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Claiming Citizenship in the Shadow of the State

Violence and the making and unmaking of citizens in Rio de Janeiro

Joanna Wheeler
December 2010

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Doctor of Philosophy
WORK NOT SUBMITTED ELSEWHERE FOR EXAMINATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

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JOANNA WHEELER, DPHIL

CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE:
VIOLENCE AND THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF CITIZENS IN RIO DE JANEIRO

SUMMARY

This thesis asks questions about the meanings and practices of citizenship, and how they change in a context of violence. Questions of citizenship are relevant because violence shifts the fundamental circumstances for citizenship. Much of the existing literature on participatory governance and democratisation assumes a certain degree of safety and security, which is a distant reality for people whose daily lives are ordered by violence and insecurity. The overarching question at its heart is: what does citizenship mean in a context of violence?

In order to answer this larger question, this thesis explores the following:

- How does violence shape how people perceive and practice their citizenship?
- How does a spatially-specific context of violence and insecurity affect the way that the state acts and intervenes? What are different forms of authority (both legitimate and illegitimate) mediating the relationship of citizens with the state? And how do these different relationships shape the prospects for citizens claiming substantive rights?
- How can participatory action research be used to investigate citizenship in a context of violence, where there are significant risks in speaking publicly about power, violence, and democracy?

This thesis focuses on three specific dimensions of the citizen-state relationship: a) the ways that the meanings of citizenship are formed (and the processes of socialisation that lead to a sense of citizenship); b) the ways that citizens are able to act in order to make claims on the state; the way that state and other forms of authority act in relation to citizens; and, c) the types of mediators that intervene between citizens and state institutions. The starting point for this analysis is the empirical reality of favelas in Rio de Janeiro, where power and patterns of authority operate in certain ways that are shaped by violence.
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Chapter 1/Introduction

The favela was never the criminal's fortress
The favela was never the criminal's fortress
Only humble people, marginalised people live there
This is a truth that never appears in the papers

The favela is a social problem
The favela is a social problem

Yes, but I am the favela
And I can speak from where I stand
My people work hard
And never had any state welfare

And only live there
Because the poor don’t have any other option
Except the right
To an income of hunger and a forgettable life

Eu sou favela/Cru, by Seu Jorge (translation mine)

Introduction

Sueli is a black woman in her fifties and has spent most of her adult life working as an educator—teaching literacy to children and adults within the favela (an illegal housing settlement). She was born in Vila Cruzeiro (a favela in Rio de Janeiro) and has lived in Quitungo (a housing estate) since 1975. She has 5 children and 3 grandchildren. In the 1970’s, she was trained in Freirian methods through the Catholic Church and used this training to run adult education and literacy courses in the favela. She has been involved in many social projects aimed at improving people’s lives in the favela, and she has a strong sense of commitment to helping make things better. She helped advocate for a crèche to be opened in Quitungo, and she is paid very little for her work.

In 2003, one of her daughters became romantically involved with a member of the drug trafficking faction in control of Quitungo. She watched as her daughter became more and more drawn into the world of violence that swirls around the favela. Her daughter shaved her head and got tattooed with the faction symbols. Then her daughter got pregnant, and while she was pregnant her boyfriend abused her and threatened her family. He kicked her in the stomach and shot her through the foot. After the baby was born, Sueli’s daughter left the baby with Sueli and practically disappeared into life with the faction. At this point, a militia formed in Quitungo, and expelled those most closely linked to the faction. Sueli’s daughter, along with the other children and young people, fled the favela and hid in a near-by community. After three days, Sueli became very worried that her daughter would starve, so in desperation she

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1 Based on an interview with Sueli, 18 December 2006.
took her granddaughter and some food and tried to reach the place her daughter and the others were hiding. She was met by a young boy with an automatic rifle who barred her way. He told her that she could not come any further and that her daughter did not want to see her. She left the food, took her granddaughter and left.

Three days later, the group managed to escape from their hideout, but most could not return to Quitungo because of the militia. At the age of 17, Sueli’s daughter came home, but has been unable to leave the house or care for her baby daughter since. She’s being treated for severe depression and hypertension. Her boyfriend was killed several weeks later, burned to death inside a transit van in another favela by a rival faction.

Sueli’s work in the community has been continually hampered by violence. She holds her courses in the residents’ association building, and when it is unsafe because of warring factions or invasions, she has to cancel the classes. During one of the most intense periods of fighting between factions, she and her students were trapped inside the residents’ association for more than 18 hours. They had to lie on the floor so that stray bullets coming in through the windows would not hit them. They were only able to leave the following day after the worst of the shooting subsided. Because her daughter was involved with a faction leader, she was unable to prevent boys from the faction hiding their weapons in the water tank on top of her house when they were fleeing the police.

Sueli is the sort of person who should be able to act on her own citizenship by claiming her rights from the Brazilian government. Through her work as an educator and a leader in the community, she understands the transformative power of education, the responsibilities of the government to her, and her own rights. And yet her life is beset by the effects of violence: her children are damaged by it, her community is damaged by it, and all her work to try and change things seems to be drawn into the negative and destructive cycles within the favela.

‘We become marked by our past,’ she says of her experiences. Sueli does not passively accept the situation; she is working to change it at great risk to herself and to her family. Yet she has been unable to find on-going support from the government or any external actors to the favela. From her perspective, she faces the overwhelming odds of violence and fear on her own. She has no guarantees that she will able to continue to do this work or that it will ultimately contribute to a more peaceful and just community.
Sueli’s story is not unique. There are many women, men, and children like her that want to change the situation in the favelas, and yet conditions of violence and exclusion persist. The Brazilian government has largely been unable to shift these dynamics. Within this context, what does citizenship mean to Sueli? Although she understands the key elements of citizenship—her rights and responsibilities and those of the state, she is not able to claim them fully. Sueli’s story demonstrates some important dimensions of why this is a relevant question in the particular context in which she lives. Violence means that even people who are aware of their rights and the government’s responsibilities are often unable to act upon them. It also demonstrates how the state, as one of the less powerful actors in the favela, is unable to deliver on the basic rights of citizens, including security. And her story also shows how those in the community trying to instigate citizen action, even on a micro-level, are often unable to make significant headway because of violence.

This thesis asks questions about the meanings and practices of citizenship, and how they change in a context of violence. It will argue that questions of citizenship are relevant because violence shifts the fundamental circumstances for citizenship. Much of the existing literature on participatory governance and democratisation assumes a certain degree of safety and security which is a distant reality for people whose daily lives are ordered by violence and insecurity. This thesis seeks to understand the dynamics of citizenship where violence or the threat of violence predominate daily life. The overarching question at its heart is: what does citizenship mean in a context of violence?

In order to answer this larger question, this thesis will explore the following:

- How does violence shape how people perceive and practice their citizenship?
- How does a spatially specific context of violence and insecurity affect the way that the state acts and intervenes? What are different forms of authority (both legitimate and illegitimate) mediating the relationship of citizens with the state? And how do these different relationships shape the prospects for citizens claiming substantive rights?
- How can participatory action research be used to investigate citizenship in a context of violence, where there are significant risks in speaking publicly about power, violence, and democracy?

Citizenship itself has become more important as a concept with the ascendancy of democracy, both as a concept in itself and as related to democracy as a political system. Since the end of
the Cold War, democracy has become more important and also more hegemonic in the ways developed countries ‘promote’ it. ‘Democracy is at once the language of military power, neoliberal market forces, political parties, social movements, and non-governmental organisations’ (Gaventa 2006: 7). Yet whatever the face of democracy, citizenship is at its core, because it is fundamentally about the roles of people in democratic systems and the corresponding roles of institutions in relation to citizens. Therefore an analysis of citizenship in a context which does not conform to the ideal, where democracy is not functioning fully despite expectations that it ought to, is important. For people living in the favelas, the meanings and expressions of citizenship (or lack thereof) are a very relevant set of concerns, because they directly relate to their ability to access their rights by making claims on state institutions, feel safe in their homes and streets, and have a sense of belonging to their society.

These questions are important because they address a gap in the dominant literature on citizenship, and because they can bring important analytical implications for theoretical debates about citizenship. But the focus of this thesis is also important because while it draws primarily on a specific empirical context, this context has connections to wider trends which are of considerable significance in Brazil and beyond. Levels of violence and insecurity are on the rise globally, which means that the questions of how to build citizenship in violent contexts are more pressing and crucial (Koonings and Krujit 2004; 2007; Pearce 2007). The violence described in the context of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro and the patterns of authority that it perpetuates are not unique to that particular context. Other recent research points to the emergence of similar patterns in civil war and post-war contexts such as Colombia, as well as other cases of everyday violence and security from El Salvador to South Africa (Mosoeetsa 2005; Hume 2007; Kalyvas, Shapiro et al. 2008). Thus, the conditions of everyday violence and insecurity that characterise Rio de Janeiro can be found in a growing number of places, in both the North and South.

The trend towards greater and more intense urbanisation, especially in emerging mega-cities in the global South will have serious implications for systems of governance (Appadurai 2002; Low 2004), as well as infrastructure, ecology, and a host of other issues (Sassen 1994; Davis 2004). Therefore, the questions of citizenship in an urban context are of growing importance globally, especially with the growing coincidence between urbanisation and violence (Wacquant 2008).
There is a large literature on failed and fragile states in both policy and academic circles (Rotberg 2004; Torres and Anderson 2004). It tends to categorise states which are unable or unwilling to effectively deliver development as failed or fragile. Brazil is generally considered to be an ‘effective’ state, however, as this thesis demonstrates, effective states like Brazil may have areas of extreme fragility or even failure in terms of the delivery of rights to citizens. This research is important in terms of engaging and critiquing the discourse on fragile and failed states from the perspective of the extreme fragility of the state experienced by people living in the favelas.

More fundamentally, questions about citizenship in this context are also of extreme importance because of their real impact on people’s lives on a daily basis. People need an understanding of their citizenship, not just because of the increasing social and political obligations it entails but because they use their understanding of citizenship as a means to get access to their rights and to make claims for greater accountability from the institutions that affect their lives. People’s perceptions and practices of citizenship from the favelas thus become an important empirical focus for this thesis.

**Fragmented citizenship**

This thesis argues that citizenship, as it is understood and experienced by people in the favela, is fragmented and that violence is central to understanding the ways that this fragmentation occurs. The theoretical framing for the meaning of citizenship will be the interaction between normative or aspirational elements and actual practices; where citizenship is understood broadly as the right to have rights (Arendt 2000; Dagnino 2005; Somers 2008). In these terms, then, the nature of citizenship within a context of high levels of violence is fragmented. Citizenship is fragmented in the sense that the relationship between citizens in the favela and the state function in some cases in a direct and accountable way (as with the access to certain social safety net programmes), in some cases in a perverse way (as with the security arrangements with armed actors such as the militias and drug trafficking factions), and in some cases is severely deteriorated (as in the lack of state response to the control of the factions over the favelas). The combination of these radically different experiences of citizenship, which may occur simultaneously, contribute to this fragmentation and unevenness. Fragmented citizenship describes how people in the favela experience and interpret their citizenship: as meaningful only in small snatches of accountability with the state; as heavily mediated by armed actors; and, as filtered through non-democratic patterns of authority. This
thesis will examine different dimensions of the citizen-state relationship in order to construct a more complete picture of how citizenship is fragmented in a context of violence.

In the broadest terms, citizenship implies a relationship between individuals and state institutions. There is a very large literature that problematises and extends the conceptualisation of different dimensions of this relationship, which will be reviewed in greater detail in Chapter 2. This thesis argues that it is necessary to consider how three dimensions of citizenship are implicated by violence: 1) the ways that the meanings of citizenship are formed through distinct processes of socialisation, and the ways that citizens are able to act in order to make claims on the state; 2) their perceptions of power and of the state’s ability to intervene, the patterns of authority operating within the favela, and the degree of legitimate political authority wielded by the state; and 3) the role of armed mediators operating at the interface between citizens and the state. The purpose of this thesis to examine the ways that high levels of violence shape each of these three dimensions (meanings and practices of citizenship, the nature of state authority, and the manners in which mediators intervene between citizens and the state). The starting point for this analysis is the empirical reality of favelas in Rio de Janeiro, where power and patterns of authority operate in certain ways that are shaped by violence.

Citizenship is affected by violence in a number of ways. This thesis will argue that the relationship between citizenship and violence involves the complex interaction between the spaces of socialization of violence and citizenship, from the level of the individual, to the community to the city. This interaction shows the relationship between the lack of citizenship and the presence of violence is not a linear one, but rather a multifaceted process where the experience of citizenship in some levels can be affected by violence and in others may be untouched. It is this complex interrelationship that further accentuates the fragmented nature of citizenship.

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2 There are debates about the institutional reference for citizenship, including literature which addresses corporate citizenship (where corporations have responsibilities akin to those of the state) (Whitfield, D. (2001). Public Services or Corporate Welfare: Rethinking the Nation State in the Global Economy. London, Pluto Press.) as well as other literature referring to global citizenship, such as (Falk, Richard (1994). The making of global citizenship. The Condition of Citizenship. van Steenbergen. London, Sage: 127-140.) In both cases the primary institutional reference is not the state. However this raises a host of other debates. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus on citizenship will be primarily as a relationship between citizens and state institutions, although there are undoubtedly some contexts in which the state is not the only or the most important institutional actor.
Chapter 4 will examine the interrelationship between how people within the favela perceive their citizenship and the ways that they practice that citizenship, and how the experience of violence affects both. Participatory and collective analysis will make clear how the meanings of citizenship, from the perspectives of people living in the favela, become emptied out by violence. In particular, the fear and sense of powerlessness that many people experience as a result of violence contributes to a strong sense that citizenship does not have meaning. Combined with a lack of rights in other areas, violence in many ways negates a sense of citizenship at the level of the favelas, despite a strong national discourse on democratic citizenship. This chapter will focus on how this understanding directly informs how people enact their citizenship. Agency and the potential for social action within the favela is a double-edged sword, with many examples of social action contributing to the dynamics of violence and feeding into perverse politics. This chapter will show how violence perpetuates barriers to citizenship at different levels of socialisation, and citizenship is thus fragmented in parallel to these barriers across the same levels of socialisation and experience. However, acts of citizenship that transcend the boundaries of parallel communities and articulate new kinds of relationships do occur. Even within a context pervaded by violence in the way the favelas are, this chapter explores the possibilities for transformative education, developing external networks and the prospects of building greater accountability of the state through acts of citizenship.

Violence also affects how the state is able to intervene within the favelas. Chapter 5 examines how state power is fractured through the existence of anti-democratic patterns of authority that take hold in favelas partly through the use or the threat of the use of violence. A participatory analysis of sources of power from the perspective of favela residents will show how state power (in terms of the state’s ability to intervene within the favela) is very weak in many respects, but especially in the sense that there is no confidence amongst citizens in the state to bring about lasting positive changes or guarantee rights. This chapter will show that within the favela, a different pattern of authority operates, based on the control of armed actors. This pattern of authority orders much of everyday life, controlling people’s use of public space as well as prospects for social mobilisation. As a result of these two factors, the legitimacy of state authority is weakened, and socially-constructed authority for armed actors becomes prevalent. This fragments citizenship further by forcing citizens to negotiate with armed actors for access to their rights, and by limiting the capacity of the state to respond.
Coercive mediators, who rely on violence or the threat of violence, then control both how citizens are able to make claims on the state and also how the state and other external actors are able to intervene. Chapter 6 focuses on the role of coercive mediators in terms of how they affect the relationship between citizens of the favela and the state. The positioning of these mediators at the intersection between citizens and the state is a result of violence. Mediators intervene in social programmes and other state benefits, influencing how these are distributed. They also control who can mobilise both politically and socially and therefore who represents the community to the state. Coercive mediators undermine citizenship in some respects because they are not accountable to citizens for their actions or position. At the same time they are more effective than the state, in many cases, at delivering benefits and access to services. The entrenchment of coercive mediators within the favelas further fragments citizenship, creating a separate kind of relationship between citizens and mediators, than that between citizens and the state.

Finally, in order to understand how these dynamics unfold, it is necessary to situate citizenship geographically in a place. Bringing in a spatial dimension to the analysis of citizenship means that the place of the favela within the city has particular implications for citizenship. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the spatial lens suggests that parallel power and perverse politics result. Chapter 7 will analyse how the fragmented nature of citizenship, demonstrated through the meanings and expressions of citizenship within the favela, the lack of legitimate political authority and prevailing patterns of authority within the favela and the prominence of coercive mediators combine to reinforce geographically specific dynamics of power, often described by residents as ‘parallel power’. At the same time, by understanding citizenship through the lens of a particular place, a pattern in how politics are structured also becomes legible, and the nature of these politics is perverse. The implications of ‘parallel power’ and perverse politics for citizenship will be the focus of chapter 7. The boundaries of parallel communities and the nature of perverse politics disrupt the distances over which citizens can hold the powerful to account. Within the favela, it is often only possible to hold the dominant power-holders to account in a very limited way (as in the case with the coercive mediators). Because of the lack of accountability within the context of the favela itself and the way that this shapes the overall relationship between the citizen and the state, this amplifies the problem into the wider dimensions of state accountability.

Finally, this thesis will make the case for how participatory action research can be used to research citizenship in violence. First and foremost, it is a means of generating knowledge and
empirical material that would not be possible by other methods, due to the difficulty of access and open discussion in this context. However, this thesis also argues that the methodology as a process tested the actual research questions and generated insights into the central research questions that contribute empirical material to the overall argument set out above. These insights will be addressed in each of the relevant chapters.

**Overview of relevant areas of literature**

There is an immense literature on citizenship. This thesis will not engage with the entire literature. Instead, the intention is to use a specific context (the favelas of Rio de Janeiro) to interrogate some of the dominant theories of citizenship. Liberal theories of citizenship characterise citizenship as a relationship between a person and an authority, where the citizen is a rights-bearer and the state authority is the duty-holder (Locke 1993). There are many challenges to the liberal version of citizenship. These include feminist critiques that challenge the public/private divide inherent in this characterisation (Lister 1997; Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999); neoliberalism and neoliberal approaches to citizenship that involve the retreat of the state and marketisation of citizenship (Dagnino 2005); social exclusion and contestation of the meaning of citizenship on the basis of particular identities (Kymlicka 1995; Isin and Wood 1999); globalisation and the erosion of state sovereignty in certain domains and its re-entrenchment in others (Falk 1994; Fox 2005). Each of these areas of literature expands and challenges the narrow liberal conception of citizenship. This thesis will also interrogate the limits of a liberal conception of citizenship, by investigating how citizenship operates when the state does not monopolise the legitimate use of violence, and when non-state and quasi-state violence is used to establish and maintain certain patterns of authority. The focus will be on how high levels of violence create generalised socio-political and psychological effects (among others), rather than on cataloguing specific incidents of violence.

This means that three sets of more bounded and specific literatures will be important. The first is the general literature on citizenship, especially as it relates to urban spaces. Within this literature, one of the key current debates is whether the spatial specificities of cities and the urban context itself have implications for citizenship itself (Holston 1999; Barnett and Low 2004; Desforges, Jones et al. 2005). The second relevant set of literature is that on violence, particularly in urban contexts. Again, there is a substantial and wide-ranging literature on violence, and this thesis will not engage with even the majority of this. It will focus specifically on the literature on urban violence, and even more specifically on the micro-dynamics of urban violence (Winton 2004). Finally there is a considerably more limited literature that
directly addresses violence and citizenship (Koonings and Krujit 2004; Holston 2008). This thesis is positioned at the overlap of these sets of theoretical debates: around citizenship, its meaning and practice; in urban spaces and the way that citizenship and violence play out in urban space; and on violence as it relates to citizenship. Chapter 2 summarises these debates in order to relate the analytical framework in this thesis to them.

**Methodological approach**

In order to research these questions, the research drew on elements of participatory action research and participatory learning and action, which treat research as a process that can create emancipatory knowledge by involving participants as active researchers (Park, Brydon-Miller et al. 1993; Pretty, Gujit et al. 1995; Reason and Bradbury 2001; Gaventa and Cornwall 2008). In particular, this research was designed to give the participants the opportunity for ‘collective self-reflective enquiry...in order to improve the rationality and justice of their own social...practices, as well as their understanding of these practices and the situations in which these practices are carried out’(Kemmis and McTaggart 1988: 1). In order to address these three foci of participatory action research (identifying practices, understanding these practices, and analysing the situations in which these practices are carried out), the research process facilitated public debate through participatory discussion groups in public spheres, connecting people of different social class, gender, age, and social positioning (see Kemmis 2008). The methodology also integrated aspects of participatory urban appraisal (Moser and Holland 1997; Moser and McIlwaine 1999; 2004), and core elements of feminist methodologies, including attention to the intersection of race, gender and class, and issues of interpretation, translation and representation (Harding and Norberg 2003: 2011).

There are several reasons why this particular methodological approach was necessary. It was important from an ethical perspective both in terms of increasing the voices of people living in favelas about their situation, and in constructing a research process that gave participants as much control as possible. On the basis of my previous experience in the favelas, where I witnessed the suffering resulting from violence and the disenfranchisement and social exclusion that accompanied it, I undertook this research in part to try and encourage the space for democracy within this context. In that sense, I am not claiming to be a neutral observer.

Aside from the ethical considerations, there was also a more pragmatic reason for choosing this methodological approach. Access to the favelas for in-depth research, especially on the topics of violence, is extremely limited. The difficulty of using surveys to research the micro-
level dynamics of conflict is well documented (Justino, Leavy et al. 2009). In fact, without strong relationships with residents in the community it is not possible to do any research there, as people would simply refuse to talk to you or you would be denied physical access to the community. This difficulty in carrying out in-depth empirical research in favelas leads to often-superficial analysis of the situation. Because of a participatory action approach, working directly with community residents as researchers, this research had a unique kind of access to this environment, and generated empirical material that could not have been gained using any other methodology.

The process of research, itself, served to interrogate central concerns of research about how citizens can act within a context of violence to claim their rights as citizens. The research process, on a small scale, represented an attempt to mobilise different segments of the favela to participate in the research and to engage in thinking about how to understand their situation and how to change it, and to generate a sense of citizenship through this process. More specifically, each of the three aspects of citizenship this thesis addresses also emerges in the research process (i.e. how to create meaning for citizenship in a context of violence and the possibilities for acts of citizenship that follow, the way that power and patterns of authority are shifted by violence, the role of mediators). There was an important initial challenge of creating an identity of researcher for the community residents involved in the research, which is a parallel for people seeing themselves as citizens—with certain rights and responsibilities. I designed the research process to directly challenge certain forms of power (e.g. the traditional power dynamics in research, which are top-down from the researcher to the research subjects). This contrasts with the often contradictory and overlapping patterns of authority within the context of the favela, from an ostensibly democratic relationship with the state, to patterns of authority based on hierarchy and violence. Like any citizens within the favela who want to engage with external actors, the research project required negotiation with the violent mediators controlling the favelas, reflecting the research results on how mediators permeate the relationships with external actors in the favela. Finally, the research process itself was a laboratory for acts of citizenship, on the scale of participating in the research process and then asking the question about future action as a result. This thesis will trace each of these aspects of the methodology as they relate to the analysis of citizenship throughout the thesis. Chapter 3 provides a deeper description of the methodology, a more detailed case for why I chose it, and some reflections on how it worked in practice.
Modes of citizen-state relations: the co-evolution of the Brazilian state and civil society

Over the past century in Brazil, there have been more than six constitutions and widely disparate forms of government, from populist authoritarianism under Getúlio Vargas, to military dictatorship, to formal democracy (Skidmore 2009). The regime changes and subsequent constitutions have translated into shifting formal definitions of citizenship in Brazil, but also to differences in the way that the state has presented itself to ‘citizens’ of the favelas under a range of guises. The nature of the state and the landscape of social movements have co-evolved over that time, and the mode of interaction between the two is important in terms of understanding the degree to which democratisation has taken hold in Brazil (Menino, Shankland et al. 2011).

The current features of Brazilian citizenship began to emerge in the 1920s with a series of social movements calling for new forms of rights, such as the right to vote for women and the right to an education and a pension. The most powerful social movement during this period was organized labour, which made increasing demands for progressive labour laws. In 1930, populist governor Getúlio Vargas capitalised on existing social movements to gain national political power—and immediately abolished national, state and municipal legislatures on corruptions charges. As a result of the power of the labour movement at that time, the 1934 Vargas Constitutions established the right to education and encoded basic labour laws, including a 40-hour workweek and the right to weekly leave. The state, during this period, developed a strong corporatist structure, which incorporated the labour movement by extending these rights to urban workers officially registered in state-controlled unions (Menino, Shankland et al. 2011). These rights were translated unevenly into practice for residents of the favelas many of whom would not be officially registered workers, and the state largely ignored favelas and their residents during this period. From the 1930s to the 1950s, when there was a brief interlude of democracy before the period of dictatorship, the relationship between the state and citizens was characterized primarily by populism and paternalism, and these tendencies continue currently, despite the many changes to the state subsequently (Santos 1997; Menino, Shankland et al. 2011)

However, from 1950, high levels of migration would begin to swell the population of many favelas and lead to the rapid expansion of the favelas in the North of Rio de Janeiro. As the population of the favelas grew, the state was forced to engage with citizens from the favelas.
During the period of the military dictatorship, the state entered into a directly antagonistic relationship with the favelas, actively seeking to undermine social mobilisation from within the favelas (such as the forced removal of favelas and the relocation of residents to geographically disperse locations far from the city centre) (Wheeler 2002). While the labour movement was incorporated into more formal structures of political power under Vargas (such as the Partido Trabalhista or Worker’s Party), under the dictatorship, new social movements that began to emerge catalysed around specific identities (such as quilombola and the black movement, indigenous peoples, feminist, gay rights) and were positioned in an oppositional way to the state (Darnovsky, Epstein et al. 1995; Alvarez, Dagnino et al. 1998; McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2003; Tilly 2007). These new social movements, together with elements of the labour movement forced into opposition to the state due to the repression of civil and political rights, gain in strength and had significant influence over the crafting of the 1988 post-dictatorship constitution.

The current constitution, ratified in 1988, marked the end of more than 20 years of military dictatorship, and expanded considerably the number of rights and the concept of citizenship in Brazil set out by the 1934 Vargas Constitution. For the first time in Brazilian history, the illiterate were allowed to vote. The involvement of new social movements and other elements of civil society in opposition to the dictatorship, ensured that the 1988 constitution defined Brazilian citizenship in broad terms:

“We the representatives of the Brazilian People, convening the National Constituent Assembly to institute a democratic state for the purpose of ensuring the exercise of social and individual rights, liberty, security, well-being, development equality, and justice as supreme values of a fraternal, pluralist and unprejudiced society, founded on social harmony...this is a legal democratic state and is founded on sovereignty; citizenship; the dignity of the human person; the social values of labour and of free enterprise; and political pluralism’ (Political Database of the Americas 2002).

The constitution also addressed Brazil’s overall social structure:

“The economic order...is intended to ensure everyone a life with dignity, in accordance with the dictates of social justice, with due regard for the following principles: national sovereignty; private property; the social function of property; free competition; consumer protection; environmental protection; reduction of regional and social differences; and the pursuit of full employment’ (Political Database of the Americas 2002).

While some of the rights included in the 1988 constitution, such as the right to education and nationalised social security, had been established by the 1934 Vargas Constitution, the list of rights included in the 1988 constitution is unusual in its scope, far exceeding, for example, the
American Bill of Rights. It includes the right to culture, sports, social security, education, health care, leisure, family planning, and a healthy environment. Also included are sweeping labour rights, including a realistic minimum wage, paid maternity and paternity leave, retirement benefits and day care, among others (Kingstone 2000).

Beyond the rights set out in the constitution, the document also marks an important shift in the mode of interaction between the state and citizens, as citizen participation is also enshrined in the constitution. The constitution formally instituted participation as part of the governance structure in Brazil through consultative councils at different levels of government (Coelho 2004; Cornwall and Coelho 2007). There is a significant body of research that examines the effectiveness and dynamics of these participatory mechanisms, including participatory budgeting, health councils and environmental councils. Brazil’s attempts at participatory democracy have attracted global attention.

Most recently, a series of centre left presidents have developed a series of extensive social protection programmes (*Bolsa Família* (Family Fund), *Luz Para Todos* (Light For All), *Fôme Zero* (Zero Hunger), etc.), aimed at reducing persistent poverty and social exclusion (Almeida 2005). This represents a trend towards the greater recognition by the state of the need to strengthen economic and social rights (Menino, Shankland et al. 2011). The drive towards reducing the persistent social and economic inequalities in Brazil, has coincided with the entrenchment of formal mechanisms for citizen participation across a range of sectors of public policy, as described above. Taken together, these two trends reflect the current nature of state-civil society relations. Menino, Shankland et al. summarise these as a reflection of:

‘...the dynamics of an unconventional democracy, one sustained on the uneasy balance between stable, democratic institutions on one side and unattended demands on the other; a stable democracy in which vivid participatory institutions, a modern set of laws, diverse formal channels of interaction and a strongly and diversely mobilised civil society live side by side with a government that is merely partially responsive; a democracy in which the state’s response to claims remains limited, while CSOs remain largely non-violent and trustful of the institutional channels of negotiation’ (Menino, Shankland et al. 2011).

However, this analysis of the co-evolution of state-society relations and the changing nature of citizenship for residents of favelas does not fully take into account how the rising levels of violence are also affecting the nature of citizen-state relations and democracy in Brazil, and how the state’s use of violence undermines its efforts to advance rights in other areas (Holston 2008). Little research has been done to understand how the significant levels of violence in different parts of the country limit the effectiveness of participatory mechanisms and social safety net programmes. This thesis argues that violence shapes how the state appears to
citizens and how citizens see their citizenship and make claims on the state. Such an understanding of how violence affects citizenship, particularly for citizens of the favelas, is necessary in order to understand the quality of democracy in this context.

**Context of Rio de Janeiro**

Rio de Janeiro, with just over 6 million residents, is one of the growing number of ‘mega-cities’ across the world, where large percentages of the population live in uncertain and poor conditions (Sassen 1994). Currently 3.2 billion people worldwide live in urban areas, and cities will account for all future population growth (Davis 2004: 5). The UN estimates that by 2020 ‘urban poverty in the world could reach 45—50 percent of the total population living in cities’ or nearly 2 billion people (United Nations Human Settlement Programe 2003). While about 20% of the population in Rio de Janeiro live favelas, only 6% of the total population holds a regularised legal title to their housing property (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro 2010). The lack of access to urban services such as water, electricity, and rubbish collection, to adequate housing, and to labour markets is a problem faced by millions in Mumbai, Johannesburg, Lagos, Mexico City and many others.

This relationship of structural social inequality has been described by Luis Antonio Machado as ‘controle negociado’ or negotiated control, which means an asymmetrical system of exchanges within the city between different geographical spaces which leads to the unravelling of solidarity and cohesion within the city (Machado da Silva 2002; Burgos 2005). *Controle negociado* is intended as a critique of the dominant analysis of interactions in the city as clientelistic. The relationships are clientelistic, but there is an overall rigid and hierarchical ordering of those relationships that means that certain powerful elements within the city benefit from maintaining the status quo. These relationships are manipulated by political intermediaries who translate the interests of different factions within marginalised communities into shares of public services. This makes the territorialisation of favelas more pressing, acting as a substitute for a struggle for rights from the state.

The extreme spatialisation of inequality that currently characterises Rio de Janeiro is at least partly due to the history of how the city developed over the past century (Alvito and Zaluar 1998). The first favela was created in the late 1800’s by former slaves working at Rio’s docks, who were evicted from tenement housing—when the government razed the buildings. Since then, favelas have emerged on land considered inappropriate for commercial development at
the time\(^3\), in response to the chronic lack of affordable housing. Currently, there are over 500 favelas (depending on how boundaries are drawn). The largest growth of favelas and other low-income communities was the result of an influx of migration from the northeast of Brazil during the 1950s and 1960s. This migration occurred from rural to urban areas across Brazil and was part of an important transformation of Brazilian society more generally. In Rio, this migration led to the rapid growth of the city, and increased the demand for low cost housing. The lack of any consolidated policies on urbanisation meant that settlements emerged in response to demand, and the infrastructure for these settlements was the responsibility of residents. As a result, residents of favelas have not, until very recently, had formal access to electricity, sewage, telephones, rubbish collection, street paving, etc. Despite over a hundred years of history, most favelas remain outside of the formal grid of urban services. Residents’ associations formed in favelas normally took responsibility for managing informal infrastructure networks. The position of the state with respect to the favelas has tended towards malign neglect, with brief periods of hostility and aggression and more recently positive intervention. There have been few coordinated attempts by the government to change the geographically entrenched exclusion. An exception is the FavelaBairro programme. During the 1990s, UN Habitat, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the city and federal government invested millions of dollars in a major upgrading programme designed to transform ten of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas into legitimate ‘neighbourhoods’. This programme, FavelaBairro (literally FavelaNeighbourhood), has had only mixed results, and has also led to increasing rates of expulsão branca (white expulsion, or gentrification), as favela residents have sold their recently regularised properties and moved into more precarious housing (Alvito and Zaluar 1998). More importantly, these programmes did not change the fundamental power dynamics at work in the favela.

In addition to favelas, other forms of low-income settlements include conjuntos, or housing estates. Many conjuntos were built during the military dictatorship to house residents of favelas in more central areas that were razed. The social context of living in a conjunto is not that different to living in a favela, even though residents have legal titles to their property in

\(^3\) In many cases, land occupied and settled as a favela latter became highly valued real estate. During the military dictatorship a number of favelas on prime land in the Zona Sul were razed and the residents resettled into distance housing estates. As the city has grown, many of these housing estates have now become part of the more central part of the city. New favelas are emerging in parallel to the expansion of the city itself to the west, as new developments for the middle class bring a demand for civil construction workers and other menial jobs.
some cases. Many conjuntos are surrounded by favelas, and the same kind of spatial barriers include conjuntos and favelas, merging into similar set of social dynamics including violence.⁴

Formally, favelas are defined as illegal settlements, but this formal definition does not quite capture the full meaning. Favela is partly defined in opposition to asfalto or pavement, which in one word represents formalised neighbourhoods where the state takes responsibility for providing services. There is also a sociological meaning to the term and an implication in terms of the type of relationship between that space and the rest of the city:

‘...the category ‘favela’ does not translate simply into a specific form of housing conglomeration [including favelas, conjuntos, and/or aloateamentos], but instead represents a particular territorial configuration, defined by a specific pattern of relationship with the city. A housing conglomeration becomes a ‘favela’ when it develops a territorial identity, which is the source of complex local institutions that establish specific interactions with the institutions of the city’(Burgos 2005: 190).

These specific interactions with the city are reflected in the lack of access to basic services such as education, health care, and security, unequal integration into the job market, and the social stigma associated with favelas. From the early 1900s, favelas have been labelled as the source of ‘contamination’, violence, and criminality by the media, public officials, and other forms of public discourse.⁵

Into this context of spatialised inequality and the unevenness of state capacity, violence driven by the drug trafficking trade and the state’s violent response to it has entered. Global demand for drugs, and global flows of drugs and arms have helped to perpetuate the power of drug trafficking groups in Brazil (as elsewhere). The volume of cocaine being trafficked globally has increased dramatically in the past few decades (Moser and Rodgers 2005). Over the past decade, the structure of the global drug trade has shifted. Local sellers and distributors are paid in kind through drugs, reducing the need for cash debts further up the chain and creating opportunities for ‘entrepreneurs’ at the street level and expanding the overall market

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⁴ The other major category of housing for working-class residents of the city is aloateamentos, where families were given small plots of land to incentivize relocation. Mainly aloateamentos are located in the suburbios, or the distant periphery of the city comprised almost entirely of poor and working-class neighbourhoods.

⁵ This kind of stigma associated with the label of favela continues to have an important role in the way that problems are framed in Rio de Janeiro. During 2002, there was a serious epidemic of dengue fever in the city (Tobar, Paula Gobbi and Hector (2002). Brazilians Battle Dengue Outbreak. Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles.). Publicly, favelas were blamed for the outbreak—with the media attributing the blame to the ‘dirty habits’ of favelas, such as piles of rubbish and open sewers. In fact, the species of mosquito carries dengue fever only breeds in clean water, so it was the gardens and pools of middle class residents that was the main source of the outbreak.
(Brinceño-León and Zubillaga 2002: 24). The most lucrative markets in the US and Europe are the main targets for the distribution network, although domestic markets across Latin America are growing. There is a strong incentive for local dealers to expand their own markets, as this is the only way to capitalise on their earnings—by selling or trading more drugs. This has, in part, fuelled the wars over territory between rival factions in Rio de Janeiro.

Parallel to this shift and expansion in the global market in drugs is the globalised arms trade. As Brinceño-Leon and Zubillaga point out, it is the lethality of crime (rather than just the levels of crime) in Latin America that is striking. Whereas 63% of all homicides worldwide are committed with firearms, in Latin America, the proportion exceeds 80 percent (ibid: 25). This is due to the readily available supply of arms: ‘The recent spread of firearms in the region is linked in considerable measure to drug trafficking: the drug organisations have also engaged in illegal distribution of guns as part of their payments to local distributors’ (ibid). In Rio de Janeiro, the sophistication and power of weapons is also escalating. As I was told in one interview with a community researcher in Quitungo: ‘Where before a young traficante would be happy with a pistol, now he wants an AK-47. Next they will have grenade launchers.’ Alcir, community researcher, 5 May 2007.

The rise of the drug trade, and the accompanying wars for control of the favelas contribute to an environment where the state is far from being the most powerful actor, and the ability of any part of the government to change this situation is limited. The favelas and conjuntos of Rio de Janeiro are an important site for understanding citizenship because they also represent the unevenness of state capacity to address social exclusion.

**The scale and scope of violence and the state response**

The issue of urban political violence becomes more pressing as it directly relates to a crisis in the legitimacy of political institutions, and to the meaning of citizenship and rights (Isin 2000). The violence of drug factions and the military police in Rio de Janeiro is both organised and systematic, and can only be understood in relation to the way it disproportionately affects different geographic spaces within the city. Excluded groups in Rio de Janeiro are faced with extremes of insecurity and safety in favelas and other marginalised communities. The levels of insecurity and the pervasiveness of the effects of violence within these communities are juxtaposed with the relative safety and state-control in other parts of the city where many residents of favelas and conjuntos work. At the same time, across Brazil’s cities, large parts of the middle class have retreated into fortified complexes, seeking to isolate themselves from
the threat of violence and the social processes that seem beyond their control (Caldeira 1999). In conjunction with the increasing spatial stratification of security, there is a growing privatisation of security. Middle class residents hire private security forces to protect their property and ensure their safety, while security in favelas is often both enforced and violated by trafficking groups. Jacqueline Chase argues that this perceived separation between the middle classes and favela residents is illusory, as in many ways people from these different parts of the city interact on a daily basis—often in very unequal ways. For example, favela residents provide most of the domestic services for middle class households (housekeeping, cooking, gardening, chauffer, etc.), as well as many other city services (garbage collection, driving buses, manual labour on construction projects, etc.)(Chase 2008).

With relatively high levels of violence in parts of Rio de Janeiro over a prolonged period of time, drug trafficking groups have become the dominant power in these communities. Between 2000 and 2006, 53,454 people have been killed or disappeared by a combination of drug trafficking groups, the military police, and para-statal death squads (Rio de Paz 2007). Homicides have increased from 9/100,000 in 1983 to 51/100,000 in 2002 (although this is as high as 90/100,000 in some regions of the city) (Iulianelli, Guanabara et al. 2004). The consequence of this violence is that ‘cultural constructions of violence as normal have been maintained and transformed in a range of contemporary urban contexts, with the result that an increasingly complex web of institutions, groups and individuals is involved in the perpetration of everyday violence’ (Winton 2004: 169).

While the specific context in Rio de Janeiro is fertile for the drug trafficking trade, global flows of drugs and arms are fueling the intensity of violence. Those most likely to be involved, whether as a perpetrator or a victim of violence, are young men under the age of 21. According to Amnesty International, young men between 15 and 24 are thirty times more likely than any other age group to die in homicide and 93% of all homicide victims are male (Amnesty International 2005). According to the Brazilian Census (IBGE), the homicide rate in the state of Rio de Janeiro per 100,000 inhabitants for young men between the age of 15 and 24 was 225 in 2004 and rose to 227 in 2005 (2006). For boys aged 10 to 19 years, the rate is 97

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6 In October 2005, Brazil held a plebiscite to give Brazilians the option to ban the sale and possession of weapons in the entire country as a means of reducing violence. This plebiscite was rejected by a high margin. In the public debate over the plebiscite, one of the main reasons for voting against the ban was that banning weapons would leave ‘honest citizens’ with out any protection, because weapons would then only be in the hands of bandidos (criminals), including the police. Basically, people in Brazil do not trust the government to ensure their safety. The rejection of the plebiscite shows how violence has undermined trust in government institutions.
per 100,000 (Costa 2006). At the same time, blacks are twice as likely as people of other race to die (Amnesty International 2005).

There has been significant research on the emergence of gangs in Latin America, and on the intersection between conceptions of masculinity, violence and gangs (see Rodgers 2003a, 2003b, Winton 2004). In the case of Rio de Janeiro, young people, especially young men and boys, become part of the machinery of traficante factions. Luke Dowdney, in his detailed study of children involved in the drug trade in Rio de Janeiro estimates that it employs approximately 10,000 people, primarily young men and boys (Dowdney 2003). In the Dowdney’s analysis, membership in ‘the movement’ (as traficantes often describe drug trafficking themselves) does provide a sense of belonging and protection in the face of fear and lack of place prevalent in most favelas (Dowdney 2003). Rodgers argues because violence ‘undermines the possibilities for making sense’, gangs are actively reconstituting the political at the level of the street, in lieu of a present state (Rodgers 2003: 131). I will not examine the complexities of why young men and boys become involved with gangs and violence here, but it is important to note the central role of young men and boys in the current configuration of parallel power in Rio de Janeiro.7

Rising levels of violence are also situated in the context of the city and state governments’ attempts at controlling the violence through repressive police action, growing levels of socio-economic inequality in the city, and a public discourse in the media around the favelas as the primary source of criminality and violence in the city as a whole. The dominant view in the public discourse on the state response to violence is that there is a zero-sum game between order and rights. This echoes a trend across Latin America that divides the public response into two camps, characterised by Fuentes as a pro-order coalition that advocates repressive policies in order to establish control through force, and a pro-civil rights coalition advocating greater respect for human rights within the context of violence (Fuentes 2009). Currently in Rio, the pro-order coalition is much more influential (Hinton 2005). This coalition gains ground with particular well-publicised events of violence that shock middle-class sentiments, such as the dragging to death of a five-year old boy behind a car stolen at a traffic light in 2007 (O

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7 There is also an important role that stigma plays in relationship to young men and boys, who are often demonised by the media. This kind of media hype and stigma contributed to public support for the actions of para-military death squads, like those responsible for the massacre of street-children sleep on the steps of the Candelária church in 1993, and the deaths of 29 people, mainly children, in Caxias in 2005. (Amnesty International (2005). Brazil: “They come in Shooting”: Policing socially excluded communities, Amnesty International.)
Globo 10 February, 2007). In a recent interview, Sergio Cabral, then the governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro was asked about a police invasion of a favela (Complexo do Alemão) on June 26, 2007 and the subsequent deaths of nearly 30 people:

‘What has to be done will be done. The majority of the population wants this, despite the stress that it might provoke. When you have a general infection, it is much better to give a strong antibiotic to resolve the problem then to just give a pain killer that won’t resolve the situation… The British ex-prime minister, Tony Blair has said that security is the most fundamental liberty. The left, for many years, has confused the execution of security as violence against citizens. Public security, in many cases, requires energetic action, which is violent. This may have a bad image, but it is necessary to guarantee public order.’ (translation mine, Veja, 09 July 2007)

Emblematic of the pro-order perspective is the caveirão, an armed car, painted with skull and crossbones, and fitted with automatic weapons and loud speakers. It is used by a special operations wing of the military policy for invasions into the favela, and is specially intended to intimidate and subdue residents of the favela (Costa 2007).

Most recently, this pro-order perspective within the government has resulted in two new developments in the security police. The first is a campaign of ‘shock of order’ (Grudgings 2009), intended to involve the enforcement of laws at all levels of society (from parking restrictions to drink driving to state control of the favelas):

‘To live in a society where the basic rules are not obeyed means chaos, irrespective of your social class. It is in the simple things that we are able to see how the city does not have rules or laws. For example: cars are parked on the sidewalks blocking the way for pedestrians. If individuals don’t respect the minimal rules, imagine the larger ones? Obeying rules is important for the poorest people in the city because they are most affected by their violation. Order in the city is not to benefit the residents of the Zona Sul (South Zone), because the most complaints come from the Zona Norte (North Zone)/Oeste (West). Our objective [with the shock of order campaign] is a city safe for all!’ Rodrigo Bethlem (Special Secretary for Public Order, architect of the shock of order campaign), policy debate in Santa Teresa, 4 June 2009

Related to this is the policy of ‘occupation’ of favelas. Under a new coalition between the mayor and state governor, police forces are ‘invading’ and then ‘occupying’ a small number of favelas (Associated Press, 2010). The government has committed to spending US$ 3.5 billion on this security policy (Amis, 2010). The goal of these occupations is to institute permanent state control of the territory. The underlying assumption is that through using overwhelming force to subdue armed actors within the favela, and maintaining police presence there, after it will be possible for the state to eventually institute other services, including regularising infrastructure under a major federally-funded initiative, Programa de Aceleração do
Crescimento (Growth Acceleration Programme or PAC). The long-term success of these policies is an open question.

**Traficantes, milícias, and the police: violent actors in the favelas**

There has been a historical evolution of the violent actors in the favela, which is emblematic of the relationship between the state and the citizens of the favelas. Since the 1980’s most favelas have been dominated by drug trafficking gangs (traficantes), who have taken advantage of the dearth of state presence in favelas to establish a highly complex structure for the distribution and re-sale of drugs, primarily cocaine and marijuana. Other research has analysed the structure of drug trafficking groups in Rio de Janeiro. This section provides a brief description of the key characteristics of what community residents call parallel power, essentially armed clientelists, and explains some of the dynamics that perpetuate this situation.

The role of traficantes in favelas is more than one of pure opportunism for carrying out illegal transactions. Traficantes have taken control of the internal governance systems in favelas by appointing their own allies to leadership positions in the residents’ associations. They control access to infrastructure, such as postal deliveries, sewage connections, electricity, etc. They control when residents come and go and how people make use of public space in favelas. They can close schools and local businesses at their discretion. Many residents within favelas call them parallel power, because the control that they exert is like that of the state, but with limited accountability to community residents. In some cases, different factions will use populist strategies to build support in the community, such as purchases drugs for the health clinic or sponsoring children’s football teams. The relationship between traficantes and the communities is partially legitimized through trade-offs: traficantes get anonymity and the space to trade and sell drugs and weapons and community residents receive some degree of services which the state has failed to provide (Winton 2004).

Both Dowdney and Rodgers have argued that parallel power does not fully describe the relationship between these groups and the state, because the groups are exploiting state

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weaknesses rather than trying to take over the role of the state (Dowdney 2003; Rodgers 2003). However, recent trends could be indicating new ambitions in terms of the reach of traficantes’ power. In some cases, traficantes have extended their influence into the political realm, by controlling who can run for political office. Candidates from a given community have to pay the traficantes a fee in order to be able to campaign openly and post their campaign photos publicly in the favela (Tiana 2006). In the past five years, traficantes have been extending their reach beyond favelas, with demonstrations of force in other parts of the city. In 2002, traficantes in Rio attacked municipal government buildings and burned buses in middle class parts of the city to demand the release of a head trafficker from prison. In 2006, traficantes in São Paulo obtained lists of addresses of officials in the police and justice system and attacked their homes, police stations, and bus stations, bringing the city to halt and spreading mass panic.

The history of the rise of the drug trafficking factions within Rio de Janeiro has particular implications for the relationship between citizens and the state. By failing to act, the state has allowed factions to gain in influence over time, operating at the margins of state control. The absence of the state, in many ways, from the favelas has given the factions the opportunity to develop their own competing form of authority within that context. For citizens, this has meant that their lack of status in some respects is constantly underlined by the persistent presence of the traffickers (despite the gains made with respect to certain rights, such as labour rights). As the strength of the factions has grown to the extent that they can directly threaten the normal operation of the city (and thus the authority of the state), the primary response has been through repressive policing and security measures in which many people within the favelas are killed. Traffickers act as mediators between the citizens and the state not out of a desire for political power, but out of necessity because they are the dominant local power structures within many of the favelas. Again, the implications for the citizen-state relationship are important—as citizens in favelas experience the state in a contradictory way through the persistent violent incursions of the police as well as more recently through nationally-mandated social and welfare policies.

Perhaps the best way to describe the situation is by using parallel power to mean the co-existence of different and at times conflictual authorities at the local level drawing on differing bases for their authority including violence. It is the overlap and contradiction between these authorities that translates into a lack of accountability for citizens. Drawing on extensive
research on violent actors in Rio de Janeiro, this statement describes the web of relationships between the state and other authorities:

‘I would like to qualify the existing idea that the violence of drug trafficking occurs in the ‘absence of the state’. I believe that this is true in some contexts, but I found other favela communities with excellent infrastructure and good ‘state presence’ co-existing with powerful drug trafficking gangs. Traficantes who command control over favela communities, *matadores* (assassins) who exercise influence over a large part of the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro and the Zona Oeste, and ‘private security forces’ that command control over other parts of the city—and in the middle of all of this are the citizens who live in these places. With an entity that’s presence is little felt: the state’ (Aleixo 2006: 29).

What this statement points to is the proliferation of violent actors within the favelas, all of whom are able to exert a significant degree of control and authority over the communities despite the contradictory presence of the state.

The relationship with the military police is part of this contradiction. Both the traficantes and the military police are responsible for numerous deaths. In some cases, traficantes have ‘arrangements’ with the police, who are involved directly with drug and arms trafficking. In 2006, 553 weapons (including automatic shotguns and machine guns) captured from the favelas were the property of the military police that had been sold to traficantes (Werneck 2006). When these arrangements break down or when a different faction tries to take control of a particular favela, the ensuing battles lead to high numbers of deaths and fatalities. From the perspective of many residents, both the military police and the traficantes are parallel power, because neither is accountable to the community and neither is legitimate. In addition to the traficantes, other types of armed groups have proliferated in favelas.\(^1\)

The most important development in terms of emerging forms of authority is the arrival of militias as a serious force in Rio de Janeiro. Prior to 2004, a militia controlled only one community in Rio de Janeiro, Rio das Pedras, and that militia had been in control for over thirty years. The remainder of Rio de Janeiro’s 500 favelas and housing estates were all controlled by one of the major drug trafficking factions. As the community timeline shows in Chapter 4, these factions often war with one another for control over lucrative drug sale and distribution points. In 2005, groups of men armed with police equipment began to invade and take control over favelas, expelling or killing those associated with the drug trafficking faction.

