is A is B is regarded as an abridged simile or a collapsed comparison from which like or as has been omitted for convenience or for heightened interest. Consider the following example:
(16) a. John is Scrooge.
   b. John is like Scrooge.
   c. John is very greedy and stingy.

In the Comparison Viewpoint, the metaphorical statement (16a) asserts some similarities between John and Scrooge (i.e. greedy, stingy, etc.). The metaphorical expression (16a) is regarded as an abbreviated form of (16b) without like. Black (1981) views the Comparison Viewpoint as a special case of the Substitution Viewpoint, as (16b) can be substituted for (16a) so as to convey the meaning of (16c). According to this viewpoint, metaphor is not a mental mechanism related to our thoughts and understanding but a matter of linguistic expression. Thus, this viewpoint allows us only to express the existing similarities between two different entities in our mind, without creating any new similarities between them.

This viewpoint is supported by Miller (1979). From the psychological point of view, his main concern is how metaphor is comprehendend. According to Miller, every metaphorical expression is a comparison sentence which omits like, similar, or as showing the relation of similarity between the components of the sentence. Thus, Miller claims that a metaphorical sentence like A child is a father of man originates from a simile sentence like A child is like a father of man, from which like is omitted. Moreover, since a metaphorical sentence is an elliptical simile sentence, and a simile sentence shows comparison, the most important thing is to find out the relation of comparison embedded in a metaphorical sentence in order to interpret the metaphorical sentence. Miller calls this process reconstruction and claims that understanding a metaphorical sentence is based on the relation of comparison shown from this process. Miller introduces a sophisticated comparison theory insisting that in understanding metaphor it should be converted into a complex simile, because there are always many extra implicit predicates or variables which could be reconstructed by the hearer. For the purpose of converting metaphors into their complex similes, he suggests rules which rely on a tripartite
classification in accordance with grammatical categories of metaphor: nominal, predicate and sentential metaphors. Miller’s rules can be represented as the following (Levinson 1983: 152-153):

(17) nominal metaphors (e.g. *Iago is an eel.*)

\[
\text{BE (}x, y\text{)} \leftrightarrow \exists F \exists G \left( \text{SIMILAR (}F(x), G(y)\right))
\]

i.e. metaphors of the \(x\) is \(a y\) kind are interpreted as: ‘There are two properties \(F\) and \(G\) such that \(x\) having property \(F\) is like \(y\) having property \(G\)

a. Some property of Iago is like some property of an eel. (vague interpretation)

b. ‘Iago’s ability to get out of difficult situation’ is like an eel’s ability to wriggle off hooks. (specific interpretation)

(18) predicative metaphors (e.g. *Mrs Gandhi steamed ahead.*)

\[
\text{G (}x, y\text{)} \leftrightarrow \exists F \exists y \left( \text{SIMILAR (}F(x), G(y)\right))
\]

i.e. metaphors of the \(x\) \(Gs\) kind (i.e. with metaphorical predicates) are interpreted as:

‘There is a property \(F\) and an entity \(y\) such that \(x\) \(F\)ing is like \(y\) \(G\)ing’

a. Mrs Gandhi is doing something which is like something steaming ahead. (vague interpretation)

b. Mrs Gandhi’s progress in the elections is like a ship steaming ahead. (specific interpretation)

(19) sentential metaphors (e.g. A: *What kind of mood did you find the boss in?* B: *The lion roared.*)

\[
\text{G (}y\text{)} \leftrightarrow \exists F \exists x \left( \text{SIMILAR (}F(x), G(y)\right))
\]

i.e. given an irrelevant proposition \(y\) \(Gs\) interpret is as: ‘There is another property \(F\) and another entity \(x\) such that the proposition ‘\(x\) \(Fs\)’ is similar to ‘\(y\) \(Gs\)’ (and ‘\(x\) \(Fs\)’ is relevant to the discourse)’

a. The lion’s roaring is like something doing something. (vague interpretation)

b. The lion’s roaring is like the boss displaying anger. (specific interpretation)

By applying the rules to (17), (18) and (19), each vague interpretation in them becomes specific: ‘some property of Iago’ is interpreted as ‘Iago’s ability to get out of difficult situation’, ‘Mrs Gandhi is doing something’ as ‘Mrs Gandhi’s progress in the elections’ and ‘The lion’s roaring’
as ‘the boss’ displaying anger’.

However, although Miller’s analysis contributes to systemizing and specifying the traditional Comparison Viewpoint, his theory has several explanatory limits. First of all, as Levinson (1983: 153-155) points out, this theory does not account for how the hearer reaches each specific interpretation (17b), (18b) and (19b) from the vague interpretations (17a), (18a) and (19a) individually elicited by applying the specific rules (17), (18) and (19), which transfer metaphorical forms to simile ones.

Prior to Levinson (1983), Searle (1979: 87-89) also pointed out some problems in this viewpoint. First, it seems to contain an ontological problem. According to the Comparison Viewpoint, metaphorical similarity should be based on objective similarity; but even in the case that the compared object does not exist in the real world, metaphorical expressions can be generated and understood. Consider the case of (20), for example:

(20) Sally is a dragon.

(21) There exists a dragon.

When the speaker utters (20), this metaphorical utterance does not entail (21), which represents the existence of dragon as an object of comparison.

Second, according to the Comparison Viewpoint, the meaning of a metaphor is true if and only if the truth value of a simile is true because ‘the literal statement of similarity’ (i.e. simile) is the basis of the meaning of a metaphor. However, a simile is a statement about similarity whereas a metaphor is implicature inferred from the similarity; hence, even in the case that the truth value of a simile is false, the metaphor related to it can be still valid. For instance, assuming that the speaker utters (22) to convey the meaning of (23), the hearer interprets the meaning of (22) as (23) on the basis of the belief (24).
(22) Richard is a gorilla.

(23) Richard is fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth.

(24) Gorillas are fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth.

In this case, according to the Comparison Viewpoint, there is a similarity, such as the one stated in (25), between Richard and gorilla.

(25) Richard and gorillas are similar in several respects: they are fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth.

However, as Searle (1979) points out:

The ethological investigation tells us that gorillas are not at all fierce and nasty but are in fact shy, sensitive creatures, given to bouts of sentimentality. This would definitely show that though the statement about Richard is true in [25] which is the statement of similarity between Richard and gorilla, yet the statement about gorilla is not true. Despite this point, the metaphorical utterance [22] can still remain true regardless of the actual facts about gorillas. To put it crudely, “Richard is a gorilla” is just about Richard. It is not literally about a gorilla at all; because the object of the metaphorical statement is not gorilla but Richard. Gorilla in this context is used to implicate a certain semantic content.

(Searle 1979: 89)

Thus, the agreement between a metaphorical implicature and a simile statement is not a necessary and sufficient condition of metaphor.

Third, while the similarities between A and B are objectively elucidated in simile, those in metaphor are inferred. Thus, understanding metaphor requires not only the ability to grasp literal meanings but also non-linguistic knowledge of the world and inference, whereas understanding simile does not require the ability of inference. For example, is the meaning of
My friend is like chopsticks the exactly same as that of My friend is chopsticks? Metaphor draws another inferred meaning ‘A is C’ from A is B, whereas simile is based on the objective similarities between A and B. Thus, the former sentence can mean just ‘My friend is very thin’ or something similar to it; on the other hand, the latter sentence might mean an inferred meaning like ‘My friend is an indispensible man’ for Japanese people who always use only chopsticks when they have their meals, or other different possible meanings in accordance with a specific context. Interestingly, this same metaphorical expression could have another inferred meaning like ‘My friend is a secondary man’ for Korean people who mainly use a spoon, instead of chopsticks, when they have their meals. This point tells us that the literal meaning of a simile does not always correspond to the inferred meaning of a metaphor.

Fourth, Leezenberg (2001:75) claims that the Comparison Viewpoint cannot properly explain how the speaker’s novel metaphors are interpreted by the hearer. According to the Comparison Viewpoint, the meaning of a metaphorical expression can be elicited by comparing the literal and extensional properties existing between two different objects. However, metaphorical expressions that draw new inferred meanings by recognizing new similarities that differ from the well-known ones between A and B are difficult to be explained within the model of the Comparison Viewpoint. In other words, in the case of novel and creative metaphor, it is almost impossible for the Comparison Viewpoint to capture the novel metaphorical similarities newly created by the speaker’s mind, because this viewpoint is based on the process of comparing already-known common similarities between A and B.

Fifth, in relation to Miller’s treatment of metaphor, Levinson (1983: 154-156) points out that not every metaphor is elicited from simile by omitting pseudo predicates of similarity such as like, as if, as or similar to, and simile cannot always be derived from metaphor by adding them. Consider this example:
(26) The North Korean regime has been deviating from its course for more than sixty five years.\footnote{This is my own example.}

If we add only like to (26), this sentence sounds strange: ?? The North Korean regime has been like deviating from its course for more than sixty five years. Relating to this point, Levinson (1983: 154) argues that here to derive the related simile we need to reconstruct much more than a deleted like or as if (no well-formed sentence results from the insertion of such item) like (27):

(27) The North Korean regime has been pursuing wrong policies like a ship deviating from its course for more than sixty five years.

In sum, the supporters of the Comparison Viewpoint tend to regard similarity as the sole tool for explanation and take the basis of metaphor only with the crude reason that similarity plays some important role in understanding metaphor. However, they overlook the critical point that the meaning of a metaphorical expression is determined by figurative similarities recognized by the speaker’s (subjective) viewpoint, rather than objective (or literal) similarities between two different objects. Thus, the meaning of a metaphorical expression cannot be fixed in every context.

### 2.3.3 Interaction Viewpoint

The Interaction Viewpoint was first introduced by Richards (1936) and developed by Black (1962, 1979, 1981). It views interpreting a metaphorical expression as a process of thinking, rather than a simple process of comparing two objects. According to this viewpoint, metaphor is a very creative language mechanism which holds new points of view, knowledge
and meanings. The Interaction Viewpoint views the similarities from metaphor between tenor
and vehicle as things that can be created through the metaphor, whereas the Comparison
Viewpoint emphasizes the relation of similarity based on the existing properties between two
objects. According to Black (1962, 1979, 1981), the Interaction Viewpoint claims that if *A is B*
is used as a metaphor, the meaning of metaphor is elicited through the interaction between
‘system of associated commonplaces’ of *A* and that of *B*. Black defines the nature of interaction
metaphor as following conditions, as discussed by Johnson (1981: 77):

1) A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects — a ‘principal’ subject and a
‘subsidiary’ one.
2) These subjects are often best regarded as ‘systems of things’ rather than ‘things’.
3) The metaphor works by applying to the principal subject a system of ‘associated
implications’ characteristic of the subsidiary subject.
4) These implications usually consist of ‘commonplaces’ about the subsidiary
subject, but may, in suitable cases, consist of deviant implications established *ad
hoc* by the writer.
5) The metaphor selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the
principal subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the
subsidiary subject.
6) This involves shifts in meaning of words belonging to the same family or system
as the metaphorical expression; and some of these shifts, though not all, may be
metaphorical transfers. (The subordinate metaphors are, however, to be read less
‘emphatically’.)
7) There is, in general, no simple ‘ground’ for the necessary shifts of meaning — no
blanket reason why some metaphors work and others fail.

Black crucially emphasizes the dynamic aspect of the hearer’s role. In other words, when the
hearer encounters a metaphorical expression, he grasps the meaning of it by choosing and
associating the commonplaces, which are shared by each object belonging to *A* (i.e. tenor) and
*B* (i.e. vehicle). Consider the following example:
(28) a. The woman is a fox.
    b. The woman is sexy and charming.

According to interaction viewpoint, *fox* in (28a) is a combination of various general properties rather than only one individual property. Thus, in the process that the general properties of $B$ (i.e. *fox*, vehicle) interact with those of $A$ (i.e. *the woman*, tenor), a new metaphorical meaning (28b) is produced by choosing and highlighting some common properties like ‘sexy’, ‘charming’ and so on.

Nevertheless, the hearer’s associating action is not always in the direction intended by the speaker. Consider the following sentence:

(29) My business partner is a dragon.

(29) is a metaphorical expression used under the conditions that (a) there are some common properties between the tenor (i.e. *my business partner*) and the vehicle (i.e. *a dragon*) and (b) the hearer also knows it. However, it is not simple to know which common properties exists between tenor and vehicle, to grasp how many of them are associated with each other and to find out which properties are associated. We may expect that the role of the association made by the hearer might be changed in accordance with the context or utterance situation, and be differentiated by the hearer’s background knowledge and belief. For example, the associated meaning of *dragon* in East Asian countries is very different from that in the Western world. While *dragon* in East Asia is ‘an auspicious symbol’, in Western countries under the influence of Christianity it has been regarded as ‘an ominous or evil monster’. Therefore, if (29) is uttered by a speaker who is from an East Asian country such as Korea, Japan or China, it would probably be interpreted as communicating a very positive meaning like ‘My business partner is an extraordinary man’ but (29) does not typically have the same implication in Western
countries. Similarly, although the metaphorical sentence (28a) *The woman is a fox* might mean ‘The woman is sexy and charming’ in English-speaking countries, as the image of a fox has been negatively introduced in many traditional fables (e.g. Aesop’s fable), if the same metaphor is used for describing a man’s character, some people might interpret a negative meaning (e.g. ‘The man is sly and treacherous’). For these reasons, the meaning of a metaphor as intended by the speaker cannot always be assumed to be the same as what is understood by the hearer. These phenomena raise the necessity of studying metaphor in a pragmatic framework which considers a language user and his socio-cultural contexts.

Moreover, the metaphorical meaning intended by the speaker is not always elicited as the result from a semantic interaction between A (i.e. tenor) and B (i.e. vehicle). Consider the following examples by Searle (1979: 91):

(30) Sally is a block of ice.

(31) Sally is an extremely unemotional and unresponsive person.

On most accounts of proper name meaning, the proper noun Sally in (30) has no semantic sense, but instead just indexes an individual in the world, while, a *block of ice* has a descriptive sense. In other words, Sally cannot have meaning in the same way that a *block of ice* has meaning. This fact means that (31) as a metaphorical meaning of (30) is elicited by the hearer’s association or background knowledge about these two objects (i.e. ‘Sally’ and ‘a block of ice’), rather than the result from the interaction of the meanings of the two expressions.

Furthermore, the Interaction Viewpoint assumes that metaphor is used only in sentences

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15 Levin (1993: 114) holds that this viewpoint of Searle’s also has a problem. Because, although Searle sees that the meaning of a language expression includes real knowledge, the speaker’s belief and attitude, under this assumption, even proper nouns can have another meaning aside from referring a person or an object. Thus, Levin claims that it is contradictory to criticize the Interaction Viewpoint on the ground that proper nouns lack the meaning involved in the interaction since they have no meaning except referential function.
that include both a topic as a literal expression and a vehicle as a metaphorical one includes, and the metaphorical meaning of the sentence is elicited by the interaction between those two; but according to Searle (1979: 91), not always this assumption is true. For instance, the speaker may convert (30) into (32) as a mixed metaphor which replaces ‘Sally’ with ‘the bad news’, if both the speaker and the hearer know that Sally always brings bad news:

(32) The bad news (i.e. Sally) is a block of ice. (Searle 1979: 91)

Even though neither topic (i.e. the bad news) nor vehicle (i.e. a block of ice) is used as a literal expression; namely, both are metaphorical, (32) may work as a metaphorical expression.

Beyond Searle’s criticism of the Interaction Viewpoint, other scholars criticize this viewpoint in that the concept of ‘interaction’ remains vague or unclear (e.g. Johnson 1981, Keysar and Glucksberg 1992). Moreover, Leezenberg (2001: 85) argues that Black’s notions of primary subject (i.e. tenor or topic) and secondary subject (i.e. vehicle) have not been clearly defined yet. According to Leezenberg, Black (1979) defines secondary subject not as extension or actual properties but as ‘systems of implications’ or an ‘implicative complex’. Thus, following Black’s definition, secondary subject works as the common opinions between discourse participants, and it may connote another new creative implicated meanings. However, in the same paper, Black identifies his secondary subject with a proposition, a statement or an assertion. In other words, as an implicated meaning is implied or presupposed, it cannot be the same as a statement or an assertion; so it is confusing to equate ‘implicative complex’ with the notions of a proposition, a statement or an assertion. Furthermore, as the nature of primary subject is not clearly defined in Black’s study, it is unclear whether primary subject should be regarded as just an ‘individual’ like the Comparison Viewpoint does, or not.

Additionally, Leezenberg (2001: 82) claims that the Interaction Viewpoint is not enough to properly explain novel metaphor, due to the basic position of the Interaction Viewpoint which
views that the meaning of a metaphorical expression comes from the implicated meaning connected to the metaphorical expression. The Interaction Viewpoint views this implicated meaning as conventionally recognized properties of words, so argues that they determine the interpretation of metaphor. However, this viewpoint does not offer any clear discussion on how novel metaphors can be explained, which describe the properties that we newly recognize by our new perspectives.

In sum, following these three philosophical viewpoints cannot contribute to explaining the nature of metaphor and how it is interpreted in the process of communication, because they do not fully consider that metaphor theory should pay attention to the context, the speaker’s intention and so forth. This conclusion naturally justifies that it is more desirable for metaphor to be treated within the domain of pragmatics, which focuses on treating the situational information such as language users’ mind (or intention) and context as well as linguistic aspects of metaphor. I discuss this issue further in chapter 3.

2.4 Metaphor and Abduction: Discovering Something New from the Given Facts

Language users rely on two main inferential processes: deduction and induction. Here I discuss a third: abduction, as proposed by Peirce (1958). Deductive inference guarantees 100% certainty because it draws its conclusion from a well-known rule and case and inductive inference contributes to scientific discoveries because it extracts the rule from the case and the conclusion. In contrast, abduction draws the case from the rule and the conclusion and therefore it cannot guarantee 100% certainty. To demonstrate the difference between abduction and other ways of reasoning, I show the inferential schema of each inference type:
i) **Deduction**: Reasoning draws the result from the rule and the case

- **Rule**: If it rains, the ground becomes wet.
- **Case**: It rains.
- **Conclusion**: The ground is wet.

ii) **Induction**: Reasoning draws the rule from the case and the result

- **Case**: It rains.
- **Conclusion**: The ground is wet.
- **Rule**: If it rains, the ground gets wet.

iii) **Abduction**: Reasoning draws the case from the rule and the result

- **Rule**: If it rains, the ground becomes wet.
- **Conclusion**: The ground is wet.
- **Case**: It rained.

In (iii), the result of ‘the ground is wet’ does not guarantee the case ‘It rained’, because other possibilities have not been ruled out. For example, a sprinkler might have watered the ground. However, abduction may contribute to discovering something new. Abduction tells us an unknown fact which already happened. Suppose that a doctor diagnoses a patient’s disease by examining his symptoms. This inferential process is achieved by abduction, not by deduction or induction. As such, most processes in which we acquire new knowledge and information are achieved by abduction. According to Peirce (1958), ordinary language users mainly rely on the inference by abduction, rather than deduction or induction, when they grasp others’ intentions in the process of communication.

In contrast, deduction is truth-preserving in that the content of the conclusion is already included in its premise. Thus, deduction does not contribute to discovering new facts or extending knowledge. Moreover, deductive inference does not consider whether the specific contents of the premise and the conclusion might be true or false; it relies on a strict logic. Thus, in deductive inference, as long as a logical validity is guaranteed in the inferential process, the conclusion with inevitability is elicited from its premise; deduction shows us the inevitable fact.
Induction requires us to examine the possible cases in order to find a new rule. It is accomplished with an inductive leap, which generalizes some partial and specific cases known by observation to the whole. Thus, the conclusion elicited by induction may just have a fixed probability, and the validity of the conclusion depends on the factiveness of the observed cases; thus, induction shows us a probable fact. In relation to this point, Popper (1999) argues that if a hypothesis (i.e. conclusion) is falsifiable, then it can be overturned by some observations which offer contrary evidence. For this reason, according to Popper, the proposition that ‘swans are white’ can be true only until a black swan appears.

Although Peirce did not propose abduction in order to explain the hearer’s inferential process for interpreting the speaker’s metaphor, I claim that abduction represents the hearer’s way of finding the speaker’s intended conclusion in the metaphorical utterance. In a metaphorical utterance, there is a premise (i.e. a rule or a well-known fact) that is not asserted but generally accepted in the community to which the speaker and the hearer belong. The hearer may discover the speaker’s intended conclusion (i.e. a new fact or case) by exploiting that tacitly given premise and the speaker’s metaphorical utterance. However, abduction does not always enable the hearer to successfully reach the conclusion intended by the speaker, as seen in the discussion of (iii).

The basic schema of Peirce’s abduction flows like this: A fact Y is observed. If X is true, Y is a natural result of it. Thus, there is room for believing that X is true. For example, when a female client visits Sherlock Holmes, he pays attention to her jacket whose sleeves are worn and shiny (i.e. recognizing a phenomenon). Then, he assumes that her worn and shiny sleeves tell him something (i.e. signifying the phenomenon), and finally he reaches the conclusion that she is a typist (i.e. interpreting the sign). In this case, the sequence of Holmes’ reasoning is composed of ‘recognizing—signifying—interpreting’. First of all, Holmes knows the rule (or the fact) that ‘if someone types very much, his/her sleeves become worn and shiny’, and observes the result that ‘her sleeves are worn and shiny’. From this rule and result, he eventually
reasons the case that ‘she has typed very much’ (i.e. ‘she is a typist’):

Rule: If someone types very much, his/her sleeves become worn and shiny.
Conclusion: Her sleeves are worn and shiny.
Case: (There is room for viewing that) she has typed very much (i.e. she is a typist).

A metaphorical utterance $A$ is $B$ reflects the speaker’s ‘call to mind’ that $B$ reminds the hearer of ‘C’ when $B$ is given in $A$ is $B$ and contains the speaker’s intended meaning. Thus, the hearer’s grasping the meaning of the metaphorical utterance is catching the speaker’s message and intention in the utterance. I argue that this process is similar to a detective’s reasoning, by which he finds out the criminal. Then, how is Peirce’s abduction applied to the hearer’s seeking an interpretation for the metaphorical utterance? Suppose that a pragmatist says Pragmatics is a terra incognita (Mey 2001: 22) in the middle of delivering his speech in a linguistic conference whose theme is something like ‘seeking a new breakthrough for solving difficult problems in linguistics’. In this case, the hearers may associate ‘pragmatics’ as a younger study than other fields in linguistics with terra incognita as ‘an unknown land of limitless possibilities’, and elicits a new meaning that ‘Like a terra incognita may allow us to enjoy unlimited potentialities and new opportunities, pragmatics may offer us plenty of possibilities for solving difficult pending problems in linguistics’. Finally, considering the contextual information, the hearer reaches the intended conclusion by the speaker ‘we need to study pragmatics’:

(33) Rule: Those who seek a new breakthrough for solving difficult problems challenge new possibilities.
Conclusion: Pragmatics is a terra incognita (i.e. new possibility).
Case: There is room for viewing that seeking a new breakthrough (for solving difficult problems in linguistics) is studying pragmatics.
Thus, the hearer can extract a case from the rule commonly accepted by people in the world and the conclusion offered by the speaker’s metaphorical utterance; this is a new piece of information that the hearer discovers, which contains the message or the argument that the speaker intends to convey.

Furthermore, abduction as a reasoning method contributes to examining the inferential process that the hearer grasps the message in the utterance and responds to the speaker’s intention, rather than directly intervening in the process of strengthening the argumentative power of the speaker’s utterance. I come back to this topic in chapter 5, in relation to covering abduction as a semiotic inference with cognitive inference by RT.

### 2.5 Summary

In this chapter, I discussed some philosophical (i.e. epistemological) issues concerning metaphor. Experientialism as the third alternative in the opposition of objectivism vs. subjectivism makes a big contribution to explaining the explanatory limits of these two sides.

I then moved from this general discussion of metaphor in order to discuss how the previous philosophical approaches treated metaphor. Examining three viewpoints on metaphor, I found that none of them properly covered what metaphor is and how it is interpreted, and their explanatory limits come from the fixed idea that metaphor is not a natural linguistic mechanism but something unusual or abnormal.

Finally, I covered abduction which contributes to language users’ finding new facts, and I examined how this inference is connected to interpreting metaphorical utterances.

In the next chapter, I discuss and evaluate the linguistic viewpoints on metaphor.
Chapter 3

Metaphor as a Linguistic Mechanism

3.0 Introduction

While the previous chapter treated some philosophical approaches to metaphor, this chapter surveys and assesses how sub-disciplines of linguistics, particularly syntax, semantics (including cognitive linguistics, henceforth CL) and pragmatics treat metaphor.

This chapter is composed of two main parts. In the first half (i.e. from section 3.1 to 3.2), I review linguistic approaches to treating metaphor such as early generativist (e.g. Chomsky 1965) and semantic (e.g. Matthews 1971) viewpoints, the CL approach (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980), (neo)-Gricean approaches (e.g. Grice 1975, Levinson 1983, 2000, Horn 1989, 2004) and the Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) treatment of metaphor (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1995).

In the second half (i.e. sub-section 3.3), I highlight two recent controversies regarding metaphor: The first is whether metaphor is ‘what is implicated’ (the most widespread viewpoint) or ‘what is said’ which is the position taken by some Relevance Theorists (e.g. Wearing 2006, Wilson and Carston 2006, Wilson 2011) and contextualists (e.g. Bezuidenhout 2001, Recanati 2004). The second is the potential of harmonizing RT and CL, in relation to metaphor study, as suggested by Gibbs and Tendahl (2006) and Tendahl and Gibbs (2008).
3.1 Non-Pragmatic Approaches to Interpreting Metaphor

3.1.1 Early Generativist and Semantic Approaches

A seminal work in modern linguistics, Chomsky (1965) views metaphorical expressions as deviant sentences that do not observe selectional restrictions, the constraints on the semantic environments in which a word can appear. For example, in a sentence with Subject-Verb-Object structure and the verb *kill*, a selectional restriction on that verb is that its object should have the semantic feature [+ANIMATE]; otherwise, the sentence would be semantically anomalous even though it is syntactically well-formed (e.g. *Tom killed the stone*). Chomsky claims that such deviant sentences can be metaphorically interpreted, if a proper context is given, by a direct analogy with a well-formed sentence which observes the selectional restriction.

Sentences that break selectional rules can often be interpreted metaphorically or allusively in one way or another, if an appropriate context of greater or less complexity is supplied. That is, these sentences are apparently interpreted by a direct analogy to well-formed sentences that observe the selectional rules in question.

(Chomsky 1965: 149)

Early linguistic semantic studies on metaphor develop from the Chomskyan view are led by Matthews (1971). Following from early generativist assumptions on metaphor like those of Chomsky (1965), Matthews (1971) tries to explain the linguistic deviance of metaphorical sentences mainly with the notions of selectional restriction and semantic features, as well as the Aristotelian assumption (see section 1.4) that ‘linguistic meaning is fixed’. However, there exists a difference between Aristotle’s position and this semantic viewpoint: while Aristotle tried to explicate the metaphorical meaning at the word level, Matthews (1971) attempts to do so at the sentential level.
Matthews (1971) develops the semantic analysis implied by Chomsky’s notion of selectional restrictions, holding that a metaphorical expression that violates selectional restrictions can be interpreted by analogy with well-formed sentences. Consider (34):

(34) a. The volcano burped.
   b. The man burped.
   c. The volcano erupted.

The syntactic structure of metaphorical (34a) is the same as those of literal sentences (34b) and (34c), and these literal sentences show that ‘nouns in a sentence do the action qualified by verbs’ (Matthews 1971: 419-420). Furthermore, the semantic features of the relevant sense of the verb *burp* can be represented as [human action, emitted from mouth, coming from within, caused by gaseous pressure, abrupt … etc.], and it is under a selectional restriction that demands a [+ANIMATED] subject. Thus, (34a) is an abnormal sentence which violates the selectional restriction, while (34b) is a grammatical and normal sentence which observes it. However, according to Matthews (1971), those who read or hear (34a) associate volcano with man by considering the structural identities among (34a, b, c) and the semantic features of the verb *burp*, and analogize each similarity between volcanoes and men, such as the similarities between crater and mouth, cone and lips, and vent and throat. On the basis of the similarity between volcano and man, (34a) is interpreted as having a metaphorical meaning.

However, Matthews’ position does not survive further analysis. Selectional restriction violation cannot be a necessary condition for metaphor, since some sentences that do not violate selectional restrictions can be metaphorically interpreted; for instance:

(35) Tom blew his own trumpet in the party, and Jerry ridiculed him for it.
Both (35) and (36) observe the selectional restrictions of their verbs, and have no faults in their syntactic structures. However, (35) can be interpreted not only as having the literal meaning (i.e. ‘Tom played his own trumpet in the party, and Jerry ridiculed Tom’s poor trumpet-playing’) but also as having a metaphorical meaning (i.e. ‘Tom praised himself, and Jerry ridiculed Tom’s audaciousness’). Similarly, (36) could be metaphorical if it is used to mean that people at that address still remember Charles Dickens’ career as a writer, even though he died in 1870. But if one accepts the position that metaphor is an analogical process resulting from a deviation from selectional restrictions, these examples would not qualify as metaphor.

Matthews’ idea that linguistic meaning is fixed, and metaphor should be explained within the domain of semantics is closely related to the viewpoint that metaphor is related to langue (i.e. language viewed abstractly as a system of forms and conventions used for communication in a community), not parole (i.e. language viewed as a specific individual usage) in the Saussurean sense. However, as pointed out in chapters 1 and 2, without fully considering parole dimension (i.e. without paying attention to the information about the speaker and the utterance situation), there is no way to properly interpret metaphorical utterances.

In conclusion, interpreting metaphor is not a matter of selectional restrictions. Therefore, this thesis takes the position that interpreting metaphor is not achieved by semantic means but by considering information about language use, which necessarily happens in context: by whom, when, why and how an expression is used.

### 3.1.2 Cognitive Linguistic Approach

In chapter 2, I introduced experientialist epistemology and its connection to metaphor. In this section, I survey how CL, which reflects experientialism, treats conceptual metaphor.

The CL position on metaphor has largely been developed by Lakoff and Johnson, who are
interested in what they term *conceptual metaphor*, a subtype of metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Conceptual metaphors represented in capital letters (e.g. LIFE IS A JOURNEY) are realized in the language in various ways. That is, the conceptual metaphor is not a bit of language, it is a way of thinking that results in a range of language expressions that reflect that type of thinking. For example, through the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, we can understand metaphorical utterances such as *My life reached its turning point* or *She’s gone through life with a lot of baggage*.

Conceptual metaphor involves a cognitive mapping from a source domain as a space of an experience to a target domain as a space of another experience: ‘The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003: 5). The source domain is a systematized experience from our daily life which is concrete, physical and clear, while the target domain is neither typically systematized nor physical, and abstract or unclear. In this case, the source domain is in a striking contrast to target domain in terms of our experience. Thus, conceptual metaphor in CL means a kind of cognitive action in which a target domain is conceptualized by using a source domain which is familiar to us and more easily conceptualized. This process deeply involves subjectivization, a mental process by which a language user determines his own meaning through extending his experience. This point helps to answer this question: Why do language users frequently use metaphor instead of a literal expression, even though they could choose a literal expression which is more direct and clear than metaphor?

Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003) introduce three types of conceptual metaphor, according to their cognitive functions: *structural metaphor*, *orientational metaphor* and *ontological metaphor*. In structural metaphor, abstract concepts are systematically structured by concrete concepts. In relation to this point, consider (37):
(37) ARGUMENT IS WAR
   a. Your claims are indefensible.
   b. He attacked every weak point in his argument.

   (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003: 4)

In the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, while ARGUMENT is an abstract concept, WAR is concrete; and (37a) and (37b) are examples which show that ARGUMENT is systematically structured by WAR. According to Lakoff and Johnson:

   It is important to see that we don’t just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument — attack, defense, counterattack, etc. — reflects this. It is in this sense that ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing.

   (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003: 4)

   Orientational metaphors enable language users to understand abstract concepts by connecting them to concrete spatial orientations such as UP-DOWN, IN-OUT, FRONT-BACK, ON-OFF, DEEP-SHALLOW, CENTRAL-PERIPHERAL. The following examples reflect orientational metaphors:

   (38) [HAPPY / CONSCIOUS / MORE / HIGH STATUS / GOOD / RATIONAL] IS UP.
       [SAD / UNCONSCIOUS / LESS / LOW STATUS / BAD / EMOTION] IS DOWN.

   a. I’m feeling up. I’m feeling down.
   b. My income rose last year. His income fell last year.
   c. The discussion fell to the emotional level, but I raised it back up to the rational plane.

   (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003: 15-17)
Ontological metaphors contribute to language users’ understanding of abstract emotion, experiences and events, through concrete objects or contents which exist in reality. For example, when we need to express some invisible and abstract experiences such as ‘mind’ or ‘theory’, we liken them to concrete objects. Ontological metaphor is different from structural metaphor, in that whereas the former is a matter of mapping the properties of a concrete object (e.g. MACHINE) to abstract concepts (e.g. MIND), the latter is that of mapping complex, concrete concepts (e.g. WAR) to abstract concepts (e.g. ARGUMENT). Consider (39) as an example of ontological metaphor:

(39) THE MIND IS A MACHINE
   a. We’re still trying to grind out the solution to this equation.
   b. I’m a little rusty today.

   (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003: 27)

In conceptual metaphors, there is often more than one source domain that can map to the same target domain, and vice versa. For example, various source concepts may be mapped to the same target concept, in accordance with which property of a target concept is emphasized. Consider the following examples from Kövecses (2002: 80):

(40) a. AN ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER
    Your argument has a lot of content.
    b. AN ARGUMENT IS A BUILDING
    She constructed a solid argument.

In (40a), CONTAINER is chosen as a source domain in order to highlight the ‘content of an argumentation’; in (40b) the BUILDING source domain emphasizes the ‘construction’ of the argument. These examples show that although the target concept (i.e. ARGUMENT) is fixed, source domains used as media are different; this is because one concept is not enough to
understand various properties of the target concept.

In addition, a single source concept can be mapped to various target concepts. For instance, BUILDING as a source concept can be mapped to target concepts such as THEORY, CAREER, COMPANY, ECONOMIC SYSTEM, SOCIAL GROUP, LIFE, ARGUMENT and so on. In these cases, not every property of the BUILDING concept is used to express and understand metaphor. In other words, though a building has a roof, rooms, corridors, doors, windows and so on, these things are not typically used in the following metaphors exemplified in (41). The concepts which are used are properties of a building such as its construction, structure, strength and foundation (Kövecses 2002: 108-110).

(41) a. THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS
Scientific knowledge is constructed by small numbers of specialized workers.
b. CAREERS ARE BUILDINGS
His career was in ruins.
c. A COMPANY IS A BUILDING
They built up a successful company.
d. ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS
There is no painless way to get inflation down. We now have an excellent foundation on which to build.
e. SOCIAL GROUPS ARE BUILDINGS
He’s about to rock the foundations of the literary establishment with his novel.
f. A LIFE IS A BUILDING
Now another young woman’s life is in ruins after an appalling attack.
g. AN ARGUMENT IS A BUILDING
We’ve got the framework for a solid argument.

In (41a-g), words like construct and build refer to the formation of a ‘building’ (i.e. theory, company, economic system), framework means a whole structure of a ‘building’ (i.e. argument), in ruins and solid show a degree of strength of a ‘building’ (i.e. career, life, argument), foundation refers to a basis of a ‘building’ (i.e. economic system, social group). In this way, when the source concept BUILDING is mapped to a target concept, only some of its properties
are projected.

Thus far, I have briefly surveyed the nature of conceptual metaphor from a CL viewpoint. However, there are some theoretical problems of the CL approach to conceptual metaphor. Firstly, Stern (2000) and Leezenberg (2001) claim that this approach cannot properly account for the interpretation of metaphorical expressions because it does not consider the contexts in which metaphorical utterances are used. For example, in a metaphorical sentence like *My life is a prison*, the metaphorical expression *prison* can be interpreted as various meanings like ‘a form of punishment’, ‘suppression of freedom’, ‘My life is the stress of life’ and so on. Suppose that after being sent to his room for causing some trouble, a five-year-old child says (42):

(42) My father drove me to this prison.

Although it is possible for *prison* in (42) to be interpreted as ‘suppression of freedom’, because cognitive linguists do not consider the role of context in the process of interpreting metaphor, it is not easy for them to clearly explain the meaning of a metaphorical expression like (42), which is context-dependent.

However, Tendahl and Gibbs (2008) defend this weak point of CL in this way:

Conceptual metaphor theory is predominately concerned with generalizations about metaphor and therefore cognitive linguistics has not shown a huge interest in the role of context in metaphor understanding. Nevertheless, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 184) do acknowledge that “meaning is always meaning to someone,” and they explicitly deny the possibility of sentences having meaning in themselves. They seem to be well aware of the pragmatic intricacies of metaphorical utterances, but nevertheless they have not devoted much work to this issue.

(Tendahl and Gibbs 2008: 1840)

Secondly, according to Jackendoff and Aaron (1991), Stern (2000) and Leezenberg (2001),
the CL approach does not show any criteria for determining which conceptual metaphor is applied when a metaphorical expression is interpreted. For example, when a metaphorical expression *You are wasting my time* is interpreted, this approach does not explain why a conceptual metaphor *TIME IS MONEY* should be applied to it, instead of *TIME IS LIMITED RESOURCE* or *TIME IS VALUABLE COMMODITY*, which are broader conceptual metaphors than *TIME IS MONEY*. In relation to the *X IS A BUILDING* metaphor in (36), a similar question could be raised: How do we know that the metaphor is of a building, rather than another kind of structure?

Thirdly, Leezenberg (2001: 141) is dubious of cognitive linguists’ reliance on concept-formation from physical experience. According to cognitive linguists, concepts come from human physical characteristics and experiences, and conceptual metaphors originate from these characteristics and experiences. However, according to Leezenberg, these explanations are less than persuasive because their claim seems to absolutely view that all language users’ conceptual systems can be generalized by only several people’s physical experiences.

Finally, according to conceptual metaphor theory, metaphorical concepts are always prior to their linguistic expressions, because metaphorical expressions originate from the metaphorical conceptual system. However, Leezenberg (2001: 142-144) points out that the ‘preconceptual structure’ at the base of the metaphorical conceptual system is under the influence of socio-cultural factors, and it is difficult for these socio-cultural influences to be properly recognized, without any linguistic means. In other words, because this ‘preconceptual structure’ is developed by a mutually dependent relation between culture and language, it cannot be formed only by physical experiences. For example, although I have never been to India, so have never seen the real Taj Mahal, I may say (43) in order to humorously express ‘my puppy’s kennel is too fancy and magnificent for its small body’:

(43) My puppy’s kennel is the Taj Mahal.
According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003: 19), ‘no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately represented independently of its experiential basis’. If the claim that metaphorical concepts are formed only by direct (physical) experiences is right, there is no way to explain why it is possible for me to use (43). However, I may say (43) because I have accumulated some indirect experiences through photos and other media which have informed me about that edifice, and these indirect experiences are closely connected to the processes of human learning and socialization. In fact, much of human knowledge comes from these indirect experiences, because it is impossible to physically experience everything. In chapter 2, I have pointed out that according to experientialism, all human experiences are embodied, and the notion of ‘experience’ includes not only direct (physical) experiences but also indirect experiences. Thus, I propose that cognitive linguists’ notion of ‘experience’ should be understood as a corporate body including indirect experience as well as physical experience, in order to avoid that challenge in Leezenberg (2001).

In spite of those criticisms, the CL approach has been very influential in explaining metaphor, and cognitive linguists have made remarkable contributions to concretizing the essence of metaphor, upgrading its status to a normal language use that reflects the process of human cognition and conceptualization. Additionally, the CL approach builds a ground for consistently analysing metaphor within one explanatory system. Furthermore, assuming that there is a cognitive system of metaphorical conceptualization in human mind, the CL viewpoint offers a more persuasive explanation for our immediate understanding of metaphorical expressions than other traditional semantic fields (Gibbs 1992).

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16 In fact, there is another problem that it is not easy to make a clear distinction between physical (direct) experience and indirect experience. For example, if I see the photo of the Taj Mahal in India by using my optical nerves and become influenced by it, this may be my own physical experience. However, at the same time, this is my indirect experience, in that the photo was taken by someone, not by me and his viewpoint was reflected in it.
3.2 Pragmatic Approaches to Metaphor

3.2.1 The Gricean Approach

The first explicitly pragmatic approach to studying metaphor was by Grice (1975). Gricean pragmatics established the notions of a Cooperative Principle and its related Conversational Maxims and of implicature, which can be caused by following or flouting (i.e. intentionally and blatantly violating) Conversational Maxims. Here, I introduce Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Conversational Maxims in order to describe the Gricean approach to metaphor:

1) **Cooperative Principle**: Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purposes or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

   (Grice 1975: 158-159)

2) **Maxim of Conversation**:
   a. Maxim of Quantity:
      i) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
      ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
   b. Maxim of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.
      i) Do not say what you believe to be false.
      ii) Do not say that for which lack adequate evidence.
   c. Maxim of Relation: Be relevant.
   d. Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous.
      i) Avoid obscurity.
      ii) Avoid ambiguity.
      iii) Be brief.
      iv) Be orderly.

   (Grice 1975: 159)
Grice (1975) views metaphor as conversational implicature produced by (blatantly) violating the Maxim of Quality. For example, Suppose that Jerry utters a metaphorical expression *Tom eventually cut the Gordian knot*, in order to mean ‘Tom solved a very difficult problem’. In this case, Jerry blatantly violates Grice’s Maxim of Quality because he says the sentence while knowing that Tom has never cut the literal Gordian knot. However, the hearer who believes that Jerry observes the Cooperative Principle and knows the relevant anecdote about King Alexander can properly interpret Jerry’s metaphorical utterance through an inferential process that involves recognizing that the utterance is not intended to represent a literal truth and therefore interpreting it as ‘what Tom did is similar to cutting the Gordian knot’. This may lead the hearer to finally infer another implicated meaning ‘Tom is able and decisive enough to solve a very difficult problem’. This pragmatic viewpoint can be applied to not only metaphor but also other indirect ways of speaking, such as irony.

