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HUMAN SECURITY ASSEMBLAGES IN GLOBAL POLITICS

THE MATERIALITY AND INSTABILITY OF BIOPOLITICAL GOVERNMENTALITY IN THAILAND AND VIETNAM

Nadine Voelkner

Submitted for the degree of DPhil International Relations, University of Sussex, Feb 2012
Human Security Assemblages in Global Politics: The Materiality and Instability of Biopolitical Governmentality in Thailand and Vietnam

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the implications of human security on global politics. While it adopts a Foucauldian analytics of governmentality and biopolitics, the thesis differs from biopolitical accounts of human security. These accounts tend to reduce human security to a coherent, totalizing, and inadvertently successful mode of governance, deemphasizing its situatedness and instability. In contrast, by complementing the Foucauldian approach to the study of human security with a Deleuzian lens of machinic assemblage in which materiality is particularly emphasized, the thesis argues that the governmental logic of human security gives rise to a multiplicity of open-ended vernacular assemblages and associated orders of governance. Though these assemblages are particular, messy, contingent systems which vacillate, undermine themselves, clash and hybridize with surrounding assemblages, this does not render them ineffective. When the object of analysis is the global, a focus on the materiality of events helps to explore how the global is localized. A focus on materiality opens up the opportunity to explore how the local materializes. This interplay between localizations and materializations disrupts the logics that underlie governmental processes. In this way, the thesis demonstrates how the intransigence of life constantly escapes and readjusts the biopolitical imperative. Empirically, the thesis traces the way human security materializes as a situated governmental strategy in emerging assemblages for managing pathogenic and illicit circulations relating to global migrant communities in Thailand and Vietnam. It shows the way the intricate and productive as well as destructive interplay of human and nonhuman elements inherent to the assemblages helped to constitute two vernacular orders of human security and associated political subjectivities.

Keywords: Human security, governmentality, assemblage, materiality, complexity, global governance, migrant health, human trafficking
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CECEM</td>
<td>Vietnam – Centre for Community Empowerment (Vietnam)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGG</td>
<td>Commission on Global Governance</td>
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<td>CHS</td>
<td>Commission on Human Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Thailand – Chief Medical Officer</td>
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<td>DfID</td>
<td>UK – Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DOLISA</td>
<td>Vietnam – Department of Labour – Invalids and Social Invalids</td>
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<td>DOSEP</td>
<td>Vietnam – Department of Social Evils Prevention</td>
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<td>FHS</td>
<td>Friends of Human Security</td>
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<td>Folder</td>
<td>Thailand – Migrant Health Folder</td>
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<td>GMS</td>
<td>Greater Mekong Subregion</td>
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<td>HIS</td>
<td>Thailand – Health Information System</td>
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<td>HSN</td>
<td>Human Security Network</td>
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<td>HSU</td>
<td>Human Security Unit, United Nations</td>
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<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Information, Education, Communication</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IPEC</td>
<td>International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour</td>
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<td>MCHV</td>
<td>Thailand – Migrant Community Health Volunteer</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>MCHW</td>
<td>Thailand – Migrant Community Health Worker</td>
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<td>MHIS</td>
<td>Thailand – Migrant Health Information System</td>
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<td>MOLISA</td>
<td>Vietnam – Ministry of Labour – Invalids and Social Affairs</td>
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<td>MOPH</td>
<td>Vietnam – Ministry of Public Health</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Vietnam – Ministry of Public Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>Vietnam – National Plan of Action against Trafficking</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>PHO</td>
<td>Thailand – Public Health Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>TICW</td>
<td>ILO Mekong Sub-regional Project to Combat Trafficking in Children and Women</td>
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<td>Vietnam – Vietnamese Women’s Union</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>UNTFHS</td>
<td>United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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In recent post-Cold War international relations, the concept of human security has increasingly influenced the governance of conflict and poverty in the world. Set against the traditional geopolitical programme of state security, the human security agenda to promote life over states and their means of destruction has been presented as more suitable to manage the complex interdependency and transnationality of insecurity associated with contemporary violence and underdevelopment. This has led many of those debating human security to argue that its agenda to secure life as an end itself, and not as a means to the end of the state, is eroding the state and state sovereignty. Yet, in contrast to this, the thesis finds, the state and what falls within its competency remains central to the governance agenda associated with human security. What, then, is the distinctive political logic associated with human security as a means to govern contemporary insecurities? In answer to this question, in this introduction, the thesis turns first to the agenda-setting document that initially introduced the concept of human security: Human Development Report 1994 (UNDP, 1994). It then suggests reading the governance agenda around human security emerging from this document in terms of a governmental logic which is giving rise to security practices that are constituting specific forms of political subjectivity including the 'human' and 'the state' that are making up a curious global political order. In order to trace and analyse this effect of human security in the world, it proposes a method to approach both the text of large-scale national and international policies as well as, and in many ways more importantly so, the vernacular micropolitics of human security. Finally, it sets out the way the thesis proceeds to show how human security manages contemporary insecurities.

THE BIRTH OF HUMAN INSECURITIES

In 1994, a range of issues concerning the everyday life of people including unemployment, famine, diseases, air pollution, earthquakes, flooding, industrial and traffic accidents, rape, and gun crimes were the subject of a chapter entitled ‘New Dimensions of Human Security’
published by the UNDP in that year’s *Human Development Report* (HDR 1994). The authors presented these issues as threats to human security. Human security was to represent a profound transition in thinking about security, namely from “an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security”. Rather than taking the state as the security referent as was hitherto customary in security thinking (see e.g. Buzan, 1991), they took life itself as the referent of security. The end of the Cold War, they argued, afforded recognition that many conflicts happened within countries rather than between countries with their origins lying in increasing socio-economic hardship and inequalities, threatening the ability of people in both developing and developed countries to live fulfilling lives (see e.g. Kaldor, 2006). Secondly, they reasoned, under conditions of globalization, these everyday deprivations and disparities are not only interdependent but also transnational in nature: they are “no longer isolated events, confined within national borders. Their consequences travel the globe”. States alone, they noted, are incapable of managing issues relating to the transnationalization of human insecurities. On this basis, they challenged the obsession with military threats and military responses in late Cold War and early post-Cold War security studies and security policy, arguing that security in post-Cold War life means protection from everyday threats such as disease and crime more than “from the dread of a cataclysmic world event” (UNDP, 1994:22). Indeed, they questioned the state-centrism in both security and development discourses, noting that states too can be perpetrators of human insecurity.

In order to emphasize the variety and complexity of perceived threats to people’s security in contemporary daily life, the authors of the HDR 1994 quoted men, women, and children from around the world on their views about security. A man in Namibia is quoted as saying: “Robberies make me feel insecure. I sometimes feel as though even my life will be stolen”. A shoe-mender in Thailand is quoted as saying: “When we have enough for our children to eat, we are happy and we feel secure”. A fourth-grade schoolgirl in Ghana is quoted as exclaiming: “I shall feel secure when I know that I can walk the streets at night without being raped”. A man in Ecuador is quoted as noting: “What makes you feel insecure above all is violence and delinquency – as well as insecurity with respect to the police. Basic services are also an important part of security” (UNDP, 1994:23). From the long list of perceived threats to people’s security, the authors identified seven main categories from which, they claimed, people everywhere, “in rich nations and poor,” must be freed to achieve human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political insecurity. In their equation, the threat of physical violence was only one of many elements which render people insecure including those threatening people’s welfare and quality of life more generally. Though their intensity may differ in
different parts of the world, the authors noted, “all these threats to human security are real and growing” (UNDP, 1994:22-5).

Economic insecurity was associated with a lack of job security, unemployment, lack of a social safety net and social security, precarious employment opportunities, disability. Food insecurity referred to a lack of access to food, poor food distribution, malnutrition. Health insecurity involved poor nutrition, diet and lifestyle, environmental causes such as pollution, lack of access to health services, the circulation of communicable diseases such as associated with HIV and SARS. Environmental insecurity pertained to the degradation of local and global ecosystems, lack of clean water, air pollution, deforestation, catastrophes such as Chernobyl, drought, migrations to cyclone-, earthquake- or flood-prone areas. Personal insecurity was associated with threats from the state such as physical torture, interstate war, ethnic tension, rape, domestic violence, child abuse, suicide, drug use, (violent) crime, industrial or traffic accidents, workplace, sexual harassment. Community insecurity concerned dynamics in a family, community and/or organisation including genital mutilation, discrimination against indigenous peoples, interethnic strife. Finally, political insecurity related to violations against human rights, political repression, systematic torture, ill treatment, disappearance, press unfreedom. The authors of the HDR 1994 suggested, there are considerable links and overlaps between these different forms of insecurities. In their words, “A threat to one element of human security is likely to travel – like an angry typhoon – to all forms of human security” (UNDP, 1994:25-33).

Secondly, in order to stress the transnationality of the different interdependent forms of human insecurities identified, the authors suggested that advanced technology, instant global communication, travel, and finance, while widening people’s choices and increasing their participation in emerging world events, also made possible the globalization of insecurities. In the words of the authors (UNDP, 1994:1):

The threats to human security are no longer just personal or local or national. They are becoming global: with drugs, AIDS, terrorism, pollution, nuclear proliferation. Global poverty and environmental problems respect no national border. Their grim consequences travel the world.

They pointed out, for example, environmental threats like land degradation, deforestation and the emission of greenhouse gases affect climatic conditions around the globe. They noted, for example, that the trade in drugs in turn draws millions of people in different corners of the world, producers and consumers, into a linked cycle of violence and dependency. Similarly, according to them, inequalities between countries encourage
people to migrate whether or not they are welcomed at their destinations. Frustrations over inequalities may also, they claimed, foster religious fundamentalism, even terrorism. Pathogens, they noted, can travel with migrants, bringing incurable diseases to any corner of the world.

In essence, the report attempted to demonstrate that the security priorities of a globalizing post-Cold War world marked by global flows, complex interdependency and transnationality are notably different to those of the bygone bipolar world of the Cold War, thus necessitating a profound shift in thought. Based on their comprehensive definition of security, the authors surmised that the real threats in the 21st century will “arise more from the actions of millions of people than from aggression by a few nations”. From their point of view, in 1994, human security everywhere or what they referred to as ‘global human security’ is threatened by unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, excessive international migration, environmental degradation, drug production and trafficking, and international terrorism (UNDP, 1994:34). Noting the absence of global safeguards against the complex and interdependent threats to global human security, they concluded their analysis with recommendations for how to enhance global human security in the 21st century. In order to meet the threats to contemporary global life, they argued, not only was a conceptual shift in security necessary, in fact, a new “edifice of global security” driven by this people-centred formulation of security was required.

Ultimately, the ambitious objective of the HDR 1994 was to make the case for building an intergovernmental global security framework that would respond to “the threat of global poverty travelling across international borders in the form of drugs, HIV/AIDS, climate change, illegal migration and terrorism” (UNDP, 1994:24). In the authors’ view,

> Over the past five decades, humankind gradually built up an edifice of global security – an edifice of nuclear deterents, power balances, strategic alliances, regional security pacts and international policing through the superpowers and the United Nations. Much of this global security framework now needs change. In its place – or, at least, by its side – must be raised a new, more encompassing structure to ensure the security of all people the world over.

What they had in mind specifically was an “institutional framework of global governance” oriented around development and led by a strengthened United Nations (UN) system and the Bretton Woods institutions that would “[defend] the new frontiers of human security”
These afforded an approach which sought to secure life itself and not as a means to secure the end of the state. In the end, the authors asserted, “The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives” (UNDP, 1994:1-11).

THE DIFFRACTION OF HUMAN SECURITY

As presented in the HDR 1994, human security was not only put forward as a new way of thinking about issues affecting the everyday life of people under contemporary post-Cold War conditions of globalization. It was also introduced as a way to manage what were presented as threats to global human security, namely, and most overtly, by promoting an ambitious intergovernmental framework of global governance. In fact, the HDR 1994 was written as a basis for the UNDP’s contribution to the World Summit for Social Development held in the following year, 1995, in Copenhagen, at a time when the UN was to celebrate its 50th anniversary and was to review and define its goals for the coming 21st century (UNDP, 1994). Concurrently that year, the UN-funded Commission on Global Governance (CGG) published its report, Our Global Neighbourhood, in which it made recommendations to reform the UN in order to “build a more effective system of world security and governance”: global governance (1995:359). Though the concept of human security has since had considerable effect on thinking and action within and outside the emerging UN-led architecture of global governance, in fact, the comprehensive formulation as developed in the HDR 1994 initially faltered at the World Summit where delegates preferred a vague language absolved of concrete financial and political commitments (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006:149, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:23). Indeed, for a time, and in view of compelling physical threats to people in the 1990s in the onset of civil conflicts around the world shortly after the Cold War, a narrow formulation of human security concentrating mainly on people’s rights and the protection of people from personal and political insecurities especially in conflict situations took precedence.

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1 This new ambitious institutional framework was to adopt a range of measures that included drawing up a new world social charter, new objectives for development, the reduction of military spending, disarmament, and the reallocation of resources from the peace dividend to development, a global human security fund to finance international responses, and an economic security council alongside the existing Security Council. UNDP, The. (1994) Human Development Report 1994. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
In terms of advocacy for narrow conceptualizations of human security, the campaign against landmines is seen as a successful example. Under the leadership of Lloyd Axworthy, then Canadian Foreign Minister and a champion advocate of human security, in partnership with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (CALM), a coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) launched in 1992, the Ottawa Treaty - *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction* – came into force in 1999. That same year, an alliance of ‘like-minded’ countries – Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thailand, with South Africa as an observer – emerged from the landmines campaign to form the Human Security Network (HSN). Their collective efforts helped to promote the creation of the International Criminal Court (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:23). In this sense, the invocation of human security helped to assemble transnational networks comprising governments and non-governmental organizations to respond to common concerns. In fact, the HSN’s concerns have fallen between the narrow and broad formulations of human security including the protection of children in armed conflict, the control of small arms and light weapons, the fight against transnational organized crime, human development and human security. Yet, between 2001 and 2003, the narrow formulation of human security took precedence again in the debate on the ‘responsibility to protect’ led by the Canadian International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which recommended humanitarian intervention to respond to gross and systematic violations of human rights.

On the other hand, concurrently, at the end of the 1990s and in response to the ongoing transnational repercussions of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Japanese Government began reinitiating discussions around the ‘responsibility for development’ as argued for in the HDR 1994 (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:23). In 1999, together with the UN Secretariat, it launched the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), initially to fund general UN development initiatives in areas such as health, education, agriculture and small-scale infrastructure development (HSU, 2011). Meanwhile, in 2000, at the UN Millennium Summit, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, once again echoing the HDR 1994’s sentiment regarding the globalization of insecurities, campaigned for a framework of global governance premised on a people-centred form of security (Annan, 2000). These activities culminated in the establishment of the independent international Commission on Human Security (CHS) in 2001. The CHS was formally established by the Government of Japan and informally endorsed by Kofi Annan (Chen et al., 2003:viii). Co-chaired by former UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Madame Sadako Ogata, and Nobel Prize economist, Professor Amartya Sen, both of whom had previously also
advised the CGG, the CHS sought to clarify the concept of human security by drawing on the HDR 1994, advance public discussion on security in people’s lives, and propose actions that governments, international agencies, and other institutions might take to further human security. It released its own report in 2003, *Human Security Now*.

Human security, as the CHS explained, is about the inclusion of people and their everyday concerns for security in processes of (global) governance (CHS, 2003:149). Towards this purpose, in 2004, the Human Security Unit (HSU) was established at the UN Secretariat in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to manage the UNTFHS with the overall objective of mainstreaming the concept of human security throughout the UN bureaucracy and translating it into concrete UN associated activities (HSU, 2009). It is in this sense that the then Chief of the HSU, Kazuo Tase, suggested in 2007, “*Human security is a logic!*” The task of the HSU is to institutionalize the human security logic within the UN system.  

To date, the UNTFHS has committed over USD 350 million to UN-associated human security projects managed by UN and UN-associated agencies in over seventy countries, disseminating and embedding the human security outlook with variable effect – as I go on to demonstrate in two case studies in chapters four and five – to South and Central America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast and East Asia. The aim of these projects is the management of threats to human security arising from diverse issues, most generally to do either with conflict, underdevelopment, and/or transnational issues. As the CHS writes, “The existing international security system is not designed to prevent and deal effectively with the new types of security threats” (CHS, 2003:23). In a world of ‘growing interdependence and transnational issues,’ a new global alliance is needed in which “the institutional policies that link individuals and the state – and the state with a global world” are strengthened (CHS, 2003:2-5). As this thesis will demonstrate, this attempt to link individuals and the state, and the state with a global world constitutes a central feature in the logic of human

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2 Interview with Kazuo Tase, Chief, HSU, New York (October 3, 2007)

3 The UNTFHS has funded human security projects in South and Central America (including Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Peru), Sub-Saharan-Africa (including Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, The Gambia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe), the Balkans (including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo), Eastern Europe (Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine), Middle East (Lebanon occupied Palestinian territories), Central Asia (Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), and Southeast and East Asia (Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam). HSU. (2011) ‘Untfhs’ Activities around the World. New York: United Nations.
security as practiced by UN agencies and affiliated organizations in UNTFHS-funded activities.

Since the popularization of human security in the HDR 1994 and in spite of continuing definitional disagreement, an extensive bureaucracy of (inter-) government agencies and networks, non-governmental organizations, academic centres, international commissions, financial institutions, and grassroots and civil society groups eager to define, fund and realize human security, has emerged within the UN-led architecture of global governance. Generally, while human security advocates can agree in principle that the vulnerability associated with physical violence and abuse constitutes elementary human insecurity, in other words, human security is ‘freedom from fear,’ disagreement exists over the extent to which other vulnerabilities associated with contemporary life can also be considered security issues. Some, such as agencies associated with the UN, maintain the necessity to address structural inadequacies such as poverty and to take into consideration transnational issues contributing to people’s insecurity. In this extended understanding, human security means also ‘freedom from want’. For these advocates, the concept of human security is an umbrella term for the set of issues associated with community, food, economic, environmental, health, personal and political insecurities as first raised by the HDR 1994. Despite this intellectual discord about what constitutes human security, as Hampson et al have argued, “[i]n reality, many human security initiatives, [...] tend to fall somewhere between the narrower and the broader definitions of human security” (Hampson et al., 2002:5).

**AN EMANCIPATORY OR INTERVENTIONARY CONCEPT?**

human security according to their own cultural contexts (Jolly and Ray, 2006). Yet, as Grayson has argued, the search for a 'workable' definition of human security itself ought to be examined since it is suffused with relations of power (Grayson, 2004, 2008).

Considering its political implications, human security has been heralded as an emancipatory and empowering concept which puts individuals and their needs rather than state interests at the centre of international policy making. Much like the HDR 1994, Jolly and Ray (Jolly and Ray, 2006) have argued that human security addresses newly emerging security challenges which traditional state-centric approaches with their formal commitments to non-intervention and sovereign immunity are increasingly unable to deal with (cf. Bellamy and McDonald, 2002, Jolly and Ray, 2006, Roberts, 2010). Within this context, for example, a number of scholars have also emphasized the space for gender sensitivity that human security is said to create such as in relation to human trafficking and girl and boy soldiers in international security (see also Clark, 2003, Fox, 2004, Hoogensen and Stuyvoy, 2006, Jonsson, 2008, O’Connell Davidson, 2008, Truong et al., 2007). As such, as others have observed, human security signifies the democratization of security and international relations in so far as people become partners in the pursuit of a common global security (Axworthy, 2001, Evans, 2004, Hampson, 2004).

On the other hand, it has been criticized as being used to justify intervention and introduce harsh foreign and domestic policies in order to achieve human security (see e.g. Bain, 2000). Chandler and McCormack and others have argued that human security authorizes geopolitical interventions on the basis not of vulnerability but of threats to the interests of powerful Western states, thereby reinforcing rather than challenging the existing distribution of power in international politics (Chandler, 2008:465-6, McCormack, 2008). Resonating with this argument, biopolitical accounts of human security, which I consider in more detail in chapter 2, go further in presenting human security as a governmental technology which works to set up an environment in which communities particularly in the global South can live according to the need to govern that specific narratives about global security necessitate (see e.g. Alt, 2011, Berman, 2007, de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008, Duffield and Waddell, 2006, Elbe, 2009, Grayson, 2008, Roberts, 2010).

Human security has also been argued to challenge the precepts of international order by questioning the role of the sovereign state as principal provider of security. The impetus to control civil populations through human security justifies intervention by the international community when a state fails to fulfil its obligations. Some scholars argue that a fast changing world necessitates adjustments to the international order such as the
recognition that security is now the responsibility of a multiplicity of actors including the state (Liotta, 2005, Mack, 2002, Paris, 2001). More often than not, however, the debate about the erosion of the state and state sovereignty has raised alarmist accounts about international security as such. In response to this, however, Buzan has noted that while human security challenges the role of the sovereign state, it retains a state-centric outlook (Buzan, 2004). Taking this further, some biopolitical accounts of human security argue that it is reconstituting and consolidating a global order in which the state and sovereignty remain central (see e.g. Duffield, 2007, Voelkner, 2010).

**HUMAN SECURITY AS GOVERNMENTALITY**

Human security is a governmental logic that is concerned with the management of conflict and underdevelopment through mechanisms of global governance. Implicit in human security is an aspiration to shift political authority away from the traditional centre of the nation-state to multilayered, networked configurations with, and through, a host of (inter)governmental, para-governmental, nongovernmental, and private organizations. Indeed, accounts of global governance including human security often rely on the idea of a shift in the locus of political power and authority. However, they fail to capture a significant aspect of the functioning of power in contemporary world politics, namely, how the discourse of global governance also reconstitutes existing political subjectivities including the state giving rise to new iterations of the latter. Within this context, studies of governmentality have offered a critique of, and an alternative to, theories and discourses of global governance, firstly, by critically examining the connection between the notion of governance and its associated political imaginary, secondly, by drawing attention to the diverse governmental assemblages that seek to order political reality, but which are occluded by the global governance paradigm. I consider these in more detail in chapter one. The English publication of Foucault’s lectures series, *Security, Territory, Population* and *The Birth of Biopolitics*, has opened up a number of new directions for such critical analyses of governmental assemblages and their relation to broader questions of power and world order. Considering this, in this thesis, I adopt a Foucauldian analytics of governmentality to the global governance of human security. As a governmental assemblage, human security produces, disseminates, consumes, and refines meaning and understanding of how to interpret and, consequently, how to do things that then govern conduct in the world.
Foucault’s Governmentality

The concept of governmentality must first be understood in terms of Foucault’s understanding of power as productive. According to Foucault (Foucault, 2002:120),

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasures, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.

