Recognition and property in Hegel and the early Marx

Chitty, Andrew (2013) Recognition and property in Hegel and the early Marx. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16 (4). pp. 685-697. ISSN 1386-2820

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Abstract

The article attempts to show, first, that for Hegel the role of property is to enable persons both to objectify their freedom and to properly express their recognition of each other as free, and second, that the Marx of 1844 uses fundamentally similar ideas in his exposition of communist society. For him the role of ‘true property’ is to enable individuals both to objectify their essential human powers and their individuality, and to express their recognition of each other as fellow human beings with needs, or their ‘human recognition’. Marx further uses these ideas to condemn the society of private property and market exchange as characterised by ‘estranged’ forms of property and recognition. He therefore uses a structure of ideas which Hegel had used to justify the institutions of private property and market exchange in order to condemn those same institutions. It is concluded that Marx’s adoption from Hegel of the idea that property as the means of self-objectification and of expressed recognition, leaves his vision of communism open to the charge that in it, just as in market society, the relations between human beings are mediated by things.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Marx, Hegel, recognition, property
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Andrew Chitty
Date Deposited: 31 Oct 2012 15:33
Last Modified: 08 Mar 2017 13:47
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/41759

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