Levinson (1983) holds that Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Conversational Maxims are important because they generate implicatures that are beyond the semantic content of an uttered sentence. Implicatures may be distinguished in accordance with the speaker’s relation to Conversational Maxims. Firstly, under the assumption that the speaker observes the maxims, the hearer would extensively interpret what the speaker said. For example:

(44) Tom: (to Jerry) My car is out of order. Please, help me.

Jerry: I will call XYZ for you.

Jerry’s utterance implicates that XYZ is the name of an auto-repair company or car insurance company that can help Tom solve his present problem. However, if Jerry knows that XYZ is a pizza store, not an auto-repair company and does not expect Tom to recognize this, Jerry does not observe Cooperative Principle and Conversational Maxims. The inference made by observing maxims in this way is called *standard implicature* (Levinson 1983: 104) or
generalized implicature (Grice 1975).

Conversational implicatures also arise when the speaker intentionally flouts maxims:

(45) A: Let’s get the kids something.

B: Okay, but I veto I-C-E-C-R-E-A-M-S.

(Levinson 1983: 104)

In (45), B ostentatiously infringes the Maxim of Manner (i.e. Be perspicuous) by spelling, rather than saying *ice cream*. However, what B intends to indirectly convey is that A should not mention *ice cream* to the children; because if anyone directly says *ice cream*, the children would immediately demand it. Flouting is the more relevant means of creating implicatures for the purpose of this study, because metaphor is claimed to be a particularly clear case of inference caused by intentionally violating maxims.

Although Grice viewed metaphor as a kind of indirect meaning caused by the difference between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’, Levinson (1983: 156-157) points out that Grice’s viewpoint on metaphor is not absolutely right in that metaphors are not always exploitations of the Maxim of Quality. For instance, the utterance *Freud lived here* can be both literal and metaphorical, according to how we interpret *Freud*, because *Freud* may literally refer to a real person or metaphorically refer to his theories. Moreover, Grice’s approach offers only a partial criterion for recognizing metaphor, not for explaining what the nature of metaphor is and how the speaker’s metaphor is properly interpreted by the hearer, due to the problem of ‘open-endedness’; namely, a metaphor as the speaker’s intended meaning could be understood by the hearer in different ways according to the context. Relating to this point, consider this example:

(46) You are the cream in my coffee. (Grice 1975: 163)
According to Grice, (46) is a typical metaphor which flouts the first sub-Maxim of Quality because You cannot literally be ‘the cream in my coffee’. Thus, the hearer seeks an alternative interpretation (47) of the speaker’s metaphorical utterance (46) under the assumption that the speaker observes a Cooperative Principle, and a reasonable speaker cannot have intended such an absurd proposition as (46):

(47) You are an important and special part of my life.

However, (46) is ‘open-ended’ in that it could be variously interpreted in different contexts to generate other implicatures, such as those in (48):

(48) a. You are my important friend (or spouse).

b. You are my bane.

If (41) is uttered in the midst of a conversation between two friends who are on good terms with each other, it might be interpreted as (47) or (48a). On the other hand, however, if it is known that the speaker dislikes cream in coffee, it might be interpreted as (48b). Furthermore, if (46) is uttered in the scene of a coffee creamer advertisement which describes a young, affectionate couple having coffee together, it could have some implicated meanings like ‘COFFEE MATE will enrich your love life’.

In spite of showing good criteria for recognizing metaphor, Grice’s approach does not offer any further explanation for how to choose just one of these possible interpretations in a particular context. Moreover, as Levinson (1983) points out, Grice does not consider other cases of metaphor where not only the Maxim of Quality but also other maxims are explicitly violated:
(49) Tom: Spike got very angry because of my mistake. Do I have to apologise to him now?

Jerry: A stitch in time saves nine.

In (49), Jerry’s utterance is a sentential metaphor flouting the Maxim of Relation (i.e. ‘Be relevant’), not the Maxim of Quality, and means ‘Tom should make an apology to Spike right now lest the situation should get worse’. Therefore, Grice’s claim is confronted with the challenge that metaphor may be caused not only when the Maxim of Quality is flouted but also other maxims as well. In relation to this point, suppose that Tom is a piano teacher, and one day Spike requests Tom to test whether or not Jerry, a new student, plays the piano well. The following conversation ensues:

(50) Spike: Does Jerry play the piano very well?

Tom: Well, I tried to teach a fish how to swim.

When Spike asks Tom how well Jerry plays the piano, Tom could answer Spike with a metaphorical expression like (50) which means ‘Jerry is a master of playing the piano’. In this case, according to Grice, Tom’s utterance flouts the Maxim of Quality because there is nobody who tries to literally teach a fish how to swim. Moreover, Tom talks about an irrelevant thing, which flouts the Maxim of Relation, because his answer seems not to be *prima facie* relevant to Spike’s question. Finally, Tom speaks ambiguously and offers vague information, flouting the Maxim of Manner, by using a metaphor instead of a literal expression. These points show that metaphor may occur not only when the Maxim of Quality is flouted but also when other maxims are flouted.

As a final point, looking forward to chapter 4, irony is another case which occurs when the Maxim of Quality is flouted; but Grice’s theory does not explain how interpreting irony is distinguished from interpreting metaphor. Thus, Grice’s theory lacks an account of (i) how
metaphor can be distinguished from other figurative expressions (e.g. irony) and (ii) how metaphor is interpreted once it is recognized. Some pragmaticists, particularly Horn (1989, 2004) and Sperber and Wilson (1995) have attempted alternative explanations of metaphor based pragmatic inference in order to avoid the shortcomings in Grice’s theory. In sub-sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, I survey those approaches.

### 3.2.2 Neo-Gricean Approaches

Major pragmatic approaches since Grice’s seminal work are often classified as neo-Gricean and post-Gricean; Horn’s (1989, 2004) Q and R Principles represent the neo-Gricean side, whereas Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) Principle of Relevance is at the centre of post-Gricean work. Both of these approaches attempt to integrate Grice’s maxims within one or two principles in accordance with Zipf’s (1949) principle of economy. The speaker pursues the speaker’s economy by trying to convey what he means by using the shortest and fewest expressions, whereas the hearer pursues auditor’s economy through minimum interpretive efforts. According to this view, verbal communication can be realized when the economy of these two sides interacts and forms a proper balance. In relation to these two economies, Mey (2001) comments:

As to the maxim of relevance itself, this has been the subject of two major efforts at rethinking Grice. The first is due to Horn (1984); the other to Sperber and Wilson (1986). The two proposals are bit alike in that they both concentrate on relevance; they are different in that Horn’s model keeps relevance within the general framework of Gricean theory, whereas Sperber and Wilson make the maxim of relevance the cornerstone of their own approach to ‘communication and cognition’, aptly described as Relevance Theory (RT).

(Mey 2001: 82)

Horn (2004) reforms all of Grice’s maxims except for Quality as two main principles: the hearer-oriented Q[ANTITY] Principle and the speaker-oriented R[ELATION] Principle, which is based on Grice’s treatment of metaphor. I summarize Horn’s Q Principle and R Principle in Horn (2004) as the following:

a. **Q Principle (Hearer based): MAKE YOUR CONTRIBUTION SUFFICIENT.**
   Say as much as you can (modulo Quality and R)
   Lower-bounding principle, inducing upper-bounding implicata
   (It collects Grice’s first Quantity maxim along with the first two ‘clarity’ sub-maxims of Manner.)

b. **R Principle (Speaker based): MAKE YOUR CONTRIBUTION NECESSARY.**
   Say no more than you must (modulo Q)
   Upper-bounding principle, inducing lower-bounding implicata
   (It collects Grice’s second Quantity maxim, Relation maxim and the last two sub-maxims of Manner.)

   (Horn 2004: 13)

According to the Q Principle, the speaker makes an utterance as informatively as possible, if his utterance contains weaker content than could otherwise be expressed, the hearer will conclude that the speaker wants to implicate ‘it is not the strongest content’. Thus, ‘scalar implicature’ among the graded expressions in accordance with semantic strength is one of the most representative inferences based on the Q Principle. This is illustrated in (51) and (52):

(51) Scale: <always, usually, often, sometimes>
   Tom sometimes drinks white wine alone.
   → Tom does not {always / usually / often} drink white wine alone.

(52) Scale: <must, can>
   They can leave tomorrow.
   → It is not the case that they must leave tomorrow.
The R Principle is, according to Horn, connected with an extended interpretation for the content of an utterance. Consider one example related to the R Principle.

(53) We went to the zoo yesterday. The elephant was sick.

|→ The elephant in the zoo where we went yesterday was sick.

In (53), the hearer may infer that the elephant that the speaker has mentioned belongs to the zoo they went to, even if the speaker does not add this extra information to his original utterance. In this case, the R Principle claiming ‘Say no more than you must’ works, because the speaker and the hearer assume that they should refer to the mutually most relevant elephant.

Horn’s R Principle can be regarded as a neo-Gricean approach to interpreting figurative expressions like metaphor and irony, in that this principle is speaker-oriented (i.e. ‘Say no more than you must’), and opens a possibility of extended interpretation.

After Horn, Levinson (2000: 75-164) developed a neo-Gricean account that re-thought the maxims as the Q[uantity]-Principle, I[nformativeness]-Principle and M[anner]-Principle. Levinson seeks to make a clearer distinction between semantic minimization (‘semantically general expressions are preferred to semantically specific ones’) and expression minimization (‘“shorter” expressions are preferred to “longer” ones’) than in Horn’s approach.

(54) a. **The Q-Principle** (simplified)
   Speaker: Do not say less than is required (bearing the I-Principle in mind).
   Addressee: What is not said is not the case.

b. **The I-Principle**
   Speaker: Do not say more than is required (bearing the Q-Principle in mind).
   Addressee: What is generally said is stereotypically and specially exemplified.

c. **The M-Principle**
   Speaker: Do not use a marked expression without reason.
   Addressee: What is said in marked way is not unmarked.
Thus, Levinson distinguishes between pragmatic principles governing an utterance’s surface form and pragmatic principles governing its information content (Huang 2007: 41).

According to Attado (2000) and Lagerwerf (2007), neo-Gricean approaches to interpreting figurative language such as metaphor or irony view figurative language as a case of deviant language use.¹⁷ Neo-Griceans call this deviant language use inappropriateness, but this notion of ‘inappropriateness’ is relevant in the given context, as the starting point for alternative (i.e. extended) interpretations (Attado 2000). For example, when the speaker metaphorically utters My brother is an eager beaver, as the hearer knows that his brother is not a literal beaver, and this utterance is inappropriate but relevant in the given context, the hearer eventually seeks another interpretation in which the speaker’s brother is a hard worker, after he associates the salient properties of a beaver with his brother’s character. Relating to this point, Lagerwerf (2007) explicates a neo-Gricean viewpoint:

If the most salient meaning of an utterance is considered awkward in the context, the interpretation process should start all over again. In the renewed interpretation, the hearer may assume that humor, metaphor, or other not solely informative intentions are involved (Giora, 2002). New meaning combinations may be derived, and this process of innovation may lead to a positive appreciation of the utterance (Giora et al., 2004).

(Lagerwerf 2007: 1705)

This explanation refines Grice’s view that no matter how odd an utterance may sound, the hearer seeks another possible interpretation from the utterance, because the hearer believes that a rational speaker will always cooperate with the hearer in order to achieve successful communication.

However, the neo-Gricean notion of ‘inappropriateness’, which is used as a significant criterion for interpreting figurative expressions, might have an explanatory limit, in that the neo-

¹⁷ Neo-Griceans call it a destabilizing trope (Lagerwerf 2007: 1703). Thus, for neo-Griceans, to interpret figurative expressions means to recognize and solve this destabilizing trope in the context.
Gricean approach regards figurative expressions such as metaphor and irony as deviations from normal language use. In fact, there are many cases in which figurative expressions may be metaphorical or ironic without any inappropriateness. For example, in the context that Spike and Jerry are campaigners for Candidate X and they have worked on the same side, when Tom asks Jerry what happened to Spike and Jerry last week, Jerry might reply to Tom with:

(55) Spike did not listen to me, and I had to send him to Coventry.

Although the literal interpretation of (55) may not be considered awkward or inappropriate in the context, it can be interpreted as having a metaphorical meaning: ‘Jerry renounced Spike’.

According to an experiment conducted by Glucksberg (2001), when there is a metaphorical/literal ambiguity in the utterance, most hearers attempt a metaphorical interpretation before they attempt other means of resolving the ambiguity. This result implies that metaphor is normal language use, not deviation from it. However, if we still observe Gricean maxims, we should predict that the hearer would not seek a metaphorical interpretation until he recognizes ‘inappropriateness’ in the context. Thus, this result from experimental pragmatics supports the cognitive approach to metaphor, and makes it the more persuasive account at this stage of explaining it.

In sum, as the neo-Gricean notion of ‘inappropriateness’ views metaphor as something deviant from normal language use, this approach has an explanatory limit for treating metaphor. Moreover, neo-Griceans’ way of treating metaphor is not compatible with experientialist language philosophy that I accept, because it persists in treating metaphor as deviant language use. For those reasons, despite some systematic explanations of implicature in neo-Gricean works, I pursue RT as an alternative approach for explaining figurative language.
3.2.3 Sperber and Wilson’s Principle of Relevance

As a cognitive and communicative theory that reconsiders some of the explanatory limits of Grice’s approach, Sperber and Wilson’s RT (1995) is attractive, because it offers meaningful explanation of how hearers infer meanings for figurative language use. Sperber and Wilson (1995) start by questioning whether all the maxims given by Grice are really necessary, and claim that every human inference related to language use can be explained by a single principle (i.e. the Principle of Relevance). This section shows that Sperber and Wilson’s approach enables us to grasp metaphor while avoiding the theoretical pitfalls of the Gricean approaches.

On the Gricean accounts, metaphor is created through blatant violation of Maxim of Quality, so the hearer must first recognize that something false has been uttered. However, in RT, this extra step of recognizing metaphor is not necessary. Instead, RT claims that metaphor is somewhere on a continuum with other literal expressions. This is to say, RT views metaphor as a normal linguistic mechanism, and it shares this view with CL.

Rather than having a Cooperative Principle and Conversational Maxims, RT reduces the explanation of implicatures to their relevance. In other words, RT holds that the hearer always chooses the most relevant interpretation of an utterance that is the most directly related to the present situation. Here, the notion of ‘Relevance’ is not an all-or-none matter, but a matter of degree. Thus, the hearer does not treat all information that he has in order to catch all possible meanings from the utterance; he uses only the most accessible information that provides sufficient positive cognitive effects in order to reach an interpretation. This aspect of RT contributes to solving the problem of ‘open-endedness’ in interpreting metaphor.

‘Relevance’ works on the basis of two principles: the Cognitive Principle of Relevance, and the Communicative Principle of Relevance. Sperber and Wilson state the Cognitive Principle of Relevance as (56):
Both speaker and hearer act on the basis of this principle. The speaker offers the hearer the key which helps the hearer achieve the utterance’s relevance. For instance, in a restaurant, if a customer shows a waiter his empty water glass, the customer’s sign guides the waiter to pour him another drink. In other words, the customer’s action lets the waiter achieve the relevance of the assumption that the customer wants to have another glass of water. This way, the sign which guides achieving relevance of ‘ostensive inferential communication’ is the ‘ostensive stimulus’. ‘Ostensive inferential communication’ is communication in which this ‘ostensive stimulus’ is used (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 63). In this communication, the speaker has an informative intention to express something to the hearer by showing the glass is empty, and holds a communicative intention like ‘I expect you to pour me another drink’ to communicate with the hearer, by making the hearer know the speaker’s informative intention.

The other RT principle is the ‘Communicative Principle of Relevance’. This is defined as:

(57) **Communicative Principle of Relevance:**
Every act of inferential communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 260)

According to the Communicative Principle of Relevance, the hearer assumes the speaker’s ostensive stimulus to be worthwhile to process and the most relevant potential stimulus for the given situation. This presumption of optimal relevance is described in (58):
(58) **Presumption of optimal relevance:**

i) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee’s effort to process it.

ii) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities and preference.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 270)

According to Wilson (2011), this presumption of optimal relevance conveyed by every utterance is precise enough to ground a specific comprehension heuristic that hearers can use in interpreting the speaker’s meaning:

(59) **Relevance-guided comprehension heuristic:**

a. Follow a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation of the utterance (e.g. in resolving ambiguities and referential indeterminacies, adjusting lexical meaning, supplying contextual assumptions, deriving implication, etc.).

b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

(Wilson 2011: 185)

RT also differs from the Gricean approach in that RT is more hearer-oriented than speaker-oriented. The mechanisms for interpreting utterances as relevant are based in the notions of ‘cognitive effect’ and ‘processing effort’ (Sperber and Wilson 1995). Cognitive effects are achieved when the utterance strengthens or contradicts an existing assumption or when it combines an existing assumption with new information to yield new cognitive implications (Sperber and Wilson 1995). Thus, cognitive effect means a conclusion (i.e. contextual implication) elicited after considering both the context and information in the utterance. When a conclusion (Q) is elicited by the assumptions from old information (C) and new information (P), it is to contextualize P in the context C. In this process of contextualization, the new conclusion Q is deduced which cannot be produced by only C or P. This contextual implication is a combination of old and new information or the result of an interaction between them.
Contextual implication is defined in (60):

\[(60) \textit{Contextual Implication}\]

A set of assumptions \( P \) contextually implies an assumption \( Q \) in the context \( C \) if and only if
i) the Union of \( P \) and \( C \) non-trivially implies \( Q \),
ii) \( P \) does not non-trivially imply \( Q \), and
iii) \( C \) does not non-trivially imply \( Q \).

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 107-108)

Additionally, according to Sperber and Wilson (1995:109), ‘contextual implications are contextual effects: they result from a crucial interaction between new and old information as premises in a synthetic implication’. In relation to this point, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 119) argue that ‘having contextual effects is a necessary condition for relevance, and that other things being equal, the greater the contextual effects, the greater the relevance’. Furthermore, a contextual effect is connected to an inferential process, in which an utterance strengthens or cancels the assumed content in the context, or generates a contextual implication. Thus, every utterance becomes relevant only when it has a contextual effect. On the contrary, if the processing effort were greater than cognitive effect (i.e. contextual effect), this would then reduce the relevance in the communication, and decreases the likelihood of successful communication. Focusing on this point, Sperber and Wilson (2006) define ‘Degree of relevance’ as in (61):

\[(61) \textit{Degree of relevance}\]

a. The greater the \textbf{cognitive effects} achieved by processing an input, the greater its relevance.

b. The smaller the \textbf{processing effort} required to achieve these effects, the greater the relevance.

(Sperber and Wilson 2006: 177)
If the speaker makes what appears to be an unsuitable utterance, the hearer must spend more effort processing what the speaker said, and this utterance is less relevant. Suppose that a Muslim student, Ali is invited to a party. Ali asks the host whether or not pork will be served. The host could reply with one of these answers:

(62) a. Meat will be served.
   b. Pork will be served.
   c. Only one of these sentences is true: Pork will be served or the solution to multiplying 5 by 127 is not 635.

Although all three utterances are relevant to Ali’s question, (62b) is more relevant as an answer to Ali’s question than (62a) or (62c). As Ali’s intention is to observe his dietary restriction as a Muslim, (62a) is not fully informative for him; thus, less relevant. (62c) is logically the same as (62b) and may bring about the same cognitive effect, but Ali as the hearer would need to spend more processing effort treating (62c) than he would for (62b). The speaker knows that he should not make the hearer spend useless processing effort, because if the hearer’s processing effort increase in an irrelevant and uneconomic direction, the speaker’s intention could be misunderstood.

The final main difference between RT and the (neo-)Gricean account is that the borderline between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ is differently placed. Grice (1975) set ‘what is said’ as the notion contrasted with the speaker’s intended meaning, by making a distinction between what the sentence means and what the speaker means. The meaning of ‘what is said’ is the literal meaning in which references of the sentence are assigned and ambiguity is solved. On the other hand, the implied meaning inferred from the context is defined as ‘what is implicated’, which is intended by the speaker.

Unlike Grice’s viewpoint, RT distinguishes between implicature, discussed above, and explicature. Although Grice proposed ‘what is said’ as a semantic notion, by including
expl icature in ‘what is said’, RT allows pragmatically inferred meaning which is not confined to linguistically input meaning to be included in that category. For example, suppose that Tom says (46) *You are the cream in my coffee* to his best friend Jerry, in order to imply ‘Jerry is Tom’s important partner in Tom’s life’. Before reaching the final meaning intended by the speaker Tom, the hearer Jerry must flesh out Tom’s original utterance by fixing the reference of the indexicals *you* and *my*. After this inferential process, Jerry may elicit the meaning ‘Jerry is the cream in Tom’s coffee’, which is prior to the implicated meaning such as ‘Jerry is Tom’s important partner in Tom’s life’. According to Sperber and Wilson (1995) and other Relevance Theorists such as Carston (2002) and Blakemore (2004), this interim step of meaning determination can be termed as *explicature*, which is elicited by some pragmatic elements such as assigning referents to indexicals, disambiguation, enrichment, saturation and *ad hoc* concept construction from contextual information. On Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) view, inferences that are not explicatures are implicature. In order to make the notion of explicature clear, Sperber and Wilson (1995) define *explicitness* (i.e. explicit assumption) as (63):

(63) **Explicitness**

An assumption communicated by an utterance $U$ is explicit if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by $U$.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 182)

To illustrate the difference between explicature and implicature, consider Carston’s example in (64):

(64) X: How is Mary feeling after her first year at university?

Y: She didn’t get enough units and can’t continue.

(Carston 2001: 4)
According to Carston (2001: 4), the hearer Y in (64) may represent the following explicit assumption in (65a):

(65) a. MARY\textsubscript{X} DID NOT PASS ENOUGH UNIVERSITY COURSE UNITS TO QUALIFY FOR ADMISSION TO SECOND YEAR STUDY AND, AS A RESULT, MARY\textsubscript{X} CANNOT CONTINUE WITH UNIVERSITY STUDY.

b. MARY\textsubscript{X} IS NOT FEELING VERY HAPPY.

Although (65a) still holds the logical forms encoded from (64Y), the content of (65a) is more detailed than the input content of (64Y), *She didn’t get enough units and can’t continue*. In other words, (65a) as an interpretation of what is explicitly said is elicited after passing these processes:

i) *Mary* is assigned to the pronoun *she* in (64Y) by reference assignment.

ii) The meanings of the ambiguous words like *get* and *unit* in (64Y) become fixed in accordance with the context, by disambiguation.

iii) The omitted contents in (64Y) are restored by saturation, which fills in the details of the arguments of *enough* and *continue*.

iv) The meaning of ‘cause and result’ is enriched by using the conjunctive *and*, according to the context.

However, (65b) illustrates implicature rather than explicate, because it is elicited not by directly developing the logical form of the original utterance (64Y) but by making an inference based on another premise such as ‘people usually want to pass courses, and are disappointed if they don’t’.

Another inferential factor which works in the process of eliciting explicate is *ad hoc* concept construction, which is connected to lexical narrowing or broadening by ‘loose talk’.

Carston (2000) explains *ad hoc* concept construction:
a lexical concept appearing in the logical form is pragmatically adjusted, so that the concept understood as communicated by the particular lexical item is different from, and replaces, the concept it encodes; it is narrower, looser or some combination of the two, so that its denotation merely overlaps with the denotation of the lexical concept from which it was derived.

(Carston 2000: 37)

This can be illustrated with (66):

(66) Kato (of O.J. Simpson, at his trial):
He was upset but he wasn’t upset.
(= He was [upset*] but he wasn’t [upset**])

(Carston 2000: 37)

In this example, there can be two interpretations of upset: the second upset is used to narrowly mean, ‘in a murderous state of mind’, whereas the first one has a more general interpretation. Thus, although the utterance sounds contradictory on the surface, its meaning can be resolved without treating it as contradiction.

How is the notion of explicature applied to interpreting a metaphorical utterance? Consider another example from Carston (2010):

(67) Utterance: My lawyer is a shark.
Explicature: [LAWYER X] ¹⁸ IS A SHARK*. ¹⁹
Implicature: LAWYER X IS RUTHLESS, MERCILESS TO HIS OPPONENTS, EXPLOITS HIS CLIENTS FINANCIALLY, etc.

(Carston 2010:301)

The content in brackets is newly filled by a pragmatic inferential process that assigns the right referent to the indexical My lawyer. Thus, LAWYER X IS A SHARK is viewed as ‘what is said’

¹⁸ I added the bracket to Carston’s example for explanation.
¹⁹ Here the asterisk distinguishes the communicated concept SHARK* from the lexically-encoded concept SHARK.
(i.e. explicature). The metaphorical interpretation of *shark* as ‘a ruthless man’ is achieved through implicature.

However, I point out that the metaphor *my lawyer is a shark* can be interpreted in different ways, according to the given situation:

(68) a. My lawyer exploits his clients financially. (negative meaning)
   b. My lawyer is dauntless and aggressive enough to never give up his cases.
      (positive meaning)

In relation to the different interpretations of *shark* in (68), suppose that the speaker utters *Although my lawyer is a shark*, *he is not a shark*, in order to convey ‘although my lawyer is dauntless and aggressive enough to never give up his cases, he does not exploit his clients financially’. In this case, a polysemous word *shark* can negatively or positively be interpreted, according to the speaker’s intention in the given situation.

Having surveyed the gist of RT, the next question is: How is RT applied to interpreting metaphor? While the (neo-)Gricean approach views metaphor as the result of blatantly violating the Maxim of Quality, RT (e.g. Wilson and Carston 2006) views that metaphor is located somewhere on the continuum with other linguistic mechanisms, and a particular metaphorical interpretation is selected in order to satisfy the expectation of optimal relevance in the given situation. Consider the example (69):

(69) This room is a pigsty. (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 236)

Suppose that a mother utters (69) when she sees her lazy daughter’s room in disorder. Following Sperber and Wilson’s analysis (1995: 236), this is a very standardized metaphor which has only one or two accessible inferences such as ‘the room is very dirty and untidy’. 
Thus, when (69) is treated in the context with a fixed idea that ‘a pigsty is stereotypically filthy and untidy’, it conveys an implicature that ‘the room is very dirty and in disarray, beyond the normal level’. However, this metaphor does not bear any other creative inferential meanings because it strongly implicates that the properties automatically called to mind as shared between A (i.e. This room) and B (i.e. a pigsty) are very strong and fixed.

On the other hand, (70) is a weak implicature in which the properties directly called to mind between A and B are weak and obscure; it also conveys many more various and broad implicated meanings than (69):

(70) (Tom introduces the newcomer Spike to Tom’s company colleagues Jerry and Droopy, who have not met Spike yet.)

Tom: I want to introduce an ICBM (i.e. Inter Continental Ballistic Missile) to you.

According to the RT approach, when the speaker utters (70), the metaphor ‘Spike is an ICBM’ works and the hearer’s interpreting process can be described as the following:

(71) **Sentence uttered:** I want to introduce an ICBM to you.

**Decoded content:** [THE MAN WHO THE SPEAKER X INTRODUCES TO THE HEARER Y] IS AN ICBM.

**Communicated content:**

**Explicature:** [THE MAN WHO TOM INTRODUCES TO JERRY AND DROOPY] IS AN ICBM. (Assigning references to the indexicals I and you)

**Implicature:** THE MAN WHO TOM INTRODUCES TO JERRY AND DROOPY IS DANGEROUS; TENACIOUS; HARDLY DECEIVED; NOT EXHAUSTED; DAUNTLESS; AGGRESSIVE; etc.

The metaphor in (70) could be interpreted in various ways depending on the context as in the following:
i) Spike is very reckless.
ii) Spike is very accurate.
iii) Spike is very tenacious.
iv) Spike is very dangerous.
v) Spike is very intransigent.
vi) Spike is hardly deceived.
vii) Spike is not exhausted.
viii) Spike is dauntless.
and so on.

It is presumed that the hearer finds only one possible interpretation that is most relevant to the present situation, by pursuing optimal relevance. Sperber and Wilson (1995) explain this point:

In general, the wider the range of potential implicatures and the greater the hearer’s responsibility for constructing them, the more poetic the effect, the more creative the metaphor. A good creative metaphor is precisely one in which a variety of contextual effects can be retained and understood as weakly implicated by the speaker.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 236)

In other words, a creative metaphor\(^{20}\) is achieved by weak implicature and has a poetic effect, in that it leaves much room for interpretations by the hearer. This may offer the hearer the pleasure of a new discovery in a given utterance situation. Even though metaphor could make the hearer spend more processing effort than a normal literal expression, metaphors are used because the cognitive effect that the hearer gets from them are bigger than the processing effort for treating them.

Thus far, I have surveyed the gist of RT and shown that RT offers some useful explanatory foundations for treating metaphor. Most of all, the RT approach to figurative language contributes to a more economical way of explaining it. This point is re-confirmed in chapter 4

\(^{20}\) Sperber and Wilson’s term *creative metaphor* is identified with *novel (linguistic) metaphor* in this thesis.
which deals with irony in that RT enables metaphor and irony to be treated by a single Principle of Relevance. Thus I employ RT as an explanatory mechanism for treating argumentation by figurative language.

In sub-section 3.1.2, I surveyed the CL approach to conceptual metaphor, which is another big contribution to examining the nature of metaphor. However, I do not employ the CL approach to metaphor for two reasons, although I accept its experientialist epistemology: 1) the purpose of this thesis is to examine and explain argumentation by metaphor (or irony or both), and the matter of argumentation is more closely connected to how a metaphorical utterance is used in the given situation. When a metaphorical utterance is used in the process of argumentation, it holds implicated meanings that transcend the literal sense of the sentence (i.e. linguistic use of metaphor). This is different from conceptual metaphor, which is a way of thinking that brings about a range of language expressions that involve that type of thinking. In this thesis, I focus on novel (linguistic) use of metaphor, rather than conceptual metaphor. 2) A pragmatic approach (i.e. RT) may offer a more efficient explanatory ground for treating non-conceptual metaphor and irony within a single principle. This contributes to pursuing a more economical way of explaining argumentation by figurative language. Thus, I develop my further discussions on metaphor, based on experientialism (as an epistemology for metaphor) and RT (as an explanatory mechanism), instead of accepting the CL approach to metaphor. This works because experientialism is compatible with RT, as pointed out in Tendahl and Gibbs (2008), who hold that there is a potential of harmonizing CL and RT, in that these two sides share some points with each other. I discuss this matter in sub-section 3.3.2.
3.3 Recent Relevant Debates on Metaphor

3.3.1 Is Metaphor ‘What is Said’ or ‘What is Implicated’?

After Grice (1975), the position that metaphor is ‘what is implicated’ was generally accepted for decades. However, contextualists (e.g. Bezuidenhout 2001, Recanati 2004), some Relevance Theorists (e.g. Wearing 2006, Wilson and Carston 2006, Wilson 2011) and some non-Gricean theorists (e.g. Romero and Soria (forthcoming) and Nogales 2012) have claimed that metaphor should be regarded as ‘what is said’, not as ‘what is implicated’. Here I introduce some metaphor theorists’ positions, which view the status of metaphor as ‘what is said’:

Relevance Theorists have consistently defended a continuity view, on which there is no clear cut-off point between ‘literal’ utterances, approximations, hyperboles and metaphors, and they are all interpreted in the same way.

(Wilson and Carston 2006: 4, also in Wilson 2011: 181)

I will argue that when one utters a sentence in some context intending it to be understood metaphorically, one directly expresses a proposition, which can potentially be evaluated as either true or false. This proposition is what is said by the utterance of the sentence in the context. We don’t convey metaphorical meanings indirectly by directly saying something else.

(Bezuidenhout 2001: 156)

The metaphorical content of a metaphor is not a Gricean implicature of its literal interpretation but rather constitutes “what is said,” itself a reflection of a type of speaker commitment to truth conditions and consistent with the ordinary language distinction between saying and implying.

(Nogales: 2012: 998)

Thus, surrounding the issue of how the status of metaphor should be defined, an interesting opposition between literalism and contextualism has newly appeared. Literalists (in the Gricean
tradition) view that metaphor is non-semantic, so metaphor is an expressive mechanism by which the speaker says *A is B* but means ‘*A is C*’. Thus, for literalists (e.g. Stanley 2005) ‘what is said’ by a metaphorical utterance is achieved by the conventionally literal meanings represented by its words. However, on the other hand, contextualists reject this viewpoint. According to the contextualist view, the meaning determination is, even at a basic level, context-dependent; so it is a very pragmatic process. From this point of view, contextualists (e.g. Recanati 2004) have argued that it is necessary to make a clear distinction between ‘what is literally said’, ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’. Furthermore, ‘what is said’ is different from ‘what is literally said’, in that the former is composed of ‘what is literally said + contextual information’; namely, for contextualists ‘what is said’ is the result of the hearer’s fleshing out the original utterance, according to the given situation. This contextualist view on metaphor has been accepted by some Relevance Theorists as well (e.g. Blakemore 2004, Wearing 2006, Wilson and Carston 2006).

In this clear distinction, contextualists view that metaphorical utterances as ‘what is said’ have their own metaphorical truth-conditional contents. Moreover, these contents are concomitant with pragmatically-determined ‘metaphorical meanings’ that the speaker intends to communicate and that the hearer intuitively understands. Thus, metaphorical meanings are not restricted to literal meanings of the used expressions.

What is interesting here is that the RT side is divided into two positions, defining the status of metaphor: while Sperber and Wilson (1995) in Standard Relevance Theory (i.e. SRT) views (novel) metaphor as a case of weak implicature which has a poetic effect, Wearing (2006), Wilson and Carston (2006) and Wilson (2011) in Recent Relevance Theory (i.e. RRT) argue that metaphor should be regarded as ‘what is said’. According to RRT, metaphor (as ‘what is said’) is the result of ‘loose talk’ and located somewhere on the continuum with other linguistic

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21 Stern (2006) is exceptional, in that although he is classified as a literalist, he views that metaphorical meanings belong to ‘what is said’.
mechanisms; and one metaphorical interpretation is selected, in order to satisfy the expectation of optimal relevance in the given situation. For this reason, metaphor and other linguistic mechanisms can be treated in the same way, without making any pragmatic distinction between them.

Although I agree that there is room for some cases of dead or conventionalized metaphor to be treated as ‘what is said’, in this section I argue that (novel) metaphor should be viewed as ‘what is implicated’, rather than ‘what is said’. This means that I stand by the SRT position on metaphor, and accepting RT does not mean entirely agreeing with the RRT claim that metaphor is ‘what is said’, not ‘what is implicated’. My position is similar to the contextualists’ in that I also view that metaphor is a natural linguistic mechanism and that meaning determination is context-dependent. However, I disagree with contextualists’ and some Relevance Theorists’ positions (i.e. RRT) that metaphor should be treated as ‘what is said’.

I am dubious of the metaphor as ‘what is said’ positions for the following four reasons:

1) The ‘what is said’ position does not sufficiently account for the discontinuity between metaphor and hyperbole.

2) The notion of ‘directness’ in the process of treating metaphor is not a sufficient condition for viewing metaphor as ‘what is said’.

3) The fact that official documents and discourses avoid using novel figurative language is evidence that language users do not treat metaphor as ‘what is said’.

4) Romero and Soria (forthcoming) argue that because metaphoric implicature is not cancellable, metaphor is not ‘what is implicated’ but ‘what is said’. However, this argument cannot be accepted, because it is based on the incorrect premise that a metaphorical utterance is interpreted as only one meaning.

Regarding the first of these arguments, Wilson (2011: 182) holds that ‘there is no clear
dividing line between hyperbole and metaphor, and an adequate account of metaphor should therefore apply to hyperbole in the same way’. However, this position is controversial. In relation to Wilson’s position on metaphor, consider (72):

(72) a. There’s no better way to fly --- Lufthansa
   b. What a wonderful palace in the sky! --- Lufthansa

While (72a) is the original advertising copy by Lufthansa Airline, which seems to be a case of exaggerated promotional publicity or hype, (72b) is a possible metaphorical copy whose message may correspond to that of (72a).

Although I have not heard that Lufthansa Airline has been accused of hype in relation to (72a), it is a risk, in that There’s no better way to fly --- Lufthansa asserts that ‘Lufthansa is the best airline’ and does not imply that ‘there could be another better airline than Lufthansa’. Without a factual basis for this claim, the company practises hype (i.e. an exaggerated advertisement).

On the other hand, if that advertising copy is composed of metaphor (e.g. What a wonderful palace in the sky! --- Lufthansa) which conveys the same message to customers, it can clearly avoid any accusations of hype, because it leaves room for the belief that ‘there might be a better airline than Lufthansa’. In (72b), the metaphor Lufthansa Airline is a wonderful palace works. To be strict, no matter how nice the facilities and the services of Lufthansa airplanes are, as they cannot exactly be identified with those of a wonderful palace, this metaphor can also be a case of hyperbole. Thus, this point contributes to some Relevance Theorists’ position that metaphor should be viewed as ‘what is said’, because there is no pragmatic distinction between metaphor and other linguistic mechanisms (including hyperbole).

However, that argument can be questioned. The advertiser who utters (72b) intends to convey another inferred meaning, by setting the facilities and the services of Lufthansa airplanes
and those of a wonderful palace in the relation of equivalence. Although there is common knowledge or belief that a palace is a comfortable place in which wonderful facilities and services are offered, this knowledge or belief is not what is asserted in the metaphorical utterance. Thus, although customers may guess that what the advertiser really intends to argue is that ‘Lufthansa is the best airline’, they cannot accuse the advertiser of lying, because metaphorizing Lufthansa Airline as a wonderful palace is a part of the advertiser’s own imaginative rationality, and this matter is none of other people’s business. Thus, there seems to be a discontinuity between metaphor and hyperbole, which would mean that they cannot be treated in the same way. In other words, although this metaphor can be viewed as a case of hyperbole, not all cases of hyperbole can be treated as metaphor.

Recently, Carston and Wearing (2011) agree that metaphor and other loose-talk uses including hyperbole should not all be treated in the same way. According to them, the literal/metaphorical distinction is a qualitative matter, whereas the literal/hyperbolic distinction is entirely quantitative. Thus, ‘while it seems right to place hyperbole on a continuum with approximations and other loose uses, metaphor is not sufficiently characterized by the claim that it too is just another case of loose use’ (Carston and Wearing 2011: 291). Although Carston and Wearing do not entirely give up the notion of metaphor as what-is-said, their view seems to mitigate the previous position on metaphor/other loose uses distinction, which some Relevance Theorists have generally maintained (e.g. Wilson and Carston 2006: 4).

My second argument is that although contextualists such as Bezuidenhout (2001: 166-167) have observed that ‘many reading time experiments have found that non-literal interpretations are accessed as quickly as literal ones’, this cannot be an absolute criterion for viewing metaphor as ‘what is said’. In relation to the reading-time argument, Camp (2006: 288) responds that ‘more recent empirical evidence suggests that unfamiliar novel metaphors do take significantly longer to process than either literal utterances or familiar metaphors’, citing
research including Bowdle and Gentner (2005). Moreover, Giora (1997, 2002, 2003) claims that comprehension time cannot be a good criterion for judging whether metaphor should be viewed as ‘what is said’, because reaction time is influenced by both immediate conversational relevance of the utterance and by the explicit availability of relevant interpretive assumptions than by the linguistic status of the utterance as metaphorical, sarcastic, or indirect. Therefore, it is a jump to regard every case of metaphor as ‘what is said’. Although I agree that dead metaphor may belong within the boundary of ‘what is said’, I hold that novel metaphor should be treated differently. Here the compromise which I propose is to say that metaphor exists somewhere on the spectrum between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’. No matter how novel a metaphor initially is, once it becomes routinized, it may have conventional meanings that amount to ‘what is said’. However, the status of novel metaphor can be seen as closer to ‘what is implicated’ than ‘what is said’, because the characteristic of novel metaphor allows the hearer to have more room for inferring the speaker’s intention than dead or conventionalized metaphor does.

Regarding my third argument, if metaphor and other linguistic mechanisms can be treated as ‘what is said’, it should be unproblematic for metaphor (or also irony, by the same logic) to be used in official documents such as contracts or laws. The authors of such documents aim to guarantee the same interpretation by different interpreters. However, figurative language such as novel metaphor (or irony) is generally avoided, if not banned, in official documents and official discourses in order to prevent different interpreters or hearers from misinterpreting or misunderstanding the speaker’s real intention. This fact is connected to the point that the way of associating A with B is the speaker’s, not the hearer’s.

According to the contextualist view (e.g. Recanati 2004), metaphor is a part of ‘what is

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22 Sperber and Wilson (1995) also agree that novel metaphor as weak implicature imposes more responsibility for interpretation on the hearer.

23 Thus, Camp (2006: 290) also holds that highly routinized metaphors like The ATM swallowed my credit card lie at one extreme on a spectrum from conventionality to novelty.
said’, which is composed of ‘what is literally said + contextual information’, and thus metaphor contributes to truth conditions. However, every language user would not interpret every entity in the same situation in the same way. On the contrary, the speaker who uses metaphor adds his imagination (with verisimilitude) to the reality with which he is faced. Again, as pointed out in Morgan (1989), ‘call to mind’ of something is the speaker’s, not the hearer’s.

Finally, there is one more basis on which the contextualist viewpoint of metaphor as ‘what is said’ can be refuted. Romero and Soria (forthcoming) hold that metaphor should be viewed as ‘what is said’, because if metaphor is ‘what is implicated’, then metaphoric implicatures should be cancellable. But, the metaphoric implicature of (73) is not cancellable, so metaphor is not ‘what is implicated’ but ‘what is said’:

(73) [Tom asks Jerry what the weather is like today and Jerry utters:] The sky is crying although it is not raining.