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and suppressing open drug trade (Bottari and Ramalho 2006; Ramalho 2006; Torres 2006). These ‘militias’, as the media has labelled them, are made up of a mixture of off-duty, retired, or suspended police officers (military and civil), prison guards, firemen, and civilians. Within 18 months of taking over the first favela in 2004, the militias controlled nearly 171 communities across the city (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008: 45). The trend towards vigilantism is not unique to Brazil, and both the rise of neoliberalism and persistent corruption are linked to ‘self-help’ security in other Latin American contexts (Goldstein 2005).

These militias vary by community. In some cases, they are made up of police officers, etc. who were residents, but had been expelled by the drug traffickers. In other cases, as different groups established secure bases, they invaded nearby communities where they have no ties. But in all cases, the militia retain close ties with the official police, often using weapons and vehicles from police depots for their ‘operations’, and communicating with the official police on a regular basis (Bottari and Ramalho 2006; Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008).

In most cases, the militia extort money from the community through a variety of means backed by threats of violence, from beatings and torture to execution (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008: 44). They charge local business and residents a ‘security fee’, they add a surcharge to electricity, gas, and water connections, and they also charge a fee on real estate transactions (Bottari and Ramalho 2006). The amounts extorted from the communities can vary greatly, but lead militia members demonstrate their wealth visibly, and are able to finance ‘operations’ against other favelas by hiring men with guns on a daily basis with the guarantee of a cut of the takings (Bottari and Ramalho 2006). Within the community, the common belief is that the militia pay a portion of the money that they extort to the local police precinct head (Tiana 2006; Dão 2007). Most recently the militia in Quitungo and Guaporé built gates and blockades at the entrances to the community. They claim that this is to prevent criminals from entering, but they have also started to charge residents to come and go. According to the Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito (Parliamentary Inquiry Commission or CPI), a large militia in the Campo Grande area of the city takes in $R 2 million per month (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008: 41).

The ambitions of many militias extend beyond security and financial gain. Increasingly, militias have strong ties with political figures. In 2007, two city councillors, a state senator, and the
The head of the Civil Police were arrested on charges of leading militias (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008: 34). The head of the civil police was later elected to the Senate and claimed immunity from prosecution. And in 2008, journalists from the newspaper O Dia were kidnapped and brutally tortured for carrying out investigations on the militia (ibid).

The militias pose an awkward problem for the city and state governments, charged with the responsibility for public safety. On one level, the militias appeal to the reactionary and politically powerful elements of society that believe that more repressive policies are needed to halt the violence spreading from the favelas to the rest of the city. On the other hand, the militias are not under the control of the government and are testament to the lack of accountability and corruption within the existing police and security forces. In effect, the militias demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the government within the favelas.

The militias imply a different kind of relationship between citizens and the state. Because the militias operate beyond of state authority, but draw on their connections to the state for some of their legitimacy (at least symbolically), they also therefore position themselves more strongly as a conduit between citizens and the state. For citizens of the favelas, the militias are perceived as able to deliver security and other services that the state has not, and this confers a greater degree of legitimacy on the militia’s authority. The blurred boundary between the militias and the state, such as the conviction of relatively high-level political figures for involvement in the militias, further supports this. For the state, the militias are evidence of the inability of the state to decisively intervene in a way that fundamentally changes the power dynamics within the favela (past interventions have improved material conditions, but not altered the dynamics of power and control within the favela. This is a key departure from the relationship between the state and the traffickers, in which traffickers have operated in the relative absence of the state, with little evidence of ambitions to exert legitimate political authority. The complexities these different armed actors generate in terms of how legitimate political authority is constituted are explored in Chapter 5. The particular historical evolution of the control of violent actors in the favelas studied is explored through a participatory community timeline of violence in Chapter 4.
**Quitungo/Guaporé and Santa Teresa: the case for selecting the research sites**

In Rio de Janeiro, there are distinct patterns of research that focus on certain favelas, so that there are large portions of the city that have never had a significant engagement in any research (McCann 2006). These favelas tend to be those with easy access to the South Zone, or have had major interventions by the government or external NGOs. This relatively small group of charismatic favelas is possibly over-researched. In addition, much of literature on violence (excluding survey data) in Rio de Janeiro is based on weak empirical research, also carried out within a very small percentage of total favelas. For me, it was important to conduct this research in areas not within the few that are usually researched (e.g. most favelas in the South Zone, and certain favelas in the North Zone such as Maré and Vigário Geral). The sites for this research, Quitungo and Guaporé in the North Zone and Santa Teresa in the South Zone, are not in the small group of favelas usually researched.

**Figure 1: Map of Rio de Janeiro**

Quitungo and Guaporé is the name for a community made up of two large housing estates which were built in 1970 to house residents from a favela called Catacumba which was razed by the military government. Quitungo and Guaporé are separated by a hill that now contains three favelas: Divinea, Piquiri, and Manguinhos. Residents consider these favelas part of Quitungo and Guaporé. Together, approximately 40,000 people live in this community according to community leaders (Interview with Cesário). While Catacumba was located in the South Zone of the city on the edge of the lagoon, Quitungo and Guaporé are in the city’s largely industrial North Zone. The North Zone is made up working class neighbourhoods,
favelas, and industrial sites. Within the North Zone, Quitungo and Guaporé are also within the administrative region with one of the highest levels of violence in the entire city (Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania 2008). Quitungo and Guaporé, despite very high levels of violence, have not experienced significant or high profile interventions by the government or external NGOs. Currently, two different factions of a para-police militia control Quitungo and Guaporé. Chapter 4 explores in greater detail the context and background of Quitungo and Guaporé in relationship to the central research questions.

Quitungo and Guaporé is an important site for this research because of history of the relationship with the state, which becomes legible through this location. Quitungo and Guaporé were created as a result of forced removal of prominent South Zone favela (Catacumba) during the dictatorship. Housing estates imply a role for the state that has not been fulfilled in subsequent years, leading to favelas surrounding the original estates. This lack of state presence is accompanied by a history of violence examined in greater detail in chapter 4. The nature of the violence in these areas a reflection of the history of the relationship between the communities and the state—violent actors (first traffickers and now the militia) have emerged unchecked by the state, and levels of violence reached extreme levels. This very high level of violence and geographical position within the city led to take over by militia, marking the start of a new period in the relationship between the communities and the state. Partly due to the strength of these armed actors, but also the frequent changes in the controlling faction, there is a comparative weakness of non-violent community organisations in Quitungo and Guaporé in relation to other favelas in the city (such as those studied in Santa Teresa). Finally, I conducted research on social mobility, citizenship and gender from 2000-2005 in Quitungo and Guaporé, so I had a strong existing network of contacts and knowledge of the community that was essential for the participatory approach to the research.

Santa Teresa, by contrast, is a primarily middle class neighbourhood in the affluent South Zone of the city, which is surrounded by around 17 different favelas. Residents of two of these favelas participated in the research process as community researchers: Prazeres and Fuguetierio. The research process constructed in partnership between myself and a local NGO, Viva Santa, which has focused on environmentally sustainable development for Santa Teresa.

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11 For example, within Prazeres, there are several external NGOs operating, including a UK-based volunteering programme (i2i), which places UK students as volunteers within the favela; a sexual health education NGO; several NGOs supporting cultural activities linked to the Ministry of Culture initiative Pontos de Cultura; a programme for young people and digital media skills (galera.com), and others.
including participatory dialogues between residents of the neighbourhood and leaders from favelas. Its membership is primarily middle class residents of Santa Teresa. Different drug-trafficking factions control Prazeres and Fogueiro, as are the rest of the favelas surrounding Santa Teresa. A total of 41,145 people live in Santa Teresa (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro 2009). Prazeres and Fogueiro benefited from major upgrading schemes sponsored by the municipal government (Favela-Bairro), and Prazeres in particular has received significant interventions by

The favelas in Santa Teresa are important as a comparative case because of the relatively strong relationship between favelas and middle class neighbourhoods surrounding them, and the uninterrupted control of drug trafficking faction which implies a different kind of premise for interaction with the state than that in Quitungo and Guaporé, and the comparative strength of non-violent community based organisations. I lived in Santa Teresa from 2000 to 2003, and became a member of a local NGO, so it is also a place in which I had strong existing relationships within the favelas and NGOs working with the favelas, and therefore a strong basis for participatory action research.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has set out the central research questions that this thesis will address as well as the overall argument that it makes. It has situated these questions and argument within the recent historical context of Brazil and Rio de Janeiro, including that of the violence and the policy responses to that violence. In general terms, it has described the methodological approach of participatory action research. It has also described the sites for the field research and explained why these sites where chosen.

The next chapter explains how the thesis engages some of the key theoretical debates on citizenship, urban space and violence by summarising the relevant aspects of these debates and relating them to the central research questions. This leads to questions about how to conduct the research, given the empirical reality described in the introduction and the complex theoretical landscape outlined in Chapter 2.
Chapter 2 / Citizenship, the city, and violence

Introduction

Citizenship is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it denotes rights and status as a member of a political community, which should certain guarantee conditions of daily life, and an accountable and democratic relationship with political institutions. On the other, the boundaries drawn around citizenship can create exclusions and reinforce hierarchies of gender, race, class, ethnicity, and nationality (Mamdani 1996; Lister 1997; Isin and Wood 1999; Kabeer 2002; Somers 2008). Transitions to formal democracy which should have resulted in the right to vote for many in Latin America, have not necessarily led to more democratic societies with lower levels of inequality and violence. For every example of enfranchisement and substantive citizenship, there is a counter example of how people have been either formally or informally excluded by the boundaries of citizenship or by the demarcation of rights. In Brazil, this argument is demonstrated forcefully through the persistence of a citizenship ‘that manages social differences by legalizing them in ways that legitimate and reproduce inequality....under monarchy, dictatorship, and democracy’(Holston 2008: 4). Yet Holston also demonstrates how, in Brazil, ‘the most entrenched regimes of inegalitarian citizenship can be undone by insurgent citizen movements’ (ibid).

This double-sided nature of citizenship is especially evident from the perspective of how citizenship functions within the context of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. This chapter will incorporate the theoretical threads from three sets of literature in order to relate theoretical debates to the empirical questions central to this thesis: the debates on citizenship, particularly as they relate to interaction between the status of citizenship and its actual practice; the debates on the city and the urban context as a unique social and political setting, and; the debates on violence, particularly in urban contexts and as they relate to citizenship. The purpose of reviewing elements of these three areas of literatures is to draw from all of this what is useful in order to analyse citizenship in the context of violence that characterises Rio de Janeiro’s favelas.

The literature on citizenship is vast and stretches across many disciplines. This chapter does not represent a comprehensive review of this literature (see Gaventa and Jones 2002). Rather, it will take a specific analytical approach to citizenship as a starting point to tease out arguments that are relevant to the central research questions of this thesis. The analytical
approach to citizenship will be to treat it as both a normative and aspirational or ideal concept, and as a set of practices, acts and actions; and, to focus on the interaction between these two. This may not be the dominant analytical approach (as most of the citizenship literature is divided between those that focus primarily on political, legal and philosophical theory, and those that focus primarily on empirical problems of citizenship), but it is not a unique analytical approach. Other scholars advocate this in slightly different terms. For example, Margaret Somers, in *Genealogies of Citizenship*, argues that citizenship is both ‘willy-nilly a normative and empirical concept’ and she continues that citizenship ‘however much an empirical institution of governance, is perceived as a desideratum and a good, and these normative qualities have causal powers’ (Somers 2008: 24). Engin Isin and Greg Nielsen argue that critical studies of citizenship have shown that both the legal statuses of citizens as well as the practices that constitute citizens are important. They advocate a focus on the status of citizenship, the acts of citizenship and the habitus of citizenship in order to ‘understand the decisions involved in making subjects into citizens’ (Isin and Nielsen 2008: 18). They continue:

‘To investigate acts of citizenship that are irreducible to either status or habitus, while still valuing this distinction, requires a focus on those moments when, regardless of status and substance, subjects constitute themselves as citizens—or, better still as those to whom the rights to have rights is due’ (ibid) 12.

And Michael Saward argues that democratic principles:

‘come alive (are ‘lived’) through the medium of formal decisional mechanisms which are designed to activate them and which come to be justified in terms of them. Their perceived utility as principles will largely rest on the performance of those devices. This is the essence of the reflexive relationship between principle and action’ (Saward 2003) (emphasis in the original).

In different ways, each of these authors is advocating the analytical approach chosen here: to approach citizenship as a complex interaction between the normative (status, principle, formal definition) and the lived experiences of citizenship (empirical reality, acts, habitus, action). This approach is also justified because of the demands of the particular context. In the Brazilian context, James Holston argues that the ‘development of autoconstructed urban peripheries [has] produced a confrontation between two citi­zenships, one insurgent and the other entrenched’ (Holston 2008: 6).

The normative definition of citizenship used here centres on the right to have rights (and therefore the right to have a role in how those rights are articulated), rather than on a

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12 I will return to Isin and Nielsen’s concept of acts of citizenship later, as it is a useful theoretical tool for analysing citizenship in the favelas.
particular set of rights or a fixed relationship with the state or other political authority. In this, this thesis follows the arguments of Hannah Arendt, Margaret Somers and others that the right to have rights is the most fundamental and irreducible characteristic of citizenship, and the element which gives citizenship its normative character (Arendt 1969; Somers 2008). And as Evelina Dagnino has argued, social movements in Latin America recognised this definition for themselves through the process of trying to claim specific rights from the Brazilian state (Dagnino 2005). The mechanisms for analysing this definition of citizenship in practice will be to explore how violence interacts with the meanings and practices of citizenship, the patterns of state authority, and the roles of mediators between citizens and the state. The focus of this analysis will not be primarily on political institutions, but rather on the everyday experiences of those living in favelas. This focus will help to ‘theorise citizenship as simultaneously political, ethical and aesthetic’ (Isin and Nielsen 2008: 4), as opposed to purely limited to public political participation.

The interest here is to understand what the prospects are for meaningful citizenship for those living in a context characterised by high levels of violence and social exclusion, and how violence, itself, shapes these prospects. The overwhelming majority of the literature on citizenship assumes a certain degree of safety and security to the environment that allows for a public sphere and the constitution of a political community. Therefore, part of the contribution of this thesis is to look at citizenship where that safety and security are very tenuous, and in some situations, may be provided by actors other than the state, who are themselves implicated in the violence. The perspectives on citizenship and rights that emerge from the favela provide an important interrogation of the theories of citizenship, by showing how violence shapes both the normative conception of citizenship, the practice of citizenship and the interaction between the two.

**Brief genealogy of citizenship and rights**

Given the immense literature surrounding it, it would seem that is difficult to make sense of citizenship. Once the territory of political scientists and political philosophers who tried to describe and prescribe forms of government, in the past fifty years, the concept of citizenship has been expanded, stretched and altered in many new ways. Sociology, anthropology, history, cultural studies, geography, and feminism have all joined the debate around what

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citizenship means. Meanwhile, social movements, politicians, and citizens themselves have been engaged in another (and often times unrelated) process of discovering, what use, if any, the concept of citizenship might be to people’s actual lives. This section will provide a brief description of how the dominant theories about the status of citizenship and rights emerged, highlighting the historical evolution of these concepts and asking how violence might affect them. Then I will turn to the literature that focuses on the complexities and problems that emerge from an empirical approach to citizenship. Combining these two elements provides a useful theoretical foil for the results of the research from the favelas.

**Theories of citizenship: shifting relations between citizens and the state**

Historically, the idea of citizenship rests primarily on a relationship between people and a form of government linked to a specific territory. This has not always been a nation-state, although the European and North American model of national liberal citizenship has become dominant. National liberal citizenship refers to the idea that citizenship that is encoded through specific political rights and obligations in a national legal system, where, formally, it applies equally to all those within its boundaries. National liberal citizenship, while problematic in many respects, is the result of a series of conceptual evolutions around the nature of the relationship between people and their government. The next section will explore the relationship between citizens and the state, where the nature of the government determines the nature of citizenship. The nature of this relationship has evolved as the basis for political institutions themselves has shifted.

States, as architects of citizenship, have constructed citizenship in relationship to different conceptions of how citizens should relate to political authority. This has varied over time, as the source of the political authority of the state has shifted from the status or divine right of the ruler towards the sovereignty and rights of the citizens. The nature of the ‘social contract’ between citizens and the state has also evolved (Hobbes 1982). (Locke 1993) (Rousseau 2003). While the premises of these exchanges in sovereignty differ, the underlying principals apply to all: individuals are sovereign, and they enter into a social contract with a government, transferring their sovereignty to that government, in exchange for certain status as citizens. The re-centring of sovereignty, from rulers to individual citizens, was the result of complex and simultaneous processes of change—Luther’s reformation and the emergence of an unmediated and individual connection between people’s souls and God; Adam Smith and the
rise of capitalism where people became the primary agents of their own economic welfare; and, the political revolutions that eroded the power of the feudal system in Europe.

At the same time, the political unit of the state emerged in Europe—where the state is a ‘human community which (successfully) lays claim to the *monopoly of legitimate physical force*’ (emphasis in the original) (Weber 1994: 4). This state, through political reform and revolution, also became the guarantor of certain rights for individual citizens within its boundaries. Historically, and because of the force of liberal ideology, these rights included political rights such as the right to vote and the right to representation, the right to free speech, and the right to assembly. The bearers of these rights, primarily civil and political, are individuals, who all have equal status before the law. The emergence of other rights is a more recent occurrence, which will be addressed below. While the liberal version of citizenship has become dominant within Western democracy, there are other important variations of citizenship predicated on different conceptions of the relationship between the state and the citizen.

Drawing on Rousseau’s theory of the common good, a set of arguments about communitarianism has emerged (Taylor 1994; Walzer 1994; Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Tilly 2007). The central premise of these arguments is that the state is based on establishment of a common good, where all citizens cede their individual sovereignty to a central government that uses that power for the good of all. This implies a different type of citizenship, because, unlike the liberal citizenship, the primary obligation of the state is not the protection of individual rights. Instead, the state’s responsibility lies in the protection of a common good (although how that is articulated is an open question). A key question within the communitarian tradition is how to set the boundary of the community. Within this context, citizenship means ‘a reciprocity of rights against, and duties towards, the community’ (Held 1991: 20).

Another category of state-citizen relations is civic republicanism, which is based on the public participation of citizens in governance (Habermas 1997; Fung and Wright 2003). Civic republicanism draws together elements of the ancient Greek city-states—where the republic was constituted by the deliberations of citizens, with contemporary theories of political

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14 It is questionable whether any state has actually managed to hold the legitimate monopoly of force within specific boundaries, and further, whether this is actually desirable in terms of promoting citizenship. See Abello Collak, Alexandra and Jenny Pearce (2009). “‘Security from Below’ in Contexts of Chronic Violence.” *Transforming Security and Development in an Unequal World* 40(2): 11-19.
participation. Here, the obligation of the state is to create the structures for the deliberation of citizens, and this deliberation generates the polity necessary for a republic. Citizens, in turn have the obligation to participate in processes of deliberation and participation in order to articulate their interests, and the government should then respond to these interests.

In each of these conceptions of citizenship, liberal, communitarian, and civic republicanism, an essential characteristic of citizenship is the status (primarily juridical), which the state grants to citizens. The state is responsible for defining the boundaries of who counts as a citizen, and what kind of relationship that entails between citizens and the state. Citizenship status is particularly central to liberal citizenship, where the fact of being a citizen brings with it certain itinerate rights and responsibilities. But with civic republicanism, another characteristic of citizenship emerges: the process of articulating interests as constitutive of citizenship. This presents disjunctures between citizenship practice (including political participation, deliberation, etc.) and the liberal emphasis on citizenship status.

To a certain extent all these theorisations of citizenship also share another premise: that citizenship is primarily defined by the state, and the nature of the relationship between the state and its citizens that is implied by a particular form of government. Traditionally, citizenship has been theorised from the top down—from the state to the nature of the relationship with its citizens. The next section will examine the relationship between citizenship and rights and how social movements and citizen action have defined citizenship and rights from the bottom-up.

Violence raises several challenges to these dimensions of citizenship theory. First the assumption that the state holds the legitimate monopoly on force is clearly false in the case of Rio de Janeiro. Not only does that state not monopolise the use of force, its own use of force is often not legitimate. This throws into relief how violence can challenge the fundamental elements of the definition of citizenship status, particularly in how it problematises the role of the state (see Chapter 5). Further, high levels of violence also undermine the implicit assumption in much citizenship theory that citizens are acting from a position of relative security and safety. Again, this is clearly not the case for residents of favelas and the dominant theories of citizenship do not offer an explanation of how citizenship can function given a lack of basic security (see Chapter 7).
The relationship between citizens and social movements: citizenship as a process of realising rights

Citizenship rights

Rights have been linked to citizenship in different ways. Within the liberal tradition, the right to own property was crucial to citizenship, and the state was obligated to protect that right (Locke 1993). This right was an important counterpoint to the power of feudal lords in Europe and the basis for early capitalist liberal democracy. Other political and civil rights emerged, in part through the French and American revolutions. In this conception, rights are part of the status of citizenship, rather than an inherent value in and of themselves. Rights were circumscribed in a narrow sense as a check on the power of the state (freedom from rather than the right to). A major shift in citizenship rights coincided with the end of World War II.

TH Marshall argued for social citizenship—incorporating political and civil rights with economic and social rights:

‘I propose to divide citizenship into three parts... civil, political and social. The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom—liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.... By the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body... By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the education system and social services’ (Marshall 2006: 81).

Social citizenship and the welfare state necessary to fulfil those rights, outlined by Marshall, became the new hallmark of European political systems in the later half of the twentieth century. As human rights came onto the international agenda post-World War II, citizenship became the subject of increasing political dispute. As the relationship between citizenship and rights has shifted from narrowly defined negative liberal political rights towards broad-ranging economic and social rights, in part through social movements and citizen action, citizenship has increasingly been used to refer to issues of access to and distribution of resources. As Elizabeth Jelin points out in relation to Latin America, social movements have acted on the premise that political democracy cannot be instituted without guaranteeing a minimum standard of social and economic rights. Therefore, citizenship within this context of democratic transition is essentially about how marginalised groups can realise their rights (Jelin 1998). More inclusive and ambitious citizenship rights have also raised the expectations of what citizenship should deliver. In many countries, these expectations have fallen short in
the face of the persistent social and economic exclusion. In Brazil, the expectation for a broader spectrum of rights as part of the process of democratisation has led to what Teresa Caldeira characterises as ‘disjunctive democracy’, since the trend in Brazil has been towards greater social rights, while at the same time increasing violation by the state of individual and civic rights (Caldeira 2000). The politization of citizenship over the past fifty years has partly been the result of the increasing diversity of rights that have been associated with citizenship.

In the process of making demands for rights and their realisation, social movements are also articulating new meanings for citizenship, expanding the expressions of political participation and altering the framing of state-society relations (Arendt 1969; Jelin 1998; Somers 2008). In Latin America, social movements originating in opposition to military dictatorships articulated yet another relationship between citizenship and rights. In addition to the economic and social rights emerging from Marshall’s social citizenship, social movements in Latin America, and in Brazil in particular, argued for the right to determine what rights they should have and how citizenship itself should be defined. As Dagnino argues, ‘...urban popular movements...soon realized that what they had to struggle for was not only their social rights, housing, health, education and so on by their very right to have rights...’(Alvarez, Dagnino et al. 1998: 48).

The basis for these new types of rights draws on various normative frameworks (humanism, liberation theology and other religious traditions, Freire/conscientisation, political philosophy) which are often separate from the liberal framework of rights, and have generated some difficult theoretical problems—particularism versus universalism, the hierarchy of rights versus the indivisibility of rights, individual rights versus collective rights. These binary oppositions have lead to much debate about what rights can mean and how they should be used (see Nyamu-Musembi 2002 for a summary of these debates). Celestine Nyamu-Musembi has argued that these theoretical debates about rights fade in importance if the starting point for analysis is the perspectives of those who are actually struggling to claim rights in practice (see Chapter 4). Molyneux and Lazer describe how rights are used by community-based organisations in Bolivia:

‘Most organisations had a fairly loose definition of rights, appealing to international legal instruments and national legislation when useful and strategically appropriate, but usually starting from a personal, intuitive idea of the inherent rights of human beings. In general terms, they shared the view expressed by Natalia, a Bolivian programme director, that rights are not just legal rights, but part of ‘daily life, personal emotional environment, work environment and human relations’ (Molyneux and Lazar 2003: 51).
In the past fifty years, the rights associated with citizenship have changed dramatically, through the efforts of trade unions, the civil rights movement, liberation theology, pro-democracy movements, and the feminist movement. Citizenship, and the rights associated with it, has been shaped not only from the top down, by states, but also from the bottom up by citizens themselves.

In some cases, what emerged in response to the failures in citizenship in practice have been social movements that have used these slippages and gaps in citizenship as a means of catalysing political power. These social movements have re-cast citizenship as a struggle to democratise the control of resources, and to gain recognition (Alvarez, Dagnino et al. 1998). The process of claiming rights from the state has become an important narrative in the way that meaning of citizenship has changed. Work by the Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability has focused on actual strategies that marginalised and excluded groups have used to claim their rights to resources, and demand accountability from the state, corporate actors, and civil society in the way that these rights are realised (Newell and Wheeler 2006). These strategies, often combining formal participation with informal attempts to influence institutions, show how the process of realising rights and building accountabilities involves unsettling entrenched and unequal power relations.

As the earlier examples show, citizenship has been a means of exclusion as much as it has a means of inclusion. And citizenship has not been static, either in the way it has been defined by states or in the way people have made use of it. ‘Citizenship is at heart a matrix of institutional relationship, technologies, political idioms, and rights-claiming processes that are always dynamic and contingent’ (Somers 2008: 35). Social movements have acted as a bridge between rights and citizenship (Kabeer 2002; Nyamu-Musembi 2002; Stammers 2009). In Brazil, social action and citizens movements expanded both the formal definition and the normative boundaries of citizenship (Dagnino 2005; Holston 2008). The formal definition of who counts as a citizen and who does not has changed dramatically over the past 150 years. Social movements, such as the civil rights movement and the movement for women’s suffrage have shifted the formal definition of citizenship status, but they have also had another important role: to shift the practice of citizenship—in terms of the rights associated with citizenship, and the ways that people articulate and claim their rights.
From the starting point of the rights associated with liberal citizenship, social movements within different national contexts (often sustained through connections to international networks), have extended the definitions of citizenship rights. In the case of recent transitions to democracy, such as South Africa and Brazil, social movements that have their genesis in the resistance against autocratic and despotic governments have articulated a powerful and ambitious set of citizenship rights—including the right to employment, to water, to cultural heritage, etc. that go far beyond the narrow liberal conception of rights. The meaning of rights and citizen participation has taken on specific characteristics directly related to the history of social movements within that context (Pettit and Wheeler 2005).

Violence has implications for these processes of social mobilisation that shape citizenship and rights. Violence has a contradictory effect on the ability of citizens to mobilise (see Chapters 4 and 6), but this thesis will show how it limits the abilities of citizens to take part in these wider mobilisations. Social mobilisation that does occur within spaces that are ordered by violence are likely to be mediated by violent actors, and this in turn, shapes the agendas of those mobilisations. In addition, as Chapter 4 will show, violence limits in many ways both the potential meanings for citizenship and the practices of citizenship. The question of how people who face high levels of violence can be included in these efforts to push the boundaries of citizenship remains open.\(^{15}\)

**Challenges to liberal citizenship theory: feminists and radicals**

If social movements and the coupling of rights and citizenship as pathway for political mobilisation have shaped the meaning of citizenship from the perspective of the practice of citizenship, two other important theoretical currents, both of which have implications for the state as the dominant architect of citizenship status, have increased the plurality of meanings of citizenship.

**Feminist citizenships**

One of the central critiques that feminist theory brings to liberal and state-centric citizenship are to redraw the boundaries of what is political, and therefore the roles that ‘citizen’ includes.

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\(^{15}\) There is a debate over whether violence may be necessary as a path to citizenship, as in the case of violent revolution (Walzer, Michael (1977). *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. New York, Basic Books.) As chapter 6 will show, drug traffickers, the militia and the police in Rio de Janeiro all claim that their use of violence is necessary to achieve democratic aims. It may be the case that violence is a path to citizenship in certain cases, but they did not appear during the course of this research.
These critiques imply a redefinition of citizenship. Liberal citizenship is predicated on a public and private sphere, where the public is the political and the private is invisible and irrelevant to the political domain. Feminists, such as Nancy Fraser (Fraser 1992) and Carol Pateman (Pateman 1989), have argued that the boundary between the public and the private is a culturally and gender specific distinction that is constantly being contested politically. Depending on how this divide is made, then the aspects of everyday life where women experience exclusion are also the experiences that do not have public political legitimacy. A much cited example of this is the way that domestic violence has moved from being ‘a private matter’ to a public political issue that must be addressed through specific changes in policy, such as specialised police stations in Brazil run by women specifically to handle cases of domestic abuse (Santos 2005). So the struggle to challenge the boundary between public and private is also the struggle to make the experiences of women and other marginalised groups have political relevance. Rather than occurring solely in the public or the private realms, citizenship occurs in the space between the private and the public—in the interactions between the two (Leca 1992; Schmidt-Camacho 2005).

Ruth Lister, in her referential formulation of feminist citizenship, argues for a dialectic relationship between liberal citizenship based on individual rights, and civic republicanism based on political participation. The bridge between these two, for Lister, is human agency:

‘By adopting a synthetic approach, which embraces [individual rights and political participation], citizenship emerges as a dynamic concept in which process and outcome stand in a dialectical relationship to each other. Moreover, this relationship is itself a fluid process as the content of citizenship rights is not fixed but remains the object of political struggles. At the core of this conceptualisation…lies the idea of human agency. Citizenship as participation represents an expression of human agency in the political arena, broadly defined; citizenship as rights enables people to act as agents’ (Lister 1997: 36).

This is a feminist theorisation of citizenship, because it recognises that women’s freedom is contingent on their ability to control the economic and social conditions of their lives (i.e. individual rights do matter to women) (Gould 1988). But these rights will only be realised through a process of political participation, which is broadly defined (beyond the narrow public/private divide). These rights then, provide the basis, for women and men to act, and in acting, to make citizenship have meaning.

Lister continues:

‘To act as a citizen requires first a sense of agency, the belief that one can act; acting as a citizen, especially collectively, in turn fosters that sense of agency. Thus agency is not simply about the capacity to choose and act but it is also about a conscious
capacity which important to the individual’s self-identity. The development of a conscious sense of agency, at both the personal and political level, is crucial to women’s...emergence as full and active citizens’ (Lister 1997: 38).

Violence has importance in terms of these arguments. Violence also crosses the public/private divide reified in liberal formulations of citizenship (see below), reinforcing the point made by feminists about the importance of challenging that divide in the formulation of citizenship itself. Feminism exposes the contradictory role of agency and violence demonstrates this. As Holston explains, the agency relevant to citizenship is not only the agency of resistance, but also the agency of ‘entrenchment, persistence, and inertia’. To this, I would add the agency of violence, where people use their capacity for organisation to perpetuate violence, security, and establish patterns of authority on that basis (see Chapter 5).

Another important element of the feminist theory on citizenship is the recognition of importance of belonging and identity in terms of how citizenship is experienced and how it is defined. The liberal, communitarian, and civic republicanism versions of citizenship are predicated on a relationship between the individual or the community and the state. Werbner and Yuval-Davis define a feminist version of citizenship as ‘a more total relationship, inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging’ (Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999: 4). People’s experience of citizenship is inevitably mediated by their identity—race, sexual orientation, class, origins, and religious affiliations. Ong argues that the universalistic criteria of liberal citizenship are regulated by different categories of subject, and the ways that different subjects are located within the nation-state and global economic relations. She uses the example of the ways that Cambodian and Chinese immigrants to the United States have been racialised as ‘black’ and ‘white’ through the institutional practices of the welfare state and the market (Ong 2003).

Due to an individualised and universalising tendency, liberal citizenship ‘orders conflict, channels and tames it; labels and classifies collective differences; [citizenship] determines how, where and when difference may legitimately be ‘represented’, and who counts as ‘different’ in the political arena, itself a social construct’(Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999: 2). But as Werbner and Yuval-Davis, Ong, and others have pointed out, the suppression of difference has translated into a hegemonic homogenisation, where racial, class, and gender differences are naturalised. I will return to the challenge of how difference and plurality can be taken into account in the public sphere in the discussion below on radical democracy.
Belonging and identity as an element of citizenship take on another meaning in contexts of violence and insecurity (Appadurai 2002). Violence and insecurity pose a serious threat to belonging. And social labelling has often accompanied situations of violence and exclusion, where labels assigned to excluded groups reinforce the insecurity violence can generate (Moncrieffe and Eyben 2007). In the case of Rio de Janeiro, violence has eroded the claims to citizenship of those living in illegal settlements by undermining their claims to a legitimate place within society. ‘While social movements made a number of claims to increase the boundaries of citizenship, a ‘non-citizenship’ was constructed through discussions on crime and the city that invalidated those rights. These discourses constructed the poor as ‘not belonging’ to any proper place in the city, save those areas beyond the reach of the state and justified a return to repressive solutions...’(Baiocchi 2001: 26). Hannah Arendt argues that is the loss of ‘a place in the world’ or a sense of belonging, that is the most serious threat to citizenship (Arendt 2000). These arguments highlight the importance of a sense of belonging and identity in terms of how citizenship is experienced. But, as the example from Rio de Janeiro shows, because identity is associated with citizenship, citizenship can also be exclusionary on the basis of that identity.

A central tenet of the radical democracy critique is that any identity is predicated on an othering, or the establishment of difference, and therefore on exclusion. It is this difference that liberalism is unable to recognise because liberalism is based on universalised and equal individuals:

‘...if citizenship involves the struggle for membership and participation in the community, then its analysis involves examining the way in which different groups, classes and movements have struggled to gain degrees of autonomy and control over their lives in the face of various forms of stratification, hierarchy and political oppression’(Held 1991: 20).

The inability of liberalism to recognise difference and therefore the antagonisms generated by the establishment of difference undermines the prospect for liberal democracy. Mouffe argues that liberalism displaces the political for the juridical, which underlines ‘blindness of liberalism to identity’(Mouffe 2002: 6). So citizenship, in as far as it is linked to identity, is necessarily exclusionary, because the establishment of any identity is based on difference, and therefore on exclusions. As Holston argues in relation to the Brazilian context: ‘Rather than categorising citizenships ahistorically as difference-blind or difference-specific, therefore, the important question is to investigate how citizenship problematizes the legalisation and equalisation of differences and struggles with the problems of justice that result. Some so-called difference neutral citizenships have consistently generated extraordinary turmoil in
structuring the differences and equalities of their citizens. Other citizenships have managed differences by legalising them in ways that consistently legitimate and reproduce inequality’ (Holston 2008: 32). The question is then how to construct democratic practices that can account for plurality and can mediate conflict rather than suppress or ignore it. This dimension of citizenship is played out clearly through processes of labelling and counter-labelling that categorise people (particularly young people and children) within favelas as sources of criminality and violence. Labelling as it relates to meanings and expressions of citizenship is examined in detail in Chapter 4.

With regards to citizenship, the implications of this critique are important in two respects that are relevant to the context of violence. First, if liberal versions of citizenship are replacing the political for the juridical, then exclusions, violence, and conflict that emerge in relationship to identity will not find easy resolution within a liberal framework of citizenship. Second, Mouffe’s arguments also raise questions about the boundaries of political community and how this is defined. In a context of violence, it is precisely these boundaries of political community which are progressively reduced and narrowed, in some cases to the immediate family and neighbours.\(^{16}\)

**The boundaries of citizenship: roles of citizens and the limits of political community**

Citizenship has been theorised both from institutional and philosophical perspectives in terms of the nature of citizens’ status, and from the bottom-up in terms of the way citizenship is constituted empirically by social movements and by citizens themselves. What is of interest in this thesis is the interaction between status and practices, acts and actions. To summarise, citizenship has been commonly theorised as:

- Status (in liberal tradition—legal, nationally bound status with specific rights)
- The practice of participation and deliberation (civic republicanism)
- Processes of realising rights (by social movements and individual citizens)
- Processes of articulating belonging (especially within feminist theory)

Each of these theorisations of citizenship assumes that there is a certain universality to the model of citizenship—that it ought to apply equally to all those defined as citizens within a

\(^{16}\) Naila Kabeer makes a similar argument about the effect of social exclusion on the boundaries of political community in Kabeer, Naila, Ed. (2005). Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions. London, Zed Books. I would argue that the combined effects of violence and social exclusion are even stronger in terms of their destructive effect on the breadth of political community.
specific political community. As discussed in the previous section, there are many examples of the unevenness of citizenship—when citizenship is a means of exclusion as well as inclusion. In this section, I would like to address two other aspects of citizenship that challenge the universality premise of citizenship status as well hold implications for citizenship practice. The first is to do with the roles associated with ‘citizen’, and the second is to do with the relationship between citizenship and political community. Both of these dimensions acquire added significance in a context of violence.

Within each of the traditions of citizenship, there are implicit assumptions about the role of citizens—how citizens should act, and what kinds of responsibilities and identities should be assigned to citizens. The liberal citizen is a public citizen, who rationally pursues his or her own interests through competition. This role of citizen implies the possibility for the citizen to utilize her role to advance her interests successfully as a member of various social groups...in the political arena’ (Leca 1992: 18). In addition to this role, there are certain ‘beliefs and modes of behaviour and a specific interpretation of what is a ‘good’ citizen’ and these rules of the game, particularly in the context of Latin America, have been written by the ‘white, male, middle class elite’(Taylor and Wilson 2004: 160). The feminist critique of this role of citizen is that citizens also have roles defined within the ‘private’ sphere, outside of what is normally constituted as a public role. The role of a citizen should not exclude the roles of mothers, fathers, sisters, and brothers, or sexual roles. The role of acting as a mother should not be hidden within the role of citizen, because acting as a mother is part of acting as a citizen. The boundaries of what constitutes the role of citizen have been expanded dramatically in the past twenty years: market citizens, fiscal citizens, proxy citizens, netizens, active citizens.

Neoliberal reforms have led to a re-casting of the role of citizens to market citizen and fiscal citizen, where citizens participate in the economy and have access to rights mediated through the market (Somers 2008). In contrast, some social movements have reclaimed the idea of active citizenship from its politically empty incarnation in Thatcher’s Britain (see Lister 1997: 22). Active citizenship has been recast to mean citizens who, individually or collectively, make claims for their rights to the institutions that affect their lives (Gaventa 2010). As Chapter 4 shows, the roles prescribed for citizens, from the perspective of residents of the favelas, have very particular normative and aspirational characteristics related to the conditions of violence and social exclusion they face.

Lucy Taylor argues that in much of Latin America what is operating is client-ship, and not citizenship. There is a formal discourse about citizenship and equality, but in practice, people
are gaining access to resources through the traditional patron-client relations that have been thinly veneered by democracy (Taylor 2004). The implications of this are significant, because it means that political participation, rather than a measure of citizenship, could be the retrenchment of clientelistic relationships. Robert Gay and Jonathan Fox have made a similar set of arguments about the hybridity of citizenship and clientelistic relationships in Latin America and in Brazil (Fox 1994; Gay 2006).

All of these different roles for citizens illustrate how the meaning of citizenship is connected to contests over power and influence. As Holston puts it, law ‘motivates the development of specific types of citizens to enact citizenship. It creates a cast of dramatis personae who mould their characters to citizenship’s specificities: not only voters, soldiers, taxpayers and nationals but also bosses, swindlers, thugs, and residents who come into conflict around its possibilities...’(Holston 2008: 25). If citizenship does describe the relationship between people and the institutions that affect them (state, civil society, corporate actors, etc.), then the role of citizen is not a merely rhetorical issue. How citizenship is defined implies a whole set of power relationships between different groups within society, and struggles over this power are being played out in the re-definition of citizenship itself. Evelina Dagnino has written about the political inversion of citizenship roles. During the 1980s and 90s, the discourse of citizenship in Brazil was used to galvanise and consolidate social movements to topple the military government and to demand new forms of rights, including the right to decide what citizenship should mean. But with neoliberal reforms, citizenship has been given another set of meanings: ‘To be a citizen is then individual integration to the market, as a consumer and as a producer’(Dagnino 2005: 19).

This redefinition of the role of citizen undermines not only the aspirations encapsulated in the citizenship discourse advanced by Brazilian social movements, but it also weakens long-standing citizenship rights:

‘...social rights ensured in the Brazilian Constitutions since the 1940s are now being eliminated under the rationale that they constitute obstacles to the free operation of the dynamics of the market and therefore restrict economic development and modernisation.... [Neoliberal rationale] transforms bearers of rights/citizens in the new villains of the nation, privileged enemies of political reforms intended to shrink state responsibilities'(ibid).

Citizenship as an emancipatory discourse has been inverted and used as a political weapon against the very people who have advocated for it. Yet, its transformative potential remains, if not in the institution of citizenship or with the citizens as individuals, then in ‘acts of
citizenship—that is, collective or individual deeds that rupture social-historical patterns’ (Isin and Nielsen 2008: 2). Chapter 4 will consider the transformative effects of such acts of citizenship in the context of the favelas. The roles of citizen have multiplied, in response to the shifting power relations between people and institutions, raising questions about the universality of citizenship within any particular context.

**Power, authority, and legitimacy**

Within this shifting landscape of citizen-state relations, issues of power become relevant, including that of citizens, the state and the violent actors. It is important to recognise that there is an extensive literature on power within many different approaches, some focussed more on structure (Marx and Kamenka 1983; Weber 1994) and others more on agency (Lukes 1974, 2005; Scott 1985) as a source of power. Foucault’s formulation, which moves beyond the structure/agency divide, is of power as ‘everywhere,’ embodied in discourse and knowledge (Foucault 1991). This conceptualisation of power is also important. It is not possible to address these debates fully here, yet an approach to power is necessary empirically to analyse how citizens and the state are able to act and how violence alters this. This thesis approaches power through an empirical assessment of visible sources of power (related to the state), and situates this in terms of the social identities and experiences that shape how this power functions within the favela in order to analyse the implications of the research findings on power for citizen-state relations.

John Gaventa explores the connections between power and possibilities for citizen participation, which helps to explain why an analysis of power is crucial to understanding citizenship:

‘Visible power is the observable forms of power, the rules, structures, institutions and procedures of decision making; hidden power is the way powerful people and institutions maintain their influence by controlling who is invited to the decision making arena and what gets on the agenda. Invisible power shapes the psychological and ideological boundaries of participation (Gaventa 2005: 9).

The distinction between visible, hidden and invisible forms of power is useful here. The patterns of authority explored in Chapter 5 correspond primarily to the visible forms of power, although they are based on hidden forms of power in the form of the threat of violence. Invisible forms are much more difficult to identify empirically but the effects of violence on self-perception, and the way that violence leads to fear is part of this (see Chapter 4). All of these dimensions affect how people act or do not act as citizens, but they also shape the nature of state authority and its absence, and the presence of mediators who act between
citizens and the state (see Chapter 6).

Gaventa develops this definition of power further through a categorisation of types of power that has been used to analyse power relations in many settings related to citizen action and social movements (VeneKlasen and Miller 2002):

‘...Power ‘over’ refers to the ability of the powerful to affect the actions and thought of the powerless. The power ‘to’ is important for the capacity to act; to exercise agency and to realise the potential of rights, citizenship or voice. Power ‘within’ often refers to gaining the sense of self-identity, confidence and awareness that is a precondition for action. Power ‘with’ refers to the synergy which can emerge through partnerships and collaboration with others, or through processes of collective action and alliance building’ (Gaventa 2006).

This categorisation of power is a useful starting point for an empirical analysis of people’s perceptions of power, which is set out in Chapter 5. But it is also important to relate this categorisation of power within the citizen-state relationship to violence. As Moncrieffe argues, power can lend itself to violence or to its opposition:

‘...power, in practice, can be repressive and even lend itself to violence; conversely, power is crucial for producing healthy changes in social relations, such as would profit those subsisting in conditions of poverty or subject to various forms of injustice; repressive power is most potent and durable when people accept and uphold the (mis)perceptions and conditions that underpin their own inequality; therefore much hinges on the extent to which, in the emerging social contexts, people are adequately challenged to recognise, confront and transform the socially acquired dispositions that allow for repression, both of others and of themselves’ (Moncrieffe 2006: 34).

Related to the discussion on power and particularly to a focus on state power is the issue of authority and what constitutes legitimate political authority in a context of violence. Again, as with power, there is a vast literature on authority, particularly in political science. Part of this literature includes a debate over whether or not authority can be democratic (Warren 1996). The purpose here is not to engage in the theoretical discussion about the nature of authority, but to focus on the patterns of authority that emerged empirically and relate these to the debates on citizenship. Nonetheless it is important to distinguish between authority, patterns of authority and power. Arendt is useful here:

‘Since authority always demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some form of power or violence. Yet authority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed. Authority on the other hand, is incompatible with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a process of argumentation...Against the egalitarian order of persuasion stands the authoritarian order, which is always hierarchical. If authority is to be defined at all, then, it must be in contradistinction to both coercion by force and persuasion through arguments’ (Arendt 2000).
Following Arendt, authority is neither the use of force nor the use of persuasion; it is based on hierarchies that naturalise that authority. This relatively un-democratic definition of authority is useful in this case, because within the favelas, it is the patterns of authority that establish and reinforce the hierarchies necessary for the efficacy of that authority. That is not to say that the armed actors always act without the use of force or persuasion—occasionally they use both as gaps in their authority emerge and are tested, as this section will show.

Somers, drawing on Arendt, argues that, historically, liberalism’s ‘anti-statist utopia turns out to be a dystopia: the rightless and the stateless did not just suffer the loss of their own governments; they were turned away by all governments in all countries’ (Somers 2008: 127). This also holds true for the context of the favelas, where the failure of legitimate state power leads to a situation where other actors occupy that space and enforce a different and anti-democratic pattern of authority, in turn mediating citizens’ access to their rights. As Somers and Arendt argue, it is only within an organised political community with citizenship can rights, and the right to have rights, be guaranteed. Therefore the nature of state power (the way that people perceive the state’s ability to act) and the prevailing patterns of authority have implications for citizenship, in terms of how people can claim their rights and how the state can respond. Violence presents specific problems in terms of the legitimacy of political authority:

‘The constraints of social exclusion, the stigma of second-class or informal citizenship and the voids left by state incapacity in many areas contribute to the emergence of alternative forms of social organisation. Access to the means of violence...has made violence and coercion the prime foundation of such forms. Power, in terms of territorial and social control, extractive capabilities and de facto political prerogatives, is organised on the basis of access to de-officialised, decentralized and fractured means of violence. State legitimacy within local urban spaces is derived from the position one occupies within the system of coercion’ (Koonings and Krujit 2007: 19).

Chapter 5 will explore how legitimacy is social constructed within the context of power and patterns of authority outlined above. Partly the answer depends on the reference point for establishing legitimacy. Arendt argues:

‘Power needs no justification, being inherent in the very existence of political communities; what it does need is legitimacy. The common treatment of these two words as synonymous is no less misleading and confusing that the current equation of obedience and support. Power springs up whenever people get together and act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together rather than any action that then may follow. Legitimacy, when challenged, bases itself on an appeal to the past, while justification relates to an end that lies in the future’ (Arendt 1969: 52 cited in Pearce 2007).
However, sources of legitimacy vary—what is perceived within a community as legitimate or illegitimate authority may be portrayed very differently by the media or the government more generally. For example, the police have formal legitimacy more broadly in the society, but in the context of the favelas they have little or no legitimacy. Similarly, for the middle classes, drug traffickers are unequivocally illegitimate, and yet in some communities, they have more legitimacy than the police. Legitimate authority is necessary for citizenship. If the state does not have legitimacy, it cannot act as a guarantor for citizens’ rights, nor can citizens hold it to account. But where does legitimate authority come from in a context where both state and private actors have used violence to monopolise authority for over 30 years? The character of state power, patterns of authority and political legitimacy are all shifted through violence, raising questions about the dominant theorisations of citizenship, that are predicated on assumptions about the legitimacy and efficacy of the state. What are the implications of these theoretical and conceptual challenges for citizenship in relation to the context of Rio de Janeiro? The roles of citizens and the referents of citizenship have become unbound from the liberal and universalised definitions of citizenship. Migration, processes of globalisation, commodification and the extension of the market, urbanisation, and violence all pose questions for what citizenship can mean within a national liberal context.¹⁷ The state acts as protector and violator of rights and citizenship and rights are used to exclude as well as to include. People make demands for rights not just of the state, but also simultaneously at a variety of levels, from local to global. The theoretical strands explored in the previous sections are analytically opposed in some ways, in particular in relation to the state-centric definitions of citizenship. Liberal, feminist, and critical approaches to citizenship are not easily reconciled. These theoretical approaches may have analytical purchase on some aspects of people’s experiences in Rio de Janeiro. But in the face of the lived experiences of exclusion and violence, the theoretical explanations of citizenship as a status defined by the state or as a process of participation are incomplete. There are hopeful signs—social movements in Brazil have managed to change the way that citizenship is conceptualised and what it means within the Brazilian context. But returning to the case of people living in favelas, these theories of citizenship cannot fully explain their relationship to the state, because violence alters the relationship between citizens and the state, shaping both the normative concept of citizenship and its practice. The next section will examine the

intersection between these debates on citizenship within the specific context of the city and violence.

**Citizenship, violence and the city**

Urbanisation and the emergence of mega-cities with populations over 10 million is another trend that challenges the universality of citizenship as theorised in relationship to states (Sassen 2001, Mohan 2005, Barnett 2004). While citizenship is experienced locally, through people’s everyday lives, the city as level of political community has become important. As Held argues: ‘If citizenship entails membership in the community and membership implies forms of social participation, then citizenship is above all about the involvement of people in the community in which they live...’(Held 1991: 20).