Power is understood here not as an exclusively repressive quality that can be possessed and controlled by the will of an a priori institution or subject but as an all-pervasive enabling as well as disabling process, in which subjects and objects are constituted. It applies itself to the immediate everyday life, categorizing individuals and communities, imposing regimes of truth on them (Foucault, 2002:331). These regimes constitute governmental assemblages4 that are “thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble[s] consisting of discourses, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid” (Foucault, 1980:194) that make individuals subjects, that is, “subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (Foucault, 2002:331). Recounting Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari note, power exists in the ‘micrological fabric’ “as diffuse, dispersed, geared down, miniaturized, perpetually displaced, acting by fine segmentation, working in detail and in the details of detail” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:247). Thus, Foucault’s conception of power shifts attention away from actors and institutions brandishing sovereign power to their constitution through micro-practices of power.

While Foucault’s work mostly dealt with ‘relatively local and microscopic analyses’ of power, towards the end of the 1970s, he became interested in the state and power. He concluded the 1977 lecture series, Security, Territory, Population, with the note that all he wanted to do that year was “a little experiment of method” that would show how starting from the microphysics of power it was possible to return to “the general problems of the

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4 Throughout his work, Foucault used the terms assemblage, dispositif, apparatus, ensemble, and complex interchangeably to refer to the whole which comprises the set of heterogeneous elements which come to gather around a specific problem such as human security, migrant health, and human trafficking. I use the term assemblage throughout this thesis in order to draw a sustained link to the Deleuzian notion of machinic assemblage.
state. The state and inter-state order were not a “transcendent reality whose history could be undertaken on the basis of itself”. They are not already given subjects but are formed by practices. Accordingly, it was “on the basis of men’s actual practice, on the basis of what they do and how they think” that Foucault developed his account of the constitution of the modern state and European order (Foucault, 2007:358). Putting it differently, instead of “starting with universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices,” Foucault started with the practices. What if the state and inter-state order do not exist? Assuming they do not exist, then, what can we make of these different events and practices which seemed to have organized around what is supposed to be the state and the early modern inter-state order? As he later noted: “I do, I want to, I must do without a theory of the state, as one can and must forgo an indigestible meal” (Foucault, 2008:76-7)

Reflecting on Foucault’s method, Veyne argues, “we tend to overlook the practice and see only the objects that reify it in our eyes” (Veyne, 1997:156). We need to stop believing in the self-evidence of objects such as ‘states’ or ‘the governed,’ he contends; we need to reduce these objects to ordinary experience. Things, objects, are only correlatives of practices. The illusion of a natural object conceals the heterogeneous character of practices” (Veyne, 1997:166). A practice is what people do. Objects emerge from practices to which they correspond. Since practices are anchored in the realities of the moment, the same applies to the objects to which they give effect. Ultimately, for Foucault, the focus on practices had the aim of “grasping the conditions that make [a specific set of practices] acceptable at a given moment” (Foucault, 2002:225). He believed that sets of more or less organized practices are “not just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic circumstances” but “possess their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence, and ‘reason’” (Foucault, 2002:225).7

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6 For example, as Veyne argues, “rather than taking for granted the existence of a body called the governed, in relation to which a body of ‘governors’ proceeds to act, let us consider the fact that practices for dealing with ‘the governed’ may vary so widely over time that the so-called governed have little more in common than the name” Veyne, Paul. (1997) Foucault Revolutionises History. In Foucault and His Interlocutors, edited by Arnold I. Davidson, pp. 146-82. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.

7 Indeed, Foucault’s methodological reflections were inspired partly by Paul Veyne’s study of euergetism in Bread and Circuses ————. (1990) Bread and Circuses: Historical Sociology and Political Pluralism, translated by Brian Pearce. London: Allan Lane, Penguin Press.
Specifically, the analytical perspective Foucault adopted in his study of the state and the early modern European inter-state order, as indeed also already in his studies of madness (1965), incarceration (1979), sexuality (1998) and war (2004), was what he referred to as an “extra-institutional, non-functional, and non-objective” analysis (2007:119). Foremost, this involved “the attempt to free relations of power from the institution”, be this the psychiatric hospital, the prison or state institution. Foucault sought to move outside the institution or away from the ‘institution-centric approach’ towards a view of the workings of power. “We need to cut off the king’s head. In political theory that has still to be done,” he famously argued (Foucault, 2002:22-3). He proposed an analysis instead which, according to him, necessarily extends beyond the limits of the state. After all, as he continued to argue, the state, “for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses,” is hardly able to cover the entire field of power relations (Foucault, 2002:22-3). In Foucault’s understanding, the institution can be understood only based on something external and general like public hygiene, penal or mercantilist order. By “reconstructing a whole network of alliances, communications, and points of support” and showing how “a whole battery of multifarious techniques” are developed to govern including, for example in the context of psychiatric order, the education of children and assistance of the poor, it is possible to see how assembled practices are coordinated by a specific general order. Is it possible, Foucault asked, that “we talk about something like a ‘governmentality’ that would be to [states] what techniques of segregation were to psychiatry, what techniques of discipline were to the penal system and what biopolitics was to medical institutions” (Foucault, 2007:117-20)?

Since his first mention of governmentality and governmental power in his lecture course in 1977, however, neither Foucault nor those subsequently writing about governmentality has been consistent in the way they have used the concept. For that reason, it makes sense to clarify the meaning of governmentality on which this thesis is based. For Foucault, “the modern political problem” of government begins to emerge in sixteenth century Europe when “a significant series of treatises” no longer “present themselves as advice to the prince” but as arts of government or governmentalities (Foucault, 2007:88). The problem of government was the problem of “governing things,” an exercise of power, articulated not just in political but also in philosophical, religious, medical and pedagogic texts

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8 According to Tully, Foucault’s reflections on government and governmentality are indicative of a general shift in Western thinking in the twentieth century that might be described as “a move away from the search for an essence hidden behind human activities to the surface aspects that give them meaning and significance”. Foucault turned away “from the routines, institutions, conditions, explanations and theories of politics to the activity or game of politics itself – what citizens do and the way they do it” Tully, James. (1999) The Agonic Freedom of Citizens. Economy and Society 28:161-82.
Government is a problematizing activity which relates to “how to govern oneself, how to be governed, by whom should we accept to be governed, how to be the best possible governor?” (Foucault, 2007:88). Foucault understood government generally as ‘the conduct of conduct’: a form of activity aiming to “affect the actions of individuals by working on their conduct – that is, on the ways in which they regulate their own behaviour” (Hindess, 1996:97). It comes in many forms and involves many people, for example, “the father of a family, the superior in a convent, the teacher” so that “there are many governments in relation to which the Prince governing his state is only one particular mode” (Foucault, 2007:93). As such, government is “much more than sovereignty” (Foucault, 2007:76). It does not replace sovereignty (sovereign power) or discipline (disciplinary power) as he had analysed in Discipline and Punish. Rather, sovereignty and discipline become but two, though important, ways of dealing with the problem of government.

For Foucault, it was the governmental problematization of political sovereignty in the nascent discipline of political science at the turn of the sixteenth century that gave rise to the state and European inter-state order. This was not to say that the set of institutions we call the state originate from this period of 1580 to 1650. Rather, to return to the series of treatises concerned with the problem of government, according to Foucault, it is at this time that the state begins to enter into reflected practice and present “a schema of intelligibility for a whole set of already established institutions, a whole set of given realities” (Foucault, 2007:286). For Foucault, then, the state is “nothing more than a way of governing [...] nothing more than a type of governmentality” (Foucault, 2007:248). It is the reflected way of accommodating the emerging desire to govern the population (Foucault, 2007:108-9):

the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the populations as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.

While Foucault traces the historic emergence of one specific form of governmentality, namely (neo)liberalism, it has also been understood to refer more generally (Dean, 1999:2) to any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of
knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.

To be sure, either way, governmentality does not refer to “the way in which governors really governed”. Rather, it is “the reasoned way of governing best, and, at the same time, reflection on the best possible way of governing” (Foucault, 2008:2). As such, it is a changing discursive field within which, according to Miller and Rose, “the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics” are justified (1992:175). It is the logic according to which a regime of practices poses problems of rule, who can govern or is governed, what or how is to be governed (Gordon, 1991:7). To be sure, by logic, I do not mean the ‘formal analysis of propositions’ so that we determine whether they are valid or true. Logic, as Coward notes, “is not a mathematical function or algorithm, but rather a grammar into which different meaningful, and yet contingent, elements can be put” (Coward, 2009:135, see also Glynos and Howarth, 2007).

While one of the attractions of governmentality has been to interpret neoliberalism in new ways, I share Pat O’Malley et al’s contention that this has also become a disadvantage. There is a tendency in the governmentality literature to take neoliberalism for granted as a metanarrative to understand a wide variety of political programs (e.g. O’Malley, 1996, Ruhl, 1999). Although I do not deny that aspects of neoliberal thinking are present in most contemporary governing processes including human security, it seems to give a wrong impression that they are simply variations of neo-liberal philosophies (O’Malley et al., 2006:97). In fact, describing certain mechanisms as neoliberal, as O’Malley et al. note, reduces the force of governmentality as a theoretical and methodological account whose strength lies in identifying the specificities of governmental formulations. Accordingly, I take seriously Foucault’s cue to start with the practices which seem to organize around human security rather than starting with universals like neoliberalism or the state as a grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices. Accordingly, assuming neoliberalism is not the only form of governmentality, then, what can be made of the different events and practices which are associated with human security? I revisit the question of neoliberalism and human security in the conclusion of the thesis.
Conceptualizing Human Security Assemblages

Accordingly, in this thesis, rather than focusing only on formal agencies, authorities, institutions and processes of human security, I analyse the way in which practices of human security rely on a specific governmental logic. This logic is much broader in scope and more subtle in its creation, maintenance as well as transformation of order in and beyond formal institutions including the state, international organizations as well as people themselves. After all, traditional categories like the state embody specific assumptions about political life such as the division inside/outside in international relations that I wanted to avoid from the outset so as not to over-predetermine my research outcome. Notwithstanding the compelling critiques of human security as a site of biopolitics and governmentality already advanced, if controversially, by scholars drawing also on Foucault (e.g. de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008, Dillon and Reid, 2000, Duffield and Waddell, 2006, Elbe, 2009, Grayson, 2008, Roberts, 2010, Truong, 2006), little has been said about how human security takes concrete form. As I mention in chapter two, by reflecting only on programmatic rationalities and top-down flows of power, deemphasizing the incoherence and contingency of power as well as the invention of governing practices from below, these critiques tend to present human security as a totalizing and inadvertently ‘successful’ rather than situated, instable, adaptive, unpredictable, and sometimes ‘failing’ mode of governance.

Since human security interventions have taken or are taking place in multiple, dispersed and different vernacular sites (see e.g. UNTFHS, 2010), I felt it was necessary to design my research in such a way that would also shed light on the variability as well as the incoherence and contingency of human security flows. Thus, as I will demonstrate, rather than investigating the power of human security only in the sites from which power is thought to emanate, namely, the headquarters of international agencies, I also traced the sites of practice where power operates and human security is performatively produced – at the micropolitical or molecular level (see also Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:224). Put differently, I chose to trace the infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have been – and continue to be – invested, colonised, utilised, involuted,

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9Here I am also inspired by Appadurai’s suggestion to consider “modernity to be rewritten more as vernacular globalization and less as a concession to large-scale national and international policies.” (Appadurai, 1996: 10)
transformed, displaced, extended etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination (Foucault, 1980:99).

Considering the instability of practices, I adopted a flexible or qualitative research strategy which would evolve in the process of gathering the dynamic empirical material (Robson, 2002:163-200). This way, I would allow for the space to be surprised and led by what I encountered on the research path. In the field, I observed the way human security emerged as a messy, contingent and at times absurd political strategy which was in the process of setting up and arranging a set of heterogeneous elements around specific problems such as migrant health and human trafficking including situated histories, (knowledge) cultures and expertise, experiences and desires, local habits and programmes, technocratic processes, mechanisms of ordering, recording, presenting, and, crucially, their materiality.

Indeed, having read Latour’s *Aramis or the Love of Technology* (Latour, 1996) on my way into sites of human security practice, I was sensitized to the possibility of material objects playing a role in the way human security is practiced and shaped. In this context, although such things as small arms, carbon dioxide emissions, viruses and airplanes are emphasized in the human security discourse, they tend to appear only as raw, brute or inert objects that either benefit or risk (global) human security. Rather than seeing them as the passive backdrop of human security's imperative, I came to see them as giving the struggle concrete form. Indeed, human security comprises assemblages of 'men and things' (Foucault, 2007:96) in which material objects, just like human beings, play a constitutive role. For example, I was struck by the importance of information technologies including global telecommunication networks like the internet (emails) and mundane paraphernalia (electricity, submarine communications cables, computers, monitors and printers, office furniture), databases (servers, software as well as filing cabinets) and spatial arrangements including buildings (UN headquarters, local health centres) as well as viruses (HIV, SARS), air pollutants, weather dynamics and, last but not least, human bodies with their materiality in setting up and, importantly, shaping human security interventions.

Though Foucault (1971, 1998, 2007) implied the composite role of all elements – human and nonhuman – in giving rise to power effects such as governmentalities, others have

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10 In *Aramis*, Latour demonstrates the way the machines (the cars) and the material forces (electricity, magnets) of an experimental Parisian guided-transportation system acted out agential capacity in a heterogeneous collectivity comprising human bodies, words, and regulations.
more decidedly, if controversially, expressed the way in which the interrelation between
differential – human and nonhuman – elements produces dynamic and mobile forces that
help to constitute specific sciences, politics and subjectivities (Barad, 2007, Bennett, 2010,
(Deleuze, 1992, Deleuze and Guattari, 2004) and Jane Bennett (2005, Bennett, 2010), I
interpret the human security assemblages as ad hoc collectivities that are always in the
process of (un-)becoming, absorbing, discarding, pulling together or assembling, and
transforming disparate human and nonhuman elements. In fact, a range of social entities,
from stem cells, electrical power grids and Earth to persons, cities and nation-states (de
Landa, 2006) can be treated as assemblages whose circumstantial and historical origins
render them contingent though not ineffective.

The move to consider nonhuman materialities not as social constructions but as actants
has led to the re-conceptualization of agency (see e.g. Barad, 2007, Bennett, 2010, Coole
and Frost, 2010, Latour and Woolgar, 1986). As I go on to discuss in chapter three, in the
distributive and composite form of agency proposed by Bennett, agency emerges not from
human intentions or behaviour but from the uncertain and unpredictable interplay of the
human and nonhuman elements comprising an assemblage. In Bennett’s ‘naive realist’
account, within an assemblage each element or actant exudes ‘a life force’ of its own which
enters into friction with other elements thus giving rise to a dynamism immanent to the
collective whole (see e.g. Bennett, 2004). As Coole and Frost have noted, according to this
new materialism, matter is “active, self-creative, productive, unpredictable” (Coole and
Frost, 2010:9). It is partly in this way that assemblages like human security are by default
circumstantial, instable, and unpredictable.

With the objective to control and the central question of ‘how best to govern’ human
insecurity, human security assemblages are, in the spirit of Foucault, governmental
(Foucault, 2007:88). Considering the multiplicity of actants involved, human security
assemblages are not governed by any one central power. Government, following Rose, is
not “a process in which rule extends itself unproblematically across a territory
[geographical or otherwise], but a matter of fragile relays, contested locales and
fissiparous affiliations” (Rose, 1999:51). While local government institutions remain one
of the key elements in these assemblages, activities are negotiated with and through
various other elements including international (non)governmental organizations and, last
but not least, material objects. It is in this sense that human security assemblages can be
understood as “web[s] of uneven topography” in which governmental power is unevenly
distributed. While the assemblages as wholes and their elements are doing things, governmental power is not equally strong everywhere (Bennett, 2005:448). Of the various points at which the trajectories of elements cross each other, those relating to human security are more heavily trafficked in some target areas than others. Here, the people targeted are more determinedly rendered governable and brought under governmental control.

Indeed, much hard work, as Li argues, goes into “drawing heterogeneous elements together, forge connections between them and sustain these connections in the face of tension” (Li, 2007:264). Focusing on community forest management in Indonesia, Li identifies six ‘practices of assemblage’ which bring the heterogeneous elements together and forge connections between them that she argues are generic to any assemblage including forging alignments, rendering technical, authorizing knowledge, managing failures, anti-politics, and reassembling (Li, 2007). Her concern is precisely to find a way to explore the practices which bring into sharper focus the gap between what is intended in governmental programmes and the ‘refractory processes’ which make governance difficult. In fact, as I go on to discuss in chapter three, looking specifically at the constitutive role of material objects, it is the tensions that are “the energies and countercultures,” which Bennett contends, “exceed and confound” an assemblage (Bennett, 2005).

**TRACING EMERGING GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES**

In terms of the empirical material, since human security is an elusive concept which has attracted an array of definitions, interventions, and politics, I decided to concentrate on the work of UN and affiliated agencies. How and to what effect does human security understood in this way matter concretely? I visited the Human Security Unit (HSU) at the United Nations headquarters in New York to begin to understand the governing practices involved in the *programming* of human security. To reiterate, the HSU administers the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) which, to date, has committed over USD 350 million to human security projects managed by UN and UN-associated agencies in over seventy countries. Judging by the work of the HSU, human security interventions have taken or are taking place in multiple, dispersed and shifting vernacular sites. As a consequence, rather than interpreting human security only in terms of the text of large-scale national and international policies and programs, I began *tracing* human security to
its micropolitics in a few selected sites (Voelkner, 2011). Specifically, by conducting a multi-sited field study, I sought to draw out the power relations flowing where power is applied concretely rather than only from where it is thought to originate. Though human security brought about changes to each of the vernacular sites, there seemed to be an inevitable gap between what was programmed and what was eventually accomplished (see e.g. Li, 2007). Thus, by venturing into the field and studying the workings of human security concretely, it became possible for me not only to see how the application of human security varies from the program as well as between vernacular contexts. It also allowed me to examine the manner in which the micropolitics of human security are linked to the broader rationalities, processes and power assemblages associated with the macropolitics of human security in the struggle to manage global insecurities.

I decided to trace the micropolitics of human security relating to two UNTFHS-funded projects tackling issues arising specifically from (forced) migration. Migration, and specifically forced migration, brings into sharper focus the question of political order. Forced migration, as Dillon has noted, raises “the fundamental ethical question of the membership of a political community, so also reflecting on the character of its justice, as well as the technical question of ordering and disciplining large mobile or potentially mobile populations” (1995:327). Indeed, it problematizes the very distinction between the inside and outside as a way of enframing political issues such as state security programs. Specifically, I looked to human security projects tackling insecurity relating to (forced) migration including human trafficking inside and outside Southeast Asia. The current increased human mobility within the region is considered a key element in the rise of global migration. Southeast Asian governments, which operate under a diversity of political orders including liberal and communist regimes, have responded by attempting to manage the problem of migration and related issues with varying strategies and efforts including human security (Regional Thematic Working Group on International Migration including Human Trafficking, 2008).

The first project in which I sought to trace the human security flows dealt with the double circulation problematic embodied by Burmese migrants in Thailand whose travelling bodies are both desired for the labour to be yielded as well as being repulsed and criminalized for the diseases and illegalities they are said to carry. The second project dealt with the circulation problematic relating to Vietnamese women and children at risk of human trafficking whose travelling bodies were both desired in a booming pleasure, i.e. sex, industry as well as being repulsed for the ‘social evil’ and lack of traditional Vietnamese femininity that they are believed to represent. In order to capture the
infinitesimal shifts in political order associated with human security as applied to issues of forced migration in Thailand and Vietnam, I followed Foucault’s cue and focused on the “incessant transactions which modify, or [...] insidiously shift sources of finance, modes of investment, decision-making centres, forms and types of control, relationships between local powers, the central authority and so on” (Foucault, 2008:77).

In order to locate these “incessant transactions” and given also the multi-scalar character of human security, I decided to trace human security transactions by employing, not only traditional semi-structured interviews with relevant groups of people involved in the networks that were established and examining relevant primary and secondary literature, but also following the material objects that were produced or appropriated in the name of human security. For example, I was interested in the emails sent from New York to Bangkok to Ranong, the management tools employed, the software developed in Geneva and transferred to Bangkok where it was reconfigured and transferred to Samutsakhorn and so on. As mentioned, things like emails, tools, as well as bodies, tend to appear only as inert objects. Rather than seeing them as passive, I took them as giving human security’s struggle to manage transnational insecurities concrete form. For example, the interrelation between the material objects dropped by the circuits of human security governance and the bodies of Burmese or Vietnamese migrants “with their materiality and their forces” helped to bring forth and shape the vernacular micropolitics of human security in Thailand and Vietnam (Foucault, 1979:26).

As implied, governmental notions which invoke the ‘global’ such as human security operate along dramatic distances. When the object of analysis is the global, a focus on the materiality of events helps to explore how the global is localized. At the same time, a focus on materiality opens up the opportunity to explore how the local materializes. Not only does it show the way governmental logics are performed, it also demonstrates their inherent situatedness and instability. Thus, the interplay between localizations and materializations disrupts the logics that underlie governmental processes. By looking at the emergence of the global assemblages that human security comprises, tracing the multiple transactions and relations that assemble the heterogeneous elements including the material objects into nearly stable organizational and institutional practices, it becomes possible to capture where and how power operates and where human security is performatively produced. It helps to understand the distinctive interplay between the micro- and macropolitics of global human security.
Specifically, in order to grasp the ways subjects of global order such as the ‘human’ and the ‘state’ are formed, I looked to the ways of seeing, understanding and managing (forced) migration. My position as researcher and my endeavour to understand was made known to the research subjects from the outset. The advantage of this approach lies in the possibility of gaining a deeper understanding of the complexity of particular social phenomena (see e.g. Geertz, 1973) otherwise unobtainable through conventional methods such as questionnaires (see e.g. Atkinson et al., 2001). The challenge of adopting this approach, however, lies in understanding to what extent I as a researcher affect the situation under observation. This is especially so in the case of research in a sensitive political area such as forced migration where migrants are seen either as illegal or morally doubtful and knowledge is not easily or safely come by. Moreover, the primary material collected will be the interpretation of the researcher. There is the problem of bias and the potential for distortion of research findings (see e.g. Haraway, 1988). Indeed, security is an expression for what and how to protect in the world that is particular. In the case of migrants in both Vietnam and Thailand, the meaning and proposed activities of (human) security differed from the proposed UN programs. It thus required an open mind to deviate from agenda-setting parameters.