In other words, Romero and Soria claim that if the implicated meaning of The sky is crying is ‘It is raining’, then if that implicature is cancelled, the result is contradictory like ‘it is raining although it is not raining’.

However, we need not always interpret The sky is crying just as ‘It is raining’. Metaphor is the speaker’s meaning, although interpreting it is the hearer’s task. Thus, the speaker may express the situation that something is falling from the sky as The sky is crying, in which case it could be interpreted as ‘It is snowing’ or ‘It is hailing’. If so, the implicature of The sky is crying may be cancellable as in The sky is crying, [it is snowing] although it is not raining’. Thus, Romero and Soria’s cancellation argument is based on a wrong premise that one metaphorical utterance (i.e. The sky is crying) should have a fixed interpretation (i.e. ‘It is raining’), and it is therefore not a valid ground to justify the argument for metaphor as ‘what is said’.

My position, in not viewing novel/creative metaphor as ‘what is said’, can be indirectly
supported by Camp (2006, 2008, 2009), who defends the traditional view of metaphor against contextualist arguments that metaphor is ‘what is said’. She advocates metaphor as ‘what is implicated’ for rather different reasons than I do, claiming:

In speaking metaphorically, I believe, speakers say one thing, which they typically don’t mean, in order to mean something else. I will argue that this view is actually supported by the criteria the contextualists themselves offer, once those criteria are properly understood.

(Camp 2006: 282-283)

Contextualists are wrong to assimilate metaphor to literal loose talk: metaphors depend on using one thing as a perspective for thinking about something else.

(Camp: 2008: 1)

In order to argue that metaphor is ‘what is said’, contextualists (e.g. Bezuidenhout 2001) set four criteria which support their claim. Camp (2006) describes contextualists’ four main arguments to support ‘metaphor as what is said’ as the following:

First, ordinary speakers are normally willing to use ‘say’ to report metaphorically expressed contents. Second, metaphorical comprehension is direct, in the sense of coming in the order of interpretation. Third, metaphorical speech can itself serve as a vehicle for sarcasm and implicature, but not vice versa. And finally, metaphor makes the speaker’s intended content explicit, in the sense that hearers can respond to the speaker’s intended content by echoing her words.

(Camp 2006: 282)

However, Camp holds that these four criteria used by contextualists for determining if something is ‘what is said’ are not consistently applied only to metaphor; thus, she argues that the contextualist viewpoint on metaphor as ‘what is said’ is not acceptable, in that it is based on the wrong premises to the wrong conclusion. For example, my second argument refuting ‘metaphor as what is said’ is connected to one of those wrong premises.
For those four reasons and Camp’s position, I claim that although dead or conventionalized metaphor can be regarded as ‘what is said’, in that it always conveys fixed meaning, novel/creative metaphor is much closer to ‘what is implicated’, rather than ‘what is said’. Again, if contextualists’ positions on metaphor were right and metaphorical uses reflected a type of speaker commitment to truth conditions, all advertisers that produce metaphorical advertising copy would be liars, and they should take legal responsibility whenever they become enmeshed in disputes of hype. Likewise, if metaphor contributes to truth conditions, it should be able to freely be used in any official documents and discourses, maintaining the same effect like other literal mechanisms do; however, the reality is far from their assumptions. No matter how elaborate a metaphor theory is, as long as it does not reflect language users’ intuition and the reality in which their ordinary language is actually used enough, it should be reconsidered from the outset.

3.3.2 The Potential of Harmonizing RT and CL in Studying Metaphor

The goal of this section is to compare RT and CL, which have made big contributions to exploring metaphor, and to discuss the suggestion by Gibbs and Tendahl (2006) and Tendahl and Gibbs (2008) that the two theories can be complementary, as well as Wilson’s (2011) response.

RT and CL differ in that while CL is interested in conceptual metaphor as human cognitive activity, RT focuses on explaining linguistic use of metaphor. Furthermore, there is another difference between those two sides, in way of explaining metaphor interpretation. Yus (2009) describes this difference as the following:
RT predicts two clear-cut phases during interpretation: one of decoding and one of inference. The first one is in charge of the language module of the mind (Fodor 1983), which apprehends a linguistic sequence and yields a de-contextualized but grammatical “logical form” which has to be enriched in order to be meaningful. By contrast, cognitive linguistics disregards modularity in favor of what is called the embodied-mind hypothesis, according to which “the same neural mechanisms used in perception and bodily movement play a role in all forms of conceptualization, including the creation of lexical fields and abstract reasoning” (Ruiz de Mendoza 2005: 36).

(Yus 2009: 149)

According to Wilson (2011: 192), ‘these differences in the treatment of metaphor can be traced to a more fundamental difference in the relative priority that two approaches assign to the study of communication (as opposed to cognition)’.

In spite of their differences, RT and CL share several common points. For example, ‘both theories advocate an inferential approach to communication, rejecting the Conduit metaphor (i.e. the code model of communication) as inadequate’ (Wilson 2011: 192). Furthermore, both theories have devoted themselves to studying metaphor as a natural linguistic mechanism, which bridges the gap between mind and language. In spite of the common points between those two sides, according to Tendahl and Gibbs (2008: 1824), ‘many metaphor scholars, including those who embrace cognitive linguistics and relevance theory perspectives, see these theories as being radically different’. Focusing on the language philosophical foundation of two approaches toward metaphor, however, Gibbs and Tendahl (2006) and Tendahl and Gibbs (2008) argue that the theories are complementary, and can be comprehensively reconciled with each other. In other words, although both RT and CL have shared consensus on the nature of metaphor, they have individually maintained different approaches to as what and how metaphor should be explained. This point shows that there is a gap between the same (or at least similar) epistemology for an entity and different ways of explaining it; thus, if an explanatory logic which can cover this gap is developed, both theories can be complementary enough.
Reacting to Tendahl and Gibbs’ position which argues that CL and RT can be harmonized, Wilson (2011: 177) claims that ‘Relevance Theorists and cognitive linguists see metaphor as entirely normal and natural for rather different reasons’. In other words, while cognitive linguists have claimed that ‘metaphor is primarily a matter of thought and action and only derivatively a matter of language’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003: 153) and ‘metaphor shapes human thought, as evident in the way people speak about the world and their experience’ (Tendahl and Gibbs 2008: 1824), Relevance Theorists (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1995) view metaphor as an example of loose talk, which is the best way of achieving optimal relevance in the process of communication.

The problem, according to Tendahl and Gibbs (2008: 1840), is that ‘cognitive linguistics has not shown a huge interest in the role of context in metaphor understanding’. However, as already discussed in sub-section 3.1.2, as CL has not focused on that aspect rather than ignored it from the outset, it would not be desirable to consider this a theoretical weak point of CL. In fact, accepting experientialist epistemology is agreeing with subjectivization in the process of meaning determination, and it consequently entails accepting the role of context in metaphor understanding.

Additionally, Wilson (2011: 190-191) and Leezenberg (2001: 142-144) point out the matter of preconceptual structure as a problem in reconciling CL with RT. In other words, both Wilson (2011) and Leezenberg (2001) hold that strictly following CL view, a language user with no experience of marriage cannot easily understand a metaphorical use such as Tom’s marriage is on a reef from a conceptual metaphor MARRIAGES ARE JOURNEYS. In relation to this matter, Wilson (2011) holds that following RT analysis for metaphor, even someone without any previous experience of marriage can adjust the meaning of on a reef in constructing an interpretation that is relevant in the expected way.

Lakoff and Johnson invited those challenges by claiming that ‘no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately represented independently of its experiential basis’ (Lakoff
and Johnson 1980/2003: 19). However, in sub-section 3.1.2, I argued that those challenges can be avoided, according to how broadly cognitive linguists set the extent of ‘experience’.

In other words, I argued that experientialists’ ‘experience’ does not mean only ‘direct experience’. We know that we learn through our indirect experiences as well as through our direct experiences; that is why I can use the *Taj Mahal* metaphor even though I have never been to India. Similarly, even a painter who has never given birth could express his/her pains for creation as *To bear a baby* (i.e. creation) *is always a painful work*. Those cases are based on the speaker’s indirect experience, rather than direct experience.

Moreover, as discussed in sub-section 3.1.2, it is not easy to make a clear distinction between direct experience and indirect experience. Therefore, it would not be desirable to narrowly recognize the extent of experientialists’ notion of ‘experience’ only as direct experience, and to argue that CL has its explanatory limits based on the former premise.

The issue of direct versus indirect experience in the understanding of metaphor can also be explained by the notion of ‘metarepresentation’, which is based on the cognitive pragmatic notion of ‘resemblance’ (Sperber 1996, 2000, Wilson 2000, 2009). Metarepresentation (i.e. the representation of a representation) can be defined as a cognitive ability which enables language users to represent an abstract X by exploiting a concrete entity which seems to be similar to X. This cognitive ability of metarepresentation lets language users cope with the insufficient relevance of a representation by making use of the secondary information on it. When the first information is not intuitively and fully understood, the secondary information or belief relevant to it makes it allows it to either be treated as something valid or abandoned as something false. For instance, even though I have never been to India, when I metaphorize my puppy’s kennel as the *Taj Mahal*, I may metarepresent something magnificent and fancy by exploiting a concrete entity (i.e. *Taj Mahal*) as the secondary information relevant to the first information (i.e. something magnificent and fancy).

For Gibbs and Tendahl’s (2006) and Tendahl and Gibbs’ (2008) position that CL and RT
treatments of metaphor could be complementary, Wilson (2011: 178-180) presents three points in reaction. Wilson’s first point is that it is necessary to first look for evidence that some metaphors arise in language use and others in thought. For instance, according to Wilson (2011: 179), while RT treats standard examples of linguistic metaphor such as (74a-c), CL has focused more on examples of conceptual metaphor such as (75a-c), which reflects conceptual mappings across cognitive domains:

(74) a. Tom is a calculator.
    b. Jane is a daffodil.
    c. Droopy is Michael Jackson.

(75) a. The bumper to bumper traffic cost me an hour. (TIME IS MONEY)
    b. He is a highly educated man. (GOOD IS UP : BAD IS DOWN)
    c. Jerry is a little rusty today. (THE MIND IS A MACHINE)

Thus, Wilson claims that those who attempt a unitary account of the examples in (74) and (75) should explain how both types of examples can be analysed the same cognitive and communicative mechanisms.

Wilson’s second point is that the possible interrelation between RT and CL treatments for metaphor could be achieved by looking at the central role of concepts in both approaches. For example, metaphors viewing women as flowers exist in many cultures. While CL might hold that flower metaphors are surface reflections of underlying conceptual metaphor WOMEN ARE FLOWERS (Wilson 2011: 179), based on systematic correspondences between the domains of ‘women’ and ‘flowers’, RT views these metaphors as ‘originating in creative uses of language for opportunistic communicative purposes, which, if repeated often enough, might result in the setting up of systematic correspondences between the domains of ‘women’ and ‘flowers’
(Wilson 2011: 179). Here, according to Wilson (2011: 180), ‘there is a genuine question about whether, and to what extent, conceptual cross-domain mappings originate in language use, and are therefore to be explained at least partly in pragmatic terms’.

Wilson’s (2011: 193) final point is that there are two benefits that CL may borrow from RT, in that CL does not focus on examining how the speaker’s metaphorical utterance is properly interpreted by the hearer. CL is faced with a major challenge in explaining how the hearer not only understands most metaphorical utterances, but typically understands them in the way the speaker intended. Because RT is compatible with the assumptions of CL, it may offer to CL an explanation of how the hearer’s inference in communicative situations might be constrained.

The other benefit that Wilson points out is that RT may help CL avoid another challenge raised by the cognitive-linguistic assumption that ‘we systematically use inference patterns from one conceptual domain to reason about another’ (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 246). This assumption cannot account for how the hearer’s inference in the process of understanding the utterance is properly warranted, because not all the inferential patterns from one conceptual domain are valid when they reach the other. According to RT, when the hearer draws a particular inference for interpreting an utterance, as long as this inference is not valid, the utterance would not elicit enough implications which are relevant in the expected way. Thus, the speaker who utters something is responsible for encouraging the hearer to derive a certain inference, which fits the speaker’s communicative intention, by using the ostensive stimulus.

In sum, although RT is also based on a cognitive perspective on using metaphor, it is unlike CL in that it has emphasized a communicative approach to metaphoric language use as well, and it offers more delicate explanation for it. This point is one of the reasons that I prefer RT over CL as the explanatory mechanism of this study, because the purpose of this study is to explore discourse of ‘persuasion’ (i.e. argumentation), which focuses on linguistic use of metaphor, rather than conceptual metaphor.
3.4 Summary

This chapter has covered three topics. First, I surveyed how metaphor has been treated within the previous linguistic studies including pragmatics. In this process, I supported my premise (in chapter 1) that metaphor can be more effectively treated by pragmatic approach. In particular, I pointed out that RT can offer more persuasive explanation on how the metaphorical utterance is interpreted by the hearer. This point is closely connected to explaining argumentation by figurative language, which I treat in chapters 5 and 6, because argumentation by the figurative utterance cannot be achieved unless the speaker’s intended meaning in his utterance is grasped by the hearer.

Second, I discussed the issue of how the linguistic status of metaphor should be recognized, which has recently been raised. In other words, although in the Gricean tradition metaphor has been undoubtedy regarded as ‘what is implicated’, recently contextualists (including some Relevance Theorists) have claimed that the linguistic status of metaphor should be viewed as ‘what is said’, not as ‘what is implicated’. Particularly, some Relevance Theorists who emphasize semantic extension by ‘loose talk’ argue that metaphor exists somewhere on the continuum with other literal expressive mechanisms, and a metaphorical interpretation is chosen in accordance with the necessity of satisfying the expectation of optimal relevance in the given situation. Consequently, this viewpoint becomes developed as the argument that metaphor and other linguistic mechanisms should be treated in the same way; and there is no pragmatic distinction between them. However, for several reasons, I made it clear that I cannot entirely agree with the assumption that metaphor is ‘what is said’, even though I accept the basic explanatory mechanism of the RT approach to metaphor.

Third, I discussed the possibility of harmonizing RT and CL, which has recently been raised by Gibbs and Tendahl (2006) and Tendahl and Gibbs (2008), as well as Wilson’s (2011) response to it. The upshot of this discussion is that those two theories can be complementary in
a comprehensive sense, in that both are based on the same epistemological outlook on metaphor. However, there are some theoretical differences between those theories about how metaphor should be explained.

In the next chapter, within RT framework, I examine the nature of irony as another natural language use that reflects human cognitive ability.
Chapter 4

What is Irony?

4.0 Introduction

The discussion of metaphor so far has confirmed that many meanings intended by language users transcend the literal meaning of the words uttered by them. In other words, the meaning of an utterance is not entirely determined by the synthesis of the word meanings and grammar in it. Like metaphor, irony represents a case where the speaker’s intention is something other than (and in this case generally opposite to) the literal interpretation of the utterance. In this chapter, I survey the definition, characteristics and functions of verbal irony, and give a pragmatic perspective on why language users use irony instead of literal expressions.

At the highest level, irony can be classified into two basic categories: verbal irony and situational irony. In general, verbal irony occurs when the meaning of what is said by a speaker is opposite to that of what is implicated by him. Thus, irony cannot be interpreted without shared context between the speaker of an ironic utterance and the interpreter (i.e. hearer or reader). On the other hand, situational irony is a state of the world that is recognized as the oddness or unfairness of the given situation (e.g. The cobbler’s son goes barefoot), and it is mainly represented in the arts including photography or painting, in which language is typically not used. Thus, according to Attado (2000), most (linguistic) treatments of irony (e.g. Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1976 and Holdcroft 1983) deliberately ignore situational irony, as do I in this thesis.

As for metaphor, the first pragmatic approach to irony was attempted by Grice (1975). Grice holds that the speaker flouts the Maxim of Quality when he uses irony by expressing a
meaning that is opposite to the meaning he intends. However, Grice’s approach to irony cannot effectively explain, for instance, how other explicit violations of the Maxim of Quality (like metaphor) differ from irony, and why some cases of irony seem not to violate the Maxim of Quality.

As a theoretical alternative to Grice’s approach, Sperber and Wilson (1981, 1995) and Wilson and Sperber (1992) offer a treatment of irony as ‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’ based on relevance. This has considerable explanatory power for the essence of irony. Thus, in this chapter, my discussion of irony is based on Sperber and Wilson’s (1981, 1995, 1998) and Wilson and Sperber’s (1992) approaches.

However, Sperber and Wilson’s ‘irony as echoic mentioning’ is also faced with some challenges. For example, Giora (1995), Seto (1998) and Utsumi (2000) question whether irony is always ‘echoic mentioning’.

Additionally, although the representative RT approaches to irony (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1981, 1995, 1998, Wilson and Sperber 1992) have focused on its sarcastic use, Lee (2002: 71-72) points out that irony can also be used to satisfy non-sarcastic purposes, in which the speaker intends to humorously praise or encourage the addressee’s merits or achievements. Thus, in this chapter, I discuss not only general patterns of irony to which Sperber and Wilson’s approach has been applied but also other cases of irony that Sperber and Wilson and other Relevance Theorists have neglected.

In order to accommodate the treatment of such examples in RT, I propose that Sperber and Wilson’s RT need not maintain that every case of irony is ‘echoic mentioning’. Instead, we should employ Utsumi’s (2000) notion of ‘incongruity’ as a key notion in the definition of irony. This means that the echoic-mention type is a subtype of irony, and other types of irony can be explained by adapting the notion of incongruity. As the first step of this task, in sub-section 4.1, I discuss how irony is defined in pragmatics (and RT in particular).
4.1 Defining Irony

According to *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary* (2012), a lay definition of irony is ‘the use of words to express something other than and especially the opposite of the literal meaning’. In this way, irony is the most indirect way of speaking in that it generally conveys what is directly opposite to the speaker’s real intention; in contrast other rhetorical expressions (e.g. metaphor or metonymy) depend on similarity or extensibility of concepts and varieties of expressive methods. What we must pay attention to here is that when a speaker uses irony, he has a reason for saying something that is untrue. Typically, a speaker who makes an ironic utterance intends to ridicule the hearer’s attitude, blame the hearer, or present the speaker’s disappointment or disapproval toward some events or situations by expressing these intentions in a contrary way. For example, if someone says *You have come earlier than I expected* to a friend who is more than two hours late for an appointment, this is surely an ironic utterance used to blame the addressee for making the speaker wait and to accuse him of inattention to time. In this case, the use of irony amounts to sarcasm, which is distinguished by the intention to mock or insult.

However, as pointed out in Lee (2002), not all irony uses are connected to blaming, insulting or ridiculing the addressee, or to showing the speaker’s cynical attitude towards the given situation. Other uses of irony such as genteel irony can be used to save the addressee’s face, or to humorously praise or encourage the addressee’s merit or achievement. I discuss this matter in sub-section 4.4. Before developing a fuller discussion on the nature of irony, it is necessary to distinguish irony in a broader sense from sarcasm, satire, paradox and parody as particular functions or subtypes of ironic utterances.

Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) make a useful distinction between irony and sarcasm. According to them, no one in particular is the victim in irony, while there is a specific victim who is a target of ridicule in sarcasm. For example, when *What a sunny day* is uttered in heavy
rain, it would be ironic if it brought to mind a wishful desire for fine weather; on the other hand, it could be sarcastic if it called to mind a specific weatherman’s forecast that the weather would be fine. Similarly, Attado (2000: 795) claims that ‘sarcasm is an overtly aggressive type of irony, with clearer markers/cues and a clearer target’. Lagerwerf (2007: 1708-1709) points out another difference between irony and sarcasm: whereas irony can be used in commercial advertising which has the positive informational intention of having consumers buy a specific product or service, sarcasm generally cannot be used in this context, because the purpose of sarcasm is negative.

While sarcasm mainly concerns the matters between personal relations, satire is related to public issues. Satire particularly is used to cynically criticize social phenomena or people in authority, while the sarcasm is not always used in this way.

Furthermore, irony is different from parody. A parody is a literary or artistic work that imitates another author’s style or work, in order to ridicule the target or bring about humorous effect. Thus, parody is distinguished from irony, in that parody is used to directly describe the target and is similar to the original work which it imitates, while irony is an indirect expression which over-turns the common sense of the world, and it is not always accompanied with humorous effect and imitating the original work. Parody is also different from satire in a strict sense, in that the former is based on others’ original works, where as the latter is not always so.

Finally, irony differs from paradox, in that the former is to say the opposite of what the speaker really means and it superficially makes sense, whereas the latter denotes a strong truth through the expression of a contradiction which may sound absurd on the surface. For example, if someone says How impatient Job is, it is irony; however, God, please give me patience, but make it quick it is paradox.

The traditional dictionary definition of irony is insufficient in that it holds that an ironic utterance communicates a single definite proposition, which could have been conveyed by a literal utterance. Following this definition, the ironical utterance (76) should be pragmatically
equivalent to the literal utterance (77). Suppose that Tom describes his new classmate Spike’s looks in the following:

(76) He looks really fantastic! (used as irony)
(77) He looks terrible. (used as literal utterance)

Language users intuitively know that (76) and (77) are different from each other in terms of their pragmatic effects. Rather than simply describing Spike’s looks, the ironic (76) also expresses the speaker’s attitude toward Spike’s looks, which is a different attitude than is expressed by the literal (77). For this reason, it is necessary to explain this difference in pragmatic effects realized by ironic utterances and their literal counterparts, and to include this in any definition of irony.

Grice’s early pragmatic approach to irony (1975) holds that irony is brought about when the Maxim of Quality is flouted, and the utterance therefore conveys not a literal meaning but another implicated meaning. As discussed in sub-section 3.2.2, neo-Griceans inherit this position and take uses of figurative language including metaphor and irony as deviant language uses, which are superficially inappropriate but interpreted as relevant and cooperative in the given situation. However, this Gricean definition is not sufficient because, as Utsumi (2000) points out, there are cases in which irony is achieved without flouting the Maxim of Quality. For instance, a mother might ironically say This room is totally clean when she finds that her son has littered his room, or she could say something like (78):

(78) I love children who keep their rooms clean. (Utsumi 2000: 1780)

According to Utsumi (2000), the mother’s utterance (78) can also be interpreted as irony, even though (a) it does not flout the Maxim of Quality, and (b) it is what the mother intends to
express, because it is uttered to indirectly scold her son in an ironic environment. Utsumi (2000: 1783) defines an ‘ironic environment’ as the following:

i) The speaker has a certain expectation $E$ at time $t_0$.
ii) The speaker’s expectation $E$ fails (i.e. $E$ is incongruous with reality) at time $t_1$.
iii) The speaker has a negative emotional attitude (e.g. disappointment, anger, reproach, envy) toward the incongruity between what is expected and what actually is case.

The mother’s ironic utterance of (78) does not implicate ‘I do not love children who keep their room clean’ or ‘I love children who keep their rooms messy’, but implicates ‘I expect my son to always keep his room clean’. Unlike Grice’s viewpoint that the literal meaning of an ironic utterance is not true and it conveys a directly opposite meaning, the literal meaning of (78) is also true but still ironic because it is uttered in an ironic environment.

Because of the inadequacy of the Maxim of Quality approach, I see that Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory as more suitable for explaining irony, in that it regards irony as the speaker’s echoic mentioning. In fact, Wilson and Sperber’s (1992) and Sperber and Wilson’s (1981, 1995) notion of ‘irony as echoic mentioning’ has invigorated irony studies through showing a communicative approach to irony without sticking to the previous positions that see figurative language such as metaphor or irony only as rhetorical devices. Thus, I survey how irony is explained within Sperber and Wilson’s RT in the next section; then in sub-sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 I discuss some other aspects of irony that Sperber and Wilson’s approach has comparatively neglected. Relating to this point, I make the following arguments. First, irony does not always involve ‘echoic mentioning’. Second, Relevance Theorists tend to over-extend the scope of ‘echo’ in order to defend their claim that irony is always echoic mentioning. However, such extreme extension of the scope of ‘echo’ needs to be constrained in that it could decrease the explanatory power of their theory on irony. Finally, I point out that RT should extend the scope of its study on irony, in order to explain other aspects and functions of irony by
proposing an alternative way to explain irony within the RT approach.

4.2 Irony as Echoic Mentioning

Wilson and Sperber (1992) and Sperber and Wilson (1981, 1995) claim that we need not postulate two kinds of meanings literal and figurative, in order to explain metaphor and irony; moreover, they do not view irony as involving inferred meaning from a violation of the Maxim of Quality as Grice claimed. Instead, they explain irony as mention which is opposite to use. The distinction between use and mention can be illustrated through the following examples:

(79) a. We didn’t start the fire.

   b. ‘We didn’t start the fire’ is what Billy Joel argues in his hit song.

In (79a), We didn’t start the fire is used by the speaker to express what he thinks or believes to the hearer, whereas in (79b) the same sentence is mentioned by the speaker to refer to itself rather than to express his thoughts or beliefs to the hearer. In light of this distinction, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 239) define irony as a linguistic mechanism used to show that ‘the speaker dissociates herself from the opinion echoed and indicates that she does not hold it herself’ through mentioning or copying another’s statement. Thus, the gist of Sperber and Wilson’s viewpoint on irony is summarized as ‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’. In other words, because the speaker does not use the literal meaning of an ironic expression but mentions it, he intends to show how absurd another’s actual utterance is, or how far it is from reality. Sperber and Wilson (1995)’s necessary and sufficient conditions for irony are:
When the speaker utters an ironic expression,

i) The hearer should be able to recognize the utterance is echoic.

ii) The hearer should be able to identify the source of the opinion echoed.

iii) The hearer should recognize that the speaker’s attitude to the opinion echoed is one of rejection or dissociation.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 240)

For instance, suppose that my friends and I know that yesterday’s weather forecast said *It will be fine tomorrow*. Nevertheless, I awoke to find that is very rainy this morning, spoiling my plans for the day. In that case I might say to my friends *It certainly is fine today*. In doing so, I intend to criticize the absurdity of yesterday’s weather forecast by mentioning the weatherman’s statement, and my friends who hear my utterance would recognize that it is irony.

Sometimes we can use irony without identically reproducing what the other person said. For example, suppose that when Tom who has never served in the military, boastfully says *I used to serve in the U.S. Navy SEAL Team*, Jerry cynically replies to Tom by saying *And I am captain of the Vietnamese Ski Troop*. Jerry’s utterance can be regarded as a case of sarcastic irony which ridicules Tom’s claim, and it implicates ‘Don’t tell a lie’ or ‘I don’t believe you’.

However, this seems to deviate from Sperber and Wilson’s original definition of irony, because Jerry’s utterance is not echoic mentioning of Tom’s antecedent utterance. In order to explain this case, Sperber and Wilson (1998) hold that all ironic utterances are essentially echoic, because the extent of ‘echoic mentioning’ includes not only what another person has antecedently said but also our common sense/beliefs/knowledge, socio-cultural norms, standard expectations and so on; moreover, the implicatures of a previous utterance can be echoed too.

Explaining why Jerry’s utterance is interpreted as a case of sarcastic irony, Tom’s utterance implicates that ‘I claim that I used to serve in the U.S. Navy SEAL Team’, and Jerry rejects or dissociates himself from the truth of that claim by claiming that Tom used to serve in the U.S. Navy SEAL Team.
Now I analyse and examine a real case of (sarcastic) irony, which can be well explained by Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) approach (i.e. echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation). Consider the following example (80):

(80) I doubled the national debt. Let me do it again.
(Or vote for change. Vote Conservative.)

Figure 1: the Conservative Party’s campaign for the UK general election in 2010

The example (80) is a case of (sarcastic) irony uttered in billboard advertisements for the Conservative Party for the UK general election campaign in 2010. The purpose of this political campaign in (80) was to criticize the Labour Party policy and to persuade the voters to choose the Conservatives in the 2010 general election. This utterance in (80), which is partially ironic (i.e. Let me do it again), was shown with the smiling face of Gordon Brown the leader of the Labour Party order to criticize Labour Party policy and to persuade voters to choose the Conservatives.

In this setting, the Let me do it again statement is ironic. Gordon Brown (as the victim of

the Conservative Party’s sarcastic irony) says to the voters *Please stand by the Labour Party once again in spite of its poor economic policy*, as if he did not seriously recognize the problems that the Labour Party’s policies caused. As discussed in chapter 1, the ironic utterances used in advertisements are usually accompanied with follow-up sentences, in order to prevent consumers from misunderstanding the advertiser’s real intention. The same phenomenon is also observed in (80), where *Or vote for change. Vote Conservative* is the message that the advertisement is intended to convey to consumers.

In general, two messages are conveyed when an ironic utterance achieves its contextual effect. The first message conveyed to the hearer is something negative that is not influential because of people’s fixed ideas (e.g. ‘it is not desirable to increase the national debt’), and the second message is that ‘another meaning intended by the speaker might exist, besides the superficial meaning and the implicature of the ironic utterance’. In other words, the utterance in (80) overturns a fixed idea, and it is formed as irony, which is interpreted as ‘Do not vote for the Labour Party’, by echoing the alleged claim by the Labour Party that ‘it is not problematic to increase the national debt’. The conclusion of this analysis successfully applied to the frame of ‘ironic environment’:

i) **The speaker has a certain expectation E at time t₀**: Increasing the national debt is the fault of the Labour Party; thus that party is not qualified to come into power again.

ii) **The speaker’s expectation E fails (i.e. E is incongruous with reality) at time t₁**: The Conservative Party believes that the Labour Party is not qualified to come into power again, because the Labour Party failed in its economic policies. However, the Labour Party is standing in the general election, in order to come into power again.

iii) **The speaker has a negative emotional attitude (e.g. disappointment, anger, reproach, envy) toward the incongruity between what is expected and what actually is the case**.

The Conservative Party has a negative emotional attitude (i.e. reproach, ridicule or anger) toward the incongruity between what it believes and what actually is case.
As discussed above, (80) is a typical case of sarcastic irony, which Sperber and Wilson’s standard RT approach may explain. The sarcastic irony in (80) can be explained by saying that:

i) The Labour Party tries to come into power again in spite of its faulty policies.

ii) This behaviour of the Labour Party implicates that it does not believe that it has failed in its economic policies.

iii) The Conservative Party echoes this implicature and rejects or dissociates itself from it.

Nevertheless, there have been some challenges that not all cases of irony follow the typical pattern given by Sperber and Wilson’s RT. In relation to this point, there are some pragmatists who have questioned Sperber and Wilson’s ‘irony as echoic mentioning’. For example, Giora (1995), Seto (1998) and Utsumi (2000) hold that ‘echoic mentioning’ is not necessary condition for being irony. Additionally, according to Lee (2002: 71-72), even though irony can also be used to satisfy non-sarcastic purpose, the representative RT approaches to irony (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1981, 1995, 1998, Wilson and Sperber 1992) have not made this point clear.

In the next sub-section, I introduce these challenges to RT and examine their arguments, before in sub-section 4.5 proposing an alternative RT treatment of irony, which contributes towards neutralizing those challenges.

### 4.2.1 Is Irony Always Echoic?: Non-Echoic Irony

Sperber and Wilson generalize that all cases of irony ultimately involve ‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’. However, according to Utsumi (2000: 1780), ‘Sperber and Wilson’s notions of echoic interpretation and of dissociation from an echoed material are too narrow, and
therefore unable to explain all cases of irony’. In other words, Utsumi (2000) argues that echoic mentioning is not a necessary condition for being irony. Some cases of irony are still ironic, in spite of not clearly echoing a rejected proposition. In relation to Utsumi’s position, consider Jerry’s utterance in (81), which can be regarded as non-echoic irony in Seto (1998):

(81) Tom: Droopy has just scratched your new Benz.
    Jerry: Well, I like that!

According to Seto, it is not easy to view Jerry’s reply to Tom as a case of echoic mention, because there is no immediately antecedent or even a possible remote source that is echoed. In other words, nobody has said Jerry, do you like this?, and nobody has thought that Jerry would like Droopy to scratch Jerry’s new car. Moreover, there is not any cultural norm or common belief that ‘one should like somebody to scratch his new car’. In this case, therefore, Jerry’s utterance should be viewed as irony without any echo.

Sperber and Wilson (1998) defend their viewpoint against Seto’s criticism, claiming that it is still echoic irony because Seto’s example echoes the universal desire for things to be such that we can like them. However, this is to extend the notion of ‘echo’ very broadly; hence, this approach has been faced with several criticisms (particularly in Giora 1995 and Utsumi 2000) that the notion of echoing in RT is not sufficiently constrained. While extending the scope of ‘echoing’ allows Sperber and Wilson to not regard Seto’s example as a counterexample, Giora (1995: 246) presents another challenging counterexample:

(82) I think the washing hasn’t dried. (said on a very rainy day)

Giora claims that the utterance of (82) is not echoic because the utterance in (82) need not be attributed to another speaker; yet it is irony. In response, Curcó (2000: 261) supports the echoic-
mention argument by claiming that ‘nothing in the definition of utterance of echoic use (and hence of irony) imposes the requirement that an echoic ironic utterance should represent a belief attributed to another speaker’. Curcó (2000: 261) furthermore claims that ‘echoic utterances are those that achieve relevance by informing the hearer that the speaker is entertaining a certain attributable thought and that the speaker simultaneously holds an attitude to it’. Thus, according to Curcó (2000: 262), ‘echoic utterances include those cases where the speaker attributes a thought or an utterance to herself at a time different from the time of utterance, precisely what the first condition on verbal irony proposed by Sperber and Wilson requires’. Following Curcó’s claims, we can imagine that the speaker found that the washing was still hung outside in the rain, even though he had asked his son to get it inside if it started to rain. In this case, according to Curcó, the speaker might utter I think the washing hasn’t dried, attributing the result to his son or to himself assumed in a different situation (i.e. the situation in which it is not raining), with an implicit attitude of dissociation.

However, if we extend the notion of ‘echo’ in this way, there may be no case in which we can say This is not echoic irony. We have already seen that there exist some cases like Seto’s example which are ironic but non-echoic (or, at least, what is being echoed is not clear). Curcó’s further extension of the scope of echo ultimately reduces the attractiveness of Sperber and Wilson’s echoic mentioning approach, although it explains most cases of irony.

Finally, there could be another kind of non-echoic irony is illustrated by the situation in (78), in which three European students, Jean and Pierre from France and Klaus from Germany, have a conversation in English:
(83) Klaus: What on earth can English people do better than French people? Cooking?
Jean: Non, jamais! Are you kidding?
Klaus: What about pop music? England has held a very wonderful tradition of pop music since the Beatles.
Jean: Mon Dieu! You ignore the splendid tradition of French chanson.
Klaus: If so, how about museum study? I think the British Museum is excellent.
Jean: Well… but don’t say that before you visit the Louvre Museum.
Klaus: Ah… I gave you a really difficult question. Didn’t I? Ha, ha, ha…
Pierre: Hey, guys! Enough is enough. The answer is very easy. English people speak English much better than us!
Klaus and Jean: Wow, bingo! That’s it!

When neither Klaus nor Jean can find a proper answer for Klaus’s question, Pierre interrupts with a humorous conclusion. The implicated meaning of Pierre’s utterance is that ‘there is nothing else that English people can do better than French people’. Pierre’s answer sounds funny because he ridicules English people, by saying a fact that is very natural. Pierre’s utterance can be interpreted as a case of sarcastic irony, in that it attacks English people. In order to judge whether or not Pierre’s utterance in (83) is irony, I apply it to Utsumi’s (2000) notion of ‘ironic environment’. If Pierre’s utterance in (83) is interpreted with reference to an ironic environment, it can be regarded as a case of irony:

i) The speaker has a certain expectation E at time t₀.
   → Pierre believes that there is nothing else that English people can do better than French people.

ii) The speaker’s expectation E fails (i.e. E is incongruous with reality) at time t₁.
    → Klaus believes that there must be at least one thing that English people can do better than French people.

iii) The speaker has a negative emotional attitude (e.g. disappointment, anger, reproach, envy) toward the incongruity between what is expected and what actually is case.
     → Pierre has a negative emotional attitude (i.e. cynicism) toward the incongruity between what he believes and what Klaus believes.
As shown above, Pierre’s utterance in (83) is applied to ironic environment; thus his utterance can be viewed as another case of irony. But, does Pierre’s utterance in (83) count as irony under the ‘echoic mentioning’ definition? If Pierre says *English people can do cooking better than French people*, it is a case of echoic irony, which echoes the wrong opinion in Klaus’s utterance (i.e. ‘English people’s cooking is superior to French people’s’). Perhaps Pierre’s ironic utterance in (83) could be interpreted as echoing the common belief that ‘there is at least one thing that English people can do better than French people’. However, Pierre’s utterance does not echo this common belief, because what Pierre says sounds very natural in that English is English people’s mother tongue, and he also believes that English people speak English much better than French people. Thus, Pierre’s ironic utterance echoes nothing, or at least what is being echoed by his utterance is unclear. In other words, Pierre does not echo the propositional content of the antecedent utterance, and as it is natural that English people should speak English as their own mother tongue better than French people, we cannot view that Pierre’s utterance echoes the common sense/belief in the world (i.e. ‘there is at least one thing that English people can do better than French people’). Moreover, it is not the case that Pierre’s ironic utterance echoes the opposite of what Pierre says. For these reasons, it is possible to view that Pierre’s ironic utterance in (83) is an exceptional case which the previous pragmatic approaches to irony including Sperber and Wilson’s do not cover.

4.2.2 Echoic Mentioning but not Irony: Echoic Non-Irony

Besides the explanatory problem of ‘non-echoic irony’ discussed in sub-section 4.2.1, there is another problem raised by Giora (1995) and Utsumi (2000), which is that there is not a clear-cut distinction between echoic ironies and echoic non-ironies. According to Giora (1995) and Utsumi (2000), although Mira in (79) echoically mentions what the Prime Minister said on
television, it might not be irony, so echoic mentioning may not be a necessary and sufficient condition for irony:

(84) (Dina entered the room after the television news had ended, and asked Mira what the Prime Minster said about the Palestinians.)

Dina: I missed the last news broadcast. What did the Prime Minister say about the Palestinians?
Mira (with ridiculing aversion): That we should deport them.

(Giora 1995: 248)

According to Giora (1995: 244-245), an ironic text is well-formed if and only if it meets the following conditions:

i) It conforms to the relevance requirement in that it introduces information about an accessible discourse topic;

ii) It violates the graded informativeness requirement by introducing a least probable message, either too or less informative than required in the given context (the marked informativeness requirement);

iii) It makes the addressee evoke an unmarked interpretation (i.e., the implicature) comparable with the marked message whereby the difference between them becomes perceivable (the incancellability condition)

Relating to these conditions, Giora claims that:

Thus, irony differs from non-irony in that it makes use of a highly improbable message (conforming to the marked informativeness requirement) to evoke a less marked, more probable interpretation. It is this condition that accounts for the flavor of humor that accompanies the implied criticism or disillusionment. The humorous effect is a result of introducing to the discourse a surprising message that still bears relevance to the topic under discussion.

(Giora 1995: 245)
Thus, according to Giora (1995: 248), Mira’s utterance in (84) is echoic but not ironic, in that ‘though it allows for both the original and the current speaker’s attitudes to get through, the message itself is not markedly informative as required by the marked informativeness condition’. On the other hand, Mira’s utterance in (85) is ironic:

(85) Dina: I missed the last news broadcast. What did the Prime Minister say about the Palestinians?

Mira: That we should host them in 5 star hotels in Lebanon.

(Giora 1995: 248)

Giora (1995) explains the case of Mira’s ironic utterance in (85) as the following:

Mira’s utterance in [85] conforms to the marked informativeness condition of well-formed irony, and markedly informative messages are surprising, which explains their humorous effect. Unlike Mira’s utterance in [84] which contributes probable information to the discourse, that in [85] is highly improbable and reducing possibilities. Additionally, Mira’s utterance in [85] evokes an unmarked interpretation that brings out the contrast between the two readings (in accordance with the incancellability condition).

(Giora 1995: 248)

However, in order to defend Sperber and Wilson’s mention-based approach, Curcó (2000: 257-280) argues that Mira’s utterance in (84) cannot be a counterexample to Sperber and Wilson’s viewpoint on irony as echoic mentioning, because:

i) Mira’s utterance is elliptical, so that the proposition expressed by her utterance can be represented by ‘The Prime Minister of Israel said that we should deport the Palestinians’; and this is a clear case of descriptive use.

ii) According to Sperber and Wilson, ironies are cases of interpretive use; but Mira’s utterance is not.

iii) Mira is not dissociating herself from the proposition expressed by her utterance. Rather
on the contrary, she’s endorsing it *qua* description of state of affairs in the world. She is using her utterance to describe a state of affairs in the world in virtue of its propositional form being true of it.

iv) It would be very strange for a theory to predict that any case of reported speech combined with the implicit expression of a dissociative attitude on the part of the speaker would produce an instance of verbal irony.

To understand Curcó’s claim, we must distinguish between *descriptive* and *interpretive* uses of language. In saying *That we should deport them*, Mira may be expressing her own view of the situation, or she could be quoting or alluding to a view that the Prime Minister expressed on television. In RT, these differences are analysed in terms of a distinction between *descriptive* and *interpretive* uses of language:

Any representation with a propositional form, and in particular any utterance, can be used to represent things in two ways. It can represent some state of affairs in virtue of its propositional form being true of that state of affairs; in this case we will say that the representation is a *description*, or that it is used *descriptively*. Or it can represent some other representation which also has a propositional form — a thought, for instance — in virtue of a resemblance between the two propositional forms; in this case we will say that the first representation is an *interpretation* of the second one, or that it is used *interpretively*.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 228-229)

In relation to this distinction between descriptive and interpretive uses of language, Curcó concludes that Giora’s example is a case of descriptive use, and so has nothing to do with Sperber and Wilson’s characterization of irony.