Violence and the particular political context of the city have important implications for citizenship: the constant making and unmaking of citizenship (Holston’s entrenched and insurgent citizenship) is exposed starkly in the context of the city and in a context of violence.

One of the ways in which citizenship is unmade through violence is the way in which violence translates into state failure on several levels (both in guaranteeing citizenship status but also in practice). Violence, both state-sponsored and carried out by drug trafficking factions and militias ‘undermines the constitution of citizenship as a principle based on non-violence and the rule of law’ because it ‘undermines the very foundations of democracy and bears witness to the failure of the state to uphold the rule of law and citizens’ security’(Koonings and Krujit 2004: 6). At the same time, violence is also an integral part of the establishment of order (Kalyvas, Shapiro et al. 2008), raising questions about how legitimate political authority is established. The remainder of this chapter will explore the significance of urban context and the importance of the city as a context for understanding citizenship, the prevalence and meanings of violence as these might related to citizenship, and; the implications of the urban context and violence for an analytical approach to citizenship.

**The city as a context for citizenship**

Through two major international gatherings a conception of the right to citizenship in the city emerged, spurred by a strong coalition of civil society organisations. This was encoded in a treaty call ‘Towards Just, Democratic, and Sustainable Cities, Towns and Villages,’ signed by 120 civil society organisations. The right to citizenship in the city was formulated as:

‘The participation of inhabitants of cities...in deciding their own future. It includes their right to housing, sanitation, health, education, food, job opportunities, leisure, and information. It includes their right to freedom of organisation, with respect for minorities...It includes the preservation of citizens’ cultural and historical heritage and their access to a culturally rich and diversified environment with no distinctions of gender, nationality, race, language or religious belief’ (quoted in Flores 1996: 19).

The assumption underlying this declaration is that is important to specify what citizenship in a city should entail, because this is somehow different from the definition of citizenship at the national level. This is not to say that this version is incompatible with other citizenships, but that by virtue of the way that citizenship is experienced in cities it requires an additional layer in terms of how citizenship is defined (Avritzer 2010).

There is certainly a risk of what Low calls ‘nostalgia of the city-state’—assuming that cities as a particular type of space are necessarily more fertile for democracy (and citizenship) (Low 2004). Whether or not cities are necessarily spaces with potential for greater democracy is an open question, but cities are a qualitatively different form of political community that is not wholly encompassed by national identity. This makes cities an important site for understanding citizenship, because cities represent a level of political community that is different from but also part of national political community. As Holston argues:

‘cities are especially salient sites for analysing the current renegotiations of citizenship, democracy and national belonging...[because] cities make manifest these national and transnational realignments...[and] [rescribe the consequences of these changes in the spaces and relations of urban daily life...]’ And ‘cities are both a strategic arena for the reformulation of citizenship and a stage on which these processes find expression in collective violence’ (Holston 1999: vii).

It is within cities that inequalities are often most starkly juxtaposed and experienced (Mitlin, Satterthwaite and Stephens 1996). As Koonings and Krujit express it in relationship to Latin American cities:

‘Two decades of neo-liberal reforms, formal democratisation and globalising urban modernity, however, have produced nothing but disillusionment for the 50-70 per cent of urban denizens estimated to live on the wrong side of the breach of poverty, insecurity, and exclusion...The traditional social cleavages appear to have become wider and more intense. Poverty has become an urban phenomenon in the region. The urban middle classes, once seen as the harbingers of modernity and social advancement, now live under siege. Local administrators are overwhelmed by the task of governing conflicting interests and providing basic services... Latin American cities in fact constitute a coexistence of contradictory social and spatial elements within the same social-geographical space’ (Koonings and Krujit 2007: 1).

The concept of ‘territory’ may be useful here (Harvey 2000): the relationship between specific places and their social histories that becomes legible through time. This means that the
coherence of a particular community, the networks of relationships, economic relations, institutions that make up a particular place is embodied physically in a place. This helps to explain why some places become imprinted with social history in such a way that physical changes cannot erase this history. Removed favelas in Rio de Janeiro continue to exist in the social imaginary of the ‘city’ and in the memories of people living in the city. But the connection between place and social history, aside from recording the experiences of exclusion and repression that can scare a city, also are a source of hope. James Holston argues the geographies of cities provide the opportunity for insurgent citizenship, where resistance to the nationally-determined, planned, modernist city is legible in the physical ways that people construct a city (Holston 1999). What Holston describes is the interaction between top-down and bottom-up cities. And the ways that cities are built from the bottom-up are important in terms of understanding how favelas and other informal settlements are forms of resistance:

‘New neighbourhoods spring up in which all activities that define the processes of settling in the city are coordinated and developed under the direct control of the grassroots base organizations....These new practices are not merely forms of subsistence and survival. Rather they are the seed of a freer and more democratic, plural, creative and diverse city than that conceived by the systematizing and homogenized mind of the technocrats or of those who freely succumb to the forces of the market’(Flores 1996: 18).

The interaction between the normative dimension of citizenship and the actual experience of citizenship in practice, as argued earlier, is an important dynamic in understanding citizenship (Lister 1997; Holston 2008; Somers 2008). To this, this thesis adds a focus on the interaction between citizenship and place, to understand how citizenship operates in practice in relationship to overlapping political communities—state, city, favela. The radical democracy critique, as well as the arguments emerging from political geography, urges a re-examination of citizenship in relation to political community and place. Desforges, drawing on Sassen (Sassen 1994), and Isin and Wood’s (Isin and Wood 1999) earlier works, defines citizenship as ‘a set of social processes in which individuals and social groups negotiate, claim and practice not only rights, responsibilities and duties but also a sense of belonging which enables full participation within a multiplicity of ‘communities’(Desforges 2004).

Liberal democratic versions of citizenship are often de-territorialised. They do not take account of ‘place’ in the experience of citizenship. By place, I mean that the experience of citizenship is embodied—it happens in a particular place and different places have their own character which shapes these experiences (Appadurai 2002). Living in a favela or other popular neighbourhood in Rio de Janeiro means confronting, on a daily basis, the threat of
state-sponsored violence, lack of access to schools and health clinic, and the lack of basic services. These aspects of favelas as a place have to be factored into how citizenship is understood, because in practice, it are these experiences that shape the conditions in which citizens make demands on the state.

The implications of locating citizenship within a particular place (in this case, the city) are several. It requires examining the various dimensions of citizenship and the relationship between citizens and the state from the perspective of a particular place. This spatial dimension to the analysis means that assumptions about the uniformity of state authority, or the universality of the meaning of citizenship, for example, must be questioned. The subsequent chapters will examine how the dynamics of a particular place shape both the meaning of citizenship and its practice.

**Violence and the city**

Different places in the city are distinguished not only by the variation in rights to basic services, but also by the different levels of human security where the state controls the use of force to greater and lesser extents. Mouffe argues that the definition of who is a citizen requires setting boundaries within political space (Mouffe 2002). This point can also be made in relationship to actual places within the city: ‘contestations over citizenship imply boundaries and meanings about places, and...conversely, discussions over boundaries and places imply certain kinds of citizenships’ (Baiocchi 2001: 24). Violence, and how it is experienced differentially is symptomatic of the unevenness of citizenship. And the prevalence of violence within favelas and other informal settlements calls into question the very legitimacy of the state, because it is unable to provide basic security for all citizens equally, and even contributes directly to this violence. Again, Koonings and Krujit describe the situation in general in Latin American cities:

‘Across Latin America urban poverty is persistent; urban crime and violence are on the rise; the effective presence of state authorities is minimal and the rule of law has changed into its antithesis. Within this context, urban denizens face violence and fear. The absence or failure of governance (especially the enforcement and protection of citizens’ security) opens the way for a variety of armed actors and violence brokers who carve out alternative, informal spheres of power on the basis of coercion. The result is in many cases a fragmented, ambivalent and hybrid cityscape with varying manifestations of the complex of poverty, exclusion, coercion, violence and fear’ (Koonings and Krujit 2007: 7).

In fact, as the community time line of violence in Chapter 4 shows, it is unclear if the Brazilian state ever had a monopoly on legitimate force in the favelas.
Processes of socialisation of violence

What is the nature of the violence that is so dramatically affecting Latin American cities in general, and Rio de Janeiro in particular and how is that violence relevant to citizenship? In order to respond to these questions, this section focuses on the processes of socialisation of violence in the context of Rio de Janeiro, beginning to show where possible intersections might be with citizenship.

There is a large literature on the causes and meanings of violence, which I will not summarise here. However, it is useful to review some of more relevant formulations of the causes and types of violence as they relate to Rio de Janeiro, in order to be explicit about how violence can affect citizenship. Various authors have addressed the causes of violence, ranging from structural causes to more prosaic and specific causes. For Escobar, ‘regimes of selective inclusion and hyper-exclusion’ have led to a ‘regime of social fascism that coexists with democracy’ (Escobar 2004). Development, according to Kothari and Harcourt, involves a re-ordering of society that engenders violence (Kothari and Harcourt 2004). For Brinceño-León and Zubillaga, the causes of urban violence in Latin America are found in the convergence of global transitions (drug and arms trade, economic structural adjustment) and local transitions (the re-ordering of the drug trafficking apparatus at the local level, the rapid expansion of cities, and the decreasing formal employment opportunities in most Latin American cities). All of these trends have intensified since the 1980’s at the same time that levels of violence in Latin American cities have risen dramatically (Brinceño-León and Zubillaga 2002). Other studies of particular cases of violence at the local level focus on the more specific causes of violence in a given community (Moser and Holland 1997; Rodgers 2003; Arjona and Kalyvas 2007; Hume 2007; Arias 2007; Justino, Leavy et al. 2009).

Potentially all of these may be relevant to understanding violence in Rio de Janeiro. There are certainly structural factors, particularly in terms of the spatialisation of exclusion and the lack of a consolidated state policy of urban development, that contribute to the context of violence.
There are many different typologies of violence, some developed through participatory research processes. Moser and Rodgers (Moser and Rodgers 2005) summarise some of the general points of agreement from the literature on violence (Barrett 2009):

- First, it is widely recognised that violence takes both direct and indirect forms, despite a general acknowledgement that the most basic is the use of intentionally harmful force.
- Second, the use of violence is an expression of power used for the legitimisation of force for specific gains, which can be symbolic or literal (or both).
- Third, violence tends to initiate a chain of reactions, which might occur sequentially but can also combine in less linear ways as follows: acts of violence—fear— insecurity—vulnerability—decreased ‘well being’.

In an innovative study, Caroline Moser and Jeremy Holland used participatory methods to identify types of violence in Jamaica. Focus groups identified 25 different types of violence, which the researchers later categorised and grouped into six categories (Moser and Holland 1999). Later, Moser, in an introductory article for a special issue of Environment and Urbanization on urban violence, draws on participatory research to group violence according to its primary motivation: political, institutional, economic, economic/social, and social (Moser 2004). In relation to Latin America, (Brinceño-León and Zubillaga 2002) categorise forms of violence as emotive, expressive and functional—according to the intended effect of the violence.

However, perhaps more important than the definition or causes of violence, in terms of the implications for citizenship, are the processes of socialisation of violence and the way that these hierarchies affect how violence is understood. The focus in this thesis is not on violence in a reified way, or even on specific acts of violence, but rather on the way that high levels of a variety of types of violence (from gender-based to state-sponsored) have a broader set of social and psychological effects. As the following chapters will show, the high levels of violence lead to a kind of miasma of fear and insecurity that extends beyond particular incidents of violence.

Jenny Pearce argues that the process of how violence is categorised creates hierarchies of violence and legitimates certain forms over others:

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19 It is important to be explicit about the methodology used to investigate violence, since the nature of the research itself determines how violence is defined. See Scheper-Hughes, N and PI Bourgois, Eds. (2004). Violence in War and Peace. Malden, US, Blackwell.
'These hierarchies of violence play out in different ways in distinct social, cultural and historical contexts, and the struggle to secure the universal condemnation of violence against women is emblematic of how most societies have put that particular form of violence very low on the hierarchy of recognised violences’ (Pearce 2006: 66).

This highlights the importance of considering gender in relation to violence and citizenship.

There is an important connection between public life and private life and the way that violence can erode one through the other. The formation and perpetuation of masculinities predicated on shame, honour, pride and femininities predicated on compliance, acquiescence, and status are central to the persistence of violence (Gilligan 2001; Hume 2007). For example, Alba Zaluar argues that the masculine warrior ethos helps to explain the attraction of violence to young men and boys in the favela (Zaluar 2004). The process of socialisation establishes shared ‘codes through which they search for respect and consideration’ and in an attempt to follow these unwritten rules, young men ‘become conformists and lose autonomy and are thus called teleguiados’ (ibid: 148).

The processes of socialisation in the favela include gender, family, and other categories of identity that add up to the complex web of interpersonal relationships that determine social positioning within the community (see Pearce 2006). Social positioning affects how people relate to mediating actors, what kind of claims they can make as citizens and what kind of strategies they have to use to make those claims. Understanding the dynamics of social positioning within the favela is difficult because it is affected by a large number of factors including gender, age, family structures and the broader relationships with the rest of the city.

As Moncrieffe explains, drawing on Jenkins:

‘Identities are shaped by an internal-external dialectic, that is, through interaction between the individual and the collective. Jenkins argues that ‘individuals are unique and variable, but selfhood is...constructed in the process of primary and subsequent socialisation, and in the ongoing interaction during which individuals define and redefine themselves and others throughout their lives.’ Selfhood is not fixed...’ (Jenkins 2004: 18).

As explained in the introduction, children and young people are particularly central to both the reproduction of violence and the social domination that accompanies it:

‘Very young humans are dependent: there is much that they must discover about the world and their place in it. All things being equal, they are hard-wired to be voracious learners, and they must learn who’s who and what’s what...Identities established during infancy and childhood may be less flexible than identities what are acquired subsequently (Jenkins 2004 cited in Moncrieffe 2008: 19).
The various processes that socialise children and others generate identities that feed into violence can also be linked to the actual spaces of socialisation (from the family, to the school, the neighbourhood, the city, and the state). Again, as Jenny Pearce argues:

‘...the categorisation of forms of violence must be complemented by a spatial analysis if we are to refine our understanding of how in practice these kinds of violence interact with gendered socialisation processes with in each space. I would therefore start with the socialisation space of the home, move to the socialisation space of community, neighbourhood, school, to the socialisation space of associational life or civil society and finally to the socialisation space of nation state construction, whether as a finished or (as in many parts of the global South) incomplete and arguably unfinishable process, given the logic of globalisation. Gender socialisation is a variable in all these spaces, a likely transmitter mechanism for the reproduction and reinforcement of violence through all the spaces. This kind of analysis is open to empirical research...’(Pearce 2006: 77).

What are the implications for citizenship of this argument about how violence is transmitted between different spaces? If you were to draw a map of citizenship in Rio de Janeiro, there would be peaks and troughs in the levels of citizenship, not dissimilar from the physical geography of the city itself—concentrations of inclusion and exclusion, extremes of citizenship with gaps and jagged edges in between. Within a city, it is possible, by moving from one place to another, to move between at times radically different relationships with the state. Walking on the streets of a housing estate there is an ever-present risk of state-sponsored violence, the knowledge that the city government has not upgraded any of the buildings for thirty years, and a different (and lower) order of protection for your rights than walking through the streets of Ipanema or Leblon. This is important because while the middle class may avoid moving into spaces where citizenship breaks down, residents of favelas must live simultaneously in different places with different levels of citizenship. At the same time, the nature of exclusion experienced also shifts from one person to another and even for the same person in different situations, according to their identity and social positioning. A young woman, supporting a family, must move between favelas and other places in the city to work, to find health care, and to get access to other services. As she crosses the geographical boundaries within the city, she also crosses boundaries in her relationship with the state. She can expect different treatment depending on where she is, physically, within the city. By contrast, a middle class woman would only be forced to cross those boundaries if she chose to for leisure (such as during carnaval, when samba schools hold ensaios (rehearsal parties) at the entrances to favelas). Similarly, a young black man walking on the street will be treated in a completely different way by the police than I would as a white woman. Violence within the city has a special character and has serious implications for the citizenships that people experience:
‘...people use violence to make claims on the city and use the city to make violent claims. They appropriate a space to which they then declare they belong; they violate spaces others claim. Such acts generate a city-specific violence of citizenship.’
(Holston and Appadurai 1999: 16)

Violence helps to constitute the boundaries of citizenship in Rio de Janeiro, because it delineates places where there is a different type of relationship with the state and because it also alters the way that people are able to make claims on the state for their rights. It is a pervasive part of the everyday lives of people who live outside the places where citizenship is more substantive. Because of this pervasiveness, there are a series of levels of socialisation that are relevant to both the experience of violence and citizenship. These include the individual and family, the community (including schools and public spaces within the favela), and the city and broader state-societal relations. Chapter 4 will examine these in greater detail.

Finally, there is a spatial dimension to the relationship between the favela and the city. The interaction between the spatial dimension and violence has distinct political ramifications for the relationship between citizens and the state. It leads to ‘parallel power’ and forms of perverse politics. Parallel may not the best word to describe the relationship between the favela and the state as it suggests there is no intersection between them, and this is not the case (Dowdney 2003; Rodgers 2003). However, people within the favela frequently use the expression ‘parallel power’ to describe authorities who use violence to achieve their ends (including the factions, the militia and the police under this heading). Community residents describe the dominant actors in the favela (police, militia, factions) as the ‘parallel power’ because they do not operate under the formal authority of the state. The nature of this relationship with the state (police repression combined with a lack of accountability in social programmes) contributes to ‘parallel communities’. These communities are parallel in the sense that a shadow is parallel to an object—it is a negative reflection of what it should be. Violence reinforces the boundaries of the parallel communities, both in terms of the physical control of delineated geographical areas and in terms of the stigma that is associated with them. These dynamics contribute to the perpetuation of inequality and exclusion. The implications of parallel communities for citizenship are crucial because they can act to distort the relationship between citizens and the state, making an accountable relationship difficult. Chapters 4-7 will explore the specific characteristics and implications of this.
It can be argued that the cause of this parallel structure is in fact the state’s own strategies toward the favela which have led to two sets of laws, the lei do asfalto (law of the pavement, or neighbourhood) and lei da favela (law of the favela) (Santos 2002: 155). As Wacquant describes the role of the state in creating and perpetuating parallel communities with reference to American urban ghettos:

‘the isolation...is the product of an active process of institutional detachment and segregation fostered by the decomposition of the public sector. It follows that the sources are not simply economic...they are also and above all properly political, rooted in the abandonment of the ghetto [or favela] by the state permitted by the marginalisation of poor urban blacks in the local and national political fields’(Wacquant 2008: 224)(emphasis in the original).

The state may be complicit in the underlying causes of the parallel communities, but the internal dynamics surrounding the patterns of authority and coercive mediators also reinforce the boundaries from the inside out. Chapter 5 explained how a separate pattern of authority orders much of people’s lives within the favela. While the control of armed actors over many aspects of daily life is pervasive within the favela, outside of this geographical boundary it has little force. The sense of crossing a boundary when you enter the favela is partly because of the parallel system of authority at work, but this boundary is also reinforced in other ways.

Stigma, fear, and divisions of class, race, and age further reinforce the boundaries of the parallel community. These divisions are overlaid with social exclusion to create very persistent and real boundaries between the favela and the asfalto. Zaluar describes them as ‘interlocking mechanisms of social inequality in the urban domain and failure of public institutions to uphold the law’(Zaluar 2004: 143). Broader processes of labelling as discussed in Chapter 4 determine the relationship between the community and the rest of the city. These psychological boundaries are again reinforced by differential experience of violence and security (including security policy), which have life and death consequences (Koonings and Krujit 2007).

Parallel communities and the power dynamics and boundaries that accompany them contribute to perverse forms of politics. By perverse politics I mean that the there is a hybridisation between democratic, clientelistic, and authoritarian modes of politics such that the outcome of processes of social mobilisation or state intervention that could lead to more democratic relations in other circumstances, instead produce the opposite. For every dimension of politics that should be positive and contribute to greater democracy is a darker side that emerges within the context of parallel communities and violence. What exists in
practice is a mixture of the two, which leads to situations where state interventions and community mobilisations do not always lead to the desired outcomes of greater democracy and social inclusion. The table below lists the two sides to each dimension of politics within a context of violence. In practice, both of these sides co-exist and it is the experience of this clash that contributes to fragmenting the experience of citizenship.

**Table 1: Perverse politics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule of law: human and citizenship rights</th>
<th>Unrule of law: violence, fear, and insecurity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship and civil society</td>
<td>Armed actors and uncivil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate and effective empowerment</td>
<td>The politics of coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decent states and public policies</td>
<td>State failure, arbitrariness, rule of the jungle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from (Koonings and Krujit 2004: 8).

Holston describes this hybridity:

‘Thus Brazilian democratisation is at a critical point. It has not been able to overcome the violence and impunity that lacerate all social groups. Simultaneously, however, these counterconfigurations have not prevented the consolidation of significant measures of democracy and democratic innovation. Above all, they have not prevented the legitimation of democratic citizenship in its extensive sense and its adoption as the language in which the most diverse sectors of society, including organised crime, frame their interests. For the time being, neither democracy not its counters prevails in Brazil. Rooted, yet rotted, they remain entangled, unexpectedly surviving each other’ (Holston 2008: 273).

The relationship between violence and the making and unmaking of citizenship is clearly complex, and implicates many dimensions of the citizen-state relationship. The subsequent chapters will explore how fragmented citizenship emerges from the empirical reality and the implications of this for the conceptual debates outlined in this chapter.

**Conclusion**

This chapter shows how the dominant theoretical debates on citizenship do not fully take account of the ways that violence can shift the parameters for citizenship. Given the boundaries of these debates, this thesis will focus on citizenship as the interaction between status and practice where citizenship is defined as the right to have rights. The city is a particular site for considering citizenship, and the role of place in explaining both the meanings and experiences of citizenship is crucial, especially because of the way that violence affects places differently. Violence, taken in a multi-dimensional way, cutting across spaces and processes of socialisation has its own implications for citizenship. Together, these two contextual elements (the city as a particular political community and place for citizenship, and violence as a social phenomenon that affects citizenship across different spaces of
socialisation) raise some challenges to the analytical approach to citizenship. That is, both of these elements have implications for the interactions between the status of citizenship as a normative concept and as a set of practices, acts and actions. Taken as a whole, this approach can also raise some challenges for the leading theories of citizenship set out earlier in this chapter.

**Figure 2: Analytical approach to the meaning of citizenship**

In order to unpack the complex relationship between citizenship, the city and violence, this thesis examines the implications for the three dimensions of citizenship central to this thesis. First, in relation to the meanings and practices of citizenship, the normative casting of citizenship is altered by violence and this has characteristics specific to the experience of violence in the favela. And the potential range of meanings and acts of citizenship are also both circumscribed and enabled by violence (see Chapter 4). Second, state power and legitimate political authority are called into question by violence, as the dynamics within particular communities alter the ways that the state intervenes and which patterns of authority prevail (see Chapter 5). The relationship between citizens and the state becomes permeated by an intricate web of mediators, some of which use violence as the basis for their control, but this control also has set geographic parameters (see Chapter 6). The spatial aspects of the relationship between the city and the favela lead to parallel power and perverse politics, which both reflects these aspects of citizen-state relations and contributes to them (see Chapter 7). Given this rich but complex theoretical picture, and the difficulties of researching in contexts of violence, the next chapter will address the methodology for research and how this methodology attempted to meet these analytical demands.
Chapter 3 / Methodology

Introduction

Given the complex and potentially insecure context for this research as well as the analytical demands outlined in Chapter 2, what methodology is appropriate for this context and this topic? This chapter explores the possibilities of participatory action research methodology for researching citizenship and violence. What emerges are a number of unique features of the research arising from this methodology including the kind of access it provided, its ability to interrogate the research questions themselves, as well as its potential to contribute to positive change at the community and policy levels. This chapter also describes the methods used and assesses how these methods worked in practice. Finally, in this chapter, I will reflect on why I chose to do this kind of research and some of the challenges that emerged in the process.

Reflexivity is an essential element of participatory action research, and involves ‘making explicit the power relations and exercise of power in the research process’ (Reid and Frisby 2008: 94). This includes some critical reflections on the methodology and on myself as the researcher. It examines the roles of the community researchers, and my own role as an external researcher; and the risks involved in the research.

As outlined in the introduction, the research methodology that I used was based on participatory action research and participatory learning and action. At their core, these methodologies treat research as a process that can create emancipatory knowledge that can contribute to positive social change, by involving participants as active researchers (Park, Brydon-Miller et al. 1993; Pretty, Gujit et al. 1995; Reason and Bradbury 2001; Gaventa and Cornwall 2008). Central to this approach is a focus on the everyday dimension of experience, as part of what Chambers points out as the paradigm shift away from expert knowledge towards the daily realities of poor people (Chambers 1995). This is an important perspective to bring to bear on citizenship and citizen-state relations, which are often studied primarily through an institutional or theoretical lens. The emphasis on the everyday is also fundamental to feminist methodologies (Smith 1989). This research drew heavily on feminist methodologies and feminist participatory action research because of the way that it connects the personal to hidden forms of inequality encoded in social roles and institutions:

‘The aim [of feminist participatory action research] is to connect the articulated and contextualized personal with the often hidden or invisible structural and social institutions that define and shape our lives. This can foster the development of strategies and programs based on real life experiences rather than theories or
Building on all of these elements, and following Kemmis and a critical approach to participatory action research, I designed the research process with these goals in mind. It was intended to provide the opportunity for ‘collective self-reflective enquiry...in order to improve the rationality and justice of their own social...practices, as well as their understanding of these practices and the situations in which these practices are carried out’ (Kemmis and McTaggart 1988: 1)(emphasis added). In order to map existing practices, connect these to a greater understanding of these practices, and then examine in more detail the situations in which these practices occur and fundamentally how they can be changed, the research process facilitated public debate through participatory discussion groups in public spheres, connecting people of different social class, gender, age, and social positioning (see Kemmis 2008). We also built on past work that uses participatory urban appraisal to research violence (Moser and Holland 1997; Moser and McIlwaine 1999; 2004). Finally, throughout the research process, I paid attention to another core aspect of feminist methodologies which is endeavouring to understand of the intersectionality and fluidity of identities, such as the intersection of race, gender and class, and issues of interpretation, translation and representation between them (Harding and Norberg 2003: 2011).

Because of the way that the methodology and the analysis are so intertwined, and because of the participatory nature of the research, I use different voices throughout this thesis. In so doing, I seek to reflect the different levels of inquiry bound up in this thesis, drawing on Reason’s notion of the three voices of action research (Reason and Bradbury 2001). I use the first person voice to write about things that relate to my own values and assumptions and to be self-reflective. I use the second person voice to reflect the collective nature of the research process, and the ‘shared responsibility for the design and execution of the project that enhances co-inquiry’(Mead 2008: 645). Finally I use the third-person voice to move to wider and more impersonal academic community in an effort to ‘make a contribution to the body of knowledge’ and the wider systems surrounding it (ibid). I have left these different voices in the thesis deliberately to reflect the different positions from which I am writing.

This methodological approach, although complex and multi-layered, was essential from an empirical perspective, because the communities involved are controlled and isolated by the authority of the militia and the drug trafficking factions. These conditions present specific obstacles to research (Lee and Renzetti 1990). An approach that privileges a relationship with
community leaders was the only way that research on this topic could happen at all given the circumstances because of the difficulty of gaining entry to communities where access by external actors is very limited by the militia/drug traffickers. Beyond this initial question of access, this approach was also necessary because it helped to create the conditions for more open discussion around questions of violence and citizenship. Given the context, open and frank conversations on these topics are difficult to achieve. Closed questionnaires on their own are even less likely to illicit open responses about violence (Justino, Leavy et al. 2009). This approach was necessary because it offered the possibility of contributing positively at the community level to the problems the research addressed (Grant, Nelson et al. 2008). In that sense, it was a deliberate choice for a methodology that had the potential to create more space for democracy in the face of violence. Finally, much of the existing research on violence in Rio de Janeiro is based on police reports, hospital records, and newspaper reports (Levine 2003). There is relatively little in-depth empirical research on citizenship and violence and even less using a participatory methodology to examine these issues. This research can make an important contribution to the debates around violence and citizenship in Rio de Janeiro because of the relatively uniqueness of the methodology.

**Description of method**

My research methodology including the following main elements:

- Working with community researchers from the outset to carry out participatory action research, including stakeholder analysis, developing research themes, facilitating research meetings, and creating participatory videos

- Approximately 60 participatory discussion groups, facilitated by community researchers on themes chosen by them with separate groups of children, elderly, parents, community leaders, and women using a range of participatory tools including Venn diagrams, problem trees, calendars, timelines, community mapping, transect walks, etc.

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20 During the research process we revised and applied a questionnaire to 343 residents. I have not analysed the questionnaires in this thesis as they were intended to create comparability with a larger study as part of the Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability as part of the research group working on Violence, Participation and Citizenship. The purpose of applying this questionnaire at the end of a participatory process was to build on the trust built through participatory process as an entry point for a questionnaire in order to generate more reliable data than other similar surveys. See Justino, Patricia, Jennifer Leavy and Elsa Valli (2009). “Quantitative methods in Contexts of Everyday Violence.” IDS Bulletin Violence, Social Action and Research 40(3): 41-49.
• Using participatory video and participatory theatre throughout the research process for training, documentation, and developing people’s ideas
• Semi-structured interviews with community leaders
• Field and methodological diary
• Policy dialogues with local, state, and federal government representatives and NGOs

A timeline showing how these elements relate to each other is included as Annex 1.

**Working with community researchers**

A central element to this approach was building up a team of community residents who could act as community researchers. In order to do this in Quitungo and Guaporé, I worked closely with a coordinator who lives in Quitungo, whom I know well and have worked with on prior research projects. Together we invited different leaders from the community to participate in a monthly meeting over a space of about five months to discuss some of the key issues in the research. These leaders were drawn from different segments of the community in terms of age, race, religious affiliation, political affiliation, and area of work within the community. Crucially, all were perceived as primarily neutral in relation to the armed groups relevant to the community. Many where leaders whom I had worked with previously on other research projects, so I had prior knowledge of their work, their profiles within the community and their interests. At the end of this period, the community coordinator and I reviewed all the notes from the sessions on the participants and invited those that were most interested and consistent in their participation to become the team of community researchers. We used this method, because those who were only interested in the project as a rent-seeking activity or for the political clout it might provide soon dropped out of the meetings.

We tried to balance the selection of community researchers according to gender, age (ranging from 16 to 65), sector of activity within the community (sport, drama, political party activist, social work, education, music). Annex 4 provides a brief profile and biography of each of the community researchers. What was most important about this group was its capacity to mobilise different groups within the favela, which given the context, was not an easy task. So the community researchers, as leaders within the community, needed to have a certain degree of legitimacy in order to be able to take forward a participatory action research process.
The role of the community researchers was to be co-researchers with me, in the sense that they guided how the research questions were investigated, which groups within the community were most relevant and should be involved, and which tools were appropriate for particular sessions. We also undertook collective analysis of the research for them to identify for themselves what the most important implications of the research were for their own work as community leaders. Throughout the research process, we had numerous discussions about how the knowledge produced should be used, by whom and for what kinds of purposes. In recognition of the seriousness of this role and the commitment required during the most intensive period of the research, community researchers were paid a monthly salary for 20 hours work per week.

Once the group of community researchers was established, I conducted an in-depth methodological training over a period of five days on participatory research. At the end of this training, I held a workshop with the community researchers to discuss the central research questions, so that they could identify the sub-themes that they thought we should pursue. For example, the research team in Quitungo and Guaporé chose community design, identity, education, fear, power, prejudice and labelling, and violence as the important themes to investigate in relation to the central research questions.
We also conducted a stakeholder analysis to identify which groups within the community were most important to work with. This involved identifying all the important groups and segments of the community, discussing which were most influential and which were potential saboteurs, and then choosing which groups were most important to work with, given the research topic. The community researchers were responsible for mobilising residents to participate in the research process, setting the agenda for the participatory discussion groups, and facilitating and documenting them. I provided support during the entire process, and there were often problems and difficulties that arose. These were varied and ranged from participants not turning up for meetings to too many people turning up, to unrealistic expectations from participants (e.g. if I participate I will receive certain benefits from the government), to militia members invading a meeting to censor it. I examine some of these issues in greater detail below. Nevertheless, the community researchers became increasingly confident with participatory tools during the course of the research.

As the community researchers became increasingly confident with participatory tools, I assumed a supporting role, among other things facilitating weekly meetings for on-going analysis and reflection on emerging findings and a final workshop pulling together key results from the participatory discussion groups. Finally, I also provided training in how to use the research results, including discussions on how community researchers could use them strategically in their own work. The time required to build relationships with community researchers is crucial to making participatory research processes effective (Grant, Nelson et al. 2008).

Working with community researchers in this way was critical to the research because of their ability to mobilise residents to participate in the research process. Without working closely with residents, it would have been impossible to gain the access that I did and have the freedom to discuss the topics that the research covered. Because they are perceived as leaders in the communities, they were able to create spaces for discussion that would have been difficult or impossible for an outsider to generate. It was also important because of the way that it decentralised the control over the knowledge generated through the research process. I left all of the original materials produced in the participatory discussion groups and the reports on these meetings with the community researchers, as well as copies of the films the researchers made. The community researchers retained more control over the information collected through the research process than they would have through any other
approach; and they are also best placed within the community to act upon this information or work with others to act upon it.

Working so closely with community researchers also has certain limitations. Perhaps because of the centrality of community researchers to the research process and the degree of control that they had over the research, a series of tensions and dilemmas about the differences between my agenda and theirs also emerged (Nyden and Wiewel 1992). It is also very time consuming because it requires quite intensive training for the community researchers as well as close supervision and support throughout the research process. In this case, none of the researchers had secondary education, which also means that the writing skills in the group were not excellent. These constraints had implications for me as the external researcher because all of the different elements of the research required significant inputs from me, in order for the community researchers to be able to carry them out. I explore these issues in greater depth in the section on roles below.

**Participatory Discussion Groups**

The participatory discussion groups brought together women, children, parents, community leaders and elderly into around 60 discussion sessions in total, meeting weekly over four months. The community researchers conducted a stakeholder analysis to choose the groups as described above. These groups formed the core of the qualitative research. Each meeting had a theme that the community researchers selected in advance. We also discussed which participatory tools would work best for that particular group and topic. In relation to the choice of which specific tools and methods to use during the research, there was an important element of trial and error. It was often necessary to experiment with different participatory tools, depending on the topic of discussion and the particular group involved. For example, children worked very well with a ‘river of life’ exercise to discuss how violence affected their lives, while this same tool was not as successful with a group of elderly. It was crucial for the community researchers to have an array of different tools and methods, and to encourage changes to the schedule or plan based on how sessions progressed. While we would discuss in advance which methods to use and why, in practice, adaptation and improvisation was often important. It was not always possible to anticipate how a particular method would work.
**Table 2: Participatory Discussion Groups in Quitungo, Guaporé, and Santa Teresa**

**Quitungo/ Guaporé**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Themes addressed</th>
<th>Number of meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children and young people</td>
<td>Community design, Identity, Education, Fear, Power, Prejudice and labelling, Violence</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Community design, Family, Identity, Fear, Prejudice and labelling, Education, Power, Violence</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>Community design, Family, Education, Participation, Power, Violence</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>Community design, Community history, Power, Violence</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community research team</td>
<td>Planning, Evaluation, Analysis, Video</td>
<td>15 (including research methods workshop, planning workshop, and participatory video workshop)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Santa Teresa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Number of meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young people</td>
<td>Public security, Violence against women, Media, Building leadership</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community leaders</td>
<td>Public security, Violence against women, Media, Building leadership</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community research team</td>
<td>Planning, Evaluation, Analysis, Video</td>
<td>9 (including research methods workshop, planning workshop, and participatory video workshop)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The meetings opened space for dialogue around issues related to violence and citizenship and helped explore themes related to the main research questions. They also built relationships with different key groups in the community. In order to document these meetings I photographed and transcribed the flip chart/cards from participatory exercises. I also used video and still photography to record meetings (although research participants controlled the cameras). Community researchers also produced a report on each session, and I supplemented this with an entry in my field diary.

There are several limitations to this element of the methodology. First, there was a problem of continuity. In order for these groups to function well and delve into greater depth on the issues involved, there needed to be a certain amount of continuity of participation. For example, if, at every meeting of children, completely different children arrived, then the community researcher would need to spend a significant amount of time explaining the nature of the research project and building the trust of the children. The community researchers did manage to achieve some continuity of participation, but this was difficult for them. Also, as an external researcher with specific questions in mind, I was not able to steer the group sessions completely in the direction of the questions or topics I would like to investigate. I gave up this control so that the community researchers could have more of a role. But this also presented a challenge in terms of the empirical evidence: how did I fill the gaps between my research questions and the topics covered through the discussion groups? I relied on the semi-structured interviews to go into greater depth on areas that I felt had not been covered through the participatory sessions (see Reason and Bradbury 2001). This approach is also very time consuming, because holding a meeting with a relatively large group of people can take more time than conducting interviews with specific individuals. In order to compensate for these limitations it was important to combine a variety of methods, as described below.

**Participatory video and participatory theatre**

Participatory video has been used since the 1970s as one in a range of participatory approaches to development work and more recently as a participatory action research tool\(^\text{21}\). Some of its advantages are highlighted by (Snowden 1983) who pioneered its use in 1967:

> ‘The ability to view immediately one’s own self speaking on videotape assists individuals to see themselves as others see them. This self-image conveys the

\(^{21}\) For example, ActionAid used participatory video as part of a three year action research project in Malawi linking villages to policy makers in the national government and international donors. See ActionAid Sierra Leone (2002) *Participation – Poor People’s Representation. A promise unfulfilled?* DVD
impression immediately that one's own knowledge is important and that it can be effectively communicated. These video techniques create a new way of learning, which not only build confidence, but show people that they can say and do things that they thought were not possible before’ (http://www.fao.org/sd/CDdirect/CDre0038.htm, accessed 04/06/08).

There is a small but growing body of work on participatory video as a research methodology (see White 2003). Some of the challenges of using participatory methods in contexts of urban violence have been explored at a general level, such as how to define and categorize complex and interrelated forms of violence, the ethics of using participatory approaches in terms of dealing with trauma and emotions that can arise, etc. (Moser and Holland 1997; Moser and McIlwaine 2004). Adapting participatory methodologies – particularly participatory video - to violent contexts presents some specific challenges. It is important to note that some of the difficulties arising from using participatory video would apply to any research method, qualitative or quantitative, participatory or not, used in a sensitive context (see Lee and Renzetti 1990).

As illustrated in the time line, I used participatory video, often in combination with participatory theatre throughout the research process (see White 2003; Guhathakurta 2008). The use of participatory video involved on-going and light training for all participants in the research in basic camera skills so that they could record research sessions. I also conducted intensive training in participatory video including facilitation and editing for community researchers. The community researchers later carried out specific video projects towards the end of the research process. We integrated participatory theatre into the making of the videos and as part of training exercises.

At the end of the research project we created three films addressing the central research question around how violence affects people’s lives and what steps they could take to address the situation. Each film had a different focus and theme, reflecting the views of the group making it. The creation process was participatory. All participants received training in basic filming skills and put these to use. I trained some of the community researchers in basic editing skills that enabled them to play roles in editing.

**Semi-structured Interviews**

I conducted around twenty semi-structured interviews. Five of these interviews were with policy makers and the remaining fifteen were with community leaders and other key informants in Quitungo, Guaporé and Santa Teresa. A list of these interviews is included as
Annex 3. I conducted these interviews at the end of the participatory research process, which shaped the areas that I covered in the interviews. These interviews allowed for a sharper focus on the central research questions, and a deeper exploration on specific aspects of the research questions not covered through other qualitative methods. In particular, the interviews contributed to a set of narratives of in-depth examples of cases of mediation. While these interviews did provide important in-depth information, they would not have been possible if I had not already established trust and relationships within the communities through the participatory research process. It is likely that some interviewees would have refused to meet with me and others would have been less willing to talk openly about sensitive issues. Further, the prior participatory research process helped increase my understanding of community dynamics and issues surrounding the research questions so that I could more effectively navigate these during the semi-structured interviews. The interview guide is included as Annex 2.

**Informal conversations/field and methodology diary record**

The main focus in my field diary was on the informal conversations that I had with the ten community researchers, as well as with around ten of the most regular participants from the participatory discussion groups (Wheeler, Joanna 2007). I had sustained and regular contact with these people, and this allowed for on-going conversations around different issues. These conversations were very important in terms of contextualising the discussions from participatory groups. For example, during one meeting of children in Quitungo, a group of young men arrived and were very disruptive, but interested in participating. Through informal conversations with the community researchers I learned that these young men had been directly involved with the drug trafficking prior to the arrival of the militia and had been banned from appearing publicly in Quitungo. I also used these conversations to triangulate information between the participatory discussion groups and the semi-structured interviews.

**Policy dialogues**

These included meetings with specific members of city and state governments, a public screening of the participatory videos, and a series of debates with a panel of government representatives22. These discussions were towards the end of the research process. The policy dialogues were important as an opening for community researchers to use research results to generate discussions about actions and policies that can improve the situation.

22 These included a debate following the video screening in March 2007 with a municipal councillor, a community leader, and a representative of the federal ministry of culture; and a series of four debates in May and June 2009 with key government officials in Santa Teresa, Quitungo, Vila Canoas and Cidade de Deus.
In the analysis of this research in this thesis, I triangulate between all of these sources. The participatory sessions provide a broad base of data and the interviews and field diary provide complementary and at times contrasting anecdotes. In the course of the research, I often pursued issues that emerged at the participatory session with people afterwards in private. Thus, much of the insights offered here are taken from the threads of discussion and conversation that stretch over months, and in some cases years. The claims made in this thesis are based on the breadth of the participatory exercise and the depth of long-standing relationships with individuals within the favelas.

The next section examines in greater detail the case for the value of this methodological approach.

**Why choose a participatory action research methodology?**

**Difficulty of access**

Carrying out research in areas controlled by armed actors requires an on-going process of negotiation along a series of different axes. Permission from these groups is essential in order to have access to communities that are dominated by non-state groups, yet independence from these groups is also fundamental to the integrity of the research. The negotiations that I as an external researcher engaged in mirrored the compromises that residents make on a daily basis in such areas. Negotiating permission with the drug traffickers/militias for carrying out research, including physical access to the communities, was a prerequisite to any research activities. Their permission was essential for the research to occur, because without it, there would be increased risk to anyone involved in the research process. On the other hand, it was also important to protect the independence of the research from these same groups. The implications of this system for the research project were clear: it was crucial that residents and participants in the research process did not perceive the community researchers to be affiliated with the militia or drug trafficking mafias, yet these violent actors needed to give their consent for the research to happen. In the end, this resulted in a complex process of negotiation to gain access while maintaining neutrality.23

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In Quitungo and Guaporé, where the militia is in control, the first negotiations were held indirectly—the community coordinator approached the mother of the leader of the militia to tell her about the research project and ask her opinions. The assumption was that she would discuss this with her son and any objections would be raised via her. This protected the community coordinator from direct contact with the militia. However, once the research began, the community researchers felt that more direct contact was necessary. I went to meet with the leader of the militia, accompanied by two of the community researchers. He agreed to the research project going forward.

Approximately two weeks later, a meeting of the community researchers to plan some of the upcoming participatory discussion groups was invaded by five armed members of the militia. The brother of the head of the militia began an argument with one of the community researchers in the street and then the group of men followed her to the meeting. During this meeting, the militia members accused the researchers of having political motivations and forming cliques that did not work for the benefit of the community. The tone of the confrontation was aggressive on the part of the militia members, and a clear attempt at intimidation. Eventually the head of the militia appeared and agreed that the research could continue, but under the auspices of the militia. This meant holding meetings in a militia-controlled building and including people chosen by the militia in the team of community researchers. When the militia members left the meeting, they sent a young woman who worked for them to sit at the meeting and take notes.

The community researchers were angry at this treatment, and felt that the militia were threatening the entire research project through an abuse of power. In the end, I met again with the head of the militia and his lieutenant and refused to agree to his demands. I emphasised the external connections of the research project as well as interest from the national media in the project as a means of increasing the safety of the researchers. The head of the militia wanted me to remove two of the researchers that he had prior disagreements with about unrelated issues. This was a clear example of how the micropolitics of the community, which are shaped by the context of violence, had an impact on the research project. I refused to make any changes to the team of community researchers. He reluctantly agreed, but because he did not perceive the research as a threat. When the meeting ended, he offered the community coordinator and I a ride in his car to the research meeting site, and we both refused. As we left the building, the coordinator said ‘I’d rather be dead than be seen
in his car.’ If we had been seen in his car during the middle of the day in the favela, this would have interpreted as a very clear statement that we were working with the militia.

The difficulty through all these negotiations was demonstrating enough flexibility to the militia to appear not to be a threat, while at the same time maintaining the neutrality of the research. If the research was seen by community participants to be affiliated with the militia, this would have a significant impact on who would attend meetings and what would be discussed. Also, there was a high degree of interest by the national media in the militia, with stories appearing on an almost daily basis about their activities. The militia leader was cautious about this because he did not want any disruption to their operations and may have feared further media attention.

In Santa Teresa, the process of negotiation with the drug traffickers was more straightforward. The primary concern of the traffickers was to maintain a suitable environment for the drug trade, where state vigilance does not reach and where they can carry out transactions unhindered. In order for this to be the case, they need either sufficient legitimacy or sufficient levels of fear within the favela to maintain silence on the part of the residents vis-à-vis the state. Research meetings were held in the middle-class neighbourhood 500 metres away, and this small geographical distance meant that the traffickers did not need to give direct permission for the research to go ahead. During filming for the participatory video, the community researchers needed to ask permission from the traffickers. Certain shots and angles were not allowed because they could reveal details of the trafficking operations or show the identities of individual traffickers. Holding the research meetings outside of the favelas was an important indicator of neutrality from the traffickers, and also diminished any threat that the research might inadvertently or deliberately reveal information about the drug trade. However, it also meant that the research was more removed from the favelas, and that meetings were less well attended.

As these processes of negotiation demonstrate, the issue of physical access to conduct research is very problematic in this context. Only a research approach which builds trust with residents and involves them as active participants in the research process could secure access for the research to go ahead. There is a second layer of the difficulty of access around the lack of openings or forums to discuss violence. This approach also meant that through the relationships with community researchers it was feasible to bring up questions of violence, power, and citizenship and discuss these in a relatively open way. In order to achieve access, both physically and in terms of the possibility to discuss these particular topics, this research
methodology required an approach which ceded more control to community researchers. The community researchers were uniquely positioned to mobilise participants without upsetting the militias/factions. It is also important to note that my own long standing relationships with the communities and some of the people living there enabled this approach of working directly with community residents as researchers. I examine the role of the community researchers in greater depth below.

**Difficulty in holding open, grounded discussion**

The public nature of participatory research limits what people are able to say and also opens the possibility for profound reflection, and this is connected to a context of fear and mistrust caused by violence. Because of a history of frequent shifts in the violent control of the community, extreme caution is needed in what one says and to whom. This is a significant barrier to any kind of empirical research within contexts of violence. The level of trust between the researcher and the research participants directly affects the type of information that will arise. As one woman explained:

‘Before [when the drug traffickers were in control] we did not have freedom of expression, we couldn’t have friendships. You never knew when one word that you said to someone on the street two kilometres from here might be taken the wrong way, reported back to the trafican tes, and your life would be over’ (field diary, 10 December 2006).

Fear and mistrust between residents, and the self-censoring that results, is replicated in all their interaction with people from outside the community. On many occasions, I observed residents expressing one opinion publicly, while saying something very different to me privately, or changing the way they described a given situation according to who was present. The norms and rules governing what can be said and to whom are complex, yet well understood by residents. Hence the importance of the research being led by community researchers who could navigate these norms and rules so as to create what felt like relatively safe spaces for community residents to participate and reflect on their experiences.

Self-censorship and the expressing of different and even contradictory opinions are tendencies to which the external researcher needs to be attentive in any kind of research, but particularly in a violent context (Nordstrom and Robben 1996; Lundy and McGovern 2008). There are many silences and gaps that emerge in researching violence and this creates particular methodological challenges, as de Vries and Weber explain:

‘...although violence determines the structure of everyday life, of the individual and collective self, from within its very ground manifestation, and effects are often more elusive than can be grasped by cognitive or hermeneutical procedures for establishing
and understanding reality. In that sense, violence—whether past or present, hidden or manifest, excessive or mitigated—can be said to impose a certain difficulty of articulation. Its catastrophic and traumatic aspects call for more than moral indignation, theoretical cognition, or even aesthetic imagination. What seems to be required, in excess of these categories is a sensitivity to the indeterminate ‘feelings, ‘signs of history’, ‘ruins’, and ‘silences’ for which no generally accepted or accessible idioms are ready to hand (de Vries and Weber 1997 cited in Pearce 2007: 18.’

People do not say what they think for a variety of different reasons, and social research has to contend with a constant cycle of ‘editing out’, made more acute in participatory research because of its interactive and relatively public nature.

This reticence might be attributed to several factors. Participants may say what they think an outsider wants to hear; this ‘interviewer effect’ is well documented for all qualitative research (Singer, Frankel et al. 1983). People may be afraid or reluctant to talk about something because of possible repercussions, or because they have a vested interest such as family members or they themselves being involved in drug trafficking. During discussion groups, people made direct references to the drug traffickers and the militia, but still often using a kind of code. For example, in a children’s session on citizenship, we asked them to list examples of things that are not citizenship. Many responded, ‘Paying 10 reais’, which is a reference to paying the militia for protection. The level of trust needed between the researcher and the research participants has a direct impact on the type of information that will result. Because I have known some of the residents for over eight years, I had a certain degree of credibility with them and these personal relationships helped to expose this kind of dissonance between the performance of a public persona, and the way that the same issue might be discussed in a context of greater trust and privacy. The creation of a safe space for discussion occurred in some cases and not in others throughout the research, but without a participatory community-research led approach, it would not have happened at all.

