A more efficient derivative action system in China: challenges and opportunities through corporate governance theory

Zhao, Jingchen (2013) A more efficient derivative action system in China: challenges and opportunities through corporate governance theory. Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 64 (2). pp. 233-253. ISSN 0029-3105

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Abstract

The derivative action is an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle thatwas introduced with high expectations during a Chinese company law (CCL hereinafter) reform that came into effect in 2006. It is vital to combat the abuse of derivative action in China, a country with an emerging corporate governance model, a weak legal system and inefficient enforcement measures. This article examines several deficiencies in derivative actions, with the purpose of arguing for a more effective and positive derivative action rule for the benefit of shareholders and their companies, and also for the development of CCL and the reconstruction of the Chinese corporate governance system. Corporate governance theories will be discussed as theoretical supports for a more efficient and enforceable derivative action system in China.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of Law, Politics and Sociology > Law
Subjects: K Law
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Jingchen Zhao
Date Deposited: 05 Feb 2013 15:56
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2017 00:52
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/43637

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