Nevertheless, some questions about Curcó’s analysis should be raised. First of all, is Mira’s utterance absolutely descriptive? Curcó assumes that Mira’s utterance is elliptical. If so, we can presume that something (i.e. *The Prime Minister of Israel said*) was omitted in the upper clause of this sentence, and we know that this type of elliptical sentence is frequently used for
describing or conveying what another person said. If we accept Curcó’s assumption, Mira’s utterance is descriptive, not interpretive; thus, Giora’s viewpoint is groundless because Sperber and Wilson claim irony of echoic mentioning is interpretive.

However, is Mira’s utterance in (84) necessarily descriptive? We can imagine that Mira might have reconstructed what the Prime Minister had said as her own interpretation. Suppose that Dina entered the room after the Prime Minister had said *Because of the Palestinians, we have been confronted with many complicated troubles, so it's time for us to say 'Goodbye' to them*, then (with ridiculing aversion) Mira could interpret the Prime Minister’s utterance by her own way, and then report to Dina that he said *We should deport them*. Is it still descriptive? We could interpret Mira’s utterance with one of four possible contextual assumptions:

a) The case that Mira likes both the Prime Minister and this specific policy  
b) The case that although Mira dislikes the Prime Minister, she agrees with this specific policy  
c) The case that although Mira likes the Prime Minister, she surely disagrees with this specific policy  
d) The case that Mira likes neither the Prime Minister nor this specific policy

In case (a), there is no reason for Mira to use irony, whereas what Mira utters is ironic in context (d). The problems are caused by (b) and (c), because it is possible for Mira’s utterance to be interpreted as echoic non-irony or echoic irony in accordance with Mira’s opinion of the Prime Minister and this specific policy of his. In case (b), suppose that although Mira hates the Prime Minister because he has been corrupt, Mira agrees with his specific policy. In that case, she might say *(The disgusting man said) That we should deport them* with a cynical intonation; in this case Mira’s utterance is interpretive, not descriptive, and RT defines irony as echoic mentioning based on interpretive use of language. However, despite Mira’s echoic mentioning based on interpretive use of language, this is not irony because what she utters is not opposite to the Prime Minister’s opinion and she does not reject or dissociate herself from the opinion
echoed (i.e. ‘it is just to expel the Palestinians’) from the Prime Minister’s utterance.

Considering that point discussed above, it is possible to generalize that all cases of reported speech or utterance like the (b) type always involve the potential of echoic non-irony, because although the speaker who conveys somebody’s utterance to another could have a negative feeling toward the original utterer, he may agree with the content of original utterer’s utterance.

In case (c), if Mira has admired the Prime Minister as a good politician, it is unlikely that Mira intentionally uses irony with ridiculing aversion in that way to criticize or ridicule him even though she disagrees with his specific policy. Therefore, the point at issue in Giora’s claim is related to (b) and (d): echoic non-irony vs. echoic irony. For this reason, it sounds radical to argue that echoic mentioning is a necessary and sufficient condition for forming irony.

As discussed above, there are two different possibilities for interpreting Mira’s utterance in (84), and the process of judging whether or not Mira’s utterance is ironic may involve not only (para)linguistic variables (e.g. intonation) but also some non-linguistic factors like whether or not Mira is known to have a good feeling toward the Prime Minister and his policy. Similarly, consider example (86):

(86) Japanese student: Have you ever been to the Hiroshima Peace Park? I think that all American people should visit there in order to realize the misery of the war.

American student: It seems advisable for you to visit the U.S.S. Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor.

When the Japanese student mentioned the Hiroshima Peace Park, which was built in the memory of the people who died as a result of the American atomic bomb on Hiroshima in World War II, the American student replied with the utterance in (86). What the American student said can be interpreted as a case of sarcastic irony which conveys ‘No, I won’t visit it’ or ‘You don’t know the historical truth’. In this case, the American student’s ironic utterance echoes the
Japanese student’s implicature that ‘I claim that America is responsible for many innocent casualties in Hiroshima’, and the American student rejects or dissociates himself from the validity of that claim by claiming that ‘America is responsible for many innocent casualties in Hiroshima’.

However, in relation to the American student’s utterance, we can consider another possible interpretation: the American student could be giving unironic advice to the Japanese student. In other words, although the American student has no hostility or antipathy against Japan and its people, if he believes that many Japanese people are not fully aware of the war’s effect on the U.S., he could, without any sarcastic purpose, advise the Japanese student to learn about it. In this case, the speaker’s expression and tone might function as crucial clues for judging whether or not it is irony. However, sometimes the speaker’s expression and tone might be too obscure to be firm and constant criteria for judging irony as shown from the Mira example.

Thus far, I have discussed Sperber and Wilson’s treatment of irony as ‘echoic mentioning’ and also some challenges to it raised by other pragmaticists such as Seto and Giora. In response to those challenges, in sub-section 4.5, I propose an alternative approach to explaining irony, including those exceptional cases, within the RT approach.

Besides Seto, Giora and Utsumi, Lee (2002) also raises another challenge toward the RT approach. According to him, although Sperber and Wilson’s RT has focused on sarcastic use of irony, it should be noted that irony can be used to satisfy non-sarcastic purpose as well. For example, using genteel irony which aims to humorously praise another’s merits or achievements contributes to increasing the social intimacy between communicators, and examining this matter requires a sociolinguistic perspective. For this reason, it is necessary for pragmatics to explain non-sarcastic use of irony, not only its sarcastic use, and I discuss this matter in sub-section 4.4.

In relation to discussing non-sarcastic use of irony, as this task involves other pragmatic approaches such as Leech (1983) and Dews, Kaplan and Winner (1995), I treat these approaches in the next sub-section.
4.3 Other Pragmatic Approaches to Irony

In this sub-section, I discuss other pragmatic perspectives on irony in order to make a foundation for explaining another characteristic of irony, which Sperber and Wilson’s RT approach does not treat.

Clark and Gerrig (1984) and Currie (2006) view irony as ‘pretence’ that the speaker uttering an ironic expression acts as if he were a different person in front of the hearer. When the hearer realizes that the speaker is uttering in a pretending attitude, the hearer might recognize that the speaker intends to criticize or ridicule the imaginary speaker’s or hearer’s attitude. For example, suppose that somebody broke up with his girlfriend and, to make matters worse, lost his job and was scolded by his parents on the same day. In this terrible situation, he might say *What a wonderful day* in front of friends who have witnessed these situations. In this case, we may think that the speaker has made an extravagant utterance, not only pretending that he is a fool who cannot see the unpleasantness of the present situation but also treating his friends as if they were strangers who do not know what has happened to him.

Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) point out that this ‘pretence’ can be applied to other implicative expressions as well as to irony. For example, a person could utter *It’s hot in here* on seeing two people vehemently quarrelling with each other in his office. Although the speaker pretends as if he does not see the argument and only talks about the high temperature in the office, he expects the hearers to understand his real intention to request that they stop quarrelling. It is possible to view this notion of ‘pretence’ as compatible with Sperber and Wilson’s ‘dissociation’, in that both represent the speaker’s attitude as not accepting the situation with which he is faced. Thus, as mentioned in Wilson (2006: 1722), ‘the two approaches have sometimes been seen as empirically or theoretically indistinguishable, and several hybrid accounts incorporating elements of both have been proposed’.

However, Sperber and Wilson (Sperber 1984, Wilson 2006, 2009, Wilson and Sperber
2012) argue that the echoic-mentioning approach differs from (and is superior to) the pretence approach. Let’s take for example a case when the speaker utters *What a sunny day* during heavy rain. It would be ironic if it brought to mind a wishful desire for fine weather, but there is no other person who the utterer is pretending to be (i.e. victim of the pretence). According to Sperber (1984), focusing on the victim of ironic utterance, the pretence approach sets 1) the person who the speaker pretends to be and 2) the ignorant hearer who accepts what the speaker says. For this reason, whereas the pretence theory cannot account for victimless ironic utterances like *What a sunny day*, RT can; because RT allows for the opinion echoed to be common knowledge/belief, social norms or expectation in which there is no victim.

There is another reason why the RT approach should be distinguished from the pretence approach. Wilson (2006: 1738) holds that ‘not even all echoic utterances are plausibly analysed as cases of pretence’, because sometimes we may use echoic utterances in order to ask the hearer to confirm that we have heard or understood what he said correctly. For instance, suppose the situation in which Tom asks Jerry to join a party at seven in the evening, after finishing their homework. Although Tom thinks that it is difficult for Jerry to finish his homework in time, Jerry promises Tom to do it, and Tom expects Jerry to keep this promise. Thus, when Jerry says *OK, I will finish my homework by seven*, Tom asks *You will finish your homework by seven?*. In this case, although Tom’s utterance follows an echoic pattern, his intention is not to blame or ridicule Jerry by sarcastic irony but to confirm if what he understood from Jerry’s reply might be correct. For those reasons, it is hard to regard RT in the same light as the pretence theory.

Ducrot (1984) develops the integrated pragmatic approach to irony. This is similar to Sperber and Wilson’s approach in that it distinguishes between mention and use, but different in that it does not make a distinction between semantics and pragmatics.

Ducrot (1984) defines irony within his theory of polyphony. Polyphony rejects ‘the singleness of the speaker’, and holds that various voices are included in the utterance. Thus,

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25 In chapter 5, I discuss the main points of Ducrot’s integrated pragmatics.
Ducrot (1984) distinguishes the *locuteur* (i.e. speaker) as the author of the *énonciation* (i.e. utterance) and the *énonciateur* (i.e. utterer) as the person responsible for the speech acts (e.g. ‘assertion’, ‘promise’) that are realized by the *énonciation* / utterance. For example, imagine that I tell someone *If you intentionally set fire to public buildings, you will be arrested for arson.* Although this utterance is made by me as a *locuteur*, I may not be the *énonciateur* who is responsible for the content of the utterance, since I am expressing a legal position in the society, not promising to arrest someone. On the other hand, if I were a person with judicial power, I (as the speaker) could be the *locuteur* and an *énonciateur* at the same time.

According to Ducrot, irony is realized when the speaker implies that he would not take any responsibility for the utterer’s (*énonciateur*’s) intention because he thinks that it is absurd or not right, even though he conveys the utterer’s thought or intention to others. Thus, irony can be shown when the speaker seems to externally praise another’s attitude or thought, but in fact he ridicules or blames them (Ducrot 1984: 211). Ducrot’s notion of *locuteur* corresponds to Clark and Gerrig’s (1984) ‘pretender’ in that a *locuteur* is a person who is not responsible for the content of present situation. In a broader sense, being *locuteur* may be connected to Sperber and Wilson’s ‘dissociation’; namely, Ducrot’s notion of *locuteur* can be viewed as the subject of ‘mentioning’, whereas *énonciateur* as that of ‘using’.

Returning to the main point of this sub-section, both Clark and Gerrig’s (1984) and Kreuz and Gluckberg’s (1989) approaches to irony can be connected to Dews, Kaplan and Winner (1995), who classify the functions of irony as humour, status elevation, aggression and emotional control. These different positions of irony, which do not view it just as ‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’ for communication, could be complementary to a sociolinguistic perspective, which tries to explain how language users form and develop their

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26 Parler de façon ironique, cela revient, pour un locuteur L, à presenter l’ énonciation comme exprimant la position d’un énonciateur E, position don’t on sait par ailleurs que le locuteur L ne prend pas la responsabilité et, bien plus, qu’il la tient pour absurde. Tout en étant donné comme le responsable de l’ énonciation, L n’est pas assimilé à E, origine du point de vue exprimé dans l’ enunciation. (Ducrot 1984: 211)
social relationships by using their ordinary language. Thus, the functions of irony pointed out by Clark and Gerrig and Kreuz and Glucksberg account for why people use irony. For example, Jerry’s ironic utterance in (81) could be motivated by Jerry’s desire to control his emotion, instead of directly showing his anger in front of others, and this behaviour of Jerry’s may be helpful for him to avoid a potential future conflict with his friend Droopy.

Another significant pragmatic approach to irony views it as a means of exercising politeness and face-saving strategy, as discussed in Lakoff (1973), Leech (1983) and Brown and Levinson (1987). For explaining this characteristic of irony, Leech (1983) suggests the Irony Principle, which is a second-order principle building upon, or exploiting, the Principle of Politeness:

(87) **The Principle of Politeness (PP):** Minimize the expression of the impolite beliefs

(Leech: 1983: 81)

The Maxims of PP (Leech 1983:132):

I. **TACT MAXIM** (in impositives and commissives)
   (a) Minimize cost to other [(b) Maximize benefit to other]

II. **GENEROSITY MAXIM** (in impositives and commissives)
    (a) Minimize benefit to self [(b) Maximize cost to self]

III. **APPROBATION MAXIM** (in expressives and assertives)
     (a) Minimize dispraise of other [(b) Maximize praise of other]

IV. **MODESTY MAXIM** (in expressives and assertives)
    (a) Minimize praise of self [(b) Maximize dispraise of self]

V. **AGREEMENT MAXIM** (in assertives)
   (a) Minimize disagreement between self and other
   [(b) Maximize agreement between self and other]

VI. **SYMPATHY MAXIM** (in assertives)
    (a) Minimize antipathy between self and other
    [(b) Maximize sympathy between self and other]

27 (81) Tom: Droopy has just scratched your new Benz.
Jerry: Well, I like that!
The Irony Principle (IP) (Leech 1983: 82):

If you must cause offence, at least do so in a way which doesn’t overtly conflict with the PP [Principle of Politeness], but allows the hearer to arrive at the offensive point of your remark indirectly, by way of implicature.

As an illustration of the Irony Principle, consider the following conversation in Leech (1983: 83):

(89) A: Geoff has just borrowed your car.
   B: Well, I like THAT!

In (89), B’s utterance can be interpreted as an ironic statement, which is opposite to what B really intends to express. According to Leech (1983: 82-83), who follows a Gricean model, there is an obvious breach of the Maxim of Quality here: ‘What B says is polite to Geoff and is clearly not true. Therefore what B really means is impolite to Geoff and true’. For example, in (84), B’s ironic utterance lets B avoid the potential conflicts with Geoff, which could have arisen if B had said a direct (i.e. literal) expression like Geoff borrowed my car without my permission. He is a real trouble maker, and I can’t stand it anymore. Although irony is often associated with sarcasm, which sounds cynical and insulting, Brown and Levinson (1987) note that in fact ironic criticism might damage another’s face less than literal criticism would in many cases, since it indirectly conveys the face-threatening act. According to Leech (1983: 142-145), because an ironic criticism superficially gives ‘lip service’ to politeness at least, it might cause less serious conflict than a literal criticism.

Furthermore, sometimes irony can be used as banter whose purpose is to increase social intimacy between the members of the same group or community. In relation to this point, Leech (1983) offers his Banter Principle:
The Banter Principle:
In order to show solidarity with $h$, say something which is (i) obviously untrue, and (ii) obviously impolite to $h$.

(Leech 1983: 144)

For example, once when I was learning Spanish in Korea, my friends and I planned a surprise party for our Spanish professor’s birthday. As soon as our Spanish professor entered the classroom, we popped the champagne and shouted ¡Feliz Cumpleaños! (i.e. ‘Happy birthday’ in Spanish). The Spanish professor was surprised but happy, and said ¡Diablos! with a gentle smile. *Diablo* literally means ‘devil’ in Spanish, but the Spanish professor’s real intention was not to insult or reprimand his students; he showed his feeling of intimacy toward his students by ironic banter.28 Culpeper (1996: 362) views this type of irony use as mock politeness, and holds that ‘mock politeness, or banter, is impoliteness that remains on the surface, since it is understood that it is not intended to cause offence’. This point can be connected to genteel irony, which I discuss in the next sub-section 4.4.

4.4 Beyond Blame and Ridicule: Extended Functions of Irony

This sub-section examines other functions of irony, besides sarcasm. The functions of irony include praise, face-saving, showing modesty and so on (Dews, Kaplan and Winner 1995, Lee 2002). For instance, genteel irony can be used to convey the speaker’s positive attitude toward the situation or the people and propositions in it.

Nevertheless, the representative Relevance Theorists’ approaches to irony (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1981, 1995, 1998, Wilson and Sperber 1992) do not make it clear that the speaker may

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28 The similar point is discussed also in Barbe (1995) and Jorgensen (1996). Particularly, Jorgensen (1996: 614) holds that sometimes sarcastic compliments among close peers and friends increase their solidarity.
use genteel irony, since their discussion focuses on sarcastic examples. Thus, in this sub-section, I discuss the speaker’s motivation for using genteel irony and the functions of genteel irony, which are unlike those for sarcastic irony.

In the previous section, I explored Leech’s (1983) demonstration that the motivation for using irony is not confined to pursuing only sarcasm. This point can be connected to genteel irony. Although genteel irony involves a negatively (or impolitely) expression on the surface, it contains the speaker’s positive message that humorously praises or encourages another’s merits or achievements. Thus, the speaker’s motivation for using genteel irony is not to criticize or ridicule the addressee or to present the speaker’s disappointment toward a situation which he does not accept, in that the speaker who uses genteel irony enjoys the situation to which he belongs. It is necessary for a pragmatic approach to irony to make this point clear and to consider how genteel irony fits into the treatment of irony more generally.

As discussed in sub-section 4.2, Wilson and Sperber (1992) and Sperber and Wilson (1981, 1995) define all types of irony as ‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’. If we assume that echoic utterances may echo not only positive-attitude propositions toward something but also negative-attitude propositions, other uses of irony (e.g. genteel irony) can also be included in the scope of Sperber and Wilson’s ‘echoic mentioning’.29

However, whether genteel irony is also ‘rejection or dissociation’ needs further discussion. When sarcastic irony is used, it is premised that there is something wrong/incorrect/false with the hearer’s behaviour, attitude or the situation with which the speaker is faced. For example, if the speaker’s son spoilt his exam but the son has no regrets about it, and the speaker echoes his son’s wrong opinion relevant to this situation (e.g. ‘it is acceptable to spoil the exam’), the speaker can reject or dissociate himself from his son’s opinion through the use of irony.

On the other hand, when genteel irony is used, it is premised that the hearer did something worth praising or encouraging, and the speaker who intends to humorously praise or encourage

29 This logic can also be applied to Utsumi’s notions of ‘ironic environment’ and ‘incongruity’.
the hearer echoes the opinion or common knowledge/belief represented by negative-attitude propositions toward something. Thus, following the RT approach, it is possible to interpret genteel irony as a case of ‘rejection or dissociation’. In relation to this position, consider the examples of genteel irony in (90) and (91):

(90) (There is a cleaner who cleans the chairman’s room; and the chairman is fully satisfied with the cleaner’s faithful service. One day, the chairman comes across the cleaner in his office and he makes this ironic joke):

My room has been too clean since you began cleaning it. Especially, my desk and this floor are shiny and slippery enough for flies to slide. **If I slide on the floor and I am hospitalized, you should pay the hospital charge instead of me.**

(Lee 2002: 55, my translation)

(91) (There is a student who always makes his father happy by frequently winning scholarships. One day, when he tells his father that he won another scholarship because of his good marks, his father becomes very happy once again and says):

What? Did you win another scholarship for being at the top of the school? **You are very selfish.** If you continuously monopolize all scholarships like that way, your school might be bankrupt; if so, **you should take over the responsibility for it!**

(Lee 2002: 72, my translation)

Both (90) and (91) are examples of genteel irony whose function is indirectly praising the addressees’ faithfulness or achievement, rather than blaming, insulting or ridiculing them. Here the question is whether genteel irony could be explained by the same way that RT treats sarcastic irony. In sub-section 4.2, based on Sperber and Wilson’s position, I noted that when sarcastic irony is used, what is being echoed can be the literal or implicated proposition of other’s antecedent utterance or our common knowledge/beliefs and social norms. Furthermore, according to Sperber and Wilson’s approach, what is being echoed should be the same as what the speaker rejects or dissociates himself from. Now I examine whether genteel irony could be
treated by the same explanatory logic that is used to account for sarcastic irony.

In the case of (90), it is possible to view that the chairman echoes ‘if the floor is too slippery, I could slide on it and be hurt. This can be a reason for dismissing the cleaner’, and rejects or dissociates himself from this thought. Likewise, in the case of (91), the happy father echoes the common belief that ‘it is unseemly for someone to monopolize all scholarships’, and rejects or dissociates himself from it.

Sometimes using irony may depend on irony users’ social status; for example, the irony in example (90) reflects that the chairman’s social status is higher than the cleaner’s. On the contrary, the cleaner cannot safely use irony in front of his boss. Likewise, the son in (91) cannot dare to use that kind of irony in order to praise the senior person’s merits or achievements, especially if he belongs to a very hierarchical society.

Besides the purposes of humorously praising or encouraging the addressee’s merits or achievements, as pointed out in Culpeper (1996) and Jorgensen (1996), irony can also be used to increase social intimacy between communicators. Particularly, Culpeper (1996) illustrates this point as the following:

I once turned up late for a party, and upon explaining to the host that I had mistaken 17.00 hours for 7 o’clock, I was greeted with a smile and the words “You silly bugger”. I knew that the impoliteness was superficial, it was not really meant, and that I had been accepted into the party.

(Culpeper 1996: 352)

Culpeper (1996: 352), citing Leech (1983), claims that ‘the more intimate a relationship, the less necessary and important politeness is. In other words, lack of politeness is associated with intimacy, and so being superficially impolite can promote intimacy’. However, in a hierarchical relationship, only the person with more status can choose to promote humility in this way. For the lower-status person to do so would entail too much cost in terms of the risk of rejection.
Sometimes, irony can be used in order to show modesty (i.e. minimize praise of self, and maximize dispraise of self). For example in Korea people offer food to their guests with utterances such as these:

(92) Although the menu of our dinner is very poor, please help yourselves.
(93) This dinner is tasteless, but we hope that you will enjoy it.

Although (92) and (93) may sound contradictory, these utterances are naturally accepted by most Korean people because they are based on the Modesty Maxim proposed in Leech (1983). In these cases, following the RT approach, the speakers who say (92) or (93) echo the opinion/belief that ‘this is really quite a banquet’, and reject or dissociate themselves from it. This is why the utterances in (92) and (93) can be interpreted as irony of humility (or modesty).

On the contrary, suppose that the Korean host or hostess says the literal (94):

(94) We did our best in preparing this menu. Please help yourselves.

Although (94) can also be seen as polite, most Korean people would prefer (92) or (93) to (94), because the persons who will judge whether or not the dinner is delicious are the guests/hearers, not the hosts/speakers. Thus, if the guests are not satisfied with the dinner, the speaker who said (94) would be put to shame. For this reason, the speaker says (92) or (93) in an attempt to avoid any possible future humiliation, as irony can be used to seek modesty as self-face-saving-strategy.

Nevertheless, the ironic utterances in (92) and (93) may raise this question: what is the difference between irony and understatement? Those utterances can also be regarded as the cases of understatement, in that the speakers who say them describe or represent their reception as being smaller or less good than it really is. In fact, sometimes it is not easy to make a clear
distinction between irony and understatement. According to Berntsen and Kennedy (1996: 22),
the key difference between irony and understatement is that whereas understatement involves
reduction, irony uses contrast or opposition. However, I do not view that this can be a decisive
and constant criterion which may clearly distinguishes irony from understatement. For example,
suppose that someone utters *It seems to be raining* in a downpour. Although this utterance
involves reduction, Sperber and Wilson (1981: 297) view it as a case of irony, rather than
understatement. Likewise, in the cases of (92) and (93), although each utterance involves
reduction and is to be viewed as a case of understatement, at the same time, it can also be
interpreted as irony in that there is a contrast between what the speaker says (e.g. *the menu of
our dinner is very poor*) and the present situation (i.e. Actually, the speaker has fixed quite a
meal). Because of this point, some psycholinguistic theorists such as Gibbs (2000: 23-24) hold
that sometimes understatement can be a subtype of verbal irony.

There is another pattern of using humility irony that is similar to but slightly different from
(92) and (93); namely, one word can influence the formation of an ironic environment. Imagine
that I accidentally come across Tom and Jerry at the airport. When I greet them with my great
pleasure, they reply to me with the utterance in (95):

(95) Dae-Young: Excuse me. You’re world-wide famous animation stars, Tom and Jerry, I
presume.

Tom and Jerry (with smiling faces): Well, **probably** we are.

In this situation, Tom and Jerry’s utterance can be interpreted as irony because of *probably.*
Even though they are definitely world-famous, they express their modesty in front of others by
using *probably.* This adverb *probably* in this context shows Tom and Jerry’s reserved attitude
toward my evaluation of their reputation, in that *probably* does not indicate 100% certainty of
the content of the sentence that it modifies. Explaining Tom and Jerry’s utterance in (95) by the
RT approach, the speakers echo the common knowledge/belief that ‘Tom and Jerry have been very famous animation stars’, and reject or dissociate themselves from it. However, Tom and Jerry’s motivation of using this humility irony is due not to linguistic reasons but to socio-cultural ones. Thus, this point suggests that it is necessary to supplement the cognitive approach with a socio-pragmatic politeness explanation of the motivation for irony.

Additionally, sometimes these functions of irony (i.e. criticism, bantering, saving other’s face, making humour, elevating social status, controlling emotion, etc.) may appear in a complex pattern. In relation to this point, Lee (2002: 54) shows an interesting example. Suppose that the Korean president delivers his speech in front of his audience, and somebody’s mobile phone abruptly starts to ring a very noisy and bizarre melody, breaking the solemnity of the event; the phone owner feels very nervous and confused. Then, the president says, with a smile, Somebody in the audience has a really nice mobile phone. Probably that mobile phone is made in Korea. Here, the president mitigates the tense atmosphere, controls his emotion and saves the phone owner’s face, by using his ironic humour. If the president had directly shown that he was very irritated by the phone; then, it might have made everybody there nervous and tense. However, even though the president could have directly indicated and humiliated the phone owner, he did not do so; instead, he let the phone owner hide in the audience, while the audience laughed. Thus, the president’s behaviour had an effect on soothing the phone owner’s guilty conscience and relieving the atmosphere which had nearly become uncomfortable. Furthermore, the Korean president’s ironic utterance can be identified with a case of wit, in that it is accompanied by humour.

Thus far, I have discussed the characteristics of irony within three phases: types of irony, various pragmatic approaches (including RT) to irony, and different (extended) functions of irony. Sperber and Wilson’s RT approach offers an effective way of explaining typical cases of irony which are used to criticize or ridicule others’ attitudes or the given situations that the speaker does not agree with. However, as their theory defines types and functions of irony just
as ‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’, it does not explain other types and functions of irony use. I argue that it is best to explain even those exceptional cases of irony within the RT approach, and this is possible by mitigating Sperber and Wilson’s strong generalization on irony. In the next section, I propose an alternative approach to explaining irony, which shows that RT may cope with all sorts of irony.

### 4.5 Alternative Approach to Explaining Irony within RT

In this section, I propose an approach that treats the cases of irony that Sperber and Wilson (1995) cover, plus all the other different types described in the previous sub-sections. These can be divided into four categories, in accordance with Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) necessary and sufficient conditions for irony (i.e. echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation):

i) **Typical irony**: echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation.

ii) **Genteel irony**: echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation (but not sarcastic purpose).

iii) **Non-echoic irony**: not echoic mentioning, but involves rejection or dissociation.

iv) **Echoic non-irony**: echoic mentioning, but it is not irony.

Sperber and Wilson (1995) treat ‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’ as a necessary and sufficient condition for forming irony; once an utterance meets that condition, it is irony.

However, as discussed in the previous sub-sections, there are some exceptional cases that are hard to be explained by Sperber and Wilson’s standard RT approach to irony. For instance, in the case of (iii), even though Pierre’s utterance does not involve echoic mentioning or what is being echoed in it is unclear, it is interpreted as sarcastic irony. In the case of (iv), there can be another potential that Mira’s utterance is interpreted just as literal meaning, not as irony, even
though her utterance is echoic mentioning based on interpretive use of language. Additionally, although (ii) satisfies Sperber and Wilson’s irony condition of ‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’, it is necessary to note that irony can also be used to satisfy non-sarcastic purpose.

In order to show that RT can cope with all types of irony, I propose that not every case of irony is ‘echoic mentioning’ and used for a sarcastic purpose, and instead focus on Utsumi’s (2000) notion of ‘incongruity’. This means that the echoic-mention type becomes just one of the subtypes of irony (although this type seems most frequent), and all types of irony can be explained by ‘echoic mentioning + adapted notion of incongruity’ or only incongruity. This approach does not entirely abandon Sperber and Wilson’s RT approach to irony, but modifies it in order to treat all types of irony. Thus, this approach still accounts for irony within a single Principle of Relevance.

Before fully discussing this approach to explaining irony, it is necessary to define incongruity. Utsumi (2000) describes an ironic environment including an incongruity as the following:

> Verbal irony presupposes a proper situational setting, which has been described in terms of ironic environment. An ironic environment consists of the speaker’s expectation, an incongruity between expectation and reality, and the speaker’s negative attitude toward this incongruity.

(Utsumi 2000: 1803)

We can interpret Utsumi’s (2000) notion of incongruity as including all the gaps between what the speaker believes, expects, imagines or thinks and the reality of the situation with which the speaker is confronted.

However, as the notion of incongruity did not originate in RT, it is necessary to adapt it to the RT domain. I propose that the criteria for judging incongruity should be viewed as a part of
‘cognitive environment’, which in RT accounts for the ground of communication.\textsuperscript{30} According to Sperber and Wilson (1995), cognitive environment is defined with reference to \textit{manifestness}:

(96) A fact is \textit{manifest} to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true.

(97) A \textit{cognitive environment} of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to him.

\hspace{3cm} \textit{(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 39)}

Cognitive environment includes the facts that communicators know and the assumptions that they hold. For this reason, it is possible to interpret incongruity with reference to cognitive environment. This notion of ‘cognitive environment’ can be understood with reference to experientialism, in that the facts that communicators know and the assumptions that they hold ultimately come from the communicators’ (physical or indirect) experiences, and these experiences are based in the processes of socialization. Moreover, relying on cognitive environment brings about subjectivization of meaning determination.

In order to treat incongruity as a part of RT, I re-define some relevant conditions of incongruity. First, the criteria (e.g. social/cultural norms, common beliefs and so on) which help communicators to judge the incongruity are also parts of their cognitive environment, which are manifest to them. Second, although Utsumi (2000) holds that irony occurs when the speaker shows his negative emotional attitude towards the incongruity between what he expected and the reality, this definition must be modified in order to include the cases of genteel irony, because genteel irony involves the speaker’s positive emotional attitude toward the incongruity. In other words, the speaker’s emotional attitude toward the incongruity is not always negative. Third, contextual information, contextual effect and cognitive environment that communicators

\textsuperscript{30} Sperber and Wilson (1995) hold that the notion of ‘mutual knowledge’, which has been regarded as the ground of communication, should be replaced with cognitive environment, because mutual knowledge is too abstract and vague to be clearly defined. I treat this issue in chapter 5.
may access enables them to realize whether the speaker’s emotional attitude toward the incongruity is negative or positive, based on the presumption of pursuing optimal relevance. Finally, Utsumi (2000: 1803) holds that ‘verbal irony presupposes a proper situational setting, which has been described in terms of ironic environment’. As an incongruity is a part of this situational setting, it is naturally context-dependent. Thus, this point is connected to the assumption that the contents of the incongruity may vary, according to the situation to which communicators belong.

On the basis of this discussion, I replace Sperber and Wilson’s ‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’ with ‘echoic mentioning + incongruity’. However, while in Sperber and Wilson’s RT, ‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’ is a necessary and sufficient condition for forming irony, in my approach ‘echoic mentioning + incongruity’ is not. Instead, I argue that echoic mentioning is not a necessary condition for being irony, and although incongruity is a necessary condition for irony, it is not a sufficient condition for it. Thus, according to my approach, sometimes both ‘echoic mentioning’ and ‘incongruity’ are necessary, but sometimes not.

Incongruity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for irony because sometimes language users tell lies (including white lies). When the speaker tells a lie, although there is an incongruity between what the speaker says and what he really believes, this is not a case of irony. The purpose of telling a lie is not to criticize or humorously praise others but to deceive them; thus it is a matter of ethics, not linguistics.

Thus far I have discussed a new explanatory foundation for irony, in order to treat it with an alternative approach in RT. The four types of irony that I classified, in accordance with ‘echoic mentioning + incongruity’, are specified as the following:

a) **Typical irony**: echoic mentioning + (the speaker’s negative attitude toward) incongruity

b) **Genteel irony**: echoic mentioning + (the speaker’s positive attitude toward) incongruity
c) **Non-echoic irony**: (the speaker’s negative attitude toward) incongruity

d) **Echoic non-irony**: echoic mentioning, but not irony (i.e. no incongruity)

Once Sperber and Wilson’s strong generalization of irony is abandoned, echoic non-irony (iv) can no longer be a counterexample to Sperber and Wilson’s approach to irony. In other words, if this strong generalization is mitigated, even though the utterance like the case (iv) involves echoic mentioning, it need not be irony. This case could be treated by the standard RT approach, which explains the process of the hearer’s interpreting the literal utterance. Recall Mira’s utterance in (84) in sub-section 4.2.2. Assuming that although Mira dislikes the Prime Minister, she agrees with the specific policy, Dina may access the contextual effect from her cognitive environment and some contextual information (e.g. what Mira usually thinks of the Prime Minister, Mira’s political stance and so on), and realize that there is no incongruity in Mira’s utterance and it is not irony.

The case of genteel irony can be explained by saying that this kind of irony echoes the negative-attitude proposition on the surface, and represents the speaker’s positive emotional attitude toward the incongruity between what the speaker says and what he really believes.

Sometimes, one can have non-genteel irony with a negative-attitude proposition on the surface. For example, suppose that when Jerry goes abroad to work, Tom may say *Jerry, never bring any present for me. I need nothing indeed.* However, in fact Tom expects Jerry to bring a present for him, and intends to remind Jerry of this expectation. In this case, although Tom’s ironic utterance is surface-disapproving, this is not the case of genteel irony, in that the purpose of his utterance is not to humorously praise Jerry’s merit or achievement, which general cases of genteel irony perform.

Non-echoic irony can be explained by focusing on the notion of incongruity. For instance, although Pierre’s ironic utterance in (83) echoes nothing, it represents the speaker’s negative emotional attitude toward the incongruity between what the speaker (i.e. Pierre) believes and
what other person (i.e. Klaus) believes.

By this alternative approach to explaining irony, it is possible to account for the types of irony and non-irony that Sperber and Wilson’s approach does not consider. However, although this approach pursues different ways of explaining exceptional cases of irony, it is still based on the basic assumptions of RT, including the Principle of Relevance.

4.6 Summary

In this chapter, I discussed the nature of irony and various pragmatic approaches to explaining it. The Relevance Theoretical approach (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1981, 1995, 1998, Wilson and Sperber 1992) based on the notion of ‘relevance’ explains irony as echoic mentioning, and it has more explanatory power than other previous pragmatic theories.

However, I pointed out that Sperber and Wilson’s generalization of irony as ‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’ does not address all types and functions of irony. For solving this problem, some Relevance Theorists (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1998, Curcó 2000) have proposed that the scope of echoic mentioning should be extended, but I argue that it is necessary to constrain the scope of echoic mentioning, and to propose another way of explaining those types of irony, in order for RT to maintain its explanatory power.

Thus, I propose an approach to explaining irony that abandons Sperber and Wilson’s strong generalization and modifies it into ‘echoic mentioning + (the speaker’s negative or positive emotional attitude toward) the incongruity (between what the speaker says or expects and the reality or the situation to which he belongs to)’ by adapting Utsumi’s (2000) notion of incongruity into a part of cognitive environment. This alternative approach can address irony in different way and still maintain the presumption that every communicator pursues optimal relevance in the process of communication.
Chapter 5

Communication, Argumentation and Relevance

5.0 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to argue that a theory of argumentation can be incorporated into a theory of communication. As discussed in chapter 1, argumentation is the process of justifying something in an organized or logical way, which is composed of one or more claims and shows one or more grounds for maintaining them. In order to examine the nature of argumentation, I present and discuss a range of concepts from neo-rhetoric and Relevance Theory and show how they complement each other in a treatment of linguistic argumentation.

In the previous chapters, I gave a good deal of space to discussing what metaphor and irony are and how they are treated in philosophy and linguistics, in order to give a theoretical foundation for explaining how figurative language such as metaphor and irony perform argumentation in discourse. Full-sized explanation of argumentation by figurative language is treated in chapter 6. Before that explanation, it is necessary to clarify what argumentation is and to examine what the relation between argumentation and communication is within the RT approach.

As discussed in chapters 1, 2 and 3, accounting for ‘meaning’ in language should focus on explaining communication between language users, going beyond merely describing semantic representation toward the object world. Then, what is communication? In relation to how communication should be defined, Sperber and Wilson (1995) hold the following:
Communication involves producing a certain stimulus with the following intentions:

*Informative intention:* to inform the audience of something;

*Communicative intention:* to inform the audience of one’s informative intention.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29)

Thus, according to RT, communication is sharing communicators’ intentions. A speaker’s conveying his intention to a hearer is to create an effect in the hearer’s mind. In other words, communication is achieved by the speaker’s producing the evidence for his intention and the hearer’s inferring the speaker’s intention by the evidence (i.e. by the hearer’s having contextual effect based on the utterance). RT holds that pragmatics should systematically explain every relevant element in the whole process in which the speaker’s intention is produced, conveyed to the hearer and understood by the hearer.

There are two models for explaining the process of communication: the code model and the inferential model. The traditional code model holds that human language is a sign system for matching human thoughts with sounds. Thus, communication is composed of the processes of the speaker encoding messages and the hearer decoding them; there is a common sign system between those two information-treating devices, and communication is possible when the messages are matched with the signs, according to the form-meaning relations in this sign system.

However, human communication cannot be explained entirely by the traditional code model, because there is a gap between the semantic representation of a sentence and the cognitive contents intended by the utterance of the sentence. When the speaker utters something, the hearer should grasp the contextual information about who utters it for what purpose, in order to exactly interpret the speaker’s intention. This contextual information is not presented by the semantic representation of a sentence. Understanding the speaker’s intention relies on the hearer’s cognitive ability. However, the traditional code model cannot explain language users’
cognitive ability, which is beyond that gap (between the semantic representation of a sentence and the cognitive contents intended by the utterance of the sentence).

Relevance Theory offers a pragmatic inferential model of communication, which maintains the traditional code model but supplements its shortcomings (see, e.g., Sperber and Wilson 1995: 24-28). From a pragmatic point of view, inference means filling in every possible piece of information or knowledge which may be elicited from the utterance and which must be elicited in order to understand the utterance as a representation of the speaker’s intentions.

The inferential model holds that it is impossible to precisely grasp the speaker’s intention only from the propositional meaning of a sentence, which is elicited by an encoding and decoding process. Encoding and decoding are subsidiary to the whole inferential process. Thus, according to the inferential model, inference fills in the gap between the semantic representation evident in the utterance and the thought contents behind the utterance. In other words, while decoding process ends when the hearer receives a sign and decodes its propositional contents, the inferential process ends when the hearer treats the premises of the utterance and finds the conclusions that can be elicited form the premises.

While Sperber and Wilson’s RT position on the nature of communication pays attention to the act of informing, it neglects the matter of argumentation. Moreover, the RT theorist Iten (2000: 694) rejects the proposal that communication is always accompanied with argumentation; but wherever there are discussions or debates in which a choice between two different values is premised, argumentation always exists. As RT is not a theory of explaining argumentation, and it focuses on explaining how the hearer interprets the utterance, there are few studies on argumentation within the RT framework.

However, the claim that communication and argumentation are intertwined has been made often enough that it cannot be ignored. For example, unlike Sperber and Wilson’s RT position, Hovland, Janis and Kelly (1953) hold that communication is a process by which a person conveys (mainly linguistic stimuli) to another, in order to change the other’s attitude or
behaviour; thus for them the goal of communication is to persuade others. In that case, communication is a kind of act in which a message is sent and received, and the messages that are sent and received are used to build argumentation.

Hovland, Janis and Kelly’s (1953) position is shared by argumentation theorists such as Plantin (1996) and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, 1996, 2004); every communication involves argumentation as a social activity. In their view, communication (as argumentation) is a bilateral process, and communicators aim to elicit others’ agreement, by exchanging and mediating their different opinions and positions. Communication is performed by linguistic or non-linguistic signs (e.g. gestures, facial expressions, signs and sounds) between speaker and hearer for sharing and understanding individual’s opinions or positions toward something.

Communication is always bilateral in nature, in that it involves the processes of confirming and revising information by communicators, which cannot be found in unilaterally conveying information. If the purpose of communication is argumentation and that of argumentation is persuasion, communication (as argumentation) must be performed within the condition in which the hearer may freely reject or accept the speaker’s position or opinion. For example, suppose that a man gets someone to do something under hypnosis. Under this situation, as all information is unilaterally conveyed to the addressee, and no rejection or refutation is possible, this cannot be considered a type of true communication.

Thus, in general communication holds the mutual processes of communicators’ agreement, disagreement, denial, question and refutation toward the given information, and those processes of confirming and revising information enable a real communication to be realized. For this reason, communication is not merely sharing information. By the mutual process of confirming and revising others’ information, communicators may draw others’ understanding or agreement on a certain conclusion, and in this case, the speaker’s argumentation is achieved. In fact, this is the goal of communication. Thus, it is possible to generalize that every act of communication is an act of argumentation. In other words, people communicate in order to persuade others.
This view of communication as having an argumentative purpose is persuasive for two reasons. First, communication is always fulfilled by at least two interactants in a specific discourse situation. Argumentation theorists such as Habermas (1984), van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, 1996, 2004) and Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca (1958) emphasize that communication (as argumentation) is a social activity, rather than something personal.