**Tensions between data collection, participatory data collection and participatory action research**

There are significant tensions between data collection, as it is typically understood in relation to doctoral research, more participatory forms of data collection that give the researched more control over how information is generated, and participatory action research in which the relationship between the researcher and the researched is fundamentally shifted so that the researched have a role in framing the research itself. There is a further tension between participatory data collection and participatory action research, which involves collaboration
between the researcher and the researched in other aspects of the research process. Participatory data collection involves the use of participatory techniques to generate information in a more collective and transparent way. Using participatory data collection for doctoral research is relatively straightforward, as it only involves articulating questions set by the doctoral researcher in a legible way through participatory exercises. This thesis sought to move beyond participatory data collection to participatory action research, which involved participants having a role in defining the parameters of the research, its purpose and use. In this approach, the process is collective in nature and contingent upon multiple views, so the (doctoral) researcher is not in a position to dictate which data will be collected when. In relation to the requirements of a doctorate, articulating this work as a thesis involves unpicking certain elements of the wider participatory action research process and building a coherent argument around them. Given the tensions between participatory action research and traditional data collection, and the additional requirements of doctoral research, this is at times an uneasy combination.

For example, participatory action research implies, in certain moments, the need to privilege the process of building up the trust and relationships sustained through the research process over more rigid forms of data collection and extraction. At first women’s group meeting in Quitungo, the women refused to discuss violence in community time line (field diary, 18 January 2007). Community researchers understood this as a result of the trauma many suffered from violence and a lack of confidence and trust in the space created through the research to relive these experiences. Later in the process, this same group of women went on to talk very openly about different aspects of their experience of violence, but as the external researcher, I needed to respect this process, rather than push for answers to the questions I wanted to ask. Similarly, throughout the participatory discussion groups, we approached the subject of violence often through oblique and tangential ways, because of the risks people felt about talking openly, especially given the potential for changes in the control of the armed group that could mean repercussions for speaking openly. A participatory action research process implies that the external researcher cedes control over how questions are addressed in large part to co-researchers from the community involved (Kemmis 2008). In a context of violence, these processes are even more sensitive and carry greater weight in terms of the risks involved for participants and researchers. Therefore there is a need to allow the slow, not always linear development, of a sense of collective identity around the research process to emerge. This kind of process is not always easily reconciled with the needs of doctoral
research, in which the dominant model is a sole researcher seeking primarily to create original academic contributions through a more individualized project.

Because of these tensions and because of the contingency of sensitive information within this context, it is important to have parallel research processes—some which are more public, collective and participatory, and some which are more private and individualised. This variety of different research methods helps the external researcher to contrast different types of information and make sense of dissonances that these different methods will expose, as well as balancing the requirements of participatory action research with doctoral research.

Interpersonal dynamics between community researchers themselves and between the researchers and the research participants also shaped the participatory quality of the research. It is difficult to ascertain how representative and inclusive participation was from within the community, because those who participated reflected the social circles and connections of community researchers. Despite this, there is still value in creating the opportunities for reflection and discussion. Participatory action research can play an important role in awareness-raising, and this is particularly important in a context of violence (Gaventa and Cornwall 2008). In Quitungo and Guaporé, the research process created a space for conversations that would not have been possible before the arrival of the militia. This is partly fortuitous, to do with the arrival of the militia, which has created more stability in the community—a necessary condition for holding regular meetings with different groups. While the threat of violence was still very imminent, it was a more stable threat. If there are on-going gun battles in the streets, it is difficult to hold participatory research sessions. It is also partly to do with the broad base of leadership that the community researchers involved represented, and the careful stance of neutrality that we took in relation to both the militia and the drug traffickers (Feenan 2002). And it is also partly to do with the role of participatory process itself within the research.

Potential to contribute positively to citizenship

An important question for me in undertaking this research was: what will this research contribute to the concrete realities of those involved? The obligation for participatory research to provide some kind of benefit (tangible or intangible) is heightened in a violent context (Moser and McIlwaine 1999; 2004), especially given the risks people take in being involved in the research. From the beginning, through interactions with the community researchers and with the research participants themselves, I consistently framed and
described the research process as a process of generating knowledge as the basis for action. In practice, the process did lead to some limited forms of action, but also exposed limitations to these (Gaventa and Cornwall 2008). The outcomes of this approach in terms of citizen engagement are explored in Chapter 7.

The perceptions of the type of contribution that the research would make varied greatly among the community researchers, participants and myself. These were also mixed with expectations about how individuals might benefit personally from involvement in the research project. On the part of those who participated in the research process, there was also a range of expectations. Some people attended participatory discussion groups because they thought that it would help them get access to government subsidies or programmes. I had discussions with the community researchers and the participants on a regular basis about what the research project was for and what it could offer to them. I continually emphasised that the research project was primarily aimed at generating knowledge that they could use as the basis for action, but that the research project itself would not bring a clinic or a new school to the community. Despite this very clear statement at the start of virtually every meeting or discussion group, there was always pressure for the research project to do more—either for particular individuals within a model of patronage politics, or for the community as a whole, raising the issue of balancing long-term and short-term possibilities for change (Grant, Nelson et al. 2008).

Finally, this research methodology offered an opportunity to interrogate the central research questions themselves about how citizens engage with the state in a context of violence. I did not anticipate this dimension, but it has proved important in the analysis of the results. Chapters 4–7 trace how the experience of the methodology itself also provides insights into the dimensions of citizenship addressed in each chapter.

**Reflecting on the research process**

Reflexivity is a key element of participatory methodology and actors in the research process have significant impact on how research occurs and what comes out of it (Grant, Nelson et al. 2008). Reid and Frisby argue that reflexivity should address three elements: ‘the identification of power relationships and their effects in the research process; the ethical judgements that frame the research and mark the limits of shared values and political interests; and accountability for the knowledge that is produced’ (Reid and Frisby 2008: 100). The next section will address these dimensions by considering the roles of the different actors in the
research process (Hume 2007; Grant, Nelson and Mitchell 2008), including my own role as an external researcher, the role of the community researchers and the role of the local NGO I worked with in Santa Teresa. In doing this, it is important to be aware of power relationships and the way that they can distort the participatory process (Chambers 1995; Guijt and Shah 1998). In particular, Robert Chambers’ typology of uppers and lowers is helpful in analysing these dynamics: ‘Human society, in this context, can be thought of as patterned into hierarchical relationship, by analogy described as North and South. Many relationships are vertical, between ‘uppers’ and ‘lowers’. Individuals are multiple uppers or multiple lowers, and a person can be an upper in one context and a lower in another’ (Chambers 1995: 33). This section seeks to trace the complex way that power relations and forms of identity interplayed throughout the research process.

**My own role as external researcher**

Personal relationships are an important dimension to entry points for research in contexts of violence because trust is crucial to research process (see Rodgers and Jones 2007). It can be very difficult to gain access to favelas, especially in light of control by militia and rapid changes in regimes of power. Most researchers gain access through an external organisation or part of the government. An entry point via an official institution would have framed the research in a completely different light, in terms of perceptions of residents and participants in the research process, because this increases the expectations of research participants of what will be delivered through the research process. Entry point via an external organisation also shapes the way that the research agenda unfolds and can shape the types of discussions possible through the research. I acted as an external researcher, but on the basis of long established relationships. My main entry point in both field sites was prior relationships with people living within the favelas/neighbourhood. I have worked together with these people on two previous research projects from 1999 to 2003, as part of a larger research project on intergenerational social mobility and urban poverty; and as part of other research on citizenship and gender. I also used to live in Santa Teresa.

The interaction was between the research agenda which I set externally and an internal process of negotiation around how that agenda was interpreted and implemented with the community researchers. This means that there were various different agendas coming together to set the overall research questions. In practice, community researchers and research participants interpreted these questions in different ways throughout the research process. Through the discussions with community researchers and through the participatory
discussion groups themselves, the nature of the research questions evolved and changed throughout the research process. For example, in Santa Teresa, the role of the media in creating and perpetuating stigma and the role of leaders in the community became a key focus of the research, while in Quitungo and Guaporé, the role of education and the family in shaping children’s views and mores was given significant emphasis. None of these topics were ones that I anticipated in my own formulation of the research questions. The research process needed to allow the community researchers and the research participants to shape the research questions in line with their own priorities, leading to an evolution of the inquiry over time. My role, as an external researcher, was to facilitate and document this process, as well as to encourage deeper exploration of areas that I perceived to be important in relationship to my own research agenda. There are certainly disadvantages to using personal relationships as an entry point (as discussed earlier), but it does mean that the negotiation over the research agenda is more direct. However, as a researcher, I was forced to address a whole range of issues that may have been ignored by another organisation, had I worked through an NGO. I was able to discuss the research agenda directly with community researchers and this interaction shaped the research process.

I had to confront the limitations of what the research could achieve within a short time frame and situations where people I worked with faced exclusion, marginalisation, and violence. As a researcher and as a person, there is an impulse to act on these situations, to try to do something to help. I was not working with any existing organisation that could help to manage the expectations of the researchers or help to ensure the sustainability and continuity of the work. In most cases, there was very little that I could do to really make a substantive change for people on an immediate basis. I had to accept that despite close personal relationships with many of the researchers and research participants, I could do little to minimise the risks and uncertainty that they face on a daily basis. On a personal level, this approach to research requires confronting how fear and uncertainty (which also informs the lives of people living in contexts of violence) affects you as a researcher (Hume 2007). It also involves confronting the limits to your own expectations, and a sense of obligation to residents who may be experiences extremes of marginalisation and exclusion as a result of violence (Boesten 2008). I examine these issues in greater depth in the section on fear and risk.

These issues were particularly acute in relationship to the end of the research project. Because I had a short time in which to conduct this work, and I had to return to the UK, I needed to take into account how to exit from the community after working to build
relationships over months. Once I returned to IDS, it was very difficult to maintain engagement with the researchers at the level I could when I was in Brazil. I was also concerned with how the processes engendered through the research would be sustained once I left. Because in the case of Quitungo and Guaporé I was not working with any external organisation, the continuity and sustainability of the project hinges on the community researchers themselves and how they chose to act following the funded end of the project.

My identity as a white, foreign, woman also had an impact on the research process. While it shaped how the community researchers and others in the community responded to me, I also employed my identity at certain points in the process to achieve specific ends. For example, when I was forced to confront the militia leaders over the choice of community researchers, I brandished my business card (written in English, with logos), as a way of emphasising my external origins and connections. The community researchers also made use of this identity selectively—by making shirts for themselves with the project logo in English, and matching identity cards. However, on the whole, my identity did not act to provide me with greater protection or access.

I found that, despite my long-standing relationship with some of the community residents, and my on-going efforts to be very clear about the scope of the research and its purpose, I was still constantly confronting unrealistic perceptions of myself, and my role as ascribed by participants. This included ideas that I could deliver a clinic or school to the community, that the research would bring about a sweeping change in the conditions of the community or lead to mass mobilisation, that I would provide employment for large numbers of people, and that I would make a lot of money from writing a book about the research which I would not share with the community. I had to make constant efforts to dismantle these perceptions and manage expectations (Boesten 2008).

Finally, it is important to note that I explored certain dimensions of the research specifically through semi-structured interviews and informal conversations, which I did not share directly with community researchers. They were involved in helping me to identify people to interview and played an important role in shaping how I approached the questions that I set, but in the end, a certain portion of the research was separate to the wider participatory process that I encouraged them to lead. In a sense there were two parallel research processes: a public process of participatory research led by the community researchers, and a more private research process, which was informed by this broader public and participatory process, but
which was my own. This is an important point, because it relates to the question of who controls the knowledge and information generated through the research process (see below).

Fundamentally, the choice to do this kind of research was a personal and ethical one. It can be justified for a range of other reasons, but without a personal and ethical commitment to this research approach, it would not happen. I choose this approach because I believe that research should try and shift relations of power as part of the process of the research, and because I believe that research can be used to contribute to process of positive social transformation even in contexts of violence, and that this research can and should give something back to the people who participate in it. It is important to both recognise and state this clearly.

**Role of the local NGO**

In one of the field sites, I worked with a local NGO, which chose the community researchers to be involved and hosted the meetings and events in the offices of the NGO. Because the NGO, and particularly the head of the organisation, had its own agenda, which did not completely match with the research agenda, there were certain limitations on the degree of participation. Partly these related to the social positioning of the people within the NGO (mainly white, middle class, middle-aged women) and the community researchers In the case of Santa Teresa (two young people and one older woman, all black, and residents of the favela). The prior relationships between the NGO and the community researchers shaped how the relationships unfolded throughout the research process. Overall, the community researchers seemed to feel less ownership over the research process and less confidence at the end of the research than those from Quitungo and Guaporé, where there was no NGO involved. This was mainly because their involvement in the research was mediated by the NGO, which acted as a gatekeeper, giving value to certain ideas and approaches and excluding others.

However, in Quitungo and Guaporé, where there was no NGO, there was also no institution to guarantee continuation of the work after the research finished, or to mitigate the problems that arose when I had to leave Brazil. Working with very grassroots activists with no institutional support is also very difficult and time consuming. So there are trade-offs between the mediation that occurs when working with NGOs and longer-term sustainability and feasibility of the project.
Role of the community researchers

The participatory research process generates different sets of expectations—on the part of the community researchers, the research participants, and also for me as an external researcher (Grant, Nelson et al. 2008). Throughout the entire process, it is important to manage these expectations, because they can undermine the integrity of the research itself. On the part of the community researchers, there are strong expectations that the research project will contribute positively to their situation. Grant et al. encourage this:

‘In order to successfully navigate relationships with communities, we as researchers need to communicate our expectations honestly and authentically, while maintaining the commitment to participation, empowerment and democracy as well as sincere interest in participants as individuals. Researchers often require certain outputs...as a function of their employment, and we encourage researchers to reflect on this and to share their needs openly with participants’ (Grant, Nelson et al. 2008: 591).

As I will explain below, even though I did try to achieve the level of transparency recommended by Grant et al, this was not sufficient to address the issue of varying expectations and motivations for being involved in the research.

Working directly with community residents as researchers and engendering a process where they take the lead threw up certain tensions around social class and related ways of working (Nyden and Viewel 1992). For most of the community researchers, there is not necessarily a divide between professional and personal obligation, and any personal obligation could outweigh a professional one without warning. This can make it very difficult to work to a time line or schedule. Their perception of time was also very different. I had to be prepared to spend many hours waiting, and the community coordinator had many disagreements with community researchers about time. For example, if a community research arrived for the last 10 minutes of a 2½ hour meeting, should they receive the same compensation as others who arrived on time? These differences were exacerbated by the relatively short time frame that I had to complete the research. Finally there were also widely varied expectations about what should be gained by involvement in project. For community researchers who worked within political party structures, there was a sense that participation in the research project should emulate participation in party structures: The research project should fund ‘breakfasts’ for the community, or parties, or barbeques. The research project should provide opportunities for the friends of community researchers to be paid, regardless of whether they contributed to the project. The research project should generate attention from the political elite who can channel funds to the community. Because so much of daily interactions between people and
external organisations in the favela function according to patronage patterns, it was difficult but also very important to try and establish a different kind of culture of interaction through the research project.

Another dimension of the power dynamics that emerged throughout the research process is to do with the limits of social hierarchy and differential levels of access to resources. Despite all the elements of the process designed to balance these differences, a stark difference in realities of our lives remained (those of favela residents and my own as a middle-class white foreign woman). Essentially they face a precariousness of daily conditions much more extreme then my own. And beneath this is the knowledge on both sides that I could walk away from this research at any time that I chose. As Boesten describes:

‘...the relationship between researcher and the researched cannot be equal, and genuine engagement does not lead automatically to better relationships. Most of the researched will have to live on within the social structures they form a part of—even if these are dynamic and changing—, while the researcher inevitably leaves the site and thereby, the social structures. The freedom that the researcher has ‘to walk away’ is not the problem. The problem is that the researched have far less freedom to walk away, or in and out’(Boesten 2008: 21).

Because of these differences of social positioning, and regardless of how participatory the process, there was still the tendency on the part of the community researchers to view it as way of generating income, both for themselves and for the community more broadly (through social projects or other external interventions). This emerged at various points throughout the research process. Despite an ethical, transparent and rational approach to payment (through contracts with openly discussed terms of references) this logic was continually undermined by the social environment and the material conditions that shape it. The patterns of the relationship between the community researchers and I is in part the result of the nature of relationship between state and its citizens, and between the people living in the favelas and the rest of society. It is therefore impossible to isolate the research process from these dynamics, despite attempt to address social hierarchy within the research process. On the basis of reflecting on this research, it is unclear how far a time-bound and relatively short term participatory research process can shift the frontiers of dependence that are perpetuated through a whole raft of clientelistic and unequal relationship in society more broadly (Boesten 2008).

The interpersonal dynamics between community researchers themselves and between the community researchers and the research participants also had an impact on the participatory
nature of the research. It is very difficult to ascertain how representative and inclusive participation was from within the community, because those who participated reflect directly the social circles and connections of community researchers. As a result, all of the micropolitics present in the community, which may have no relationship to the research itself, directly affect the research process. For example, one of the community researchers has responsibilities for enrolling people for consideration to receive state welfare benefits. He would ask these people (often women) to come to research meetings, and they would arrive at the meetings with the impression that their participation would earn them state benefits. This kind of contingency is a feature of any kind of participatory research, because it is a part of the social fabric that is not excluded through a participatory process (Chambers 1995; Guijt and Shah 1998). On the contrary, a participatory process can provide openings for exploitation and the perpetuation of existing exclusions within the community (see Chapter 5). By involving community researchers to a high degree in the research process, I also introduced the potential for this kind of distortion. However participatory the research, it is still embedded in the existing social context, including patterns of clientelism and hierarchy. Other researchers using similar methods have encountered this dilemma (Hume 2007; 2007; Boesten 2008; Grant, Nelson et al. 2008). As echoed by the experiences of another researcher reflecting on her experience of participatory research:

‘The research opened a can of worms that seemed to flourish in the prevailing system of clientelism and dependency combined with hierarchical leadership. The research not only made the worms visible, it also gave the people disadvantaged by the actions of a few a sounding-board and a window of opportunity to break with the situation’ (Boesten 2008: 15).

In contexts of violence, the micropolitics and interpersonal dynamics between people involved can take on even greater significance, since the threat of violence and its repercussions shapes people’s interactions and conversations on a daily basis. This feature of the daily life of people living in contexts of violence is an obstacle for participatory research, which can only ever be partially overcome. It is important to reflect on how the context of violence influences interactions, and how the micropolitics and interpersonal dynamics of those involved limit the degree of participation across different sections of the community.

**Risk and fear**

Conducting participatory research directly on the topic of violence forced me as a researcher to directly confront my own assumptions about stigma and my own fears about risk (see Belousov, Horlick-Jones et al. 2007; Lundy and McGovern 2008). The research process also
engendered risks for the community researchers and the community residents who participated. In some respects these risks overlapped with my own and in others they were distinctive in character and dimension. Risk and fear emerged as part of the research topic, because they arise from violence and affect experiences of citizenship. They also act as a methodological constraint, because they affect research quality and the potential for social action to ensue from this research process, through limiting access, data validity, and participation (see Nordstrom and Robben 1996; Alvarez, Dagnino et al. 1998). But fear and risk were also a characteristic of daily experience for me, and for the other researchers and the participants, because of working and living in violent places and interacting with violent actors. This section focuses on this last dimension.

Risks as an external researcher

Each day I worked in Quitungo and Guaporé, a favela and housing estate in the North Zone, an hour and a half’s journey from my flat in a middle-class neighbourhood of the city, near the sea. I travelled against the flow of the commuter rush, on increasingly precarious transportation. As I got closer to the North Zone and Quitungo and Guaporé, I would begin to hear gunshots, see police cars bristling with weapons, and squeeze into unregulated and illegal ‘kombis’ or small decrepit vans that supplement the more expensive city buses that would frequently deviate from their routes to avoid police raids or robberies. The newspapers I often read during my journey usually included at least one story about killings and deaths in the North Zone, the growing power of the militia, and images of police invading favelas.

This physical journey paralleled a mental journey—to shift into a particular mode of interaction with the community researchers and residents, who live in a context radically different from the one I left behind every morning. I was confronting only a fraction of the unpredictability and risk that they experience all the time. And yet, this was a difficult transition for me to make daily. In contrast to my time at home in the evenings, during my time in the favela, I faced significantly greater risks, and experienced these more keenly because of the nature of the research. Participatory research implies a strong degree of empathy by the researcher towards the researched, so I could not ignore the dimension of risk that violence brought to the favela nor how the research project in some senses exacerbated it. Additionally, I felt a personal and professional obligation to respond to the tales of human suffering that constituted my data. I could arrive in the favela to learn that 25 people were killed in the next community over the night before during a militia raid. Everyone I worked with had lost at least one person close to him or her through violence. Working out how to
respond to this in a sensitive way, without becoming overwhelmed myself by fear, was a daily challenge. My particular identity and positionality also affected risk, both for myself and for my co-researchers. As a white, female, professional from a foreign country, I enjoyed a certain amount of protection, as an outsider. But I also attracted more attention to our work.

It is difficult to gauge what level of risk I faced as a researcher. My own perception of risk varied during the research process. Certain risks were predictable and thus to some extent manageable. Faced with the risk that the militia or drug trafficking faction would perceive the research as a threat and ban me from the community or harm me as a result, I sought to minimise it by working closely with community researchers and by carefully negotiating our access arrangements with traffickers and militia. A greater source of fear for me (as for those living in favelas) are the unpredictable risks: in my case, being caught up and accidentally shot in a gun battle between police, militia and drug trafficking factions; a change in which faction controlled the community, which necessitated suspension of the research; being robbed—although this risk was probably greatest while I was in middle-class neighbourhoods or on public transportation. During one visit to Fogueteiro, a community researcher escorted me through the favela to ‘show me the community’ and her work there as a leader. This included walking through areas riddled with gunshots, passing in close proximity to young men changing clips on their semiautomatic weapons, and visiting locations often at the centre of battles between the police and traffickers. Rationally, I knew that the risks I took in going there were diminished by the manner in which I visited. Yet mitigating actions reduce risk but do nothing to diminish the fear generated by the fundamental capriciousness of violence. At the end, there was a fundamental difference between my risk and that of the community researchers and participants. I could choose to walk away from the situation at any point, while they do not have that option.

**Risks for community researchers and research participants**

The research participants and the community researchers, through their involvement in the research, also faced risks beyond those they normally faced. For researchers, these included the risk that a negative portrayal of the militia or faction would lead to their local organisations and activities being shut down in reprisal, to physical harm to themselves or their families, or forced exile from the community. For participants, the risk of harm or exile also existed, but to a lesser degree than for researchers, who were publicly associated with the research and could be held responsible for it. Community researchers assessed risks constantly, deciding what topics to discuss and how these discussions occurred. This was particularly sensitive during
the negotiations with the militia and the drug traffickers for permission to carry out the research. The actual research project itself was a direct threat to these actors, because it questioned their legitimacy and tried to encourage participatory social action as pathway for reducing violence. The community researchers were insistent on wearing a uniform (they printed t-shirts with a logo in English, and identity cards with their names, pictures and logo). This was one way that they reduced their risk—by giving a formality to the work and clearing showing their links to a foreign organisation.

Within these communities there is a context of fear built up over time through a whole series of events that have degraded the social fabric and had implications for the research. Many people (including the community researchers) were reluctant to go through the pain of remembering and recounting things that had happened. Fear stilted the environment for discussions during the participatory discussion groups and other activities. A participatory process may help to open opportunities to discuss some of these fears, but the circumstances that have generated fear stretch over years, limiting what can be achieved in a few months of research, however participatory. Also, perversely, the more participatory the research process, the more these dynamics are likely to be uncovered and can interfere. Anonymous interviewing conducted in private is a setting in which interviewees can probably keep their feelings under wraps more readily than in a participatory process where inter-researcher rapport and closeness are built up over time through the sharing of common experience.

Life in the favela is governed by a set of rules, unwritten but clearly understood by residents, about what people are allowed to do and say in relation to the drug trafficking factions and the militias. I have learnt these rules over time. They entail not talking openly or publicly about the militia or faction, especially not to outsiders or the media. For transgressors the consequences can be dire—informants have been tortured and killed. Hence the importance of community researchers deciding how to discuss violence: they are best placed to negotiate these rules and reduce risk to themselves and other participants, and by extension to me. The degree to which they and participants felt comfortable with the process determined their participation, which was thus a proxy for the predictable risks generated by the research.

For me as an outsider, each day involved confronting my fears and recognizing the fear and risk faced by residents. The research was a process of coming to terms with violence as part of the fabric of daily life, while also recognising that violence does not totally limit or inform all possibilities for action. As a co-researcher and NGO leader (from a middle class
neighbourhood) expressed the somewhat flippant and stoic attitude of those wholly accustomed to this mode of life:

"Being mugged or robbed is not violence—it's just the redistribution of resources. Real violence is getting shot or something" (Field diary, 25 February 2007).

In the face of overwhelming but episodic violence and brutality, I learned to at least partially submerge my own fears, helped by empathy and engagement with those living in the favelas, who faced state-sponsored violence in addition to the violence of the drug trade on a daily basis. The research itself, as well as causing risks, offered ways to diminish risk, but not eliminate fear: it is important to recognise that engaged and participatory research on violence is not without a personal and emotional cost—both for the researchers and for those who participate.

Conclusion
This chapter has laid out the case for why a participatory action methodology was necessary, from both an empirical and an ethical point of view. In reflecting on the research process, it is clear that a more traditional research process would not have been successful in addressing the conceptual and theoretical challenges laid out in Chapter 2, because favela residents would simply refuse to provide information or access to the communities, but also because the research process itself tested the key research questions. Within all of this, my own use of my positionality and identity in different settings is illustrative of the ways that power dynamics shape the research process and the people involved. Yet despite the limitations, it also appears that the research process not only generated unique insights into the empirical contexts, but it also generated knowledge that can be used by people within the favela as a basis for future action. Finally, this research process also interrogated the central research questions themselves. The subsequent chapters will examine what insights this methodology uncovered in relation to each of the three dimensions of citizenship at the heart of this thesis.
Chapter 4 / Meanings and practices of citizenship in a context of violence

What is the relationship between imaginings of citizenship and its practice, between how citizenship is talked about and how it is expressed through acts? Citizenship, as argued in Chapter 2, is constituted through the interaction between a normative ideal, informed by people’s daily experiences, and the actual practices involved in engaging with the state to assure access to rights. The central question this chapter will address is how violence affects these two intertwined dimensions of citizenship: the way in which people in the favela imagine their citizenship and how they enact that citizenship. These dimensions of citizenship are mutually constitutive of each other: the range of meanings of citizenship that people perceive delimit the acts they take as citizens to realise that version of citizenship. Similarly, through acting (or being unable to act) as citizens, people in the favelas shape the way that they understand citizenship itself.

When residents of favelas face daily assaults and invasions by drug trafficking factions, police groups, and militias, this shapes their relationship with the state and their ability to participate in formal and state-sponsored participatory forums, and raises questions for the formal citizenship set out by the Brazilian constitution. ‘...Brazil’s hybrid spaces of democratic citizenship produce a sphere of social change in which the legal and the illegal, legitimate and criminal, just and unjust, and civil and uncivil claim the same moral ground of citizenship rights by way of contradictory social practices’ (Holston 2008: 274). It is these contradictions that shape both how people imagine their citizenship and the possibilities for them to enact it.

This chapter will examine the relationship between the meanings of citizenship and experiences of violence, focusing on how processes of socialisation transmit the effects of violence across different levels of experience of citizenship. It will explore both the ways that violence has evolved in the favelas and the ways that violence is linked to how people understand their citizenship. From this basis, this chapter will then examine how these understandings of citizenship, contingent on the experiences of violence, inform and are shaped by the ways that people act (or are unable to act) as citizens. These understandings of citizenship as well an analysis of people act as citizens will contributes to a more detailed picture of how citizenship is fragmented from the perspective of citizens within favelas
because it will show both the ways people experience their citizenship and its lack and how this fragmentation is further reinforced through experiences of making claims as citizens.

The concept of acts of citizenship is important because it is separate from but related to social action and the way people perceive their citizenship: ‘An ‘act’ is that moment in which a being comes away from everyday politics and at the same time renews the openness of the subject to the world...explaining the condition that enables subjects to disrupt their everyday’ (Isin and Nielsen 2008: 4). Central to acts of citizenship is the act as ‘an expression of the need to be heard’ (ibid). This is consistent with a definition of citizenship as having a place in the world, as set out in Chapter 2. This theoretical approach to citizenship is important because it can be applied to a context where traditional social mobilisation is disrupted and often violent. Acts of citizenship, then, may occur in unexpected places and times, and may not be linked to an upward trajectory of social mobilisation.

This chapter will not catalogue an exhaustive list of particular acts of citizenship but rather will explore the setting in which they can occur and how violence shapes this. This is important in relation to existing literature because the literature on participation and active citizenship does not fully account for how violence changes the rules of the game for citizens and for the state.

What emerges are the meanings and expressions of citizenship in a context of violence, where some of the potential meanings for citizenship are blocked and others are made possible through the control of armed actors. The meanings of citizenship are shaped by fear and stigma associated with violence and the processes of socialisation perpetuated through violence—leading to implications for the possibilities of how citizens can act. This creates not a linear relationship between the fulfilment of citizenship rights and the absence of violence, but a problematic interrelationship between how violence and citizenship are experienced. This chapter will also outline the prospects for acts of citizenship given this context, recognising that while there are constraints, they do not completely erase the possibility for agency, although it will take into account that not all social action reduces violence or increases a sense of citizenship.

24 This is not to suggest that only residents within the favela enact citizenship. Citizenship is also enacted by representatives of the state and people across all social boundaries. However, the focus of this thesis is on the ways that people living in favelas perceive and practice their citizenship.
This chapter traces the interrelationship between citizenship and violence at different levels of socialisation: the individual and family; the community; and the city and wider societal relations. At each level, certain features emerge about the way that experiences of violence shape both the meaning and practice of citizenship. At the level of the individual, the way that children and other social groups are positioned through violence becomes important in understanding how violence limits participation through fear and a sense of powerlessness, with implications for the nature of political community. At the level of the community, the difficulties in initiating and sustaining social action emerge, especially in relation to the legitimacy of leaders, the risks of co-optation and censure, and the difficulties in establishing neutrality. Finally, at the level of the city, this chapter will explore how armed clientelism characterises the relationship between the city and the favela, and the role of stigma and labelling in how citizens and the state relate.

Although this research did not explicitly seek to examine social action, the research process was designed to generate knowledge that could provide a basis for action. So this chapter also examines the role of the research process itself in testing the question of how people perceive and enact their citizenship within the context. The research process interrogated the question of how certain kinds of acts can contribute to a sense of greater citizenship and a reduction in violence. It also accompanied some acts of citizenship on the part of a variety of people across the favela, including community leaders from favelas that have been more successful at non-violent social mobilisation. Drawing on participatory action research as both illustrative and generative of a sense of citizenship and its practice, this chapter examines the effects of experiences of violence on the possibility of acts of citizenship.

**Experiences of violence across time and space**

The next section will outline the scope of how violence permeates the lives of people in the favela. As an indicator of the character of violence within this context, I include a collectively produced history of public events of violence, a mapping of types of violence against women, and a summary of how people understand the causes and solutions to the violence in their communities. Together these document a sample of the extent to which violence pervades people’s lives in the favela, from the home, to school, to public spaces. Beyond the specific incidents of violence described here, it is also important to point out the way that these experiences combine to create a kind of generalised sense of trauma. Beyond the direct effects of specific incidents of violence, there is a kind of miasma of violence that encompasses nearly everyone in the favela. This became very clear through the participatory research
sessions, where many people became unable to speak because of the emotion overwhelming them (Pearce 2007). Some people were never able to speak about things that happened to them, such as during a session with elderly women who refused to talk about violence at all in their community timeline. They feared reliving the experiences of violence through speaking about them, and produced a community timeline that did not include a single incidence of violence over thirty years (field diary, 18 January 2007). In contrast, some, such as one woman during a session with parents, told a moving story about the violence she suffered from her husband, and the death of her son (22 November 2006). Everyone has experienced loss as a result of the violence, and the emotional effects of this cannot be underestimated. These discussions, in themselves, were often very difficult and painful, both for the participants and for me. It is not just the violent events themselves, but the way that these become embedded in people’s personal histories and ways of being that will matter to the analysis of citizenship.

The following is a composite community history of violence, completed by children, elderly, and community researchers during the research process in one of the research sites. It was constructed through a process of participatory timeline, where participants brainstormed the most important events over the past ten to thirty years (depending on the age of the group), and then ordered these events on a visual timeline. It outlines what they collectively remember as being the most important episodes of violence over the past thirty years in their communities.

Table 3: Collective history of violence in communities Quitungo and Guaporé

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Arrival of residents (relocated after forced removal from favelas in the Zona Sul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>The beginning of the dispute for power over the communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>First violent confrontations in both communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Founding of Falange Vermelha (fore-runner of the Comando Vermelho, one of the main drug trafficking factions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>War between G. and another community controlled by a different faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Division between the factions, creation of Comando Vermelho and Terceiro Comando and Amigo dos Amigos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1987</td>
<td>There were criminals, but they respected people and didn’t have guns or arms. There were problems when the police entered the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Massacre of ‘the apartment’ (between factions), where five are killed including a child of 11. The beginning of the power of the drug trafficking, the sale of drugs and the war of the factions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 to 2000</td>
<td>Killings and quartering of people. They used people’s heads as footballs in the community football field and played publicly with body parts. Three girls are found dead in front of the football field. They were found nude. A child dies playing Russian roulette.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 The events cited here are directly reproduced exactly as participants in the research process expressed them.
A boy is killed during a football match. Four girls are mutilated when they enter the community by mistake, they were on their way to a rival favela. The police invade an apartment where bandidos (criminals) live to capture them but they abuse their power. They made them parade in public in their underwear. One boy tries to flee and throws himself from the fifth floor and dies. Ivan, a military police officer is said to kill many people (at least 50) and terrifies everyone in both communities.

2000 to present
The beginning of many assaults and rape (by the police and the criminals). The resident’s association lost its legitimacy because it was either headed up by a criminal or by those controlled by the criminals.

2000 to 2001
A new rival faction invades the community, but after a few months the local faction returns and resumes control. When they return, 30 traficantes die, although only 13 are reported in the media. What happened to the rest? A stray bullet kills a child in full daylight. After the massacre of the 13’, a police station is set up in the community, but the police accept payoffs to leave the sale of the drugs unrestricted.

2001
Invasion of the communities by Comando Vermelho. In the aftermath many people are killed. This is the worst invasion in our history. The massacre of the ‘barbeque’, when police invade during a barbeque (the police were given money by Terceiro Comando to help them invade and take control from Comando Vermelho).

2002
The change of faction happens at any time, several times per week. Someone delivering water is killed because he lives in a rival community. He was just doing his job! Girls who go to a baile funk (dance) outside of the community are tortured: their heads are shaved, they are beaten, forced to eat spoonfuls of salt and then expelled from the community.

2003
Comando Vermelho invades G and there are many deaths. Then there is a shift to Terceiro Comando. All the children involved with Amigo dos Amigos are killed.

2004
In Q, the local faction boss is killed, three people are found dead in the skip. Comando Vermelho invades, and a woman is found quartered by the community rubbish pile. The faction in charge of G invades Q and innocent people are caught in the crossfire. The militia invades Q and kills the boss and his partners, taking control.

2005
The militia kills those it considers aligned with the traficantes trying to stay in Q, 11 die. Comando Vermelho takes control of G and the favela. The militia kills the boss of Morro da Fe. In retaliation, criminals burn a city bus with the passengers inside.26 Five people die including a baby. The militia is disgusted and invades and takes over G.

2006
War between the militia and the traficantes in G. All the different factions try to invade Q and G, but are not successful.

2007
The head of the militia in G is killed trying to invade a near by community.

The timeline constructed by community residents creates a vivid portrait of the context of violence in Quitungo and Guaporé27. It shows how the degree of control by external factions of drug trafficking gangs increased over time, as well as the growing instability of their control. It also illustrates how the role of the police in the violence mirrors that of the ‘criminals’ from

26 It is worth noting that the burning of the bus attracted international and national attention, including a film about the events. While the communities in this research are not well known, this particular event attracted a great deal of notoriety, although this did not lead to more or better public policy interventions in the communities in question.

27 It is important to note that there were divergences between how different groups remembered events, and their recollections also differed from official accounts. The table here is a composite view of residents who participated in more than one participatory discussion group, recognising that there are discrepancies with how the media or the government represents these events.
the outset. At the same time, there is a trend towards more extreme acts of brutality. This is only a partial list of the incidents of violence in these communities, but it is indicative of a context where violence and those who control it exert influence over residents within the boundaries of the communities. It is clear from this timeline that the role of the state is highly problematic within the favela, both in terms of contributing to the violence directly through the actions of the police, but also indirectly in terms of the state’s inability to check the violence. This timeline shows how violence in the community (public demonstrations of violence such as the public humiliation of girls, the open disposal of bodies, the killings at community events) is closely linked to violence at the level of the city and state (assaults by the police, attacks on public transportation, representation of events in the media). Both the socialisation spaces of the community and those of the city are shot through with dramatic and extreme experiences of violence.

An important space of socialisation not fully illustrated by this collective history of violence is the experience of gender-based violence. We conducted separate sessions to try and address the issue of gender-based violence, including violence within the home and at school. The table below is taken from a mixed-gender participatory discussion session in Santa Teresa and ranks the types of violence against women experienced (or known) according to prevalence:

Table 4: Types and prevalence of violence against women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most prevalent</th>
<th>Abuse of drugs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Depression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical deprivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical aggression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalent</td>
<td>Unwanted pregnancy through rape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sexual harassment at work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Machismo (e.g. refusal by men to wear condoms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Verbal aggression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Prevalent</td>
<td>Discrimination against women in the workplace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obsession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Betrayal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participants interpreted violence in a wide way (including abuse of drugs and depression which are directly related in their view to physical aggression and rape). The table of types of violence against women shows how the experience of gender-based violence crosses spaces of socialisation, moving from physical aggression at home, to discrimination in the work-place, to

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28 Based on a group discussion of community leaders in Morro dos Prazeres and Fugueteiro on 16 January 2007.
verbal aggression the streets and other public areas. When read in conjunction with the community timeline above, this describes another layer of the experience of violence.

As this research was action-orientated, I did not want to just collect information about how people experienced violence. In order to take these discussions further, we used subsequent sessions to explore their perceptions of the causes and possible solutions to violence. As with citizenship, there is an existing literature on the causes of violence (see Chapter 2). However, I wanted to base the analysis of the connection between citizenship and violence on people’s own understandings of the causes and potential responses to violence as well as their own understandings of what citizenship can mean.

Table 5: Residents’ perceptions of causes and solutions to violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What are the causes of violence?</th>
<th>Frequency of response</th>
<th>What are the possible solutions to violence?</th>
<th>Frequency of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug trafficking/drugs</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Respect/unity/love</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of security/peace</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality and poverty</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>More effective government policies, more capable politicians</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disintegration of family structure/family fights</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Better policing/justice/end to the militia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of opportunities</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Access to employment</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of employment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Better distribution of income/social equality</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of government</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Better relationships between parents and children, support for families</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of respect</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Access to health</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Disarmament, death penalty, the militia, dialogue</td>
<td>2 or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma, war between police and criminals, Lack of health, Lack of love</td>
<td>2 or less</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table shows how residents of favelas see a confluence of micro and macro-level factors driving the dynamics of violence. More macro-level factors, including the drug trafficking trade and inequality/poverty (Brinceño-León and Zubillaga 2002), are given almost equal weight as more micro-level factors such as the disintegration of family structure. This balance between the micro and the macro is important because it reinforces the argument that violence travels across spaces of socialisation and time, from experiences in the community to those within the home (Pearce 2006). Shoot-outs between the police and the drug traffickers cannot be divorced from violence within the family, or from state failure to address the violent repression of the police and structural inequalities. In addition, participants highlighted the lack of access to jobs and resources and the lack of a capable and accountable government as part of the cause of violence. This relates directly to citizenship, since having access to and respecting rights is a key element of citizenship. Also, the sense of residents that the government is neither capable of addressing the problems they face, nor accountable for what it does, shows how violence and the state’s role in it undermines the relationship between citizens and the state.

In terms of the solutions that residents identified, again there is a confluence of micro and macro-level factors. At the micro-level, residents emphasised the importance of unity, respect and love especially within families. This is the antithesis of fear and insecurity, which seems to characterise much of people’s every day experiences. At the macro-level, residents also point to the need for better public policies and more capable politicians, a more equal distribution of resources, and an accountable police force. There are important implications of these solutions for the relationship between citizens and the state. The distribution of the solutions also crosses from the micro to the macro, emphasising the need for policy approaches that address both structural issues, such as access to employment and distribution of income, and micro-level dynamics within the favela and within families.

A small minority of responses suggest that the militia is a solution to the violence. Although this was not a very frequent response, it is important to note that there is growing sentiment in the favela that the militia are delivering what the state has been unable to deliver: stability and a suppression of open violence (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008: 39). This view is documented in the CPI, and also emerged throughout the process of the research:
'The militia has brought specific improvements over the factions. People aren’t being killed in the streets and there is no more ‘powder in the stairwell’. You can walk around in the streets until later.

If I had to vote between the factions and the militia, I would vote for the militia. At least they have stopped the open sale of drugs.\textsuperscript{30}

This has serious implications for the government, and for the nature of the relationship between citizens and the state. It means that the state will have to re-assert legitimate political authority in the face of a quasi-state actor who has achieved a certain degree of social legitimacy to its own power. This is not necessarily the case with the drug trafficking factions, which may have certain legitimacy, but have never claimed to provide security in the way that the militia do (see Chapter 5).

Levels of socialisation of citizenship and violence

In terms of contextualising meanings of citizenship in the actual context of violence, both the collective and individual experiences of violence are important. Both show different dimensions of how violence affects people’s lives and how it crosses spaces of socialisation. As argued in Chapter 2, an analytical approach to violence requires recognising how violences move across different spaces of socialisation, and through sets of social relations. As Pearce argues:

‘...a focus on direct physical violence highlights the complementary factor in the transmission of violence; its exercise in particular social spaces and social relationships. Everyday violences take place in space of the home, the neighbourhood, the school, etc. Political violence emanating from state and non-state armed actors also takes places in spaces, sometimes the home, but more often the street, the neighbourhood, police stations, prisons etc. And spaces are about social relationships and interactions, and thus when violence penetrates those spaces it also colours and contaminates those relationships, or conversely those social relationships are already contaminated by violence which is then further reproduced. The interaction of different types of violence with the spaces in which they are executed allows transmission and reproduction of violence over time through the social relations embedded in those spaces ‘(Pearce 2007: 19).

As shown through the examples above, experiences of violence occur at a number of spaces or levels of socialisation including the individual and family; the community or favela; and the city and wider society, including the way that the state addresses violence and relates to favelas. In the same way that violence moves across spaces of socialisation, the effects of violence on the meanings and enactments of citizenship operate at different levels, across

\textsuperscript{30} Excerpt from a discussion of the community researchers about the benefits of the arrival of the militia, field diary, 19 December 2006.
different spaces of socialisation. Simultaneously, there is not a firm division between each of
the levels, since there is interaction and interplay between the spaces of socialisation in each.
The way that the experience of violence crosses different levels of socialisation is made quite
strongly by people’s own analysis of how violence affects them:
‘You grow up in the morro (favela), and the guys (traffickers) treat you well, give you money
and sweets and you think they are the greatest. In comes the police, and they kill him right in
front of you. Then this happens another eight or nine times. You keep this inside of you. So the
problem comes from above. Lula [President of Brazil at the time of this research] has one
vagabundo (bum) or another by his side, and the thing trickles down from there until it reaches
the morro, and catches on fire’ (Henrique, field diary, 17 January 2007).

**The relationship between the meanings and practices of
citizenship, and violence**

This research shows not only that experiences of violence at different levels are
interconnected (as argued by Pearce and others). In order to understand the way that
violence affects the meanings and practices of citizenship, the next section analyses the way
that violence affects different dimensions of citizenship across spaces of socialisation. The next
sections will explore in greater detail the relationship between citizenship and violence at each
level of socialisation.

**Table 6: Levels of socialisation spaces and the effects of violence on the meanings and
practices of citizenship**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of socialisation space</th>
<th>Effects of violence on the meanings and practices of citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individuals/families</td>
<td>Fear, sense of powerlessness, apathy, narrow sense of political community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Lack of space for non-violent social/political mobilisation (because occupied by violent actors); risks to families for leaders; difficulty for non-violent leaders in establishing neutrality; militia create unaccountable security regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City; state-society relations</td>
<td>Lack of state credibility (due to lack of accountability, repressive security policies, lack of continuity in social programmes) Clientelism privileging violent mediators Negative labelling and stigma against residents of favelas Geographically specific forms of exclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Citizenship, particularly the dimensions of its meaning and practices, when understood as
comprised of both normative elements and practice, of having the rights to have rights but
also of claiming them, also crosses the same levels and spaces of socialisation as violence (see
Chapter 2). That is, citizenship is not only relevant in the public sphere through typically
political acts, like voting. Past research shows how citizenship must also have meaning in the
home, in schools, and in everyday life in order to have meaning overall (Bentley 2005; Kabeer 2005; Wheeler 2005). And experiences of citizenship, or its lack, in these different spaces of socialisation affect one another. The focus here is on how experiences of violence through a range of processes of socialisation affect the meanings of citizenship and are in turn affected by how people act as citizens. This approach to citizenship is consistent with feminist formulations that challenge the boundaries between public and private (Pateman 1989; Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999), and also the division between normative notions of citizenship and its practice (Lister 1997; Somers 2008).

How can violence be related to the meaning of citizenship? This a difficult question, and posed an important empirical challenge for my research. The main focus of this research is not on violence itself, but on how a context of violence has implications for citizenship and citizen participation. That violence alters the meaning of citizenship does not imply the corruption of an original and ‘pure’ sense of citizenship. There is not a simple relationship between the meaning of citizenship and the experience of violence. The focus here is on the empirical reality of the meanings of citizenship: the way that citizenship is imagined and given meaning by people in the favela through the interaction between their own experiences, including those of violence, and their sense of what their citizenship is.

First, why is it important to begin with people’s own understandings of citizenship and not rely solely on formal, legal, or theoretical formulations? Other research demonstrates how empirical work can offer important insights divergent from and relevant to theoretical discussions as well as offer insights into practical interventions. The importance of citizenship (and democracy) being relevant to everyday life is also being emphasised in the UK:

‘The concept of everyday democracy allows us to reconfigure democracy for this age. It is the practice of self-government through the choices, commitments and connections of daily life. Everyday democracy means extending democratic power and responsibility simultaneously to the settings of everyday life. It relies heavily on the mediating role of institutions that can symbolise and represent shared commitments – but simultaneously stimulates a wider range and choice of such institutions. It means that people can actively create the world in which they live’ (Bentley 2005: 25).

The issue in the favelas is how violence relates to these everyday dimensions of citizenship.

Past research I carried out on citizenship in the favelas in 2001-2002 detailed how citizenship was accessed through ‘private’ networks, and emphasised the centrality of dignity to people’s own sense of citizenship:
Seventy-four percent of the participants in this study identified dignity as citizenship’s most important characteristic. They made it clear that meaningful citizenship cannot exist without dignity. For the participants in this study, it was not their poverty or lack of rights that meant they had no dignity. Rather, it was the aggregation of everyday interactions and experiences, conflicts and triumphs that meant the difference between dignity and exclusion. As one woman said: ‘Dignity is everything for a citizen—and we have no dignity. We are treated like cattle in the clinics, on the buses and in the shops. Only in rich neighbourhoods are people treated with dignity’ (Wheeler 2005: 109).

This perspective of people living in the favela on the meaning of citizenship coincided with the meanings and expressions of citizenship articulated through a larger collection of detailed empirical studies on the meanings and expressions of citizenship. Inclusive Citizenship, edited by Naila Kabeer, draws together twelve studies with marginalised and excluded groups in developing and developed contexts. Kabeer argues, in the Introduction, that in looking across these cases, a series of common themes about the meanings of citizenship emerges. These include the importance of justice, particularly informal justice at the community level; recognition of rights and identity; the ability for self-determination to decide how to live and act as citizens; and solidarity with others in the same community and similar circumstances (Kabeer 2005).

The studies in Kabeer’s volume show that in-depth empirical research that focuses on the perspectives of marginalised and excluded groups offers a critique of existing theoretical distinctions. Nyamu-Musembi argues that focusing on actual struggles for rights in practice will show how the theoretical distinctions, such as universalist versus relativist arguments, do not have much purchase for explaining how people actually access their rights (Nyamu-Musembi 2002). The same is true for citizenship: focusing on the actual experience of citizenship moves beyond the dominant theoretical debates. For these reasons, it is important to consider the meanings and expressions of citizenship specifically taking into account the way that violence shapes these. The dominant literature on citizenship (as discussed in Chapter 2) does not take into account the way that insecurity and violence can shift the very meanings and possibilities for citizenship.

**Perceptions and meanings of citizenship**

How did participants in the research define their citizenship and how does violence shape this? How do people identify with a sense of citizenship, if at all, in this context? Towards the outset of the research process, we held the first of the participatory discussion sessions with each of
the groups on the meanings of citizenship, the causes of violence and the role of participation. These sessions were structured deliberately to relate citizenship, violence and participation. It became clear that people had a strong sense of the normative character of citizenship in conjunction with the certainty that violence overrides this. These imaginings of citizenship are constructed in part through the lens of the experience of violence.

Table 7: Meanings of Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is citizenship</th>
<th>Frequency of response</th>
<th>What is not citizenship</th>
<th>Frequency of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have and respect rights (including rights to employment, education, health, ‘ir e vir’ or movement, sport, culture, housing, voting)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping others</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Lack of rights</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity and solidarity</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Apathy/lack of participation</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Discrimination, stigma and racism</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace, absence of violence</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lack of respect</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Social inequality</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being honest and ethical</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bad community relations, lack of unity</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Corruption in the government</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of how participants defined citizenship, there are some interesting insights. First, there is a balance between having access to rights and respecting others’ rights. This is an important move away from a classical liberal individualistic definition of citizenship and demonstrates that residents in the favelas understand citizenship as comprising both rights and responsibilities to others (Lister 1997). Another striking feature of the way that they defined citizenship is as an active concept, involving many dimensions that citizens must act out in order to have validity (helping others, solidarity, respect, being honest, participating, etc)(Houtzager and Archarya 2009). This is in contrast to a formulation of citizenship as a ‘status’ conferred by the state. The responses also indicate the importance of values of unity, solidarity, respect and equality to a sense of citizenship. This strongly echoes Kabeer’s findings

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32 Compiled from participatory sessions with children and young people, elderly, religious leaders, parents, and women in Quitungo and Guaporé.
in *Inclusive Citizenship* (Kabeer 2005). Finally, peace and the absence of violence were also central to the understanding of citizenship.