How does tracing assemblages in the way suggested above matter to critical analyses of global relations? Tracing the workings of human security through the material objects it produces or appropriates allows for (better) appreciating the variability and contingency as well as the complex interplay between differently levelled governmental flows. It is possible to see the way the micropolitics of governance and macropolitical rationalities and processes relating to international and global governance are intimately related. By adopting a flexible research design strategy, the contextual particularities of governance can be considered. The researcher remains open to unexpected encounters with the research field. The differences in interpretive environments can be taken into account and creatively utilized towards finding new avenues of research otherwise obscured. For example, not only do ‘global’ programmes only tangentially become adaptable to ‘local’ settings but governance is frequently also invented from below, producing hybrid forms of governance in which ‘global’ and ‘local’ governance cultures become intertwined.
THE ARGUMENT

What are the implications of human security on global politics? In order to investigate the governmental logic underlying the global governance of human security, in chapter one, I begin to investigate the discourse of global governance more generally in terms of a governmental logic whose emerging processes constitute the specific global political order which comes to be governed in and through these same processes. Specifically, I develop my narrative concerning governmental logics by advancing Foucault’s own considerations about the way a governmental logic concerning inter-state relations materialized in Western Europe in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Crucially, Foucault demonstrated the way orders of governance and associated political subjects (the human, the modern state and inter-state relations) comprising emerging governmental assemblages are co-determinant. These linked effects of governmental logics change as the dynamics of governing processes change. In this respect, they are contingent on perpetually evolving governing processes. I then demonstrate the way the contemporary ‘international’ can similarly be interpreted as an assemblage by drawing particularly on the arguments put forward by poststructuralist scholars concerning the regimes and associated knowledge practices which helped to constitute the theory and practice of International Relations. Building on this, I review the literature on ‘global’ governmentalities. Finally, I investigate the way global governance itself can be taken to constitute a governmental logic comprising an assembled set of political imaginaries, theories, subjects and objects, problems and solutions, facts, forces and dynamics which produces a ‘complex’ reality of the contemporary global political order that advocates of global governance take to be the real and, crucially also, act upon. Here, I am particularly interested in the way orders of governance and the political are framed vis-a-vis the metanarrative of complexity.

Chapter two examines the way the policy discourse of human security begins to set up an emerging governmental assemblage whose arrangement is circumscribed by the intersections between a contemporary biopolitical problematization of life and the logic of ‘complexity’ as adapted to global governance. Specifically, the chapter explores, by drawing on recent critical accounts of human security, the way it constitutes and manages a biopolitical imaginary in which ‘life’ is taken as the ontopolitical object of governance. This ‘complex’ reality that it presumes to exist not only defines the limits of the kind of human life to be protected and promoted but also determines the kind of problematizations, correlative spaces, agents, and mechanisms through which human
security operates. Specifically, the governing processes of human security proceed on a metanarrative concerning the complex interdependency of security, in which, according to some scholars, the security of 'humanity' itself is threatened. In this narrative, managing human insecurity involves, I contend, constituting and acting upon a heterarchical (de-territorialized) rather than geopolitical (territorialized) order of networks which does not involve the eclipse of the state and state sovereignty eroding as some scholars of human security have argued. Rather, the governmental logic of human security involves the governmentalization of the state and sovereignty. Moreover, the self-governance of systems that it engineers involves 'human' subjects as constitutive parts.

These taken-for-granted assumptions constitute human security assemblages which comprise an order of governance and associated political subjectivities including the individual, the state, and global order that pass through sites of practice in which this reality is enacted. Indeed, they take on definite material forms in the assemblages which can be traced as consequently emerging in the world, as I go on to demonstrate particularly in the migrant health assemblage in Thailand and the human trafficking assemblage in Vietnam in chapters four and five. Notwithstanding the compelling critiques of human security as a site of biopolitics and governmentality, little has been said about how human security takes concrete form. Accordingly, this chapter begins to trace human security at the 'molecular' level. In contrast to biopolitical accounts of human security which tend to present human security as a neat, closed, totalizing, and successful mode of governance, it can be argued that human security assemblages are in fact open, contingent systems which continually vacillate, backfire, undermining themselves, clashing and hybridizing with other assemblages. Accordingly, I discuss the significance of the logical framework as a governmental object that sets out to arrange the distribution of human security assemblages in the field.

In chapter three, I discuss the way human security assemblages can be conceived of as embodied and existing in a myriad of material objects dispersed around the world including emails, computers, the internet, managerial tools, and the spatial arrangements in sites of intervention. Specifically, the chapter theorizes the way these objects play a constitutive role in (un)making human security politics in largely de-territorialized locales. In keeping with the argument that human security constitutes orders of governance and political subjectivities, this chapter examines the part human security objects play in bringing about mutations in the contemporary global order. In this context, the chapter advances Foucault's materialism by particularly drawing on Deleuze's conception of the machinic assemblage. Specifically, it draws out the distributive agency in
assemblages. A Deleuzian assemblage is characterized by an open-endedness which always somehow escapes the dominant strategic imperative within it, e.g. a biopolitical rationality. I proceed in this manner, firstly, to demonstrate, through Foucault's materialism, the ways in which human security is not only partly generated by the intermingling of dispersed 'global' and situated material and other (e.g. spatiotemporal) processes but is also dependent on the corporeal world which it comprises. Secondly, I want to emphasize, through Deleuze's materialist conception of assemblage, the way human security's relation with material and other forces renders it, and the intended effects produced out of it including political subjectivities, state forms, and world orders, always transient and subject to unintended and unforeseen change.

Chapters four and five are two field-based analyses of the way human security emerges as a situated political strategy within the Thai migrant health and the Vietnamese human trafficking assemblages. Chapter four traces the emergence of human security in the struggle to manage the circulation of pathogens relating to Burmese migrant communities in Thailand. Specifically, the chapter focuses on the intricate and productive interplay of a range of human and non-human elements that helped to bring forth and shape the vernacular micropolitics of human security. It documents the biopolitical mechanisms of the human security intervention in two of Thailand's provinces. By enframing, ordering and depoliticizing the complex health world of Burmese migrants in terms of simple dichotomies in which 'unruly' nature (pathogens, diseases, bodies) is contrasted with human techno-scientific ingenuity (scientific evidence, technological innovations, managerial effectiveness), these mechanisms arrange the elements of the assemblage in such a way that renders the circulation of pathogens amenable to biopolitical governance. It is here argued that, on the one hand, the struggle to manage pathogenic circulation through human security transforms the issue of migrant health into a technical matter concerned with the (self-)management of bodies and the governmentalization of the Thai state to the exclusion of important but difficult questions concerning a violent politics of exclusion. On the other hand, the tensions, contradictions and practical difficulties in biopolitical encounters arising from the interplay inherent in the assemblage attest to the productive power of human-nonhuman alliances in the manufacture of political decisions and subjectivities. They remind us of the contingent and therefore precarious nature of human intentions and strategies encapsulated in initiatives like human security.

Chapter five similarly analyses the emergence of human security as a situated political strategy for managing illicit circulation relating to the trafficking of women and children in and beyond Vietnam. Specifically, it focuses on the dynamic assemblage that helped to
bring forth and shape the vernacular micropolitics of human security in this site of practice. Much like in Thailand, this involved a multiplicity of forces including market, social, international, governing, viral and chemical forces which mutually interacted, helping to shape the emergence of the human trafficking assemblage in Vietnam. Here too, biopolitical mechanisms were developed to prevent the occurrence of human trafficking. The complex world of Vietnamese women and child migrants was enframed, ordered and depoliticized in terms of simple dichotomies in which the 'unruly' life of those earmarked as at risk of human trafficking is contrasted with human techno-scientific managerialism. In so doing, these mechanisms attempted to arrange the elements of the assemblage such that the illicit circulation of women and children were made amenable to biopolitical governance. Yet, in contrast to the Thai migrant health assemblage, not only was the intervention at first resisted by the Vietnamese state authorities and central elements to the rearrangement of the assemblage either escaped or were discarded from the assemblage, but the assemblage clashed and, consequently, hybridized with the situated precepts of 'social evil' which emerged in Vietnam prior to human trafficking.

Drawing on the field-based analyses carried out in chapters four and five, **chapter six** concludes the thesis with a reflection on the political implications of human security for global politics. By constituting orders of governance comprising a set of political subjectivities, human security is reconstituting global order at the molecular level. Specifically, the chapter analyses the sets of biopolitical processes which aimed to render dangerous circulations manageable and the implications these have for the understanding of global order. These include processes of technicalization and depoliticization, ordering, enframing and mapping, authorizing knowledges, and training. By drawing out the differences between the biopolitical enframing of human security prepared at the outset and the processes and effects in the materialization of human security, the chapter notes how a focus on assemblages of power allows for an understanding of human security at the molecular level.
This chapter begins to examine the discourse of global governance as a governmentality whose processes constitute the specific global political order which comes to be governed in and through these same processes. It draws on and advances Foucault’s cursory comments on the ‘international’ as presented mainly in the lectures, *Security, Territory, Population*. Not unlike his lectures, *Society Must Be Defended*, where he showed the way the idea of the battle constituted both inter-state relations and domestic societies (Foucault, 2004), Foucault interrogated the way key political subjects and objects – human subjectivity, the early modern state and European inter-state order – mutually developed in and through processes associated with specific emerging governmentalities between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. I review the relevant literature on International Relations and governmentality which has drawn inspiration from Foucault before discussing the way global governance can similarly be taken to constitute a governmental regime of truth (a set of subjects and objects, problems and solutions, facts, interests, forces and dynamics) that produces a reality of the contemporary global political order that advocates of global governance take to be the real and, crucially also, act upon. I take this further in chapter two by looking at the particularities of global governance specific to human security. Examining global governance (and human security) as a governmentality entails beginning by drawing out the unspoken, tacit presuppositions about governing the contemporary state of the world which pass through and constitute sites of practice in order to understand how it has been possible to shape the debate in certain and not other ways. What are the terms and conditions under which global governance is debated in academic and policy circles? Put differently, how is thinking about global governance framed?

**Foucault on Inter-state Governmentality**

Foucault himself dealt with issues pertaining to international political life – in contrast to claims to the contrary (see e.g. Chandler, 2009, Selby, 2007). Already in the lecture series
Society Must Be Defended which he gave in 1975-76, he engaged with modern political theory in his investigation of the discourse of war and demonstrated the precariousness and relative novelty of the inside/outside divide (Foucault, 2004). Here, he showed the way the notion of modern war encapsulated both political imaginaries of inter-state relations as well as racial lineages in the domestic. It is in this sense that Foucault argued that war is embedded in the everyday of modern life. In the lecture course Security, Territory, Population he gave in 1977, Foucault examined the way the regime of truth and exercise of power associated with the governmentality of reason of state constituted both the state and inter-state relations during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe. In this context, Valverde has suggested that Foucault was beginning to reflect on “Genealogies of European States” (cf. Devetak, 2008, Valverde, 2006).

Although Foucault seemed to have relied on only a few very select references, consequently cutting out from his analysis important nuances and historical developments in inter-state relations at the time, his notes on how key historico-political subjectivities – the sovereign state, the modern individual, and inter-state relations – were mutually constitutive in their development is instructive for analysing the relation between the global governance of human security and the constitution of contemporary political order carried out here. For Foucault, the phenomenon of the ‘governmentalization of the state,’ in which the nature, logic, means and ends of contemporary political rule are continually redefined, was tied in important ways to strategic reflections about inter-state relations including the existence of a plurality of states in competition and the development of the ‘diplomatic-military techniques’ in Europe from the sixteenth century (cf. Leira, 2009). In relation to this, it can be said that critical scholars such as Richard Ashley and scholars drawing on Ashley such as David Campbell have taken Foucault beyond Foucault by advancing compelling narratives for the co-constitution of modern ‘Man’, the state and state system in the twentieth century through International Relations theory and foreign policy (Ashley, 1989, 2005, Campbell, 1998).

Foucault developed his line of argumentation concerning the relation between the state and international relations in his explication of the emergence and transformation of reason of state, a governmentality, which comes to replace the dominance of the Church’s pastoral governmentality and economy of salvation (Foucault, 2007:231). For Foucault, the formation of reason of state begins during the sixteenth century when the concept of the state begins to enter into reflective practice. That is, when the state becomes an object of knowledge and analysis, when it becomes “part of a reflected and concerted strategy,” and begins to be “called for, desired, coveted, feared, rejected, loved, and hated” (Foucault,
This is not to say that the institutions still associated with states today such as the army, taxation, and justice only began to emerge at this time. Quite the contrary, it is at this point that these already existing institutions began to be subsumed and identified in terms of states. For reason of state, the state is both its foundation and its aim, and it is the projected result of governmental interventions which aim to preserve the state. Unlike contemporary interpretations of reason of state which take Machiavelli’s manuscript *The Prince* as embodying the essence of this political rationality, Foucault argued that it was theorised through, and not by, Machiavelli. Machiavelli, according to Foucault, belonged to the period of princely rule before the emergence of government: “What Machiavelli sought to save, to safeguard, is not the state but the relationship of the Prince to that over which he exercises his domination,” that is, his principality (Foucault, 2007:243).

Initially, the goal of state preservation embodied by reason of state was negotiated in terms of territorial expansion. With the introduction of the notion of ‘economy’ into governmental discourse, however, this gradually shifted to a preference for the development of the state’s forces (Foucault, 2007:349). The historical context within which this modification of reason of state took place, according to Foucault, is the end of the age of dynasties in Europe, the constitution of American colonies, the withdrawal of the Church, and the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Crucially, the imperative to develop a state’s forces emerges in parallel with the realisation that a plurality of states exists in a space of competition. Again, this is not to say that struggles and wars between different ruling entities only emerged at this point, but that the state, now conceived of as one of many, could not be thought without reference to its competitive interplay with other states. In this sense, according to Foucault, “The state only exists as states, in the plural” (Foucault, 2008:5). As such, the prevalent notion of inter-state competition led to the imperative to develop a state’s forces but also to maintain a balance between forces, a political thought which, Foucault argued, led to the drafting of the treaties of Westphalia. In Foucault’s reading, the Peace of Westphalia sought the balance of power in Europe in terms of “the impossibility of the strongest state laying down the law to any other state” (Foucault, 2007:299).

The objective of the balance of power in Europe is universal peace, notes Foucault, which is a way for different states to co-exist with each other without one state dominating others. In this sense, “Universal peace is the stability acquired in and through a balanced plurality” (Foucault, 2007:260). To both develop and maintain a balance between forces in Europe, Foucault noted the creation of two important governmental assemblages: on the one hand, a military-diplomatic assemblage, on the other hand, the police assemblage. The
**military-diplomatic assemblage** evolved to govern the balance of power in Europe and might be considered inchoate antecedents of contemporary foreign and international policy. If states exist alongside each other in a competitive relationship, Foucault argued, then “a system must be found that will limit the mobility, growth, and reinforcement of all the other states as much as possible” while still allowing each state to develop its own forces (Foucault, 2007:299). This system involved the creation of “practically permanent negotiations and a system of information concerning the state of forces in each country” that was supported by statistical knowledge (Foucault, 2007:275). It involved also considerations about defining juridical relations between “the states of Europe, coexisting in a new space, or society of nations” (Foucault, 2007:302-3). Finally, it called for setting up a permanent military apparatus and defining war as an instrument for preserving the balance of Europe.

While the diplomatic-military assemblage concerned the external relations of states in terms of European equilibrium, the police assemblage was concerned with the set “of laws and regulations that concern the interior of a state and which endeavour to strengthen and increase the power of this state” (Foucault, 2007:322). Specifically, in order to enhance the state's forces from within, police aimed to control for men's co-existence with each other and the circulation of goods. Its aim was “the management of a whole social body” (Foucault, 2008:186) in ways which also determined the emergence of a specific state form, namely, the police state (cf. Foucault, 2002:341, Lemke, 2000:2-3). In other words, it fashioned specific subject-citizens in response to the tenets of reason of state. Apart from the material network that allows the circulation of goods, police power was concerned with circulation itself, that is, “the set of regulations, constraints, and limits, or the facilities and encouragements that will allow the circulation of men and things” within and beyond the state (Foucault, 2007:325). It sought to discipline in the areas including religion, morals, health and subsistence, public peace, the care of infrastructure, the sciences and arts, commerce and manufacture, the care and discipline of the poor. As such, police concerned not just the ‘being’ but also the ‘well-being’ of its subject-citizens. Statistics became indispensable to police in order “to know the population, the army, the natural resources, the production, the commerce, and the monetary circulation” of one’s own state as well as that of other states (Foucault, 2007:315).

11 Devetak has suggested that it might yield interesting results if Foucault’s historical research into confinement, discipline, and governmentality were brought together with intellectual histories and state-building literatures to develop a more comprehensive account of the historical emergence of the early modern states-system's distinctive political rationality and its relation to the production of subject-citizens p.271 Devetak, Richard. (2008) Foucault, Discipline and Raison D'etat in Early Modern Europe. *International Political Sociology* 2:270-72.
The important point to make here is that, in Foucault’s narrative, the two ‘great’ governmental assemblages, the one concerned with the governance of domestic society, the other concerned with the governance of inter-state relations, were mutually constitutive insofar as the military-diplomatic assemblage sought inter-state balance by ensuring that “each state has a good police that allows it to develop its own forces”. Put differently, the nature, logic, means and ends of state rule were transformed, partly through the development of a series of techniques and knowledges including statistics and political economy, in order to govern the space both inside a state’s territory, namely by seeing to it that subjects’ conduct is brought into line with broader objectives to do with inter-state relations, and ‘outside’ in inter-state relations. Put differently, the state was governmentalized in terms of reason of state. The political implication of this governmental reflection was what Foucault referred to as the ‘weak’ state thesis: the existence of a state with ‘bad’ police was seen as risking unbalancing Europe, therefore, giving the set of European states “the right to see to it that there is a good police in each state” (Foucault, 2007:314-5). Here, then, Foucault had developed an account of international relations in which imaginaries of the ‘outside’ such as inter-state competition and the ‘inside’ such as fostering the circulation in men and things associated with the governmentality reason of state mutually determined each other’s development. In this sense, the ‘outside’ or foreign is folded into the domestic and links the inside to the outside, thereby simultaneously constituting both the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (cf. Campbell, 2005).

It should be noted here that the historical accuracy of Foucault’s account has come under some serious criticism. From the outset, however, it should not be forgotten as well that both Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics are transcripts of lectures Foucault gave that he did not want to be published. In these lectures, he explored ideas and hunches. Some of these are excellent, some embryonic and in need of further development, some to be discarded altogether. In this context also, Foucault was a “somewhat fragmentary and experimental thinker, pragmatically crafting concepts to undertake particular analytical tasks but unafraid to dispense with them should they outlive their usefulness” (Haahr and Walters, 2005:289). As such, though the handling of the governmentality lecture notes does indeed require some critical distance, I maintain that Foucault’s important insight that governmentalties co-constitute key political subjectivities remains instructive. In terms of the criticism of Foucault’s account of reason of state and the relationship between the state and other states, this has revolved around his selective choice of literature which led him to omit important nuances and historical developments in inter-state relations.
Amongst other things, Foucault is charged with underestimating the continued importance of religion and overestimating the importance of the Peace of Westphalia as well as the extent to which reason of state actually dealt with external relations during the time on which he lectured (cf. Leira, 2009:486). Foucault would have us believe that God was taken out of governmental reflections around the time between 1580 and 1750 and that the state and state system were codified in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia. Yet, if we take seriously the historian Koselleck, then, the major conceptual shifts in Europe did not take place until the period between 1750 and 1850 when politics was de-theologised in order to establish a civil and secular government as supreme authority. Koselleck identifies Hobbes as the central figure in this decoupling of politics and religion (Devetak, 2008:271, Koselleck, 1988). Moreover, in terms of the treaties of Westphalia, Teschke and others have developed compelling arguments for why 1648 must be understood as a historical myth (Teschke, 2003). In this respect, as Bartelson has noted, the ‘international system’ did not emerge as an object of knowledge until centuries after Westphalia (Bartelson, 1995:137-39). In terms of reason of state, Bartelson has also noted that it was first a governmentality that applied itself to the inside of states and not to governing external relations between states. In this context, ‘foreign policy,’ in the sense of regularised and planned interaction does not really arise until the nineteenth century (Leira, 2009:489n). Finally, I take seriously the postcolonial critique that the development of the modern European political order developed on the backbone of the exploitation of colonial societies. Foucault’s narrative fails to take into account this important relation of Europe at the time with the rest of the world.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, one of the more important points to emphasise here and carry forward from Foucault’s eclectic narrative about the development of the modern state and inter-state relations in Europe is the idea that the political subjectivities central to modern political rationalities (the identities of individuals, states, and their relation with thoughts about international/global order) are mutually constituted in and through the governmental assemblages which emerge from these rationalities. Put differently, political identities and their emergence and transformation as well as the material fabrics they comprise are not independent of the wider currents of historical thought which give rise to the assemblages in which they are embedded. Although the lectures in which

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12 Teschke challenges the reification in International Relations of the Treaty of Westphalia as giving rise to the modern state system, instead demonstrating the way ‘international politics’ remained under dynastic rule and absolutist political entities which emerged from feudal property regimes long after Westphalia.

Foucault began to tackle the workings of power as they relate specifically to the problem of inter-state relations were not made widely available until recently, namely in *Security, Territory, Population* (Foucault, 2007) and *The Birth of Biopolitics* (Foucault, 2008) as well as *Society Must Be Defended* (Foucault, 2004), nonetheless, his analysis of knowledge/power more generally and subsequently of governmental rationalities or governmentality have provoked intriguing critiques which have taken Foucault beyond Foucault, examining both the core assumptions underlying contemporary International Relations and the historical lineages and (though less represented) empirical vicissitudes of contemporary international/global life. It is to some of these that I turn to next.