Second, there is no rational communicator that says something without any intention. For example, if somebody utters *I must go to the station now*, although this utterance can be viewed as a case of merely conveying information to the hearer, at the same time the utterance can be a ground for an argument such as ‘(and) I cannot do what you want me to do now’, which is intended to persuade the hearer to accept the speaker’s position that he is unable to help the hearer. Moreover, even the speaker’s saying *Hello* to the hearer can be the speaker’s argumentation claiming that ‘the speaker wants to interact with the hearer’. Likewise, when the speaker utters *This is an apple tree*, the speaker asserts the relation between *this* and *apple tree* as a truth, and urges the hearer to accept this relation (i.e. the speaker’s argument) as the truth, rather than merely conveying the information ‘I believe this is a apple tree’ to the hearer. When the speaker says something to the hearer in a specific discourse situation, it always has another inferred meaning; and this inferred meaning is an argumentative conclusion, based on the speaker’s original utterance as a ground.

This aspect becomes more salient in advertisements, which is a special kind of human language. The final goal of every advertisement is to achieve argumentation which persuades those who see it to do what the advertiser intends. Typically the intention is to guide consumers to believe that the advertiser’s products or services are desirable, so that they ultimately buy them. In this case, the implicated message inferred from the advertising copy is an argumentative conclusion intended by the advertiser.

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31 In relation to this matter, monologue should be distinguished from communication. If someone communicates with and persuades himself by his monologue, this would not be communication but self-justification.
It is necessary to more broadly interpret the notion of ‘intention’ set by RT, in order to fully explain those characteristics of argumentative discourses performed by ordinary language. When the speaker utters something, by the utterance the speaker aims to change the hearer’s attitude toward somebody/something and guides the hearer to accept or perform what the speaker intends, rather than merely conveys some information to the hearer. This point means that there is a third intention, besides informative and communicative intentions of RT. I call this third intention the argumentative intention. This point of view can be a ground for pursuing an integrated way of explaining argumentation by the RT’s cognitive and communicative approach.

My position can be supported by Mercier and Sperber (2011) and Sperber and Mercier (2012). According to them, the function of inference is to argue something, and human reasoning ability is optimized for devising an argument and estimating it, in order to persuade others. For this reason, unlike the classical logic viewpoint, from a cognitive pragmatic point of view, inference passes the process in which language users select the conclusion first which corresponds with their intuition, and justify the intuition by argumentation (Mercier and Sperber 2011: 58-59).

Accepting that argumentation is an inevitable outcome of communication, I aim to explain argumentation by figurative language. For this task, in chapter 6, I focus on cases of commercial advertisements in which figurative language (metaphor and irony) is used. As the goal of every advertisement is to persuade consumers, and to guide them to purchase specific products or services, it is one of the most representative argumentative activities.

As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, I set two premises, in approaching advertisements as argumentative discourse: Firstly, I accept experientialism as the philosophical basis of my argument. Second, I employ Relevance Theory.

There are three reasons why I choose the Relevance Theoretical approach in order to explain argumentation by figurative language, instead of AT. Firstly, whatever the phenomenon
may be, it is most desirable to seek explanatory economy in explaining it. Therefore, if one theoretical framework can account for the phenomenon as a whole, then we should not try to employ two frameworks in their entirety. Secondly, according to argumentation theorists’ position, the purpose of argumentation corresponds with that of communication itself. If so, it should be possible to amalgamate AT with RT, which focuses on explaining the process of communication. Thirdly, if argumentation is the purpose of communication, it is more reasonable to integrate AT into RT, because the latter offers more comprehensive (i.e. cognitive and communicative) approach to communication. There are further advantages to explaining argumentation by figurative language within RT frame:

i) The cognitive and communicative approach of RT makes it possible to integrate various argumentative concepts and other non-linguistic argumentative conditions that should be introduced in order to explain argumentation by figurative language (e.g. doxa, topoi, polyphony, speech act, abduction and multimodality) into the RT approach. This ultimately contributes to pursuing more economic and coherent explanation on argumentation by figurative language.

ii) Advertisements in mass media such as television, newspapers and magazines are a mixture of visual codes and verbal signs. For interpreting this kind of multimodal advertisement, consumers should grasp the given visual codes, and then interpret the relevant verbal message by advertiser. As RT simultaneously develops both the code model and the inferential model in order to explain communication (Sperber and Wilson 1995), it can offer more useful grounds for explaining communication (as argumentation) by figurative language, as used in multimodal advertisements. In relation to this point, Yus (2009) holds that process of comprehending verbo-pictorial metaphors composed of two different levels can be explained by a single principle of relevance.
In other words, I aim to use argumentative concepts and non-linguistic argumentative conditions to explain argumentation by figurative language, by adapting them in accordance with the RT approach. My attempt to do this is based on following position: in communication in which the speaker tries to persuade the hearer to accept the speaker’s intention and to do what the speaker wants, increasing argumentative power embedded in the speaker’s utterance is directly connected to achieving optimal relevance of the speaker’s argumentative utterance.

The next step is to justify how RT can successfully amalgamate the argumentative concepts introduced by AT, in order to pursue integrated explaining argumentation by figurative language within the assumptions and principles of RT. This means that it is necessary to extend the scope of applying RT whose purpose is to explain communication, and to adapt argumentative concepts introduced by AT, in order to absorb them within RT.

**5.1 Argumentation from a Pragmatic Perspective**

In the discourse of ordinary life, interlocutors communicate with each other by conveying their messages, which are performed by their utterances. The speaker intends his utterance to intend to lead the hearer to a conclusion intended by the speaker.

Based on this view of argumentation in Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca (1958), introduced in chapter1, here I propose a pragmatic definition of argumentation and argument:

**Argumentation** is the process of justifying one or more claims and showing one or more grounds for maintaining them.

**Argument** (in a pragmatic sense) is an illocutionary act performed by the utterance, which serves as a ground for the speaker’s argumentation.
For example, if the speaker utters *Jane is an angel* when he knows that the hearer is hesitating about marrying Jane, this metaphorical utterance asserts by implicature ‘Jane is very nice’, which becomes the ground for the speaker’s argumentative conclusion that ‘the hearer should marry Jane’.

In this thesis, my further discussion on communication (as argumentation) is based on those definitions given above, and they are from argumentation theory (i.e. AT). Thus, for developing further discussions on argumentation, it is necessary to briefly survey the history and the purpose of AT.

Academic interest in argumentation originated in classical rhetoric, and the study of rhetoric at that time was intended to educate people on how to use language for persuasion; thus, traditional rhetoric highlighted the interrelation between ‘argumentation’ and ‘audience’.

Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca (1958) and Toulmin (1958) opened the horizon of neo-rhetoric, which translates Greco-Roman rhetoric to the modern perspective (Breton and Gauthier 2000). Whereas Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca incorporated classical rhetorical notions into discourse study, focusing on argumentation in its socio-cultural context, Toulmin suggested a systematic argumentation structure which transfers formal logic to ordinary argumentation theory, by making an observable argumentation model. In this thesis, I follow Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca’s position on argumentation, because as pointed out by Habermas (1984), Toulmin’s argumentation structure does not clearly separate context-dependent claims from the universally adequate ones. In other words, Toulmin’s argumentation theory fluctuates between a general model that can extract universal and context-independent argumentation structure and a descriptive study of the context-dependent argumentation form, which is related to the domains of various human mental activities such as law, science, ethics and art criticism. Although it is true that the present current of European AT accepts the foundation of neo-rhetoric established by Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca, Toulmin’s model is still applied to rhetorical education and argumentative writing because it provides a useful tool
for examining the structure of argumentation (Williams and Colomb 2007).

The purpose of argumentation studies is not to explore objective and absolute truth toward the object world but to find the world of subjective and relative meanings related to human experiences and recognition, which are mediated by human language. Argumentation theories from Aristotle to Perelman hold that argumentation arises where there is a controversy (Perelman 1977: 20).32 Two opposed viewpoints on one phenomenon could explicitly be expressed in the discourse, or implicitly exist in it. In the former case (e.g. debates for and against an issue), argumentation directly aims to persuade others, and in the latter (e.g. figurative expressions or images in advertisements), it can be viewed as an action for indirectly intervening in and influencing others’ thoughts, attitudes or behaviours. In the process of explaining argumentation of advertisement, I define argumentation as a linguistic activity whose purpose is to justify why a specific value or position should or should not be chosen on the foundation of common opinions shared by language users.

5.2 Argumentation and Relevance

As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, I employ two theories: RT and AT. While RT focuses on explaining the process of the hearer’s interpreting the speaker’s utterance, AT is interested in examining how the speaker’s utterance is used to effectively persuade the audience. However, here there is room for RT and AT to collaborate. Argumentation is a process of interaction between interlocutors, by agreement, refutation, confirmation and question toward the given information or values; (supposing that the speaker’s argumentation is successful,) the hearer reaches the final conclusion intended by the speaker, exchanging and compromising their

32 Une argumentation n’est jamais capable de procurer l’évidence, et il n’est pas question d’argumenter contre ce qui est evident. (…) l’argumentation ne peut intervenir que si l’évidence est contestée.
positions on the topic at hand. This point is directly connected to Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) notion of ‘contextual effect’. According to RT, context is not given at the outset in the specific utterance situation; instead, the hearer chooses the context in which optimal relevance of the utterance can be achieved. Thus, in the process of interpreting discourse, ‘relevance’ is what is taken as given and context is treated as a variable. Having contextual effect is a necessary condition for relevance. There are three types of contextual effect:

1) Contextual implications are contextual effects: they result from a crucial interaction between new and old information as premises in a synthetic implication.

2) New information may provide further evidence for, and therefore strengthen, old assumptions;

3) Or it may provide evidence against, and perhaps lead to the abandonment of, old assumptions.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 109)

According to RT, the speaker tries to make his utterance relevant to the given situation, by making the hearer enjoy maximized cognitive effect without spending any useless processing effort. At this stage, it is necessary for the speaker to choose or manipulate his ostensive stimuli (e.g. selecting words, expressions or examples) in order to achieve optimal relevance of his utterance. This process of the speaker’s manipulating his ostensive stimuli is directly connected to that of increasing argumentative power of the utterance. In other words, the more relevant the utterance is, the stronger its argumentative power is, because the hearer would not accept the speaker’s intention unless the utterance sounds plausible and persuasive.

For that reason, RT and AT may cooperate in the process of explaining argumentation. I propose an integrated way of explaining argumentation, by putting RT first in importance. In

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33 In fact, attempting to harmonize pragmatics and rhetoric is not something new. In Dascal and Gross (1999), this potential is described as ‘the marriage of pragmatics and rhetoric’. However, the pragmatic theory that those theorists consider is the Gricean pragmatics, not RT. Thus, here I explore the possibility of harmonizing RT and AT, in order to explain communication (as argumentation).
other words, argumentative concepts introduced by AT are adapted and absorbed into the domain of the Principle of Relevance. The view taken here, and the neo-rhetorical view, in general, is consistent with Sperber and Wilson’s view on literal meaning in classical rhetoric. In fact, RT (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1990) has attempted to cover the explanatory lacunae of AT. Relevance Theorists’ interest in this matter is shown in the following:

Note that both classical rhetoricians and their Romantic critics take as self-evident that, if there is such a thing as literal meaning, then utterances come with a presumption of literalness. We disagree.

(Sperber and Wilson 1990: 141)

However, although Sperber and Wilson see the inadequacies of classical rhetoric and their Romantic critics, neo-rhetorical approaches (i.e. rhetoric of argumentation) do not share those inadequacies; therefore this AT is not prevented from being adopted into RT.

Like RT, AT (e.g. Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca 1958, van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 1996, 2004) is also based on an inferential model of communication. According to AT, communication (as argumentation) should focus on verisimilitude (i.e. the quality of seeming to be true or real). Thus, the speaker argues his position and may draw the hearer’s agreement, based on this verisimilitude. In this phase, the speaker’s linguistic signs cannot properly be interpreted unless specific situation is fully considered. As it is premised that every communication (as argumentation) is accompanied with the process of sharing communicators’ thoughts and positions, it is inevitable for communication (as argumentation) to be based on mutually acceptable verisimilitude. This position of AT is connected to that of RT, which holds that successful communication is based on pursuing optimal relevance, so this common point between the nature of AT and the position of RT adds theoretical adequacy to this approach.

I have demonstrated the possibility of amalgamating RT and AT from the RT perspective. Next it is necessary to check the same matter from the AT perspective. What is important here is
whether the basic position of AT on treating argumentation is compatible with that of RT pragmatics. According to Plantin (1996), AT is connected to the fields of pragmatics in that modern argumentation studies depend on the speech act theory of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) and on the Gricean conversational implicature theory. There are five research directions of AT, summarized by Plantin (1996: 13)\(^{34}\); and except for (v), they study argumentation as communication.

i) The `pragma-dialectics` (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992):
The pragma-dialectics treats argumentation as a type of normative dialogue, and this approach offers an explicit rule-system for rational argumentation in debates

ii) Argumentation and analysis of conversation (Moeschler 1985): The progress of analysing verbal interactions makes it possible to analyse the argumentation in the conversation as well.

iii) Linguistic pragmatics integrated in langue (i.e. integrated pragmatics): (Anscombe and Ducrot 1983 and Ducrot 1980, 1984): Argumentation is the semantic/pragmatic value embedded in language as langue. This approach tries to identify argumentation triggers in discourses, and examines their works in the process of argumentation. On this view, the argumentation principles which define an argumentative discourse cannot be explained by discourse principles like conversational rules or the Cooperative Principle, and argumentation is not on a pragmatic level but integrated into the essentially semantic system embedded in language.

iv) Sociological and philosophical pragmatics of communication (Habermas 1984):
Argumentation can be studied in terms of discourse ethics. Discourse ethics, sometimes called argumentation ethics, refers to a type of argument that attempts to establish normative or ethical truths by examining the presuppositions of discourse.

v) Pragmatic logic (Vignaux 1988, Grize 1990): The logicians who try to construct the natural logics are also interested in pragmatics.

According to Plantin’s survey, among the AT schools which study argumentation as communication, only Ducrot’s integrated pragmatics claims that argumentation is a matter of langue, and this position cannot be compatible with the basic assumption of pragmatics. Thus,

\(^{34}\) I have translated the original text from French to English, and reformed some points in it.
the next task is to verify that RT is more suitable for treating communication (as argumentation) than integrated pragmatics.

The crucial difference between RT and Ducrot’s integrated pragmatics is that whereas RT holds that it is necessary to make a distinction between semantics and pragmatics, integrated pragmatics views that argumentation is not set at the level of discourse but at the *langue* dimension, in order to claim that argumentation is the primary semantic content of language. In other words, integrated pragmatics is an attempt to explain the pragmatic meaning(s) of an utterance within a structural semantic system at the sentence level.35 For this reason, in integrated pragmatics, all elements of argumentation are integrated in linguistic signs themselves. Thus, integrated pragmatics focuses on argumentation triggers (e.g. argumentative connectives such as *mais*/*but*) in discourse and examining the argumentative connection or interrelation between words or phrases in which those argumentative elements are integrated, without making any distinction between semantics and pragmatics. In relation to that point, Anscombe and Ducrot (1983: 8) present the definition of argumentation:

Un locuteur fait une argumentation lorsqu’il présente un énoncé E₁ (ou un ensemble d’énoncé) comme destine à en faire admettre un autre (ou un ensemble d’autres) E₂.

(Argumentation is a linguistic activity in which the speaker presents his enunciation E₁ in order to make the hearer accept another enunciation E₂ from it.)36

For clearer understanding, consider the following examples:

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35 In relation to this point, Guattari (1984), who views the notion of speech act as micropolitical activity going beyond the dimension of a linguistic mechanism, points out that the French integrated pragmaticists tend to underestimate the value of metaphor, and deny or doubt defining human language as the method of communication.

36 This is my translation.
(98) Tom is short, but intelligent.

(99) Tom is intelligent, but short.

When the speaker of (98) says the antecedent sentence $E_1$ (i.e. Tom is short) to coaching staff who are discussing whom they should select as a new member of the basketball team, the utterance is an argument which makes the hearer infer a fixed conclusion (i.e. ‘Tom is not suitable for being a new member of the basketball team’). However, when the following sentence $E_2$ (i.e. Tom is intelligent) is said, the hearer infers ‘Tom has a merit for being a member of the basketball team’. At this stage, as the weight of the speaker’s intention is focused on the latter argument, the total utterance meaning is oriented to ‘Tom has a merit for being a member of the basketball team’ as the implied conclusion of the following sentence. On the other hand, although (99) can be analysed in the same way as (98), the argumentative orientation of the utterance meaning in (99), which is inferred, biases more toward the argumentation that ‘Tom is not suitable for being a member of the basketball team’. From this point, we may expect that the content of argumentation in (99) could be overturned, if the order between Tom is short and Tom is intelligent is switched, although the semantic information of the whole sentence is the same as that from (98).

However, sometimes Ducrot’s approach does not fully consider the situational information of the utterance. In relation to this point, consider (100) and (101):\(^{37}\)

(100) It’s small, but strong. ------ Volkswagen POLO

(101) It’s strong, but small. ------ Volkswagen POLO

Although it is possible for both (100) and (101) to be analysed by the same means as (98) and (99) were analysed above, unlike in the case of (100), we cannot judge that small in (101)

\(^{37}\) Whereas (100) is the text of a real billboard advertisement in London (2008), (101) is not.
always guides the hearer to reach a negative conclusion. If we strictly maintain Ducrot’s viewpoint, the consumer who sees (101) may not choose a POLO because the conclusion in (101) sounds negative; but this expectation is not absolutely right. For instance, if a single person who wants an economical car sees (101), the argumentative power might be more strongly directed to such a person, while it does not if the viewers are looking for a family car which is spacious enough to accommodate five adults. Thus, the cases of (100) and (101) seem to be slightly different from those of (98) and (99), because the value of small is not an absolutely weak point in car-choosing situation, whereas that of short is an almost absolutely weak point in a basketball-player-choosing situation. This point shows that it is not desirable to explain argumentation by an utterance only within linguistically codified domain (i.e. semantics or integrated pragmatics), without fully considering non-linguistic contextual elements that could influence the argumentative interpretation of the utterance.

Additionally, this linguistic phenomenon brought about by connectives (e.g. but) shown in (98) and (100) can be explained by procedural analysis based on relevance. For example, Hall (2007) proposes that but in discourse has the following procedural meaning:

**But** indicates that what follows is cutting off a line of inference opened up by the previous clause.

(Hall 2007: 168).

But in (98) (i.e. short but intelligent) expresses denial of expectation. According to Hall’s (2007) approach, the implicated meaning in the first clause (i.e. Tom is not suitable for being a member of the basketball team) is blocked by other implicated meaning in the second clause (i.e. Tom has a merit for being a member of the basketball team), which is introduced by but.

Another theoretical lacuna of Ducrot’s AT is found in how the speaker’s utterance is

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38 For further study on procedural meaning by the RT approach, see Blakemore (1987, 2000), as well as Hall (2007).
interpreted. For Ducrot, the notion of topoi is significant. Topoi are bundles of knowledge or concepts (i.e. lieu commun/common grounds) which enable inference so that the hearer can reach the conclusion intended by the speaker. However, Iten (2000: 693) points out that there is an explanatory problem in interpreting the utterance by using topoi. For example, when the speaker utters It’s hot, the topoi which can be applied to interpreting this utterance include:

(102) T₁: ‘the warmer the weather, the nicer the beach’
    T₂: ‘the warmer the weather, the less pleasant the work’
    T₃: ‘the warmer the weather, the shorter the skirts’ and so on.

However, in this case, Ducrot’s integrated pragmatics does not clearly define which topos among them the hearer should use, according to different situations. As the speaker’s argumentation cannot be achieved until the hearer exactly interprets the speaker’s utterance and grasps the speaker’s intention, it is problematic if Ducrot’s AT cannot properly explain how the hearer exactly interprets the speaker’s utterance. In fact, it is traditionally expected that a pragmatic theory will answer this question, because a pragmatic theory considers the contextual information of the given situation; nevertheless, integrated pragmatics does not answer it. In other words, what is necessary in the process of interpreting the utterance is not to apply some finite bundles of knowledge or concepts but to know the speaker’s intention and the contextual information about the given situation; this means that it is necessary to seek more extended base for inference than topoi. Moreover, as Ducrot’s AT does not offer any clear criterion about which topos should be applied to which situation, it is impossible to explain how that one utterance can differently be interpreted, according to the variables such as the speaker’s

39 However, I do not entirely reject the validity and the role of topoi in the process of performing argumentation of the utterance. The problem of Ducrot’s AT pointed out by Iten (2000) is that this theory uses the notion of topoi as a linguistic mechanism for interpreting the utterance. On the other hand, however, I view topoi as an argumentative concept included in ‘cognitive environment’. For doing this, it is necessary to adapt the notion of topoi, returning to its original sense. I discuss this matter in sub-section 5.4.1.
intention and various utterance situations. For this point, Iten (2000: 693) claims that what is necessary here is non-integrated pragmatics, not integrated pragmatics. If it is claimed that argumentation is something that can be explained only by semantic contents inside linguistic representation, it is impossible to capture how non-linguistic variables (e.g. the speaker’s social status/authority, ways of message-conveying, familiarity between communicators … etc.) work in the process of argumentation, which significantly influence many parts of discourse. This aspect can be confirmed by a case of ‘order-words/mots d’ordre’ as well, introduced by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), which I discussed in chapter 1. If the speaker of *if you fail in this matter...* were not a Mafia boss but a five-year-old child, this utterance would not sound very threatening.

For that reason, explaining communication (as argumentation) should be a task of pragmatics, and RT is particularly eligible to do this task, in that RT offers an economic and comprehensive way of explaining the process of the hearer’s interpretation of the speaker’s utterance. In the next section, as the first step for explaining communication (as argumentation) by figurative language, I survey the notion of ‘cognitive environment’ proposed by RT. Additionally, I explain why ‘cognitive environment’ is more effective for integrating various argumentative concepts than ‘mutual knowledge’ (i.e. background knowledge).

5.3 Cognitive Environment and Relevance

In order to achieve successful communication, communicators must share inferential bases or grounds. RT views these inferential grounds as the ‘cognitive environment’. In this section, I discuss the answer to three questions: 1) What are ‘inferential bases or grounds’, and why are they necessary? 2) How have inferential bases/grounds been treated in competing pragmatic approaches? 3) What is ‘cognitive environment' in RT, and why should this notion be supported?
How effectively the speaker’s argumentative utterance persuades the hearer depends on how much the hearer feels sympathy with the contents of the speaker’s utterance. What is important here is that the contents of the speaker’s utterance should be based on something that the hearer also knows or can agree with. For example, suppose that I discuss some issues of English weather with an Englishman whom I accidentally met in the airport, it is necessary to consider some background facts such as the changeableness of English weather and the long sunshine duration of English summer. In this case, those relevant facts (or knowledge) should be shared, in order to achieve successful communication, and it implies that every successful communication depends on establishing common grounds between speaker and hearer.

However, many differing positions exist regarding common ground in communication. Attempts at describing this phenomenon have approached it as ‘mutual knowledge’ (Grice 1957, Schiffer 1972), ‘common knowledge’ (Lewis 1969), ‘common beliefs’ (i.e. ‘pragmatic presupposition’ by Stalnaker 2002), ‘background knowledge’ (Gumperz 1995) and so on. In relation to the difference between ‘belief’ and ‘knowledge’, B.P.H. Lee (2001) notes that they differ in terms of different degrees of certainty of the ‘truth’. Thus, according to B.P.H. Lee’s (2001: 23) position, the distinction between these two terms depends on ‘how securely the individual holds them’, and ‘knowledge’ is more secure than ‘belief’. For example, following B.P.H. Lee’s position on the distinction between ‘belief’ and ‘knowledge’, ancient Egyptians believed that their dead Pharaoh would revive, and they knew that the Nile is regularly inundated.

Another difference in the concepts is whether the knowledge (of belief) is seen as common, shared or mutual. According to Kreckel (1981), common (or background) knowledge is held by speaker and hearer as the result of being brought up under similar conditions such as culture, subculture, region and education, whereas shared knowledge refers to the negotiated common knowledge (based on mutual interaction) used for the interaction. For example, Tom accepts the information that Los Angeles is in the west, and Chicago is in the middle of the U.S. to be
common knowledge between himself and Jerry (who lives in Alaska and has never been to the mainland of the U.S.), even though they have not talked about the relative locations of the two cities before. The reason why this is possible is that Tom and Jerry have very similar childhoods and share the same school experiences and therefore can assume that both have some general knowledge about American geography. Once they have discussed enjoying a possible vacation together to Los Angeles and Chicago and whether they would do it by car or the plane, then that information about the locations of the two cities is part of Tom and Jerry’s shared knowledge.

According to B.P.H. Lee (2001: 25), in contrast to common and shared knowledge, ‘mutual knowledge refers to the type of knowledge which two (or more) persons hold to be common with 100% certainty. This 100% certainty is based, technically speaking, on an infinite regression of statements’. Judging from this point, the main criterion which distinguishes common and shared knowledge from mutual knowledge is whether the knowledge is based on the certainty that both people share the knowledge. However, the criterion remains controversial in that it is not clear how the ‘degree of certainty’ is judged and who determines it; recognizing and examining some entities could be a very subjective (or relative) matter. Thus, it is not easy to draw a clear boundary between shared and mutual knowledge. Relating to the point discussed above, consider the sceptical viewpoint in Allan (forthcoming):

What seems abundantly clear is that although one might nit-pick differences among them (see Lee 2001), the terms common knowledge, mutual knowledge, shared knowledge, assumed familiarity, presumed background information and common ground are describing essentially the same thing, and it is what defines the pragmatic constituent of communicative competence: the knowledge and application of how and when to use utterances appropriately that combines with grammatical knowledge (of semantics, syntax, morphology, phonology) in the production of utterances to generate a coherent text comprehensible to its intended audience.

(Allan: forthcoming)

In relation to the role of background knowledge in the process of communication,
Gumperz (1995: 120) holds that ‘lack of shared background knowledge leads initially to misunderstanding’. This position defending the status of background knowledge is connected to sociolinguistic viewpoints claiming that the socio-cultural aspects of the society or the community in which a specific language is used must be considered in discussing linguistic communication.

On the other hand, a contrasting position holds that assumption of ‘mutual knowledge’ is not necessary in the process of communication. Relevance Theorists including Sperber and Wilson (1982, 1995) argue that the notion of ‘mutual knowledge’ should be abandoned, because it is impossible to systematically define or verify. Thus, according to Sperber and Wilson (1982), ‘mutual knowledge’ is an untenable notion for a theory of pragmatics because it requires interlocutors to know an infinite set of propositions:

(103) Mutual Knowledge is knowledge of an infinite set of proposition. By the usual definitions, a speaker S and an addressee A mutually know a proposition P if and only if:
(i) S knows that P.
(ii) A knows that P.
(iii) S knows (ii).
(iv) A knows (i).
(v) S knows (iv).
(vi) A knows (iii).
… and so on ad infinitum.

(Sperber and Wilson 1982: 63)

Although it might seem like the notion of ‘mutual knowledge’ is necessary for defining contexts, the process of verifying it is endlessly repeated. Thus, Sperber and Wilson (1982, 1995) argue that the notion of mutual knowledge should be abandoned, because mutual knowledge is not a possible condition for forming contexts. In relation to this point, suppose that an old Korean man who had a narrow escape from death during the Korean War utters (104):
(104) I am a Korean. And so I hate communism.

There is a premise that those who interpret (104) may understand that (105) is implicated:

(105) Korean people hate communism.

According to Sperber and Wilson (1995), (105) is not elicited from the set of mutual knowledge that communicators have. In other words, without assuming mutual knowledge, it is possible to approach (105) by a different criterion (e.g. considering procedural meanings by connectives), by knowing (105) is necessary for understanding (104), and (105) belongs to the context in which interpreting (104) is possible. This point can be made clearer using another example. Suppose that the speaker requests the hearer to open the window, by uttering (106):

(106) Open the window.

If there are more than two windows in the room in which the communicators are, this fact can be assumed to be shared between the communicators. However, it is impossible to confirm the exact referent which *the window* refers to, by using the mutual knowledge. In summary, the set of necessary information for understanding utterances (i.e. context) is less than that of mutually shared knowledge between the speaker and the hearer.

If mutual knowledge is not a sufficient condition that forms contexts, it could be regarded as a necessary condition for forming them. Nevertheless, RT has a negative position for this viewpoint. According to Sperber and Wilson (1995: 18-21), regarding mutual knowledge as a necessary condition for forming contexts is assuming that communication is always successful, and this ultimately assumes that mutual knowledge is a necessary condition for communication. However, there is no advance guarantee that communication would not fail. In the case of failed
communication, the origin of failure is not always due to absence of the mutually shared codes between communicators.

RT develops a mixed model which simultaneously considers both the code model and the inferential model, and the core of this mixed model is not discussing the opposition between them, but exploring whether it would be possible to elicit the inferential model based on the code model. Sperber and Wilson (1995) hold that the possibility of doing this was suggested by the Gricean model. The Gricean model relies on mutual knowledge as a necessary and sufficient condition of communication.

RT is based on a different hypothesis for explaining communication than the Gricean model. According to RT, while the code model is confined to dealing with linguistic aspects of communication, the inferential model includes non-linguistic aspects of communication such as assigning referents, disambiguation and drawing implicated meanings. As the process of interpreting non-linguistic aspects of communication does not rely on the code model, the notion of mutual knowledge is not necessary any more. However, in order to show that complete discord toward forming necessary context for communication does not exist between the speaker and the hearer, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 39) suggest ‘mutual manifestness’, as an alternative to the Gricean notion of ‘mutual knowledge’. Furthermore, Sperber and Wilson (1995) use ‘cognitive environment’ as a means of covering the ground covered by ‘mutual knowledge’ in the Gricean approaches. In chapter 4, I discussed this notion in order to explain the relation between ‘incongruity’ and relevance. Here I recite Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) notion of ‘cognitive environment’:

(96) A fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true.

(97) A cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to him.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 39)
According to RT, when the speaker and the hearer communicate with each other, the hearer infers the speaker’s intention by picking out the facts that the hearer knows or assumptions, which are manifest to the hearer. Suppose that while Jerry has finished his homework, Tom hasn’t yet. When Jerry suggests that Tom go to the party together, Tom says I have to do my homework now. In this case, the fact that ‘Tom has not finished his homework yet’ and the assumption that ‘for this reason, Tom may not want to go to the party with Jerry’ are manifest to Jerry. This fact and assumption of Jerry’s cognitive environment enables Jerry to infer Tom’s intention that ‘Tom does not want to go to the party’. The principle that ‘human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance’ (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 260) explains this aspect of communication. Thus, every overt communication occurs under the communicators’ presumption that it is relevant. To return to an example from the sub-section 3.2.3, when a Muslim student Ali asks whether or not pork is served in the party, pork will be served is more relevant to the cognitive environment than meat will be served. In other words, humans automatically attend to the stimuli which seem the most relevant to the situation with which they are faced.

In this section, I have discussed why the phenomena that Gricean pragmaticists attribute to mutual knowledge is better treated with the notion of ‘cognitive environment’ as proposed in RT. This discussion lays the theoretical foundation for justifying why and how RT can amalgamate various argumentative concepts as well as non-linguistic conditions that have been introduced in AT in order to explain argumentation. In the next section, I discuss how various argumentative concepts as well as non-linguistic conditions introduced by AT can be absorbed into a single principle of relevance.
5.4 Relevance and Argumentative Concepts as Inferential Bases of Argumentation

Explaining communication as argumentation employs not only various language philosophical concepts (e.g. doxa, topoi, polyphony and speech act) but also other non-linguistic concepts (e.g. multimodality). Additionally, in the process of communication (as argumentation), inference by Peirce’s abduction discussed in chapter 2 may contribute to the hearer’s finding the speaker’s ‘case’ (as the conclusion intended by the speaker) from ‘rule/fact’ and ‘result/conclusion’.

My aim is to pursue an economic and coherent explanation of argumentation by figurative language, by integrating those argumentative concepts within RT. The aim of this section, then, is to show why and how argumentative concepts such as POLYPHONY and SPEECH ACT can be treated within the domain of RT. Finally, I argue that the RT approach to implicated meaning may cover Peirce’s abduction. This means that I motivate an extension of the scope of RT’s application, so that it encompasses argumentation particularly. My approach to explaining argumentation can be compatible with the RT position that every ostensive-inferential communication can be accounted for under a single Principle of Relevance. The various argumentative concepts that have been used by AT can be included in broader boundary of ‘relevance’ and contribute to helping the hearer properly interpret the speaker’s intention. Once the speaker’s meaning is interpreted by the hearer, based on cognitive environment, the speaker’s intention is argumentative in another cognitive environment newly formed again.

My approach contributes not only to pursuing a more economic explanation of argumentation but also to concretely examining how cognitive environment works in the process of argumentation, and suggesting how other non-linguistic conditions could be successfully absorbed into the domain of RT.
5.4.1 Doxa and Topoi as Parts of Cognitive Environment

Since Aristotle, doxa and topoi have been viewed as significant elements of argumentation. Neo-rhetoricians such as Perelman and Ducrot later introduced these concepts into modern pragmatics. In this section, I argue that doxa and topoi can be considered parts of cognitive environment, in that they are cognitive products of language users’ socio-cultural experiences. Here I treat doxa and topoi as inferential elements which influence strengthening argumentative power drawn into the utterance. Doxa and topoi help the hearer grasp the speaker’s intention (i.e. argumentative conclusion) in the process of communication based on Principle of Relevance.

The term doxa originated in Plato’s the Republic (Plato 1985), and it can be translated as ‘common opinion’. In general, doxa may contrast with episteme ‘true knowledge’. According to Amossy (2002), although doxa is not meant to be an exact synonym of ideology, ideology can be a type of doxa in that it makes people conflict with each other, because they fix their ideas in the direction of specific tendency (e.g. capitalism vs. communism), instead of exploring each entity or target which they experience in accordance with the given situation. For this reason, doxa can be wrong. For example, at the point when Copernicus claimed that the earth turns around the sun, the Ptolemaic system was doxa. Thus, although the doxa is supported by many people within a society and it influences their reasoning, it is neither absolute nor always justified in a strict epistemological sense.

Plato regarded doxa as inferior knowing in comparison with episteme, but did not view doxa as something absolutely false. Thus, although doxa reflects people’s status of imperfect knowledge and belief, our ordinary language use and inference is under the influence of it. Because of this, doxa as an argumentative concept is a premise which supports the speaker’s argumentation, because drawing popular support by persuading others does not always have to be based in absolute truth, as when Hitler agitated German people to join the war by his inflammatory speech based on the doxa of Aryan racialism (i.e. ‘Only Germans are great, and
the world should be ruled by Germans’). For the German people who lived in Hitler’s regime, this *doxa* of Aryan racialism was manifest to them, because this ideology was taught in the German schools and promulgated by German mass media, and it was regarded as a fact by the German people.

Then, in this case, by what consequence can *doxa* be a part of cognitive environment? In relation to performing argumentation, for the speaker to increase argumentative power of the utterance is to offer mutually acceptable verisimilitude between the speaker and the hearer. In other words, the more sympathy with the content of the utterance the hearer has, the stronger argumentative power of the utterance is. In this process, forming acceptable verisimilitude between the speaker and the hearer is necessary condition for increasing argumentative power of the utterance. To say that an utterance or a story has its verisimilitude means that it is based on the facts or the assumptions that both the speaker and the hearer are aware of (i.e. cognitive environment); otherwise, the utterance might sound implausible, and its argumentative power is not guaranteed. Thus, to say something argumentatively means to make the utterance relevant to the given situation. If the utterance is not relevant to the given situation, the hearer may not react to the speaker’s intention, and the utterance cannot have its argumentative power.

Returning to Hitler’s case, by introducing Aryan racialism, he could increase the argumentative power of his tirades, because this *doxa* is connected to the German nationalism which is represented by the German legend such as *Das Niebelungslied* (The epic of Nibelungen). The Nazi regime emphasized this German legend, which had been manifest to the German people’s mind, in order to connect it with Aryan racialism. Thus, the *doxa* of Aryan racialism was strengthened by another *doxa* of the German legend, which was broadly promulgated by the Nazi mass media and education. This process is similar to a type of contextual effect (i.e. new information may provide further evidence for, and therefore strengthen, old assumptions). For this reason, in Hitler’s case, to make his speech have argumentative power was to make his utterance more relevant to the given situation by
exploiting the *doxa* which is manifest to the German people, and this *doxa* is manifest to the German people means that it is a part of their cognitive environment.

Another useful argumentative concept from AT is the notion of *topoi*, which is a bundle of fixed and repeated ideas or concepts. According to Aristotle who first applied the notion to explaining argumentation, a *topos* is an argumentative rule which enables inferences and is shared by a given community. Thus, some argumentation theorists (e.g. Toulmin 1958) call *topos* a warrant of inference, and this argumentative rule licenses the move from an argument to a conclusion.

*Topoi* can be viewed as axioms that are accepted in a language community which serve as grounds for argumentation; they are embedded in every kind of discourse. *Topoi* can usually be seen in stereotypes or proverbs. For example, if someone says *The grass is greener on the other side of the fence*, the meaning of this proverbial utterance is based on the *topos* that ‘human nature is jealous’, which has been universally accepted by most members of the community, and this *topos* is the ground of communicators’ inference.

Anscombre (1995: 72-73) holds that proverbs are used to introduce a discourse space in a chain of discourse, therefore the proverb itself cannot be asserted, and is instead mentioned or cited. In other words, the speaker who utters a specific proverb is not the author of it, and the speaker himself does not claim a *topos* in the proverb, but he just exploits or takes advantage of it as the ground supporting his argument.

The *topos* in the specific proverb is connected to Kreckel’s (1981) ‘common knowledge’ in that a *topos* holds a status of the value or the common ground universally accepted by the members of community. This point is connected to Sperber and Wilson’s ‘echoic mentioning’ of irony use. When the speaker uses irony, he may echo not only the proposition of other person’s antecedent utterance but also our socio-cultural norms or common beliefs which can be *topoi* in AT. For this reason, *topoi* are manifest to communicators, and a part of cognitive environment.

Thus, a proverb is used for performing argumentation by appealing to generally accepted
ideas. In this case, the proverb used by the speaker may work as a ground for implicitly suggested conclusion in the discourse. For instance, suppose that Tom helps Jerry move house. When Jerry tries to carry a massive refrigerator with a small pickup truck, Tom might say (107):

(107) Oh, you try to change the course of Niagara Falls with a bucket!

The conclusion of Tom’s proverbial utterance in (107) is that ‘Tom disagrees with Jerry’s reckless attempt’; but Tom’s utterance implies the conclusion that the proverb implicates, instead of directly showing its conclusion. In relation to this point, Amossy (2000) holds that stereotypes or fixed ideas of a society can be found by analysing proverbial forms of the language. Moreover, a proverbial form, which shows the societal members’ ideological system, is given as a generic phrase, separated from a specific discourse situation and not the target of debates. By using proverbial forms, the speaker may secure other peoples’ agreement toward his personal argument. Thus, the use of stereotypes or proverbial forms verifies that discourses involve a polyphonic structure in which various voices from the speaker, the hearer and audience are embedded. Here these various voices contribute to objectifying the speaker’s personal argument, and this objectified argument may have more argumentative power.

According to Hong (2000: 18), topoi is the concept based on doxa. Literary discussion can aid in understanding the nature of topoi and the difference between topoi and doxa. In reference to literature, topos is a fixed form or a literary commonplace which is made by repeating of several motifs (Prince 2003). Here a motif is a common theme in storytelling. For example, in Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, the subject matter is a ‘big white whale’ and its motifs can be ‘opposition between good and evil’, ‘human desire for conquest’, ‘inscrutability in human nature’ and so on; these have been popular and regular motifs in Western literary works. The nature of those motifs is the same as that of topoi: a bundle of fixed and repeated ideas or thoughts. Furthermore, those motifs (i.e. topoi) are closely connected to a broad ideology that
has been accepted as an absolute truth by many people; for example, Christianity or Puritanism. In this case, these ideologies work as doxa, and those motifs (i.e. topoi) belong to these ideologies (i.e. doxa).

The motifs (as topoi) in literary works contribute the verisimilitude of those works. According to Genette (1993), verisimilitude/vraisemblance is a main element which establishes reality in fictitious narratives. Although an author makes up a narrative, it requires plausibility (i.e. verisimilitude); otherwise, those who read or listen to it would not sympathize with it. Poets, novelists and dramatists project their views of life or sense of values to their works, and readers who enjoy the authors’ works sympathize with the authors, by empathy with the hero’s or the heroine’s mind or position in the fictitious stories. In this case, the motifs chosen by the author play a role of strengthening degree of the readers’ sympathy with the author’s way of thinking, by maximizing verisimilitude of his work. For example, in the case of Moby Dick, the readers’ mind is moved because of the motifs (as topoi), not because of the subject matter (i.e. a big white whale), because the motifs used in that novel are based on Western people’s sub-consciousness formed by their religion (i.e. doxa) or socio-cultural experiences. Thus, the types of topoi can differently be shown, according to different cultural areas. For instance, the topoi which more strongly appeal to Korean readers are, unlike those frequently shown in Western literary works, something like ‘loyalty and filial piety’, ‘metempsychosis’, ‘mercy’ and ‘encouraging good and punishing evil’, which are based on Confucianism or Buddhism as doxa. Additionally, topos like ‘Korean people have long-cherished desire for reunification’ may strongly move Korean readers’ mind, and this topos is based on Korean nationalism as doxa. However, Korean literary works in which those topoi are used might not be as influential in Western readers’ mind.

Sometimes it is not easy to clear-cut the border between doxa and topoi. For example, in Germany under the Third Reich by Hitler, anti-Semitism was prevalent, and this is directly connected to Nazism or Aryan racialism (as a type of totalitarianism). Considering this situation,
suppose that a Nazi metaphorically insults Jewish people:

(108) Jewish people are cockroaches.