In terms of the implications of these characteristics for the meaning of citizenship, it is clear that citizenship is an aspiration for residents of the favela, an ideal that they would like to achieve, but feel is very distant currently. The residents of the favela imagine citizenship and rights as possibilities but they are largely absent in reality. Despite this absence, there is a sense of entitlement that is unfilled in the way that citizenship is imagined. And it is violence which is seen as the evidence that citizenship does not exist. Violence not only negates rights and a sense of social cohesion, but also demonstrates the failure of the state to resolve these problems. The experience of violence is deeply embedded in people’s biographies, in the history of community and continually reinforced through processes of social positioning.

The suggested solutions to the violence coincide in several ways with the articulation of the meaning of citizenship. The perceived lack of accountability of the government as a whole, and the police in particular, must be addressed in order to address both violence and the sense of a lack of citizenship. The need for great cohesion across the community is also both a solution to the violence and a necessary ingredient for citizenship. There may not be a linear relationship between citizenship and violence (in the sense that an absence of violence does not equate with citizenship and increased violence may not always lead to less citizenship), but this is how people in the favela perceive the relationship. Violence was by far the most important negating factor to a sense of citizenship, including access to rights (despite access to rights being listed as the most important defining characteristic of citizenship). These results match those of larger studies. A survey in 2006 by the Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e Sociedade (IETS) of 1,200 residents of favelas found that 99% of respondents chose lack of security as the biggest problem they faced, followed by 97% for poverty and 96% social inequality (Costa 2006).

What this shows is how violence can fundamentally shift the context for citizenship. Residents do not believe that they can have citizenship with violence, and violence is such an integral part of daily life, that it further underlines an interpretation of citizenship as aspirational, rather than actual. However, beyond the violence, other factors also limit citizenship (some of which are related to violence). For example, discrimination, racism, and stigma were also relatively important negators of citizenship, and the research also showed how violence contributes to these. Also, the lack of rights and lack of participation are given as further
evidence of the lack of citizenship in practice. An examination of the articulation of the meanings of citizenship in relationship to an understanding of violence showed that there are important connections, especially between the aspiration to citizenship and the solutions to violence. If violence does limit the possible meanings for citizenship, relegating citizenship to the aspirational rather than the actual, then how does this occur?

This is not to suggest that citizenship and violence are binary opposites. In practice, there may be examples of certain elements of citizenship achieved through violence, such as a sense of belonging which is often a feature of participation in gangs (Rodgers 2003). However, there was no empirical support to suggest that violence led to greater citizenship overall—a sense of belonging achieved through gang membership does not necessarily translate into increased access to government services, for example.

It is also important not to reify these perceptions of citizenship, but to consider them critically. As Holston argues, while the focus on people’s experience of citizenship is essential, so is an interrogation of those experiences which can be used to show ‘the efficacies of categories, rules and constructions of citizenship…to account for the production of citizenship’s experience, that is, to interpret both its perpetuation and its transformation as experience’ (Holston 2008). So while these perceptions are important, the way that people enact (or are unable to enact) their citizenship also matter and may in fact transform the meanings of citizenship in the process. The next section examines how violence shapes the meanings and practices of citizenship, in relationship to the three levels of socialisation outlined earlier: individuals, families; communities; and the city and state-society relations.

The level of the individual and the family: meanings and practices of citizenship

This section considers how experiences related to violence interact with how people perceive and enact their citizenship—focussing on the socialisation space of the individual and the family. That is, the focus is on the relationships that are important at an individual level, including those within the family and with peers, recognising the importance of what Gilligan terms ‘horizontal axes of difference’ (Gilligan 2001). The effects of violence that operate at the level of individuals in family cut across identity categories, including age, gender, race, and social class and these ‘horizontal divisions’, create significant obstacles for citizenship. The importance of different dimensions of identity in terms of how citizenship is defined and experienced was outlined in Chapter 2 (Isin and Wood 1999; Ong 2003).
Because of these differences, it is important to consider the perspectives of different groups within the favela, since the social position of an individual directly affects their experiences of violence and also of citizenship. Therefore, the next section will begin with an analysis of the ways that violence affects how children and young people perceive their citizenship and move from this group to more general trends affecting everyone across the favela. Particularly acute for children is the sense of powerlessness and alienation that is fuelled by violence, and the way that this is linked to and reinforced by fear. The overall effect of this is a strong sense of apathy, which affects not only children, but also many people in the favela. In counterbalance to this, opportunities for acts of citizenship arise through transformative education and opportunities for reflection.

**Children’s social positioning through fear**

We held 15 meetings with children and young people ranging in age from 11 to early twenties. In total, across the two research sites, more than 60 children participated in the research. In some cases, children who participated in the sessions were involved in the drug trafficking prior to the arrival of the militia. As Moncrieffe argues, the formation of social identities at the early stages of life are particularly important, and can transmit social exclusion across generations (Moncrieffe 2009). Children and young people play a central role in the dynamics of violence, both as victims and as perpetrators, as members of gangs and militias, as targets of police violence, and as potential citizens. Yet as this research shows, children are also affected in quite extreme ways by fear of violence, and their perceptions of citizenship are informed by these experiences. Some examples of how children defined their citizenship illustrate how closely related the experience of violence and citizenship (and its lack) are intertwined:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What does citizenship mean to you?</th>
<th>What is not citizenship for you?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It’s dignity and understanding for everyone.</td>
<td>Racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s not killing.</td>
<td>Stigma, social exclusion, violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect, rights and obligations.</td>
<td>It is when people are obligated to live with violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing with others and never solving problems with violence.</td>
<td>To not be honest with your friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is when people live together in unity, without violence.</td>
<td>War in the communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being able to be in the middle of society.</td>
<td>Robbing and killing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These examples are drawn from a participatory exercise with children and young people in Guaporé on 6 December 2006.
A citizen is someone who participates in social activities, in order to better themselves and others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace in the favelas</th>
<th>Drug-trafficking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To be a worker, always help in the community, not rob, not commit crimes, not be ‘involved’ [become a member of a faction]</td>
<td>Not helping people and sabotaging those who are helping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To have the right to come and go, to go to school, to be seen as an individual with unique characteristics</td>
<td>Resolving problems with violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through the research process, we used participatory tools to map the main sources of fear for children. Altogether the groups listed 24 sources of fear, and of these 17 were related to violence. Those ranked ‘most important’ related to violence included fear of:

- death (not waking up in the morning, never seeing the people you love again)
- gun shots
- losing parents/siblings/friends
- becoming involved with a faction, and
- rape.

Other fears around not being able to find a job or not finding a person you love were overwhelmed by fears that these children face related to violence. This violence not only affects them, but those around them including their parents, siblings and friends. Recent research by the Observatório de Favelas demonstrates that these fears are not baseless. The research accompanied 230 young men and boys (ages 10-18) involved in trafficking for 5 months. Of this group, 45 died during the course of the research: 42% were executed by the police, 19% were killed by rival factions, 11% were killed during assaults, and 9% were killed in confrontations with the police (Bottari and Ramalho 2006).

Extreme fears shape how children imagine citizenship. As the results of the participatory exercise show, within marginalised communities themselves, fear is directly related to different violent actors and the capriciousness of their power (Wacquant 2008). In the literature, a citizen is defined as a rights-bearer, but this degree of fear pre-empts a sense of rights and becomes all-consuming in its ability to shape daily life. Throughout the research, there were many examples of how fear had strong effects on people, and particularly on children, even to the point of physical impacts:

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34 Involved (envolvido) is the word used in the favela to describe people who have become part of the operation of the traffickers. It is interesting to think about the way that this word is used—it has the sense of great hovering miasma, so that it is very easy to become entangled and ‘involved’.
'One day my daughter was walking down from the house and she came around the corner and was face to face with the bandidos—a large group of boys armed with guns. They threatened her and taunted her. She was nine years old and now she has heart problems because of amount of fear she experienced' (Sueli, field diary, 6 February 2007).

Increasing the possibilities for citizenship for children and young people is necessary to reduce violence achieve long-standing changes. While the factions and the militia effectively mobilise children and young people (the overwhelming majority of traffickers are children and young people, (Dowdney 2003), and demonstrate the potential for social action led by children, there are significant obstacles to children and young-people imagining themselves and acting as citizens.

Sessions with children and young people point to the diversity of reasons that they become involved in violence (see Winton 2004). But a common element that emerged from these sessions and through the stories told in the participatory video is the sense of powerlessness and alienation that many children and young people feel. This relates directly to the lack of acts of citizenship, because children and others may not pursue such acts because of a sense of powerlessness linked to violence. This sense of powerlessness is demonstrated by the fatalism often exhibited by children faced with what they perceive as a complete lack of options:

‘If I die, another will be born in my place for the worse or the better. If I die, I will rest.’ (a child who is a member of a faction in the documentary, Falcão—Meninos do tráfico)

Children and young people become involved in certain destructive forms of social action in an attempt to ameliorate their sense of powerlessness and alienation. This is particularly an issue for boys, with feelings of shame and honour linked to acts of violence (Gilligan 2001). The shaming along the horizontal divisions occurs through the ‘asymmetry of social roles, or gender roles, to which the two sexes are assigned in patriarchal cultures, one consequence of which is that men are shamed or honoured for different and in some respects opposite behaviour for that which brings shame or honour to women’ (Gilligan 2001).

The search for respect and the lack of respect and recognition that people, especially boys, experience is related to violence:

‘So do you think we should just stay here, bare-chested in broken sandals? No one looks at us, no one sees us. If we want to be seen we have to take something for ourselves, move up in life.'
The cake should be ours, the cake IS ours. Are you with me? [waves gun'] XX35, in participatory video, ‘The Life We Don’t Want’, inciting other boys to take up guns and rob a bank

‘Boys think that they will gain respect and recognition because they have gun, but they confuse fear for respect. If they have a gun in their hands, who is going to tell them no?’ (Deco, field diary, 31 January 2007).

‘So that’s how it is in our communities. Sometimes, when you chose the wrong friends, you suffer consequences.’ X, message to young people at the end of participatory video, ‘The Life We Don’t Want’

The participatory videos produced during the research process explored the role of family in how children become involved in violence. Children can become involved through breakdowns within family, although research participants raised questions about the extent of the influence of the family/community environment on the trajectories of individuals. The participatory videos produced through the research show how neighbours and others in the community are very aware of who is becoming involved in violence and may try to stop or intervene in this process, and also how these interventions can be rejected by parents and/or the children, themselves.

What emerges when these fears are situated in relation to questions about citizenship (as shown in the table above), is the way that the effects of violence shape how citizenship is perceived. This experience of fear of violence becomes integral to how citizenship is imagined and enacted. Acts of citizenship must overcome the way that fear constructs categorisation of violence in everyday experiences (see Hume 2007). Fear is related to labelling and stigma, because fear is one of the reasons that there is so little understanding between different elements of the city. For example, fears of the middle class are contributing to the retreat into ‘fortified complexes’, and closing down of dialogue with people from the other side of the social divide. Caldeira describes how this situation is reinforcing a negative cycle of the breakdown of the social fabric of the city:

‘with the spatial proximity between the rich and the poor, without channels for effective interaction between the two, inequality has become more explicit and aggressive, leading to decreasing tolerance and decreasing interest in finding shared solutions’ (Caldeira 1999: 219).

Fear operates between different parts of the city to undermine the basis for a common solution to social problems. As a resident of several years, it has always struck me as indicative of the extent of fear and psychological distance between the experiences of violence in Rio de

35 X was part of the drug trafficking faction before the arrival of the militia in Quitungo, and was killed not long after the research finished.
Janeiro, that most middle class families I knew employed residents of favelas in some capacity (as house keepers, security guards, drivers, cooks, etc) and yet rarely if ever talked about their experiences of violence and what this means. There is very little awareness about how violence affects people from different sides of the social barriers. These fears have a relationship with stigma more generally because fear within the middle classes and the political elite is driving the current policy of repressive security measures, as discussed in the section below on city and state-society relations.

The meaning of participation and the narrowing of political community

As with violence and citizenship, we explored the meaning of participation. My interest in pursuing the meanings of participation in relation to citizenship and violence does not assume a linear relationship between participation and citizenship. Participation, on its own, is not always synonymous with citizenship. As citizenship is defined in this thesis, an act of citizenship is creative in that it transcends to some degree of existing power structures (Interview with Deco 16 December 2006; Isin and Nielsen 2008). However, acts of citizenship may be drawn from within the pool of forms of participation outlined by residents. Participation is an important element of citizenship, but does not automatically constitute a practice of citizenship—participation may reinforce existing hierarchies.

The following section examines the potential forms that residents assign to participation as well as what negates participation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is participation</th>
<th>Frequency of response</th>
<th>What is not participation</th>
<th>Frequency of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in community events, social projects, etc to demand rights</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Apathy (not demanding rights, ‘remaining with your arms crossed’)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show solidarity, unity, and cooperation with the community</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Lack of solidarity, unity, failure to search for solutions</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to looking for</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Giving bad advice,</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36 Compiled from participatory sessions with children and young people, elderly, religious leaders, parents, and women in Quitungo and Guaporé.

37 It is worth noting that asking people to define a concept, like participation, through opposition tends to lead to responses that present the concept through diametrics. This is more limited than an open-ended question. However, in practice, it proved to be a good way to open discussions about complex themes. I used the semi-structured interviews and field notes to pursue topics in a more nuanced way.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>solutions to the problems facing the community</th>
<th>hurting the community, undermining social projects, supporting the traffickers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teaching/facilitating learning in others about problems; building awareness</td>
<td>Lack of participation in social projects and events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complain (<em>reclamar</em>) about problems (i.e. violence, lack of rights)</td>
<td>Ignorance/negativity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen to others</td>
<td>Demanding from others without acting yourself, failing to listen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in children’s lives and activities</td>
<td>Feeling excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not killing people</td>
<td>Having a lack of choices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying the militia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is most striking about the formulation of participation here is that all the examples of what constitutes participation are internal to the favela. None are articulated to formal state-sponsored processes outside of the favela. Given the number of formal participatory forums convened by the government, it is important to note that residents did not consider these among the ways that they could participate. Instead, the forms of participation that they gave emphasise the centrality of community-led initiatives and their sense of a role within those. This is a view which provides some cause for optimism because it suggests that the lack of social mobilisation to improve the situation and reduce the violence is not because people do not believe in the potential of their own social action to change the situation. Yet it also begs the question: why is participation understood primarily in reference to the favela and not in reference to the wider society. As this chapter will show, this narrowed sense of political community is linked to fear and powerlessness (as demonstrated through the example of the children and explored in greater depth below), and also to the lack of state legitimacy examined in Chapter 5. So violence contributes to a narrowing of a sense of political community, overlapping with other forms of social exclusion and limiting participation to the level of the community. Even participation at the level of the community is mediated by armed actors, as will be shown in chapters 5 and 6.

Another aspect of participation that residents emphasised is the reconstitution of social fabric through solidarity and cooperation, emphasising again the ways that violence leads to fear and insecurity that limit the sense of political community. The role of transformative education or for opportunities for learning that develop awareness is also important and this is addressed in
greater detail later in this chapter. In sum, these forms of participation suggest a strong sense amongst the residents that solutions to their problems lie within the community in drawing on their own resources and capabilities, and not without, in relying on the interventions of external actors. Participation, in the views expressed here, is fundamentally about involvement in generating or enacting a shared solution.

The biggest obstacles that residents identified to participation (or the things which negate participation) are ‘sins of omission’: apathy and a lack of cohesion. Both apathy and a lack of cohesion can be understood as indirect results of persistent violence, and these are results which are highly generalised across the community. At the same time, a smaller number of people also mentioned ‘sins of commission’—direct involvement in violence or direct action to undermine community initiatives. Together these ‘sins of omission’ and ‘sins of commission’ point to the types of restrictions that violence creates for participation.

This apathy is driven by several factors, including existing patterns of clientelism and patronage (see section below), but violence exacerbates this because people become afraid of engaging with others in the community. This apathy and powerlessness is also partly fuelled by a long history of populist policies including cash transfers, and a long-standing paternalistic relationship with some parts of the state. Mediators and mediation are explored in greater detail in Chapter 6. This engenders certain aspects of people’s attitudes towards participation, which is reinforced by the isolating effects of violence. Various community leaders described the problem:

‘The problem is that people are not willing to do things to change their situation—it’s easier to sit and wait for someone else to do things.’ (Clécio, 47, community researcher).

‘People living in the community don’t just want a ripe papaya. They want you take out the seeds and spoon it into their mouths.’ (Henrique, 20, community leader)

‘It’s very difficult to be able to count on people [to participate]. You can only count on them if they are earning something. Sometimes you have a good idea, but no one to help.’ (Gloria, 52, community leader)

The apathy described by community leaders in these quotes was echoed in the difficulties we experienced during the research process of maintaining consecutive attendance at participatory discussions. Some participants did not want to return when they discovered that there was no money or goods offered. The purpose of generating knowledge to help the community was not a strong enough incentive for many.
These quotes, when taken in conjunction with the example how fear affects children demonstrate the extent to which people in the favela may chose to isolate themselves as a result of violence. For non-violent community leaders, this presents a difficult problem as they struggle to find a basis beyond narrow self-interest for their mobilisations and initiatives. This narrow self-interest may be partly to blame on the fear people experience, which is significant; but, it is also attributable in part to the lack of trust in the state to address problems. Violence contributes to the fragmentation of political community in the sense that people living in this context find it difficult to think beyond a very narrow circle of personal relationships and ascribe a sense of obligation or rights to a wider group.

Another community leader from Morro dos Prazeres described how this narrowing of political community occurs in practice. For her, the problem is not so much apathy but the difficulty that people have in thinking beyond themselves:

‘There is a problem of omission. People shut their doors when bad things happen with the police or the traffickers. They don’t think: that could be my father, my brother, or my son. What we need is more conscientization, especially with women’ (Cris, vice-president of the resident’s association of Morro de Prazeres, field diary, 7 January 2007).

What can open the possibilities for acts of citizenship in this context? It is not possible to include an exhaustive list here of the examples that emerged through this research, but it is useful to consider one example, based on the experiences of existing non-violent community leaders. This quote points to what this leader considers a possible solution to address this sense of isolation and apathy, e.g. experiences of education that are transformative of ways of thinking and acting. These include opportunities for critical reflection, such as through community-based activities including participatory research, but also more formal structured education. Cris highlights how transformative education is important because of the ways it allows people to act differently and to cross social boundaries. It can lead to people acting in a different way through developing a more critical understanding of patterns of social relations, including the relationship between the citizen and the state. This research showed how transformative education was an important factor in how many of the leaders that participated were formed (see section below). A series of interviews with different types of community leaders (from an adult educator, to the president of a residents’ association, to someone who started a community-based crèche as described in Chapter 6), demonstrated how an experience of transformative education was a crucial point in their personal trajectory in becoming a leader, and in understanding their own potential to act:

‘When was I becoming a leader, I went to every kind of course I could think of including CEAT which is very politicised. I know it’s hard to believe when you see me now, but I wouldn’t say
anything then. I just took it all in. I saw the importance of learning as part of a process of building leadership’ (ibid).

Other examples included Freirian training in teaching literacy described in the introduction, and a government-sponsored programme for people from favelas to attend university social work courses to reflect on their experiences of mobilisation (as described in Chapter 6). Opportunities for transformative education are not that common, especially given the context of formal education within favelas. This is an area for consideration for state and NGO intervention.

Another example of transformative education was the research process, itself, which provided an opportunity for critical reflection on the situation and people’s lives. Within the context of the favela, there are very few such opportunities. Part of the participatory methodology is to create opportunity for reflection precisely because through the process of analysing and describing their reality, participants can gain insights into their own situation (Gaventa and Cornwall 2008). While the research process does not represent transformative education on the scale of some of the other examples, it involved a dialectical approach to creating knowledge. For the community researchers involved, this changed their perception of themselves and led to some interesting discussions about how they would make use of the knowledge in their work in the community. Some community researchers used the participatory methods they learned in their other work in the community. Others took materials generated through the research (including the participatory videos) and used them to communicate in forums outside of the community (including a debate with policy makers and course for community leaders and police on community-policing relations) (Tiana 2007).

These examples point to the way that a participatory research process does have the potential for replication. This potential is another element that can contribute to acts of citizenship. A final consideration in understanding the research process as facilitating acts of citizenship is that it relied on me as an external catalyst. As an outsider, I was able to transgress some barriers in bringing leaders and people together from different communities and different segments within communities. I offered a connection to an external network, which lent a greater sense of legitimacy to the process. On the other hand, my involvement as an outsider meant that the research process was more limited, particularly by clientelistic expectations, the nature of my role, and the limited length of the research process.

Violence functions at the level of the individual to generate fear. Fear is connected to a sense of powerlessness, and for some this sense of powerlessness leads to the apathy described by
community leaders and evidenced through the research process itself. For others, the sense of fear can be a motivation for becoming involved in the militia and factions, as young men in particular often turn to these armed groups to recuperate a sense of honour in the face of shame and humiliation (Gilligan 2001). Together these processes of socialisation through violence contribute to a closing in of a sense of political community, a perception of the negation of rights, and the sense that the government is not able to address problems.

In terms of the implications for citizenship, a narrow sense of political community, defined by self-interest helps to explain the definition of citizenship described earlier in the chapter: a distant dream but demonstrably not a reality. This in turn relates to how people act or do not act as citizens. In order to move beyond fear and a narrow sense of political community, there is a need for opportunities for transformative education that can shift awareness and break out of these patterns. These patterns can become entrenched and reproduced through daily experiences (Crossley 2005), and the coincidence between these experiences across different levels of socialisation. Few such opportunities exist for breaking the circle of reproduction, but the ones that emerged during and as part of the research showed their importance in relationships to articulating citizenship.

The level of the community: meanings and practices of citizenship

Given the public experiences of violence described at the beginning of this chapter, the level of the community is fraught space in which to consider both the meaning and practice of citizenship. And yet, the research showed some important insights about how people perceive the community level as important, for making sense of their citizenship and carrying it out. There are many examples (several demonstrated in the participatory videos we produced) of micro-level social mobilisations or community-led initiatives, including a community-run crèche, a recycling programme, football teams for children, music and theatre classes for children (Interview with Deco 16 December 2006) (Interview with Sandra 8 March 2007). These are run entirely under the initiative of community leaders with little or no help from the government. These are not social mobilisations in the traditional sense, and function at a very micro level with a great deal of precariousness. For example, music and theatre classes were often cancelled because a lack of instruments. In all cases, groups would suspend their activities during periods of war in the favela. During the course of this research, the militia tried to force all these activities to be held within the residents’ association building that they controlled (where many residents would not want to go), and organisers were also required to pay a fee to the militia.
'I was renting space for my music classes from a family that was expelled from the community by the traficantes. Now that the ‘galacticos’[nickname for the militia] have taken over, the family has come back, but parents won’t let their children come to classes. I’ve had to stop work because if there is an invasion against the ‘galacticos’, the kids could be caught in the middle’ (Alcir, field diary, 24 November 2006).

These kinds of problems are indicative of the difficulty in sustaining even very nascent social action. As chapter 6 will show, even these precarious precursors to social mobilisation must be continually negotiated with the armed actors controlling the community.

These examples of social action are not directly aimed at influencing the relationship between the state and citizens and do not have an explicitly political framing, but they involve mobilising people within the community in order to improve people’s lives and wellbeing. The leaders behind these initiatives see them as the only type of activity they can feasibly engage in, given the context. While they do not have explicit political aims, or even specific rights-claims behind them, they could provide the basis for acts of citizenship and more sustained social mobilisation that could make demands on the state for rights and accountability. Yet they are constantly undermined, both by the nature of the relationship with the government and by the powerful and armed actors within the community. At the same time, there are ways of generating legitimate leaders and building external networks which can contribute to acts of citizenship leading to more sustained social action\textsuperscript{38}.

The next section will consider examples of how non-violent social action at the community level happen and the difficulties they face given the context of violence. The dimensions of social action that emerged as important include the meaning of leadership, the process of establishing neutral space vis-à-vis the armed actors, establishing and maintaining legitimacy, and building external networks. Sustained social action faces several barriers created or heightened by violence. These include the constraints that operate on leaders of these initiatives, especially in terms of the risks they face and the difficulty in maintaining their neutrality. It is important to note that there are difficulties in generating strong social mobilisation within favelas independent of the violence, including opposing and incompatible motives on the part of leaders. But violence increases this problem because it increases the risks associated with social action, and because of the degree of control it gives to violent

\textsuperscript{38} There is undoubtedly a close relationship between leadership and social action, although this was not explored in great detail in the research. From what emerged through the research, it is clear that there is not a direct correlation between the quality and degree of leadership and the success of particular social actions. Nonetheless, legitimate leadership is an important element of effective social action.
actors. Violent actors also occupy much of the space for social action, and this also constraints the prospects for acts of citizenship. As argued in Chapter 5, patterns of authority based on violence reinforce the capacity of the militia for effective social action within the favela. In addition, as argued in Chapter 6, there are a variety of mediators that any more organised form of social action must negotiate with in order to be effective. These mediators control access to physical space to hold activities, the level of security needed for activities to occur, and the resources generated through activities within the favela, or channelled into the community from external sources. As such, these mediators exert significant control over how social action can happen within the favela. Yet, despite these obstacles, non-violent social action does occur.

Within these community-based initiatives, a key issue is the source of leadership. As the examples below will show, it is possible to reconstitute and expand the boundaries between violence and non-violence, creating more space for citizen action, but this takes time and persistence and a certain stability in the regime of violent actors controlling the favela.

At a participatory discussion meeting in Santa Teresa with community leaders on 23 January 2007, the group listed what they felt comprised the essential characteristics of leaders within the community. These included:

- Have information about the community
- Know the community
- Know how to listen
- Know how to behave as a leader (and recognise that people are always watching them)
- Know the right moment to do things
- Communicate well
- Be patient and have patience
- Have hope that change is possible

In the discussion that followed, the participants recognised that traffickers were a type of leader within the community, and that leadership is spread across a variety of segments of the community (including the drug trafficking factions, politicians, and those engaged in community-based organisations such as sports courses, residents’ association, and recycling projects). The main challenge that emerged from this discussion was how to generate strong
and independent leaders in the long term from within the favela that could legitimately represent the favela.

Leaders are often under pressure or become co-opted by the armed actors controlling the favelas. One aspect to the way that processes of socialisation by violence at the community level affect citizenship is around the kinds of choices that individuals, particularly leaders, are forced to make given a context of violence, and the effects these choices have on their families. Essentially all non-violent community leaders must find a balance between co-optation by the armed actors and the amount of risk that they are willing to take on behalf of themselves and their families. As one leader describes:

‘If you’re working for the [residents’] association, you may think you are doing it because you are helping the community, but in the end you become mixed up [with the traffickers/militia] and you risk not only yourself but your family too.’ Clécio, 47, community researcher

This quote demonstrates two aspects of the difficulty in establishing legitimate non-violent leadership. All community leaders are forced to make compromises in relation to armed actors. And when individual leaders undertake a process of citizen action, they must consider not only the implications for themselves, but also the risks that their actions imply for their families. This includes the risk of expulsion from the community, torture and death:

‘I ran my campaign [for municipal councillor] outside of Quitungo and Guaporé because the aunts and uncles, cousins and mothers of traficantes still live here, and they know who is who. If the balance of power shifts, I don’t want to be involved’(Paulinho, field diary, 10 December 2006)

Individual leaders are not perceived in isolation from their families, and families become implicated in the choices that leaders make. When a young man becomes involved in a faction, and that faction is overthrown, his family will often be expelled or threatened with death. This emphasises how social relations impinge on community-level dynamics surrounding social action.

These points were demonstrated very clearly in Quitungo and Guaporé through the case of the burning of bus 350 in 2003, leading to the death of eleven people (2007).

The president of the resident’s association of Piquiri was implicating in helping the traffickers by buying the gasoline used to burn the bus. As another community leader described the situation: ‘We joined together the four communities so that we could be stronger. Now Beto has burned us all. The government thinks that we are all ‘involved’. Beto was subsequently sentenced to 462 years in prison and his family has been expelled from the community (Cesário and Nem Nem, field diary, 14 February).
This example demonstrates the difficulty for community leaders, both of maintaining neutrality, and of sustaining wider social action. When the motives of leaders becomes mixed up with the objectives of traficantes and/or the militia, the consequences can be dire. The involvement of community leaders with the armed actors then can compromise the ability of others to work with the state. As Cesário and Nem Nem say above, the actions of Beto have cast a pall over all the community leaders in Quitungo and Guaporé, making it difficult to negotiate with the state.

With an increase in the degree of complicity with the armed actors, comes an increase in risk to the individual leader and to their family. But it also has implications for a people’s sense of citizenship in that an attack on public transportation, which is relied upon by most of the residents for travel to work and school, went unanswered by the state. Instead, it was the militia that responded to the attacks on the bus by taking control of the communities (see community timeline earlier in the chapter).

In addition to the risk, individual leaders must also consider their own neutrality vis-à-vis the violent mediators and to what extent they are willing to cross the line between neutrality and alignment with violent actors. Leaders who choose not to align themselves with a violent mediator will be able to carry out social action within a very limited sphere, but they will be more protected from the risks of being associated with a violent actor. When leaders choose to work with one of the violent mediators, they can become more effective and have access to a broader range of resources, but they are also putting themselves and their families in greater risk. Risk is inversely related to neutrality, but so is influence.

‘There is no way to be president of the residents’ association and not have contact with [armed] groups. Whether it’s the traficantes or the militia, just like the people who live in the favelas, maintaining a relationship with them is not optional’ (Rossino Diniz, president of FAFERJ, an umbrella group for residents’ associations in Rio de Janeiro) (Ramalho 2006).

‘The militia doesn’t allow community leaders to meet. No one who is neutral wants to be president of the residents’ association’ (Rosangela 2007).

In Quitungo and Guaporé, community leaders have struggled to establish their legitimacy and maintain their neutrality in relation to the factions and now the militia. The current president of the residents’ association in Quitungo is the brother of the head of the militia and claims to be neutral:

‘Other people from other associations think I’m playing stupid when I say that I don’t have anything to do with the militia. But it’s true. Even though my brother is in charge—his business is security and mine is social projects’ (Cesário 2007).
However the legitimacy of the residents’ association is severely weakened. During the course of the research, the residents’ association held ‘elections’ for its leadership, and the only candidates on the ballot were those placed there by the militia. This is a well-documented strategy of the militia in favelas across the city (Ramalho 2006). Also during the course of the research, all the negotiations with the militia leaders took place in the residents’ association building, which was visibly occupied by the militia:

_Sandra, one of the community researchers and a community leader responsible for a crumbling community centre in Guaporé allowed militia members to use gym equipment in the community centre. Because she allowed one or two of the militia members to enter the community centre to use the equipment, soon the entire militia force began to occupy the community centre—transforming what had been a neutral space into one colonised by the militia. They soon demanded a key to the centre and started to dictate which activities could happen and who could participate in them (this had already happened with the residents’ association buildings in Quitungo and the favelas). Sandra did not have the authority to bar the militia members from the building once she had let them in. Others perceived this action as putting at risk all the people who use the community centre because once the community centre becomes a space claimed by the militia, it also becomes a possible target of reprisal invasions by the factions. She is scared because the traficantes killed the mason in Kelson’s who built the wall for the militia there and she fears reprisals. This makes the CSU no longer a neutral space and we can’t hold any more research meetings there. The employees don’t want to come to work there, either. Tiana is worried about her association with Sandra and won’t walk through the favela with her’ (field diary, 13 February 2007)._

This example shows how the militia can expand their control into different areas within the community, and how non-violent community leaders can easily lose neutral space. The greater risk that leaders are willing to take by aligning themselves with violent mediators, the more influence they may achieve in the short term. But with the loss of neutrality, these leaders also implicate their families in greater risks. Thus violence and violent mediators destabilise social action because of the way that violence places both individuals and their families in positions of greater risk. As one community leader explained:

‘When you collaborate [with the parallel power], you are an egg. When you are involved [with the parallel power], you are a pig. Eggs are broken to make breakfast, but to get bacon you kill the pig.’ Clécio, 47, community researcher

A second aspect but related aspect is the lack of space at the community level for social action that is separate from violent actors. Chapter 6 describes how violent actors intervene in processes of both social and political mobilisation. Violent mediators occupy the space for community mobilisation, reducing space for citizen action that is not linked to violence. They occupy this space in different ways. In some cases, the militia or the factions directly intervene in the formal structures of community-based organisations (especially the residents’ associations).
'When I decided to step down from the presidency of the Residents’ Association after 8 years (because I wanted some of my old life back), the leaders put together a ticket, but left the presidency open because the traffickers wanted to put in their own people. I gave them three criteria for choosing a president: some one who knows the community well, doesn’t work full time (so they will have time for volunteer work), and has another source of income like a rent or a pension. But the people they put in place have none of these things. They are the mouth pieces for the parallel power’ (Enir 2007).

There are degrees of separation from the violent actors, and non-violent community leaders must negotiate these on an on-going basis. Achieving legitimacy on its own does not create citizenship. For example, the militias gain legitimacy for providing security in the face of the failure of the state to do so, but their ‘legitimate’ leadership is not democratic but based on the threat of violence. In cases where non-violent social mobilisation gains legitimacy, it is for helping to articulate a sense of citizenship (such as through increasing community cohesion, purpose, and identity as in the example of the Festa Junina below) or by helping to make rights real (by gaining the attention of and intervention by the state etc.):

‘Violence is a pond of water, and when you throw in a stone there are ripples. We have been working to re-establish boundaries so that the police and the traficantes don’t enter the residents’ association armed. It has taken a lot of work. In 2003, we planned a Festa Junina [harvest festival] celebration with people from different favelas across the city. We spent months planning the event, with dancing, food, drink and activities for children. Groups from different favelas were coming to perform. We informed the police that this event was planned. During the event, the police invaded with a caveirão. They forced everyone to lie on the floor. The traficantes came down from the top of the favela and tried to shoot the caveirão with everything they had even though they don’t have much effect. They had a huge gun battle over our heads. The children were so terrified that I lost my voice that night from trying to help them calm down. The police don’t want the traficantes to participate in our events, but they also want to undermine our attempts to link communities together’(Cris, field diary, 23 January 2007).

This example demonstrates the difficulty in building networks with other communities and of creating a space for cultural events which is free from violence. It is the fragility of connections with other communities and networks as well as the precariousness of ‘neutral’ space (such as that of a Festa Junina), which are often overwhelmed by violence. Both of these factors are serious constraints on the actions of leaders within the favela.

In the cases of relatively effective citizen action, leaders also described a common need to establish neutrality from the violent mediators and from political patronage networks. The process of re-establishing neutrality of residents’ association and creating boundaries between the trafficking/militia and the community activities and programmes is difficult. In most cases, it involved the demarcation of a physically neutral space for community activity (i.e. prohibiting the militia or traffickers from entering the residents’ association armed). But it also
involves enforcing a more conceptual boundary that separates citizen action for the benefit of the community from the activities of the militia and traffickers. Establishing this neutrality is not an easy undertaking, especially because of the interpersonal connections that often exist between different leaders in the favelas. In the case of Morro dos Prazeres, the community leaders built their legitimacy through many micro-level projects, and this increased legitimacy has given them the basis for negotiating more effectively with the state around other larger questions, such as urban upgrading projects, health projects, etc. (Cris 2007; Enir 2007; Flávio 2007).

It is difficult to promote legitimate leaders that can initiate acts of citizenship and go on to sustain social action. Yet legitimate leaders are essential for the development of more democratic forms of authority (Warren 1996). The transformative potential of legitimate leaders is very great in that they are able to transcend boundaries and articulate new relationships with the state and community. One of the ways that this can happen is through building and extending external networks with other communities or actors outside of the favela.

The importance of external connections and networks is very clear from the cases involved in this research. Both the community-run crèche and the recycling programme in Quitungo and Guaporé were only able to function on the basis of external connections (with the Catholic Church, politicians, and a corporate sponsor). The importance of external networks to effective mobilisation within favelas has been demonstrated by other research (Gay 1994; Arias 2007). The challenge for leaders within communities, particularly those involved in this research, is how to establish external connections and networks and how to maintain these. In making these connections, there is also the potential for acts of citizenship that can overcome barriers of stigma and discrimination, and generate new alliances as a basis for future action. These external networks can also provide the basis for solidarity and support necessary to sustain social action, which is so difficult in this context.

The research process itself was intended to generate the basis for acts of citizenship potentially leading to sustained social action. It involved a process of micro social mobilisation since it entailed sustained participation over a period of eight months of a relatively large and diverse group of people from across the favelas generated knowledge about situations, practices and discourses in order to contribute to the basis for future networks.
Because the team of community researchers was drawn from favelas and housing estates in very different parts of the city, and from diverse segments within the communities themselves, the research process itself created the opportunity for connections between leaders. This generated some interesting discussions during the research process, as the differing perspectives of the leaders involved came into dialogue. When the community researchers evaluated the research process, this interaction with people from different communities and across boundaries within communities was one of the most important outcomes they recognised. While this could be an important contribution to a process of citizen action, it is not clear how long these relationships lasted after the research process ended.

Violence at the community level is compressing the space for non-violent mobilisation. Those community leaders who do not want to use violence must negotiate a series of difficult issues including their position vis-à-vis the armed actors, the sense of apathy, powerlessness and narrow political community engendered etc. These barriers can become so entrenched, as in Quitungo and Guaporé, that years may pass with very little effective non-violent mobilisation. The case of Morro dos Prazeres demonstrates how strong leaders can build relatively effective social mobilisation through a long process of gradually expanding space for social action.

The issue of leadership and leaders, particularly how people become legitimate leaders and what this entails, is an important consideration for enabling acts of citizenship leading to social action. These examples highlight the critical importance of leaders remaining neutral in relation to the violent mediators and preserving neutral spaces for community activities necessary for social action. Related to this relative success of leaders and the citizen action they take forward, is the ability of those leaders to establish and maintain networks and contacts with external groups.

**The level of the city and state-society relations: meanings and practices of citizenship**

The crisis of the emptying out of public space, and a restricted sense of political community has been described by Maria Alice Rezende de Carvalho as the ‘cidade escassa’ or a scarce city. For Rezende de Carvalho, the absence of a civic culture is central to understanding the lack of security and fundamental lack of order in Brazilian cities:

‘the inexistence of civic energy capable of integrating the urban fabric through culture and through politics, and the localism inherent in the informal market mean that the
city itself becomes virtual in the absence of mechanisms capable of creating solidarity between its parts’ (Burgos 2005: 210).

Conversely, it is in the construction of the basis for solidarity that possibilities lie for reinvigorating the empty public space and civic life of the city (Rezende de Carvalho 2000). This level or space of socialisation is important to understanding the meanings and practices of citizenship, and violence has an important role in shaping these. Chapter 2 set out the importance of the city as a space for understanding citizenship, because of the particular dynamics of violence, power and identity that operate. This section will examine how different features of the relationship between state and society play out in the favela within the context of the city with implications for the meanings and practices of citizenship, and how violence shapes these including: the lack of state credibility, clientelism privileging violent mediators, stigma and negative labelling.

In Rio, there is a lack of continuity in government social programmes as administrations change and new political parties take control, which means that when something does begin to have an effect and contribute to better circumstances for social action, the programme is cut and this undermines future attempts at social mobilisation because it contributes to a lack of confidence in the state. Lack of continuity is more important in violent contexts because of the extra time and investments in relationships needed to build successful interventions. An example of this is the New Life Programme (Programa Vida Nova), sponsored by the city government, for young people aged 16-22 who had been involved with trafficking and never finished school. The programme gave them the opportunity to learn a skill and receive an equivalency diploma. I interviewed one of the former coordinators, who lives in Guaporé.

‘When it began, it was very well publicized. When they decided to cut it, no one told us anything. There was another project here ‘Verde que te quero verde’ reforestation in the community, it was also cancelled without any notice. Jovens pela Paz was working well, but that was also cancelled’ (Rosangela 2007). She offered many examples of how the programme really made a difference in people’s lives and cited the very low percentage of participants who returned to trafficking after being involved in the programme.

Yet this was not enough to guarantee its continuation under a new administration and new political party. This is not an unusual story in Rio de Janeiro, and it is repeated in many other cases. The lack of continuity affects citizenship by weakening the credibility of the state, especially given the context of violence.

The role of political parties as clientelist mediators in the favela means that changes of government administration and party reinforce this problem. For example, the municipal
representative for the region of Quitungo and Guaporé blocks social programmes or other
government interventions that could make a difference because it is not a region that
generates many votes for her. Attempts to work together to have greater leverage with the
state have not been successful:

*When Alcir was president of the resident’s association, they created a partnership between the
define and Guaporé and made an agreement with their
municipal councillor. She promised to upgrade the houses, provide food for the creche,
regularise access to water, and give toys to the children. The ‘contrapartida’ was that only the
current municipal councillor would be able to campaign within the four communities.
However, despite the community upholding its side of the bargain during the campaign, the
municipal councillor has not delivered on her promises because the area does not deliver enough votes for
her party (field diary, 12 January 2007).*

Any interventions by external actors also risk being drawn into a web of party politics.

*‘A man came and asked me to organise meetings with the different buildings about the re-
painting project. I discovered that he was a candidate for municipal councillor, but working for
the Ministry of the Interior. I got him to go meet Beto (the former president in Piquiri) and they
went without me to meet with the president of CEDAE (water authority). They agreed to a
major upgrading project for Piquiri and this was approved and the money was released, but
nothing ever happened’ (Cesário 2007).*

These examples show how community leaders attempt to bargain with the clientelist structure
of the state as a means to get concessions. Although there were great difficulties in uniting
the residents’ associations, it was possible under the leadership of Alcir, who has a very good
reputation in the community for neutrality. He has been running music classes for children
there for over thirty years and has never been involved with armed actors. Yet even his
leadership and a period of unity in the community-based organisations were not enough to
secure concessions from the state.

These attempts at bargaining with a municipal councillor and a prospective political candidate
also demonstrate how politicians are viewed not as representatives of those who elect them
but as gatekeepers to concessions and political favours (see Chapter 7). An important
question for how to improve the sense of citizenship is how to move outside this role. The
ability for collective bargaining is diminished by the fragmentation of non-violent community
mobilisation which persists in Quitungo and Guaporé.

*Clientelism, in these examples, suffocates social action, because it is overlaid by the
interference of armed actors. Robert Gay and others have argued that within the category of
clientelism, there is space for negotiating more or less democratic relationships. This effect is
exacerbated by violence because violence privileges certain mediators, including the militia,*
the traffickers and those community leaders that ally with them. Chapter 6 on mediators will look in greater detail at how different mediators enter the relationship between citizens and the state and what difference violence makes to these relationships. Chapter 7 considers how these patterns of mediation have implications for citizenship and therefore the nature of politics in the Brazilian context.

Violence, in terms of state-sponsored violence, also contributes to these problems. As described in the introduction, police repression characterises the state approach to security. This means that residents of the favela are constantly confronted with a schizophrenic state, which on the one hand encourages a shifting patchwork of social programmes and safety nets in tandem with each administration, and on the other, is responsible for constant violence and violation of civil and political rights within the favela. The combination of the lack of continuity linked to clientelism and party politics and the repressive nature of the police lead to a lack of state credibility which is extremely serious (as discussed in chapter 5). This presents a significant barrier to sustaining social action that works with the state to address gaps in citizenship.

**Dynamics of social exclusion in the city**

These features of the way that the state interacts with the favela are situated in the particular social context of the city. This section explores the roles of negative labelling and stigma in informing the process of socialisation at the level of the city. Perceptions about the favelas and the sources and causes of violence shade the way that the state intervenes in the favela and how people from the favela are perceived as ‘citizens’ or not. But stigma and negative labelling also affect the self-perception of people within the favela, shaping how they perceive their citizenship.

In another session with the children, we discussed stigma and the types of stigma they felt were most prevalent in their communities. According to these children, the main types of stigma they face are:
### Table 10: Types of Stigma and their Associations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of stigma</th>
<th>Associations with this stigma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racism</td>
<td>Quotas for blacks in the university[^39]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High levels of sexually transmitted diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social inequality</td>
<td>Social class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behaviour (people treating you differently)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of access to education</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Based on where you live</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Based on nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Means you can only earn the minimum salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Bandido’ (criminal, usually referring to someone involved with drug trafficking)</td>
<td>Ex-prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to these, the children also listed the following types of stigma (although these were ranked as less important): disability, sexual orientation, religion, nationality, and age. The stigma perceived by children in the favela does not leave much space for them to see themselves as citizens. They feel they are perceived as ‘poor dark criminals’, to whom the state is unlikely to respond in any way other than violence:

>“What do you think the police see when they see me? They see a poor black criminal and that is all. If I run, they will kill me without asking any questions’ (Henrique, black community leader, 23, field diary, 10 January 2007).

The problem of negative labelling in public discourse, especially of children and young people and violence, occurs in other Latin American contexts as well (Peetz 2008). There have been several high profile acts of violence in the community that have attracted national media attention.

>“The only time we appear in the papers is when something bad happens, and people think that our community has nothing good about it’ (Paulinho, field diary, May 2006).

According to community leaders, this has a very negative effect on the community, because it reinforces low levels of self-esteem within the community. As expressed by the leader of a recycling cooperative in Quitungo:

[^39]: This table is reproduced directly from exercises completed by children during the research process.
[^40]: The quota system for blacks to gain entrance into universities in Brazil has generated a fierce debate. The measures were intended to reduce the racial stigma and inequality that persists in Brazil, although some black leaders have come out in opposition to the policy. It is somewhat surprising that groups of children in the favela would mention this policy in association with the stigma of racism and shows the extent to which wider debates in Brazil penetrate into the context of the favelas, especially in relation to university education—which unlikely for almost all of the children involved in the research.
‘The poor think that they don’t deserve anything better, so they accept things the way they are’ (Carminha 2007).

How are people able to reverse these labels or counter-label? What are the spaces and possibilities for recasting labels? Community leaders identified this as an objective of the research. They would like to project a more positive image of their community into the media, which they feel that other favelas have done successfully (such as Rocinha).

There is an important link between labelling and citizenship, in that ‘citizen’ itself is a form of label. Citizens should have rights, and should have certain responsibilities. Citizenship as a label usually carries other connotations about certain civic qualities—how to act as responsible citizens, etc. The negative labels forcibly applied to people living in favelas do not leave much space for a sense of citizenship, especially for young people who ‘are all suspects’ (Burgos 2005). Perhaps as a result, ‘citizen’ is a not a label that people in the favela claim for themselves.

Given the stigma already associated with favelas (along geographical, racial, and class lines), violence reinforces and entrenches this stigma. This leads to the favela being perceived both from within and without as a ‘social purgatory’, to use Wacquant’s description. He continues:

‘When these ‘penalised spaces’ are, or threaten to become, permanent fixture of the urban landscape, discourses of vilification proliferate and agglomerate about them, ‘from below’, in the ordinary interactions of daily life, as well as ‘from above’, in the journalistic, political and bureaucratic (and even scientific) fields. A taint of place is thus superimposed on the already existing stigmata traditionally associated with poverty and ethnic origin...’ (emphasis in the original) (Wacquant 2008: 237).

The process of labelling reinforces the wider dynamics of exclusions within the city in specific ways. As will be argued in Chapter 6, coercive mediators comprise a parallel pattern of authority within the favelas. Because this extends to control of the formal governance structures within the favelas, these mediators also control the interface with the state. Because of this, it is very difficult for citizen action to move around this web of relationships, and establish direct and more accountable relationships with the state. This is especially difficult in the case of the militia because of their explicit political aims, outlined in Chapters 5 and 6, which blurs the boundary between violent actors and the state even further.

Labelling and the media
A sign held by a favela resident at a rare public protest in 2004 against the violence in their communities read: ‘I live where the channels of communication only appear to count the
dead.’ (Burgos 2005: 213). And even this is disputed as favela residents often claim that the numbers of dead are under-counted by the media and the state (see the community time line earlier and (Costa 2006). As discussed in the introduction, there is a historical basis for labelling and stigma around favelas, but this stigma and associated labels are perpetuated and more deeply entrenched through violence and the way that this violence is portrayed in public discourse by the media, public officials, NGOs and films (Moncrieffe and Eyben 2007). The relationship between the community and the rest of the city is determined by broader processes of labelling (how the community is perceived by the middle class, government officials, media), other spatial dimensions to inequality and exclusions and even certain global trend and processes (drug and arms trade, consumerism, popular culture)(see Baiocchi 2001; Burgos 2005). In a group discussion with community leaders in May 2005, one of the main problems facing the community, in their view, was the negative image of the community in the media that translated into how the government treated them:

‘The government embraces only certain communities—those in the Zona Sul and centre, or places where ‘innocent people’ die because the police were involved’(Alcir, field diary, 27 November 2006).

The research group in Santa Teresa chose to focus on the role of the media in generating stigma contributing to violence and social exclusion.

In a session with children from the favelas in Santa Teresa on 24 January 2007, we discussed how children and their communities are portrayed in the media and the effects that this has on them. The children listed the images of themselves that they remembered from news stories over the past few years. The main labels that they thought were associated with their communities by the media included: violent, dynamic, historic, full of favelas, full of artists, and that young people are all criminals involved in baile funk and drug trafficking. They found that the media tended to conflate children and young people’s activities for children with the activities of the trafficking factions. They felt that children’s actions were often portrayed as illegal and wrong. For example, some of the children from these communities stand at the entrance to the road leading to the statue of Christ the Redeemer, one of the major tourist attractions in Rio de Janeiro. These children organised themselves into informal guides, with matching shirts and badges. They offered to guide people through the park to the statue. The police decided to clamp down on this because they thought that these children were robbing tourists (and tourists do get robbed on the way to the statue). However, this event was portrayed in the media as the drug trafficking factions trying to kidnap and extort tourists using children as bait. The children who had been acting honestly as guides were caught in the middle.