**The ‘International’ as Governmental Assemblage**

Global relations are constituted in a myriad of complex governing processes including, but by no means exclusively: the formulation, negotiation, and implementation of treaties, policies, doctrines and academic theories. These processes continuously enact distinct governmental regimes of truths such as those which make up the governmentality of global governance more generally, and human security more specifically. In the practice of international relations, at the forefront of these processes have traditionally been those comprising the military-diplomatic assemblage (see also Miller and Rose, 1992:178). That is, processes developed in response to diplomatic and military issues operating under a state-centric objective of international order embodied, most prominently, according to Foucault (Foucault, 2007:299) and indeed to much of the International Relations literature, in the Peace of Westphalia. These processes have materialized, on the one hand, in the establishment of permanent embassies, in ongoing bilateral or multilateral negotiations in and through international institutions, and analyses concerning the state of a world comprising a plurality of discreet and self-contained nation-states. On the other hand, in the professionalization of soldiers, the building of permanent national and international armed structures, and ongoing reflection on military matters and bygone or possible wars between, and more recently within, states. Within this assemblage, the (nation-) state has come to codify and delineate the possibilities and limits of political order in international relations. Put differently, in much of international relations, the state embodies the solution central to resolving the problem of political order in the face of an imagined external, disorderly (anarchic) realm.
Much like Foucault who was interested first in understanding the conditions which made possible particular governmental assemblages, a number of critical scholars drawing inspiration from Foucault and others (e.g. Derrida, Heidegger) have also interrogated the core assumptions underlying theories and practices of International Relations. Put differently, they have sought to denaturalize and historicize knowledge of the ‘international’ including sovereignty, security, citizenship, and diplomacy, examining the way such elements are produced in and through practices associated with specific regimes of truth or governmentalities. From this perspective, the state and its attributes such as sovereignty appear not as having a transcendental functionality or essential necessity in the world. Rather, they are complex and mobile effects produced of the same particular, context-bound and spatiotemporal (governing) processes which constitute international or global relations more generally. Again, as in Foucault’s narrative retold above, this is not to say that these effects do not constitute very specific material fabrics comprising institutions, infrastructures, technologies, and paper trails in and through which they necessarily take effect. It can be argued however, much like the way that the institutions of dynastic rule later became subsumed in and identified with the state under the logic of reason of state, shifts in political reason bring about mutations in the political identities to which we relate specific material fabrics.

In terms of relevant critical scholarship in International Relations, one of the first and most compelling critiques of the ‘International’ put forward comes in the work of Richard K. Ashley. Writing at the end of the 1980s, Ashley argued that realist texts of International Relations do not mirror a given reality of discreet states co-existing in an anarchical space but are enacting a specific modern regime of truth concerning international politics which they take to be real (Ashley, 1989). At the core of this regime, he claimed, is the taken-for-granted truth/knowledge that sovereign territorial states are the containers of political community (cf. O’Tuathail, 1996:135-6, Walker, 1993). Specifically, Ashley was concerned with the practices which inscribe, what he has termed, a ‘paradigm of sovereignty’ in global politics. Foremost, Ashley argues, this regime is a “historically fabricated, widely circulated, practically effective interpretation of man as sovereign being” (Ashley, 1989:269). Put differently, the ability of ‘man’ to reason and rationalize – in other words, a ‘subject that knows’ – forms the point of departure for relating to contemporary modern reality.

According to Foucault, ‘man’ first appeared as a “subject that knows” in the late eighteenth century, complementing the long preceding figure of man as an object of knowledge (2002:340). In Foucault’s narrative, the appearance of ‘man’ as a ‘subject who knows’ was
the time when political discourse began to shift from the dynastic discourse of princely rule to the modern discourse of government, of how best to govern oneself, the family, the state and so on (Foucault, 2007:76). It was the time when concepts like ‘population’ and ‘civil society’ began to emerge in response to wider problems of government. As such, the modern or ‘reasoning’ subject and problematics of government, for example of how best to govern a population within a delineated territory, emerge in the same historic-political field. As such, it should be noted here, as Campbell (Campbell, 1998:63) has sought to clarify, ‘man’ refers not just to individuals but incorporates

the form of the ‘domestic’ order, the social relations of production, the various subjectivities to which they give rise, the groups (such as women) who are marginalized in the process, and the boundaries of legitimate social and political action.

In this sense, as Ashley has argued, the modern subject cannot be understood without reference to the modern state which is the second defining feature of the ‘paradigm of sovereignty’. As Foucault alluded in his governmentality lectures, the modern subject and the modern state are mutually constitutive. For Ashley this translates to modern discourses taking ‘reasoning man’ as “the source of truth and meaning” and the state as “the site and resources [reserved] for the exercise of force and violence wherever history refuses to bow to man’s reason” (Ashley, 1989:268). In this view, domestic society is the space in which modern identity is embedded which stands in direct opposition to anarchy, that space of “historical contingency and chance that refuses to submit to reason” (Ashley, 1989:268). More specifically, Ashley has suggested that practices and theories of international relations are practices of statecraft which ‘craft the state into being’ by inscribing problems and dangers external to the state, thereby enframing the ‘domestic population’ in which the state comes to be seen as the legitimate centre of authority and ultimate purveyor of security (Ashley, 1989:306).

In these practices of statecraft, as Miller and Rose have also noted, the limits and coherence of the domains of political authority are established, the geographical and conceptual spaces of political rule delineated, and the authorities that are deemed able to speak for a population constituted (Miller and Rose, 1992:178). These variables are then placed in particular ‘external’ configurations with other states such as anarchy and the balance of power doctrine or anarchical society and the theory of shared rules and institutions among states. Such doctrines and theories constitute foreign policy and associated paraphernalia (including diplomatic etiquette, conventions, treaties, and
practices of warfare) in which is simultaneously claimed authority over the subjects and activities composing a state. In this respect, Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, as an early modern governmental treatise concerned with employing a discourse of danger embodied in the hypothetical ‘state of nature’ in order to constitute a political order based on reason and rationalism as I discuss in more detail in chapter two in relation to the invocation of the Hobbesian state in the global governance of human security, can be read too as an inscription of the ‘paradigm of sovereignty’.

Crucially, sovereign man is centred in the state only through modern narratives of danger. Drawing on Derrida, Ashley argues that the discourses of danger in International Relations are produced through the logocentric procedures of oppositional structuring and hierarchizing. The ‘paradigm of sovereignty’ operates based on a simple dichotomy of sovereignty/anarchy. Sovereignty is opposed to anarchy, whereby the differentiation and exclusion of the latter helps to define the boundaries or identity of the former. These two opposing concepts form the basis for mutually reinforcing dichotomies such as self/‘other-as-enemy,’ rational/irrational, order/disorder, security/insecurity, inside/outside, and so on. The hierarchization of the opposing concepts functions to define the superior concept by differentiating and excluding the inferior concept. This procedure, in which sovereignty is “a center of decision presiding over a self that is to be valued and demarcated from an external domain that cannot or will not be assimilated to the identity of the sovereign domain,” typifies the knowledge practices of the ‘paradigm of sovereignty’ (Campbell, 1998:65). In Campbell’s reading of Ashley, they reproduce the “sovereign presence of reasoning man” centred in the state through narratives of the dangerous ‘other’ (Campbell, 1998:66).

Indeed, the dichotomy of inside versus outside is perhaps one of the most salient divisions characterizing International Relations (see e.g. Walker, 1993). It is the product of a Cartesian knowledge practice of spatialization which arbitrarily draws “an absolute boundary between ‘inside’ and ‘outside,’ where the former is privileged” (Ashley, 1989:290). The ‘inside’ functions as the space of identity, “the privileged space of the Self”. It is opposed by an ‘outside,’ an externalised space of difference beyond the boundaries of the Self which escapes rational control (Ashley, 1989:290). The boundaries of the inside are produced through its differentiation from the outside. In terms of International Relations, ‘man’ at the centre of the ‘state’ is the ‘inside’ in opposition to the ‘outside’ that is the ‘international,’ a space usually taken to be anarchical. Thus, ‘man,’ the ‘state,’ and the ‘international’ are mutually constitutive. As Campbell has suggested in his reading of Ashley: “No one authors the other” (Campbell, 1998:60). In this perspective, foreign policy
appears less as solving problems and dangers threatening an a priori population but, by externalizing problems and dangers, as enframing the domestic population in which "the state can be recognized as a center and can secure its claim to legitimacy" (Ashley, 1989:302). Thus, foreign policy is a practice of statecraft that constructs the 'state' as well as the individual and the 'international'.

Following Ashley's argument, interpretations of international relations are framed by the knowledge practices of the 'paradigm of sovereignty' which takes the modern state as the principal locale of political order and hub of security. Put differently, the 'paradigm of sovereignty' disciplines politicians, academics, civil servants, citizens and denizens, to think of political life and the possibilities it entails in distinctly state-centric terms, occluding other ways of political being. These practices which, following Dillon, operate on what could alternatively be termed the 'logic of security', circulate across dispersed sites, fixing the limits of what are socially acceptable behaviour, knowledge and research, and political practice in global politics. For security is, as Dillon has argued, always logocentrically opposed by insecurity: "a package which tells you what you are as it tells you what to die for; which tells you what to love as it tells you what to defend" (Dillon, 1996:33). By knowing what to fear and desiring to control danger, modern 'man' at the centre of the modern state is constituted through the representations of danger and insecurity. Only by reference to this logic of security can it be determined what "states, domestic societies, their boundaries, and their historical problems and dangers are" (Ashley, 1989:270). Put differently, the paradigm provides "the conditions of possibility for reason, the unproblematic, taken-for-granted departure for political practice" in global politics (O'Tuathail, 1996:135-6).

In this sense, the 'international' can be interpreted as a governmental assemblage insofar as it conducts the (political) conduct of people through a particular regime of truth. For example, drawing on three case studies, Weber has shown how the core of just such a regime, namely state sovereignty, is enacted in processes of legitimating intervention (such as during the Concert of Europe's interventions in Spain and Naples in the 1820s, Wilson's interventionism in Mexico and Russia in the 1910s, and the Reagan-Bush intervention's in Grenada and Panama in the 1980s) (Weber, 1995). Taking this further by drawing on Judith Butler's notion of performativity, Weber has similarly argued how the state, if understood as the effect of 'complex citational processes', appears as "a subject in process" that is enacted performatively in practices and theories of international relations (Weber, 1998:78). Writing also on practices of foreign policy, Campbell has shown in relation to this, for example through a discussion of the international war on drugs, the
way in which such practices constitute the very identity of one state and its people, namely, of the United States (Campbell, 1998, see also in relation to Canada, Grayson, 2008). Similarly, Doty has shown the way contemporary foreign aid and human rights practices enmeshed in North-South relations are steeped in colonial history and constitute national identities today (Doty, 1996). In this way too, however, it can be said that the state and all that it has come to be associated with including sovereignty and citizenship are subject to continual transformation. As Foucault’s discussion concerning the emergence of the modern state narrated above suggests, changes in the dynamic of governing processes relating to mutations in governmentalities also change the cumulative effects they produce.

Thus, the state effect (along with the subjectivities and imaginaries of international or global order) is contingent on the intricacies of perpetually evolving governing processes. Writing in the mid 1990s, Dillon reflected on the post-Cold War problematic of ‘new world order’, suggesting it is reposing basic questions of political order. He argued that the transformation of the political landscape at the time involved “a discursive and epistemic change of enormous proportions’ which served to transform the character of political subjectivity at the national, regional, and global levels (Dillon, 1995:346). He concluded with the reminder that state sovereignty is a peculiar fiction and that all (political) identities are always mutable. In terms of contemporary transformations of political order, for example, Larner and Williams have suggested analysing the discourse of ‘globalization’ as a governmentality which involves both de-territorializations and re-territorializations. Drawing on Rose, they advocate a fluid conception of territory in which territorialization involves more generally delineating a ‘territory in thought’ and inscribing it in the real (Larner and Walters, 2004:498, cf. Rose, 1999:34). For them, geographical territory is but one form of territory. In this context, Dean reminds that globalization is but the recent way in which the world has come to be encoded, divided, appropriated and populated (Dean, 2004). It is in a similar sense that I propose to trace the mutations in political order relating to the global governance of human security in the assemblages it comprises.

In fact, over the last fifteen years, there has been a growing body of studies drawing particularly on Foucault’s analytics of government to analyse the constitution and governance of spaces beyond the nation-state in fields as diverse as colonialism, inter- and intra-state conflict, security, global commerce, environment, humanitarian disasters, regionalization, development, geopolitics, globalization, and world order. Studies of colonial governmentalities (e.g. Mitchell, 2002, Rabinow, 1989, Said, 1978, Scott, 2005, Scott, 1999), development and human security (e.g. Agrawal, 2005, Duffield, 2007,
Escobar, 1995, Li, 2007), for example, have shown the way particular historical assemblages of power/knowledge involving mechanisms of counting and forms of expertise not only (re)constitute the colony and spaces of development but also the West. The field of critical geopolitics has offered various accounts of the ways in which geopolitical thought has divided, encoded and (re)territorialized the world (e.g. Agnew and Corbridge, 1995, O'Tuathail, 1996, O'Tuathail and Dalby, 1998). Studies of the European Union (EU) have shown the way domestic and international fields relating to issues such as security, migration, and technology have become blurred (e.g. Barry, 1996, Barry and Walters, 2003, Bigo, 2000). Given the diversity and in an effort to concentrate efforts, Larner and Williams have suggested the umbrella concept of global governmentality in order “to problematize the constitution, and governance of spaces above, beyond, between and across states” (2004:2). On the other hand, Ong, Collier, and their anthropology colleagues have concentrated on the study of global assemblages in order to examine how new spatial articulations of science, bureaucracy and technocracy, capitalism and governmentality constitute globalization (Ong and Collier, 2005).

**ASSEMBLING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE**

Several scholars have begun to analyse (global) governance in terms of governmentality (see e.g. Dillon and Reid, 2000, Dillon and Reid, 2001, Duffield, 2001, Lemke, 2007, Rose, 1999, Walters, 2004). They have examined the emergence of the concept of governance and its political imaginary and have drawn attention to some of the governmental assemblages that are re-territorializing (in the sense of Rose), i.e. re-thinking and thus remaking, political authority in contemporary global politics. From a governmentality perspective, global governance does not describe an objectively given reality that is independent of its analytical categories and explanations. Rather, it appears as a particular way of thinking which constitutes the reality that it is concerned with governing. Specifically, global governance makes the reality of a supposedly emerging global political order thinkable and governable. As this chapter shows, it tames the intransigence of reality, breaking it down and subjecting it to the disciplined analysis of thought, and clarifies the problematizations of government arising from this reality. In the following, I want to first draw out the intellectual and epistemological systems underpinning global governance and human security. How is the contemporary problem of the political
discursively codified through global governance? What kind of orders of governance (constellations of subjects and objects of governance) does it give rise to?

The discourse of global governance is argued to have arisen from an analytical and theoretical shift from government to governance in political science in the 1980s (see e.g. Rosenau and Czemiel, 1992). In this understanding, government refers to a fixed centre of power like the state which governs in a top-down fashion. Governance, on the other hand, refers to the act of governing per se which is much broader in scope. According to Rose, it is a catch-all term used to refer to “any strategy, tactic, process, procedure or programme for controlling, regulating, shaping, mastering or exercising authority over others in a nation, organization or locality” (Rose, 1999:15). Indeed, the shift from government to governance can be considered an expression of a “mutation within political reason” (Walters, 2004:28) in which also a fundamentally different political order than ‘the international’ is seen emerging. This supposed political order prompts the set up of distinct assemblages of governance principally concerned with problems considered ‘global’, such as those framed in terms of human insecurity in which key political subjectivities (e.g. the individual, the state, and the global) are mutually (re)constituted. In this section of the thesis, I want to highlight some of the unspoken and tacit things which are generally taken-for-granted in the (knowledge) processes associated with global governance and consequently resonate too in the discourse and practice of (the global governance of) human security. Here too, it is worth bringing up some of the notes on governance already put forward by critical scholars, elements of which, I would argue, apply to human security too. Particularly, I am thinking about the critique of the metanarrative of ‘complexity’ and the nature of the political associated with the regime of truth circumscribing (global) governance. 14

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14 Let me point out that there are similarities between the regimes of governance and governmentality. This said, there are also important ontological differences worth mentioning here. Indeed, the discourses of governance and governmentality share an appreciation for how political power is exercised. Secondly, both are interested in what Rose and Miller have referred to as ‘political power beyond the state’ (cf. Miller and Rose, 1992, Peters, 2000). Specifically, they are interested in how governance takes place both ‘above’ or ‘outside’ the state, for example, in regional unions such as the EU or ASEAN or global networks and institutions such as the United Nations, and ‘inside’ or besides the state, for example, in schools, hospitals, community associations, the market (cf. Lemke, 2007, Rose, 1999:15-17, Stoker, 1998). In this way too, they challenge the traditional geographical assumptions and markers of certainty such as the inside/outside divide underlying the practice and discipline of International Relations. Thirdly, they share a broadly relational understanding of power insofar as power is understood as resulting from interactions and associations in mobile and flexible composite systems, i.e. in networks or complexes and assemblages (cf. Ong and Collier, 2005, Rosenau, 1999). On the other hand, governance and governmentality studies differ strongly in how they conceive of objects of governance (Jessop, 1999:6, Lemke, 2007) as well as the contemporary problem of the political (see e.g. Barry, 2001, Mitchell, 2002, Walters, 2004:33-37). For governance, the
Let me also note though that global governance comprises a growing and diverse body of literature and debates concerned with its definition, composition and practice, necessity and political implication. In fact, following Whitman (Whitman, 2005), global governance has come to refer to, firstly, the activity of ‘an extended and empowered actor realm’ such as the notion of global civil society where civil society groups mobilize in opposition to national and international agendas, for example, seeking to redress institutionalized norms and governing practices (e.g. Kaldor, 2003). Secondly, it has been used to describe ‘strengthened multilateralism’ in which various multilateral organizations, institutions and other kinds of inter-state alliances collaborate to tackle specific issue areas. Issues include financial regulation, standardization of processes, environmental redress, and so on. Thirdly, it has been used to describe ‘high-level sectoral governance’ in which actors and (governmental and non-governmental) institutions at various levels come together to tackle designated sectors rendered problematic, such as the global governance of the environment or human (in)security. Finally, it has also been used to describe a ‘summative phenomenon’ in which the totality of all forms of governing in the world is seen as adequate, “no matter how patchy and contested that sum is,” to secure no less than global life itself (Whitman, 2005:40).

The Commission on Global Governance (CGG), for example, defines (global) governance as a summative phenomenon when it declares (CGG, 1995:2) that it is

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\text{the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.}
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environment, human insecurities, refugees, the state, the global economy, the globe and so on exist prior their coordination in and through the governing processes (Jessop, 1999:6). For governmentality, however, these objects (and the agents, identities, and interests involved) are not given or fixed but are constituted in and through the way governance is exercised. It is in this way too that the state and sovereignty in global governance can alternatively be understood not as declining and eroding but as undergoing reconstitution (see e.g. Arts et al., 2009, Cerny, 2010) as this thesis goes on to show in relation to human security. Secondly, and relating to this, there are important differences in how they understand the contemporary problem of the political. There is a drive for inclusion, participation and collective problem-solving in the (global) governance discourse (e.g. CGG, 1995, Pierre, 2000, Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance, 1991) which, however, ends up displacing political conflicts, thereby marginalizing subaltern voices and excluding important alternative politics. Similarly, there is an inclination to think of, and thus foreclose, the political by rendering it technical, thereby also ironing out political contention, dissent, and alternatives. This has been referred to as the ‘anti-politics’ of governance. This certainly was the case in the human security projects examined here as I demonstrate in chapters four and five.
Much like the CGG, for James Rosenau, one of the earliest and most prolific theorists of global governance, governance is the result of “a lot of governmental and nongovernmental activities that occur in local places [...] and that contribute to the overall order of world affairs” (Rosenau, 1994). In the view of both the CGG and Rosenau, governance comes in multiple forms including in a market, a civil society (e.g. a neighbourhood co-operative), a legislative chamber, a crowded town square, a regional intergovernmental initiative, multinational corporations, the global capital market, a battlefield. Considering the diversity of shapes of governance unfolding in the world, Rosenau has argued that global governance cannot be understood as “a single frontier” but is “a host of diverse frontiers” in which “time becomes disjointed, nonlinear patterns predominate, organizations bifurcate, societies implode, regions unify, markets overlap” (Rosenau, 1997:6-7). As such, global governance refers not to a central authority, that is, a world government (see e.g. CGG, 1995:xvi, Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). It is not government of the world but refers to the many frontiers which regulate, order, and manage in the world including, as I go on to show, the ‘defence’ of “the new frontiers of human security” (UNDP, 1994:81).

Rosenau’s work and the Commission’s report are oft quoted and have been influential in setting the intellectual trajectory of the discourse of global governance more generally. The CGG was an independent group of 28 world leaders which came together in 1995 to develop a way to manage ‘global problems’ (CGG, 1995:xvii) including the problem of securing people over states, in other words, human security (CGG, 1995:81-82). Its report played a part in the conceptualization of the reform of the United Nations at the centre of global governance from which thereafter also emerged the Commission on Human Security and the Human Security Unit. In order to highlight the intersections between the CGG and Rosenau, it is worth mentioning that the latter wrote three ‘expert papers’ for the CGG including ‘Changing Capacities of Citizens 1945-95,’ ‘Changing States in a Changing World,’ and ‘Proliferating Organizations in a Changing World’ to which I turn later in this chapter (CGG, 1995). Crucially, in describing the alleged evolution of human beings into more developed members of the world, capable of governing themselves without governments, thereby giving rise to global governance in the first place, Rosenau played a part in not only constituting the ‘global subjects’ but also the state form and principles of order distinct to the assemblages set up vis-a-vis global governance (CGG, 1995:2, see also, Rosenau, 1990:211).
It is not a secret that global governance mechanisms such as Rosenau and the CGG describe proceed according to a ‘metanarrative’ or governmental logic of ‘complexity’ comprising presuppositions and assumptions drawn from the complexity sciences and adapted to international politics which frame and limit the possibilities of thinking about and acting upon the contemporary world (cf. Dillon, 2000, Jessop, 1999, Rosenau, 2000, Walters, 2004:40-41, Whitman, 2005). It constitutes a regime of truth which passes through and constitutes sites of practice including those associated with management, digitalized information and communication technologies as well as global governance such as human security. Complexity theory itself emerged at the end of the Cold War from, most notably, cybernetics, the study of how systems organize, regulate, evolve, and adapt themselves as a result of the interactions between their constituent parts (see e.g. Dillon, 2000:9, Whitman, 2005:48). In principal, complexity theory constitutes a ‘revolutionary’ move from reductionist and simplified accounts, according to Coveney and Highfield (Coveney and Highfield, 1996:7, see also Thrift, 1999:33), to

the study of the behaviour of macroscopic collections of [interacting] units that are endowed with the potential to evolve in time. Their interactions lead to coherent collective phenomena, so-called emergent properties, that can be classified only at higher levels than those of individual units.