In the metaphorical utterance of (108), a very negative stereotype (as a topos) of Jewish people is at work; for example, ‘Jews are the most inferior and harmful tribe, and they should be eradicated from the world’. This anti-Semitism is closely connected to Nazism or Aryan racialism (as doxa) that ‘Only Germans are great, and they should rule the world’. To be strict, anti-Semitism (as a topos) is different from Nazism or Aryan racialism (as doxa) specific only for Germans, in that other European cultures can also have anti-Semitism, and while Nazism or Aryan racialism can be viewed as an ideology (i.e. totalitarianism), anti-Semitism not. In this case, anti-Semitism and Aryan racialism overlap, and it seems difficult to clearly draw the boundary between these two. This point is shown in Hitler’s Mein Kampf in which Hitler consistently argues that it is impossible to build the great German nation without sweeping away the Jewish race. In other words, at least for Hitler, anti-Semitism and Aryan racialism are identified with each other.

Although literary topoi have similar status in rhetorical studies from Aristotle to Perelman, their role in integrated pragmatics is slightly different. Whereas philosophy and literature view topoi as the concepts which add plausibility of the speaker’s (or narrator’s) discourse, integrated pragmatics (e.g. Ducrot 1993, 1995, Anscombe 1995) views that topoi are embedded in the meaning of a word or a sentence itself, and confirmed by the works of argumentation triggers (e.g. connectives such as mais/but); thus, they focus on studying the relations between utterances connected by argumentative operators.

However, as discussed in the sub-section 5.2, I reject the integrated pragmatists’ basic position that argumentation belongs to langue dimension, and thus the notion of topoi that I accept here is closer to that of other argumentation theorists (e.g. Aristotle and Perelman) or
literary critics (e.g. Prince and Genette). Once I follow other argumentation theorists’ or literary critics’ original position on topoi, the status of topoi is not the contents embedded in langue level but a kind of concept which contributes to achieving successful communication (as argumentation) and is included in communicators’ cognitive environment.

Conceptual metaphor supports the notion of topoi as a part of cognitive environment. As discussed in chapter 2, metaphor is a strong mechanism which influences language users’ epistemological system. On these lines, it can be assumed that conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003) are a type of topoi. Song (2008: 17-18) holds that conceptual metaphor is also influential among those elements which form topoi, following experientialist epistemology, because conceptual metaphors are the products of human experiences in the society or the community, which are manifest to communicators. For example, the topos of ‘human nature’ indicates whether humans are seen as naturally greedy, generous, or gentle. The Korean topos of ‘human nature’ relies on the following conceptual metaphors:

(109) a. IMMORALITY IS DIRT
     b. MORALITY IS POWER

(109a) is a conceptual metaphor which shows conceptualization by metaphorizing ‘human immoral nature’ to ‘dirt’. Immoral greed is one of the negative properties of human nature, and few people like it; thus, a human shrinks from immorality as he avoids something dirty. On the other hand, (109b) is a conceptual metaphor which conceptualizes abstract ‘human morality’ as less abstract ‘power’. As it is possible for a human with morality to be more respected than another without it, it becomes the power for the human with morality in the society. Thus, ‘morality’ as the topos of ‘human nature’ becomes a ground for ‘why other people should respect a specific person’.

40 I translated these examples in Song (2008: 17) from Korean to English.
The close connection between *topoi* and metaphor can also be confirmed in the case of perfume advertisement, discussed in Tanaka (1996). According to Tanaka (1996: 95-99), whereas perfume advertisements in Western countries tend to use metaphors that concretize ‘forbidden seduction’ by showing sexual images of an attractive *femme fatale*, those in Japan are likely to use metaphors that visualize ‘purity’ or ‘naturalness’ by showing a young woman with pure and innocent image, or scenes of the nature (e.g. wilderness, meadow). For a clear contrast, I show two different cases of perfume advertisements: Figure 2 is a case of typical perfume advertisements in Western countries, and Figure 3 is an example of perfume advertisements in Japan.

![Figure 2: Christian Dior](http://www.tumblr.com/tagged/midnight-poison)

*Figure 2: Christian Dior*[^1]

*(Midnight Poison)*

![Figure 3: Shiseido (Fragrance of Kanazawa)](http://sazaepc-tasuke.seesaa.net/article/87104689.html)

*Figure 3: Shiseido (Fragrance of Kanazawa)*[^2]

These differences are due to *topoi* in two worlds in the two cultures. In other words, Western people for example, whose way of thinking is based on Judeo-Christianity are more sensitive to the cultural code of ‘forbidden seduction’ which reminds the story in the Book of Genesis, and the advertisement by Christian Dior infuses the characteristics of the perfume of *Midnight Poison* into consumers’ mind, by forming a metaphor that its perfume offers or encourages.

[^1]: http://www.tumblr.com/tagged/midnight-poison

[^2]: http://sazaepc-tasuke.seesaa.net/article/87104689.html
‘forbidden seduction’ which is hard to turn down. On the other hand, in Japan without that socio-cultural background, metaphors which visualize ‘seduction’ are hardly used, and even in the cases that women appear in perfume advertisements, their shapes are not highlighted.\textsuperscript{43} This tendency in Japan is the same as that in Korea; two countries share the similar \textit{topoi} based on Confucianism, which emphasizes the virtue of modesty or humility in front of others. Those different tendencies show that even when companies advertise and sell the same type of products or services, they consider the characteristics of the target markets and consumers in terms of their socio-cultural \textit{topoi}. In this case, argumentation by metaphorical utterances is the matter of relying on \textit{doxa} and \textit{topoi} as parts of cognitive environment (e.g. religions, superstitions, fixed ideas, ideologies and so on) that language users share.

In fact, there is possibility that the metaphor of ‘forbidden seduction’ can also be used in Japanese perfume advertisements. As commercially literate audiences expect that a commercial advertisement always conveys the advertiser’s message of ‘Buy this product or service’, they will understand the purpose through the advertiser’s mere act of conveying information in an advertising context, whatever metaphor may be used; the purpose of conveying the ‘Buy this product or service’ message can thus be achieved. However, how the message is conveyed makes a difference to the strength of persuasion by the utterance, even though the speaker conveys the same information or message to the hearer. Thus, although the advertiser sells the same products or the services to the markets, if he differentiates his ways of advertising by grasping the inclination of consumers in a particular market, it would bring about bigger effect of persuading consumers. Explaining this point in RT terms, the speaker chooses (or manipulates) his ostensive stimulus which he shows to the hearer, by accessing the hearer’s cognitive environment, in order to achieve optimal relevance and realize successful communication (as argumentation). As the Japanese perfume advertisements which use

\textsuperscript{43} Tanaka (1996: 100) describes this aspect as the following: ‘In the Japanese version, in contrast, the girl has demure blonde hair and a less visible mesh to her tights. She looks generally more ‘virginal’, and she is set back further by the smaller size of the photograph’.
metaphors of ‘naturalness’ or ‘purity’ are the cases that reflect Japanese consumers’ inclinations, this point can be viewed as the way of pursuing optimal relevance, and it can simultaneously be connected to Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980/2003) experientialist position that metaphors are often specific to languages and cultures.

As pointed out in Anscombre (1995), those who employ topoi are not the authors of them, but just users who also accept these commonly accepted ideas in their community. The topoi used by the speaker can be supported by various voices of ‘your’, ‘our’, or ‘they’. In other words, when the speaker utters something on his own, it becomes an objectified story that involves another’s position; this point can be another element which makes the power of argumentation by the speaker stronger. In the next section, I discuss this point: polyphony.

5.4.2 Relevance and Polyphony

Polyphony is an argumentation theoretical concept in which the speaker draws on various voices, in order to strengthen argumentative power of his utterance. The speaker’s subjective claim becomes objectified by various voices drawn to the utterance. The implicated meaning inferred from the utterance becomes argumentatively oriented, and this is based on doxa and topoi. In this stage, doxa and topoi can be included as parts of cognitive environment, in that they have a status of the facts that communicators know or the assumptions that they are being aware of. As polyphony means that these doxa and topoi are drawn into interpreting the utterance, polyphony can be connected to cognitive environment. In other words, when the speaker utters something, based on doxa and topoi, although the content of the utterance is manifested through the speaker’s mouth, this content is presented as the common position approved by the society or the community to which the speaker belongs, rather than the speaker’s personal claim. Thus, the speaker says ‘our common position’ as a representative. In
this stage, the hearer who is faced with the speaker’s argumentation understands the speaker’s
claim as not being the speaker’s personal position. In this section, I examine what polyphony is,
by what process this concept has been developed, and how it can be applied in RT.

The term and the notion of ‘polyphony’ originated with Bakhtin (1984). Bakhtin argues
that a new type of literary text is possible, which has the characteristic of public carnivals, as
distinguished from traditional and classical literary genres. In Bakhtin’s literary text, the writer
appears, wearing different masks. In order to analyse this type of text, it is important to find the
writer’s different voices and understand the author’s polyphony. Bakhtin’s notion of polyphony
became systematized in linguistics by Ducrot (1984) whose approach to polyphony I briefly
examine here.

I have rejected Ducrot’s integrated pragmatic approach, but I discuss his theory of
polyphony, for two reasons. First, Ducrot’s contribution concretizes the notion of polyphony and
systematizes it within a linguistic theory, and his approach offers a substantial clue for analysing
polyphony embedded in the utterance. Second, the notion of polyphony helps to explain how
the speaker’s intended meaning (which is interpreted by the hearer) becomes objectified and
argumentatively oriented, rather than inferring, in the hearer’s interpretation process. So,
accepting polyphony as a concept for explaining communication (as argumentation) does not
clash with RT. Polyphony could make a contribution to concretizing the abstract notion of
‘cognitive environment’, because doxa and topoi involve a polyphonic structure, and this
structure represents that there exist common opinions and grounds (i.e. a set of facts or
assumptions that are manifest to communicators), tacitly agreed with between the speaker and
the hearer in the process of communication.

Polyphony theory starts with a denial of ‘singleness of the speaker’, which has been a tacit
assumption in modern structural and generative linguistics. The gist of polyphony theory is to
claim that a speaking person is not always the only one that is responsible for the contents of the
utterance. According to Ducrot (1984: 171), when a speaker utters something, various voices
embedded in the utterance are simultaneously heard, in which one voice does not lead or dominate others. Ducrot (1984: 173) distinguishes three voices participating in the process of producing the utterance:

i) The first voice is from an individual who produces (i.e. says or writes) the utterance itself: (sujet de l’énoncé or sujet-parlant); the empirical producer of utterance.

ii) The second voice is from the entity that is indicated by the first-person singular grammatical subject I used in the utterance; Ducrot calls it locutor/locuteur (sujet de l’énonciation). In other words, the locutor (as the centre of all referential system in the utterance) is the subject of all acts described by the first-person singular verb, and all expressive forms in the utterance are operated, surrounding him.

iii) The third voice is from the enunciatior/illocutoire or énonciateur (sujet de l’acte de l’énonciation) who is responsible for concrete speech acts realized by the utterance such as ‘assertion’, ‘promise’, or ‘order’, which reestablish or change the communicators’ mutual relations and statuses.

First, distinguishing (ii) from (i), the sujet-parlant in (i) is a physical (or empirical) producer of a concrete utterance; for example, supposing that somebody utters OK, the sujet-parlant is a person who produces [oukei] as an object which other persons can hear and interpret, by saying OK in specific time and space. On the other hand, the locutor/locuteur in (ii) is a subject of meaning definitely shown in the action of producing an utterance by the sujet-parlant; namely, the locutor is responsible for the linguistic process of meaning production by the utterance (Ducrot 1984: 193). In the case of the OK utterance, the locutor is the person who intends the meaning of ‘I agree with it’ as shown by the expression OK. Consider (110), which more clearly shows the distinction between ‘sujet-parlant’ and ‘locutor’:

(110) Tom: I think I am not talented.
Jerry: No! You’re intelligent.
Tom*: OK! I’m intelligent, and I will try it again.

44 Plusieurs voix parlent simultanément, sans que l’une d’entre elles soit prépondérante et juge les autres (Ducrot 1984: 171).
In (110), even though the utterance of *I’m intelligent* by Tom (= Tom*) has the subject *I*, it is just repeating Jerry’s antecedent utterance, rather than suggesting Tom’s own opinion. Thus, the object referred to by *I* (i.e.* Tom*) is the *sujet-parlant* responsible for only the physical dimension of the utterance (i.e. *I’m intelligent*), not locutor responsible for producing the utterance as a definite semantic system.

Furthermore, (ii) ‘locutor/locuteur’ and (iii) ‘enunciator/énonciateur’ can be distinguished from each other, according to whether or not they are responsible for the semantic content of the utterance. According to Dendale (2006: 8), the first voice is not linguistically important in Ducrot’s perspective. Thus, my discussion on polyphony is focused on ‘locutor’ and ‘enunciator’. Although the ‘enunciator’ can be the subject of an utterance as the origin of it like ‘locutor’, while ‘locutor’ is a person who is responsible for the formal aspect of the utterance (i.e. *parole* itself of the utterance), ‘enunciator’ is responsible for the illocutionary act of the utterance. For example:

(111) (Tom spoiled Spike’s new baseball gloves, and asks a question to Jerry, who has just returned after meeting Spike.)

    Tom: What did Spike say about his new baseball gloves?
    Jerry: (Spike said that) you shall die unless you recover them as they used to be.

In (111), Jerry is just a messenger who conveys what Spike said to Tom, not a person who is responsible for the semantic content of the utterance; namely, whereas Jerry is a locutor, Spike is an enunciator. Focusing on this point, consider the following example:

(112) Everybody should be faithful.

Suppose that the speaker utters (112) in front of other people. If (112) is a maxim that is
generally accepted by many people, the speaker can be a *sujet-parlant* (in that he repeats the same utterance that somebody else already produced). Moreover, if (112) is uttered by the speaker *I*, the subject of this utterance is a locutor, who is responsible for the process of producing the linguistic meaning of (112). Furthermore, if the speaker *I* agrees with the content of (112) and tries to live in that way, *I* can be an enunciator.

Suppose that the utterance in (112) is not a repeat of somebody’s previous utterance, and *I* utters it. Although this utterance is from the mouth of *I*, he talks about one of the moral values in the world, which is commonly accepted by many people, rather than his personal point of view. In this stage, the content of the utterance by *I* contains order or the common values (i.e. *doxa*) in everybody’s world, and binds other people to the same frame of the same thoughts. In other words, *I* sees the world through ‘you’, and sees himself⁴⁵ through the world again, because the existence of *I* is confirmed by ‘you’ (as other existence who is not *I*). Therefore, according to polyphony theory, the content of the utterance by the speaker *I* may represent other people’s thoughts, although the utterance was from the mouth of *I*, because this utterance includes various points of view. Likewise, following polyphony, the speaker *I* makes other people responsible for the speech act realized by his utterance, because the various points of view in the utterance enable the content of the utterance to be objectified, rather than subjective. Thus, the more voices that are included in the utterance by *I*, the stronger its argumentative power in persuading others.

In that process, for the hearer to accept polyphony embedded in the utterance is to agree with the *doxa* and *topoi* connected to the polyphony. In other words, when the speaker utters something, the implicated meaning inferred from the utterance has an argumentative orientation, and the implicature becomes the argumentative conclusion by the speaker. In this stage, the speaker’s original utterance is the ground of that argumentative conclusion. *Doxa* and *topoi* drawn into the utterance as an argumentative ground involve a polyphonic structure, and

⁴⁵ Here, I regard the meta-linguistic person *I* as the third person singular.
increase the persuading power of argumentative conclusion proposed by the speaker.

From a Relevance Theoretical point of view, polyphony can be explained by this way: To say something relevant to the given situation is to make the utterance based on verisimilitude. This verisimilitude is from communicators’ common grounds which are brought about by doxa and topoi. As doxa and topoi are the products of communicators’ socio-cultural experiences and universally accepted by most members of the community, doxa and topoi are manifest to communicators, and these are parts of communicators’ cognitive environment. Doxa and topoi as parts of cognitive environment involve a polyphonic structure. This structure enables the speaker to draw various voices to his utterance (i.e. ostensive stimulus), which the speaker intends to show to the hearer. Once various voices are drawn to the utterance, it makes the speaker’s meaning objectified, and contributes to strengthening argumentative power embedded in the utterance. Thus, the speaker’s pursuit of optimal relevance involves polyphony in the process of communication (as argumentation), in that the utterance meaning with maximized argumentative power is the most relevant to the given situation.

Then, what about the hearer? The hearer who interprets the utterance with polyphony tacitly knows that this utterance is connected to doxa and topoi as parts of a mutually manifest cognitive environment. The hearer recognizes the speaker’s intention from the implicated meaning of the utterance, by some cognitive and communicative processes (e.g. contextual effect). As the most relevant interpretation (i.e. implicature as the speaker’s argumentative ground) that the hearer found in the given situation is elicited from the utterance objectified by various voices (or positions), the speaker’s argumentation involves both the speaker and the hearer in the frame of the same way of thinking or sense of values. In this stage, ‘the frame’ can be a set of facts (or assumptions) that are manifest to communicators (i.e. cognitive environment). Thus, the hearer responds to the speaker’s argumentative intention by pursuing optimal relevance in the context of communication. Thus, it can be justified that the notion of polyphony can be integrated with the RT approach.
5.4.3 Relevance and Speech Act

In the sub-section 5.1 I argued that when the implicated meaning of an utterance is interpreted by the hearer in the given situation, and this implicature becomes argumentatively oriented; this is the speaker’s argumentative conclusion. Here it is necessary to define what nature and direction the speaker’s argumentative conclusion has. The nature of the speaker’s argumentative utterance may differ, according to the given situation; namely, by the implicated meaning as the speaker’s argumentative conclusion elicited from the utterance, the speaker may request, advise, or propose that the hearer do something. This point involves speech act theory. As discussed in the sub-section 5.2, AT has been under the influence of speech act theory, and AT introduces this theory in order to explain argumentation. For example, Kienpointner (1987: 277) defines argumentation as ‘a speech act complex which is performed by asserting one or several propositions (= the arguments or premises) to support or attack one or several other propositions (= the conclusions or claims), which is or are controversial’.

According to Sperber and Wilson (1995: 243-254), however, even speech act theory can be encompassed by a single principle of Relevance. Thus, I discuss these two points in this section: i) what is speech act? ii) why do Relevance Theorists argue that RT subsumes speech act theory? If Relevance Theorists’ position is right, it means that the notion of speech act can also be integrated into a single principle of Relevance; and it enables us to pursue more economic explanation of the characteristic and the direction of the speaker’s argumentative conclusion.

The notion of speech act defines the nature of the utterance interpreted by the hearer in the process of communication (as argumentation). The point of speech act theory is summarized by Austin (1962: 12): ‘to say something is to do something, and by saying or in saying something we are doing something’, According to Austin (1962), whenever we say something, we simultaneously perform these three acts by our speech, and they are defined as the following:
We perform a **locutionary act**, which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which is again equivalent to meaning in the traditional sense. Second, we said that we also perform **illocutionary acts** such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, etc., i.e. utterances which have a certain conventional force. Thirdly, we may also perform **perlocutionary acts**: what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring and even, say, surprising or misleading.

(Austin 1962: 109)

The term *speech act* is sometimes narrowly used to refer specifically to the illocutionary act. A single utterance may have different illocutionary acts (e.g. Gen. MacArthur’s *I shall return* could be an assertion, a promise, a warning … *etc.*). In other words, the matter of which illocutionary acts are performed by the speaker’s utterance depends on the context of the locution. Thus in some contexts the utterance might be an assertion, in another it might be used as a request, and in some cases it might be both. The practical effects of these illocutionary acts are referred to as **illocutionary force**.

Speech acts can be classified into two categories, according to how the speaker’s illocutionary act is conveyed to the hearer. In order to make a distinction between direct and indirect speech acts, Gazdar (1981) suggests the ‘Literal Force Hypothesis’, which establishes a limited set of sentence types and a finite set of illocutionary acts and it holds that one-to-one relationship among them exists as summarized in (113):

(113) **Literal Force Hypothesis**:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sentence Type</th>
<th>Illocutionary Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Declarative</td>
<td>↔ assert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Interrogative</td>
<td>↔ question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Imperative</td>
<td>↔ request</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to (113), the declarative form is related to assertion, interrogative to question and imperative to request. If there is a direct relation between the sentence type and the illocutionary
act, it is used to perform, it is viewed as a direct speech act; if not, it is an indirect speech act. In relation to this point, consider (114):

(114) a. (In a conference, the chairman says)
   “I declare the conference closed.” (declarative, assert, direct speech act)

b. (When a janitor sees a man smoking in a no-smoking area, the janitor says)
   “May I draw your attention to this ‘No Smoking’ sign?”
   (interrogative, request, indirect speech act)

In (114a), the utterance’s sentential structure is directly related to its function; thus, it is a case of direct speech act. However, in the utterance of (114b), there is no direct relation between the utterance’s sentential structure and its function; namely, although its sentential structure is interrogative, it functions as the speech act of ‘order’ or ‘request’, meaning ‘Don’t smoke here’.

Since Austin (1962), there has been an assumption that it is necessary to include speech act theory in pragmatics, in order to adequately explain utterance comprehension. However, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 243-254) take a sceptical stance on this assumption, and they argue that a separate speech act theory is not necessary, citing three reasons. First, it is more economical to cover the observations of speech act theory by means of RT. In other words, the established speech act theory aims to classify the utterances into several types, and to assign them specific types of speech act. However, it would be more desirable to explain speech act by a single principle, viewing even speech act as one of the concepts which works in the process of communication (as argumentation), instead of pursuing taxonomy of all types of the utterances.

Second, according to Sperber and Wilson (1995: 245), many speech acts fall into one of these two categories. The first category is institutional acts such as promising and thanking, which must be recognized as such acts in order to be successfully performed. Thus, those institutional acts belong to the study of institutions, not of verbal communication.
On the other hand, the second category includes asserting, hypothesizing, suggesting, claiming, denying, entreating, demanding, warning and threatening, which do not need to be regarded as such acts in order to be successfully performed. Thus, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 245) hold that except for some institutional acts such as bidding in an auction or declaring war, ‘many other speech acts, by contrast, can be successfully performed without being identified as such either by the speaker or by the hearer’. For example, the reason why an utterance is a prediction is not because the speaker ostensively communicates that he predicts something, but because he ostensively communicates an assumption with a certain property, which is about a future event beyond his control. Thus, (115) can be a prediction, even though the speaker does not intend to communicate (116), or the hearer cannot recover the information in (116):

(115) Korea will be reunified within this year.

(116) The speaker is predicting that Korea will be reunified within this year.

In the case of predicting utterance in (115), it can be identified in terms of some condition on its explicit content or implicature. For this reason, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 246) holds that ‘in neither case does the interpretation of utterances involving such speech acts require any special pragmatic principles or machinery not already needed on independent grounds’.

Additionally, according to Sperber and Wilson (1995: 246-247), the existing speech act theory cannot explain the discontinuity between syntactic sentence type and speech act type; for instance, a metaphorical utterance or an ironic utterance are not the cases of ‘assertion’, which are shown as declaratives. For example, if a directive is an attempt to make the hearer perform the action which is explicitly described, the ironic imperative in (117) cannot be viewed as a directive:

(117) OK, you keep on watching TV!
Suppose that a mother utters (117), in order to scold her son who keeps on watching the television without doing his homework. The mother’s real intention is to have her son quit watching the television and do his homework, not to make him keep on watching the television.

Furthermore, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 250) hold that ‘the distinction between requestive and advisory speech acts is itself reducible to something deeper’. For example:

(118) Spike to Jerry: Give my best regards to Tom.

(119) (a) A traveller: How can I get to the University of Sussex from London?
   (b) Dae-Young: Take the train going to Brighton in London Victoria. When you arrive at Brighton station, transfer to another train going to Seaford, and get off at Falmer Station.

I explain (118) and (119), following Sperber and Wilson’s (1995: 251) position. According to language users’ intuition, while a requestive speech act represents a state of affairs desired from the speaker’s viewpoint, an advisory speech act represents that desired from the hearer’s viewpoint. The reason why the utterance in (118) seems to have the speech act of ‘request’ is because Spike (as the speaker) is representing as desirable from his own viewpoint a state of affairs in which Jerry gives Spike’s best regards to Tom. What makes (119b) intuitively advisory is the fact that Dae-Young (as the speaker) is representing as desirable from the traveller’s (i.e. the hearer’s) viewpoint a state of affairs in which the hearer follows a particular route to Sussex University. According to Sperber and Wilson (1995: 251), the necessary condition for understanding those utterances is not to assign the class of requestive or advisory speech acts to those utterances, but to recognize that ‘the state of affairs described is being represented as desirable from the speaker’s point of view in the first case, and the hearer’s in the second’. For this reason, following the way of analysing speech acts proposed by Sperber and Wilson, RT may neutralize the necessity of classifying speech act types. For this point, Sperber and Wilson (1995) hold the following:
The principle of relevance makes it possible to derive rich and precise non-demonstrative inferences about the communicator’s informative intention. With the principle, all that is required is that the properties of the ostensive stimulus should set the inferential process on the right track; to do this they need not represent or encode the communicator’s informative intention in any great detail. Thus, illocutionary-force indicators such as declarative or imperative mood or interrogative word order merely have to make manifest a rather abstract property of the speaker’s informative intention: the direction in which the relevance of the utterance is to be sought.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 254)

There is another reason why the types of speech acts do not need to individually be distinguished. In the sub-section 5.4.1, I pointed out that every commercial advertisement always conveys the advertiser’s message of ‘Buy this product or service’, whatever it may say. This point means that it is possible to generalize that every commercial advertising utterance always performs the same speech act (i.e. ‘request’). In this situation, the RT approach is more effective and efficient than speech act theory in that RT more economically explains how the speaker communicates his intention and how the hearer interprets it by a single principle of relevance, instead of distinguishing individual types of speech acts.

Thus far, I have discussed the nature of various linguistic argumentative concepts (i.e. doxa, topoi, polyphony and speech act) which strengthen argumentative power embedded in the utterance, and how these argumentative linguistic concepts can be integrated into RT domain. However, according to AT, there are some non-linguistic conditions which may also increase argumentative power of the utterance; I call them non-linguistic argumentative conditions. In a basic sense, argumentation is performed by human language, but argumentation involves non-linguistic argumentative conditions (e.g. the speaker’s social status, reputation, authority, way of conveying his messages, utterance timing and considering hearers’ inclination) as well.

Furthermore, it is significant to discuss the matter of multimodality as a non-linguistic argumentative condition, in that argumentation by advertisement is mainly presented by mass media, and in general it is composed of more than two conveying methods (e.g. verbo-pictorial
images). Although these non-linguistic argumentative conditions including multimodality are not necessary and sufficient conditions for argumentation, they may also contribute to achieving successful argumentation.

Nevertheless, these non-linguistic argumentative conditions can also be integrated and explained by a single principle of relevance; this position is supported by Ifantidou and Tzanne (2006) and Yus (2009). Thus, in the next section I explain how RT encompasses even these non-linguistic argumentative conditions.

5.5 Relevance and Non-Linguistic Argumentative Conditions

5.5.1 Renkema’s Four Main Factors for Argumentation

Some non-linguistic argumentative conditions may contribute to making the speaker’s argumentation more effective and successful; for instance, the speaker’s social status and authority, the situation or the atmosphere in which the speaker performs his argumentation, the mode and the channel in which the speaker expresses the utterance and so on. These non-linguistic conditions affect the argumentative power of the speaker’s message. In relation to debates about the controversial issue of abortion, Renkema (1993) holds that four main factors are crucial in the persuasion process; they are the source, the message, the channel and the receiver. Here I directly quote Renkema’s descriptions of these factors:

The first is the source. The demands made on the source have to do with credibility and the feelings (sympathy/antipathy, like/dislike) the source evokes. A reputable hospital chaplain will convince people more efficiently than a young woman who has just left an abortion clinic (credibility). If, however, the chaplain scores low on the likability scale, this will have a negative effect on his or her persuasive abilities. A listener's attitude relative to the source of communication has a good deal of influence on the
likelihood of a shift in attitude concerning a specific issue. This attitude towards the source is called ‘ethos’.

The second major factor is the message. Which arguments should one choose? Should one repute the con arguments or leave them out? In which order should one present the arguments? The strong one first, in the middle, of last? Which style would be most effective?

The third factor is the channel. Will opponents of abortion be more easily convinced when they read the persuasive message at their own pace or when they watch a television message with more nonverbal cues?

The fourth factor is the receiver. How much background knowledge does the receiver have, and what is his or her initial attitude? How involved is the reader or listener with the topic? Is the receiver male or female, old or young, educated or uneducated? The same message can have an entirely different effect on young educated women than it does on older less educated men.

(Renkema 1993: 128-129)

While the second factor, message should be regarded as a linguistic element of argumentation, Renkema’s other examples show that successful argumentation is achieved not only by linguistic factors but also by various non-linguistic factors. However, sometimes making a clear distinction between the linguistic and the non-linguistic is difficult. In other words, the matter of choosing style (as a linguistic factor) is closely connected to the fourth factor as a non-linguistic argumentative condition. For example, Martin Luther King Jr. was a master of situative code-switching and manipulating style in his speech. Routledge Dictionary of Language and Linguistics (1996: 194) defines code-switching as:

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46 Renkema’s term receiver is the same as hearer in this thesis.
Depending on the demands of a particular communicative situation, bilingual or multilingual speakers will switch between language varieties. A distinction must be made between ‘situative’ code-switching, in which the functional distribution of varieties that are evaluated differently in society is subject to normative rules (e.g. standard language on high-status occasions, dialect on more familiar, low-status occasions),\(^{47}\) and ‘conversational’ code-switching, which is not linked to a change of external factors of the speech constellation, but occurs within an externally invariant speech situation, within a turn or even intrasententially. Conversational code-switching serves to create various contexts. For example, ‘informality’ in a formal situation, the different types of relationships between individual participants in a conversation, irony vs. seriousness, and background information vs. the ‘actual’ message can all be contextualized by means of code-switching.

Thus, when Martin Luther King Jr. made a speech in front of many African-Americans who had not been educated, he always used Black vernacular English and a very familiar style, but he used a more standard version of English and a more polished style when he met the politicians in Washington. Martin Luther King Jr.’s behaviours were motivated by pursuing a sense of unity with his black followers and preventing white men from looking down upon him. He took these non-linguistic conditions into account in the process of his argumentation. For this reason, Martin Luther King Jr.’s behaviour is an example of the speaker’s choosing or manipulating his ostensive stimulus, in order to pursue optimal relevance of the utterance in the process of communication. Additionally, Martin Luther King Jr.’s way of increasing the argumentative power of his utterance (i.e. situative code-switching) is based on *topoi* (i.e. ‘For moving other people, it is necessary to arouse their sympathy’). Thus, those non-linguistic argumentative conditions can also be viewed as parts of cognitive environment, because the criteria for judging the situations and choosing the means of argumentation come from the facts or the information that both the speaker and the hearer are aware of.

\(^{47}\) This is my emphasis.
5.5.2 Relevance and Multimodality

In relation to Renkema’s third factor of argumentation, **multimodality** is a non-linguistic argumentative condition for influencing argumentative power in the utterance. Although this thesis aims to examine and analyse only the verbal plane of argumentation by figurative language, and I have chosen some cases of advertisement as the targets of analysis, it is necessary to discuss some significant points of multimodality; because in general commercial advertisements in mass media are presented by more than two different modes (e.g. verbo-pictorial images). In relation to this point, RT offers a useful account for how communicators treat multimodal signs in mass media. For this reason, in this section, I explain why and how multimodality is connected to Principle of Relevance.

In a semiotic sense, **modality** means a way of showing information by encoding it in a specific medium. For example (following Chandler 2007), when I represent an entity by some signs such as figures or letters, modality means the type of those figures or letters. In other words, modality is a means of expression in which information is stored and shown, or a specific form in which information is presented.

Multimodality means that various sensory channels for information such as linguistic signs, sounds and visual images can be combined to compose a text. For example, television advertisements are in ‘the language of multimodality’ in which visual images and audio signals are simultaneously conveyed, and often gestures, facial expressions and written captions as well. In this current, both the text producer (i.e. source) and the receiver should be able to read those individual elements in multi-modal texts in an integrated way (see Kress 2003).

As the focus of this thesis is not multimodality, here I merely point out that multimodality is one of the significant non-linguistic argumentative conditions which contribute to making consumers remember a specific advertisement longer and ultimately bringing about argumentation by the advertiser’s utterance. For example, suppose that an ice cream
advertisement has figurative language (e.g. *This little angel’s happiest dream ----- Baskin Robins 31*) and it is shown with a highlighted visual contrast between white vanilla ice cream and red strawberry syrup on it in a scene where a cute child smacks her lips. It is expected that those who see this advertisement as a multimodal text would remember it longer because of its memorable audio-visual cues, and their interest in this product would increase. This point means that multimodality in commercial advertisements contributes to making consumers enjoy cognitive effect; and for the advertiser to make his utterance relevant to the given situation is to increase argumentative power in the utterance.

For the reason pointed out above, sometimes it is not optional but necessary to pursue multimodality by employing not only linguistic methods but also visual images (also audio signals) in advertisements by television and print. For instance, recalling Tanaka (1996: 95-103), perfume advertisements cannot be easily expressed only by linguistic methods because their purposes are to sell ‘smell’, which is difficult to describe because it is invisible and intangible. Thus, advertisers often metaphorically express the characteristic of the product (i.e. the smell of the perfume) by replacing it with other entities’ properties which seem to be well matched with it; this is to say, these advertisements depend on the effect of synaesthesia. A synaesthetic metaphor exploits a similarity between experiences in different sense modalities; for example, when *I coloured the wind blue* is uttered, two different senses (i.e. visual and tactile senses) are combined in this synaesthetic metaphor.

In a synaesthetic perfume advertisement, while the expression by linguistic method is composed of just the brand name of the product or a simple sentence, the visual image of an entity which reminds consumers of the characteristic (i.e. smell) of the product is emphasized. For example, there is an advertisement for *Chanel No. 5* by Chanel, and the visual image of Sharon Stone as a *femme fatale* of the film *Basic Instinct* is shown only with No. 5 in the

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48 Psychological researches on human memory (e.g. Erdelyi and Becker 1974, Mitchell and Olson 1981) provide the evidence that the information given by a visual method lasts longer than that by a linguistic method alone.
advertisement. In this case, the personified metaphor *Chanel No. 5 is a femme fatale* conveys implicature that ‘The fragrance of Chanel No. 5 is dangerously attractive’. This phenomenon does not occur only in perfume advertisements; it is a universal way of advertising also observed in other advertisements of shampoo, coffee, liquor and cigarettes, which intend to sell ‘smell’ or ‘taste’. Relating to this point, consider the following examples:

![Figure 4: a soju advertisement (Korea)](http://www.nemopan.com/4254701) ![Figure 5: a cigarette advertisement (U.S.)](http://thisisnotaseriousblog.blogspot.co.uk/2012/08/marlboro-lights-is-vibe.html)

Figure 4 is from a series of soju advertisements in Korea, and figure 5 is from a series of cigarette advertisements (i.e. *Marlboro* by Philip Morris) in the U.S. In Korea, attractive women usually appear in soju advertisements, because the main consumers of soju are male adults. The soju advertisement in figure 4 represents a case of synaesthetic metaphor (i.e. ‘the taste of soju X is a beautiful woman’), which combines taste sense with visual sense. Thus, the images of beautiful women remind the consumers of the property of the product (e.g. smooth taste), by matching the images (i.e. visual sense) with the property (i.e. taste sense). Similarly, Marlboro

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49 http://www.nemopan.com/4254701  
50 http://thisisnotaseriousblog.blogspot.co.uk/2012/08/marlboro-lights-is-vibe.html  
51 Soju is a type of colourless liquors, sold in Korea.
advertisements have traditionally used the images of rugged and authentic cowboys or sheriffs, in order to offer consumers an image of toughness which the cigarette advertiser intends to represent.

However, in both advertisements, there is no direct relation between the taste (or the smell) of the products and the characters who appear in them. Thus, in those cases, without a multimodal strategy which simultaneously employs a linguistic utterance and visual image, it would be very difficult for the advertisers to effectively show consumers the properties or the characteristics of the specific products.

Lastly, I turn to the connection between multimodality and RT. For instance, in mass media, metaphor is frequently combined with multimodal methods (particularly verbal expressions + visual images) and becomes multimodal metaphor. Irony can be expressed in a multi-modal way as well, which represents the incongruity between what consumers believe and the situation shown in the picture. This raises the question: when the hearer/viewer interprets a multimodal metaphor, are the verbal and visual inputs treated as different phenomena demanding different interpretive strategies? Yus (2009) presents the following answer to this question:

The comprehension of verbal and visual metaphors involves similar mental procedures. While the perception of images is obviously different from linguistic decoding, reaching an interpretation of visual metaphors also entails an adjustment of conceptual information — a stage during comprehension that will be called conceptual upload — in the same way as verbal metaphors


Thus, according to Yus (2009), it is possible to interpret any type of metaphor (i.e. verbal, visual or both) by using the same mechanism: pursuing optimal relevance, while balancing cognitive effect and processing effort.

52 According to Forceville (2006: 384), multimodal metaphors are those ‘whose target and source are each represented exclusively or predominantly in different modes’.
Besides Yus (2009), Ifantidou and Tzanne (2006) also examine the connection between multimodality and RT. Whereas the primary interest of existing relevance theoretical researches on multimodal communication is static verbo-pictorial representation (see Forceville 1996), Ifantidou and Tzanne (2006: 204) focus on a television commercial for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games’ featuring moving pictures, music, sound/visual effects and spoken/written language in certain scenes. They examine how non-native viewers who cannot understand Greek react to non-verbal multimodal stimuli and connect these stimuli to their final interpretation. The results of this work show that those non-native viewers also follow the cognitive Principle of Relevance and the Relevance Theoretical comprehension procedure. In other words, those non-native viewers drew on the internationally-oriented scenes (e.g. Brazilian football fans and club dancing) and combined them with culturally-specific Greek scenes (e.g. the Euro football 2004 celebration for Greek championship) to stop as soon as they retrieved the most relevant interpretation ‘enjoy the Olympic Games in Greece’. This behaviour is the non-native viewers’ effort to achieve the relevance of the multimodal (but non-linguistic) stimuli.

Then, when a verbo-pictorial metaphor is used, which stimulus is treated first? Ifantidou and Tzanne’s (2006) finding offers a hint. According to their research, non-native Greek viewers could understand the speaker’s message, even in the situation that verbal stimuli were suspended, by treating the visual stimuli. This point implies that visual stimuli are more immediate and direct than verbal ones. Moreover, Yus (2009: 167) holds that ‘so many metaphors involve the mediation of visual sensory information contained in image schemas (see Lakoff 1987)’. Thus, it is possible to make a hypothesis that examining the process of interpreting verbo-pictorial metaphor, the viewers who retrieve the most relevant interpretation from a multimodal metaphor as a verbo-pictorial complex body would treat the speaker’s message given by visual image first, and then they may elicit their final interpretation, by connecting the result of treating the visual metaphor to the speaker’s message verbally given. In
accordance with Yus’s (2009) argument that the comprehension of verbal and visual metaphors involves similar mental procedures, relevance is a comprehensive principle, which works in every process of interpreting multimodal communication.

Thus far, I have explained what characteristics argumentative concepts and other non-linguistic argumentative conditions have, and have discussed whether those concepts and conditions could be integrated and treated in the theoretical domain of RT. The conclusion is that those argumentative concepts and non-linguistic conditions can be treated within the bound of RT; thus it is possible to apply RT to the domain of argumentation. In other words, the speaker employs various argumentative tools in order to persuade the hearer, and this reflects the speaker’s intention to make the utterance relevant to the situation of communication (as argumentation). The more relevant the utterance is to the given situation, the stronger its argumentative power is. The hearer who interprets the utterance by pursuing optimal relevance in the process of communication recognizes the speaker’s intention and responds to it. In the next section, I discuss how the hearer interprets the utterance by examining the inferential processes the hearer uses to find the speaker’s intended argumentative conclusion.

5.6 Abduction vs. Eliciting Implicature by RT

In chapter 2, I introduced abduction as a third type of inference, distinguished from deduction and induction. Although abduction does not guarantee 100% certainty for the conclusion, it contributes to discovering new things, by finding a case from the rule and the result, and I argued that inference by abduction can be applied to interpreting metaphorical utterance.

However, this inferential process by abduction is based on the code model of semiotics, and it is necessary to integrate abduction into the process of eliciting contextual effect given by
RT. This approach replaces the semiotic inference with the cognitive and communicative inference, and contributes to pursuing more integrated and economical explanation of interpreting the speaker’s intention indirectly given. In other words, when the hearer discovers new things, he exploits the well known rule (or fact) and the confirmed result (or conclusion), which are manifest to him. These rule and result are parts of the hearer’s cognitive environment, and this point implies that inference by abduction can be explained in an RT approach. In other words, the speaker’s intended conclusion (i.e. ‘case’ in abduction) can be identified with ‘implicature (i.e. implicated conclusion)” in RT. In this section, I explain the interrelation between ‘case’ in abduction and ‘implicature’ in RT, and seek a possibility that inference by abduction can be integrated into a single Principle of Relevance.

As discussed in chapter 2, abduction is a third way of inference, which finds a new ‘case’ from ‘rule/fact’ and ‘result/conclusion’. Recall the case of Sherlock Holmes’s reasoning:

Rule/Fact: If someone types very much, his/her sleeves become worn and shiny.
Result/Conclusion: Her sleeves are worn and shiny.
Thus/Case: (There is room for viewing that) she has typed very much (i.e. she is a typist).