The children also felt that on certain occasions, the media helped expose problems in the community leading to improvements and more effective mobilisations, as with the case of the crash of a bus due to the erosion of the tram tracks in Santa Teresa. They concluded that the media can help but it also hinders, because it acts according its own interests in selling more papers. They discussed how the truth needs to be written and communicated through the media, and how they would like to become involved in the production of news about their own community (field diary, 24 January 2007).
The media plays a powerful role in determining how children within the favelas are perceived by society more generally. Children, themselves, can face the negative effects of the labels applied by the media in specific situations, as in the case of the informal tourist guides. These labels also contribute to the expectations that children and adults have about how children will behave. These labels reverberate through different layers of social relations. Together with the fear and stigma that children described, this type of social positioning can make it more difficult for children to imagine a different pathway for themselves outside of violence.

Gilligan argues that the shame and humiliation that are closely linked to violence are spread systemically along both horizontal and vertical axes. The vertical divisions operate through:

‘a hierarchical ranking of upper and lower status groups, chiefly classes, castes, and age groups, but also other means by which people are divided into in-groups and out-groups, the accepted and the rejected, the powerful and the weak, the rich and the poor, the honoured and the dishonoured. For people who are shamed on a systematic, wholesale basis, and their vulnerability to feeling of humiliation is increased when they are assigned an inferior social or economic status; and the more inferior and humble it is, the more frequent and intense the feelings of shame, and the more frequent and intense the acts of violence’ (Gilligan 2001: 38).

This kind of systematic shaming through the reinforcing of exclusion and inclusion is an important dimension of the effects of violence on how people perceive their citizenship and are able to act on it. Lines of inclusion and exclusion mirror the geographic divisions of the favela. And these experiences of social exclusion, racism and stigma have come up repeatedly through the examples given here—in people’s perceptions of citizenship, participation, and violence; and in their mappings of stigma. It is important to note that barriers to citizen action exist irrespective of violence, particularly in areas which face social exclusion, marginalisation and poverty, and where patterns of clientelism and repressive state policies prevail.

**Enacting citizenship in the city**

Despite these limitations, there are still spaces where people can practice citizenship. These include creating a safe public space, where people are able to participate without fear, in building processes of negotiation with the state over public security that are inclusive, demanding public policies that guarantee access to rights; and, building better relationships of accountability between the police and the community.

There are very few existing forums where this is possible. Part of the approach of the research process was to try and create such forums in order to open opportunities for acts of
citizenship. In June 2009, I organised a series of debates between government officials and community leaders and residents on the topic of public security. I used the results of the research to produce a multi-media pack (including the participatory videos), which was distributed to the government officials in advance. In partnership with Andrea Gouvêa, municipal councillor, we held debates in four favelas including Santa Teresa, Quitungo and Guaporé, Vila Canoas, and Cidade de Deus. At the debates, community members and leaders were invited to question government officials about their approach and existing policies. Government officials were forced to justify their work. I will explore the outcomes of these debates in greater depth in the conclusion, but they did serve as opportunities for acts of citizenship that did address the relationship between citizens and the state.

For example, in the Santa Teresa debate, much of the discussion focussed on the way that children experience violence as part of the education system (including the way that children are threatened on the public transport and in the streets going and coming from school). What was most important about this was how it helped to explain the way that violence shapes daily life and the prospects for education and a sense of citizenship. Within the space of the debate there was potential for acts of citizenship in challenging state failure and police brutality and also in engaging in discussing possible solutions (including the current policy approaches of walling of favelas and occupying favelas with a permanent police force). A lieutenant cornel from the military police who participated in the debate in Cidade de Deus said:

‘I come here unarmed in every sense of the word. I am here to listen to you.’ Tenente Coronel Cid, Policia Militar, 19 June 2009, debate in Cidade de Deus

This kind of attitude from the police would have been highly unlikely in other settings, as the example of the police invasion in Morro dos Prazeres shows. The debates allowed the state to ‘see’ citizens in a different way—as challenging the status quo and articulating a new sense of citizens and citizenship, even if it was only in that particular moment.

In terms of the role of violence in shaping this relationship, the city and state government’s repressive approach to security directly affects the broader relationship between the favelas and the state. These repressive security policies combine with political divisions, a lack of continuity in state policies, and entrenched patterns of clientelism to further weaken the prospects for citizenship. The overall result of all of these is to further undermine the legitimacy of state authority within the favela. The lack of state legitimacy creates further difficulties in sustaining social action (see chapter 5 for examples). Creating opportunities for
improving the relationship of accountability with the police and safe spaces to discuss
government policies relating to the favela can both contribute to acts of citizenship that
address the relationship between the community and the state (Fuentes 2009). Despite this
articulation of the meaning of participation, citizenship is about the wider relationship
between the state and the citizen, and therefore it encompasses the relationship between the
city and the favela.

**Expressions and meanings of citizenship in a context of violence**

The picture of citizenship described in this chapter does not conform to the dominant
conceptions of citizenship outlined in the literature. Given the empirical context, the dominant
concepts of active citizenship, social mobilisation, and social action as constituent of
citizenship are not wholly adequate (Gaventa 2006; Pearce 2007; Houtzager and Archarya
2009). Civil society participation usually involves ‘the role civil society organisation play whey
they develop purposive action for building citizenship in the midst of violence or mobilising
constituencies for rights claiming while under threat from violence’ (Pearce 2007: 11). The
examples here are not coherent enough to fit in this category. Houtzager and Archaya use
institutionalized petitioning, informal brokerage, contentious collective action, and collective
self-provisioning as the main features of active citizenship (Houtzager and Archarya 2009).
While elements of all of these can be found in the favela, they do not necessarily combine to
contribute to citizenship. Instead, they may have the opposite effect, and reinforce anti-
democratic and coercive patterns of authority, undermining the relationship between citizens
and the state. In a context of violence, examples of social mobilisation are as likely to be
shoring up coercive mediators and patterns of authority based on violence, as to be
contributing to greater citizenship.

Meanings of citizenship are contingent on how it is practiced and violence affects both, so that
citizens are articulating new forms of citizenship in moments of transgression and
transformation in relation to the dominant power structure. However, these moments are not
necessarily sustainable and may be reversed as often as they occur. The meaning of citizenship
in a context of violence is sensitive to the double-edged potential of citizenship to be made
and unmade, or exclude and include, at the same time. This particular aspect of citizenship is
demonstrated repeatedly in the context of favelas, where the state lacks legitimacy and where
the dominant patterns of authority are based on violent mediators. But it also preserves the
potential for transformative agency even in a context of domination.
To enact citizenship, then, incorporates both a challenge to the status quo and a desire to articulate a more democratic relationship with the state, although neither may be possible in a sustained and coordinated way. There were many examples that emerged in the course of this research such as Alciri’s attempts to unite the residents’ associations in order to negotiate with the state for better services, community residents speaking out at the debate with representatives of the state about their treatment, directly confronting police brutality as in the example of Morro dos Prazeres, working with children who had been involved with the trafficking to try and offer them the chance for inclusion in society, and residents in Quitungo and Guaporé refusing to pay the militia. The act of citizenship is also motivated by the imperative of improving people’s daily lives in the favela. Acts of citizenship, in this context, may stand alone, or they may contribute to sustained social action. The important distinction is that they are not necessarily in all cases the same as social action, even though they may contribute to it. One of the community researchers expressed it this way:

‘Is it the responsibility of the government to fix the streets, the sewage? Yes. But since the government hasn’t done anything, does that mean we should just live in filth? There are things we can do to improve the situation. What we need is to be united so that we can get the attention of the government. This is what happened in Rocinha. They put pressure on the government until the government got sick of them and did something.’ (Wagner, 20, community researcher)

As Scott showed, looking for examples of organised resistance may miss less visible everyday forms of resistance (Scott 1985). It is these kinds of examples that are important, although resistance itself is not sufficient to constitute an act of citizenship. It must also be linked to a sense of the normative aspiration underlying the act. The examples of acts of citizenship addressed here are performative of the principles of democracy. As Saward explains:

‘...democratic principles are things that we do, rather than rights or statuses that are conferred. To act on a principle of equality is to contribute to an intersubjective process of specifying its meaning, of giving it life and referents in specific settings. To question morally a taken-for-granted (such as a monarchy) is to ‘perform’ a principle, and in an important sense to recreate it by evoking it’ (emphasis in the original) (Saward 2003: 164).

The ‘taken-for-granted’ in the case of the favelas are the patterns of authority and the coercive mediators described in chapters 5 and 6. Therefore, acts of citizenship in this context can be understood as acts which in some way challenge the dominant power-holders and the status quo. It is the impulse to act in this way that even the most repressive and violent regimes cannot completely eradicate.
Conclusion: meanings and practices of citizenship in the research process

How did the research process itself demonstrate how violence shapes the meanings of citizenship? As part of a participatory action research process, an essential characteristic is to establish greater ownership and control by participants throughout (Reason and Bradbury 2001). In a sense, this is akin to creating a sense of citizenship amongst the community researchers. To overcome the fear of being involved, they needed to see the project in terms of both their rights to benefit from the research and control the knowledge generated, but also in terms of their responsibilities in terms of ensuring the wider participation of the community in a transparent and open way. The research process was also about trying to establish a sense of a collective endeavour, with a particular identity associated with that. As the research unfolded, a sense of citizenship developed in parallel to the research process. However, there were many obstacles and setbacks to this that also illustrate how the context of violence makes meaningful citizenship difficult. For example, the interventions of the militia to try to determine who could participate in the research left the research group with a temporary feeling of powerlessness and suppression. The community researchers, throughout the research process, at various times reverted to other modes of interaction and forms of identity (such as those of political party organiser, community leader looking for resources, grandmother or mother with rising costs to cover). This too is part of the meaning of citizenship—it is contingent on other identities and dimensions of people’s lives. However, in the context of the favela, because the public space for citizen action is so restricted, and the patterns of authority and mediation so entrenched, it becomes very difficult to try and establish a different set of relations based on citizenship (as opposed to mediation, clientelism, and patronage). At the end of the research process there was a sense of belonging that stretched beyond purely instrumental and self-beneficial logic. But a question remains about the permanence of such an identity. When I returned to the favela less than two years after the fieldwork, it was clear that much of this sense of shared ownership over the research outcomes had eroded over time as the previous and dominant patterns of authority reasserted themselves. The next chapter turns to an examination of these patterns of authority; the sources of power in the favela, and in particular the nature of state power and how it is shaped by violence; and, the dilemma that this poses for the construction of legitimate political authority.
As argued at the outset of this chapter, both citizenship and violence operate across different spaces of socialisation, and therefore it is important to consider how violence interacts with citizenship at these different levels. Other research shows how citizenship unravels if not valid across different spaces of socialisation (Kabeer 2005; Wheeler 2005). Violence also operates across spaces of socialisation (families, communities, schools, wider society through repressive state action)(Pearce 2006). As citizenship unravels if not viable across the spectrum of people’s experiences, violence cannot be addressed by only suppressing violence in one type of socialisation space (e.g. reducing police violence but not addressing domestic violence).

This interconnectedness between the violence and citizenship across a range of levels of socialisation explains the lack of participation on the part of people in the favelas in formal political processes. People in favelas face violence regularly, and yet when they are given opportunity to participate in city politics, they often see this as a pointless exercise. Even if the formal process itself is well organised and deliberately inclusive, it is the way that this contradicts the conditions of daily life within the favela which are ordered by violence that prevents wider participation. Violence, in effect, is leading to fragmented citizenship and fractured democracy. Despite this, this chapter has also shown that there is the potential for acts of citizenship that transcend, even if only temporarily, the hierarchies and power relationships that constrain such acts. Although the circumstances may seem to be overwhelmingly in favour of the continuation of the status quo, they do not completely erase the potential for acts of citizenship:

‘seen from the outside...the chances that tomorrow will be like yesterday are always overwhelming...The decisive difference between the ‘infinite improbabilities’ on which the reality of our earthly life rests and the miraculous character inherent in those events which establish historical reality is that, in the realm of human affairs, we know the author of ‘miracles’. It is men who perform them—men who because they have received the twofold fight of freedom and action can establish a reality of their own’(Arendt 2000: 460).

This chapter has shown meanings and practices of citizenship are mutually constitutive in a context of violence. At every level of socialisation, there are intersections between citizenship and violence, shaping how citizens act and how they interpret their citizenship. These experiences cannot be viewed in isolation of one another—the experience of violence and a sense of powerlessness in the home and at school is not independent from the experience of violence at the hands of the police and a sense of exclusion and negative labelling across the city. All of these spaces of the socialisation of violence are relevant to constructing an accurate sense of the character of citizenship in the favela. This explains how the meanings and expressions of citizenship in a context of violence lead to fragmentation. As violence
crosses spaces of socialisation, so to do experiences of the lack of citizenship. Yet this lack is not applicable to all levels of socialisation or all situations—there some ways in which people in the favela experience and articulate their citizenship in positive ways.

The next chapter will move to explore another dimension of citizenship: the capacity for the state to intervene in the favelas to ensure people’s rights as citizens. Violence plays a role in shaping power within the favela, as well as the legitimacy of the different key actors within the favela.
Chapter 5 / State Power, Patterns of Authority and the Crisis of Legitimacy

Introduction

An important condition for citizenship to function is the legitimacy of state authority (see Chapter 2). The legitimacy of state authority is something that is directly altered by violence, which not only causes distortions and disruptions in the nature of state power but also diminishes its legitimacy when the state is complicit in the violence. At the same time, competing patterns of authority put in place by other violent actors extend greater and greater influence over people’s daily lives. This leads to a situation where coercive mediators control much of the relationship between citizens and the state. The patterns of authority, the process of socially constituted legitimacy, and people’s perspectives on the state’s ability to act are necessary for understanding the citizen-state relationship. Authority, power and legitimacy are each terms with significant weight in debates of political theory, and each relate to large literatures. This chapter will use them in very specific and limited ways, referring to them primarily in relation to how these concepts emerged as empirically relevant and important. From this starting point of people’s perceptions of power, authority, and its legitimacy, power in this chapter primarily refers to the state’s ability to act to intervene within the favela. Patterns of authority are the sets of rules and practices that order daily life, created and perpetuated by the dominant actors in the favela. And political legitimacy is the socially constructed weight that these patterns of authority carry.

Patterns of authority, power and political legitimacy at the local level frame the possibilities for both acts of citizenship and for state interventions. They shape the daily interactions that comprise people’s experience of gaining access to basic services, and even public order and safety. This chapter examines how the state’s ability to intervene is shaped by violence, and the existing patterns of authority that emerge as a result in the favela. People’s perceptions about the dominant sources of power within their communities are a starting point for understanding how the power of the main actors (state, militia, drug trafficking factions, and community leaders) is layered onto existing power relationships of identity and social positioning, and therefore are essential to understanding how violence distorts and limits state power within the community. What these perceptions show is how the state as a source of visible power is limited by the power perceived to be associated with other violent actors, including the militia and drug trafficking factions. This is another important dimension of the fragmentation of citizenship because the state’s ability to act within the favelas is closely
related to the unevenness described in Chapter 4. This chapter will explore how the dynamics of political authority, legitimacy and state power that emerge in a context of violence further entrench the fragmentation of citizenship in terms of the state’s uneven power to intervene.

At the same time, the state also uses violence as the basis for intervention via the police. In a context of state power which is severely limited in certain areas and excessive in others, this chapter provides an analysis of the patterns of authority that govern much of daily life within the favelas, exploring how rules are created and maintained within a context of violence, and how these are legitimated. Finally, this chapter will explore the dilemma of legitimate political authority that arises in a context of violence by examining how legitimacy for the authority of violent actors is socially constructed within the favelas in contrast with a lack of socially constituted legitimacy for the state.

**Power**

I used a series of participatory tools to construct a landscape of power within the favelas. This landscape includes state power, but also other sources of power from within the community, both violent and non-violent. It also includes people’s experiences of gender, age, race, and social class, accessed through my own analysis of power at the interpersonal level rather than directly through participatory methods. As this thesis is concerned with citizenship, this section will focus on the intersection between state power, the power of violent mediators who act as proxies for the state in creating and enforcing rules, and the identity-based dimensions of power and exclusion that shape interaction with the state.

Researching people’s perceptions of power is a difficult task, because of the complexity of the actors and dimensions of power involved. I focused on disaggregating the sources of power within the favela, and exploring how these different sources of power can work positively or negatively in people’s own experiences. I deliberately left the definition of power open and allowed participants to define it in whatever way they choose (Chambers 2006). The intention here is to use power in a very empirical manner according to how it was described through the participatory research process, drawing on Gaventa’s categorisations of visible, hidden and invisible power (Gaventa 2005).

**Perceptions of power**

Participants ranked the most important sources of power in their experience in the community. Amount of power in this context meant the ability of the actor to do something
within the favela—whether to exert some kind of control or bring about change, corresponding primarily to visible power which Gaventa defines as the observable forms of power, the rules, structures, institutions and procedures of decision-making (ibid). In the mapping stage, we did not differentiate between those with power for positive or negative purposes. In subsequent discussions about their map of power in the community, we addressed which sources were positive and which were negative in terms of their ability to change the situation in the community. I include here the rankings of two groups, elderly people and children:

**Table 11: Perceptions of Power from Elderly and Children**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of power</th>
<th>Source of power</th>
<th>Related to</th>
<th>Amount of power</th>
<th>Source of power</th>
<th>Related to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Militia/police</td>
<td>High Militia/police</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Militia/police</td>
<td>Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Criminals</td>
<td>Judiciary, police</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Residents’ association</td>
<td>Militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drugs (trafficking groups)</td>
<td>Money, violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recycling</td>
<td>cooperative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>Community leaders</td>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>Government agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social programmes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political leaders</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People’s mindsets</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Residents’ association</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

How do people perceive state power and power of the armed actors within the favelas? How do citizens see their state? People’s perceptions of the power of the government are often contradictory, mirroring the conflicting ways that the different layers of state power intervene in the favelas. The general perception in the participatory discussion groups was that the extent of the government’s power within the favela is limited (with the exception of the police). This view was reinforced by the majority of the community leaders who felt that the government’s power to change the situation within the favela is circumscribed. In one community leader’s view:

‘The government doesn’t have power here. Our community is not helped’ (Gloria 2007).
In the view of another:

‘The government doesn’t have the means to change the situation and get rid of the trafficking or the militia. They would have to start the communities over from zero’ (Dão 2007).

Despite the general consensus that the government is not capable of or willing to alter the situation, the deposed president of the residents’ association believes that the government allows the situation in the favelas to continue because it is to the benefit of politicians:

‘If the government wanted to, it could end all this [violence]….Politicians live off others’ misfortune’ (Cesário 2007).

Not only is there a consensus that the government is not capable of affecting the underlying situation of violence, but there is also a sense that the government initiatives and interventions that do exist are poor. In another interview, a community leader described interventions by the government within the favela:

‘What the government does actually manage to do, it does badly’ (Carminha 2007).

Another community leader felt that government assistance programmes, such as Bolsa Família, do not help, but rather fuel apathy because they encourage people ‘to accept a low level of life’. Several other community leaders pointed to the lack of a professional bureaucracy and lack of continuity of government programmes as major problems with government policies. There were a few examples of government programmes that were effective at addressing violence and social exclusion, but in all cases, these programmes were discontinued because of changes in the political party in control of the administration or the election of a different candidate (see Chapter 6). Another aspect of the power of the government is the extent to which political parties shape how government programmes function within the community rather than accountable elected officials (see Chapter 4). The government is either perceived as incapable or unwilling to address the major problems facing the communities, and the actual power of the government within the favela is limited in the perception of community residents.

Police are named as a powerful actor within the community, but not in the sense of upholding people’s rights or ensuring a just public order. Instead the police are perceived as powerful in a negative way and not seen as part of state apparatus, operating with legitimacy:

‘Police have one face for the middle class and one face for the favela’ (Enir 2007).

In practice, many residents view the power of the police as interchangeable with that of the militia and the residents’ association leading to a conflation between the three. This is
important, because in people’s experience these three armed groups act interchangeably. The militia has taken over the residents' association, and often militia members are from police forces. They also use police equipment, maintain constant communication with the police, and act as a proxy for the police (O Globo 20 January, 2007). Overall this triumvirate of actors was seen as holding the most power over people's lives on a daily basis, which is borne out by the patterns of authority described in the next section.

There are some important implications of the blurring of the boundaries between the residents' association, the police and the militia, and their collective position as the dominant authority within the favela, because the source of their power is fear and the threat of the use of violence combined with the trappings of legitimacy of the state. This relates to issues of how legitimate and accountable authority is established in a context of violence (see section below). In a sense, the militia represent catastrophic failure of the government to provide accountable and legitimate public security:

‘Getting rid of the militia means getting rid of the trafficking and the corruption in the government’ (Dão 2007).

The meanings of power that emerged through the participatory exercises were relatively straightforward and centred on the ability of something or someone to change things within the community, both for better and for worse. The categorisation outlined in Chapter 2 can help to analyse the forms of power described through these exercises (VeneKlasen and Miller 2002; Gaventa 2005). Most of the sources of power identified in the participatory maps can be understood as ‘power over’. Others dimensions of power, such as ‘power to’ and ‘power with’ emerged in other ways through the research. The approach to power here is broadly to focus on the examples of visible power and power ‘over’, with attention to the presence or absence of state power in order to understand how the state can act within the favela. Although this a relatively narrow slice of the total set of power relations operating in the favela, it is the most important for understanding the nature of the relationship between the state and the citizen in terms of how violence changes the state’s ability to act.

These responses reflect more general findings about the dominant sources of power in the favelas. The more dominant sources of visible power in the communities are a source of negative influence. With the exception of the churches, all the other actors named as important (militia, police, residents’ association, trafficking groups) were also considered as negative influences. Sources of positive power, such as community leaders, government
agencies, social programmes, etc., were ranked as very low importance.

This discussion of the perceptions of state power relate to citizenship in two ways: the implications for the nature of state power and for the power of citizens. Both have the potential to lead to positive transformation or to reinforce existing hierarchies (Moncrieffe 2006).

In unravelling the web of power relations within the favela through participatory discussion groups, interviews and observations, what emerged is how state power is multi-dimensional and how this power is superimposed on uneven power relationships within the favela and the city itself. State power is extended into the favela through different actors, including political parties, social programmes (such as Bolsa Família and Cheque Cidadão, as well as other social and cultural programmes), the police, and in a hybridized way, through the militia. These different dimensions of state power emerged through interviews with community leaders, representatives of different state agencies, and observations within the favela. Each of these aspects of state power varies in strength and ‘thickness’ according to the particular community and circumstances. The state is not monolithic, and certain dimensions of state power extend more fully into the favelas than others. There is also a hybridity of state power in the cases of actors like militias, which are linked in perception and in reality to official state actors, take over the functions of the state, using violence to establish control. These different aspects of state power engender distinct patterns of mediation, which are explored in Chapter 6. These facets of state power do not exist in a vacuum—the distinct aspects of state power intersect with existing power relations within the communities, including those of gender, race, and social class. That is, these visible examples of ‘power over’ also interact with the more diffuse sources of power that function through social positioning and identity. Hayward argues, drawing on Foucault:

‘Power’s mechanisms are best conceived, not as instruments powerful agents use to prevent the powerless from acting freely, but rather as social boundaries that, together, define fields of action for all actors. Power defines fields of possibility. It facilitates and constrains social action. Its mechanisms consist in laws, rules, norms, customs, social identities, and standards that constrain and enable inter- and intra-subjective action’(Hayward 1998: 12).

In some cases these intersections exacerbate exclusion, and in others they may open possibilities for positive change. Regardless, the dynamics of power relations related to social positioning within the favela inform how people interact with the layers of state power and their ability to make claims on the state. Within all of this, violence pervades the experience and nature of power.
It is important to note that there are differences in these perceptions that are partly due to the social positioning of the group involved in the reflection. The elderly group was reluctant to discuss the topic of power and very hesitant about naming the actors they felt had power in the community. The children were much more open about talking about the militia. The children described the militia as both a positive and negative source of power; positive because the militia has brought about a reduction in the open shootings and sale of drugs, but negative because they charge residents money for security and access to services. This perspective represented a common view of many residents in Quitungo and Guaporé in relation to the militia.

The power of the state and other mediators within the favela intersects with and is overlaid on identity-based experience of power. For example, the desire for power also drives the involvement of young men and boys and increasingly young women and girls in the drug trafficking factions. In the views of some parents, 'children get involved with the trafficking because they want power.' As Zaluar describes the motivation for young men's involvement in the factions: 'exaggerated male pride and a thirst for unbridled power in a historical context of moral and institutional crisis, with inefficient restraint on the highly lucrative, expanding market for illicit drugs' (Zaluar 2004: 150). This is somewhat of an oversimplification, especially given the increasing role of girls in the factions, and the clear role that fear also plays in motivating young people as shown in Chapter 4.

Nonetheless, the relationship between masculinity and violence is complex, but Gilligan offers insight into how shame and honour, which constitute traditional masculinity, combined with a sense of powerlessness leads to violence:

‘...The primary meaning of...manliness...was the willingness to risk one’s own life in violent combat with other men. The result of that is that men can prove their manliness, their masculine sexual adequacy, when it has been called into question by an insult or a sign of disrespect, but means of violence; and their failure or unwillingness to engage in violence can throw their manliness into doubt, and expose them to shame’ (Gilligan 2001: 57).

In the participatory video, ‘The Life We Don’t Want’, a group of boys plays out this scenario, where an older boy tries to incite younger boys to violence using this logic. Yet the power that they achieve through their involvement is often fleeting:

‘The traffickers kill some John Doe, go to prison, don’t become anything, and all share the same fate’ (Enir 2007).
The participatory exercises exposed the way that state power to intervene in the favela is limited, and the most ‘powerful’ form of state intervention is through police and the use of violence. This means that state power is very fragmented in the way that it pervades the favela. In some circumstances, the state is able to directly intervene and make changes (as in when the police invade the favela), but in others, the state may be completely powerless to act (as demonstrated by recent abductions and torture of journalists by the militias) (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008). Given how people perceive the state’s power to act in a fragmented and often contradictory way, the question of what patterns of authority structure life in the favela becomes central to understanding how citizenship functions.

**Patterns of authority**

This section is concerned with patterns of authority predicated on the use or threat of violence, in contrast to other patterns of authority that may be based on non-violence. It examines how these rules are established, what areas of life they govern, and how these rules are maintained and enforced. There are other patterns and regimes of authority, including state-based and democratic forms, clientelistic/patronage patterns of authority, and church-based/religious patterns of authority. All of these have a role within the favela, but the focus here is on patterns of authority predicated on violence because they are more pervasive than the others and contribute to the fragmentation of citizenship. Underlying these patterns of authority are hierarchies that naturalise that control, to use Arendt’s conception of authority set out in Chapter 2 (Arendt 2000).

This chapter focuses on a more superficial level of patterns of authority in terms of the practical rules governing aspects of people's daily lives as opposed to the more deeply embedded concept of *habitus* (Bordieu 2000). However, it borrows from the idea of habitus, in as much as it approaches patterns of authority as a set of rules which are constantly being enforced and reinforced in different ways through practice. Another element of this analysis is drawn from the conceptualisation of feminist theories of citizenship (Lister 1997) which requires an attention to the ways that a daily and persistent context of violence informs the social positioning of individuals within the favelas.

**Public security, the use of public space, access to infrastructure, and mobilisation**

This section considers the rules that operate within the favelas with respect to public security and public order, the use of public space, access to infrastructure, and political and social
mobilisation. The area of public security and public order is most strongly and obviously
governed by rules of violent actors. The state has never taken an active role in maintaining
public order in the favelas, with the current exception of the occupations. The opposite has
been true in that many of the favelas were the target of military repression during the
dictatorship in Brazil as demonstrated by the community timeline in Chapter 4. Since the
1980s, public order was controlled by drug trafficking factions and the militia has inherited
these rules and but extended them in certain areas. This includes determining who can enter
and exit, at what times people can come and go, and by implication, a monopoly over the use
of violence:

‘When the factions were in control, and you came home after dark, you would come around
the corner into the community and a laser point would be on your chest from an automatic
rifle. It’s dark and you can’t see anyone, but they have you in their sights. If you aren’t a
resident, you would run. Residents know how the scheme works’ (Discussion of the community
researchers, field diary, 19 December 2006).

In terms of determining who can enter and when, after the militia took over, people were not
allowed to enter or exit the community wearing the colour of a particular faction (e.g. red for
Comando Vermelho and yellow for Amigos dos Amigos). Anyone with known associations with
the factions or a leadership role with the factions would be shot if caught entering the
community. Children who had been involved with the drug trafficking but were not killed in
the initial take over by the militia were banished from Quitungo. Some of these children took
part in the research, when meetings were held outside of the boundaries of Quitungo. The
militia gradually increased the physical control over the community by installing gates with
chains at the pedestrian entrances and a barrier and counter-weight at the street entrances to
stop cars.
In Guaporé this extended to building a cement wall around a portion of the community to limit the entrances and make them easier to control, a common tactic of the militias across the city (Britto 2007). During the day, there are not many restrictions on residents entering and exiting, but at night the militia posts guards at the entrances and does not allow people to enter without being questioned. The militia started charging all residents a ‘security fee’, in some cases per month and in some cases, on an individual basis as people enter or exit (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008): 133. In Guaporé, the charge was $R10 per month per resident (field diary, 1 December 2006). In Quitungo, the militia were...
having difficulty enforcing the charge, as many residents refused to pay.

Rules governing public security and order have a pervasive affect on people’s daily lives within the favelas. This control over public order extends to a monopoly on the use of violence. Under the factions, members of the faction would openly carry and use weapons, including semi-automatic and automatic guns. Rival factions or the police might invade at any time. The relationship with the police also reinforces the militia’s monopoly on violence because the police only enter under exceptional circumstances (such as an attempted invasion by drug trafficking factions precipitated by a breakdown in the arrangement of the militia). Under the militia, militia members carry weapons, but the police do not invade and the militia uses its control of the entrances and exits, as well as communication technology (walkie talkies and mobile phones) to guard against invasions by drug factions. This monopoly over violence extends into the sanctioning and punishment of certain interpersonal violence. There are some cases of the militia disciplining men who beat their wives. Both the militias and the factions punish some instances of domestic abuse and rape, although they are also complicit in cases of violence against women and other domestic violence (Suell 2006; Tiana 2006), 17 January 2007 session in Santa Teresa with children and young people reports that factions kill rapists and badly beat up thieves.) The militia use violence or the threat of violence as a means of control:

‘There is also house arrest if you cross them—they won’t let people leave their house for between one and three weeks as punishment’(Sandra, Tiana, field diary, 10 December 2006)

In part, this control is maintained through the suppression of open criticism of the militia and a strong rule against giving information to outsiders. The rule against giving information to outsiders (including the police, the media, representatives of the government and researchers) is another rule inherited from the drug trafficking factions. Informants or ‘X-9s’, as they are known, face extremely brutal punishments if they are exposed. One man suspected of informing on the militia in a neighbouring community was tortured and burned to death during the period of this research (Britto 2007). The militia have extended this rule to include the suppression of open criticism of the militia. Because of this, during the research process, people would almost always refer to the militia indirectly—they might call them ‘the parallel power’, or ‘the security force’ (the same term used by the middle class to refer to private security). People were very reluctant to voice any criticisms of the militia during the participatory research sessions or at other points during the research. Any criticisms that I heard were always in private and only from people who knew me relatively well (such as the community researchers or other community leaders that I had known for some time). As
Kalyvas and others argue, greater control often results in less violence (although not necessarily greater justice) and controlling information is central to maintaining control (Kalyvas, Shapiro et al. 2008).

The use of public space is an area where the drug trafficking factions had already established rules about the use of public space. The militia inherited these rules but enforced them in different ways. This includes controlling when public events, such as baile funk, barbeques, and festivals can be held; whether and where the open sale and use of drugs is permitted; and, setting the physical boundaries of the community. The factions and the militias use public events and festivals as an opportunity to build goodwill and legitimacy in the community. They sponsor these events and issue open invitations as an expression of their benevolence and generosity (see participatory timeline in Chapter 4 for examples). In addition, the militia also taxes other public events (like the baile funk) by levying fees from vendors and organisers as a source of revenue. Once the militia took control, they banned baile funks organised by groups linked to any of the previous factions. This also earned them further legitimacy in the eyes of community residents who felt the baile funks were negative. An important rule under the militias is the end of the open sale and use of drugs in the community. While under the factions, the sale and use of drugs would happen openly, especially at night, but increasingly during the day, and the militia ended this. Those caught using drugs during the period of the research were beaten. One boy was beaten into a coma because he had been caught using drugs and had also spoken publicly against the militia (Tiana 2006). The suppression of open drugs trade and use is a major factor in the legitimacy of the militia, as most community residents perceive this as an improvement (Interview with Dão 28 February 2007). As described above, the militia control the entries and exits to the community, but this extends to establishing the bounded territory of the community. They decide what the physical boundaries are for the community and enforce these. They do this by putting up barriers, but also by patrolling the area that they consider to be their territory. Where the factions physically marked their territory with tags, the militia has re-drawn these boundaries and painted over the tags. Some parts of the community which were considered to be included in the geographic boundaries under the control of the faction are deemed as ‘outside’ by the militia. In particular some of the poorer and more precarious areas have been demarcated as outside by the militia. In the place of the graffiti tags of the factions, the militia painted new slogans, such as: ‘Community residents united for peace’ and ‘We love peace’. 
The drug trafficking factions, in most cases, were less concerned with controlling infrastructure than the militias. The militias have used their control over public space and public security to rapidly expand control over infrastructure. This includes controlling access to gas, water, electricity, internet, cable, real estate transactions, and determining which businesses can operate within the community (see Chapter 6). The militia’s control over public services is a major source of income generation. Previously, access to some of these services (including water, electricity and gas) was via the residents’ association. In taking over the residents’ association, the militia achieved the ability to control who has access to some services and to charge a fee for that access. In the case of other services (gas, cable, internet, real estate transactions), the militia stops technicians when they enter the community to control who can have access (cable, internet), or directly pressures vendors (gas, real estate)(Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008). The militia also levies a fee on all the small businesses operating in the community (such as bakeries, grocery shops, newsagents, etc) and can force businesses out if they do not pay. The head of the militia claimed that they control these services because they want to ensure that all residents have access, but this is not how their control is perceived by some community residents. While the militias are not openly involved with the drug trade and the factions were, they have had to replace the money
generated through this from other sources, and the tax on security and access to services is the main way they do this.

The militia uses control of infrastructure to bolster their legitimacy and reward certain residents (as the example from chapter 6 on mediators shows). They also use this control as a means of disciplining residents, by cutting off or threatening to cut off access. But one of the difficulties with this is that their control over infrastructure is difficult to enforce. Some residents in Quitungo and Guaporé refused to pay the militia, and there has been a struggle between the militia members and the deposed president of the residents’ association over control of certain services. Control over infrastructure is a source of conflict that attracts media attention (Bottari and Ramalho 2006).

Political and social mobilisation is an area that was of little interest to the drug trafficking factions as their main motivation for controlling the community was to guarantee the appropriate environment for the drug trade. For the militia, controlling political and social mobilisation includes determining which political candidates can campaign inside the community, taking control of the residents’ association, trying to force other CBOs to operate from the residents’ association building (including literacy classes, sports training and children’s music classes), and putting forward militia members as political candidates (Interview with Sandra 8 March 2007; Wheeler, J 2007; Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008).

In terms of political mobilisation, the militia only allows certain candidates to campaign, and they must make promises to deliver certain benefits to militia. They do not allow rivals to hold campaign events or post campaign materials (Cesário 2007). The militia has taken control of residents’ association by holding a rigged election (with only one candidate on the ballot, chosen by the militia), and occupied a disused bread factory that was ceded to the residents’ association. The militia is trying to force other community based organisations to hold their meetings/events in this space, and charge them per month (Sueli 2006). This directly affects several community-based organisations, which were forced to shift their meetings outside of the favela boundaries in order to maintain neutrality. As described in greater detail in chapter 3 on methodology, the militia also tried to control the location of the meetings for the research for this thesis. As a result, many hold meetings and events outside of the community to avoid this control and the risk associated with the militia. Leaders of the militia have clear political ambition, and want to use authority of militia as a means to gain formal political
power. To this end, they are willing to suppress any internal or external competition by occupying as far as possible the space (physical and otherwise) for social action within the favela. In an interview with the head of the militia in Quitungo and Guaporé, I was told:

‘There are no legitimate community leaders here. They may tell you that they are community leaders, but don’t be fooled. We are the only ones who are doing anything to improve the situation here’ (Robson 2006).

Related to their control over political and social mobilisation, the militia also seeks to control interventions by the state and by external NGOs made within the favela. All interventions must be via the militia (by way of the residents’ association), and should involve militia members where possible or people of the militia’s choosing. For example, the militia wanted to determine who could act as a community researcher on the research project (see Chapter 6). However, the militia is not able to enforce these restrictions fully, as some community leaders have external contacts that protect them from the militia’s control in this aspect.

In an example described by one community leader of a federal government project for training young people to be guides for the Pan-American Games (PAN) held in Rio in June 2007:

‘The PAN project was offered to me by the Federal government. And these people [the militia] know who they can mess with and who to leave alone. I have a picture of myself with a minister in Brasilia—they leave me alone’ (Marilsa 2007).

How are patterns of authority established and how do violent actors maintain their authority?

As described above, the system of rules enforced by the militia builds on the basis of rules created and enforced by the factions, which in turn emerged from the nature of the relationship between the state and the favelas. What these rules have in common is that regardless of the specific area of control, they are predicated on the basis of violence and fear. Sanctions for violating the rules include expulsions, beating, torture, and death. Under the factions, residents were expelled for having family members in rival factions (Sueli 2006), or for interfering in faction business (Tiana 2006). But enforcement of the rules is not purely via violence or the threat of violence. The militia also uses the existing practices of clientelism (such as relationships with political parties), and their ability to mediate access to the government and infrastructure as a means for perpetuating their control. The militia deliberately occupies existing structures of internal governance (including residents’ association buildings) and marks this control through their physical presence (patrols, cameras, barriers, and wall murals).

The militia’s pattern of authority is bolstered through the suppression of competing authority
and sources of power (such as drug trafficking factions, and other non-violent CBOs). Essential to their authority is a degree of legitimacy for what they do, which they have achieved through enforcing ‘peace’. It is important to point out that while there is undoubtedly a clear pattern of authority perpetuated by the militia and drug trafficking factions within the favelas, it is never wholly pervasive because this pattern of authority also overlays the existing power relations within the community. There are some slippages in their control and also nearly constant subversions, where people test the boundaries of their authority, as shown in chapter 4.

As outlined earlier, the ambitions of the militias extends beyond the domination of community organisations within the favela. Increasingly, leaders of the militias are looking for channels to extend their control into formal politics:

‘The militias...have powerful connections and are frequently linked not only to the police force, but also to the politicians who offer a safe house in exchange for the guarantee of the votes or money of the residents in the community controlled by the militia. This is demonstrated through the cases of the municipal councillor Jerônimo Guimarães Filho, arrested in December for the formation of a militia, and the state representative and ex-chief of the Rio police, Álvaro Lins, accused of helping to form armed groups’. http://www.estadao.com.br/nacional/not_nac188821,0.htm sexta-feira, 13 de junho de 2008, 06:25

As both the CPI and my own interviews show, the militia in Quitungo has similar political aspirations, with the leader of the militia planning to run for office. According to other community leaders, the militia leaders will try to guarantee their political success through preventing campaigning by other candidates and bribing or extorting residents to vote for them (Tiana 2006; Dao 2007; Marilsa 2007; Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008).

The evolution of the interference of militias in mobilisation is described by Pedro Paulo Pinha, a police officer from the 32nd Precinct, called upon to testify at a Parliamentary Inquiry on the militias:

*In Level 1, they are paramilitary death squads, created in the mould of the militia in Rio das Pedras, twenty years ago, when families from northeastern Brazil were recruited to work on building projects in Barra da Tijuca and the militias were established in the region. In the absence of the state, the residents themselves organised to stop the entrance of drug traffickers, robbers and other criminals, and formed a Residents’ Association. In Level 2, the community leaders begin to make a living off of the Residents’ Association, and they begin to charge fees to anyone who wants to enter the community. In this level, the fees are for registration in the area, and not for the sale or purchase of real estate. Still within Level 2, the Residents’ Association begins to support candidates to elected positions as a means to have a
representative within the state to help reply to their demands. In Level 3, the community leaders see the possibility of new income and begin to charge for services including the distribution of gas, pirated cable television, and irregular transportation. In this level, the paramilitary groups no longer need an independent Residents’ Association and control it directly. From this point, instead of giving support to particular politicians, they begin to contest elections themselves’ (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008: 36).

The extent to which the militia intervenes in social and political mobilisation has implications for the legitimacy of political power which will be analysed in greater depth below.

**Violent clientelism as a pattern of authority**

Violence has a role in both setting and shifting sets of rules and patterns of authority (as illustrated in the examples of the favelas and the changes in regime between different drug trafficking factions and the militia). Violence plays a particular role in the creation and the maintaining of patterns of authority:

‘Interactions are limited, controlled or prohibited in violent contexts. Violence is about homogeneity. Violence puts fixed boundaries on spaces, boundaries which may or may not be visible but which nevertheless people recognise as life risking frontiers should they transgress them...Space as a ‘public’ open encounter is reduced and ‘private’ space enlarges its role in everyday life. In addition, time also takes on distinct dimensions; curfews and increased violence in the hours of darkness, all impact on when people feel they can use space and restrict their movements. Many accept the ‘normality’ of violence....Violence generates emotional responses of insecurity, fear terror, which people internalise and carry into spaces’ (Pearce 2007: 26-27).

Another characteristic of these patterns of authority is that they function within a specific geographic space and part of the process of how they are constituted is related to the linking of rules and authority to spatial boundaries. As a community leader expressed:

‘Here we have the law of the community and the system of the community—and these may change. But they are not the laws of Brazil’ (Rosangela 2007).

These patterns of authority therefore become legible to residents within the spatial boundary where they function and are largely invisible to those outside this space. Patterns of authority also have a dimension of historicity. The dominant pattern of authority within the favela originates from the relationship that existed between the favelas and the state, from the time the favelas were first settled. This relationship, as discussed in Introduction, can best be described as malign neglect. It set the parameters for the emergence of drug trafficking factions who exploited certain features of the interaction between the state and the favela to develop patterns of authority based on violence that protect their drug operations from vigilance by the state. The militias inherited this pattern of authority and evolved it for their own purposes. The emergence of these patterns of authority must also be contextualised in
the history of relationships between men, women, and children in Brazilian society and the patterns of social domination by social class and race.

**Citizenship and patterns of authority**

How do these patterns of authority affect the citizen-state relationship? Guillermo O’Donnell defines informal institutions as ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (O’Donnell 2004: 2). The patterns of authority described here can be considered in this category. He argues that people, in practice, shift between informal and formal rules enforced by the same actors. In this case, residents in the favela make this shift regularly between informal and formal institutions and between informal and formal rules enforced by the same actor (the police are a prime example). However, O’Donnell goes on to argue that it is crucial to evaluate the relationships between informal and formal institutions. He categorises this relationship in two ways. *Complementary accommodating* relationships involve informal institutions facilitating formal ones. *Competing substitutive* relationship involve informal institutions undermining the formal (ibid). The patterns of authority that emerge in this analysis fall into the second category. They compete with and substitute for formal institutions, undermining them in the process.

An implication of the nature of the authority wielded by the militia is that competing forms of authority are not possible, as would be in a democratic arena. The militia cannot allow what it perceives as a competing form of authority to emerge. In areas or aspects of people’s lives where the role of the militia competes with the role of the residents’ association, the militia takes over the residents’ association. For example, the militia would not allow an independent residents’ association to determine which areas of the community would receive a water-upgrading project. It wanted to control this project because deciding which areas received the benefits of the project was a means for establishing greater legitimacy. The militia attempts to build its legitimacy through taking over the role of the residents’ association when it perceives that doing so can enhance its position in the community. The militia does not allow others in the community ‘to bring in projects’. This would mean, for example, that if another community leader was able to get a politician or government department to agree to implement a programme in the community, the militia would not accept this unless they controlled how the project was implemented and who was able to participate. This also became an issue for the research project itself, as the process of negotiation over the control of the research described in Chapter 3 showed. The militia attempted to monopolise the
entry-points into and out of the community, both physically and also in terms of acting as a
gatekeeper for all external interventions.

Under the factions, there was a lack of dialogue between the favelas and the state that the
factions were able to exploit. They reinforced this existing divide to protect their trafficking
operations. The militia takes over this same relationship as mediator between the state and
the community and inherits the same rules, but exploits them in a different way. The militia is
able to exploit the long-standing social exclusion that marks the relationship between the
favelas and the state. This is one reason why people do not report extortion to the state, but
compromise and make deals with the militia in exchange for a degree of increased security.
The relative silence vis-à-vis the state continues. The community response to the government-
sponsored hotline on the militias illustrates this point. Between June and October 2008, only
eleven calls were made from Quitungo to the hotline to report on the actions of the militia
(Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008: 134). There were no calls at all from
Guaporé, although the militia there took control in 2007 (see community timeline in Chapter
4). In addition, the information reported to the hotline, as outlined in the CPI, is missing
substantial details that emerged throughout the research, such as the number of people killed
by the militia (see participatory timeline in Chapter 4).

This is what fundamentally undermines participation: the deeply ingrained rules about how
the state and citizens relate; and, the long-standing gaps, silence and absence on the part of
the state. The formal contestation over political power is papered over in a thin veneer, where
the real struggle for power is over who sets the rules internally within the favela.

Accountability also functions in a different way from a democratic regime. The militia is not
held accountable for violence it commits, but for maintaining public order and security.
Residents can refuse to pay and refuse to give formal democratic control through elections to
the militia, they can refuse to accept the rules (risking violent reprisals) and they can break the
code of silence by talking to outsiders. None of these mechanisms for accountability limit the
militia’s use of violence. These patterns of authority are not democratic, in the sense that
there is very little potential to challenge them.41

41 Mark Warren argues that the hallmark of a democratic form of authority is the potential for challenge
Political Science Review 90(1): 46-60.
There are several implications of these patterns of authority for citizenship. First, it is clear that the informal institutions (or sets of rules) perpetuated by the militia through the use or threat of violence undermine formal democratic institutions, rather than enable them. This means that state authority is eroded by the persistence of competing patterns of authority, contributing to a downward spiral in the legitimacy of political authority, discussed in greater detail in the next section. Second, these patterns of authority also severely deteriorate public space and as a result contribute to what Caldeira describes as and ‘implosion of public life, affecting movements, habits, gestures, use of public transport, parks, common space and streets’ (Caldeira 2000: 220). These two factors together increase the difficulty of establishing more democratic and participatory patterns of authority.

**Constructing legitimacy in contexts of violence**

The previous sections describe the rules that comprise a pattern of authority within the favelas, and how these rules are maintained and enforced, and the perceptions about powerful actors within the community. A deeper question relating to this is how these rules and the dominant actors in this context gain legitimacy for their authority. This section considers the legitimacy of the main actors in the favela, including the police (as the main state actor in the favelas), the militia and drug-trafficking factions, and non-violent social action within the communities.

**The shifting legitimacy of the armed actors: militia, drug-trafficking factions, and the police**

Degrees of legitimacy are not fixed, but fluctuate according to events and the actions of the actors themselves. In fact, informal and formal legitimacy can be blended together, as groups appeal to formal means of legitimacy (including discourses of citizenship and rights), even while they may suffer from a lack of legitimacy in those same ways. For example, there is a blending together of informal and formal sources of legitimacy through the use of ‘rights talk’, which is employed both by the police and by the factions (Holston 2008), as well as by the militias. Police use the language of rights to claim legitimacy for their use of violence. From the Manifesto of the Association of Police Chiefs:

‘The situation today is one of total anxiety for you and total tranquillity for those who kill, rob and rape. Your family is destroyed and your patrimony, acquired with such sacrifice, is calmly being reduced. Why does this happen? You know the answer...How many crimes have occurred in your neighbourhood and how many criminals were found responsible for them? You also know this answer. They, the bandits, are protected by so-called human rights, something that the government considers that you, an honest and hardworking citizen do not deserve’(Holston 2008: 305).
At the same time, drug trafficking factions also appeal to normative ideas about citizenship and rights (although with very different meanings for rights and citizenship than that implied by the police). However, like the police, they use ‘rights talk’ in the interests of establishing legitimacy for the use of violence, as this extract from the Comando Vermelho’s declaration to the city of Rio de Janeiro in February 2003:

‘So now is the time to react firmly and with determination and to show these repulsive and oppressive politicians that we deserve to be treated with respect, dignity, and equality, because if this doesn’t come to pass, we will no longer stop causing chaos in this city, because it is absurd that all this keeps happening and always remains unpunished. The judiciary also continues doing whatever it wants with its power...because it is violating with a total abuse of power all the established and legal laws and even the Lawyers are targets of hypocrisy and abuse, and they can do nothing, so if someone has to put a stop to this violence that someone will have to be us because the people don’t have how to fight for their rights....because does there exist a violence greater than robbing the public’s money and killing people with bad food, without a decent minimum salary, without hospitals, without work [?]...So ENOUGH, we only want our rights...’ (Holston 2008: 308).

And in a similar way, the militia also appeals to conceptions of citizenship and rights to establish legitimacy for its actions:

‘Most of the people who claim to be leaders only bring politicians here as part of an assistentialist scheme, to distribute benefits to their friends and families, and not for people who really need it. But they are betraying the community, they don’t have legitimacy and no one will open their doors for them. We are going to cut out this problem by the roots. I like doing work for the community and we will only give benefits to people who need them—we will give them their rights’ (Robson 2006).

This example shows the blurring of boundaries between formal and informal, and between coercion and domination in order to establish legitimacy. In particular it shows how each of the armed actors appeals to discourses of citizenship and rights to legitimate their actions.

The next section considers the social construction of legitimacy in relation to each of the key actors.

**Legitimacy of the militia and the factions**

Within Quitungo, views about the militia are complex, leading to long discussions during the participatory sessions on power. A large portion of residents welcomes the presence of the militia because they suppressed the open sale of drugs and ended the uncertainty that the recent and frequent wars between the factions brought. This view is echoed by residents in many other favelas controlled by militias (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008). When the leader of the Guaporé militia was killed invading another favela on 6 February 2007, shops and commerce within the favela were closed for the day and buildings...
were hung with black cloth (Extra 6 February, 2007). So the militia has greater legitimacy in the eyes of many residents than the police, which repeatedly fuelled the wars and the drug trade, invaded the community killing people, and generally abused their power with few repercussions. However the militia operate within the regime of authority already established through the factions—they use violence to maintain control and they acted quickly to take control of any organisations or physical spaces that represented power within the community.