In this way, processes are given primacy over events, the mode of relating in collectivities or systems over discreet and self-contained entities, and evolution or development over structure (Ingold, 1990:209).

Essentially, complexity thinkers differentiate themselves from the traditional Newtonian logic which they argue proceeds on the assumption that bodies are out there, “independent of the experimental devices by which they were observed, and recorded as existing”. For complexity thinkers, bodies are contingent systems constituted in the mode in which their elementary parts interact (Dillon, 2000:8). The emphasis on modes of relating in systems leads complexity thinkers to conceive of order not in terms of a fixed structure or a predetermined, linear and divine design but of a dynamic, complex and transitional process. Specifically, while Newtonian thinking is machinic in that it assumes the world is predictable, reducible to cause and effect, and thus governable like a well-oiled machine, complexity thinking maintains that order in complex systems emerges from the messy and unpredictable self-organizing dynamics of the interacting units that
they comprise. In this way, systems are characterized by, amongst others, openness, self-organization, adaptability, a dissipative structure, bifurcation, feedback loops, autocatalysis (Dillon, 2000:4).

Crucially, systems are open because they are not isolated from their environments (Whitman, 2005:50). Put differently, they are interdependent: “Open systems depend on and contribute to their surround and are thus involved in interdependence with it as well as being dependent on the interaction of internal relationships. This interdependence imposes constraints on all their constituents” (Vickers, 1983:17, as quoted in Whitman, 2005:51). According to Vickers, while the constraining effects on systems can be mitigated, it is not possible to remove the constraints of interdependence since they “tend to become more demanding and sometimes even more contradictory as the scale of organization rises”. Vickers concludes that the possibility of managing interdependence is limited and unpredictable (Vickers, 1983:17, as quoted in Whitman, 2005:51). Although the adaptation of complexity in (global) governance/human security leads advocates to constitute a world in which state authorities interact in ‘self-regularizing’ networked configurations with public/private, private, and other units in processes of networking, piloting, steering, (global) governance/human security thinking diverges from complexity thinkers in that it still clings to the possibility of managing complex interdependence. As I demonstrate in the ensuing chapters, there remains a residual belief in human techno-scientific ingenuity (scientific evidence, technological innovations, managerial effectiveness), the ability to determine/predict the trajectories and calculate the probabilities of interdependence and complexity.

The direct influence of complexity theory on global governance, as Whitman has noted, is limited though by no means negligible (Whitman, 2005:54). At least six interrelated arguments have been put forward in relation to the adaption of ‘complexity’ themes to political science and International Relations (see e.g. Held and McGrew, 2002:1-24, Keohane, 2002, Rosenau, 1999). In fact, they do not describe an objectively observable reality but are the taken-for-granted assumptions which constitute the regime of global governance (the set of political subjects including the individual, the state, and global order) as they are passed through sites in which this reality is enacted. Firstly, as already mentioned, (global) governance involves a reorientation from institutions to processes in the practice and analyses of global politics. Secondly, political order is understood not as given by a static structure of states, i.e. the ‘international’, but as emerging from a heterarchical landscape of ‘self-regularizing networks (or frontiers) of governance. Thirdly, a narrative of the state is reiterated in which state authority is argued to be
declining and state sovereignty eroding vis-à-vis the alleged emerging heterarchical political order. Fourthly, and relating to this, it involves a shift in thinking about power from something owned by one centre to something that is produced in relation and shared among many players and networks. Fifthly, all this is embedded in an account of social transformation in which the world is seen as experiencing rapid development and increasing change, complexity, and interdependence, thereby making governance imperative. Finally, self-governance is understood as an attribute of resilient systems that must first be engineered, for example through training and learning.

The move away from the focus on institutions of government (which is taken to be synonymous with the state) to a focus on the processes or mechanics of governing in the practice and analysis of contemporary political rule is said to provide a “healthy antidote” to much of political science in that proponents are interested in “what governments actually do” (Peters, 2000:37, Walters, 2004:31). Unlike calls to ‘bring back the state’ into political studies (cf. Skocpol et al., 1985), advocates of governance are “sceptical about the conceptual centrality and validity of the state” (Walters, 2004:27-8). Instead, they are interested in the strategies, processes, procedures and programmes for controlling, regulating or managing problems at the local, national, and global levels that are developed and exercised in, through, and beyond the traditional markers and institutions of authority (Lemke, 2007, Rose, 1999:15). As Gerry Stoker has argued, “The essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on the recourse to the authority and sanctions of government” (Stoker, 1998:17). It is in this sense that, as James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel have noted, global governance refers not to a world government but to ‘governance without government’ (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992).

In comparison and in differentiation with government, governance is cast as new. Accordingly, ‘old’ government refers to a time when society was governed in a top-down manner from fixed centres of power like the state while ‘new’ governance describes a time when political concerns such as security, economy, and welfare are increasingly negotiated in processes of networking, interacting, piloting and steering in “networked configurations” with a range of governmental and non-governmental organizations (Walters, 2004:29). In this narrative, a version of which is also recapitulated in the human security discourse I discuss in chapter two, the state is problematized as inadequate to govern. State authorities are seen as increasingly having to negotiate their competencies (steering, controlling, regulating, managing) with other emerging centres of power. This debate has pushed to the limit though not abandoned traditional taken-for-granted categories and mechanisms of ordering which have functioned as markers of certainty,
grounding and disciplining the theory and practice of international relations. Here I am thinking particularly of the geographical spatialization of power in terms of bounded territorial and sovereign states conducting world politics (e.g. Featherstone and Lash, 1995, Featherstone and Venn, 2006, Held and McGrew, 2002, Scholte, 2000:54).

From the governance perspective, contemporary political order emerges not from states but from a heterarchical landscape of ‘self-regularizing’ networks of both government and non-governmental agencies involving “multiple ranking associated with differentially divided capabilities or authority” (Donnelly, 2009:64, see also Held and McGrew, 2002). For example, observing an increase in what they call complex transnational connections and mutual dependencies between states, corporations, and organizations peculiar to an increasingly interconnected and complex world, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have argued that traditional geopolitical concerns such as military force and state-centric power balancing factors are now but one set of many ‘new’ dynamics including economic, social, and ecological, sets of problems of ‘international governance’. According to Keohane, “We have overemphasized states and we have over-aggregated power” (2002:276). In their analysis of power and ‘complex interdependence’, state sovereignty is partially compromised as power derives from the asymmetrical struggle between sovereign states, corporations, organizations, regimes over who has the authority to dictate and enforce rules to control common problems (Keohane, 1984, Keohane and Nye, 2000). Stephen Krasner has referred to the ability to control transborder flows as interdependence sovereignty (1999:10).15

Heralding the demise of the state as the supreme centre of power in international relations seemed particularly the intellectual fashion across the social sciences in the 1990s (Clark, 1999, Weiss, 1998:2). The gist of this argument concerned the state’s reduced ability to monitor and control a wide range of global flows and activities that impinge on its territory. Observing for example, the changing nature of competition between states – from competition for control over territory to competition over market shares in the world economy – Susan Strange argued that the state is coming to share authority in matters of economy and society with a variety of institutions. These include transnational companies including banks, accounting and law firms, international institutions including the International Monetary fund (IMF) and Inmarsat, and nongovernmental organizations including Amnesty International and the Olympic sports organization and transnational

15 Interdependence sovereignty, according to Krasner, refers to “the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state”. Krasner, Stephen (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p. 10
professional associations of doctors, economists, and scientists. In Strange's view, the state is becoming defective and retreating since "state authority has leaked away, upwards, sideways, and downwards. In some matters, it seems even to have gone nowhere, just evaporated" (1995:56, see also, 1996). A proponent of the de-centralization of power, Ohmae similarly proclaimed the nation-state to be declining, overrun by flows of communication, corporations, customers, capital, and currencies (1996).

On the other hand, rejecting the popular belief that globalizing (economic or social) forces have eclipsed the nation-state and are creating "a global economy and society in which political boundaries and national loyalties are no longer relevant," realist Robert Gilpin argued that states continue "to use their power" (read authority) to channel economic forces in ways favourable to the national interest. In this account, although globalizing forces are profoundly transforming international relations, for the time being, the institution of sovereign states remains of vital importance to world affairs. Gilpin wants to remind that statist institutions are the only global entities with entrenched capacities to employ military force, of coinage, taxation, and "safeguarding national and individual security" (Gilpin, 2002:239-40). Similarly, in spite of their observation that power is partially migrating from the state to other centres of power such as transnational regimes, Keohane and Nye in fact retain key realist insights such as the continued supreme role of the state and the national interest in governing contemporary world affairs. As Keohane noted, the state remains an important force to uphold political order in a complexly interdependent world (2002:326). In this account, power is seen crystallizing in or transmitting between institutions which gain or lose power relative to the amount of power of other institutions.

The emergence of 'complex multilateralism' in which states, international institutions, transnational networks and agencies come together to govern common global issues such as global warming, world trade, and human security led the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to define the role for the UN, following the CGG, at the centre of 'global governance' (UN Secretary-General, 2000). Although states are deemed increasingly important as 'strategic sites' for holding together the 'complex infrastructure' of global governance, the notion of global governance rejects the state-centrism of the geographical spatialization of power (Held and McGrew, 2002:9). It is in this sense that a number of scholars have debated global governance, if controversially, in terms of a dramatic shift away from "the international" encapsulated in traditional geopolitics and sovereign states to a multilayered, pluralistic, and structurally complex system of global governance (see e.g. Cox, 1997, Held and McGrew, 2002, Keohane and Nye, 2000, Rosenau, 1999).
However, the trend to herald the demise of states rests on the assumption that there was indeed a time when states were the principal bearers of power and the main agents of (international) governance. Following Walters, such contention rests on an exaggerated understanding of the power of the state which leads to an overemphasis of the novelty and necessity of (global) governance. (Global) governance seems to assume that the state, in Walters words, was “one giant bureaucracy where authority simply flowed from the centre to the margins” when, according to recent governmentality studies of the state for example, “it too governed by assembling networks of actors, networks which cut across the nominal boundaries of state/society and public/private” (Barry et al., 1996, Burchell et al., 1991, Miller and Rose, 1995, Walters, 2004:38-9).

With the assumed erosion of the state in global governance, power has come to be defined in terms of degrees of authority relating to the extent that authority has been established and the amount of authority flowing in and between states or other spheres of authority (SoA) (Rosenau, 2000:188, 2002:8). SoA are said to be located at all sites of human activity and amount to systems of rule in which aims and goals are pursued through processes of governing, in other words, controlling, regulating, administering, managing, in order to steer a group, community, society, towards certain goals. According to Rosenau (Rosenau, 1995:13),

in a turbulent and ever more interdependent world, where what happens in one corner or at one level may have consequences for what occurs at every other corner and level, it seems a mistake to adhere to a narrow definition in which only formal institutions at the national and international levels are considered relevant.

However, in spite of emphasizing the importance of informal processes of governing, some of which are still largely inchoate such as at “a crowded town square,” clashing and overlapping, connecting and intersecting (1997:6-7), Rosenau ends up analysing these not in terms of how the processes operate but in terms of who carries how much authority (Sending and Neumann, 2006:653). Rosenau’s focus is limited to given and fixed state and non-state actors who have undergone some form of institutionalization of political authority.

Indeed, although advancing important insights into the study of the supposedly emerging relational architecture of political organization in contemporary global politics, (global) governance remains tied to a specific meaning of power as sovereignty which has circumscribed the way they are to think about and study emerging global politics. Specifically, this conception of power leads them to focus their energies on the amount of
power held by institutionalized actors rather than on how power is exercised. It suggests that such attempts to understand governing are limited in making sense of the political in contemporary world affairs. In spite of debating a shift in the spatialization of power from the territorial to other (non-territorial and overlapping) centres and spheres of power, the meaning of power appears unchanged. In effect, power is an attribute which ends up being traded between institutions including states, corporations, international societies, and individuals. The state emerges as a continuing though weakened force insofar as power is read in terms of a zero-sum game in which any increase in the power of non-state actors is interpreted as diminishing the power of the state. In this account, the space of the political in international relations is extended from the territorial state to other, non-territorial and overlapping, institutions of power. Certainly, as Barnett and Duval have argued, studies of global governance would benefit from a closer analysis of the meaning of power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005).

Finally, in Rosenau's adaptation of complexity to political order, governance emerges as "the purposive activities of any collectivity that sustain mechanisms designed to insure its safety, prosperity, coherence, stability, and continuance" (emphasis added, Rosenau, 2000:171-4). Essentially, 'systems of rule' self-govern, that is self-regulate/manage, in adaptation to dynamics of change and complexity in the world. They have the capacity to adapt and prepare for uncertainty. It is worth noting in passing, that an important aspect of arguments about self-governance and adaptation is the notion of 'resilience' (e.g. Duffield, 2007) understood as the capacity to rebound after shocks to the system and to maintain the system's functionality when confronted with constantly emerging new threats. According to Duffield, resilience is the lingua franca of risk, preparedness and survivability. Indeed, self-governance is an attribute of resilient systems that must, however, be engineered through training and learning. In his paper on the changing capacities of citizens in the twentieth century which he presented to the CGG, for example, Rosenau argued for a shift in understanding community from territorial citizenship to membership which would enable individuals to engage with large-scale organizations, territorial or not (CGG, 1995:2, see also, Rosenau, 1990:211). Although he does not explicitly talk about resilience, self-governance in a system entails, in Rosenau's understanding, "a progressive process of learning wherein the skills of people expand and thereby enable them to perform better the tasks of group membership and to engage more effectively in varying kinds of citizenship behaviour" (emphasis added, Rosenau, 1992:277-8).
In contrast to its evident call for participation and collective problem-solving, the (global) governance discourse has been criticized for its exclusionary assumptions about the nature of politics. On the one hand, as Hewitt de Alcántara and others have noted, governance tends towards technocratic practice, resulting in the prioritization of effectiveness and efficiency over situated knowledges in the conceptualization and enactment of problem management (Hewitt de Alcántara, 1998:112-3, Walters, 2004:33). On the other hand, as Walters has argued, its emphasis on participation and the widening of actors including the 'governed'—giving rise to political subjectivities such as 'communities', 'partners', 'stakeholders'—is representative of a particular kind of politics built around political consensus and problem-solving. In this respect, the CGG has called for a 'global citizenship' which includes “the poorer, marginalized, and alienated segments of national and international society” (CGG, 1995). Indeed, the promotion of ‘good governance’ in global governance has tended to involve only one kind of politics to the exclusion of alternatives. Specifically, 'good governance,' as Walters has noted, is equated with a narrow and instrumental form of democracy which “functions as little more than an institutional support for market-oriented reforms”. Effectively, global institutions are handed a depoliticized, technical basis on which to promote political reform in 'target' countries (Walters, 2004:34). In this respect, as I demonstrate particularly in chapters four and five, assemblages of global governance such as those comprising human security tend not to be spaces of politics but of technocratic management.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has drawn out some of the unspoken, tacit presuppositions about governing the contemporary state of the world encapsulated in ‘the international’ as well as global governance. The chapter began by drawing on Foucault’s comments on the emerging ‘international’ where he showed the way political subjectivities including the identity of individuals, states and inter-state relations emerged together from evolving governmental assemblages. I then discussed the Foucauldian interpretations of international relations which identify similar co-constitutions in contemporary international relations. Specifically, I looked to Ashley who demonstrated the way the knowledge practices of a dominant regime of truth (the paradigm of sovereignty) constitute specific ‘internal’ (such as the sovereign state and modern man) and ‘external’ configurations (such as anarchy) of international order. Put differently, he argued that in much of International Relations it is
taken for granted that reasoning man sets up the state which comes to embody the solution central to resolving the problem of political order in the face of an imagined external, anarchic realm. Consequently, theorizing and acting upon international relations are practices which help to craft the state and associated political subjectivities into being.

Finally, I analysed global governance first as a regime of truth which sets up the political subjectivities that advocates take to be real and act upon. This is important in order to set the stage for examining the particularities of global governance specific to human security in the next chapter. Specially, I drew out the taken-for-granted truths about governing the contemporary state of the world which ultimately pass through sites of human security practice as I go on to show in the following chapters. I was particularly interested in the way the order of governance that global governance sets up is framed vis-a-vis the metanarrative of complexity which entailed a reorientation from institutions to processes, a heterarchical landscape of 'self-regularizing networks (or frontiers) of governance, a narrative of the state in which state authority is argued to be declining and state sovereignty eroding, a relational conception of power, an account of transformation which makes governance inevitable, and finally the strategy to train the human to self-govern. Crucially, I suggested, governance thinking remains wedded to the possibility of taming complexity. In relation to this, I mentioned the inclination to render the political implications of complexity technical which ends up displacing political tensions and marginalizing subaltern voices. Problems of global governance are not objectively given but are (re)produced by discourses like human security which enact the 'truths' of global governance by imposing, as Ashley has suggested, a governmental 'purpose' on the international community (1989).
In chapter one I examined the way the discourse of global governance generally, by describing and acting on a specific political order in terms of the metaphor of complexity, also constitutes this complex reality in which governance is seen to run through multileveled, polycentric, and self-organizing networks. In this chapter I take this argument further by examining the particularities enacted specifically by the global governance agenda that is associated with human security. As I noted at the outset, human security was put forward as a new way of thinking about and managing insecurity. In human security terms, security concerns the contemporary everyday insecurities affecting an increasingly complex and interdependent life which are to be managed by an architecture of global governance that is directed by a will to secure life as an end itself, rather than as a means to the end of the state (CHS, 2003, UNDP, 1994). As such, human security has also been examined as a ‘global’ biopolitical project which produces, disseminates, consumes, and refines meaning and understanding of how to interpret and, consequently, how to do things that then govern conduct with the aim of securing specific ways of life. In this chapter, I identify the assumptions and knowledge practices which help to set up the governance of life embodied by human security.

Reflecting on the way thinking about human security has been framed and mapping the terrain upon which present political debates occur is an exercise which opens up possibilities of thought that these very debates might otherwise obscure (Connolly, 1989). Launching new avenues of thought is important not only for lucidity in the analysis but also, more importantly, for providing alternative accounts of global governance as well as human security. After all, the frameworks of thought used to make sense of the present world also inform, legitimize even, policies and practices which intervene, sometimes violently, in the different forms of life of individuals and communities around the world. As I go on to show in this chapter, human security comprises a biopolitical strategy to foster life. Specifically, its 'biopolitical imaginary' (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009) sets out the order of human security in which the life worth protecting is circumscribed by a state operating on conditional sovereignty and an ambiguous exteriority. I then go on to discuss the way human security maps this ambiguous exteriority in terms of a dangerous geography. In the third section of the chapter, I examine the kind of order of governance
human security calls for – the global governance of life – in which also a particular state
form is instigated. Put differently, as a statecraft, human security crafts a particular set of
state and sovereignty into being. Finally, I reflect on one important way these tacit
knowledges begin to be passed through sites of human security practice, namely, the
logical framework.

**ASSEMBLING HUMAN SECURITY**

From a governmentality perspective, processes of human security describe and act upon
an order of the real which is circumscribed by the intersections between a contemporary
biopolitical problematization of life and the logic of ‘complexity’ associated with global
governance as discussed in chapter one. Indeed, human security constitutes and manages
an imaginative geography through a heterarchical rather than geopolitical order. This
‘complex’ reality that it presumes to exist not only determines the kind of
problematizations, correlative spaces, agents, and mechanisms through which human
security initiatives govern but also defines the limits of the kind of human life to be
protected and promoted, thus giving rise to specifically ordered human security
assemblages. In particular, as the ensuing sections demonstrate, the governmental logic of
human security involves the governmentalization of the state by deploying an extended
Hobbesian discourse of danger and engineering, by foreclosing the political to all but
biopolitical considerations, self-governing systems in which ‘human’ subjects and their
attributes are constitutive parts. These processes take on a definite material form in a
multiplicity of governmental assemblages that can be traced as consequently emerging in
the world, as I go on to demonstrate particularly in the migrant health assemblage in
Thailand and the human trafficking assemblage in Vietnam in chapters four and five.

To reiterate, underlying human security is a will to secure life as an end itself, rather than
as a means to the end of the state as has been hitherto customary in security thinking.
Traditional security approaches proceed on the Hobbesian assumption that the territorial
state is the ultimate purveyor of political order, and hence of security too, in international
relations (for a compelling critique of this, see Ashley, 1989). In this understanding, states
hold the monopoly on the rights and means to protect the lives of citizens. In turn, order
(and peace) is principally established by the power balancing acts and the security of
states. Threats to the state, considered synonymous to threats to its borders, people and
values, were assumed to originate from outside the state (see e.g. Buzan, 1991). Accordingly, state security policy is about sustaining and promoting the core values of states in their relations with one another, these principally being sovereignty and territoriality. Put differently, the objective of state security policy is to protect the state by protecting its territory. In contrast to this, rather than taking the state (and its territory) as security referents, human security takes life itself as the referent of security (UNDP, 1994:22). Put differently, human security elevates people and their needs to the centre of security thinking (Duffield and Waddell, 2004:7).

The security challenges to (everyday) life that are of concern to advocates of human security include, as the HDR 1994 suggested, unemployment, famine, diseases, air pollution, earthquakes, flooding, industrial and traffic accidents, rape and gun crimes. To reiterate, the concept of human security was presented as an umbrella term for a comprehensive range of insecurities which are experienced at different levels of intensity including economic (job insecurity, unemployment), food (malnutrition, famine), health (viral contagions, lack of health services, environmental pollution), environmental (lack of clean water, air pollution, global warming), personal (torture, conflict, rape, domestic violence, community (interethnic strife, discrimination), and political insecurity (political repression, disappearance) (UNDP, 1994:22-5). Similarly, the CHS declared nearly a decade later in 2003 that human security is concerned with the “the lives of people”: their experience of violent conflict including displacement and trauma, of deprivation including impoverishment, pollution, ill health, illiteracy and “other maladies”, of “catastrophic accident and illness,” of “educational deprivations” that disadvantage people’s productivity and transformative potential as parents and as citizens (CHS, 2003:6).

