Leviathan carbon taxes in the short-run

Tol, Richard S J (2012) Leviathan carbon taxes in the short-run. Climatic Change, 114 (2). pp. 409-415. ISSN 0165-0009

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Abstract

A cap is imposed on the carbon tax rate if the total tax revenue is not allowed to increase. Using recent data on the carbon-intensity of the economy and the overall tax take, I show that this cap constrains almost any climate policy in at least some countries. A larger number of countries, emitting a substantial share of global carbon dioxide, cannot fully participate if the carbon tax (or equivalent alternative regulation) is high enough to meet the 2 °C target. For that target, the carbon tax revenue in 2020 is greater than 10 % of total tax revenue in every country.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of Business, Management and Economics > Economics
Subjects: A General Works
Depositing User: Richard Tol
Date Deposited: 15 Mar 2013 08:16
Last Modified: 15 Mar 2013 08:16
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/44038
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