A new argument for pragmatism?

Booth, Anthony Robert (2008) A new argument for pragmatism? Philosophia, 36 (2). pp. 227-231. ISSN 0048-3893

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Abstract

Shah, N. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 481–498 (2006) has defended evidentialism on the premise that only it (and not pragmatism) is consistent with both (a) the deliberative constraint on reasons and (b) the transparency feature of belief. I show, however, that the deliberative constraint on reasons is also problematic for evidentialism. I also suggest a way for pragmatism to be construed so as to make it consistent with both (a) and (b) and argue that a similar move is not available to the evidentialist. Thus, far from settling the debate in favour of evidentialism, considerations concerning the deliberative constraint on reasons support pragmatism.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Depositing User: Anthony Booth
Date Deposited: 01 Nov 2012 16:29
Last Modified: 01 Nov 2012 16:29
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/41326
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