Holmes exploits his cognitive environment, and it enables him to find a new case. This means that Holmes’ cognitive environment produces contextual effect of interaction between new information and old information. In other words, the rule that ‘if someone types very much, his/her sleeves become worn and shiny’ and the result that ‘the client’s sleeves are worn and shiny’ are facts manifest to Holmes. Thus, Holmes may reason a new ‘case’ that ‘his client is a typist’ from those manifest facts to him, and make another inference that might be helpful for solving his case, by using the hint from the new ‘case’ that he found. This point corresponds to the assumption that when the utterance is interpreted by the hearer, the interpreted meaning has implicated meaning, according to the given situation; and this implicature becomes argumentative conclusion proposed by the speaker. In this stage, the hearer interprets the
utterance, by using the help from the cognitive environment which exists between the speaker and the hearer, rather than the hearer arbitrarily treats the utterance. It was already explained that in cognitive environment, there are common opinions and bundles of concepts or knowledge that both the speaker and the hearer accept, and those make the implicated meaning from the utterance argumentatively oriented.

One of the most important assumptions proposed by RT is that communicators pursue their maximum contextual effect by their minimum effort. Thus, in the stage of deciding what content is explicitly expressed and what content is left implicit, the speaker who pursues optimal relevance implicitly leaves all contents which the hearer could recover by the hearer’s minimum effort in the process of treating the speaker’s ostensive stimulus. This means that the speaker decides upon an utterance most relevant to the given situation, after presuming the hearer’s cognitive ability and the contextual resources in the given situation. The more information the speaker implicitly presents, the bigger the degree of mutual understanding which is believed to exist between the speaker and the hearer becomes.

Sperber and Wilson (1995: 195) ‘distinguish two kinds of implicatures: implicated premises and implicated conclusions. All implicatures, we claim, fall into one or the other of these two categories’. As Carston (2006) describes:

On the relevance-theoretic view, implicatures come into two sorts: implicated premises and implicated conclusions. Implicated premises are a subset of the contextual assumptions used in processing the utterance and implicated conclusions are a subset of its contextual implications.

(Carston 2006: 643)

I take one example, in order to show the process of eliciting implicature by RT. Suppose that Tom who works for a McDonald’s restaurant makes the following suggestion in (120) to Jerry:
(120) Tom: Why don’t you have a Big Mac meal for lunch?
    Jerry: In fact, I’m on a diet. (Thus, I do not want a Big Mac meal.)

(121) Eating food which has high caloric value like a Big Mac meal is harmful for a diet.

(122) Jerry would not want a Big Mac meal.53

Sperber and Wilson (1995: 194) hold that ‘the implicatures of an utterance are recovered by reference to the speaker’s manifest expectations about how her utterance should achieve optimal relevance’. In (120), Jerry’s answer does not directly address Tom’s suggestion. Thus, following Sperber and Wilson’s (1995: 194) position, Jerry’s implicature is a contextual implication, by which Jerry intends his utterance to be manifestly relevant, manifestly intended to make the fact that ‘Jerry is on a diet’ manifest to Tom.

According to the presumption of optimal relevance, because Tom can assume that Jerry’s intention is to answer Tom’s question (i.e. suggestion), Tom may infer (121) from Jerry’s answer as an implicated premise, which is treated as a ‘rule/fact’ in Peirce’s abduction, and (122) as an implicated conclusion, which corresponds to ‘case’ in Peirce’s abduction.

Here (121) is based on a *topos*, and ‘Jerry believes that a Big Mac meal would be harmful for his diet’ is inferred. This *topos* is connected to a *doxa* such as ‘watching one’s diet is a good habit for keeping one’s health’; these *topos* and *doxa* are parts of communicators’ cognitive environment. In this step of grasping the speaker’s implicature, the hearer should find the implicated premise; namely, the hearer recovers it from his memory or elicits it from the context, based on the speaker’s utterance itself or mutually manifest cognitive environment. Here if more

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53 There are two points we should additionally consider here in relation to Jerry’s implicature in (120): 1) this implicated conclusion elicited from Jerry’s utterance in (120) can be cancelled by saying *But just this once won’t hurt, will it?* 2) In fact, Jerry might have implicitly meant that he does not buy products of McDonald’s Company, as he has antipathy against the immorality (e.g. exploiting labour power) of the company. In spite of that, Jerry might indirectly refuse Tom’s suggestion, without directly saying *I do not have any products made by that immoral company* in order to save Tom’s face.
necessary premises are added to the utterance, more implicatures would be elicited.

In summary, table 1 compares the terminology of Peirce’s abduction and Sperber and Wilson’s eliciting implicature:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: The Comparison of Abduction and Eliciting Implicature by RT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abduction</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rule/Fact</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result/Conclusion</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Thus/Case</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

5.7 Summary

In this chapter, I made two main arguments. One is that communication is always accompanied by argumentation. In communication (as argumentation), the speaker’s goal is to persuade the hearer to accept the speaker’s intention, rather than merely conveying information to the hearer. This position is based on the assumption that rational communicators always speak in order to fulfil their intentions, and it reflects argumentation theorists’ position that every act of communication performs argumentation. This point is more salient in communication by advertisement, because an advertisement is a typical argumentative activity which has the purpose of persuading consumers to choose a specific product or service. I verify this point in chapter 6, by analysing some real cases of commercial advertisement.

The other main point is that argumentation can be explained within the RT approach. RT
was not designed as a theory for explaining argumentation. Thus, for explaining argumentation within the RT approach, it has been necessary to show that various argumentative concepts and non-linguistic argumentative conditions (which AT introduces in order to explain argumentation) can be effectively integrated into RT or encompassed with it. For this reason, following the RT approach, I justified that those argumentative concepts and conditions can be integrated into the workings of a single principle of relevance, or covered with it.
Chapter 6

Argumentation by Figurative Language: Application and Analysis

6.0 Introduction

This chapter examines how a speaker’s argumentation can be realized by figurative language, particularly focusing on some real cases of commercial advertisement in which metaphor, irony or both are used.

According to Deleuze and Guattari (1987) discussed in chapter 1, every utterance is potentially argumentative, and in chapter 5 I noted that argumentation is particularly salient in the cases of advertisement, because the purpose of every advertisement is to persuade the audience to do what the advertiser intends. Thus, in this chapter, focusing on some real cases of commercial advertisement, I examine how argumentation by figurative language is realized.

Advertisements rarely make explicit requests that consumers buy the advertiser’s products or services, as in ‘Buy product X or service Y’. It is impolite to say Buy X and it is not an argument, since it gives consumers no reason to buy the product or the service. Since advertisers intend their products or services to be viewed positively, they cannot be impolite in their advertisements and they want to convince consumers that there is a reason to buy those products or services. Advertisers pursue two goals and strategies of their advertisements: the advertisers have the goal of making their advertisements perceived positively, and for that goal they have the strategy of giving the message of their advertisements indirectly. The advertisers also have the goal of having the message of their advertisements stay in consumers’ memory, and for that
goal they have the strategy of maximizing the cognitive effect of the message.

Following RT, advertisers pursue optimal relevance, which makes their utterances most relevant to the given situation, by maximizing the cognitive effect of the message so that consumers may enjoy it. As discussed in chapter 5, the speaker who pursues optimal relevance presumes the hearer’s cognitive ability and the contextual resources in the given situation, and presents all contents in implicit way, which the hearer could infer with minimum effort. In relation to this point, Tanaka (1996) holds that the more information the speaker implicitly presents, the bigger the cognitive effect that the hearer enjoys. In interpreting advertisements, consumers tend to pay more attention to the advertisement whose message is implicitly shown than that explicitly or directly presented, and they remember the former longer (Tanaka 1996, Colston and O’Brien 2000).

Advertising copy is generally restricted in terms of time and space in mass media. Thus, advertisers aim to make their advertisements convey their messages to consumers in a very condensed way. Figurative language such as metaphor contributes to this strategy. For instance, according to Felon (1994) and in keeping with the cognitive linguistic position, metaphor may show the nature of experiences which language users have not had beforehand, because it is able to concretize the abstract. When reasonable consumers choose a specific product or service, they want to make a decision after obtaining as much necessary information about it as possible. However, it is impossible to show a picture of the nature of a service because it is formless. Moreover, even some visible products such as computers are too complicated to immediately be understood by consumers. Additionally, packaging may prevent consumers from directly recognizing the contents of the products. In these cases, advertisers may more effectively explain and show the characteristics of their products or services to consumers by exploiting metaphor as a semantic condenser.

Finally, as discussed in chapter 3, another advantage of figurative language in advertising is that metaphorical utterances can avoid potential accusations of hype, while equivalent literal
expressions cannot (i.e. the case of Lufthansa Airlines).

This chapter is broadly divided into two stages. In the first stage, I discuss the nature of argumentation in terms of advertisement, and describe the relation between advertisement and mass media and how the examples of commercial advertisements were selected. Additionally, it is necessary to deal with some special linguistic devices (e.g. register and shifter) with reference to the particular environment of commercial advertisement.

In the second stage, I approach argumentation by figurative language in the real cases of commercial advertisements, by broadly dividing the matter into several themes: metaphor in advertisements, irony in advertisements and interactions (i.e. connection and overlapping) of metaphor and irony.

6.1 Advertisements as Argumentation in Mass Media

In this section, I highlight the nature of communication (as argumentation) in terms of advertisement in mass media. In Renkema’s (1993) description of ‘argumentative discourse’:

The clearest examples of argumentative discourse are discussions, advertisements and information pamphlets. The purpose of these discourses is to change attitudes. A popular definition of ‘attitudes’ is: general evaluations people hold with regard to themselves, other people, objects, and issues. These general evaluations are believed to be an important determiner of behaviour. By changing attitudes, communicators hope to change the behavior of the recipients. In advertising, for example, one wants to create a more positive evaluation of the product. This change in evaluation should result in a behavioral change: the purchase of the product.54

(Renkema 1993: 128)

Thus, argumentation in the domain of commercial advertisement can be understood as having

54 This is my emphasis.
the goal of changing consumers’ attitudes and bringing about their purchasing advertisers’ products or services. My focus in this section is thus; if an advertiser’s (i.e. the speaker’s) communication (as argumentation) is successful, why and how are consumers (i.e. the hearers) persuaded by it?

Furthermore, based on Renkema (1993), I briefly survey what advertisement (as an argumentative activity) is. As one of the most important purposes of advertisement is to convey to consumers the distinctive and preferable characteristics of a specific product or service, and to persuade them to buy it, advertisement can be regarded as one of the most representative argumentative activities by the speaker. Thereby, before discussing argumentation by advertisement, it is necessary to define what advertisement is. According to Bovée and Arens (1992: 7), ‘Advertising is the non-personal communication of information usually paid for and usually persuasive in nature about products, services or ideas by identified sponsors through the various media’.

Bovée and Arens (1992) and other communication theorists (e.g. Wright, Winter and Zeigler 1982) sometimes use advertising and advertisement as synonyms. In this thesis, advertising means advertising activities or the whole of their processes, advertisement is an instance of the product or the message of ‘advertising’. My focus is on ‘advertisement’, rather than ‘advertising’.

6.2 Selection of Advertisements

In this chapter, I treat some real commercial advertisements that use figurative language; these have appeared in mass media, particularly television, magazines, newspapers and billboards. My English and Korean materials were found on and collected from the world-wide web, as well as some advertising billboards in London and Brighton. There are three criteria for
deciding whether to discuss those materials here: First is that they should be composed of
metaphor or irony, or both. Second is that these figurative advertisements should be composed
of concise taglines or catch-phrases, which are accompanied by multimodal information. Third
is that, in order to keep the focus of the discussion on universal issues, where I have used
Korean advertisements, I have tried to choose ones that require little cultural background
knowledge.

Because this is a study of linguistic argumentation, I do not discuss the advertisements in
which metaphor or irony is given only as visual signs without verbal language. However, as
commercial advertisements in mass media frequently use both words and images, it is necessary
to consider how consumers interpret visual images in those advertisements. Thus, I briefly
discuss the interpretation of visual images in non-verbal advertisements in sub-section 6.4.

6.3 Linguistic Devices in Advertisements: Register and Shifter

In chapter 5, I introduced relevant argumentative concepts from AT. Here I turn to some
linguistic devices which can also be noted in AT that are relevant to the interpretation of
advertising copy: register and shifter (i.e. embrayeur in French pragmatics). Starting with the
register as ‘manner of speaking or writing specific to a certain function, that is, characteristic of
a certain domain of communication (or of an institution)’. Thus, register shows the hearer a
guide to the domain in which he should interpret the utterance. This notion is more concretely
defined by Romaine (2000):
While regional dialect reveals where we come from and social dialect what our status is, register gives a clue about what we are doing. The concept of register is typically concerned with variation in language conditioned by uses rather than users and involves consideration of the situation or context of use, the purpose, subject matter, and content of the message, and the relationship between participants. For example, two lawyers discussing a legal matter use the register of law.

(Romaine 2000: 21)

Thus, the metaphorical statement *You are the cream in my coffee* is understood by the speaker to convey different messages if uttered in an advertisement for coffee creamer or in a personal love letter. The register gives the hearer a clue in judging how he should interpret the utterance. Thus, Goatly (1993: 148) emphasizes that register is an important element that the hearer should know; he argues that recognizing register is a necessary condition for pursuing optimal relevance, when the hearer interprets the utterance.

The importance of register is illustrated by a case in which misinterpretation occurred due to not recognizing register. Sometimes, in order to maximize consumers’ curiosity toward advertisements, advertisers convey their advertising messages in such a way as to prevent the consumer from realizing that the messages are advertisements for a particular product. For example, about twelve years ago, the line *Seon-Young, I love you* was displayed on main streets across Korea. This phrase was written in big black print on white banners or billboards, without any name or logo of a company product or service. It took more than three months for consumers to realize that *Seon-Young, I love you* was an advertisement by a web portal company. After that time had passed, the company showed that these displays constituted a teaser advertisement.55 Thus, before that, many people had believed that *Seon-Young, I love you* was

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55 According to *Dictionary of Marketing Terms* (2000), a teaser advertisement is defined as: a brief advertisement designed to tease the public by offering only bits of information without revealing either the sponsor of the ad or the product being advertised. Teaser ads are the frontrunners of an advertising campaign, and their purpose is to arouse curiosity and get attention for the campaign that follows. In order for a teaser campaign to be effective, the ads must have great visibility in print, broadcast, and out-of-home media so as to reach a great many people. Teaser ads are often used in the introduction of a major motion picture or a new product.
just a young man’s confession of his love for a girl whose name is Seon-Young.

The ultimate goal of every commercial advertisement is to let consumers know the company and its products or services, and to connect this effect to the company’s promoting sales. However, although this teaser advertisement succeeded in making consumers remember Seon-Young, I love you, they did not come to associate it with the company name and what the company does and thus it failed in bringing about sales. Thus, from a linguistic (i.e. Relevance Theoretical) point of view, in this case, the advertiser’s utterance made consumers spend useless processing effort without achieving what the advertiser intended.

The case of that teaser advertisement shows that if the registral clues of the utterance are not recognized by the hearer, the speaker’s intention cannot be conveyed to the hearer and communication fails. However, this point can also be incorporated in the RT approach, because the Principle of Relevance is applied to every case of utterance interpretation. In other words, accepting RT, it is unnecessary to additionally consider the matter of register. RT holds that the context is not determined at the outset; when the hearer interprets the utterance, he selects the context which may achieve relevance by considering some contextual information and contextual effect, which rely on the hearer’s cognitive environment. If so, it is premised that the hearer knows to which direction he should interpret the utterance in order to grasp the speaker’s intention. In this way, register is a part of the context which the hearer selects in order to pursue optimal relevance in the process of interpreting the utterance.

Next we turn to the notion of ‘shifter’. When a shifter is used in an advertisement, it works as an overt expressive technique of argumentation, which makes passive consumers participate in the context of the advertisement (e.g. X company helps you realize your dream). The term shifter was first introduced in Jespersen (1922: 123) and is called embrayeur in French pragmatics. According to Perret (1994: 58), an embrayeur (henceforth shifter) is a kind of argumentation-guiding device which is shown on the surface of the utterance.

A discussion of shifter involves the notions of deixis and reference. English has a wide
variety of deictic expressions such as personal pronouns I and you, demonstratives this and that, spatial adverbs here and there, temporal adverbs now, then, today, ago, motion verbs come and go and so on. Lyons (1977) explains deixis as the following:

> By deixis is meant the location and identification of persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it, typically, or a single speaker and at least on addressee.

(Lyons 1977: 637)

The use of deixis always involves a particular viewpoint, which is called the deictic centre. In unmarked situations, the deictic centre is equivalent to the viewpoint of the speaker. For example, according to Levinson (1983), a deictic pronoun you refers to the person who is not the speaker(s) in coding time (i.e. the time of utterance), and he, she and they refer to the third person(s) who are neither I nor you. The third persons he, she and they are distinguished from you, in that they are not the addressees of I’s utterance in coding time.

However, deictic terms are not only used for simple speaker/addressee reference. Sometimes they are used as a rhetorical device, in which case they are called shifters. Although Fludernik (1991) makes further discussion on the similarity and the difference between shifter and deixis, I view that there is no essential difference between these two, in that shifter shares the same linguistic mechanism with deixis, and this term of shifter is used in more argumentation-oriented contexts.

A shifter plays a role of increasing argumentative power of the utterance, because it involves polyphony. In other words, although the advertiser utters something by I’s mouth, this is not I’s personal matter or position. As a representative saying the common position, the advertiser tells our interests to you as consumers. In this case, the proposition in the utterance becomes the matter of I, you and we, because this utterance draws various voices, which involve
doxa and topoi. For example, shifters are the expressions such as you, here and now, and these guide consumers to accept the status of active participants who take part in the utterance situation, by binding them to the same context or situation in which the advertiser codifies his message. Here, the consumers who see or read the advertisement are not the targets for the advertiser’s persuasion but the co-conspirators in the same situation. Thus, consumers are active addressees who participate in the advertiser’s messages, or furthermore tacitly accept the advertiser’s position. In relation to this point, consider (123):

(123) Weave your way to immortality. ----- NIKE

In (123) the second-person you is a shifter, and those who hear or read (123) are not bystanders but active participants in the message of this advertisement, because of the function of your as a shifter. In this case, although (123) is uttered by the advertiser, you becomes involved in the context as the person whom I talks to.

Now can also be a shifter:

(124) Now remember your daddy ---- No. 7 for men (cosmetics by Boots)

Now in (124) functions as a shifter which binds consumers to the same epistemological frame and environment, by inviting them to the advertiser’s coding time. Because of the function of these shifters, consumers are not bystanders for the advertiser’s matter; because these shifters draw both the advertiser and consumers to the same event. Thus, the probability that consumers easily react to the advertiser’s message is increased.

In the next section, I briefly discuss how visualized metaphor and irony are treated in the dimension of advertisement, as a step toward later explaining argumentation by verbo-pictorial

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56 Billboard, Brighton Station, 2010.
57 Advertising poster by Boots in 2011.
metaphor or irony in advertisements.

6.4 Interpreting Visual Metaphor and Irony in Advertisements

Metaphor in advertisements is used by matching a product with an object, which the advertiser wishes to associate with the product, in order to encourage a certain image of the product in consumers. We know that fresh metaphor or novel irony is harder to understand than a normal literal expression, because figurative expressions like metaphor and irony are indirectly and covertly conveyed. In relation to this point, Camp (2006: 288) writes that ‘recent empirical evidence suggests that unfamiliar novel metaphors do take significantly longer to process than either literal utterances or familiar metaphors’, citing research including Bowdle and Gentner 2005.

Where visual metaphor or irony are used, it is expected that consumers would spend more processing effort grasping the advertiser’s utterance, because consumers should understand the visual message first, and subsequently interpret the verbal message, considering the connection between the visual image and the verbal copy; for example,

![Figure 6: New Balance Running Shoes (Spanish Version)](http://grupo17.bligoo.com/clase-n-4-trabajo-practico-comunicacion-visual)
Figure 6 is a case of multimodal metaphor in which visual metaphor and verbal metaphor in Spanish are used. This advertisement presents New Balance running shoes as a heart, and guides consumers to metaphorically interpret the advertiser’s utterance, by identifying those products with the heart.

However, for those who do not know Spanish, this advertisement is still interpretable as a visual metaphor, rather than a verbo-pictorial metaphor. Suppose that Tom and Jerry, who do not know Spanish, see figure 6 in the airport when they go to Spain. Although this advertisement is aimed at Spanish speakers and it shows the metaphor of ‘New Balance running shoes are the heart’ in the Spanish copy Corre con el corazón (i.e. ‘Run with the heart’), non-Spanish speakers Tom and Jerry could also grasp the intention of that advertisement. As discussed in chapter 5, Ifantidou and Tzanne (2006) point out that even in the situation in which verbal stimulus is suspended, it is possible to interpret the speaker’s intended metaphorical meaning by pursuing optimal relevance.

Furthermore, if Yus’s (2009) position that both visual stimulus and verbal stimulus are treated in the same way (i.e. by the Principle of Relevance) is right, non-native Spanish viewers would first access the information manifest to them (i.e. visual stimulus), and interpret the advertiser’s hidden message, based on this visual stimulus. In other words, although non-native Spanish viewers cannot accept the advertiser’s verbal stimulus, they may realize that the advertiser guides them to view the given image as a heart, because there are some visual stimuli such as the contour of the shoes, red and blue tubes and the mixture of red and white colours on the surface of the shoes, which individually remind the viewers of the icon of the heart, blood vessels and the heart muscles.59 Thus, the non-native Spanish viewers find the advertiser’s hidden metaphor of ‘New Balance running shoes are the heart’ after seeing the visual image in figure 6. Then, those viewers would elicit one of possible interpretations relevant to the given

59 In relation to this point, Tanaka (1994: 41) holds that ‘in covert communication, the hearer does not have the speaker’s guarantee of optimal relevance to guide her, but other stimuli can be used to overcome this deficiency’.
situation (e.g. ‘New Balance running shoes bring passion to your running), by connecting one of the most salient properties of the heart (e.g. ‘The heart has been believed to be the seat of the emotions’) to the characteristics of the products.

Following Tanaka (1996), although the non-native Spanish consumers should spend more processing effort interpreting that advertisement, once they understand it, they may enjoy more pleasure from it and remember it longer than other literal advertisements. Thus, as this pleasure may offset or exceed the consumers’ processing effort, the metaphorical advertisement in figure 6 could be a visual utterance which satisfies the expectation of optimal relevance.

In relation to advertising impact for consumers, although it is not easy to judge whether visual metaphor or verbal metaphor is more effective for advertisement, some researchers (e.g. Childers and Houston 1984, Whittock 1990) hold that visual metaphors are easier to understand and last longer in consumers’ mind. Visual metaphors are believed to be more effective for advertisements, because while consumers have to draw their own image from a verbal metaphor, visual metaphor does part of this process for the consumers.

However, if an advertisement uses only the visual mode, without any verbal clue, consumers could misinterpret or not easily understand it; and this point might inhibit the search for relevance. Thus, in order to minimize this possibility of different interpretations, advertising tag lines (i.e. advertising copy) serve as verbal clues for visual metaphor in order to prevent consumers from misunderstanding or missing the advertiser’s intended visual metaphor.

Barthes (1998) holds that verbal information in advertisement plays a role of anchoring visual information in it, and verbal information not only confirms the contents of visual information but also limits room for other different interpretations by consumers; this process is connected to satisfying the expectation of optimal relevance. Thus, when an advertiser chooses both a visual image and a verbal expression as the ostensive stimuli which are shown to consumers, taking the interaction of those two stimuli into account makes the advertiser’s utterance more relevant to the situation.
A non-verbal stimulus can be used for ironic advertisement as well, as in figure 7:

![Figure 7: a case of comparing advertisements (FedEx)](http://ad2ream.com/xe/?mid=pds&category=24254&page=2&document_srl=24135)

While metaphor is inference at the conceptual level, irony is not. As pointed out in chapter 4, irony represents the speaker’s negative or positive emotional attitude toward the incongruity between what the speaker says and the situation with which he is faced. Consumers who interpret the advertiser’s visual irony in figure 7 presumably spend more processing effort in the process of interpreting it than a literally expressed advertisement, because this advertisement offers the consumers only the name of the company and a visual image. Thus, the consumers should comprehend advertiser’s visual irony first before they interpret the advertiser’s real intention, and interpret the message accordingly.

Figure 7 shows consumers that a white box is put in a bigger box with FedEx company logo. Although the logo on the surface of the white box is almost hidden, as it reminds consumers of DHL company, they may presume that a DHL box has been put in a FedEx box. Here these facts are manifest to consumers: 1) FedEx and DHL are rival delivery companies,
and 2) FedEx has in the past made other advertisements, in which they compare their service with DHL’s. Thus, consumers may realize that figure 7 is one of the series of comparing advertisements by FedEx, because the new information of figure 7 strengthens consumers’ old information and it brings about contextual effect.

After that cognitive process, the consumers may realize that figure 7 represents an irony that ‘DHL uses FedEx’ without directly giving any verbal ironic utterance, and indirectly conveys the advertiser’s hidden message that ‘the delivery service by FedEx is fast and exact enough for even DHL to also use it’.

According to the RT account of irony, the advertiser’s ironic utterance in figure 7 echoes our common sense/belief that ‘a company which sells a service X does not use the same service of its rival company’ and this irony represents the incongruity between what consumers believe and the given situation. For this reason, following Colston and O’Brien (2000), passive consumers would pay more attention to this ironic utterance which overturns their common sense/belief, and remember this type of ironic advertisement longer than literal one that just says *FedEx offers consumers a better delivery service than DHL.*

Thus far, I have discussed some cases of visual metaphor and visual irony in commercial advertisements. In the next section, I examine and analyse argumentation by verbo-pictorial advertisements, which are composed of figurative language and visual images.
6.5 Argumentation by Figurative Language in Commercial Advertisements

6.5.1 General Points about Figurative Language in Commercial Advertisements

In this section, I examine how metaphor and irony perform argumentation in commercial advertisements. Before I fully do this task, I discuss some general points of metaphor and irony, focusing on the contexts of advertisement.

First, I point out that the persuasiveness of the speaker’s argument can be increased when he successfully uses metaphorical expressions, because they add credibility to the speaker’s argumentative utterance, by making something abstract more vivid and clear. In this case, the speaker’s metaphorical utterance can be ‘argumentative ground’ for his argumentative conclusion (i.e. implicature). Primarily, the speaker’s metaphor serves as an ‘argumentative ground’ by emphasizing some salient properties between tenor and vehicle, since metaphor highlights some common properties, and hides the rest (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003: 10-13). Because of this characteristic of metaphor, more than one possible metaphorical description is available for any entity. For example, while one person might metaphorically define American society as a ‘melting pot’, another person might present it as a ‘salad bowl’.

Because metaphor simultaneously highlights similarities and hides differences between two entities, metaphor can be a tool for achieving argumentation whose goal is to make the hearer accept the speaker’s argumentative conclusion (i.e. implicature inferred from the speaker’s metaphorical utterance). Thus, whether or not the ground of the speaker’s metaphorical utterance sounds persuasive depends on how much the connotation of his metaphor appeals to the hearer’s mind. In other words, the speaker’s metaphor as the ground of his utterance may draw the hearer’s agreement, and acquire its authenticity only when it reflects
the universal sense of values in the community to which they belong.

The argumentative power of metaphor can be better confirmed particularly in the environments of commercial advertisements in mass media, whose purposes are to persuade consumers (as the hearers) to buy the advertiser’s products or services. For instance, consider a metaphorical advertising copy such as *Sleeping is good medicine*, which is used in the advertisement by a bed company. This metaphorical utterance is used in the argumentative context of ‘As sleeping is good medicine, you should sleep on a good quality XX bed’, and it aims to ultimately convey the advertiser’s message that ‘Buy a XX bed, because good sleeping on a good bed gives you the effects of good medicine’. In order to make this argumentation sound plausible, the advertiser’s metaphor should be based on the *topos* that ‘health is very important’ or ‘good medicine is helpful for keeping a good health’.

Then, what about irony? Argumentation by irony requires the premise that all communicators should be capable of recognizing necessary conditions for being irony and ironic environment. When the speaker utters an ironic expression and the hearer successfully recognizes and interprets it in accordance with the specific situation, it is possible to approach it within the realm of *doxa*, *topoi* and polyphony, in that it also reflects the common opinions (i.e. *doxa*), the common grounds (i.e. *topoi*) or the same sense of values in the community to which both the speaker and the hearer belong. This point is directly connected to Sperber and Wilson’s (1998) position on extending the scope of echoic mentioning that the speaker’s irony may echo not only the proposition in other’s antecedent utterance but also our common knowledge/beliefs, social norms and so on. For example, when Tom scratched Jerry’s new Benz, Jerry might ironically say *You are my good friend indeed*. The reason why Tom feels sorry for his mistake and Jerry’s utterance becomes irony is that there is a common opinion or sense of values that ‘it is a bad manner to damage other’s property’, which is objectified by polyphony. Furthermore, this point is closely connected to experientialist epistemology discussed in chapter 2, in that *doxa* and *topoi* as communicators’ inferential grounds are parts of their cognitive environment,
and this cognitive environment is formed by communicators’ experiences.

Based on Colston and O’Brien (2000), I argue that irony can be more effective than metaphor in terms of making consumers (i.e. the hearers) remember the advertiser’s message longer, in that irony in advertisement may give them stronger impacts because it overturns the fixed ideas or beliefs in the world, while metaphor is based on the similarities between tenor and vehicle.

Additionally, the use of irony can be shown in different ways, according to whether it is used in public service advertisements or commercial advertisements. In other words, typical cases of public service advertisements in which irony is used warn that the viewers must not do something bad or undesirable (e.g. taking drugs or smoking), and if the viewers do it, it would cause negative results for them. For this reason, those advertisements present positively framed surface meaning first, but they convey the advertiser’s real intention by implicating negative results of doing bad or undesirable things as intended meaning. On the other hand, as the purpose of commercial advertisements is to guide consumers to buy a specific product or service, when irony is used in them, its intended meaning should be positive. In relation to this point, Lagerwerf (2007: 1708) holds that ‘sarcasm cannot be used in commercial advertising; the purpose of sarcasm is negative, whereas commercial advertising has the positive informational intention of having people buy a product’. When irony is used in a commercial advertisement, its surface meaning is shown by negatively framed message first, and the advertiser’s real intention is presented in a follow-up sentence, context or background scene that always contains a positively framed message. The difference between irony used in commercial advertisement and that in ordinary utterance, is that whereas the former usually shows the advertiser’s real intention by follow-up sentences whose purpose is to prevent consumers’ misunderstanding, the latter might not.

Those points presented above are the foundations of my developing further discussions on argumentation by figurative language in the contexts of advertisement. For doing this task, I
classify the cases of argumentation by figurative language into several themes: metaphor in advertisements, irony in advertisements and interactions (i.e. connection and overlapping) of metaphor and irony.

Firstly, I analyse argumentation by metaphor, in terms of connotation. Crystal (2003) defines connotation as:

[…] the emotional associations (personal or communal) which are suggested by, or are part of the meaning of, a LINGUISTIC UNIT, especially a LEXICAL ITEM …

For example, the connotations of the lexical item *December* include ‘bad weather’, ‘dark evenings’, etc. (for north Europeans, at least), or ‘parties’, ‘Christmas’, etc. (Crystal 2003: 97-98)

When connotation is used in metaphorical advertisement, it inevitably involves *doxa*, *topoi* and polyphony as argumentative concepts, because *topoi* are confirmed by stereotype, and stereotype can be a part of connotation. Furthermore, *topoi* are based on *doxa*, and *doxa* and *topoi* bring about a polyphonic structure, as discussed in chapter 5. These points show the interconnection between connotation and other argumentative concepts.

Secondly, I examine irony in advertisements, focusing on humility. This type of advertisement is frequent in Asian countries, which have been under the influence of Confucianism which emphasizes the virtue of humility. When humility is realized in ironic advertisement, it may highlight the high status of a specific target (e.g. advertiser’s products or services), by the advertiser’s self-downgrading of its characteristics. This point can be confirmed by Leech’s (1983) Modesty Maxim (i.e. Minimize praise of *self*, and maximize dispraise of *self*) discussed in chapter 4. Thus, humility can be practiced by irony, because advertiser’s irony which contains negatively framed message lets consumers reach the positive conclusion intended by the advertiser, by echoing the proposition of the negatively framed message.
Following Bernstein’s (1974) distinction between ‘reason’ and ‘tickle’ in advertising, the virtue of humility can be connected to ‘tickle’ advertisements. ‘Reason’ is something like ‘fact’, ‘clinical truth’, or ‘needs’, on the other hand, ‘tickle’ is something like ‘emotion’, ‘imagination’, ‘poetic truth’ or ‘desires’. According to Bernstein (1974), while a ‘reason’ advertisement tends to focus on directly showing the merits of advertiser’s products or services and the reasons why potential consumers should choose and buy them, a ‘tickle’ advertisement leads potential consumers to choose advertiser’s products or services, by stimulating potential consumers’ emotion. For example, tyre advertisements in Korean mass media tend to directly show why consumers should choose a specific product, by concretely enumerating its merits; and this is a case of ‘reason’ advertisement. On the other hand, coffee advertisements frequently appeal to consumers’ emotion, by showing a celebrity who has a delicious cup of coffee, rather than emphasizing the reasons why consumers should buy the product; this is a case of ‘tickle’ advertisement, in that it exploits people’s mind which wants to follow others whom they like or to imitate their behaviours. Furthermore, Bernstein (1974) holds that although it is easier for consumers to understand a ‘reason’ advertisement than a ‘tickle’ one, once consumers decode the implicature of the ‘tickle’ advertisement, it could bring about more effect than ‘reason’ one, because a ‘tickle’ advertisement appeals to consumers’ emotion and sub-consciousness.

Thirdly, it is possible for metaphor and irony to appear in a connected way in advertisements. For instance, consider advertising copy composed of two sentences, in which the first sentence is ironic and the second is metaphorical: *Boddingtons is not beer;* (instead) *it’s the cream of Manchester.* In this case, the ironic antecedent sentence draws consumers’ attention, by overturning common sense of the world, and the following metaphorical sentence shows the advertiser’s real intention. Here, the metaphorical sentence as a follow-up utterance plays two roles: getting rid of consumers’ possible misunderstanding of the advertiser’s real intention, which could be brought about by the ironic sentence, and persuading consumers to purchase Boddingtons beer, by metaphorically highlighting the characteristics of this product.
Finally, there are cases in which metaphor and irony overlap. This is different from the case of connection. When metaphor and irony are equally connected with each other by a connective (e.g. *but*), their individual functions are overtly shown. In the case of overlap these two figurative mechanisms work at the same time in advertising copy, without showing any overt connection: *A Devil’s Temptation* ----- *French Café*. In the case of overlap, although advertising copy seems metaphorical on the surface, it works as irony as well in the given situation.

From now on, I analyse individual cases in accordance with different issues discussed above, and examine communication (as argumentation) in those cases.

### 6.5.2 Metaphor in Advertisements: Focusing on Connotation

Figure 8 is an example of commercial advertisement in which connotation is applied. This example involves two cognitive linguistic mechanisms: metaphor and metonymy.

![Figure 8: ExxonMobil in the UK (Esso)](http://cacb.wordpress.com/2010/09/01/esso-put-a-tiger-in-your-tank/)

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The advertiser metaphorizes Esso petrol as a tiger, and metonymizes the car as one of its parts, the tank. As this thesis focuses on metaphor, not metonymy, I focus on the metaphor in this section.

This is a case of multimodal advertisement (i.e. verbo-pictorial advertisement), and consumers who see it would find the following metaphor, by connecting the visual image to the verbal stimulus shown in the advertisement:

(125) Esso petrol is a tiger.

The primary point that should be considered in the process of persuading consumers and drawing their purchasing behaviour is how effectively the advertiser’s message can be conveyed to consumers and interpreted by them. If so, it is necessary to verify which one (literal expression or metaphor) can more effectively achieve the advertiser’s intention. In relation to this question, consider following two types of advertising copy:

(126) Use Esso petrol, and it improves the performance and the fuel efficiency of your car.
(127 = 5) Put a tiger in your tank.

The advertiser’s utterance is optimally relevant in this context: the advertiser’s utterance should be worthwhile for consumers to interpret and infer its message. However, although (126) can be economical in terms of consumers’ information processing, the cognitive effect that they may enjoy cannot offset the processing effort that they would spend in treating it. In other words, consumers who see (126) would access only their encyclopaedic knowledge of petrol and cars, and pay no more attention to (126). Thus, (126) would easily fade away from consumers’ mind, without achieving the positive effect intended and expected by the advertiser. Therefore, (126) cannot satisfy the expectation of optimal relevance.
On the other hand, when consumers see (127), they find the contextual effect intended by the advertiser, based on their encyclopaedic knowledge of tigers. The consumers might naturally recall some connotations of a tiger such as ‘power’, ‘strength’, ‘bravery’, ‘ferociousness’, ‘swiftness’ and so on. Considering that the metaphorical utterance in (127) is used to advertise Esso petrol (i.e. considering relevance of the utterance in the process of communication as argumentation), consumers would match Esso petrol and ‘power/strength’ among the salient properties of a tiger, infer the connection between ‘petrol’ and ‘power/strength’, and finally interpret (127) as (128):

(128) As Esso petrol is powerful and strong, it improves the performance and the fuel efficiency of your car.

As readers of (127) can access the interpretation in (128) well enough, and the effect of the interpretation may satisfy the advertiser’s intention, (127) is more relevant to the given situation than (126). Furthermore, when consumers see (127), as they become interested in new information, besides their encyclopaedic knowledge on ‘petrol’ and ‘tiger’, this metaphorical utterance in (127) may sufficiently draw consumers’ attention. Thus, although consumers have to spend more processing effort for treating (127) than (126), they may enjoy pleasure in finding new information by treating (127). Thus (127) satisfies Principle of Relevance in terms of cognitive effect as well.

The next step is to discuss how the advertiser’s metaphorical utterance in (127) comes to have argumentative power. In the process of argumentative communication by advertisement, (128) is the advertiser’s argumentative conclusion which is elicited from (125); thus, (125) is the advertiser’s argumentative ground which makes consumers infer (128). Consumers would develop following inferential process, in order to elicit the argumentative conclusion intended by the advertiser:
(129) a. A tiger is a powerful and strong animal. (implicated premise/topos)

b. Put a tiger in your tank. (the speaker’s metaphor ‘Esso Petrol is a tiger’)

c. There is room for viewing that Esso petrol is powerful and strong. (implicated conclusion)

In consumers’ inferential process of (129), (129a) as implicated premise may have the status of topos as a common ground between communicators; thus, it is something that both the speaker and the hearer agree with. When the advertiser utters (127), its implicated premise should be restorable by the hearer’s cognitive ability. When consumers interpret advertiser’s metaphorical utterance in (127), they should recall their encyclopaedic knowledge on tiger, which is connected to stereotype of a tiger. In this stage, the stereotype of a tiger works as a topos. As pointed out in chapter 5, the reason why the hearer is persuaded by the speaker is not because of encyclopaedic knowledge of X but because of doxa and topoi related to X, which are introduced by the utterance.

According to Toulmin (1958) and Anscombe and Ducrot (1983), who succeed to the tradition of Aristotelian rhetoric, topoi are the warrant of inference or the mechanism for enabling argumentation, which are embedded in every type of argumentative discourse. Furthermore, Anscombe (1995) additionally holds that although topoi are general mechanisms used as the grounds which support inference, they can neither be inferences themselves nor be targets for assertion in discourse. Thus, following those argumentation theorists’ position, the speaker himself does not argue topoi in argumentation, but just introduces topoi which are agreed with by the community in order to take advantage of them as the grounds for supporting the speaker’s argument.

In (127), stereotype of a tiger (as topos) is ‘a tiger is a powerful, strong, swift and intelligent animal’ and as this stereotype of a tiger becomes inferential ground which both the speaker and the hearer tacitly agree with, rather than just a personal opinion or position.
Thus, this *topos* brings about a polyphonic structure which lets the utterance have an objectified meaning, by drawing various voices to the advertiser’s argumentation, rather than merely left just as the advertiser’s personal opinion. Here the advertiser says OUR position or opinion as a representative, and this effect of polyphony enables the advertiser’s argumentative conclusion (i.e. Esso petrol is powerful and strong) to have more argumentative power, by binding the advertiser and consumers to the same boundary of thinking and sense of values. In this stage, the advertiser is not only a locutor responsible for the formal aspect of the utterance (i.e. *parole* itself of the utterance) but also an enunciator responsible for the illocutionary act of the utterance. However, as discussed in chapter 5 and this section, the advertiser is not the author of the *topos*, and he strengthens the argumentative power of his utterance, by drawing the *topos* (as a common ground) which is universally accepted by his community into the utterance.

Additionally, two things should be pointed out: First, this advertisement is a type of ‘reason’ advertisements, in that it offers the reason why consumers should choose Esso petrol, by highlighting the merits of the product. Second, this advertisement also uses a shifter (i.e. *your*). When a shifter works in the advertisement, it enables the advertiser to make consumers the co-conspirators in the same situation. This condition is another factor that contributes to increasing argumentative power of the utterance.

Finally, I discuss the relation between *doxa* and *topoi* in this case. If this advertisement is used in East Asian countries such as Korea and China, this *topos* may belong to *doxa* such as totemism or folk religion, which worships tigers as an auspicious symbol. This kind totemism used to be prevalent in East Asia; particularly in Korea and China. Thus, a tiger has stood for an entity of reverence as well as fear in those countries. For this reason, Korean and Chinese people tend to metaphorize a person whose character is strict but reliable and respectable as a tiger. For example, if Korean young children call their old male teacher a tiger, it means that their teacher educates his students in a very strict way. But, this tiger teacher secretly takes care of his students behind their backs, because actually he loves his students. This metaphorical
meanings of tiger in Korean exceeds the basic connotations of this word, which describe just physical properties (e.g. power, strength and swiftness) of tigers.