The legitimacy of some militias is increasing within favelas due to the way that the militias use violence strategically to repress the drug trade. Other uses of violence can detract from their legitimacy. Their attempted monopoly over existing patronage systems, government benefits and other community-based organisations is a tactic employed to bolster both their legitimacy and their control.

‘Fear is the source of the informal legitimacy of the militias. Insecurity is instrumentalised such that residents believe and accept in ‘bringers of justice’, ‘saviours’ and ‘liberators’ who offer them security. In this sense, illegal commerce and informal security expand and lead, in practice, to the informal privatisation of security, in the face of a state which has abstained, in recent years, from offering any alternative of public security for the population’ (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008: 39).

Militia leaders employ a discourse of providing social benefits and of non-violence as a mean of building legitimacy more broadly, but in practice their actual legitimacy is perceived in relation to public security. In the words of the leader of the militia in Quitungo:

‘We are the legitimate community leaders here—we are putting the residents’ association to rights, we are organising things because before there was a connection between the association and the traffickers’ (Robson 2006).

Despite these claims, throughout the research it became clear that the militia has more legitimacy in relation to public security and order and less in terms of intervening in political/social terms.

As they deliver real benefits to the communities, their legitimacy grows (such as suppressing open drug trade and violence), especially as residents see these improvements in relation to other favelas where warring factions still control the communities. This leads to further entrenchment of their social legitimacy in the favela. In part, this legitimacy is bolstered by their shadow connections to the state, via both the police and particular politicians. The militia is known to use police equipment and operate with the tacit approval of the police (Bottari and Ramalho 2006; Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008).
number of politicians openly involved with the militias is growing, as shown in the introduction (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008). In a context where the state has very little social legitimacy, and yet residents believe the state should be responsible for guaranteeing rights, the connections of the militia to the state are not only plausible, but desirable in the eyes of residents (Dão 2007; Marilisa 2007):

‘Dão talked to me today about the ‘galacticos’. He said that they decided to come in and get rid of the criminals from outside the community. We talked some about Walter, who used to be in control of the trafficking in the community (I interviewed him in 2002) and how he had everything going for him (education, good family, etc). He was killed…and the new leaders of the faction were not from the community. He said that from that moment on things got really bad and there is a sense of relief that the galacticos have come in and ‘cleaned things up’. He said massacres were commonplace and happened on a regular basis before. He said it was difficult for him and Deco to remember all the people who they know who had died and all the people that have been lost. He said that the galacticos didn’t kill residents—only criminals (somehow this is better—there must be a lot of resentment towards them). He said that they had asked about the project and wanted to see if they could get money out of it but that they would let it carry on since it was meant to help the community. I thought that he had a very good opinion of them (Tiana says we must keep him in the nucleo because he has close connections with the militia and will keep us from having any problems with them.) But then he said: their business is money. They’re in it for the money…but in the mean time if things are a bit better for the community, then who’s going to complain. As Sandra said earlier—’I can let my 12 year old out by himself at night and I know that he can come home in the dark without having to worry….’ There has been a definite improvement in the general level of security. Also the use of drugs has been banned by the galacticos so no more smoking marijuana in the streets, or lining up to buy drugs at night’ (field diary, 12 November 2006).

Nonetheless it is important to note that while the militia do have certain legitimacy in the favelas, the use of violence is only perceived as legitimate under certain circumstances. Their legitimacy is weakened by practice of extorting money using violence, or when they are not perceived as ‘respecting the community’. This is only possible in the context of an absent state, or a state which is only present through limited public services and public order (which it is unable to maintain). Warren argues that rules of authority only maintain their legitimacy in as far as they produce normative value:

‘We hold rules as authoritative (or lacking in authority) because of the normatively significant work they do. If the rules and procedures produce normatively questionable outcomes, then they tend to lose their authority, and they become subject to public debate and political challenge’ (Warren 1996: 55).

This point is demonstrated by the attitude of many of the non-violent community leaders I interviewed, who grant a certain degree of legitimacy to the militia, as long as they deliver benefits in improved security:

‘It would be better if the security [militia] stayed on their side (ficava na parte deles) and community leaders did the part of social projects. We need to bring together the different community leaders from across Quitungo and Guaporé. Some people want money and some
people want well-being for the community, but there is potential power in the leaders. The state should come in and work with the militias—paying them a salary and formalising their work. If they don’t accept it, then we will know that they are no different from the factions’ (Marilsa 2007).

The drug trafficking factions use force to take control of the community, and force and fear to maintain their control—as well as certain populist tactics in some cases (free barbeques, street parties, paying for clinics, football uniforms for kids, etc). Because they monopolise authority within the community, any social action or government intervention is forced to negotiate with them. The end result is that they mediate the relationship between external government initiatives and community-based mobilisations:

‘The political place occupied by traffickers is not, then, clear cut. They may be praised for the respect they have for neighbours or for the many social activities they patronise inside the shanty towns. Contrariwise, they may be loathed because of the way they seduce or order girls to have sexual relations with them as well as for the continuous threat that their guns represent in any case of conflict or suspicion of betrayal involving traffickers, unarmed inhabitants and policemen. Still, youngsters say that the criminal crews provide more security for their members, since they assure juridical assistance that increases the chance of not being sentenced the higher the youngster is in the gang hierarchy. Since money can buy defence, and guns offer the protection that emerges from fear...’ (Zaluar 2004: 151).

Drug trafficking factions have a certain degree of legitimacy in some favelas because those with connection to the community are often perceived as more legitimate than the police or the state and because of the modest benefits they offer to the communities they control. On the other hand, legitimacy of drug trafficking factions with no history in the community is decreasing because of increasingly brutal tactics employed. Violence generated by drug trafficking factions acts to decrease their legitimacy, as the many discussions on citizenship and violence summarised in chapter 4 show.

Legitimacy of the police

Although the police have the formal legitimacy of the Brazilian state, they have little to no legitimacy within the favelas. This is because the police are implicated in corruption with drug trafficking factions, militias and gambling syndicates. They are deeply embedded in existing clientelistic structures that pervade the wider society, including the state: ‘...security officers and incumbents are embedded in unlawful and patrimonialistic behaviour; that is, both public authorities and police officers use their positions and authority to achieve private benefits, creating a complex network of patronage’(Fuentes 2009: 84). Many policemen and women are themselves from favelas or other working-class neighbourhoods, and receive very low pay and inadequate training. Corruption is commonplace, within the military police and within the
justice system as a whole (Hinton 2005; Fuentes 2009). Leaders of different factions have
taken over parts of the prison system and run their drug operations by mobile phone from
within the prison walls. There is also a long history of violent and repressive tactics used
within favelas (use of caveirão, torture, executions). This relates to the role of the police during
the military dictatorships of the last century, during which the police ‘received special training
in the application of torture and other coercive methods to control political dissenters and
suspected subversives; [and] heavily armed shock squads were formed to serve as a vanguard
of political repression’(Hinton 2005: 81). The positioning of the police in relationship to the
favelas has a historical context: ‘The police, with few exceptions, have not made the transition
from protecting the state, as was their role in the time of dictatorship, to protecting its
citizenry, and especially its low-income citizenry, who continue to be treated as the enemy, as
was the left during the military regime’(Leeds 2007). These actions are bolstered by public
discourse about need for security and are used widely in the media to justify acts of police
brutality, as described in the introduction. But beyond this, the culture of impunity and
corruption that affects the Brazilian state as a whole also impedes any lasting improvements in
terms of more democratic and accountable policing:

‘Since the police are the visible face of law enforcement, there is a natural tendency to
single them out for corruption, brutality or ineffectiveness...But if elected officials fail to
police themselves by applying checks and balances intrinsic to democratic governance,
the police institution can hardly be expected to become a beacon of honesty, service or
legalism. In an environment of generalised anomie, the very legitimacy of the
democratic state is threatened’(Hinton 2005: 95).

The state has a central role in the violence that occurs in Rio de Janeiro, especially the military
police, and police-sanctioned death squads. The polícia militar, or military police, were the
main arm of repression during the military dictatorship. The military police and the criminal
justice system have not been fully reformed since the end of the dictatorship, and there is
some evidence that authoritarian legacies from military dictatorships seriously impede the
form of the police and justice system (see Pereira 2001). The repressive tactics of the police
are justified in public discourse as a necessary response to the violence of traficantes (Burgos
2005). Torture is considered a legitimate use of police authority by 13% of population in Rio de
Janeiro (Brinceño-León and Zubillaga 2002).

Levels of police violence are very high in Rio de Janeiro. According to Amnesty International,
the police in Rio de Janeiro killed 9,889 people between 1999 and 2004 in ‘acts of resistance
followed by death’(Amnesty International 2005). Police literally invade communities, usually
with no warning and forcibly search houses and hunt for traficantes. The levels of distrust and
fear of the military police within favelas is extreme. This lack of trust in the police is reflected in the low numbers of reports of crimes to the police. In research conducted by the Núcleo de Pesquisa em Violência at the Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, between 70 to 80% of crimes committed in the city of Rio de Janeiro between 2005 and 2006 were not reported to the police. Over one-third of respondents said they did not report a crime because they did not believe it would achieve anything (Weber, Braga et al. 2007). Within the favelas, the use of the caveirão contributes to the perception that the police use force illegitimately. In February 2007, residents of a favela neighbouring Quitungo occupied five city buses and built a road-block to prevent the caveirão from entering their favela. They staged a protest with placards attacking the military police and state governor, Sérgio Cabral and calling for justice (2007).

Some important initiatives to change the relationship between police and the community, such as an initiative of community policing in Rio de Janeiro documented by Arias (Arias 2007), a similar community policing scheme support by the Ford Foundation in Belo Horizonte (Reardon 2007), women’s police stations in São Paulo and other major cities (Santos 2005), and successful work on violence prevention in Vittoria (Ribeiro 2005). Currently, in Rio, there is also the experiment with favela-occupation through a ‘community police force’. The overall effects of these occupations is not yet clear.

State-sponsored violence is a major factor contributing to cycles of violence in Rio de Janeiro because residents of favelas cannot trust the police or the traficantes, who both use violence to maintain their authority. There is no legitimate authority at the local level to enforce the basic rule of law and ensure security. This leads to one contradiction, among many, in this context: there is a strong emphasis in Brazil on social rights (such as access to education and health care), but basic civil rights are non-existent in the daily life of people in favelas, or regulated violated (see Caldeira 2000).

**Legitimacy of non-violent citizen action and community leaders**

While the social legitimacy of the armed actors within the favela varies, the same is true of the primary non-violent actors. In certain cases, the context of violence makes it increasingly difficult for non-violent actors to establish legitimacy. In the case of non-violent community-based organisations and community leaders, the contextual legitimacy of social action increased by their connection to patronage networks and as a means of accessing services. There is also a certain degree of trust in the ability of CBOs to provide social benefits.
However, only the residents’ association is formally recognised by state and it is very difficult and costly for other CBOs to gain formal recognition by the state (see Chapter 6).

At the same time, as shown in Chapter 4 it is very difficult for non-aligned community leaders to gain legitimacy and establish the boundaries of their neutrality, limiting the space for social action. There is a lot of competition between community leaders who do not align themselves with the violent groups in control, within the limited space for manoeuvring that is available. This means that they often undermine one another, and it has not been easy for them to work together in a coordinated way. On the rare occasions that this had happened, there have been positive results, but these have been almost immediately undermined by yet another shift in the dominant power in the community.

**Legitimacy of other state actors**

Other aspects to the state besides the police (such as social programmes) have more legitimacy within the favelas, but they have little power, as the previous section shows. There is no possibility for the state to have more legitimate power within the communities until the fundamental issue of public security and accountability of the police is addressed. At the moment, the state is failing on both accounts. From the perspective of the community the caveirão is emblematic of the government’s stance towards them, and for the middle classes, the state has not gone far enough to control criminality.

The paucity of legitimate state authority within the communities, and levels of fear that this lack engenders, leads to an increase in the degree of mediation between citizens living in these circumstances and the government. Without formal legitimacy for the actors involved, it is clientelistic and paternalistic relationships between people living in the community and the state that prevail, giving way to the system of mediators described in chapter 6. Clientelistic practices are wide spread within the political terrain, and are replicated at many levels in other forms of interactions. As the comparative case from Santa Teresa shows, it requires organised and persistent social mobilisation within the community to turn back and limit the predatory incursions of political candidates at election time—with paternalistic and corrupt strategies and empty promises.

Each of the key actors in the favela achieves varying degrees of social legitimacy from the perspective of favela residents. In terms of how this legitimacy is perpetuated, it is the interrelationship between these actors that actually contributes to perpetuating the situation.
Arthur Stinchcombe argues that it is the perception of legitimacy by the relevant power holders in a given situation that determine the stability of legitimacy. ‘By analysing...who has to believe in legitimacy of a power for it to be stable, we will see that the person over whom power is exercised is not usually as important as other power holders’ (Stinchcombe 1968: 150)(emphasis in original). In the case of the favelas, it is actually the complicity of the state in the relationship between the militias, trafficking factions, and police that prop up the legitimacy of the armed actors. The lack of legitimacy of state authority, reinforced by violent action by the police, and the tacit acknowledgement of the control of militias and trafficking factions (described in greater detail in chapter 6), means that the state itself is complicit in lending legitimacy to the armed actors controlling the favelas. As Stinchcombe elaborates:

‘...an exercise of liberty or of authority would not be possible against people who object unless certain other strategic centres of power recognise and right as legitimate. A legitimate right or authority is backed by a nesting of reserve sources of power set up in a fashion that power can always overcome opposition’(Stinchcombe 1968: 160)(emphasis in original).

While the state may not officially or formally acknowledge the authority of the militias or the traffickers, in practice it does not intervene in the patterns of authority established by them within the favela. In effect, this results in a situation where the armed actors can in fact overcome opposition from within the favela. Further, the state negotiates with these actors on a regular basis, creating a situation where armed actors mediate the relationship between citizens in the favela and the state (see Chapter 6). This arrangement contributes to the legitimacy of these actors while at the same time further eroding the basis for legitimate political authority. It is this dynamic that contributes to the perverse politics, described in Chapters 2 and 7, where interventions made by the state to promote democracy and citizenship, actually reinforce the position of the armed actors. The table below summarises the views on legitimacy examined above:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Formal (legal)</th>
<th>Informal (socially-determined)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Little or no legitimacy within</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>favelas because of use of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>violence, corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived as legitimate by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>None, but links to state</td>
<td>Increasing legitimacy within some favelas due to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Strategic use of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Connections with police/state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the perspective of community residents, there are two forms of legitimate authority. The first is legal, externally valid, formal, and state-derived. The second is socially-derived and contextual, and constituted within the boundaries of the community. Socially constructed legitimacy refers to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Authority</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community-based organisations (non-violent)</td>
<td>Only residents’ association formally recognised by state, very difficult/costly for other CBOs to gain formal recognition by state</td>
<td>Legitimacy of social action increased by: • Connection to patronage and as a means of accessing services • Certain degree of trust in the ability of CBOs to provide social benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State programmes and interventions (not including the police)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Varying degrees of legitimacy, based on degree of clientelism involved; involvement of armed actors also decreases legitimacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Attempted monopoly over existing patronage systems, government benefits and other community-based organisations
- Perceived as doing positive things for the community
- Legitimacy in some favelas increasing because those with connection to the community are often perceived as more legitimate than the police or the state) because of the modest benefits they offer
- Legitimacy of drug trafficking factions with no history in the community is decreasing because of increasingly brutal tactics
- Violence generated by drug trafficking factions decreases legitimacy
‘In relations of authority, the meaning of authority (its ability to evoke willing obedience, its legitimacy, and so forth) depends on agents authorizing others and judging that the authorization is warranted...Authority depends on the judgement of subjects, specifically, the judgements embedded in deeply held beliefs and commitments. It is these judgements that distinguish authoritative relationships from coercion, domination, manipulation, or mere acquiescence’ (Warren 1996: 55).

What emerges in the context of the favela is a mixture of all of these, making it very difficult to distinguish legitimate authority from authoritative relationships of coercion and domination. If the militia and the trafficking factions had no social legitimacy whatsoever, then the patterns of authority that they perpetuate would unravel completely. The fact that they continue to have effect is evidence of how patterns of authority can be both coercive and have a certain degree of legitimacy.

**Power, patterns of authority and legitimacy in the participatory research process**

The research process again served as a mirror for reflecting the wider issues around power, patterns of authority and legitimacy. As discussed in Chapter 3, participatory processes can expose dimensions of the existing power structure within the context where the research is conducted (Guijt and Shah 1998; Lee and Stanko 2003; Fonow and Cook 2005). While the aim of participatory research is to challenge existing categories of ‘uppers and lowers’ in Chamber’s terms, the research process can also inadvertently reinforce exclusions (Chambers 1995; Gaventa and Cornwall 2008). Power can and does distort the participatory research process (Chambers 1995), leading to a debate about how participation perpetuates its own form of tyranny (Cooke and Kothari 2003; Hickey and Mohan 2004). As Gaventa and Cornwall argue:

‘The dangers of using participatory processes in ways that gloss over differences amongst those who participate, or to mirror dominant knowledge in the name of challenging it, are not without consequence. To the extent that participatory processes can be seen to have taken place, and that the relatively powerless have had the opportunity to voice their grievances and priorities in what is portrayed as an otherwise open system, then the danger will be that the existing power relations may simply be reinforced, without leading to substantive change in policies or structure which perpetuate the problems being addressed’ (Gaventa and Cornwall 2008: 181).

In the case of Quitungo and Guaporé, the research process exposed some important features of the power structure at the local level, in terms of the politics of authority and control and the ways that power maps onto geography and physical space. This power structure has a direct impact on the research itself, because the differences of power inform participation within the research process as well as bounding the possibilities for action as a result of the
First, there were geographical divisions of power both within and between the favelas. Although Quitungo and Guaporé were built at the same time, there have been ongoing rivalries between the two housing estates. These relate partly to how people from Catacumba were divided and re-settled. For example, one community researcher told me that those with higher socio-economic status were re-settled into Guaporé, and for this reason Guaporé has had more effective organisation and cohesion at the local level (Deco 2006). It is certainly the case that the community-based organisations in Guaporé are stronger and have maintained greater legitimacy than those in Quitungo, although neither are particularly strong, especially in comparison to other favelas or housing estates in Rio de Janeiro, such as those in Morro dos Prazeres. What is of interest is the rationale that the residents themselves ascribe to this difference. Adding to the initial division of people from Catacumba into the two estates, since the 1990s they have been controlled by different and competing factions of the drug trafficking mafias. While many residents consider the boundaries of their community to include both estates, control by rival gangs meant that movement between the two has been very limited over various periods. As a result, during the research project, we alternated the participatory discussion groups between sites in Quitungo and Guaporé. There were tensions between residents of the different estates (field diary, 30 January 2007). During one meeting of children and young people, there was very nearly a physical fight between groups from the different estates. Among the community researchers, who were also drawn from both estates, there were also tensions over who had to cross over from one to the other more often, and how much footage of each community was shot for the participatory video.

In addition to tensions between the two housing estates, there was another set of power dynamics involving the favelas spanning the hills between the estates. One of the favelas pre-dates the housing estates, while the other two are more recent and are largely made up of ex-Catacumba residents who did not like the housing estates and opted to move into a favela rather than stay in their government-assigned flat. As a group, residents from the favelas expressed a sense of exclusion in relation to the housing estates, mirroring the ‘asfalto’/‘morro’ (pavement/favela) division used the in rest of the city. While residents of the housing estates consider themselves to live in the ‘community’, meaning marginalised and excluded communities, for residents of the favela, those living in the housing estates display a superiority they associate with middle-class neighbourhoods. This led to tensions when a community leader from Quitungo ran for president of the resident’s association of the nearest favela. In his view, the favela and Quitungo are part of the same community. But residents in the favela expressed their sense of exclusion from Quitungo (Tiana 2006). The exact
boundaries of what constitutes the ‘community’ varied according to the group involved and the location the meetings were held in. Through a participatory mapping exercise with different groups, and a participatory video transect walk, I explored these differences through the research process.

The differences between the favelas and housing estates have also been exacerbated by the arrival of the militia, which controls only the housing estate areas, forcing many children who had been involved in the drug trafficking into hiding in the connected favelas. So while some residents and community leaders do not distinguish between favela and housing estate, the militia have been reinforcing this boundary—physically through chains and gates, and also in practice through refusing to allow children known to have been involved in the drug trafficking to appear publicly in the housing estate streets. In terms of the research project, these dynamics were important because they influenced the choice of the physical location for meetings (to include or not favelas). Particularly with children, the choice of location had a significant impact on who attended meetings. One of the elements that the community researchers themselves felt was an important outcome of the research was to have brought together leaders and residents from the different areas of the community, despite the tensions and difficulties that emerged. At the close of the participatory video that the community researchers made, they name this as an important achievement that they are determined to maintain.

The difficulty in shifting existing patterns of authority was demonstrated through the research process itself. I designed the research process to try and subvert the normal patterns of authority in research. However, this proved very difficult because people’s experience with patterns of authority was primarily clientelistic or coercive. In the words of one of the community researchers:

‘Those men who get something [a government project] and distribute it to people in the community are not just ruining that project, but they are creating a habit of assistentialism that is very difficult to change. This is why people don’t know how to react to a participatory research project. They think they should be getting something, or they think it is just another person who is coming just to make empty promises. What is important is to get people to recognise what they themselves can do, what they themselves can mobilise’ (Alcir, field diary, 10 January 2007).

As a result, the community researchers often become uneasy with the responsibility that the research process gave them. Frequently, the community researchers expected me to act more as a patron. I needed to constantly reinforce the parameters of a more democratic pattern of authority. This was only ever partially successful throughout the research process,
demonstrating both the difficulty in remaking patterns of authority, but also how they can become easily hybridized.

The research process itself also demonstrated how legitimacy is socially constructed. Without legitimacy, it is impossible to do participatory research, since it requires that participants trust the researchers and the process enough to actually participate. Legitimacy in the research process was based on a transparent relationship with the community researchers, who were each capable of mobilising certain elements within the community. The community researchers needed to see the research as legitimate in order to be able to mobilise others to be involved. At the core of participatory research is a transfer of power from the external researcher to the co-researchers in order to achieve legitimacy in the process (Grant, Nelson et al. 2008). The orientation towards generating knowledge as a basis for action is also a part of the legitimacy built through participatory research (Gaventa and Cornwall 2008). There were various obstacles to maintaining legitimacy. These included the need to maintain neutrality in the research from the armed actors controlling the favela (see Chapter 3). As discussed above, the research process involved engendering a more democratic arrangement of power, and this was only possible in as far as the research was also independent from the armed actors (who would have imposed their own pattern of authority).

**Conclusion**

Essentially, this chapter demonstrates the dilemma of legitimate political authority in a context of violence. There are some important implications for citizenship that emerge from this analysis. First, this chapter demonstrates the fractured nature of state power and how its complicity in violence produces a paucity of political legitimacy within the favela. Second, it shows how patterns of authority, predicated on violence, order people’s daily lives in a way that often further restricts the ability of the state to act. Finally, it shows how socially-constructed legitimacy in this context favours the actors (violent or non-violent, formal or informal) who are perceived to deliver concrete benefits.

However, the lack of legitimate formal political authority is very problematic for citizenship because it is not clear which institutions are accountable for delivering rights. As a result, citizens turn to the capable (which are the armed actors), rather than the responsible (the state). This leads to the rise of armed actors as mediators between citizens and the states, which is addressed in detail in the next chapter.
Another implication for citizenship is the way that this landscape of power and patterns of authority also bounds the possibility for acts of citizenship that can shift these power relations, pointing to the way that citizenship is shaped as it interacts with distinct patterns of authority and constellations of actors. This landscape of uneven state power, pervasive patterns of authority based on violence that order every day life, and often conflicting forms of social legitimacy for armed actors add another significant dimension to the fragmentation of citizenship. This chapter has shown that the role of the armed actors is central to how daily life is ordered within the favela, and the next chapter will examine how these armed actors then mediate the relationship between the state and the citizen, shaping how citizens can make claims as well as how the state can respond.
Chapter 6 / Mediators between Citizens and the State

The relationship between citizens and the state is mediated by different kinds of actors and institutions. This chapter focuses on the specific mediators within favelas, examining the types of mediation that occur, and how these mediators affect people’s lives within a context of violence. This chapter will describe these mediators and explore their roles in relation to citizenship. It will trace several examples of how people are able (or not able) to act as citizens and attempt to claim their rights, the ways that their rights are mediated by armed actors, and how the state can respond to these claims given the influence of mediators. Mediation is another aspect of the fragmentation of citizenship, because mediation by armed actors can both enable and constrain access to rights for citizens. Mediation contributes to fragmentation by reinforcing the unevenness of state power in the favela, filtering state interventions through highly local power arrangements.

Mediation is a term used in various disciplines with very different meanings. For example, in the field of communication and media studies, there is a great emphasis on mediation because it reveals ‘the changing relations among social structures and agents’ (Livingstone 2008). While the focus here is not the media as a mediator, the use of mediation as an analytical descriptor is useful precisely in order to expose and make explicit the shifting relations between social structures (particularly the state) and agents (or citizens). Williams identifies two meanings for mediation that are relevant to this situation:

1) Acting as an intermediary (e.g. the political act of reconciling adversaries), and
2) Intermediate (indirect) agency between otherwise separated parties to a relationship (Williams 1983).

Mediators, for the purpose of this analysis, are the institutions, organisations or individuals who act at the juncture between those living in favelas, and state institutions, and who control both how citizens are able to make claims or mobilise as well as the conditions for how external actors (the state, external NGOs, etc) intervene. In this sense, the mediators in this chapter fulfil the aspects of the definition of mediation above. They act as intermediaries between the state and citizens (although not necessarily for the purpose of reconciliation), but they also intermediate agency between citizens in the favela and the state. This relationship is not explicitly or formally expressed, so mediation is a more exact way of describing what does
not fall into other obvious categories (such as representation, client/patronage relationships, etc.).

Mediators may also act as gatekeepers for a range of actors external to the favela, but the focus in this chapter is on mediation that is connected in some way with the state. For those people living in favelas and housing estates in Rio de Janeiro these mediators control how people from these communities access services, but also how they access networks outside of the boundaries of the community. At the community level, any programme, service, or benefit distributed by the state must negotiate this with the control of the traffickers or other armed group. These mediators control the terms of how state institutions or others from outside the community can enter—which politicians are allowed to campaign, which government programmes get implemented and who benefits from them, and who represents the community externally. This prevents citizens from making organised or collective demands directly on the state, in most cases. As the examples below will show, residents face a shifting constellation of mediators and types of mediation in any interaction with the state; and the state must also contend with the same web of relationships in making any intervention in the favela. It is often difficult to determine precisely where the effects of violence end and other forms of mediation, including traditional clientelism, begin. Mediation is in part a reflection of the nature of the relationship between the favela and the state, which has a particular historical character outlined in the Introduction. Armed actors have come to act as mediators as a result of their position within the favela, which has evolved alongside the favela-state relationship.

**Examples of mediation: security, urban services and social protection, education, and social mobilisation**

What are the implications for democracy when residents in these communities must rely upon mediators who use violence to gain access to basic rights? This section will examine how examples of mediation play out in practice by looking at how mediators determine how residents get access to urban services, education, and security, and how residents are able to mobilise at the community level. These examples show the complexity of mediating relationships and the way that these bound people’s lives on a daily basis, but also how mediators enable access to rights and services. They show how mediators act as gatekeepers both for both internal and external constituencies. Not only do they determine how community residents can claim their rights, but also they determine how government agencies or other external actors can implement those rights within the community. It is important to
note that in any example, there may be different mediators involved simultaneously, and these mediators can have conflicting interests as well as other types of relationships (representation, client/patron networks, etc.). This chapter traces how each case of mediation corresponds to the two aspects of William’s definition: acting as an intermediary and intermediating agency between separated parties, in order to visibilise otherwise hidden relations.

Security

Security is a basic right and one of the most basic rights that states should guarantee (Shue 1996). Chapter 4 showed how a sense of security and safety is a necessary condition for a sense of citizenship. Chapter 5 expressed how patterns of authority that exist around security within the favela are structured. Directly related to this, then, is the way that armed actors control who has access to security and how that security is delivered. Attempts by citizens to claim security clearly expose the role of coercive mediators, as virtually all such claims are made to the mediators and not to the state. Both the way that police operations happen within the favela and the ways that citizens access their security is controlled by coercive mediators.

In addition to this highly differentiated geography of safety and danger, particular events could also precipitate a different set of security arrangements. For example, if there was going to be an invasion or other armed action by the traffickers or the militia, they would inform certain key community leaders and the community would be shut down—people stay inside, shops and businesses close, schools close, and the streets empty. In some cases, this message is communicated publicly:

‘Resident: today, access to the favela only until 17:00. Shoot out at 17.30’

This phenomenon is frequent enough that it has had an impact on primary and secondary education (Leeds 2007). In a recent wave of violence in November 2010, 159 schools were closed in and near favelas affecting 38,566 students (Veja 2010). This is a regular consequence of the violence. Beyond this, there is also a clear set of rules bounding the use of public space. Certain public spaces are claimed by the traffickers or the militia for their own ‘bases’ or for their specific activities. Other public spaces are then available for commerce, meetings by community groups, etc. Because public space itself is quite scarce in most favelas, the control of what public space there is becomes a significant source of power. It also acts to restrict social mobilisation because any community leader or external politician who wants to initiate
public meetings must negotiate for the physical space to do so with the militia or traffickers. Finding a neutral public space that is not under the control of a faction or the militia is virtually impossible. If a community group uses a public space controlled by one of the violent mediators, then there is the risk that if a surprise invasion occurs (as in the quote from Alcir in Chapter 4), any participants in those activities will become causalities of the violence. In addition to controlling the boundaries of safe and unsafe the militias and the trafficking factions also control who enters and exits the community. Individuals and families can be banished by the factions or the militias as punishment for association with a rival group. A cycle of banishment and exodus accompany every change of faction. Sueli was exiled several times because of her daughter’s involvement with the factions (field diary, 17 January 2007). When a new faction or the militia take control, those most closely linked with the previous *donos* (local heads of factions) will be forced to leave or be killed. When the militia took over Quitungo, all of the children that had been involved with the drug trafficking were banished to the favelas (Piquiri or Divinea). This meant that the children were living on the street or sleeping with different relatives every night, because they could not return to the housing estate (Sueli 2006; Tiana 2006).

Despite this tight control over the physical space of the communities, at times the violence becomes unpredictable—for example when the police, another militia, or a trafficking faction invades with no warning. It is these unpredictable episodes of violence that lead to the greatest sense of precariousness, fear, and insecurity for residents. When events conform to the security regime imposed by the controlling actor, the levels of security and public safety can be generally quite high. But the uncertainty that at any time a total inversion of these rules can take place by an armed group, entering and killing indiscriminately colours all the interactions in public spaces.

As the last chapter showed, when citizens in favelas want to make claims for improved security, these claims must be made to the coercive mediators that control the favelas. State institutions do not control security at the level of the favela nor do they respond to claims for improved security from citizens in the favela. Despite the high levels of violence in favelas, the issue of security is not anarchic. On the contrary, the provision of security and the enforcement of certain rules imposing a type of public order are taken very seriously by both the militias and the trafficking factions in areas they control. In fact, of all the dimensions of

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42 As described in the introduction, it remains to be seen whether the new and limited policy of invasion and occupation by police will alter this fundamental relationship.
daily life in the favela, it is the physical security of people where the coercive mediators have the most impact. The extent of the reach of the mediating actors in the case of security extends to determining what physical spaces within the community are ‘safe’, which are neutral, which are off-limits, and which are acceptable for what kinds of activities (relating to the patterns of authority concerning public spaces discussed in Chapter 5).

During participatory discussion sessions in Quitungo, research participants mapped areas of safety and danger in their community. Specific areas were clearly delineated on the community maps as violent and dangerous. These mappings were considered so sensitive by the residents, that they did not want them to be kept in the favela. They insisted that I store them at my flat in Rio de Janeiro and take them back to the UK at the end of the research.

Figures 7-9: Participatory maps of communities and violence\(^4^3\)

\(^{43}\) Each of these maps depicts a particular part of the community relevant to the group creating the map. Main features of the community are drawn in pen. Points of particular danger or relevance to the violence are marked with post-its.
These were the areas where the sale of drugs and weapons occurred, where executions or torture would occur, and where shoot-outs would frequently happen. In the places where drugs and weapons are bought and sold (known as the ‘boca de fumo’), residents cannot enter.
during the hours of darkness without being involved in the trafficking. In some more extreme cases, this ban extended into day-time hours when a faction that was in control expanded the period of trafficking each day. When the militias took over Quitungo and Guaporé, they installed gates and barriers at the main entrances to the communities, as shown in Chapter 5. Over time these have been augmented and fortified to include a cement wall along one side of the community, echoing the gated communities of the middle class. The militias use these physical barriers to control the flow of people in and out of the communities, charging R$10 for the right to enter and exit per month per resident in Guaporé.

The militias and factions are also involved in establishing a system of informal justice within the favela to govern security arrangements (Santos 2002). As municipal councillor, Andrea Gouvêa, said at the policy debates on 5 June 2009:

‘The defining characteristic of a favela is that it is a place where the justice is not delivered by the state.’

Under this system, certain crimes and forms of violence are punished in certain instances (such as rape and domestic violence) as discussed in Chapter 5.

Suellí’s story in the introduction shows how people who engage in any kind of public action have to negotiate for space and the security to carry out these activities (e.g. suspending literacy classes when ordered to do so by the faction/militia, etc). Talking to the police, a member of militia or drug trafficking faction can be interpreted as a political act that jeopardises not only the individual’s security, but also that of their family. Residents are not allowed (or are not willing) to report the actions of the militia to the state authorities. This was demonstrated by the low number of calls to the hotline set up by the state government on the militias (as described in Chap 5). Beyond this, the implications of this control of security is a kind of closing down within the community—a sense that whatever happens within the community stays there and must be resolved there without any external intervention. This is echoed in people’s perceptions of citizenship and participation, which are highly referent to the community, as discussed in Chapter 4. But also throughout the research, at participatory sessions, interviews and informal interactions, was a sense of isolation—that no one from the state or another external actor could really intervene at the basic level of security.

At a very fundamental level, armed actors control access to security within the favela. The militia acts as the intermediary between the police and residents, taking control of how they are able to interact with each other:
'I don’t want the residents’ association mixed up with the police. They [community residents] have to come talk to me’ (Robson, field diary, 21 November 2006).

They also connect the demands for greater security with their own regime and pattern of authority to institute security on their terms. They set boundaries within the community and they control the frontier between the communities and the rest of the city. This has obvious impacts on the resident’s daily lives, but it also affects other activities within the community from education to commerce to social mobilisation. The control of the militia as mediators of security is almost totally pervasive within the favela, to the extent that they exert more control than the police (or other state institutions), or citizen groups over how security is delivered. On this most fundamental aspect of life, security, it is the militias and the factions who are in control. They intermediate agency between citizens and the state in the sense that the militia or the factions themselves address the demands from residents for greater security, and the ability of the state to overturn these arrangements is very limited. Any state interventions must either negotiate with coercive mediators (as in the case of upgrading and infrastructure projects explored below), or they must eliminate them (as in the case with police raids, and the current policy of occupation). In either case, in their role as providers of security, the militia also position themselves as the formal protectors and leaders of the community and their ability to provide security is integral to this (see Chapter 5).

Access to education

Claiming the right to education is an important case in which to analyse how mediators control how citizens can claim their rights. Levels of education and literacy in Brazil are generally high. In the communities involved in the research, the questionnaire applied as part of the complementary research for the Violence, Participation and Citizenship group, found that over half of respondents (51.5%) have been educated as far as primary level, and just over one-third (36.2%) have at least some secondary level education. However, very few respondents (6.2%) have higher education. The percentage of respondents with just pre-primary or no education whatsoever is also low at 5.3%. These results reflect a broader trend, where those from poor backgrounds are much less likely to complete any higher education. There are also strong racial distinctions in levels of access to higher education (Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro). While public primary and secondary schools are free and generally accessible, they are not of good enough quality on the whole to allow students to pass university entrance examinations. Within the community, the issue of access to education begins at the level of the crèche and

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44 This story is based on Sandra’s contributions to participatory discussion groups as well as a semi-structured interview with her on 8 March 2007.
carries through to access to university. The case of Sandra demonstrated this both in terms of how citizens access to state-provided education is mediated and also how citizens attempts to create opportunities for education is also controlled by mediators.

Sandra is a 40-year-old woman who had a central role in getting the first community crèche started in Quitungo. She was very poor when she was growing up, but her parents put a lot of emphasis on education. She and a group of eight other women from Quitungo began to campaign for a crèche in the community because they believed that education for the very young was an important way to improve the situation in their community. There were no other crèche facilities available. They spent years visiting every politician who would meet with them, sometimes sitting for hours waiting to be seen. Every politician and bureaucrat they met would make promises to help, but nothing ever materialised. They had an ally—‘Solange’—who was born in the community but left and became a mid-level bureaucrat in the municipal department of social development. She helped them identify politicians that could sponsor the project and kept encouraging them not to give up. Finally, after four years of trying to get the sponsorship of a politician, the women decided that they would start the crèche themselves with no outside support. They took over an unused building in a central location in the community and tried to launch the crèche. In the beginning, there was no running water, no equipment, and no chairs. Mothers bringing their children to the crèche had to bring plastic bottles full of water everyday along with food. At the same time, the basic conditions of safety (from invasions) had to be negotiated with the traffickers. ‘I’m afraid there will be an invasion [by a drug faction or the police]—but we work with our doors open. And yet we always work in fear. There are no peaceful days, without fear.’

After two years, the crèche had 300 children and attracted the interest of an external NGO and then the state government. The NGO gave the crèche a grant to cover the teachers’ salaries and provide basic equipment and food to the children. Within a year of this happening, half of the original 8 women involved had been kicked out for diverting resources from the grant. ‘It was natural—they didn’t have food for their own children at home and we had no administrator. It was completely natural to take home a piece of meat for your family or a spare plate. But this was the start of fights in our group.’ The NGO brought in an external administrator to run the crèche.

Sandra decided that she wanted to try to study pedagogy at the university through a scholarship programme created by a local politician for favela residents working in education. To get the scholarship, she had to submit a list of 25 people who would promise to vote for the politician in the next election. For 25 votes, she got access to a university education that would have been completely out of her reach. When she entered the university, she faced prejudice and discrimination—she did not have the money to dress like other students, buy books, or eat in the canteen. She and the other pedagogy students from the favelas were treated like pariahs by many of the other students and professors. Two of the professors leading her course began to talk about social exclusion, and insist to the students from the favelas that they had the right to their education and that their experiences of teaching at the community level were very valuable. Sandra’s undergraduate thesis was on her experience of founding the crèche in her community. When she defended her thesis, she filled the auditorium with people from the community who had been involved with the crèche—she wanted her achievement to be a public celebration of what they had achieved. Her time at the university gave her an awareness of the social dynamics behind the exclusion she faces. ‘At first I thought everything that had gone wrong was my fault, but then I began to understand what social exclusion means.’ The struggle to keep the crèche afloat continues.
Different forms of mediation co-exist simultaneously—the traditional client/patron relationship with politicians and government bureaucrats, but also the more coercive relationship with the drug trafficking faction and militia. The government bureaucrat was an ally and helped the women get access to politicians likely to support the project. But this was mixed with traditional clientelistic politics of the local politician using patronage practices to mediate access to education. This example illustrates a major difficulty facing community activists in terms of shifting or changing patterns of patronage. Even when people are clearly committed to positive social change within the community, this does not preclude acting according patterns of patronage.

The group of women engaged in social action to organise the crèche had to negotiate with traffickers to go ahead with their project for the crèche, and they also needed the agreement from the factions to allow the crèche to remain open. In this case, the militia and traffickers intermediate between community-based attempts to provide access to education and external support available for such initiatives. Through their intermediation, they can withdraw support and undermine the arrangement at any time, leading to greater difficulties in sustaining access to education. This example shows how mediators limit the agency of citizens. Social action as initiated by a non-violent group faces significant obstacles, in terms of finding resources including physical spaces, confronting existing social norms, and negotiating with the factions to be able to carry out their work. Social action initiated through non-violent means has to struggle for even the very basic conditions to make a difference, while the social action initiated through violence (as in the case of security) has a pervasive effect almost immediately. The importance of education in facilitating deeper changes is clear as this case shows how one woman was able to succeed in getting higher education, and how the success of just one person contributed to the continuing existence of a community-organised crèche in spite of many obstacles. Fundamentally, this story makes explicit the role of armed actors, politicians and other patronage networks as gatekeepers that determine when and how people can access education at all levels. This is a role which is rarely recognised in state programmes aimed at improving access to education.

**Access to urban services and social protection**

The issue of how citizens access their rights to basic urban services, including water, is another important window into the role of mediators. Access to water and other basic services is a

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45 This story is based on several meetings with Robson, conversations with the community research group, and interviews with the former head of the residents’ association.
formal right (like education), which should be guaranteed by the state. Yet, as this example shows, the way that people can claim this right and also the way that the state interventions happen is shaped by mediators (see McCann 2006 for other examples of how mediators control access to public services). Access to urban services in the favelas has been improving over recent years. Many are now paved, have relatively reliable access to water, electricity and even internet. In the questionnaire I conducted, almost 100% of respondents had both electricity and water connected to their homes. However, many of the systems for urban services are informal or pirated off formal systems. And the militia in Quitungo has taken control of the distribution of gas, and levies a surcharge on electricity and water, and determines which houses can have access to the internet (Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2008).

The head of the militia in Quitungo, Robson was an officer in the civil police. He was born in Quitungo but now lives in a new upper-middle class neighbourhood on the other side of the city and visits Quitungo twice a week in an expensive imported SUV. In a series of interviews, Robson explained about the projects the militia is trying to initiate within the community. At various times during these interviews, Robson would be in radio contact with the nearest police station to give updates about the situation within the community and the possibility of any attacks by the drug factions.

According to Robson, the city government and the water authority offered to finance a water upgrading project in the community to regularise access to water in the favelas between Quitungo and Guaporé. They approached the residents’ association with the offer of the project. It would be up to the residents’ association to decide which houses and areas in the community would benefit from the water project.

Robson and the militia took control of the residents’ association when they invaded Quitungo and expelled or killed the drug traffickers. They held a rigged election with only one name on the ballot to put their candidate in charge of the association. But Robson said that it was he, himself, who would decide which houses would receive the upgrading project because he ‘had gone door to door’ and ‘knew the real needs and necessities of the people’. He said that there were no legitimate community leaders in Quitungo because everyone had their own personal agendas and wanted to benefit personally from their work. He considered his work to be the only legitimate community work because he was not interested in personal gain and everything he did was for the greater good of the community. He believed that he would be best able to target the water upgrading project at those with greatest need (field diary, 14 December 2007).

Rigged elections for residents’ associations have occurred in many favelas occupied by militias (Ramalho 2006). Newspaper reports show that the militias are taking control of residents’ associations in order to gain control of social safety net funds (including Bolsa-Família and Vale-Gás), disbursed by the government to the residents’ association for distribution within the favelas (ibid).
In a separate interview with the previously elected president and vice-president of the residents’ association (officially forced out of the post by Robson and the militia), Cesário told me that Robson’s real interest was political power and that he wanted to mount a campaign in the 2008 elections. Cesário has been president of the residents’ association for seven years and refuses to relinquish the title despite the situation with the militia. His brother is involved in the militia, but he insists that he has nothing to do with them. Cesário has documents showing his appeal to the water company to do upgrading work, and correspondence over several years with them about the implementation of the programme. But the entire project has now passed to the control of the militia (field diary, 28 February 2007).

This story shows how the state must work by mediating actors and institutions to achieve anything within the geographical boundaries of the community. The militia acts as an intermediary between the community, public utilities, and local government. The state or any other ‘external’ actors have very limited ability to carry out social interventions without these mediating actors. It also affects the dimension of agency and how it is articulated with external authorities (including public utilities and local government). This mediation must also be understood in relation to the power dynamics within the community—which leaders have control over which resources, pathways to government assistance and funding, and force. In many cases this takes on an overtly political dimension as leaders of the militia and other community leaders seek to gain purchase in the political party machinery.

The issue of legitimacy of community leaders who are not directly involved with the factions or with the militia is complex. In some cases, these leaders may themselves act as mediators (as in the case of Sandra and the crèche). But in many cases, they have to negotiate with more powerful mediators who rely on violence as the basis for their authority, or with wider patronage structures connected to political parties, churches, or specific politicians. At times, community leaders work within these power structures and at times they try and subvert them—although this strategy has significant risks (see Chapter 4). Prior to the militia, the drug traffickers controlled or exerted significant influence over the residents’ association. Whichever group controls the use of force within the community can assume the mantel of official power by manipulating the residents’ association and win the legitimacy to negotiate with the state. The implication of this mediation is that residents must decide whether or not to ally themselves with the group in power in order to get access to basic rights, such as access to clean water.

**Social mobilisation**

Social mobilisation at the community level is a difficult and often dangerous undertaking. Mediators often play an important role in social mobilisation, in both facilitating and stifling it.
This section gives examples of how mediators intervene in processes of social mobilisation. It is worth noting that not all social mobilisation is to the benefit of the community, or contributes to more participatory and democratic processes. Both the trafficking factions and the militia are highly organised and effective examples of social mobilisation with questionable benefits for the community. However the scope of this research did not include a detailed examination of these types of social mobilisation. Instead, it focused on types of social mobilisation that intend to reduce social exclusion and inequalities. In Quitungo and Guaporé, social mobilisation and non-violent community-based organisations have been considerably weakened and undermined by the past 15 years of extreme levels of violence (see Chapter 4). This section will draw on examples of attempts at social mobilisation to show the role of mediators in this process.

Interviews with community leaders exposed a complex web of mediation and the limitations that this imposes on social mobilisation. The head of the residents’ association describes a classic and pervasive pattern of patronage politics that persists within many parts of Rio de Janeiro, where voting blocks are controlled by specific gatekeepers who bargain with political candidates for support in exchange for concessions (see Gay 2006; McCann 2006; Arias 2007). This is like a type of currency that community leaders can trade in, when dealing with external actors or with other mediators within the community:

‘I’ve been here for a long time before the militia turned up. A lot of people are against the militia, but we speak out against them. We need money to make social projects work, but people give up because they are afraid. People refuse to participate, but that doesn’t mean that they accept the situation. We constantly make requests to the government, but they never have any projects for us. We had Project Honey here from Rosinha [a municipal councillor], but she pulled it out. Now Cabral has come to power and if I wanted to get any projects from his government, I would need to join his party and work for at least a year or two’ (Cesário 2007).

A former president of a residents’ association explained how this patronage system worked in the last election:

‘We managed 700 votes for our candidate, Robson [head of the militia] got 300 for his, someone else managed 200 for theirs and so on. With these 700 votes, we will be the last to be helped—after the communities that managed 3000, 1500, and so on’ (Cesário 2007).

Fear of reprisals is another aspect of how this mediation limits social mobilisation:

‘There was a woman who had a CBO, and she taught English classes and other things. But she got involved in the business of the bandidos and they closed down her CBO’ (Alcir/Tiana, field diary, 19 December 2006).
People are afraid of becoming publicly aligned against the militia—the risks associated with this were explained in detail in Chapter 4. This same issue emerged throughout the research process, as demonstrated by the difficulty in having open discussions about the militia. It also shows how this form of mediation within the favela is juxtaposed over client/patron structures connected to the state. At the same time that people are afraid of becoming involved publicly, social mobilisation is limited by traditional patronage, where politicians require a certain number of votes to deliver resources. A more in-depth example reinforces these points.

In June 2007 the Pan-American Games were held in Rio de Janeiro. The Federal government sponsored a programme of civic guides, where children from favelas were trained to act as guides to Brazil’s history, culture, traditions, and Rio de Janeiro’s tourist attractions. Children were chosen from the favelas closest to the sites of the Games. For murky reasons related to political patronage, Quitungo and Guaporé were included in the programme, even though they are not near the sites of the Games. The person appointed to head the programme in Quitungo and Guaporé, Marilsa, has connections with senior politicians in the Federal government, as well as the city and state governments. For example, she was responsible for distributing the Cheque Cidadão in Quitungo. She is relatively well educated and affluent for Quitungo (she owns a car, owns her own property, her husband works in a formal job). Despite these relatively high profile connections (which she demonstrates by showing photographs of herself with senior politicians), she was not able to independently mobilise children to fill the slots for the programme. She needed fifty children who would commit to attending training courses run by the government including visits outside of the community. She asked Alcir, one of the community researchers and community leader who has run a percussion and music school for children for 20 years in Quitungo, to ‘provide the children for the programme’. According to Alcir, Marilsa wanted him ‘to provide the children for her programme, so that she can go to Brasília and claim the credit for these children’s accomplishments.’ Alcir has the capacity to mobilise a significant number of children because of his work with music and percussion with them. He can ‘provide’ children who fit the requirements of the programme, assuring her that they are not involved in the trafficking. While he resented Marilsa taking the credit for his own capacity for mobilisation, he also wanted to pass on the opportunity to the children he worked with. However, when the militia learned of this programme, they sent the message via intermediaries that they would be sending a certain number of children on the programme as well. These would be boys or girls who had some involvement in the militia, or whose parents were involved. They also sought to ban any children they perceived as having links to the trafficking factions from the programme.

Once the struggles over who would be invited to participate were resolved, the issue over where the training courses would be held arose. During the time of the research project, the courses were moved several times as the militia took over residents’ association buildings. Marilsa eventually settled for a church building in the favela, although some parents did not want their children attending an event in a rival denomination’s building. The militia also had to agree to buses being sent to the favela for the children to attend the external events. Marilsa was confident that she could fend off attempts by the militia to intervene because of her connections with senior federal politicians (whereas connections with state or municipal politicians are less beneficial because of the sway of the militia with the local police forces and politicians).