**Biopolitical Strategies**

Considering its security referent is human life in all its multi-dimensionality, a number of scholars have analysed human security as a site of biopolitics. In this interpretation, human security arises within a more general epistemic shift to ‘make life live’ beginning in

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16 It should be mentioned here too that already during the Cold War, threat perceptions began changing, exposing limitations to the state security approach. What was considered the principal origin of threats to the security of the state, namely, the international realm, shifted to include also the domestic realm. According to the National Security Doctrine, the state needed to protect its sovereign territory from outside as well as inside, reflecting Cold War specific politics of fear fuelled by, for example, the threat of a communist Coup d'État. See e.g. O'Tuathil, Gearoid. (1996) *Critical Geopolitics*. Borderlines. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
eighteenth century Western Europe. As indicated in the previous chapter, this was the time of the emergence of the 'subject who knows', specifically, the realization that 'man' was endowed with the ability to reason and rationalize. In Foucault's narrative, the appearance of 'man' as a 'subject who knows' was the time when political discourse began to shift to the modern discourse of government, of how best to govern oneself, the family, political sovereignty and so on (Foucault, 2007:76). It was the time when concepts like 'population' and 'civil society' began to emerge in response to wider problems of government. As such, the modern or 'reasoning' subject and problematics of government, for example of how best to govern a population within a delineated territory, emerge in the same historic-political field.

Underlying biopolitics is a powerful governmental logic to foster life (Foucault, 1998:138). According to Foucault, the preoccupation with governance (of the self, the family, the school, the state) coupled with advancements in the sciences (e.g. statistics, demography, medicine, political theory) in eighteenth century Western Europe led to the belief in the possibility of mastering the inexorableness of human life so as to ensure the sustainability of certain dominant ways of life. Importantly, man was no longer regarded as a machine but as a living organism, a species with biological, somatic and corporeal attributes (Dillon and Reid, 2001:41). The bio-politics that has emerged from this is concerned with taming life by breaking it down and subjecting it to disciplined analysis, clarifying the problematizations of governance, thus rendering it governable (Foucault, 1998). Concretely, this has involved the development of mechanisms of identification, classification and management of living human beings as statistical 'populations' which make life amenable to particular ways of governing, of "systems of belief and cultural propensities or what one might want to call 'ways of life'" (Foucault, 2007, Grayson, 2008:384). The category of population is applicable to anything that "extends from biological rootedness through the species up to the surface that gives one a hold provided by the public" (Foucault, 2007:75). In fact, the emergence of biopolitics was accompanied by the violent imperial struggle to seize territory, control resources, and reconfigure state apparatuses in the colonies.

The governance of living human beings principally concerns the management of the contingent or alleatory characteristics distinct to populations so as to mitigate risks and

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17 Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero argue that Foucault's account of biopolitics needs to be revised in the wake of the molecular and digital revolutions. In their view, contemporary understandings of life are informationalized, necessitating 'an account of what it is to be a living thing in terms of complex, adaptive and continuously emergent, informationally constituted systems' (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009)
control threats emerging from them (Dillon, 2007:41). Essential to the effective management of populations is the continuing development of knowledge about the dynamics of life of target populations including definitions of normality and abnormality and the range of contingency as well as the mechanisms of intervention in order to normalize the dynamics of populations (Foucault, 2007). Specifically, it has led to the development of novel security assemblages concerned with improving the welfare, living conditions, health, wealth and sustainability of populations (Grayson, 2008:385). By constituting living human beings as statistical populations, biopolitics offers state officials and agencies a way to problematize and govern life. On the other hand, it helps to constitute and give rise to mechanisms of governing the excess (abnormal, deviation) of life. As Foucault argued, "The art of government therefore became a juggling act to promote the 'right ways' of living in 'a system anxious to have the respect of legal subjects and to ensure the free enterprise of individuals" (Foucault, 2008, as quoted in Grayson, 2001:385). Thus, biopolitical strategies target by disciplining, punishing, shaping and transforming abnormal or 'substandard' ways of life which could present as dangers to the norm (Dillon, 2007, Foucault, 2004). A variety of biopolitical strategies have been found in numerous practices of contemporary global politics, "marking a significant shift in the conceptualization and practices of security, development," and other fields (see e.g. Berman, 2004, Dillon, 2006, Duffield, 2001, Duffield and Waddell, 2004, Elbe, 2009, Grayson, 2008:386, Pupavac, 2005).

Human security is a form of biopolitics which aims to regulate target populations globally through the institutional framework of global governance. As such, the global governance of life that human security embodies proceeds on a metanarrative of 'complexity' which helps to constitute an order of the real in which several arguments about the state of the world are taken for granted (see e.g. Dillon and Reid, 2000, Dillon and Reid, 2001, Duffield, 2001). Specifically, human security comprises a heterarchical order in which the sum of self-regularizing networks manage human insecurity. Secondly, in relation to this, human security presents a narrative of the state in which state authority is diminished and sovereignty made conditional on the responsibility to protect. In fact, as I go on to argue, human security proceeds on a dangerous ontology in which there is a commitment to the Hobbesian state. Notwithstanding, this involves also the refashioning of state authority and the reconfiguration of sovereignty. Thirdly, the imperative of human security is embedded in an account of social transformation in which the world is seen as experiencing rapid development and increasing change, complexity and interdependence. Finally, human security works towards engineering self-governance through learning and training. This 'complex' reality that it presumes to exist informs the kind of
problematizations, spaces, agents and mechanisms through which human security governs. Indeed, it is a biopolitical imaginary which gives rise to specifically ordered human security assemblages as this thesis demonstrates.

Interestingly, as Grayson has argued, the biopolitical imperative underpinning human security was facilitated by knowledge practices which are circumscribed by a cosmological realism (Grayson, 2008). Specifically, Grayson has shown the way human security, as constructed by both analysts and policy-makers, has drawn on ontological and epistemological positions which share a belief in the self-evidence of the complex reality outlined above which is believed can be dissected, measured, and understood based on empiricism or rationalism. Grayson (Grayson, 2008:387) concludes that

The entrenchment of cosmological realism has therefore disciplined what kinds of questions one can ask about the subjects, objects and dynamics of human security, the spectrum of research that is accepted as sound scholarship by the field and the limits of our ‘ethical and practical horizons’.

This is evident, for example, in the programmatic practice of framing logically which I discuss in the last section of this chapter. The technocratic search for precision, measurement, and causality that defines human security knowledge has political effects in terms of agency, normalcy, and the scope of intervention. Indeed, as I will demonstrate, it forms the criteria by which the distribution is arranged in human security assemblages.

For all its criticism of state-centrism and the state, I argue, human security is not only committed to the state, it also crafts a specific kind of state and sovereignty into being. As such, it can be understood as a practice of statecraft in the sense developed by Ashley as I discussed in the preceding chapter (Ashley, 1989). Put differently, human security governmentalizes the state in so far as it helps to redefine what falls within the remit of the state, and what are the roles and responsibilities of states in relation to human security. In the following, I want to suggest that human security is committed to what Ashley has referred to as the paradigm of sovereignty (see e.g. Tan, 2001). This said, I see a re-modulation of the paradigm of sovereignty to incorporate the imperatives of global governance. Specifically, while human security promotes a Hobbesian state which is responsible for the human security of its citizens, the state must operate alongside the ‘international community’ – a range of governmental, intergovernmental, parastatal and nongovernmental agencies – within the perimeters of global governance. Moreover, the sovereignty of the state is not absolute but conditional on the fulfilment of that responsibility.
A HOBESIAN ONTOLOGY

In Hobbes’s imaginary, without the vigilance of Leviathan – the state apparatus to which ‘reasoning men’ willingly surrender their sovereignty – people live in a stateless condition of profound insecurity. In this hypothetical state of nature, the security of ‘man’ is threatened by “a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death,” resulting in a ‘war of all against all’ (Hobbes, 1996:66). In Hobbes’s ontology, then, individual security and the state are inextricably linked in opposition to a dangerous but supposed natural condition of war and anarchy. The danger of the state of nature is grounded in Hobbes’s conception of human nature. The Hobbesian subject is dangerous because of his desire for power and inability to trust others. Thus, in the absence of political community as embodied by the Leviathan, in the competition for power all persons in the state of nature are enemies to others. Ultimately, in Hobbes’s exposition, the fear of death and the ability to tap into reason and recognize the need for society enables ‘man’ to transcend the state of nature and embrace sovereign control (Connolly, 1989, Hobbes, 1996:86). Importantly, this conception of the social contract has “undoubtedly provided political thought with a powerful and lasting imaginary that inseparably links danger, government, and subjectivity” (Odysseos, 2002:406).

In this context, as Connolly reminds, when discussing the state of nature, Hobbes was “talking to people already in civil society” (1989:28). The purpose of Hobbes’s exposition was to convince people to remain domesticated. As such, the state of nature functions as a ‘shock therapy’: "The fear of death pulls the self together. It induces subjects to accept civil society and it becomes an instrumentality of sovereign control in a civil society already installed” (Connolly, 1989:29). The central strategy of Hobbes’s political theory, then, as Campbell notes, was to employ “a strategy of otherness designed to discipline the self” (1998:58). At various points in his text, Hobbes differentiates the rational, scientific, disciplined, and domesticated ‘man’ from unfavourable others, such as the “stubborn, insociable, forward [i.e. perverse], intractable,” and the ‘savage’ who lives in “brutish manner” (Hobbes, 1996:101 and 85). The other functions as the point of differentiation through which the desirable dispositions of a superior modern identity, namely rational, scientific, and social, are promoted. In this sense, as Campbell has suggested, Leviathan is “a polemic for science and the rationalism of the Enlightenment” (original emphasis,
In effect, it is a script promoting the modern and state-centric form of life to the exclusion of other forms of life.

Hobbes's dangerous ontology can be said to be foundational of and endemic to what Foucault has called 'the attitude of modernity,' “a mode of relating to contemporary reality; [...] a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving” distinct to modern life (2000:309). In this sense, modernity is an economy of power which circulates knowledge practices across dispersed and varied sites which discipline interpretation and conduct, constitute modern subjects, but also struggles with attitudes of ‘countermodernity’ such as delinquency. In Hobbes's dangerous ontology, the inside is the space of the rational, ordered polity, the Leviathan, which is differentiated from the dangerous, chaotic, and anarchical space of outside (Campbell, 1998:60).

Though Hobbes had little to say about the relation between states and the role of foreign policy, various major works of International Relations have taken his imagery of insecure individuals in a state of nature as a metaphor for interstate relations in a condition of anarchy. As Campbell and others including realists such as Bull have noted however, there are serious and fundamental objections to the way Hobbes's work has been used to support a predominantly “crude realist” understanding of international relations as the permanent struggle for state power in anarchy. As Hobbes himself emphasized, first, the state of nature is hypothetical, “there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this” (Hobbes, 1996:85); second, the state of nature among states is qualitatively different to that of the state of nature among men (Bull, 1995, Campbell, 1998:53). Given that Hobbes took the state as the site where “civil and international war was mediated,” it seems arbitrary to assume that the state of nature among states is the same to the state of nature among men which, after all, the state is to transform. Notwithstanding, implicitly or explicitly, the Leviathan has stood as “a factual, historical narrative” (Campbell, 1998:55).

In fact, the force of Hobbes's reasoning, following Campbell, is “the fear of slipping back into the state of nature should men give up their allegiance to the sovereign power in the state” (original emphasis, Campbell, 1998:56). Theories of International Relations have succeeded in institutionalizing this fear (of death) in modern narratives of interstate relations. It is in this sense that Ashley has argued, the practice of 'international politics' is about inscribing the dangerous, it is about “the externalization and totalization of dangers” (Ashley, 1989:304). The raison d'être of International Relations, as Jahn has claimed, has been simply to take 'the international' as the dangerous Hobbesian state of nature (Jahn, 1999:411). Based on this logic, Odysseos argues, survival has become the operating
concept for international relations (2002:410). This ethos of survival, according to her, provides the state as the space of reason with the legitimacy to act irresponsibly towards the 'externalized' dangerous Other to 'reasoning man' (Odysseos, 2002:415). In Ashley's words (Ashley, 1989:295):

All variants of modern discourse presuppose the necessity of a state as an agency of rational law and violence whose legitimacy obtains in its deployment of violent means to bring an external 'anarchy' under control and secure the conditions of sovereign man's autonomous and reasoning being within domestic bounds.

Indeed, key categories and terms of reference of Hobbes's dangerous ontology and framing of the 'other-as-enemy' have provided scholars of International Relations and security the images by which global politics has been understood.

To summarize, in Ashley accounts, the modern – reasoning – subject and the modern state are mutually constitutive (Ashley, 1989:268). In this view, domestic society is the space in which modern identity is embedded that stands in direct opposition to contingency and chance which "refuses to submit to reason" (Ashley, 1989:268). Thus, in its reference to Hobbes (see e.g. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:168), human security can be read as a practice of statecraft which inscribes problems and dangers external to the state, thereby enframing the 'domestic population' in which the state comes to be seen as the legitimate source of authority and ultimate purveyor of security (Ashley, 1989:306). Accordingly, human security establishes the perimeters of political authority, delineates the geographical and conceptual spaces of governance, and constitutes the authorities that can speak on behalf of targeted populations. These variables are then placed in an 'external' configuration with the complexity of contemporary life. Importantly, reasoning man is centred in the state only through modern narratives of danger. Human security is a discourse of danger which reinforces dichotomies such as self/other-as-enemy, rational/irrational, order/disorder, security/insecurity, inside/outside, and so on. This is demonstrated in the way a dangerous geography is mapped in and through human security.

MAPPING DANGEROUS GEOGRAPHY

Underlying human security is an imaginative geography comprising articulations of identity and difference circumscribed by a narrative of increasingly rapid and complex
interdependency of security in the world. Global space takes centre stage in the dramatic narrative of distance and difference articulated through human security. In what is effectively a dangerous geography of human security, Earth or the Globe emerge as the whole in which human and nonhuman parts now flow, that is, they globalize. These parts include goods, services, finance, people, labour, images, information as well as, what in the literature on human security is commonly referred to as the 'downside risks' of globalization or (global) human insecurities, CO₂ emissions, refugees, viruses, trafficked persons, ozone, transnational terrorism (cf. CHS, 2003:2-6, Fukada-Parr, 2003, UNDP, 1994:34). These human-nonhuman parts “travel the globe” (UNDP, 1994:34). They will be felt all over the globe (UNDP, 1994:36) as they connect in new or modified ways, for example through instant global communication, computer networks, and ever more sophisticated travel. According to the HDR 1994 (UNDP, 1994:22),

When the security of people is endangered anywhere in the world, all nations are likely to get involved. Famine, disease, pollution, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic disputes and social disintegration are no longer isolated events, confined within national borders. Their consequences travel the globe.

As the CHS has emphasized: “We share a planet, a biosphere, a technological arsenal, a social fabric,” i.e. the whole, in which “today’s global flows spotlight the many interlinkages in the security of all people” (CHS, 2003:2). In this dangerous geography, the relationality obtaining between the parts of this ‘complex, gigantic whole’ is characterized by an obtuse interdependency of (in)security in which the ‘downside risks’ of global flows – global human insecurities – are perceived as threatening the security of, no less than, ‘humanity’ as a whole (Dalby, 2000, Gasper, 2005, United Nations Secretary-General, 2005).

Thinking or imagining space, time, and people as one geography is a process beset with the thinkers’ preconceptions, desires, and fantasies about what constitutes self and other. In fact, ‘imaginative geographies’ such as human security’s dangerous geography say more about the thinkers than the nature of that which is being thought or imagined. They are inextricably linked with the production of identity and alterity. As Said (Said, 1978:55) noted in relation to the imaginative geography of the Orient,

The objective space of a house—its corners, corridors, cellar, rooms—is far less important than what poetically it is endowed with, which is usually a quality with an imaginative or figurative value we can name and feel; thus a house may be haunted or homelike, or prisonlike or magical. So space acquires emotional and
even rational sense by a kind of poetic process, whereby the vacant or anonymous reaches of distance are converted into meaning for us here.

Said would have us think through how space, time, and people converge together to form a particular understanding of the Orient; however, an understanding that is meaningful first to the geographer(s). In his words: “For there is no doubt that imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away” (Said, 1978:55).

Essential to Said’s theorization is the ‘poetic process’ of enclosing identity and difference through a series of mapping or geo-graphing exercises. It is in this struggle of power that the limits of forms of life, between self and other, are constituted. Essentially, this is the logic of human security: “the making of the human through the advent of boundary or difference as such”. The limit is not only that which gives a thing identity as the very thing that it is; it is that which "continuously also betrays an excess, or surplus, to which the very existence of that thing remains irremissibly indebted" (Dillon, 1996:4). Such a perspective emphasizes the undecidability of borders. Just as the unnatural categories of the Occident and the Orient are subject to continued performative constitution so too is the dangerous geography of human security an unstable ‘enframing’. Thus, a perspective of limits asks not “how to secure security” but “what is lost and forgotten, and who or what pays the inevitable price, for the way that ‘we’ are thus habited in fear” (Dillon, 1996:35)? What forms of identity and difference are enclosed in human security’s dangerous geography?

By saying what we are menaced by such as unemployment, illegal migration, disease as well as ‘bad’ (cf. CHS, 2003), human security is sifting between the good and the bad elements that it comprises. International trade and instant global communication are considered good, “widening people’s range of choices” and enabling “many more to participate in world events as they happen” (UNDP, 1994:34). Conversely, viruses, CO₂ emissions, drugs, and crime, ethnic and religious tensions and ‘bad’ states, i.e. states that do not take the human wellbeing of their population seriously, are bad, threatening the security of people everywhere. In this respect, for example, in his discussion of HIV/AIDS and contemporary international security, Stefan Elbe (Elbe, 2009:72) has argued that human security’s application to the AIDS pandemic is indicative of the particular rationalization of political rule characteristic of what he identifies as the contemporary “era of (neoliberal) governmentality”. This, according to him, “leads to the identification of a new category of threats to the welfare of populations - which Foucault referred to […] as

‘crises of circulation’ (Elbe, 2009:72, Foucault, 2007:64). Recalling Foucault’s discussion of the way the French city of Nantes (Foucault, 2007:17) was positioned within a much broader set of processes of circulation including the circulation of wealth, people, diseases, climate and so on, Elbe (Elbe, 2009:81) suggests that states today are similarly trying to position themselves optimally with respect to various processes of international circulation (be it labor, capital or tourism) [and] are thereby also potentially exposing themselves to seeing ‘dangerous’ increases in levels of HIV/AIDS among their populations – the AIDS pandemic as the ‘dark side of globalization.

Organizing everyday life including people’s health in terms of good/secure and bad/insecure flows, the HDR 1994 endowed these occurrences with an ‘imaginative or figurative value’ of danger. Nothing is a danger in itself but an effect of interpretation (Campbell, 1998:2). That the range of issues concerning the everyday life of people including unemployment, famine, diseases, air pollution, earthquakes, flooding, industrial and traffic accidents, rape, gun crimes, and social disintegration as well as ‘failing’ states are made out to be threats to human security (CHS, 2003, UNDP, 1994), in fact, “bears no essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action or event” from which they are said to derive. Nothing is intrinsically more dangerous for human security than anything else, except when interpreted as such (Campbell, 1998:2). This is not to say that issues such as diseases, accidents, political violence and state failure are not ‘real’ dangers with deadly consequences. However, as Campbell has pointed out, not all issues are equally dangerous. Danger is a subjective value which results from a calculation about objective things which, according to Campbell, “results from the calculation of a threat that objectivises events, disciplines relations, and sequesters an ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk” (Campbell, 1998).

Although argued to be universal, the human security perspective is modelled on, and mainly applies to, the everyday insecurities lived in developing countries (Duffield and Waddell, 2006, MacFarlane and Khong, 2006). Linking everyday insecurities in developing countries with the notion of the security of ‘the globe’ or ‘humanity’ as indicated earlier was not, however, an original feat of the UNDP, nor is it an exclusive perspective amongst human security advocates. In fact, the emergence of this specific logic of danger concerning the problem of global security, in which an ethos of survival is cultivated, goes back much earlier to the Brandt (1983, 1980), Palme (1982), and Brundtland Commissions as well as Boutros-Ghali’s ‘Agenda for Peace’ (1992). Essentially, future
threats to international security were argued to originate largely from developing countries. Development was heralded as the new international security policy. It is within this context also that the CGG conceptualized global governance (1995). In this context, for example, Duffield has argued that development's constant invocation of ideals such as rights, freedom and the people actually “conceals a stubborn will to manage and contain” the destabilizing effects associated with poverty and underdevelopment (Duffield, 2007:viii). According to him, development manages undeveloped life; a life which, essentially, is life not insured by insurance-based welfare technologies. In the absence of these welfare technologies, the object of development, he contends, is the “stasis of basic needs and self-reliance”. Duffield concludes that development maintains rather than overcomes the divide between developed and undeveloped life (Duffield, 2007, Voelkner, 2010).

The populations and states that are targeted under human security are identified through statistical knowledge. In terms of target populations, the subjects created include those ‘at high risk of trafficking’, ‘the sick’, ‘the hungry’, ‘internally displaced people’, ‘poor farmers’, ‘women’ and ‘girls’, ‘children in need of special protection’. These are the ‘categories of beneficiaries’ for example through which the UNTFHS operates. The knowledges and expertise on which human security depends are drawn from the likes of the Human Security Audit carried out by the Human Security Centre (Human Security Centre, 2005) and the Human Development Index computed by the UNDP. The Audit provides information such as the number of ‘cases of armed conflict and one-sided violence by country’, and ‘numbers of reported deaths from political violence by country’. The Human Development Index in turn is computed from the Human Development Indicators such as ‘life expectancy at birth’, ‘adult literacy rate’, ‘combined gross enrolment ration of primary, secondary and tertiary schools’, and ‘GDP per capita’. These are translated into indexes – i.e. values, which enable comparability. Following comparison, an average can be established, and the normal range of fluctuation can be computed. Indeed, this process has as its frame of reference the stabilization of population, which is assumed imperfect in the sense that it fluctuates around an average that requires monitoring and intervention if necessary to reinstate a feasible balance. The identification of statistical normality is at the heart of Foucault's account of biopolitics.