However, we cannot connect this doxa to the case of Esso petrol advertisement in the UK, because a tiger has not lived in England, and there must not have been such totemism or folk religion (i.e. doxa) in this country. If so, a question of what doxa is connected to this topos might arise, because in chapter 5 I noted that topos belong to doxa. My answer for this question is that there need not always be the specific doxa which is connected to topos. Sometimes, it is not easy to clearly draw the border between doxa and topos, as shown by the case of Hitler’s Aryan racialism and anti-Semitism in chapter 5, or doxa level is empty; only the topos works in the case of Esso petrol advertisement.

In sum, metaphor which involves connotation includes the emotional associations which are suggested by the meaning of a lexical item. Here the emotional associations are based on the stereotype of the entity expressed by the lexical item. Considering the point that topos are confirmed by stereotypes or proverbial forms, the emotional associations suggested by connotation can be another medium that may confirm the topos of a lexical item.

6.5.3 Irony in Advertisements: The Motivation of Humility

Confucianism still has strong influence on people’s way of thinking particularly in some East Asian countries such as Korea, Japan and China. Confucianism has taught the virtue of humility to East Asian people. The virtue of humility is connected to the behaviour of self-downgrading in front of others, in spite of one’s merits or achievements. As a result of treating humility as a virtue, people show some sympathy for the weak, but antipathy against the strong that are rude or boastful. Thus, in these cultures, it is common that the humility virtue affects marketing and public relations.
In humility advertisement, the advertiser aims to emphasize that even though the quality or the merit of the advertiser’s products or services is superior to those of other rival companies’, the advertiser’s company has the virtue of humility. This practice of humility encourages consumers to have a sympathetic feeling towards the company, and this feeling is ultimately exploited in marketing, by guiding consumers to place trust in specific products or services produced by the company. For this reason, in these cultures, sometimes the advertisement expressing ‘I’m nothing’ would be more effective than other types of advertisement that involves showing off (e.g. ‘I’m somebody’). In sum, the virtue of humility is a type of *topoi* frequently shown in East Asian countries, and Confucianism is a type of *doxa*, which includes the virtue of humility as a *topos*. Humility advertisements are a type of ‘tickle’ advertisement, in that it downgrades the merits of the target, in order to draw consumers’ sympathy for it.

Irony is frequently used in commercial advertisements which profess humility. The advertiser who intends to display humility must profess that his company, products or services are not very good. This attitude echoes consumers’ common knowledge or belief that ‘the purpose of every commercial advertisement is to show the merits of advertiser’s company, products or services’. As consumers already know that the advertiser’s real intention is not to downgrade his products or services, they try to find another interpretation by pursuing optimal relevance. When an ironic commercial advertisement which reflects the virtue of humility is shown, although its surface meaning is given by a negatively framed message first, the advertiser’s real intention is presented by some relevant devices such as a follow-up sentence, a background scene or both, which contain a positively framed message. These devices contribute to the advertiser’s manipulation of his ostensive stimuli shown to consumers, which have the goal of preventing consumers from misinterpreting advertiser’s real intention and ultimately satisfying the expectation of optimal relevance. Consider these examples:
Figure 9: an airline advertisement (Asiana Airlines, Korea)  

Figure 9 is an advertisement by Asiana Airlines, a Korean airline. This advertisement shows that this company won a top prize of the aviation industry, ‘Airline of the Year (2009)’ awarded by Air Transport World. Asiana Airlines advertised its achievement as:

(130) Asiana Airlines has marked a new era in the 60-year history of Korean civil aviation.  

Two days later, rival company Korean Air published the following advertisement, in response to Asiana Airlines:


63 This is my translation from Korean to English.
In figure 10, a flight attendant of the Korean Air greets customers courteously, and there is a big trophy in the background, which made of text listing the company’s past achievements. The black text at the top of the advertisement says:

(131 = 7) We will forget everything.\textsuperscript{65}

Furthermore, customers find follow-up utterances in the bottom of figure 10, which can be translated as:

Although Korean Air has won many international prizes so far, we will forget everything. Our customers’ praise is more precious for us than any other prizes.

\textsuperscript{64} http://blog.naver.com/doc3328?Redirect=Log&logNo=120064535364
\textsuperscript{65} This is my translation from Korean to English.
This advertisement uses irony, which echoes people’s common belief that ‘winning a prize is good and something to be proud of’. This ironic advertisement aims to indirectly boast that Korean Air is an older airline company than Asiana Airlines and has a longer history of winning international prizes, and this history proves the excellence of Korean Air. In this ironic advertisement, the advertiser’s message is negatively framed at the outset, but interpreted in a positive frame, because the background scene and the follow-up utterances work; this corresponds with the advertiser’s ultimate intention.

This ironic advertisement can be regarded as a kind of ‘tickle’ advertisement, which aims to reverse the disadvantageous atmosphere for Korean Air, by reminding customers of the virtue of humility and by exciting people’s sympathy for the apparent loser in the more recent contest (i.e. Korean Air). If Korean Air advertises its excellence like *In spite of a one-time achievement by Asiana, Korean Air is still superior to it*, customers would not be sympathetic to this advertisement at all; on the contrary, they might sneer at Korean Air: *That’s why that company was defeated by Asiana*. As this result does not satisfy advertiser’s intention, that kind ostentatious advertisement is not the most relevant in the context.

However, there could be another interpretation of this advertisement. Cook (2001: 15) points out that sometimes ‘tickle’ and ‘reason’ may work together. Although some advertisements seem ‘tickle’ because they are presented in a very oblique way, they guide consumers to tacitly realize the merits of the product or the service, by indirectly showing ‘reason’. Considering the case of Korean Air advertisement, it can be regarded as a type of ‘tickle’ advertisements, because it was presented to consumers, right after this company was defeated by Asiana Airlines, and appealed to consumers’ sympathy. Nevertheless, at the same time, this advertisement can also be viewed as a case of ‘reason’ advertisements, in that it indirectly shows consumers the merits and achievements of Korean Air, by specifying the history of winning prizes of this company in the background trophy.

Some cases of Western advertisement also take advantage of the virtue of humility.
Consider the following example:

![Figure 11: a case of beer advertisements by Carlsberg (World)\textsuperscript{66}](http://image.search.yahoo.co.jp/search?ei=UTF-8&fr=top_ga1_sa&p=Carlsberg%2C+probably#mode%3Ddetail%26index%3D0%26st%3D0)

(132 = 8) Probably the best beer in the world ------ Carlsberg

In figure 11, two expressive mechanisms are used; one is a visual metaphor (i.e. Carlsberg beer is a pearl), and the other is irony (i.e. Probably the best beer in the world) which is verbally given by an advertising tag line.

Because of the probably, (132) can be viewed as a case of humility advertisement, which recalls Tom and Jerry’s example (95) discussed in chapter 4.\textsuperscript{67} Probably does not guarantee 100% certainty; thus, it expresses the speaker’s intention which shrinks from asserting that ‘something/somebody is clearly XX’. For this reason, probably in (127) may suspend the

\\[\text{http://image.search.yahoo.co.jp/search?ei=UTF-8&fr=top_ga1_sa&p=Carlsberg%2C+probably#mode%3Ddetail%26index%3D0%26st%3D0}\]

\textsuperscript{66} (95) Dae-Young: Excuse me. You’re world-wide famous animation stars, Tom and Jerry, I presume.

Tom and Jerry (with smiling faces): Well, probably we are.
advertiser’s assertion that *Carlsberg is the best beer in the world*. However, consumers may infer that the advertiser’s real intention is to say *In fact, Carlsberg is the best beer in the world*. Thus, the utterance in (127) shows humility by downgrading the claim of merit. Furthermore, this utterance sounds ironic, in that it echoes people’s common knowledge/belief that ‘the purpose of every advertisement is to maximally emphasize the merits of specific products or services’.

Although the advertisement by Carlsberg is similar to that by the Korean Air, in that both cases employ a humility strategy, their individual motivations seem to be different. Whereas Korean Air aims to induce consumers to feel sympathy for it, Carlsberg seems to do it in order to avoid accusations of hype as well as to draw consumers’ sympathy. Suppose that the advertising copy in (127) is used without *probably*. This is advertiser’s assertion that ‘Carlsberg is the best beer in the world’ with 100% certainty. The problem is that sometimes arguing *We are the best* may bring about debates of hype by other rival companies. Once a company becomes enmeshed in accusation of hype, apart from pursuing its marketing by persuading consumers, its social reputation could seriously be damaged. The Carlsberg advertisement presented in figure 11 contributes to avoiding that risk. Moreover, this advertisement aims to get the consumers’ sympathy by downgrading the merits of the product.

From a linguistic point of view, Leech’s (1983: 132) Modesty Maxim (i.e. Minimize praise of *self*, and maximize dispraise of *self*) of the Principle of Politeness works both in the cases of Korean Air and Carlsberg advertisements. This principle can also be regarded as a type of *topoi*, in that it is viewed as a fixed and repeated idea, which is commonly accepted by most members in the community. However, the ideologies (as *doxa*) on which the *topos* is based are different from each other. In other words, while the polite principle in East Asian countries is based on Confucianism, that in Western countries is based on Christianity, which also teaches people the
virtue of humility.  

In sum, a humility advertisement by irony contributes to making the advertiser’s utterance relevant to the context where the context includes the assumptions that humility is a virtue. This is further evidence that pursuing optimal relevance increases argumentative power embedded in the utterance.

6.6 Interactions of Metaphor and Irony

6.6.1 Connection

In some advertisements, metaphor and irony come together. One way in which they can do so is what I call connection, instances of metaphor and irony that are explicitly or implicitly connected by a connective (e.g. but), and collaborate with each other, in order to achieve successful argumentation. Recalling this point, consider these examples:

Figure 12: Tomato ketchup advertisements by Heinz

68 ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit, for there is the kingdom of heaven’. (Matthew 5: 3)
Figure 12 shows two cases of multimodal advertisement from a series by the Heinz Company. In each picture, a Heinz tomato ketchup bottle is conflated with the image of a tomato, or Heinz tomato ketchup is visualized as a tomato, and with each picture, the same advertising copy is shown:

\[(133 = 9) \text{No one grows ketchup like Heinz.}\]

Consumers who see these advertisements in (133) should recognize that the given verbo-pictorial information includes metaphor and irony. The advertiser who utters (133) claims that Heinz Company grows tomato ketchup, and this utterance negates the well known knowledge/belief that ‘tomato ketchup is manufactured’; it is therefore irony.

At the same time, the advertiser lets consumers find the visual metaphor *Heinz tomato ketchup is a natural and fresh tomato*. The connection of metaphor and irony that consumers may find is:

\[(134 = 11) \text{Heinz tomato ketchup is not an industrial product (irony), but a natural and fresh tomato. (metaphor)}\]

While the antecedent utterance in (134) negates our common knowledge about tomato ketchup, the following utterance offers new information, which refutes the negated old information of the antecedent utterance. In this stage, the relation between these two utterances is refutation, and consumers can restore the hidden connective *but* (or other connectives whose function is similar to that of *but*) between them.

Before engaging in further analysis of (134), the role of the connective *but* needs clarification. According to Ducrot (1980), *but* has two possible functions: refutation or

\[\text{http://sassysouthernshopper.blogspot.co.uk/2011/04/heinz-ketchup-coupon-free-heinz-ketchup.html}\]
argumentation. When the but of argumentation is used, it shows the opposition between an antecedent utterance and following one, replaces the speaker’s former evaluation of an entity with his new one, and finally changes the direction of argumentation (e.g. Betty is homely but wise).

On the other hand, the but of refutation represents the opposition between the factivity of an antecedent component and that of a following one (e.g. Tom did not steal the cheese, but Jerry did) and suggests new information in the following utterance, by connecting them. Here, but of refutation does not show the orientation of argumentation between the propositional content of the antecedent utterance and new information in the following utterance.

Relating to this point, it could be generalized that but in advertisements in which irony is used follows the pattern of the but of refutation, because irony in advertisements is used to deny the normal characteristics of existing products or services, and to show the advertiser’s new product or service has something distinctive from them (e.g. Ivory is not soap, but purity itself). What is significant here is that this utterance Ivory is not soap, but purity itself uses metalinguistic negation. According to Horn (1989: 363), ‘[metalinguistic negation is] a device for objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatever, including the conventional or conversational implicata it potentially induces, its morphology, its style or register, or its phonetic realization’. Considering this utterance is a case of metalinguistic negation, the advertiser’s final purpose is to object to people’s use of the common word soap to refer to Ivory, not to deny that ‘Ivory is soap’. Thus, the advertiser’s real intention is to emphasize the unique characteristics and quality of Ivory soap, which are distinguished from those of other companies’ products; the following metaphorical utterance Ivory is purity itself performs this function.

Following the RT approach, the advertiser who utters Ivory is not soap echoes our common knowledge/belief that ‘Ivory is soap’. In other words, the advertiser echoes people’s common belief that ‘Ivory is nothing but ordinary soap’ and rejects or dissociates himself from this
common belief.

The utterance about Heinz ketchup in (133) can be analysed by the similar explanatory way which is applied to *Ivory is not soap; but it’s purity itself*. The ironic utterance which comes first in (133) echoes consumers’ fixed ideas about normal tomato ketchup, because tomato ketchup is not grown. When consumers see the advertiser’s ironic utterance in (133), they would access the message with negation (i.e. Heinz tomato ketchup is not an industrial product). This message with negation makes consumers retort ‘why is tomato ketchup not an industrial product?’ However, soon consumers would reinterpret the advertiser’s message with negation again by contextual effect, because they presume that there must be another meaning intended by the advertiser, not the superficial meaning of the ironic utterance. As the result of this cognitive process, consumers would realize (135):

(135) Although Heinz tomato ketchup is surely an industrial product, the advertiser intends to convey additional information to consumers, by overturning people’s common knowledge/belief that ‘tomato ketchup is manufactured’.

The advertiser’s metaphorical utterance, which comes with his ironic utterance, satisfies consumers’ expectation that the advertiser might have something different that he really intends to convey to consumers. As is often the case, the ironic advertising copy is accompanied with follow-up utterances whose purpose is to prevent consumers from misunderstanding advertiser’s real intention. In (133), although advertiser’s follow-up utterance (i.e. *Heinz tomato ketchup is a natural and fresh tomato*) not directly shown, consumers may infer it from the given visual image which shows them the ketchup metaphorized as a natural and fresh tomato.

Consumers, who interpret advertiser’s hidden metaphorical utterance in (133) based on their encyclopaedic knowledge of ‘tomato’, would recall a contextual effect that influences their inference in the present cognitive environment. This contextual effect may include some implicated meanings such as ‘nature’, ‘purity’ and ‘nutrition’, which contrast with ‘pre-prepared
food’, ‘various artificial ingredients’, ‘pollution’ and so on. Thus, the consumers might interpret the advertiser’s hidden metaphorical utterance in (133) as (136):

(136) As Heinz tomato ketchup is made of natural and fresh tomatoes, without adding any artificial ingredients, its natural taste and flavour are guaranteed.

Consumers approach the interpretation in (136) within their cognitive environment, and their interpretation is consistent with the advertiser’s real intention. Thus, advertiser’s utterance in (133) satisfies the expectation of optimal relevance.

Furthermore, although the advertiser’s utterance in (133) requires that consumers spend considerable processing effort in interpreting a connection of irony and metaphor, the novelty of the advertisement guarantees enough cognitive effect to justify the effort, in that it lets consumers enjoy the pleasure for finding new information in it. In other words, the advertiser’s verbal ironic utterance in (133) makes passive consumers who are indifferent to normal advertisements pay attention to it, and the advertiser’s visual metaphorical utterance releases the new information for those who seek fresh and healthy food. Thus, the advertiser’s utterance in (133) is effective in terms of cognitive effect.

Based on the RT approach, it is presumed that consumers would develop following inferential process, in order to elicit the argumentative conclusion intended by advertiser’s metaphorical utterance:

(137) a. Natural and fresh tomatoes are tasty and good for health.  
(implicated premise/topos)

b. Heinz tomato ketchup is a natural and fresh tomato.  
(the speaker’s metaphor/ostensive stimulus)

c. There is room for viewing that Heinz tomato ketchup is tasty and good for health.  
(implicated conclusion/the speaker’s argumentative conclusion)
Here, a topos like ‘natural and fresh tomatoes are good for health’ works, and it is connected to doxa like that ‘which is natural is good for health, but that which is artificial is bad for health’.

And as these topos and doxa are based on many people’s common opinion or agreement, the content of the advertiser’s metaphorical utterance based on them is perceived not as a personal opinion but as an objectified and universal position. This means that various voices which are drawn to the speaker’s metaphorical utterance bind both advertiser and consumers to the same thinking frame, through polyphony. Thus, a series of these processes brings about increasing argumentative power of advertiser’s metaphorical utterance.

Additionally, the advertiser may employ other non-linguistic argumentative conditions, in order to strengthen argumentative power in his utterance. For example, in figure 12, the advertiser shows visual images such as a ketchup bottle that sliced in the way that a tomato is sliced and a tomato stem, both of which remind consumers of natural and fresh tomatoes.

If the sentential order in (134) is switched, is its final meaning changed? In fact, the sentential order of (134) is due to my presumption. However, there is a possibility that consumers’ reading might follow the order in (138):

(138) Heinz tomato ketchup is a natural and fresh tomato (metaphor); not an industrial product (irony).

If the sentential order in (134) is switched to that in (138), although the quantity of information offered to consumers is the same, the nuance of the advertiser’s utterance would be changed. In other words, in the (134) semantic focus is loaded on the metaphor which holds that ‘Heinz tomato ketchup is natural and fresh because it is grown in the farm’, and this is new information that persuades consumers who seek natural and healthy food. The irony in (134) plays only the role of drawing consumers’ attention to the advertiser’s utterance.

However, in (138), as semantic focus falls on irony, the metaphor is responsible for
drawing consumers’ attention, and the following irony would perform argumentation. In this case, the advertiser’s real intention (i.e. selling his products by emphasizing the merits of them) could not be satisfied, because the irony coming later conveys only the information that ‘Heinz tomato ketchup is not an industrial product’. What consumers want to know is whether the quality of Heinz tomato ketchup is trustworthy, not whether it is actually an industrial product.

On the other hand, if the same advertising copy (133) were given with the visual images like figure 12, which are bigger and more vibrant than the text, consumers might read the metaphor like ‘Heinz tomato ketchup is a fresh and natural tomato’ first and the irony next. In this case, metaphor-irony order seems more possible than irony-metaphor order. As the advertising copy in (133) involves strong visual images, and the new information (i.e. ‘Heinz tomato ketchup is a natural and fresh tomato’) which the advertiser intends to convey to consumers is explicitly offered by these visual images. Thus, in this case, the order of the advertising information may not be a sensitive condition for consumers who interpret it.

Thus far, I have discussed the case of connection in which metaphor and irony co-occur. Another case in which metaphor and irony work together is overlap, which I turn to next.

6.6.2 Overlap: Metaphorical Irony

When metaphor and irony overlap, the speaker’s metaphorical utterance works as irony in the given situation. Imagine a situation in which a mother uses metaphor to admonishes her son who habitually gets up late to stop being lazy. Her son replies to her utterance, also using metaphor:

(139) Mother: Early birds catch the worms.
Son: Early worms are caught by the early birds.
Although the son’s utterance is certainly still metaphorical, at the same time, it is ironic. The mother’s idiomatic utterance represents the *topoi* that ‘everyone should be industrious’ and that ‘industrious people get up early’, which are accepted by most members of the community to which she belongs. The son copies and adapts his mother’s utterance, and conveys that he does not agree with the idea that ‘one should get up early (in order to be industrious)’.

Explaining the son’s utterance by the RT approach, he echoes the *topos* in his mother’s idiomatic utterance and rejects or dissociates himself from it, and conveys the implicature that ‘I do not want to get up early’.

How is the interaction of metaphor and irony comprehended in this situation? There are two possibilities: Do we interpret the son’s utterance as metaphor at first, then sequentially move to the level of irony, or treat both at the same time? In relation to this question, Popa (2009) proposes an account that relies on these three points within a pragmatic perspective: First is the ‘metaphor’s priority thesis’, which proposes that the correct result is only achieved if the metaphor is interpreted first. Second is that metaphors as ‘what is said’ have their own metaphorical truth-conditional contents, and the third is that when metaphorical ironies are used, the metaphor neutralizes or attenuates the ironic comment by enhancing metaphoric effects: metaphor is set by the expressions of the utterance, and then serves as a vehicle to determine an ironic interpretation. Popa (2009: 280) spells out ‘metaphor’s priority thesis’ as the following:

- a metaphoric interpretation $P$ is first generated from the particular expressions employed in a sentence $S$;
- $P$ is then interpreted ironically, producing interpretation $Q$;
- $Q$ can in turn generate a further implicature $R$.

Popa’s first point is supported by Winner and Gardner (1993: 429-430). According to them, the comprehension demands posed by irony are very different from those posed by metaphor, in that irony requires the ability to infer another’s intention and belief, whereas metaphor requires
the ability to match two different conceptual domains and knowledge about them. Popa (2009) makes the point that metaphor must be resolved before irony can be understood, because when the hearer interprets the speaker’s metaphorical irony, it is impossible to know the speaker’s intention represented by the irony unless the metaphor is treated first. While Popa uses this to support the contention that metaphor is ‘what is said’, we can accept her observation that metaphor must be interpreted prior to understanding irony without committing to the metaphor-as-what-is-said view. In fact, Popa’s point that metaphor attenuates irony can be seen as undermining the claim that metaphor is what-is-said, because if metaphor should be defined as ‘what is said’, which contributes to truth conditions of the metaphorical utterance, metaphor cannot attenuate ironic comment in the use of metaphorical irony. For example, suppose that Jerry usually ridicules Tom’s poor baseball play, and Tom and Jerry’s friends know this fact. One day, when Jerry sees Tom enter the playground, Jerry says Here comes Babe Ruth to his friends in a sarcastic tone. In order to use Here comes Babe Ruth sarcastically, there has to be a previous belief that Tom or someone else thinks that ‘Tom is a good baseball player’. So, Jerry will say Here comes Babe Ruth if he is with people who share the belief ‘Tom (or someone) thinks that Tom is [like] Babe Ruth’. If Jerry says Here comes Babe Ruth to the hearer who does not know anything about Tom’s baseball playing, the hearer will probably have to hear a sarcastic tone of voice in order to understand it as ironic. In order to understand the tone of voice as relevant, the hearer will have to reason by abduction that Jerry is rejecting that ‘Tom is a good baseball player’ and that this rejection is relevant if Jerry believes that someone else believed that ‘Tom was a good baseball player’.

In this case, if Jerry’s metaphor is ‘what is said’, it should be treated as a case of assertion, and the meaning of the proposition in Jerry’s metaphorical utterance is vividly shown. Thus, Tom and Jerry’s friends who hear Jerry’s utterance may realize that at the same time it is also used as sarcastic irony. For this reason, in order to argue that metaphor can mitigate ironic comment in the use of metaphorical irony, it is necessary to view metaphor as ‘what is
implicated’, which does not explicitly assert the proposition of it.

In this section, I treat a possible case in which metaphor and irony overlap with each other. This pattern of metaphorical irony is sometimes found in commercial advertisements. Consider the following advertising copy in (140), which was used in a Korean coffee advertisement:

Figure 13: a case of coffee advertisements in Korea (French Café)\footnote{\url{http://www.eto.co.kr/news/outview.asp?Code=20090812114009983&ts=52244}}

\begin{center}
(140 = 10) A devil’s temptation ------ French Café\footnote{This is my translation from Korean to English.} 
\end{center}

When consumers see the advertising copy in (140), they need to bring two points to mind: one is that the advertiser’s utterance in (140) is a metaphor which says *French Café is a devil’s temptation*, and the other is that this metaphorical advertising copy can also be used as irony at the same time, which echoes consumers’ belief that an advertiser cannot negatively describe the value of his product. Thus, the advertiser’s utterance in (140) is used as a case of metaphorical
irony in the given situation. In the process of interpreting metaphorical irony, metaphor comes first, and it has an ironic effect in the given situation.

The advertiser’s metaphor (i.e. ‘French café is a devil’s temptation’) is more effective in terms of cognitive effect than a literal expression like the taste of French café is hard to resist, and consumers would remember the former longer than the latter. This point satisfies the advertiser’s intention, and French café is a devil’s temptation is more relevant to the given situation than the taste of French café is hard to resist.

Examining this advertising copy from a different point of view, it can be a case of irony, in that the advertiser intentionally conveys a negatively framed surface meaning (i.e. ‘A devil’s temptation’). This advertiser’s intention is connected to the point that irony is more effective for drawing consumers’ attention, because it overturns people’s common sense or knowledge on something.

However, some devices such as background scene or follow-up utterance given in advertiser’s ironic advertisement enable the advertiser’s negatively framed surface meaning in irony to be turned as a positively framed message, and the advertiser’s irony in (140) ultimately conveys that ‘French Café is hard to resist because it tastes and smells good’ to consumers.

In the process of this argumentation, based on the RT approach, it is presumed that consumers might infer the following:

(141) a. The devil tries to tempt people with attractive things. (The devil’s temptation is bad, the devil is evil or temptation is usually bad, because it interferes with self-control, etc.) (implicated premises/topoi)

b. French Café is a devil’s temptation. (the speaker’s metaphor/ostensive stimulus)

c. There is room for viewing that (the taste and the aroma of) French Café is too attractive to resist. (implicated conclusion/ the speaker’s argumentative conclusion)
In (141), the implicated premises of (141a) are the results of some *topoi* as common grounds between communicators, and these *topoi* belong to a religious ideology (i.e. *doxa*) such as Christianity or Buddhism. In this advertisement which has a dark background tone as a whole, an attractive actor in a black jacket appears. In general, black colour symbolizes something evil in both Christian and Asian cultures, and this advertisement shows a handsome model in black tempting consumers to have French Café. This scene reminds consumers of the Biblical situation in which the serpent tempted Eve to pick and have the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden.

The *doxa* and *topoi* connected to (141a) are not the advertiser’s personal opinion, but an objectified position of the cultures, the advertiser’s metaphorical ironic utterance in (140) draws various voices. This polyphony in advertiser’s utterance contributes to strengthening argumentative power in advertiser’s implicated conclusion in (141c).

Furthermore, other non-linguistic argumentative conditions increase argumentative power in the advertiser’s utterance. As coffee is a product that is sold for its taste and smell, there is no metaphorical entity that can condense and concretize those intangible characteristics of the product in one expression. Thus, advertisements for cigarette, perfume or coffee advertisements frequently show entities whose images are expected to best describe the characteristics of the specific product, in order to evoke these non-visual sensations (i.e. taste and aroma) by those images. This point reminds us of the matter of synaesthesia discussed in the sub-section 5.5.2, because this pattern of visualizing non-visual sensations follows a way of forming synaesthetic metaphor, which exploits a similarity between experiences in different sense modalities (i.e. visual and olfactory senses or visual and taste senses). When the advertiser produces an advertisement for those kinds of products, it is common that the advertiser examines who the main (potential) consumers are, and selects a model who could best appeal to those consumers’

72 Also in Buddhism, there are some devils which disturbed the Buddha’s ascetic exercises and guide people to fall into depravity.
mind. For example, the advertiser visualizes that his product (i.e. French Café) is a temptation that is hard to be resisted by employing a well-known actor who is very popular among young Korean women. This point implies that the main target of this advertisement is young Korean women whose age is in their 20s and 30s, because they are main consumers who enjoy coffee most and the image of that handsome actor is expected to more strongly appeal to their mind; and this advertisement considers ‘receiver’ as one of argumentative factors (see Renkema 1993).

In sum, this advertising strategy aims to make consumers pay attention to the advertiser’s message and remember it long. This strategy reflects the advertiser’s intention that pursues maximizing argumentative power embedded in his utterance, by making his utterance relevant in the process of argumentation by advertisement.

Furthermore, the process of argumentation by metaphorical irony involves metaphor’s priority thesis; thus the metaphor is interpreted first, and then the irony is next. This metaphorical irony in (140) pursues a double advertising effect that metaphor describes the characteristics of the product, and irony emphasizes them again.

6.7 Summary

In this chapter, I explained how argumentation by advertisement is realized by examining some real cases of commercial advertisements. Particularly, I did this task, focusing on verifying that argumentative communication by all types of advertisement can be explained by universal and consistent way within a single principle of relevance.

In the sub-section 6.3, I discussed the nature of argumentation in terms of advertisement. In this process, I examined some special linguistic devices (e.g. register and shifter) with reference to the particular environment of commercial advertisement. Additionally, in order to explain how consumers interpret metaphor and irony given in verbo-pictorial advertisements, in the sub-
section 6.4 I briefly discussed the cognitive processes of interpreting visual metaphor and irony.

I analysed argumentation by figurative language in the real cases of commercial advertisements, by broadly dividing the matter into several themes: metaphor in advertisements, irony in advertisements and interactions (i.e. connection and overlap) of metaphor and irony.

In the sub-section 6.5, I examined the process of argumentation by figurative language, focusing on the case of metaphor exploiting connotation, and that of irony used to present the virtue of humility.

In the sub-section 6.6, the phenomena in which metaphor and irony work together were discussed. While connection treated in the sub-section 6.6.1 is that metaphor and irony are connected by an overt or covert connective (e.g. but) and they collaborate, overlap in the sub-section 6.6.2 is that they co-work as metaphorical irony without any explicit connective, and metaphor serves as a vehicle which settles down ironic interpretation.

The conclusion of these approaches show that figurative language such as metaphor or irony is effective for achieving the speaker’s intentions (i.e. persuading consumers, drawing their attention and making them remember the advertiser’s message long) in the process of communication (as argumentation); and this point means that even metaphor and irony as cognitive inferential mechanisms contribute to making communicators achieve optimal relevance.
In this final chapter, I summarize the preceding chapters and make some general conclusions on the points that I discussed.

This thesis had two main purposes: The first was to explain how figurative language such as metaphor and irony can perform argumentation. This was based on Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca’s (1958) neo-rhetorical stance, in which argumentation is the process of justifying something in an organized or logical way, using one or more claims and showing one or more grounds for maintaining them. In this way, argumentation is not a process of merely conveying information to the hearer, but a kind of social activity in that it brings about the changes of the social relations between communicators. My approach is also consistent with other argumentation theorists’ positions (e.g. Habermas 1984, Plantin 1996 and van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 1996, 2004).

The second purpose has been to hypothesize the inferential process of the hearer’s interpreting the figurative utterances. My approach to this matter is based on two significant positions: experientialism and cognitive pragmatics in the form of Relevance Theory. Experientialism is the epistemological foundation on which my discussions on the nature of figurative language are based, and RT is the linguistic mechanism that I employ in order to explain the process of interpreting figurative language. Both sides are compatible with each other in that they view figurative language as a normal linguistic mechanism, not as something deviant from normal language use.

For doing those tasks, I have examined some real cases of English and Korean commercial
advertisements by figurative language particularly from print media such as newspapers and magazines or billboards. As the ultimate purpose of every commercial advertisement is to guide consumers to buy the advertiser’s products or services, a commercial advertisement is one of the most salient cases in which the speaker’s argumentation is performed. Thus, examining and analysing the mechanisms of figurative commercial advertisements is explaining argumentation by figurative language.

Two pragmatic theories, RT and AT are involved in this explanation. I start from the position that communication is always accompanied with argumentation. In pursuing an economical approach to the phenomenon, it is necessary to consider which of these is primary. I argue that it is most economical to explain argumentation by a single Principle of Relevance.

However, RT has been more focused on explaining how the utterance is interpreted by the hearer, not how argumentation is performed. For this reason, this approach presented here has argued for the needs to extend the scope of RT’s application. In other words, the cognitive and communicative approach of RT makes it possible to integrate various argumentative concepts and other non-linguistic argumentative conditions that should be introduced in order to explain argumentation by figurative language into the RT approach. This ultimately contributes to pursuing a more economic and coherent explanation of argumentation by figurative language.

Nevertheless, this position does not mean that I ignore the theoretical value of AT. I amalgamate AT with RT within a broadly defined cognitive and communicative approach, in order to explain how argumentative power in the utterance is achieved.

In chapter 2, I surveyed some philosophical approaches to metaphor. Particularly, I made it clear that experientialism which Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003, 1999) have developed offers a significant epistemological ground for recognizing and treating metaphor. This epistemology accepts neither objectivism nor subjectivism, and instead views metaphor as the result of basic human conceptual activity, rather than a mere expressive mechanism. According to experientialism, metaphor reflects conceptualization and cognitive ability, and this point is
confirmed by the evidence of polysemy. Furthermore, experientialism stands by the assumption of subjectivization, which holds that language meaning is neither objective nor independent of the subject’s interpretive thought; thus, language users are the subjects of meaning determination. This position is exactly compatible with a pragmatic perspective.

Examining three philosophical viewpoints on metaphor (i.e. Substitution Viewpoint, Comparison Viewpoint and Interaction Viewpoint) and discussing some explanatory problems of each viewpoint has enabled me to justify why I employ a pragmatic approach to explaining argumentation by figurative language. The virtue of pragmatics is that it tries to grasp the nature of the meaning of *meaning* within the relation between language users and the world, not between signs and the world.

Additionally, in chapter 2, I introduced the inferential process of abduction, which was discussed by Peirce (1958). Inference by abduction contributes to discovering something new (i.e. case) from the known facts or results, which is more closely connected to the process of interpreting metaphor than other inferential ways such as deduction or induction. Although Peirce did not introduce abduction in order to explain metaphorical interpretation, I described the connection between this inference and language users’ way of finding something new (i.e. case/the speaker’s intended conclusion) from the metaphorical utterances. However, I pointed out that abduction (as a semiotic inference) can be seen as part of the cognitive process of eliciting implicature by RT. In chapter 5, I further discussed this potential.

While chapter 2 examined the nature of metaphor in the philosophical viewpoint, chapter 3 discussed metaphor within the linguistic discipline. I surveyed the gist of early generativists’ and semanticists’ viewpoints on metaphor, and pointed out their explanatory problems.

I then surveyed the CL approach to conceptual metaphor, which has had a great impact on how linguists view the nature of metaphor. However, I made it clear that the CL approach to metaphor is not sufficient for my purposes for two reasons. The first is that the purpose of this thesis is to examine and explain argumentation by metaphor (or irony or both), and
argumentation is the matter of treating implicated meanings that transcend the literal sense of the sentence (i.e. linguistic use of metaphor). This is different from conceptual metaphor, which is a way of thinking that brings about a range of language expressions that involve that type of thinking.

The second reason is that RT, as a cognitive and communicative approach, offers a more efficient explanatory ground for treating non-conceptual metaphor and irony within a single principle of relevance. This contributes to a more economical way of explaining argumentation by figurative language.

In the second half of chapter 3, I discussed some recent relevant discussions about metaphor. In this part, two main issues on metaphor are treated. One is the debates about the status of metaphor: Is it ‘what is implicated’ or ‘what is said’? Paying attention to language users’ intuition and the reality of their ordinary language use, I justified why the position of ‘what is implicated’ should stand, in spite of some reasonable accounts of metaphor as ‘what is said’. My position is that no matter how elaborate a linguistic theory is, as long as it does not reflect language users’ intuition, it should be rejected from the outset.

The other recent issue discussed in chapter 3 is the potential that RT and CL can complement and be harmonized with each other, as is suggested by Gibbs and Tendahl (2006) and Tendahl and Gibbs (2008), and responded to by Wilson (2011). I compared their positions on metaphor, and tapped the possibility of harmonizing them. However, while CL focuses on studying conceptual metaphor, RT is interested in linguistic use of metaphor; this point means that there are some theoretical differences between those theories about how metaphor should be explained.

Irony was treated in chapter 4. While RT develops the mention-based approach to irony, Clark and Gerrig (1984) and Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) maintain ‘pretence’ approaches. Additionally, Ducrot (1984) proposes a ‘polyphony’ approach based on the distinction between locuteur and énonciateur. Furthermore, Lakoff (1973), Leech (1983) and Brown and Levinson
(1987) approach irony as a means of exercising politeness. Particularly, Leech’s (1983) Principle of Politeness offers a useful ground for explaining some cases of argumentation in chapter 6, which involves humility.

In relation to defining the motivation and the function of irony, whereas RT mainly focuses on sarcastic purpose of irony based on ‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’, other pragmatic approaches emphasize some social motivations and functions of irony (e.g. Dews, Kaplan and Winner 1995) or increasing communicators’ feeling of intimacy (e.g. Leech 1983, Jorgensen 1996, Culpeper 1996). Additionally, Lee (2002) points out that the function of irony is not confined only to blame or ridicule, taking some examples of genteel irony whose purpose is to humorously praise or encourage the addressee’s merits or achievements.

The significant issue which arose in this chapter is that although RT may explain the typical sarcastic cases of irony (by ‘echoic mentioning + rejection or dissociation’), this approach cannot explain some exceptional uses of irony (e.g. non-echoic irony). I presented and analysed those exceptional uses of irony, and propose an alternative approach to explaining irony, within the boundaries of RT, in order to show that RT can cope with exceptional cases of irony in a different way.

My approach to irony is that not every case of irony is ‘echoic mentioning’ and used to present the speaker’s negative (i.e. sarcastic) intention of criticizing, insulting or ridiculing the addressee(s), or to show the speaker’s disappointed feeling toward the given situation which he does not accept or agree with. I focused on Utsumi’s (2000) notion of ‘incongruity’ and proposed that it can be integrated into the RT approach to irony. This means that the echoic mentioning type is just one of the subtypes of irony (although this type seems most frequent), and all types of irony can be explained by ‘echoic mentioning + (adapted notion of) incongruity’ or only incongruity. This approach does not entirely abandon Sperber and Wilson’s RT approach to irony, but applies the relevance-theoretic model to treating all types of irony, which includes those exceptional cases.
Chapter 5 explored the interconnection between cognitive pragmatics (i.e. in the form of RT) and AT. The important premise in this process is that every act of communication is an act of argumentation, and the process of confirming and revising information in argumentation can be identified with that of eliciting contextual effect in communication. This premise enables us to justify that various argumentative concepts (e.g. *doxa*, *topoi*, polyphony, speech act) and non-linguistic argumentative conditions (e.g. the social relation between communicators, multimodality, *etc.* ) which are employed by AT can be adapted into the domain of RT.

In the first step of doing this task, I explained why the pragmatic notion of ‘mutual knowledge’ is to be replaced with ‘cognitive environment’ as proposed by RT. Once this approach is justified, it is possible to argue that *doxa* and *topoi* as the results of ‘mutual knowledge’ can be parts of cognitive environment. Moreover, *doxa* and *topoi* bring about a polyphonic structure which draws various voices into the utterance, and this structure contributes to strengthening argumentative power embedded in the utterance. Communicators perform argumentation by exploiting their cognitive environment, and this is why argumentation can be explained by the communication theory, RT.

Furthermore, the RT approach makes it possible that speech act theory can be integrated into a single principle of relevance. Sperber and Wilson (1995) point out some explanatory problems of speech act theory, and justify why it is more desirable for this theory to be treated within the domain of RT.

In relation to multimodality, Yus (2009) and Ifantidou and Tzanne (2006) present the connection between multimodality and RT. Particularly, Yus (2009) holds that it is possible to interpret any type of metaphor (i.e. verbal, visual or both) by using the same mechanism of pursuing optimal relevance, finding the balance between cognitive effect and processing effort.

In chapter 6, I demonstrated how argumentation by figurative language is realized, by analysing some real cases of English and Korean verbal advertisements particularly from print media such as newspapers and magazines or billboards. A commercial advertisement is one of
the most salient examples which show the speaker’s argumentation, in that every commercial advertisement aims to stimulate consumers’ purchasing motivation and behaviours.

In doing this, I also proposed explanations of some linguistic phenomena in which metaphor and irony work together: connection and overlap. Connection is when metaphor and irony are explicitly or implicitly connected by a connective (e.g. *but*), and collaborate with each other, in order to achieve successful communication (as argumentation). Overlap is that metaphor and irony work together, without any explicit connection. In the case of overlap, the speaker’s metaphorical utterance works as irony in the given situation (i.e. metaphorical irony).

Finally, I expect this study to contribute to the field of pragmatics in the following ways. First, in chapter 3 I proposed the explanatory grounds which may support the previous positions (e.g. Camp 2006, 2008, 2009) viewing the status of metaphor as ‘what is implicated’. This might invigorate the recent debates on metaphor as ‘what is said’ vs. ‘what is implicated’.

Second, this thesis proposes an alternative approach to explaining exceptional cases of irony within the domain of the RT approach, which Sperber and Wilson’s standard RT does not treat. Thus, this alternative approach may strengthen the explanatory power of RT.

Third, RT has defined the goal of communication as merely conveying information. However, I argue that the scope of RT application should be extended to the domain of argumentation, by verifying that communication is accompanied with argumentation. This approach ultimately increases the theoretical utility of RT, in that it offers the ground for RT to cover the domain of argumentation as well as that of communication.

Fourth, as discussed in Guattari (1984), integrated pragmatics (e.g. Ducrot 1980, 1984), devalues metaphor, and this approach denies or doubts defining figurative language as the method of communication (as argumentation). This thesis rejects this position, because we empirically know that even figurative language (i.e. metaphor and irony) is successfully used in communication as argumentation (e.g. advertisements and politicians’ speeches). Moreover, although there are several neo-rhetoric studies which treat metaphor (e.g. Perelman 1977), they
treat just the rhetorical issues of the relation between analogy and metaphor, rather than the
process of argumentation by metaphor or irony, or both, within the dimension of communication.
This work verifies, within a pragmatic perspective, how figurative language successfully
performs argumentation.

Fifth, although communication and argumentation have separately been studied by
different fields (i.e. RT and AT) so far, this work aims an integrated approach to explaining
communication (as argumentation) by pursuing the harmony between RT and AT. This approach
proposes a way of more economical explanation on communication (as argumentation).
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