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46 This story is based on interviews with Alcir and Marilsa on 27 February 2007.
This is an example of a small-scale social mobilisation. From the outset, for even a small opportunity for a small number of children, various mediators are involved in determining who participates and who benefits. The web of different mediators determines which children become involved with this programme, where the training sessions are held, and the terms of the participation of the children. Community leaders such as Alcir and Marilsa trade on their ability to mobilise specific groups (20 young people for this government programme, 30 elderly people for this church programme, a certain number of voters for this candidate). In the case of this social mobilisation that aims to reduce social exclusion, there is a mixture of forms of mediation—between clientelism, paternalism, and coercion. This is a pattern repeated in other favelas, with drug trafficking factions and militias, and leads to a weakening of the basis for non-violent community-based organisations (McCann 2006, Arias 2007). Non-violent community leaders also act as mediators—and not all mediation is negative with respect to establishing more democratic relations. The question is how violence leads to different types of mediation as the purpose of that mediation is different. As argued in the previous chapter, patterns of authority become replicated, in part through these practices of mediation. As these examples also show, it is difficult to achieve a paradigm shift from these patterns.

This example shows how sustaining traditionally understood social mobilisation is difficult in the context of coercive mediators. Fundamentally, the mediators in each case limit or alter the state’s ability to intervene within the favela, as the example of the benefits to children is mediated by who can participate, where, etc. In terms acting as an intermediary between citizens and the state, the militia controls how social mobilisation from within the favela can interface with the state and how this mobilisation in terms is made legible to the state. The militia intermediates agency within the favela through controlling how mobilisation occurs (e.g. setting the location for meetings, trying to determine who can participate and controlling whether buses can collect children from within the community). The militia uses this control over social mobilisation to try and gain greater legitimacy and formal recognition for their role (as also explored in Chapter 5). Non-violent community leaders also act as mediators, and the state seeks them out in this role, as in the case of the distribution of welfare benefits. But the state must negotiate their relationship with armed actors as well. This raises the question of how social action is linked to violence.

**The darker side of social action**

While not the focus of this research, it is important to consider the ways that social action can contribute to violence. ‘Effective’ social action within contexts of violence often leads to or
increases violence (Koonings and Krujit 2004). Perversely, the most effective examples of social action and mobilisation from within favelas contribute to violence: drug trafficking gangs and militias. The militia and drug trafficking factions are examples of social action are both sustained and coordinated, but that perpetuate violence. The militia have suppressed certain kinds of violence, but their presence has not led to greater citizenship or accountability within the areas they control, and their authority is based on part on the threat of violence. This has implications for the role of the state for several reasons. First, elements of the state are implicated in the actions of the mediators in the case of the militia through their link with politicians and the police. Second other elements of the state, such as social, welfare and infrastructure programmes are unable to act within the favela without the collaboration of a mediator. Finally mediators take on the role of the state within the favela, in some cases, providing security and access to basic services.

There is extensive research on role of social mobilisation on citizenship, and more specifically on citizen participation in policy processes, which requires prior social mobilisation (see Coelho 2004; Cornwall and Coelho 2007). The dominant model of good governance assumes a ‘organised civil society’ that is capable of making demands on government institutions. Conversely formal participatory forums designed to value social action and formal democracy can increase certain aspects of citizenship, but not lead to a reduction in violence.

The city government’s policy of neglect has also relied on strong social mobilisation within favelas to provide a proxy for the state, by coordinating services for the community. And yet, this level of community mobilisation does not translate into greater participation in formal forums set up by the state, or into a reduction in violence. As mentioned earlier, violence in the favelas has had a drastic impact on the capacity for social mobilisation (see Burgos 2005).

In particular, community leaders who are not willing to negotiated directly with the traficantes or other armed groups are not able to hold positions of leadership for any length of time. Those who do enter into alliances with particular factions often lose these positions when the control of the favela shifts. A community leader I interviewed in 2001, ‘Gilberto’, held a position as president of the residents’ association. He was articulate and charismatic, and reached some kind of agreement with the traficantes in control at that time—who had grown up in the community. He was optimistic that because the traficantes were ‘local’ that he would be able to achieve significant advances in terms of services for the community. I
learned in an interview in May 2005 that Gilberto was killed by the militia. Personal networks are not sufficient to mitigate against the effects of the mediators.

The control of the community by violent and illegitimate force constrains the space for social mobilisation because any community-based groups powerful enough to be seen as a threat to dominant power structure must negotiate an alliance, which makes them vulnerable when the power configuration shifts. The sort of community based groups that are able to continue without having an open relationship with the dominant force in the community must be careful to cast their work as non-threatening and insignificant enough to escape notice or censure. The examples above demonstrate the need to move away from equating social mobilisation or social action with citizenship (implicit in notions of active citizenship). Not only does social mobilisation potentially lead to more, not less violence, but violence can also undermine social mobilisation aimed at positive social change. The absence of peaceful social mobilisation does not, however, mean that people are not still acting as citizens. Instead, it suggests a re-visioning of the modalities of citizenship in contexts of violence.

**Coercive mediators and the research process**

This research sought to uncover forms of mediation but the research process itself was not immune from them, especially in terms of the power dynamics involved in negotiating with the militia and the traffickers as described above. In addition to the mediation shored up through violence described above, there are structures of traditional client/patron relationships, which coexist with the mediation via violence within the favelas. The client/patron relationships are reinforced particularly through the political parties and religious organisations. In either case (the mediation via armed groups and the client/patron structures associated with political parties and other), there was a distinct risk of repeating or replicating this structure in the research process. This was particularly a challenge for me, as the external researcher. I needed to constantly reinforce and shore up the boundaries and norms of the project to avoid compromising its integrity, while simultaneously giving the community researchers the space to take the lead. This exposes a limitation to the participatory research process: it is impossible to isolate the process from these sorts of power dynamics, and those who participated in the process reflect the circles/connections/networks of community researchers themselves, and also the way that powerful mediators chose to bound action.

As described in Chapter 3, there was a lengthy and, at times, conflictual process of negotiation, particularly with the militia. Throughout this process, the concern of the militia was primarily
in controlling what they perceived as the flow of resources into the community. They were less concerned with the actual content or subject of the research, and more interested in the relationships, perceived legitimacy, and potential money at stake. For example, the militia wanted to control which community residents participated as researchers rather than censure any particular discussion that occurred through the research process:

‘Since we have arrived there is no more blood on the streets and no ones does drugs anymore, there are no more mothers crying. This is why all programmes and activities should pass through the association. Everyone knows that here in Brazil the only people to get anything are those that have a godfather’ (Robson 2006).

Their interest in having this kind of control was motivated by a desire to be perceived by external actors (in this case me, as a foreigner) as the sole legitimate source of leadership within the community. Invading a research meeting with five armed men on one day (6 December 2006) and then insisted on an ‘official’ meeting at the residents’ association building the next day to clarify their intentions and apologise for the threat of violence demonstrated how they can use the past threat of violence to try and control the situation. Their attempts to control the research process clearly fell within the ‘coercive’ category.

The reactions of the community researchers to this direct intervention in the research process is also of interest since it demonstrates on a limited scale the possibilities for manoeuvre and negotiation with coercive mediators. In response to the demands of the militia to hold our research meetings in the building they controlled, the community researchers and I agreed on a strategy of appeasement to appear to agree. We scheduled a fake meeting where we invited no residents to participate and then claimed to the militia that no one would attend meetings in their building. This ploy allowed us to continue to hold our research meetings in neutral locations not controlled by any of the armed actors. In a way, this illustrates again how coercive mediators affect the prospects for citizenship. There are still possibilities to act independently and to move around the power structures in place, but these are constrained by the control exerted by the militia. Had the militia continued to insist, with further threats, that the research meetings had to be held under their auspices, we would have been forced to agree. In fact, since the research was completed, several of the community researchers have been forced to move their activities into the building controlled by the militia.

Mediators and forms of mediation

The role of mediation is well established in political science literature, although generally in a positive light. For example, Somers argues that ‘ideal-typical democratic and socially inclusive
citizenship regimes rest on a delicate balance of power among state, market and citizens in civil society, which is mediated through collective adjudications in the public sphere’ (Somers 2008: 2). Traditionally, in the favelas, the residents’ associations provided this kind of mediation. However, as discussed in the introduction, the combined pressures of coercion by the drug trafficking factions and the militias and co-optation by the state have drastically weakened the residents’ association (McCann 2006). This means that the space is open for armed mediators and other types of (non-democratic) mediation to gain control.

The mediators in this case are different from elected representatives because they are not chosen in an open, transparent way. Instead, they mediate between the interests of residents in the favelas and external actors for some objective of their own. An important difference between mediation and representation is the issue of legitimacy. People living within the favelas accept mediators who use violence because they are not offered another option and are not able to make an active choice for a different form of representation.

Important mediators within the context of the favela include political party machinery, police, militia, drug trafficking gangs, community-based organisations (non-violent) including resident’s associations, social programmes instigated by external actors (such as the Catholic church, NGOs), religious organisations, and other influential individuals who may have connections to more than one of these mediating institutions. These can be categorised in several ways. First, there is a distinction to be made between informal and formal mediators. Formal mediators have legal recognition for their role and act as formally-constituted organisations, such as political parties and NGOs. Informal mediators are neither legally recognised nor institutionalised. As argued in Chapter 5, Guillermo O’Donnell’s work on informal institutions is of use here—particularly his point about how actors within these contexts know how and when to move between formal and informal rules and institutions (O’Donnell 2004). He uses the example of traffic laws, and the ways that people obey these selectively depending on the context, such as not stopping at red lights after a certain time of night because of danger in doing so. In this case informal and coercive mediators are also linked to the patterns of authority described in Chapter 5. This argument can be applied in an interesting way to the context of the favela. For example, one woman in Quitungo won a case in the employment tribunal, where she was awarded payment for wages and benefits that

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47 Other forms of mediation proliferate in Rio de Janeiro—clientelistic and patronage relationships mediate political mobilisation. These different intermediaries and forms of mediation are of relevance to citizenship when they have a role in how interests and demands are translated into access to public goods.
were not paid in a previous job. Yet on a daily basis she faces insecurity and fear and must negotiate her life within this context, despite a justice system established by the state that was able to uphold her labour rights (Tiana 2006). This chapter explores how mediators control how people in the favela move between informal and formal institutions in order to make claims for their rights.

A second distinction centres on the basis for authority: coercive or non-coercive. Coercive mediators use violence or the threat of violence as their primary source of authority. Coercive mediation differs from the client/patron arrangement in both depth and scope. The extent of the influence of coercive mediators is further than a traditional client/patron arrangement because they rely on the use of, or the threat of the use of violence. The scope of the relationship is also different because residents have no option but to interact with the mediator and there is very little or no scope for negotiation. They cannot opt for a relationship with a different actor to access the same things. In a classic client/patronage relationship, such as the political party machinery, the client expects certain benefits from the relationship with the patron in exchange for political support (see Scott 1972; Kaufman 1974; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980; Gay 2006). However, the client can switch allegiances and enter into another arrangement with a different patron if they are not satisfied. More recent political science literature points to the importance of what Houtzager and Archarya call informal brokerage as a type of citizenship practice (through political or authoritarian clientelism) (Fox 1994; Taylor 2004; Gay 2006; Houtzager and Archarya 2009). However, the mediating actors in the favela are more than informal brokers or patrons. In the case of the mediating actors in the favela, community residents have no option but to negotiate with the mediating actors because the mediating actors use violence as the basis for their authority. The option of switching allegiances to another ‘patron’ is either not a possibility at all, or a very dangerous one. The mediating actors differ from the client/patron model because both community residents and external actors (such as government agencies, NGOs, public services) must interact with the mediating actors, who act as gatekeepers for access ‘to’ and ‘from’ the community. Space for negotiation with mediators exists, but is much more limited than with a client/patron relationship. Negotiation occurs within the boundaries stipulated by the hard facts of the violence that hovers in the background to all interactions. This coercion is based on violence and the threat of violence and is not always obvious. Coercion can be linked to hidden forms of power, embedded in the collective memory of past violence (Gaventa 1982). While coercive mediators may act according to typical clientelistic patterns, there is always the threat of going beyond that through the use of violence. In sum, while there are multiple
forms of mediation at work in the favela, the focus in this chapter is on coercive informal mediators because, empirically, these are the most relevant to understanding how violence shapes citizenship. Although many types of mediation co-exist within the favelas, the domination of the informal/coercive mediators (see the areas of mediation below) means that they filter the remaining mediators and often push out other formal and non-coercive mediators.

The table below outlines some of the most important mediating actors within the favelas, and describes what they mediate access to and how.

**Table 13: Mediating actors in the favela**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediating actor</th>
<th>Type(s) of mediation</th>
<th>What they mediate access to</th>
<th>Purpose of mediation</th>
<th>Source(s) of authority</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>Informal, coercive</td>
<td>Distribution of services (gas, electricity, internet, pirate cable), security, real estate transactions, some community-based organisations including residents’ associations, weapons, livelihoods for young men</td>
<td>Extorting money from transactions, Suppressing open drug trade, reducing violence from warring factions, providing security</td>
<td>Violence, reputation in community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug trafficking factions</td>
<td>Informal, coercive</td>
<td>Security, some community based organisations including residents’ associations, weapons, drugs, livelihoods for young men</td>
<td>Guaranteeing sympathetic environment for drug trade (i.e. complicit silence of residents), building a base for bigger operations and control of additional communities</td>
<td>Violence, reputation in community, personal relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Formal, coercive</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Extorting money from militia and factions (in some cases), providing security (in some cases)</td>
<td>Violence, legal status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church groups</td>
<td>Formal, informal, non-violent</td>
<td>Distribution of government benefits (Bolsa Familia, Cheque Cidadão, milk vouchers), crèche,</td>
<td>Maintaining base of political power, addressing poverty and social exclusion</td>
<td>Moral authority, history in community, controls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48 The descriptions of mediating actors are drawn from participatory discussion sessions, and the examples used in this chapter taken from interviews. The remaining sections of the table are my analysis.
As the table shows, it is the coercive mediators, who rely on violence, that have the biggest impact on people’s lives, dictating access to a whole range of services. Of these, the militia is perhaps one of the most important, as militias are relatively new occurrences across Rio. In the case of the militia, there are several levels of mediation between citizens at the community level and the government. Citizens must negotiate with the militia, who in turn are negotiating the remit of their authority with the police, which is in turn negotiating its authority with the government. In some respects, it is easier for community leaders to make demands on the government when there is a drug trafficking faction in control, as long as the faction is not extremely brutal, because citizens can negotiate directly with the government, circumventing the factions, if community-based organisations are established enough to maintain their independence. In the case of the militias, no such possibility exists.

While informal, coercive mediators hold the greatest sway, there are other mediators and other forms of mediation at work as well as other democratic processes of representation and participation. Other research has focussed extensively on these other forms of mediation and how they related to democratic practice including the way that democratic and clientelistic practices are hybridised (Taylor and Wilson 2004; Gay 2006). However the issue of how violence shifts these forms of mediation has not been adequately explored. It is the coercive mediators and the way that they are very present in many areas of daily life, from access to basic services to education, to processes of social mobilisation, that underlines their importance in terms of the relationship between citizens and the state. They shift the mode of interaction with the state, making democratic relationship of accountability unviable, and also curtail the sense of political community, limiting it to the geographical boundaries of the area that they control.
Conclusion

This chapter gives examples of different mediators, and shows how coercive mediators who use violence as the source of their authority are the most dominant within the particular geographic boundaries of the favelas. In a context of violence, mediators who use violence to maintain and strengthen their position prevail. These mediators can undermine more transparent processes of representation fundamental to democracy. Within the favela, there are many examples of mediation, some of which are more accountable than others. In some cases mediators can help make relationships more democratic and accountable. In the majority of cases, mediators distort or redirect lines of accountability, weakening democratic relationships between people and public institutions and reinforcing existing social exclusion.

In this context, mediating actors and institutions can weaken citizenship status (Burgos 2005). In terms of gaining access to basic rights, people negotiate through overlapping and contradictory forms of mediation that bring together elements of coercive, clientelistic, paternalistic and democratic practices. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, citizenship concerns both the relationship between the individual/community and the state, and also the sense of identity and belonging that help constitute the boundaries of political community. Mediation shifts both of these axes of citizenship. It shifts the relationships between individuals and the state by directly intervening in how people can make claims and how the state can respond. It shifts the boundaries of political community by creating and sustaining new, more narrow boundaries, that are geographically specific to the area controlled by the mediators, reinforcing the way that violence closes horizons (see Chapter 4).

The relationship between people and the state in this context cannot be understood without taking into account the complexities of forms of mediation which produce uneven and fragmented citizenships that function in certain respects and are brutally exclusionary in others. The empirical findings in these communities tend to reinforce the idea that contexts of violence narrow to an extreme degree the possibilities of citizenship in any meaningful way and pose a formidable challenge to discovering alternatives and routes of change.

The social position of different groups informs the terms for how they can relate to mediators, as the example of the mobilisation of children for the PAN shows. Multiple and at times opposing forms of mediation, such as the militia and patronage systems, are overlaid on the complex power dynamics related to social positioning within the community and the broader
sets of relationships within the city (around race, social class, geographical location, etc.) The informal and coercive mediators hold sway over a broad set of areas and aspects of people’s daily lives and the space for shifting this control or negotiating with them is limited. The implications of this for citizenship in this context are related to the limits on citizenship. The creation of certain alliances opens possibilities for change, such as in the case of the crèche. But other configurations of forces can stifle social action aimed at undermining repressive and unaccountable power structures by subverting government programmes and other external intervention through mediating these relationships in a way that reinforces unaccountable forms of power and legitimacy.

The coercive mediators in this case are not constrained by the rule of law or by democratic norms. They are acting under different patterns of authority that are geographically specific to the physical area that they control. Within those boundaries they exert influence over many aspects of daily life. These coercive mediators are more present in people’s daily lives than any legitimate representative of state institutions, or even of other clientelistic mediators such as church groups and political parties. Patterns of authority control and limit the possibility for specific individuals to sidestep these mediators and establish a direct relationship with the state. The lack of accountability of state institutions reinforces the position of the mediators as those who are able to achieve results. It is because of this position that this constellation of relationships has implications for the prospects of citizenship. These mediators undermine the prospects for citizenship in two ways. They control how citizens within the favela are able to make claims on the state or other external actors, and they determine how those same external actors are able to intervene within the favela. In many cases, they act as a proxy for the state in providing a parody of services a state should provide (such as access to urban services, security, and education). The militia are representative of a trend towards armed non-state actors taking over governance at the local level across Latin America (see Jones 2004; Arjona and Kalyvas 2007; Feldmann and Hinojosa 2009). Specifically within Brazil, coercive mediators are also a result of the evolution of the relationship between the state and the favela, and the emergence of the militias as a new kind of armed actor (which is also building on previously established patterns of authority as argued in Chapter 5). Coercive mediators in most cases undermine the principles necessary for a democratic domain: political equality, inclusion, reflexive freedom and transparency, and therefore the construction of legitimate political authority (Saward 2003). At the same time, the violence and threat of violence employed by these mediators shapes the meanings of citizenship, and
mediators who use violence enable certain patterns of citizen-state interaction and limit others.

The final chapter will take account of all the ways that violence affects the dimensions of the citizen-state relationship addressed in this thesis in order to assess the implications for the prospects for the right to have rights. It will also bring together the elements of place and context that have emerged through the preceding chapters in order to create an overall picture of how citizenship is both imagined and works in practice in the favelas through fragmentation.
Chapter 7 / Conclusion: Parallel communities, perverse politics, and fragmented citizenship

The preceding chapters have examined how violence affects different dimensions of citizenship, including its possible meanings and practices, the uneven nature of state power and prevailing patterns of authority within the favela, and the role of coercive mediators. This chapter will connect these different dimensions in order to draw out the implications for understanding the dynamics of citizenship in violent contexts more broadly, and to respond to the questions set out at the outset of the thesis. It will explore the spatial dimensions of parallel communities and perverse politics emerging from these various dimensions of the citizen-state relationship in order to explain how they contribute to the fragmentation of citizenship. This chapter will also clearly identify how this thesis contributes to the key areas of existing literature set out in Chapter 2. Finally it will explore the outcomes, in terms of its contribution to citizen engagement, of using participatory action research as the research methodology.

The central questions this thesis investigated included:

1. What does citizenship mean in a context of violence?
2. How does violence shape how people perceive and practice their citizenship?
3. How does a spatially-specific context of violence and insecurity affect the way that the state acts and intervenes? What are different forms of authority (both legitimate and illegitimate) mediating the relationship of citizens with the state? And how do these different relationships shape the prospects for citizens claiming substantive rights?
4. How can participatory action research be used to investigate citizenship in a context of violence, where there are significant risks in speaking publicly about power, violence, and democracy?

In response to these questions, this thesis has demonstrated that citizenship, in a context of violence, is fragmented. This fragmentation means that citizenship is simultaneously present in certain aspects and conditions and greatly diminished, degraded or distorted in others. Violence and its effects can both make and unmake citizenship: some meanings of citizenship are blocked through the experience of violence, while coercive mediators enable access to certain rights. The patterns of authority built around violence pervade the everyday within the favela and constrain democratic accountability, but social legitimacy is also conferred on
armed actors in the absence of a wholly legitimate state. These aspects of fragmentation combine to show that violence fundamentally alters the dimensions of the citizen-state relationship examined through this research.

In Chapter 2, this thesis argued that place and spatial analysis are important to understand the central questions posed. This concluding chapter will look across the analysis in Chapters 4-6 in order to highlight what, specifically, a spatial dimension can add to the understanding of how citizenship is fragmented, in order to deepen the argument in relation to the first three questions above. From this, two important aspects of place emerge that inform how citizenship functions. The first is the parallel nature of the community, in the sense that the dynamics within the favela are geographically specific and distinct from other parts of the city, and operate as a negative reflection or shadow of the state. The section below explores what this parallel community means for citizenship, and how violence contributes to this dynamic, by exploring the geographical, social, economic, and psychological boundaries of community and how these are reinforced.

Secondly, the arrangement of parallel patterns of authority within the favela also leads to a kind of perverse politics, where the normal drivers of democratisation can have the opposite effect from what is often anticipated in other contexts, and where social mobilisation can also feed the cycle of violence. Politics are perverse in the sense that the state reinforces its own failures through well-intentioned interventions that ultimately have the unintended consequence of supporting coercive mediators and related patterns of authority. Combined with the lack of state legitimacy, this contributes to the entrenchment of the boundaries of parallel communities and fuels the persistence of perverse politics. As part of this dynamic, the relationship between the citizen and the state is not direct or accountable, and the armed actors in the favela mediate it.

The next section explores the ideas of parallel communities and perverse politics as they have emerged through the preceding analysis, before coming back to the question of how these contribute to fragmented citizenship and research questions 1-3. Subsequently, it will summarise the main contributions of this research to the relevant existing literatures. Then the final section will explore the contribution of participatory research on violence made by the thesis, in response to research question 4.
Parallel communities and perverse politics

Analytically, the dimension of parallel communities is important in as far as it explains why things function differently within the favela than outside of it. There are, in fact, several dimensions of this parallel relationship. The first was addressed in Chapters 5 and 6, and centres on the patterns of authority that operate in the favela and the coercive mediators at the heart of these.

As set out in the introduction, this is not a case of independent parallel political authority and state absence. Rather the state presence reinforces the sense of fragmentation through interventions that undermine its own legitimacy. As a result, alternative forms of violent social organisation emerge in hybridity with the state. These hybrid forms, such as the militia, are not separate from the state or from violence. It is this violence which shapes the hybridity and inhibits more democratic relationships. The patterns of authority related to violence and inscribed geographically within the city contribute to a sense of one set of rules that apply within the favela and another set that apply outside the favela (Santos 2002). The implications of this parallel relationship for citizen-state relations are significant.

This parallel dimension has geographic and spatial specificity which is also analytically critical. Territorial boundaries within the city are enforced and reinforced through violence, mirroring other patterns of exclusion. What makes the favelas a different kind of space is how pervasive this violence is, and the way that the boundaries that surround it cut across all aspects of life, affecting state power and the possibilities for acts of citizenship. The geographical dimension of social exclusion means that people living in these spaces constantly confront what appear to be contradictory experiences of inclusion and exclusions. Citizenship, in this context, has explicit territorial and geographic dimensions which mirror the power of particular mediators who are also constrained by geographic limitation and boundaries. These two dynamics are mutually reinforcing. A mediating actor who may be extraordinarily important in determining the possibilities for action within a favela may have little or no significance whatsoever only a few streets away.49 Within the community, space is controlled in a direct way, as in the example of security. This overlaps with physical geographic boundaries with the social

49 Sometimes there are transgressions of these geographical limits, when mediators temporarily expand their influence beyond the normal geographical barriers, or are responsible for something so brutal that it attracts the attention of the wider city—such as in the case of the murder of Globo journalist Tim Lopes, the attack on police stations, buses and businesses in December 2006, and the invasion by police and military forces of Complexo Alemão in 2007. Nonetheless, these are exceptions and the patterns of authority that operate at the local level within favelas remain mainly confined to particular geographic boundaries.
exclusions that subject people to coercive mediation ruling specific dimensions of life. Processes of labelling, such as those described in Chapter 4, heighten the social divisions that reinforces this parallel dimension.

This parallel pattern of authority, identity and exclusion creates a conundrum for democratic politics. Caldeira argues that democracy has accelerated the building of walls (literal and figurative) between communities in Brazilian cities, and the deterioration of public space (Caldeira 2000). This thesis has demonstrated that there is not a true separation between the favelas and the rest of the city, but rather that the favelas occupy a kind of shadow-space, which is connected to the rest of the city but operating in unexpectedly perverse ways. Violence has contributed to this process in many ways, because it heightens the fear and stigma that reinforce geographical boundaries with social inequality and isolation. The political openness (even if partial) of democracy creates possibilities for change. Some of the changes have been negative, as Caldeira points out, and these seem to become more entrenched.

Perverse politics, in this context, means the hybridisation between democratic, clientelisitic and authoritarian modes of politics such that interventions and social action that would normally contribute to deepening democracy can lead to the opposite. The perversity of politics is demonstrated through processes which should lead to greater democratisation (such as formal participatory forums), but actually serve to entrench parallel patterns of authority. Perverse politics have a particular spatial specificity as they operate within the favelas and through the relationship between the favelas and the rest of the city.

The nature of perverse politics was exposed at several points throughout the research process. During the debates held in June 2009 with government officials, community leaders and residents, several striking examples of this hybridisation emerged. The likely outcome of such forums is that the militia will seek to control who participates from the community. The way that many of the political leaders addressed the audience of community residents combined both a paternalistic attitude and an impulse for greater democracy. Several officials exhorted residents to participate in more democratic processes (such as participatory planning for the city budget), while at the same time addressing residents in a way to suggest that the state would act as provider and patron for them. Over the course of the debates, government officials invited residents to engage with the state more directly, yet community leaders had difficulty in mobilising people to come to the event to meet officials at the debates. The way
that residents responded also reflected the perversity of politics in this context: they made demands for the state to deliver benefits to their community, to give people jobs and to provide basic goods and services, even though all the residents realise that any such interventions would be controlled at the local level by coercive mediators:

‘Guaporé is remembered when you talk about the burning of the bus 350 and Kombis filled with dead kids. In the communities Rocinha, Alemão, Prazeres things are done [by the government], I believe because they have greater visibility. Many in our community don’t know what dignity is, they don’t know what citizenship means and they don’t want to talk about politics, they don’t know what their rights are in relation to the State. Fernando William [the secretary for health and panel member at the debate]: Guaporé is calling you! We need a medical clinic and a community crèche. How will you help us bring dignity to the residents of Quitungo and Guaporé?’ Wagner, 5 June 2009, debate in Quitungo

This demonstrated how residents also approach the state as a patron, while at the same time claiming to want greater citizenship. Both sides seem to be playing out prescribed roles of client and patron within existing patterns of perverse politics.

What heightens the perverse nature of politics is that state interventions, through social programmes to improve people’s welfare, serve to reinforce the role of coercive mediators, further eroding the legitimacy of the state. For example, in Quitungo and Guaporé, the militia has taken control of a water-upgrading project funded by the state, determining which households receive the benefit (as described in Chapter 6).

The head of the training programme on human rights for the police (at the Ministry of Public Security), at the policy debate in Vila Canoas in May 2009, described how they were trying to improve the relationship with the community:

‘We have tried to show that the police are responsive to the community. We organised an open day at the battalion headquarters near Maré (a large complex of favelas). We had theatre for the children, free vaccinations and other citizenship services, such as issuing identity documents, and many other activities. Yet no one from the community came. My children were the only ones there.’ Jéssica Oliveira, Department of Public Security

In response to this, Jorge Barbosa, the director of Observatório da Favela, an NGO based in Maré that does research on favelas, replied that people did not come because while the police station is open during the day, at the end of the day, people go back to their homes where the police are not in control and they cannot risk being seen to go to a police station when the police will not protect them later (notes, debate at Vila Canoas, 8 June 2009).

In this example, the state plays a schizophrenic role: as shown throughout this thesis, it acts as the violator of rights both through omission and commission. It fails to give continuity to many effective interventions that could guarantee people’s rights, but at the same time it directly
violates people’s rights through police action and tacit support for the militias. Yet despite this, the state still has the theoretical role as protector and guarantor of rights. So both aspects of the state’s role feed the dynamics of parallel patterns of authority. It then becomes very difficult for the state or for civil society actors to unravel these dynamics.

The perversity of politics is not confined to the contradictory effects on state interventions. Social mobilisation and citizen action, often associated with strengthening democracy, can also have the opposite effect in the context of parallel communities. Houtzager and Archaya argue that participation improves the quality of democracy:

‘Participation matters because it strengthens those associations that, as collective agents, struggle to democratise the political institutions that shape citizenship practice. Associations as collective agents, rather than as schools of democracy, mediate the contribution that individuals make to the quality of democratic citizenship’ (Houtzager and Archarya 2009).

However, in the context of parallel communities, social action often strengthens the position of coercive mediators (rather than leading to a better quality of democratic citizenship).

Throughout this thesis, there have been examples of the ways that militias and the factions can co-opt social mobilisation in the favela, using the force of social action to enhance their position as mediators. While there are also counterexamples, it is important to emphasise that both possibilities exist: social action can lead to greater violence as well as greater citizenship, and these are not necessarily opposites. Politics become perverse because state intervention (whether via social programmes or through the police) can worsen the problem, and at the same time that social action can have the same effect. This analysis could apply to other settings in Latin America, where violence and democracy converge, described by Koonings and Krujit as the ‘inbuilt hybridity of legitimate institutions and extra-legal violence’ (Koonings and Krujit 2004: 15; see also Abello Collak and Pearce 2009).

In sum, this thesis has found that the perversity of politics that occurs in a context of violence has implications for citizen-state relations, such that features of political and social life that would normally be an indicator of greater citizenship and democracy can lead to the opposite. This shows the central importance of considering the levels of security and violence in relation to citizenship, a relationship often ignored in the literature. Violence is not incidental to citizenship but formative of many of its dimensions, leading to both its making and unmaking.
The effect of these features of place, the parallel nature of patterns of authority and the boundaries surrounding it, and the perversity of politics, combine to contribute to fragmented forms of citizenship. As Wacquant argues in relation to urban ghettos in the United States: ‘These two dimensions are closely intricated: the organizational ecology and capacity of a poor district helps determine the types and levels of objective and subjective insecurity; street violence, real or perceived, in turn affects the viability of local institutions and thence the life changes of those who rely upon them’(Wacquant 2008: 202).

**Fragmented citizenship**

In responding to the initial questions posed at the outset on how violence affects citizenship, the thesis has pointed to a number of ways. The meanings of citizenship, from the perspective of people living in the favela, become emptied out by violence. In particular, the fear and a sense of powerlessness that many people experience as a result of violence contributes to a strong belief that full citizenship does not have meaning. Combined with a lack of rights in other areas such as inadequate access to health care, education, employment opportunities, etc., violence in many ways negates a sense of citizenship at the level of the favelas, despite a strong national discourse on democratic citizenship. This directly informs how people enact their citizenship. Agency and the potential for social action within the favela become a double-edged sword, with many examples of social action contributing to the dynamics of violence and feeding into perverse politics. Violence perpetuates barriers to citizenship at different levels of socialisation, and citizenship is thus fragmented across the same levels of socialisation and experience. However, acts of citizenship that transcend the boundaries of parallel communities and articulate new kinds of relationships do occur. Even within a context pervaded by violence in the way the favelas are, there are still possibilities for transformative education, developing external networks and building greater accountability of the state and acts of citizenship can emerge through these possibilities.

State power itself is also fractured through the existence of anti-democratic patterns of authority that take hold in favelas partly through the use or the threat of the use of violence. The participatory analysis of sources of power showed how state power is very weak in many respects, but especially in the sense that there is no confidence in the state to bring about lasting positive changes or to guarantee rights. Within the favela, a different pattern of authority operates, based on the control of armed actors. This pattern of authority orders much of everyday life, controlling people’s use of public space as well as prospects for social mobilisation. As a result of these two factors, the legitimacy of state authority is weakened,
and socially-constructed authority for armed actors becomes prevalent. This fractures citizenship further by forcing citizens to negotiate with armed actors for access to their rights, and by limiting the capacity of the state to respond.

Coercive mediators, who rely on violence or the threat of violence, then control both how citizens are able to make claims on the state and also how the state and other external actors are able to intervene. Chapter 6 analysed how different combination of mediators operate within the context of the favela, and the ways in which coercive mediators can dominate these constellations of relationships between citizens and the state. The positioning of these mediators at the intersection between citizens and the state is a result of violence. Mediators intervene in social programmes and other state benefits, influencing how these are distributed. They also control who can mobilise both politically and socially and therefore who represents the community to the state. Coercive mediators undermine citizenship in some respects because they are not accountable to citizens for their actions or position. At the same time they are more effective than the state, in many cases, at delivering benefits and access to services. The entrenchment of coercive mediators within the favelas further fragments citizenship, creating a separate kind of relationship between citizens and mediators, cross-cutting between citizens and the state.
When considered in relation to the specificities of place, including the aspects of parallel community and the perversity of politics, the fragmentation of citizenship has a number of effects. There are extreme difficulties in sustaining social action for rights and accountability, because of the way that violence redefines the boundaries of political community and in some cases generates apathy. Moreover, as we have seen violence leads to parallel patterns of authority, supports coercive mediators who control social mobilisation, and limits acts of citizenship at different levels. In turn this means that it is also very difficult for citizens, either individually or collectively, to make claims on the state, not only because it is problematic for citizens to make themselves heard by the state, but also because of the weakness of the state in its ability to respond to those demands. And finally, it is also very difficult for citizens, either individually or collectively, to engage with participatory processes sponsored by the state. The lack of basic security often prevents people from participating, and this is further exacerbated by the lack of legitimate political authority on the part of the state means that citizens do not believe their formal participation is worthwhile. As one community leader said in the showing
of the participatory videos to national, state and city officials in March 2006 when they encouraged him to participate in the city and state-wide participatory councils: ‘We’re nowhere close to that.’ Fundamentally this means a lack of accountability, of the state to its citizens, of social mobilisations to their base, and of citizens to one another.

Low argues that democracy in the context of a city is ‘contesting the ways that citizens communicate power over different distances, how they oppose it, and hold it accountable’ (Low 2004: 144). The boundaries of parallel communities and the nature of perverse politics disrupt the distances over which citizens can hold the powerful to account. Within the favela, accountability is weakened by the prevailing patterns of authority based on violence, as argued in Chapter 5. Because of the lack of accountability within the context of the favela itself and the way that this shapes the overall relationship between the citizen and the state, this amplifies the problem into the wider dimensions of state accountability. Given the picture of citizenship that has emerged, democracy is also at risk because of the effects of violence (Appadurai 2002; Koonings and Krujit 2004; Pearce, McGee et al. 2010).

This thesis has also shown that fragmented citizenship is situated in and bounded by place. Parallel communities and the perverse politics that characterise them are also mutually reinforced by social exclusion and poverty. As a result of these specificities of place, citizenship is negotiated on one basis within the favelas and on another basis outside of the favelas. This leads to a situation where citizens navigate the political through their daily lives, sometimes through acts of citizenship, but also through the lack of such acts. What is needed is an expanded sense of the political that understands citizenship through the possibilities and limitations that operate across different spaces of socialisation (Holston 2008). This implies both the emancipatory and transcendent qualities of citizenship, but also its exclusionary and divisive potential.

This research emphasises how citizenship is a social process with a ‘multiplicity of communities’ (Desforges 2004: 551). At the level of some communities, violence can empty the meaning of citizenship, while strong discourses and practices of citizenship continue to function at the level of other communities. But at the level of the favela, the overall effect of these dynamics is a weakening of place and a retreat into an increasingly narrow sense of political community (Wacquant 2008).
Contribution to existing literatures

This view of citizenship is a significant contribution to the literatures set out in Chapter 2. In sum, this thesis has found that a context of violence has implications for citizen-state relations, such that features of political and social life that would normally be an indicator of greater citizenship and democracy can lead to the exact opposite in a context of violence. This shows the central importance of considering the levels of security and violence in relation to citizenship, a relationship often ignored in the literature. Violence is not incidental to citizenship but formative of many of its dimensions, leading to both its making and unmaking. This is a contribution to the existing literature of citizenship and violence, but it also helps to shed light on how people facing exclusion experience citizenship.

This thesis has further shown that violence interacts with citizens, the state and mediators to lead to forms of ‘fragmented’ citizenship. This view of citizenship as fragmented moves beyond the general categorisations of how citizenship is commonly theorised (as status in the liberal tradition, as civic republicanism, as a process of realising rights or articulating belonging). The resulting fragmented citizenship is simultaneously a presence of citizenship and its relative absence: certain dimensions of the citizen-state relationship function, others are distorted, and still others fail to function entirely.

This finding is an important contribution to some of the existing literatures. For the literature on citizenship, this thesis has shown how the formal boundaries of political community may be superseded in practice by informal but very entrenched boundaries, such as those between the favela and the asfalto, or the formal parts of the city. These boundaries have substantive implications for the practice and meanings of citizenship, as shown. For the literature on urban space and governance, this thesis has shown how the presence of a geographically specific pattern of authority exists in relation to the wider city, and the implications that this has for the possibilities for democracy and citizenship. In relation to the literature on violence, this is an important contribution because there is very little work that considers the micro-level political implications of violence. A particular contribution of this thesis is to link Pearce’s earlier work on spaces of socialisation and the reproduction of violence to dimensions of the practice and meaning of citizenship. Each of these points move beyond the debates about the formal level of political community to focus on how the boundaries of patterns of authority and state power are shaped directly by violence, in turn creating forms of perverse politics, explored above.
Power and knowledge: understanding the outcomes of participatory action research in terms of citizen engagement

Finally, we turn now to consideration of the fourth and final research question: what have been the outcomes of using participatory action research as a methodology for researching citizenship and violence? It is important to note that the outcomes of participatory action research, and indeed of citizen action, are not easily measured (McGee and Gaventa 2011). There is a significant body of practice engaged with the challenges of evaluating these kinds of outcomes (Earl, Carden et al. 2001). This includes the often long-term nature of impact, making participatory action research difficult to assess in the short-term. The focus of this concluding section is to explore in what ways the process of participatory action research could contribute to citizen engagement, or to the strengthening of citizenship, and how the context of violence affected this, if at all. This involves examining how knowledge was created through the research process and why this matters to the outcomes of citizen engagement. This will not provide a definitive evaluation of impact or outcomes, as that was not possible within the constraints of this research.

In order to suggest how this research could contribute to citizen action, it is necessary to first clarify which dimensions of citizen action would be most likely to be implicated through the research process. Based on over 100 case studies on citizen engagement conducted as part of the Citizenship DRC, Gaventa and Barrett developed a useful classification of types of outcomes of citizen engagement (Gaventa and Barrett 2010).50 These include: the construction of citizenship, the strengthening of practices of participation, the strengthening of responsive and accountable state, and the development of inclusive and cohesive societies. This disaggregation of the outcomes of citizen engagement is useful in terms of suggesting where the contributions of an action research process may lie. First, as Gaventa and Barrett, point out, increased awareness (civic and political knowledge and greater sense of empowerment and agency) is a key first step towards citizen action. First and foremost, this participatory action research approach can lead to changes in people’s perceptions of themselves. Central to potential for the construction of citizenship is how a participatory action research builds the knowledge of those involved. This is relates to the issue of who controls how knowledge is generated and who makes use of that knowledge as part of the

50 Gaventa and Barrett note that for each of these potential outcomes, there can be both positive and negative contributions from citizen engagement. This section focuses on where the positive contributions of the research may be found. In the case of a full evaluation, it would be crucial to consider both positive and negative outcomes.
research process (Reason and Bradbury 2001). As participants have more control over how their knowledge is produced and used, there should be greater opportunities for them to make use of this knowledge.

If the external researcher retains primary control over the results and there is no basis for community researchers or participants to use the information and knowledge generated, than this research cannot be considered participatory and would be less likely to contribute to the greater awareness required for the construction of citizenship. There may be different sets of results and while I may use one set of results in a certain way for this thesis, there are equally important, parallel, and complementary sets of results that will be used by the community researchers and the research participants themselves (Gaventa and Cornwall 2008). For example, one community researcher showed the participatory video on violence we produced during the research process at a course sponsored by the municipal government designed to create dialogue between police and community leaders in Rio de Janeiro. There was significant interest from other community leaders to carry out a similar process in their communities. Beyond this, involvement in the research process entailed a shift in how the researchers saw themselves and how they understood their role within their community:

‘When I joined this project, I thought: this is it! This is what our community has been waiting for. Now I realise that this project will help, but it can’t help everything. But I can take what I’ve learned and use it again. People here don’t know what citizenship means or what rights they should have—but we all know what it means to live with dignity.’ –Wagner, community researcher in Guaporé, field diary, 8 March 2007

Another potential contribution of the participatory aspects of the research to citizen engagement centres on the expanded networks and capacity for mobilisation described in Chapter 4. As the research process brought together people from diverse backgrounds, identities, and locations, it helped to create the basis for a thicker network crossing these boundaries. Gaventa and Barrett point to the importance of increased capacities for collective action and the deepening of networks and solidarities as central to how practices of participation are enhanced. In this sense, the process of participatory action research was critically important as it involved the building of trust between different groups. The lack of such networks has been identified as a major contributing factor to the perpetuation of violence and lack of rights and accountability for citizens (Arias 2007). As noted in Chapter 4, participants rated these new connections and forms of solidarity very highly in terms of the outcomes of their research. The importance of these networks for addressing violence became the subject of one of the participatory videos created by the research group in
Quitungo and Guaporé.

The research approach demonstrated both some of the limitations and possibilities of a community research group itself as a mechanism for social action. It did this in part by bringing together leaders from different geographical areas of the community. It went some ways towards helping this group to articulate a common agenda for action, which is also something that has been missing. However there are two large questions around the sustainability of this group and the role of external catalysts in the process. In the case of Quitungo and Guaporé, it is unclear who will take up the leadership of the group and how its potential for social action will be sustained. As an external catalyst, I helped to push this process forwards, although the community researchers themselves had already been working for many years (in some cases) on particular and often very limited spheres of social action. The group needs a leader to help to link together the different community activists and leaders who have maintained their neutrality from the militia. But it has been very difficult for this kind of cohesion to emerge.

It is useful to compare the two field sites. In Santa Teresa, the communities have relatively strong internal organisations and community-based organisations aimed at improving lives of residents, while in Quitungo and Guaporé there are very weak internal organisation and the strongest community-based organisation is predicated on violence. The favelas in Santa Teresa have been much more effective at making demands on the government and other external actors and have succeeded in attracting numerous government projects and NGO programmes. Despite the very high levels of violence in Quitungo and Guaporé, the communities have not been able to attract even a fraction of these activities. This is in large part due to the weakness of the community leadership structure (as separate from the armed actors). In Quitungo and Guaporé there is an on-going challenge of maintaining legitimacy in the face of the armed groups, of establishing a shared agenda across the different community leaders who are neutral, and a constant process of undermining one another. The research process offered a space where some of these obstacles could be overcome for a short time, in large part because I acted as an external catalyst to help create that space and balance these tensions. The question that remains will be what will now happen as I have distanced myself from the process, and what advances, if any the group will now make.
In terms of strengthening the accountability of the state and contributing to a more accountable and inclusive society, the participatory action research approach also opened the opportunity for interaction with the state by including often excluded voices and forms of knowledge in policy dialogues, as explored earlier through the descriptions of the debates. Other research in violent contexts shows the strengths of participatory research in contributing to policy approaches (Winton 2004). There is a lack of strong empirical research on violence in Rio de Janeiro, particularly on the militias since they are a very recent phenomenon. Because this methodological approach provided strong empirical research into a difficult and sensitive context which directly relates to current policy debates around public security and violence, this research has the potential to contribute to policy at the both the municipal and state levels. Currently the government is trying to address both human development (social exclusion) and the violence and security issues in separate and often contradictory ways. There is a need for research that can connect to both of these areas and create a dialogue with policy makers that draws the two together. Participatory research can contribute in two ways: by generating information and insights that can be useful for policy decisions, and also by helping to build the capacity for community residents to act as interlocutors with the government. The series of debates we organised between community residents and high-level policy-makers addresses both of these dimensions (as described in this chapter). As argued in Chapter 4, violence creates specific barriers to acts of citizenship and this limits the potential interlocutors with the state. This methodological approach helped to support existing community activists to become more able to play this role.

In order to have a productive dialogue with policy makers (at the municipal, state, or other level), interlocutors between the favelas and government institutions are key. Because of the power structures described earlier, the question of who acts as interlocutors and their legitimacy becomes extremely complicated. As described in Chapter 4, there is a struggle over who the legitimate representatives are within favelas, and it is difficult for government institutions to identify these from the outside. Anyone who claims to speak for the community with external actors (including the state), must have some kind of negotiated arrangement with the dominant mediators within the favela (whether drug traffickers or the militia). In the case of the militia, because they have specific political aspirations, they are reluctant to allow others to take on this role. Given these constraints, the spaces opened for dialogue between citizens and aspects of the state were even more important. The participatory action research approach led to this possibility, because it helped to articulate people’s experiences and views on violence and citizenship. These views gained legitimacy because of how they were
generated, and participants themselves could share them in an interactive way with representatives of the government.

The research project did help to open space for dialogue, both between people within the communities involved and more broadly with different aspects of the state. While important, a series of policy debates is not sufficient to shift entrenched inequalities in how decisions are made and chronic gaps in accountability. The important question is what will happen in the longer term. This relates to the question of how community researchers will make use of the research results. Given the way that government agencies work, a single space for debate is not enough—there needs to be on-going pressure on different fronts. There are many misperceptions within the government contributing to the stigma surrounding favelas. This is a well-documented aspect of public policy in many poor urban areas (see Palmer et al 2004, and Fraser 1996). Generating information and knowledge at the community level is an important first step but it is not sufficient for significant policy changes without further pressure. This requires legitimate interlocutors from the community as well as more accountable state institutions that can engage with them (see Chapter 5).

The complexities that violence brings to participatory action research are many, and have been explored throughout this thesis. To conclude, this section brings together some of the key aspects of how violence affects the potential contributions of participatory action research. Involving community residents in the research process provides access to perspectives and knowledge that would otherwise be inaccessible by more traditional research methods with the potential to contribute to citizen engagement, but using this approach in a context of violence also raises numerous ethical considerations around risk and fear, as addressed in Chapters 3 and 4. It exposes the research process to the complex micropolitics operating at the community level and can risk reinforcing existing patterns of exclusion and patronage, as explored in Chapters 3, 5 and 6. As the external researcher, I had to find a balance between building and sustaining trust crucial to the research process and towards supporting citizen action, and taking into account the structural factors, including violence, that limit this.

This research process exposed the contingency of information within contexts of violence. In particular it emphasised how existing social relationships within the community and the relationships between the researcher and the researched informs and limits what kind of knowledge is generated. Both of these dimensions are important in understanding how participatory research functions within a context of violence. Because this research occurred
within context of violence, it was subject to the same rules (established through the violent mediating actors) that govern everyday life for people living in the communities involved, even as it tried to create a space where these can be subverted.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has summarised the argument made in this thesis in relation to the four research questions posed at the outset and consolidated the relevance of the spatial dimension in how this argument is made. It has demonstrated how parallel communities and perverse politics result from and contribute to fragmented citizenship. It has also outlined the main contributions of this thesis to the existing literature on citizenship, urban governance and violence. Finally, it has explored the dimensions of how participatory action research can contribute to citizen engagement in a context of violence, and some of the limitations to this.

At the outset, this thesis argues that the most appropriate analytical approach to citizenship for this context is to see citizenship as the interaction between normative elements and actual practice shaped by aspects of place. This thesis therefore combined a geographically located understanding of citizenship with the analysis of how violence affects broader citizen-state relationships. What the resulting analysis suggests is that such an engaged understanding of citizenship which is sensitive to the nuances of these interactions also requires a broader and less institutional understanding of politics in order to take account of power relations, particular to violence, but also relevant to other settings of exclusion. In these settings, local forms of governance and the patterns of authority that accompany them do not equate with the formal government. This analysis also highlights the contradictory tendencies incorporated into citizenship—both exclusionary and inclusionary, as social action in a context of violence can both contribute to violence and to greater peace. This mirrors the same kind of contradictory tendencies of violence itself. Violence both constitutes order and undoes order: ‘...order is necessary for managing violence as much as the threat of violence is crucial in cementing order’ (Kalyvas, Shapiro et al. 2008: 1). In the same way, this thesis has demonstrated the role of violence in both the making and unmaking of citizenship.

I chose a participatory action research methodology for ethical (potential to contribute to citizenship) and empirical reasons (access to open discussions and communities controlled by violent actors), as explained in Chapter 3. But the relevance of the method in later analysis became even greater as it became clear that the research process functioned as a microcosm in which to test the research questions, themselves. Because the participatory process is so
embedded in a social context, and the approach to citizenship taken here was also trying to see citizenship from an equally embedded perspective, the research process was able to provide insights into the analytical questions in terms of both the positive and negative aspects of social action to reduce violence. This conclusion has pointed to some of the ways that a participatory action research process can contribute to citizen engagement, given a context of violence. In this process lies some hope, despite its vagaries, for how to articulate greater citizenship in a context of fragmentation. A meaningful approach to increasing citizenship must engage at the local level with the realities of the power dynamics and structures of governance (even if they are not democratic), but in a more sustained way than possible in a very time limited research process. Fundamentally, attempts to democratise relationships within the favela must build on the residents’ clear and persistent desire for a better life and people’s own belief in their capacity to act as citizens despite the obstacles.
Chapter 8 / Bibliography


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