Essentially, human security is predicated on a specific understanding of what constitutes defensible human life and what does not (Coward, 2005:863). As Duffield concludes, international development in the guise of human security, for example, is “a means of dividing humankind against itself in the generic form of developed and underdeveloped
species-life" (Duffield, 2007:iix). Representing issues as alien, subversive, dirty, or sick, as that from which we must be freed such as states ‘failing’ to provide human wellbeing, also has the important function of shaping and giving character to identity, to human being and its form of life. It is in this sense that the mapping of dangerous cartographies involves drawing boundaries between self and other, identity and difference, human security and human insecurity. By constituting and mobilizing what disallows life, such as war, violence as well as disease, and unemployment, and ‘bad’ states, human security is imparting a specific way of life including a specific state form. This dangerous geography is carried forward into the sites of human security practice. As I go on to demonstrate in chapters four and five, emerging problematizations of forced migration such as migrant health and human trafficking embody this dangerous geography which consequently necessitates governance.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF LIFE

The CHS argued that governance in contemporary world affairs is enacted through a complex of states, international institutions, transnational networks and agencies (both public and private) which governs common problems of ‘humanity’. It invited a complex of actors including states, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations as well as individuals and communities targeted to form a transnational alliance which can govern the ‘downside risks’ of globalization or global human insecurities including CO₂ emissions, refugees, viruses, trafficked persons, ozone, transnational terrorism, and last but not least ‘ineffective’ states (CHS, 2003:2-6, Fukada-Parr, 2003). The CHS claimed that a new paradigm of security was urgently needed because "both the challenges to security and its protectors have become more complex" (CHS, 2003:2). As I indicated in the introduction, the HDR 1994 describes and calls to act upon a reality that is marked by global flows, complex interdependency and transnationality, thus necessitating a profound shift in the way conflict and poverty are managed in the world. In contrast to the geopolitical spatialization of power concerned with demarcating the boundaries of government around a fixed territory, the geo-biopolitical spatialization of power is concerned with demarcating the boundaries of government around shifting and de-territorialized populations. Indeed, Duffield and Waddell have examined human security in terms of a shift from geopolitics, the security of states, to biopolitics, the security of population in which the resilience of populations are sought to be engineered through a range of economic, health, educational and prudential interventions (Duffield and Waddell, 2004).
Indeed, implicit in human security is an aspiration to shift political authority away from the traditional centre of the nation-state to multilayered, networked configurations with, and through, a host of (inter)governmental, para-governmental, nongovernmental, and private organizations. Accounts of human security often rely on the idea of a shift in the locus of political power and authority which is passed through and acted upon in sites of practice. Consequently, a set of political subjectivities are constructed including the ‘international community’, the ‘human’ and a globalised state running on contingent sovereignty as I go on to examine below.

In terms of the ‘human’, there is an impetus in human security to encourage self-governance. This is particularly evident in the way, for example, the CHS promotes a specific reality in which self-governance is proclaimed a basic right. The CHS argues that human security protects the “freedom to take action on one’s own behalf” (CHS, 2003:10). This is facilitated through the participatory and collective problem-solving approaches in which individuals are invited to participate in their own governance. This logic is performatively invoked in the implementation of human security programmes and practices, consequently constructing a political subject that is always free to self-govern. Promoting such a self-governing individual amounts to a form of prevention. Intervention is thus conceived as pre-emptive, taking place at the point where ‘freedom’ is produced, i.e. at the point that individuals come to know what their freedoms entail. Duffield has argued that the resilience of uninsured life hinges on “how adept and entrepreneurial” such life is in maintaining self-reliance and coping with life contingencies (Duffield, 2007:18). This, on the other hand, as the CHS states, necessitates working institutions at every level of society, including police systems, the environment, health care, education, social safety nets, diplomatic engagements and conflict early warning systems, which provides the necessary conditions in which individuals can self-govern (CHS, 2003:132).

Thus, the objectives of state, nongovernmental and intergovernmental, officials and the individuals targeted are brought into line with the set of global norms to improve the condition of the targeted population, whether this be its health as in the case of the Burmese in Thailand I discuss in chapter four, or its risk factor such as in the case of the Vietnamese women and children I discuss in chapter five. Indeed, to reiterate, in order to investigate the way human security practices constitute a specific kind of political order (political subjectivities including the state and the individual) concretely, I selected to trace the way they are applied particularly to problems of forced migration. Migration, I argued, highlights the question of political order. Specifically, forced migration raises the question of the membership of a political community as well as the technical question of
how large mobile or potentially mobile populations are constituted through regimes of governance such as human security. Indeed, migration flows problematize the distinction between the inside and outside as a way of enframing political issues as such. In the following, I examine the way the categories of the state are renegotiated in the literature of human security. Crucially, it is in this debate about the role of the state in human security that the dangerous imaginary outlined above is most evident.

**Governmentalizing the State**

For all its criticism of state-centrism and the state, human security is not only committed to the state, it also crafts a specific state and sovereignty into being. As such, it can be understood as a practice of statecraft. Put differently, human security governmentalizes the state in so far as it helps to redefine what falls within the remit of the state, and what are the roles and responsibilities of states in relation to human security. The human security agenda often is presented generally as challenging the state security approach and state centrism in security studies and international relations more widely. Human security's claim to critique the state-centrist conceptualization of security has since often been repeated and hotly debated. Indeed, it has provided a fruitful basis for raising fundamental questions concerning the role and security of the sovereign state as well as the state of state sovereignty in the contemporary global order (see e.g. Alkire, 2003, Bain, 2000, Evans, 2004, Hampson, 2004, Newman, 2004, Nishikawa, 2009). Most prominent in this context are the norm of non-intervention and the value of state sovereignty. Indeed, reflecting the discourse of global governance, much of the literature concerning human security and the state has focused on the question about state sovereignty, debating in how far a human security-principled world could erode absolute sovereignty and displace state power in international relations.

By presenting statism as a perpetual problem, I contend, human security is putting in circulation what could be called an "inflationary critical value" (Foucault, 2008:187) by which the state unit, rather than disappearing from political agendas, remains the crucial nodal point of discussions. Secondly, human security's ongoing problematization involves "continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state's domain, what is public and what private, what is and is not within the state's competence" (Foucault, 2007:109). Indeed, the response to specifications set out by the human security agenda fuel 'incessant transactions which modify, or move, or drastically change, or insidiously
shift sources of finance, modes of investment, decision-making centres, forms and types of control, relationships between local powers, the central authority and so on” (Foucault, 2008:77), bringing about a continual reconstitution of the state. Foucault termed this specifically modern process of reconstitution the ‘governmentalization of the state’, which he believed to be “a particularly contorted phenomenon” (Foucault, 2008:109).

As human security advocates value the security of people higher than the security of states, human beings tend to be set against states in the competition for political privileges. This follows also in the spirit of the original conceptualization in the HDR 1994, wherein human security explicitly was argued to be the alternative approach set to supplant the state security approach (UNDP, 1994). In other words, human security and state security were set to compete. Thus, were the world governed by human security, so it is interpreted, not only would the state be de-ranked to second or less of a place when it comes to security. More profoundly, where states fail to fulfil the ‘responsibility to protect’ their citizens against any of the many human security issues, it also becomes acceptable to intervene in the domestic affairs of states in the name of human security – thereby supposedly undermining the state and state power. As Alkire summarises then, “A core edge of disagreement between human security and state security comes when these two agendas are said to compete. Clearly the debate about intervention and “responsible sovereignty” identifies an area where views differ deeply” (Alkire, 2003).

However, notwithstanding the extensive problematization around state-centrism and the state to which it has given rise, human security thinking and application remains largely statist. As the co-chair of the CHS, Sadako Ogata, has emphasized, “the task of the challenge to focus on the security of the people is not to replace state security. Security of the state has to be reinforced. […] In turning to the people themselves […], the fundamental security of the state is reinforced” (Ogata, 2002:5-6). Indeed, in its final report, the Commission promotes a staunchly statist human security approach: the state is “the fundamental purveyor of security” whose security is to be guaranteed by human security (CHS, 2003:2). In fact, as the CHS argues (CHS, 2003:6),

Human security and state security are mutually reinforcing and dependent on each other. Without human security, state security cannot be attained and vice versa.

Human security requires strong and stable institutions.

The Commission operated in the immediate post-9/11 political environment that saw international policy largely converging in affirming the continued commitment to state security (Page, 2004). Indeed, Thomas and Tow have argued in favour of a statist form of
human security in which “states and their borders remain the primary referent of security” (2002).

While the striking statism of the human security agenda has been interpreted as the gradual co-optation (Bellamy and McDonald, 2002:373), adaptation, cajolement and manipulation (Tadjbakhsh, 2007) of human security into a statist framework, considering Ashley’s paradigm of sovereignty, human security has never been outside a statist agenda. Rather, the increasingly explicit commitment to the state indicates the intensification of mechanisms of human security (Duffield, 2006). Human security is deeply rooted in statism. The ongoing critique of the state integral to the debate and application surrounding human security is enabling the reconstitution of practices of statecraft in the contemporary global order. As such, human security is more than ‘hot air’ as some of its critics have argued (Paris, 2001). It is powered by the critique of state-centrism and the state which allowed human security to emerge in the first place. Indeed, it is what Foucault would term its ‘inflationary critical value’ which has cast the state at the centre of human security thought and application. Scholarly work on human security has tended to begin by reference to the revered challenge to state-centrism and state security afforded by human security, repeating and instantiating this supposed given (Axworthy, 2004, Gasper and Truong, 2005, Jolly and Ray, 2006, MacFarlane and Khong, 2006, Mack, 2004, Shani et al., 2007, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, Thakur, 2004).

In fact, the perpetual problematization of the state that inevitably follows human security has involved ongoing redefinition of what falls within the domain of the state, and what are the roles and responsibilities of states in relation to human security (see e.g. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:168). Indeed, in response to specifications set out by the human security agenda, practices of statecraft are shifting. For one, human security invites a range of actors to act on behalf of human security. As the CHS states: “unlike traditional approaches that vest the state with full responsibility for state security, the process of human security involves a much broader spectrum of actors and institutions – especially people themselves” (CHS, 2003:6). As suggested above, people are made responsible for themselves through human security initiatives “empowering people to fend for themselves” (CHS, 2003:4). Although human security reaches into and across states by linking the efforts, the practices and successes” of human security players in national, regional and global alliances, ultimately the aim of these alliances, according to the Commission, is “to create a kind of horizontal, cross-border source of legitimacy that complements [and is thus separate from] that of traditional vertical and compartmentalised structures of institutions and states” (2003:143).
In practical terms, according to Duffield and Waddell, "the Commission remains wedded to reinstating the state" (Duffield and Waddell, 2006:9). However, it is 'effective states' that it seeks to secure (CHS, 2003:8) as

a cohesive and peaceful international system is far more likely to be achieved through the cooperation of effective states confident in their place in the world, than in an environment of fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state entities.

'Effective' states are those able to regulate 'downside risks' from local and global human insecurities, that is, "insecurities that threaten human survival or the safety of daily life" including disease, pestilence and abrupt penury related to economic downturns (CHS, 2003:3). The ideal of a "'humanely secure state' would be a fully sovereign democracy with a functioning administration and social political, economic, and legal institutions and a strong and focused developmental agenda" (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:171). As human security advocates Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy argue, the state is "a security arrangement of prime importance"; "it should not and cannot withdraw from its obligations in the field of security" (2007:168). Crucially, in this perspective, "the weak state is defined as one that cannot uphold the Hobbesian contract for providing not only security, but also an especially development goods and human rights imperatives for its own citizens" (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:173).

Unlike state security, where protection efforts were argued to be directed at the territory, in human security, "a state's identity, in terms of its ability to perform certain key functions, may no longer be so intimately connected to territory" (Barkin, 1998:84). Rather, as Barry Buzan (Buzan, 1995:191) suggests, states have now to worry not just about their military strength and the security of their ruling families, [...] but also about the competitiveness of their economies, the reproduction of their cultures, the welfare, health and education of their citizens, the stability of their ecologies, and their command of knowledge and technology.

Indeed, human security is about "ensuring that states protect their people. When they do not, it is about ensuring that there are international mechanisms that can fill the gap ad interim and redesign states so that they will fulfill their purpose in the future" (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006:265). However, the burden of providing security does not lie with the state alone: "unlike traditional approaches that vest the state with full responsibility for state security, the process of human security involves a much broader spectrum of actors
and institutions – especially people themselves” (CHS, 2003:6). Human security makes sovereignty conditional on protecting individuals according to standards set by the human security agenda. It is not about marginalizing the state but rather about redefining the responsibility upon which the recognition of state sovereignty is dependent.

Newman (Newman, 2004) suggests that the focus on individuals permits a reassessment of the relation between the state and the citizen, as state legitimacy becomes more directly dependent on meeting citizens’ demands inside than on the ability to protect against a hostile outside. In this context, the ‘state reconfiguration thesis’ put forward by some scholars of globalization is instructive. For adherents to this thesis, the state is not a fixed concept but is subject to constant change. On this premise, globalization is reconfiguring, and is itself a product of the reconfiguration of, states (Clark, 1999, Mann, 1997, Shaw, 1997). In terms of the diminishing importance of territoriality in international relations and the implications for sovereignty as exemplified in the context of human security, a widely held view is that “a state's identity, in terms of its ability to perform certain key functions, may no longer be so intimately connected to territory” (Clark, 1999:84). According to Barkin, “A state in the post-Cold War world is, thus, legitimated less by its relationship with a given piece of territory and more by its ability to ensure the political rights of its citizens.” (Barkin, 1998:249, Clark, 1999). Thus, the salient statism of human security is not only serving to instantiate the state unit but is also reconstituting the kind of state unit deemed acceptable in the contemporary global order.

Human security advocates argue that where states are deemed to be failing, it is the responsibility of other centres of power, i.e. the international community, to intervene (CHS, 2003). Intervening governing processes take the form of diplomatic pressures, preventive development initiatives and, in the extreme case, humanitarian intervention (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006). Moreover, it is assumed that given the interdependent and transnational character of much human insecurity, individual states are incapable to manage on their own. Here too, it is argued that, in the absence of state power to address transnational issues, the international community has a ‘responsibility to protect’ (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, 2004). In this sense, human security makes sovereignty, particularly of developing countries, contingent on protecting individuals according to standards set by the human security agenda. It is not about marginalizing the state but rather about redefining the responsibility upon which the recognition of state sovereignty is dependent. Contingent sovereignty is based on the assumption that the sovereignty of states is not absolute. Rather, states are obligated to fulfil the Hobbesian contract as
purveyor of security. When this is not honoured, states risk forfeiting claims to non-intervention (e.g. Duffield, 2007, Elden, 2006, Stewart, 2004).

Following Weber who argued that state sovereignty is enacted in processes of legitimating intervention (Weber, 1995), Duffield contends that the re-modulation of sovereignty into contingent sovereignty in human security is the effective means to intervene in order to contain, maintain and control non-insured life. Sovereignty is internationalized, negotiable and contingent. It is worth mentioning here that, much like Mbembe before him (Mbembe, 2003), Duffield differentiates between territorial sovereignty over life. In this understanding, sovereignty over life is the ability to decide the point of exception; that is, the ability to decide which life is worth promoting and which is not. In fact, Duffield argues it is this sovereignty over life that is made contingent while territorial integrity continues to be respected. Similar to the argument put forward in this thesis about the reconstitution of the state and sovereignty within the confines of governmental assemblages, for him, when sovereignty over life is made contingent, it becomes a fluid and relational zone shaped by interactions between target states, United Nations (UN), donor and military agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Drawing on work carried out in Mozambique and Afghanistan, Duffield concludes that sovereignty over life has come to be contingent insofar as the international community "exerts a good deal of control and oversight over core economic, environmental and welfare functions of the state," essentially exerting control over core biopolitical state functions (Duffield, 2007:82). Interestingly, Duffield makes the case that contingent sovereignty applies to nongovernmental organizations too. As such, the independent petty or banal sovereignty of NGOs, the sovereignty that lies in "the endless decision making concerning whom to help and champion" (Duffield, 2007:52), gradually has been drawn back into the politics of donor states making NGO sovereignty over life now contingent on donor sovereignty over life.

While the emergence of contingent sovereignty in Duffield’s account does not obliterate the state as a privileged organizing unit in global politics, it does indicate disruption of the conventional national/international dichotomy in political imagination. Zones of contingent sovereignty, state or non-state led, interact across the imagined inside/outside divide. This is most obviously discernible in ‘governance states’ (Harrison, 2004), Duffield argues, where the collapse of the national/international dichotomy takes concrete physical form in state institutions. A ‘governance state’ is defined by the international community forming an integral part of the state. Indeed, a ‘new’ kind of state is argued to have been born in which state institutions appear to be functioning as conduits for the
transmission of biopolitically informed governmental strategies and mechanisms deployed externally to secure insured life. What are the terms of operation for a world of states in which the inside/outside divide is collapsing in favour of overlapping zones of negotiable and contingent state and non-state sovereignty (Voelkner, 2010:212)? Interestingly, in this context, Elbe argues that the securitization of infectious disease has given rise to the identification of new types of ‘rogue’ states which resist this process by asserting their ‘viral sovereignty’ (Elbe, 2008). Specifically, viral sovereignty came to prominence in 2007 when the then Indonesian minister of health argued that deadly viruses are the sovereign property of individual nations. This defies international health regulations based on principles concerning sharing information in order to prevent pandemics (Holbrooke and Garrett, 2008).

In conclusion, irrespective of claims to the contrary, human security takes for granted that the principle site of political order and security provision is the state. Yet, it is not the classical state but a reconstituted ‘global’ state operating on contingent sovereignty. Steeped in the dangerous ontology outlined above, the state is seen as a self-evident given and visible fact of global life whose boundaries are already decided. As Doty has argued, “there must be in place a society, a self, with a distinct and meaningful identity that is represented by the state” (1996:179). Yet, the state does not exist independent of the practices of statecraft which call it into being. The state, following Weber, is the effect of citational processes; it is performatively produced (Weber, 1998). She argues elsewhere, “it is impossible to talk about the state as an ontological being – as a political identity – without engaging in the political practice of constituting the state” (Weber, 1995:3). Human security discursively constitutes the state by working to produce, elaborate, and enframe the domesticated population of ‘humans’ who at once supply the governmental ground of state legitimation and actively serve as agents of statecraft themselves. Human security does this through the problematization of the ‘human’ and through the selective recognition and externalization of dangers (Ashley, 1989:303).

Notwithstanding the compelling arguments about the biopolitical logic of human security already advanced by scholars of International Relations (de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008, Dillon and Reid, 2000, Dillon and Reid, 2001, Elbe, 2009, Roberts, 2010, Truong, 2006), little has been said about how human security takes concrete form. In reflecting only on programmatic rationalities and top-down flows of power, existent analyses tend to deemphasize the incoherence and contingency of power as well as the invention of governing practices from below. In so doing, an image of human security is inadvertently created in which it seems totalizing and 'successful' rather than situated, instable,
adaptive, unpredictable, and sometimes ‘failing’. An important exception comes in the work of Duffield who looked to both the macropolitical narratives and the micropolitical mechanisms in Mozambique and Afghanistan in making sense and enhancing our understanding of the dynamics of human security (Duffield, 2007). It is in this way, for example, that he was able to show how sovereignty is becoming contingent. This thesis similarly explores the way the dangerous enframing of human security takes concrete form in sites of human security practice though it suggests to do so by tracing the way it materializes. Towards this purpose, in the following, I examine the logical framework as a governmental thing which begins to set up human security assemblages.

LOGICAL ENFRAMINGS

The governance of life, I would contend, tends towards technocratic practice, resulting in the prioritization of effectiveness and efficiency over situated knowledges in the conceptualization and enactment of problem management. As Grayson has shown, the biopolitical imperative underpinning human security is facilitated by a cosmological realism (Grayson, 2008). In this way, human security is constrained in terms of which questions about its subjects, objects and dynamics, which kind of research, and which kind of practices are allowable. This is evident, for example, in the programmatic practice of framing logically. The technocratic search for precision, measurement, and causality that defines human security knowledge has political effects. It forms the criteria by which the distribution in human security assemblages is arranged. This will be demonstrated in more detail in relation to the field analyses that I present in chapters four and five. In relation to the technocratic approach of development more generally, Ferguson has argued development is an ‘anti-politics machine’ which “pretends to be a disinterested, neutral bureaucratic function that exists outside the realm of politics” when in fact its programmatic approach has the effect of instituting new logics of political rule (Ferguson, 1990). In the following, I consider the role of the governmental thing that is the logical framework (logframe). The logframe is an object which organizes the assemblages that are set up in the name of human security by aligning the elements according to the biopolitical imaginary and strategies outlined above.

In the mechanisms of human security, as already suggested, target sites are ranked according to the calculated Human Development Index and trends are computed for prediction purposes. It is based on these numbers that the criteria for targets of human
security are established. In this way, the logic of governing through human security takes the concept of population as its referent object and works towards improving the well-being of the populations that are its target. Human security seeks to develop mechanisms capable of ensuring the regulation of these populations. It attempts to act directly and indirectly through strategies and techniques in order to swing an outlier population into a range or field that is considered normal and ultimately conducive to security. Ultimately, human security's understanding of the political, to quote Dillon's conceptualization of biopolitics (Dillon, 1996:31),

construes the political realm as a domain of calculability in which political practices become exercises in the political arithmetic of representation of the things to be secured and of the calculuses which will secure them. This makes of human being not merely an index of (inter)national security, but an index whose very indexicality has to be secured first if there is to be an (inter)national political arithmetic at all.

The logframe and the related logical framework approach (LFA) exemplify the calculability on which human security practices are predicated. Since the 1990s, logframes have played a central role in development practice. In fact, the logframe was developed as a planning approach for the US military in the 1960s, adapted after by the US space agency National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) before finding its way to United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the 1970s, where it was adapted to development project planning. In the 1980s, the logframe made its way to Europe. By the 1990s, it had become standard requirement to be utilised in the scripting of development projects for grant applications. The logframe is a matrix which "summarises the main elements of the program of work and connects them to each other". The LFA is considered required thinking about "the wider planning procedures of problem analysis, the development of objectives and indicators, and identification risks and assumptions, which feed into the overall program plan" (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005:1-3).
Logframes and LFAs provide openings and closures, that is, they attempt to fix an otherwise messy social field on which standardised, and equally strategically fixed operations, can be carried out. Closure is a feature of expert discourses, which enables determining too the criteria for project success (Li, 2007). Success is to be measured (qualitatively and quantitatively) in terms of the extent to which project output, the results that should be within the control of project management, are in line with projected outcomes (Mosse, 2005). The logframe is an integral method to the logic of governing manifest in the human security approach. The HSF, for example, “recommends the use of the logframe,” because logframes are “useful in the design and planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of a project. It also makes it easier to report on a project”. In other words, it makes the project manageable; after all, “the logframe is a tool for project management” (2008:18-9).

To be a useful management tool, however, the logframe, according to the UNTFHS (UNTFHS, 2008), depends on ‘good’ indicators:

A good indicator is one that can be measured. Indicators provide data that assist with making more informed and better decisions throughout the process of a
An indicator is something that helps the project see if there is any change or progress towards achieving the objectives.

An example for a set of indicators on which human security relies is the Human Development Indicators mentioned above which are used to compute the Human Development Index. Standard indicators include ‘life expectancy at birth,’ ‘adult literacy rate,’ ‘combined gross enrolment ration of primary, secondary and tertiary schools,’ and ‘GDP per capita’. These indicators are translated into indexes. Following comparison, an average is established, and the normal range of fluctuation within or between populations determined. In this way, outlier populations are identified as targets for human security intervention. Logframes generate indicators and identify populations for better, (understood in terms of effectiveness) project management: these logistical and statistical applications ultimately are considered an essential part in providing leverage for the management of global human insecurity. While logframes are not exclusive to planning for human security, the parameters determining whether a proposed intervention broadly meets the criteria set out by the logic of governing through human security are argued to be specific (UNTFHS, 2008). Governing a problem through statistical knowledges and techniques is not new of course. Human security is utilizing the methods adopted from long-standing development practices of which it is also a constituent. In turn, development is mainstreaming – through ongoing training programs – established planning methods borrowed from other fields such as the military and, more recently, management studies.

Logframes set up human security assemblages. They are construed as a method for determining whether the governance of a messy field is framed ‘logically’ in terms of the biopolitical imaginary presented above. Put differently, they are a method for setting out what will be included and what not in an assemblage. Logframes identify the problem to be tackled (e.g. migrant health in Thailand), construe the narrative within which the problem is rationalized (e.g. no access to public services), determine the complex of international and local agencies set to govern a specific problem (e.g. the World Health Organization and the International Organization for Migration), draw out the populations targeted (e.g. 9,500 Burmese migrants in Ranong province), and design the implementation activities (e.g. aware-raising events). There is a foreclosure of politics at work here, as I go on to demonstrate in two sites of practice in chapters four and five, in which all but bio-political mechanisms are excluded. In fact, important but difficult and highly political questions such as legal status, informal businesses, exploitation, racism and citizenship are not addressed.
The exclusion of sensitive political matter from proposed interventions, however, is a necessary condition for agencies to negotiate their entry into the sites of human insecurity. In this way, organizations are enabled to work alongside and with state authorities. Importantly, it also made it possible for agencies to work with populations otherwise considered legally aberrant (i.e., not generally qualified to receive public services such as illegal migrants). By rendering a local problem technical, in which disparate datasets and expert knowledges, strategies and practices are assembled, human security actors begin to align the objectives of local state authorities with global imperatives, on whom it writes forms of subjectivation in pursuit of managing human insecurity, e.g. training in self-medication. Through the governmental thing of the logframe, human security presents in the space of a few paragraphs an assemblage with a discreet problem, target population, evidence, strategies, methods, tools, funds, and solution.

Thus, I contend, in contrast to the call for participation and collective problem-solving evident in human security, it can be criticized for its exclusionary assumptions about the nature of politics. Firstly, the governance of life tends towards technocratic practice, resulting in the prioritization of effectiveness and efficiency over situated knowledges in the conceptualization and enactment of problem management. On the other hand, its emphasis on participation and the widening of actors including the ‘governed’– giving rise to political subjectivities such as ‘communities’, ‘partners’, ‘stakeholders’ – is representative of a particular kind of politics built around political consensus and problem-solving. The promotion of ‘good governance’ involves only one kind of politics to the exclusion of alternatives. Specifically, ‘good governance,’ as Walters has already shown, is equated with a narrow and instrumental form of democracy which “functions as little more than an institutional support for market-oriented reforms”. Effectively, global institutions operate according to a depoliticized, technical rationale on the basis of which they promote political reform in ‘target’ countries (Walters, 2004:34).

CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the tacit knowledges which direct and circumscribe narratives and practices of human security. Specifically, I argued that human security, in aiming to foster life, is a form of biopolitics which has the goal to regulate targeted populations globally through the notion of global governance. As such, I suggested that human security
operates on a metanarrative of ‘complexity’ which helps to constitute an imaginative geography that delineates the excess of the kind of human life to be protected which I argued is inscribed a dangerous value in the contemporary ‘complex’ world. This ‘complex’ reality that it presumes to exist informs the kind of problematizations, spaces, agents and mechanisms through which human security governs. Indeed, it is a biopolitical imaginary which gives rise to specifically ordered human security assemblages as this thesis demonstrates. In describing what must be secured, human security also operates on an imperative to govern which presumes the necessity of a heterarchical order in which self-governing networks and trained subjects manage human insecurity. Specifically, human security engineers systemic self-governance through learning and training in the logic of resilience. Moreover, I argued that its dangerous ontology commits human security to a re-configured Hobbesian state which operates on contingent or conditional sovereignty. In so far as this narrative is carried forward into its practices, human security is a form of statecraft.

Critiques which take human security as a site of biopolitics and governmentality have tended to reflect only on the programmatic rationalities and technologies of governance, consequently greatly downplaying the incoherence and contingency of power. In fact, generally, little has been said about how human security assemblages play out in sites of practice. As I noted in the introduction, if human security is not only partly generated by the intermingling of dispersed material and other (spatiotemporal) processes but is also dependent on the corporeal world which it comprises, then, it seems crucial to analyse the political implications of human security not in terms of the intentions of the programmatic agenda but in terms of the assemblage organizing around a human security problem. In other words, I depart from the text-centred hermeneutic models of the past and engage in the messy, material field itself. What kinds of politics of human security do these sites reveal? Before taking up an investigation of the way human security takes concrete effect in two situated moments, the following chapter examines the constitutive role of material objects in helping human security to emerge as a political strategy in these sites.
At the beginning of the Millennium, an e-mail is sent from an ‘online’ computer connected to the internet\textsuperscript{19} at the office of the HSU in New York to an online computer at the ILO headquarters in Geneva where it is forwarded to another online computer at the ILO Southeast Asian Regional Office in Bangkok. The e-mail addresses a request for amendments to the logical framework – the template of which can be downloaded and printed off the HSU webpage hosted by an unknown local server from anywhere connected to the internet – which was part of an ILO application for UNTHS funding for a project to control human trafficking from and within Southeast Asia by preventing its recurrence in the Mekong basin in Vietnam and Cambodia. Upon satisfying the requirements put forward in previous email communications between the HSU Chief administering the UNTFHS and ILO officials, and the receipt of final confirmation from officials at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, USD 1.5m - represented as so many pixels on a screen – were transferred in a specific pattern of zeros and ones, inducing the flow of capital from New York to Geneva to Bangkok to the ILO country offices Hanoi and Phnom Phenh and to local project partners along the Mekong.\textsuperscript{20}

Human security is \textit{embodied} and exists in a myriad of material objects dispersed around the world including, as the above event suggests, emails, computers, the internet, offices, institutions, management tools such as the logframe, capital, pixels, digits, and the river Mekong. These objects play a \textit{constitutive role} in enacting the order of human security that I investigate in this thesis. Though some material objects like small arms, earthquakes, CO\textsubscript{2} emissions, viruses, and ozone are emphasized in the literature on human security, they tend to appear not as playing a part in the politics of human security but as raw, brute or

\textsuperscript{19}The global system of interconnected computer networks consisting of private, public, academic, business, and government networks is linked by an array of electronic and optical networking technologies.

\textsuperscript{20}This scenario was written for the purposes of the arguments that follow. The electronic communication between the different points and the transfer of funds did indeed take place for the implementation of the human security project in Vietnam that is the subject of chapter five. However, since the precise details of this happening are unknown, I have created this fictional account so as to demonstrate the tangle of human and non-human elements in bringing human security to life.
inert objects whose existence either benefits or risks the state of (global) human security. Contrary to this tendency to depreciate material objects to the passive background setting of human security, this thesis sees them as giving the struggle of human security concrete form. By drawing attention to the materiality of human security, it is not possible to present it as a coherent and totalizing mode of governance as some of the biopolitical accounts of human security that I introduced in the preceding chapter have tended to do. Instead, it becomes clear that its materiality is actively involved in the (mis)management of human insecurity. In this context, though Foucault toyed with the idea of a *materialism of the incorporeal* in which he emphasized the constitutive role of material forces in giving rise to power effects such as political imaginaries and governmental logics, others have more decidedly, if controversially, expressed the dynamic and mobile forces of both human and nonhuman agencies in helping specific sciences, politics and subjectivities to emerge (e.g. Barad, 2007, Bennett, 2010, Coward, 2009, de Landa, 1991, Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, Hinchliffe, 2007, Latour, 2004, Mitchell, 2002).

Accordingly, in order to understand the political significance of material objects in human security, this chapter introduces and advances Foucault's materialism by particularly elaborating on the Deleuzian conception of the *machinic assemblage*. Foucault and Deleuze shared a relational ontology in which the interaction between human and nonhuman elements in an assemblage is ontologically more fundamental than the elements themselves. As I show in this chapter, implicit in Foucault's work but elaborated by Deleuze and Guattari is a distributive form of agency which arises in the relationality between the elements. It is this agency which engenders states of power such as governmental strategies. In the following, I begin by drawing out Foucault's conception of materialism which arises in his earlier work from the evolving framework of his ontology of radical relationality. Foucault's review of Deleuze's immanent materialism in *Theatricum Philosophicum* leads me to consider Deleuze and Jane Bennett's conception of 'thing-power' and agency in assemblages (Bennett, 2010). Finally, I develop a narrative of human security's dispersed emergence with and in the corporeal world which informs my interpretations of its emergence in Thailand and Vietnam which I discuss in chapters four and five. As the epigraph implies, tracing material objects not only shows the ways in which the global is localized and the local materializes. It also helps to demonstrate, on the one hand, the various ways in which governmental logics like human security are performed, on the other hand, the ways in which they are inherently adaptive and unstable.
In an interview in 1993, Latour suggested that Foucault, in what he called “the typically French attitude,” harboured a “complete belief” in the ‘solidity’ and passivity of nonhumans. The real test of Foucault’s redefinition of power, he argued, “would be to see whether or not the nonhumans [...] can be brought into his description”. Otherwise, if power is limited to human interactions, Latour claimed, Foucault’s redefinition of power is reductive (Crawford, 1993:252). Latour of course wants to “accommodate the nonhumans in the fabric of our society” (Crawford, 1993:262). He holds that the constructed realms of ‘nature’ and ‘society’ are not separate but “completely related”. In fact, ‘natural’ (nonhuman) and ‘social’ (human) entities are ‘agents in association’ or actants – a term coined by Latour (Latour, 1993, Latour, 1987) to refer to human and non-human elements with agential capacity – within networks that involve different forces, spatial scales, and temporalities which, in combination, are capable of producing effects (Crawford, 1993:260). In this view, things happen in the world because human and nonhuman actants have the capacity to strike alliances, forming partnerships and new networks or using, furthering or distorting networks already in place. Foucault similarly championed a form of ‘radical relationality,’ in which “the emergent property of bodies” is “contingent upon the modes of relationality productive of and mediated by them” (Dillon, 2000:5). However, as Latour contends, Foucault only raised the problem of materialism but “did not do the work” of bringing nonhuman agency into his description of power (Crawford, 1993:252).

Contrary to Latour’s understanding, it is conceivable that Foucault considered nonhuman agency in his description of power, albeit only tangentially. Crucially, as he noted in his description of assemblages, people are never entirely in control of the world, since the mode of relationality of assemblages can give rise to new – and, for the human element, potentially unintended and undesirable – effects (Foucault, 1980:195-6). That (human security) politics, nonetheless, appears as the effect of singular human intention is, as Coward (Coward, 2006:421) has argued, the legacy of Enlightenment thinking, which regards the human, ‘by virtue of being the sole element endowed with reason’, as taking precedence over, and as master of, all other elements. This anthropocentricism remains salient in modern thinking, producing a world in which productive forms of activity remain the preserve of humans and not of human–non-human alliances (Bennett, 2005:455). The thesis shows how such thinking is carried forward into human security mechanisms, overshadowing not only the constitutive role of human–non-human alliances.
in giving concrete form to human security strategies and effects but also, importantly, the inherently contingent and precarious nature of these effects.

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, a reflection on the relation between rhetoric and power/knowledge that he originally published in 1969, Foucault began sketching his kind of materialism by considering the materiality of language and modern history in the making. Here, Foucault was mainly interested not in what language (and history) had to say as such but in how it emerges, amongst others, through, and in relation to, materiality. His conception of materiality, however, had less to do with the material quality of artefacts such as computers and more to do with the *material mode of relationality* of assemblages which consist of linguistic, spatio-temporal as well as material elements. In this conception, the materiality of human security does not correspond to the individual materials or substances of artefacts or sounds through which it is articulated or expressed but refers to the relationality of the set of materials, material processes and relations which come to define what is (im)possible in human security practice. A year later, in 1970, Foucault further advanced and specified these materialist ideas in his inaugural speech at the Collège de France, 'The Order of Discourse,' and in his review essay of Deleuze's work, *Theatricum Philosophicum* (1981, 1998). Here, he called for a materialism of the incorporeal which, though not nominally present in his later work, nonetheless informed his analytics of power.

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, focusing on the statement in his analysis of language, Foucault (emphasis added, Foucault, 2002:112) argued that it must have a material existence:

> The statement is always given through some material medium, even if that medium is concealed, even if it is doomed to vanish as soon as it appears. And the statement not only needs this materiality; its materiality is not given to it, [...] once all determinants have been fixed: it is partly made up of this materiality.

Thus, the statement *co-emerges with and through the materiality* that it consists of. Put differently, a statement is itself an assemblage comprising heterogeneous, including material, relations that are constitutive of the characteristics of the statement. A statement, according to Foucault, has a material being which inhabits a specific space and time that combine in a specific way, defining its materiality. When these requisites change, he argued, the whole texture of the materiality changes, consequently changing the identity of the statement (2002:113).
This said, how is it possible to determine its identity, if a statement, for example ‘Human security now!’ is articulated in multiple, dispersed, and differentiated spatio-temporal and material enunciations, repetitions, and transcriptions, such as when a voice articulates it, a surface such as the logframe bears its signs, when it is embodied in a 'sense-perceptive element' such as the mouth, when it leaves a trace, no matter how minuscule, “in someone’s memory or in some space”? While the enunciation is an unrepeatable event, however, what stands out and is endlessly repeatable in enunciations, according to Foucault, is not their 'small' deviations in time, place, and material support which he argues are not significant enough to change the identity of a statement but the general form of a statement, e.g. a sentence, a meaning, a proposition. It is in this sense that a statement cannot be reduced to any specific artefact or material media such as a type-writer or loud-speaker or a time and place. On the other hand, nor can a statement simply be reduced only to a grammatical or logical form since, according to Foucault, “to a greater degree than that form, and in a different way, [a statement] is susceptible to differences of material, substance, time, and place” (2002:112-5).

Thus, the statement is unique: it is “neither entirely linguistic, nor exclusively material” (Foucault, 2002:97): it cannot with identified with certainty in the way it was first uttered as it is endlessly repeatable; on the other hand, it is not as free as a pure form because it is bound up with its environment. What, then, is that materiality proper to a statement which allows it to be repeated occasionally? For Foucault, the materiality of the statement is not “a perceptible, qualitative materiality, expressed in the form of colour, sound, or solidity, and divided up by the same spatiotemporal observation as the perceptual space” (2002:115). Rather, it is more akin to an assemblage whose elementary relationality defines “possibilities of reinscription and transcription (but also thresholds and limits), rather than limited and perishable individualities” of say enunciations (2002:116). Put differently, the statement partly emerges out of relations with materials. As it emerges in its materiality, the statement, according to Foucault, “appears with a status, enters various networks and various fields of use, is subjected to transferences or modifications, is integrated into operations and strategies in which its identity is maintained or effaced” (2002:118). Thus the identity of statements like ‘Human security now!’ is an effect generated by modes of relationality which are constantly subject to change. In this sense, statements have distinctive histories of formation and finite life spans.

Correspondingly, in history, Foucault contended, the document is not “the language of a voice since reduced to silence” or “an inert material through which [historical statements

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21 This is the title of the report of the Commission on Human Security published in 2003.
try] to reconstitute what men have done or said”; rather, modern history co-emerges with
the document, “trying to define with the documentary material itself unities, totalities,
series, relations” (emphasis added, Foucault, 2002:7). According to Foucault, history is not
an ancient collective consciousness that refreshes its memory through its material being.
Rather, distributed in material documentation including books, texts, accounts, registers,
acts, buildings, institutions, laws, techniques, objects, and customs, modern history is, in
fact, “one way in which a society recognises and develops a mass of documentation with
which it is inextricably linked” (emphasis added, Foucault, 2002:7). Thus, effects of social
relations, e.g. historical, political, and artistic statements, partly emerge out of relations
with materials. In turn, books, texts, and buildings are material objects whose properties,
e.g. an ‘Edwardian’ house, emerge in material-discursive relation. Indeed, materiality and
intelligibility are linked in ways irreducible to a function of signification or historical form.

In ‘The Order of Discourse,’ Foucault proposed to treat discourses as events which, he
argued, emerge in relation to the material world. Similar to his conception of the
statement, he (emphasis added, 1981:69) defined the discourse/event as

neither substance nor accident, neither quality nor process; the event is not of the
order of bodies. And yet it is not something immaterial either; it is always at the
level of materiality that it takes effect, that it is effect; it has its locus and it consists
in the relation, the coexistence, the dispersion, the overlapping, the accumulation,
and the selection of material elements. It is not the act or the property of a body; it
is produced as an effect of, and within, a dispersion of matter. Let us say that the
philosophy of the event should move in the at first sight paradoxical direction of
materialism of the incorporeal.

A materialism of the incorporeal seems paradoxical, Kelly (2008:13) suggests, because
materialism is a material ontology. On the other hand, the incorporeal does not have a
body and is thus immaterial. Yet, statements or events are incorporeal, i.e. they are not of
‘the order of bodies,’ but neither are they immaterial since they emerge in the material
world. Thus, the materiality of the incorporeal is not material in the sense of a materialist
ontology but in the sense of the incorporeal co-emerging with and in a world of dispersed,
overlapping, and accumulating matter.

While matter or the material, as Latour suggested, appears undifferentiated in these
works, in his review, Theatricum Philosophicum, of Deleuze’s ‘metaphysical treatise,’ Logic
of Sense, however, Foucault may have tried marking a kind of material dynamism or
agency when he wrote about an incorporeal dimension of bodies (Bennett, 2010:57). In
reference to *Logic of Sense*, he noted, "the body-organism is linked to the world through a network of primal significations which arise from the perception of things". This incorporeal dimension consisting of *phantasms* that form "the impenetrable and incorporeal surface of bodies," shaping and falsely presenting a centred organism, are produced out, Foucault contends (Foucault, 1998:346), of material surface effects:

emissions proceeding from deep within bodies and rising like the wisps of a fog – interior phantoms that are quickly reabsorbed into other depths by the sense of smell, by the mouth, by the appetites, extremely thin membranes that detach themselves from surfaces of objects and proceed to impose colors and contours deep within our eyes (floating epiderm, visual idols).

This "swarming of the impalpable," argued Foucault, must be redeemed from the *unthought*. Foucault called for a philosophy of the phantasms which emerge among the surfaces of the corporeal world to which it is related (Foucault, 1998:346).

Phantasms constitute what Foucault called *incorporeal materiality*. Firstly, because a phantasm is "not quite a discrete body or substantial corpus," secondly, as Bennett suggests, because "this mobile activity remains *immanent* to the material world, remains in-corporeality" (original emphasis, Bennett, 2010:57). Phantasms function at the limit of bodies. According to Foucault, they “stick to bodies and protrude from them,” “touch them, cut them, break them into sections, regionalize them, and multiply their surfaces”. They function between bodies according to laws of proximity, entanglement, and differential distance (Foucault, 1998:346-7). They stimulate human perception, “for it is these mobile floaters that hit our sense apparatus” (Bennett, 2010:57). As such, they are not beings or nonbeings, they are *extrabeings*, incorporeal things which are embodied and exist within the material world (Foucault, 1998:347). For Foucault, in his discussion of phantasms, Deleuze registers that which has remained unthought in philosophical discourse. Foucault recounts Deleuze's example of the mouth. It is through the mouth, he explains, “that cartloads of food pass as well as carts of meaning (if you say cart, a cart passes through your mouth)”. The mouth is the canal “where cries are broken into phonemes, morphemes, semantemes: the mouth where the profundity of an oral body separates itself from incorporeal meaning” (1998:354).

Considering these tentative steps towards a materialism of the incorporeal, is it possible to conceive of the identity or emergent property of the incorporeal such as the statement ‘Human security now!’ or a political rationality such as *state of reason*, as emerging and taking effect in relation to, but being also contingent on, the arrangement of an ensemble
of differential material including materially different tracings of phonemes, ‘sense-perceptive elements’ and 'someone’s memory'? How do relations of power figure in these considerations?

**IMMANENT MATERIALISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE AGENCY**

Though Foucault may not have mentioned ‘incorporeal materiality’ again and in subsequent work dedicated his focus to the analysis of economies of power and the emergence of strategic imperatives such as governmental logics and their effects in and through assemblages, nonetheless, it can be argued, contrary to Latour’s opening remark about Foucault’s neglect of nonhuman agencies, that he brought material dynamism into his description of power, however tangentially. This is because Foucault understood power not as possessed by humans but to be “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate” of which the human is but one element to have an effect (Foucault, 1998:92). Put differently, states of power emerge in the interaction between the differential elements of an assemblage. Taking into account also his prior considerations concerning the materialism of the incorporeal, the multiplicity of force relations conceivably refers to the encounter between different 'inhuman and subindividual forces' – prior to nature/culture, form/matter distinctions constructions – immanent in a heterogeneous field comprising, amongst others, disparate bodies, their dispositions, forms of matter, substances, and materially different tracings (Cheah, 1996:124). It is this dynamism in their differential encounter which constitute[s] their own organization and which, according to Foucault, ultimately gives rise to states of power (Foucault, 1998:92). In this sense, all elements immanent in a sphere are constitutive of the sphere. Put differently, they are ‘agents in association’ or actants within a network, capable of producing in combination whole power effects whose power, however, is dependent on the actants it can mobilize on its behalf.22

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22 It should be noted here that Foucault’s body of work is principally concerned with the discursive/social construction in/of the world which largely departs from the vitalist ontology of the new materialists which proceeds on the assertion that there is a mind-independent world or a world prior to construction. While scholars such as Cheah have attempted to show that the ontological gap between Foucault’s and new materialist thinking is not as significant as usually assumed, others like Aradau argue that although Foucault was concerned with the materiality of power and bodies he rejected ‘things’ anterior to discourse (Aradau, 2010:493). Indeed, the majority of contemporary scholarship drawing on Foucault maintains that the world is not *a priori* but only emerges in discourse. Bearing this in mind, in this thesis, I consciously proceed on a partial
What, then, is the ability to produce power effects, to make a difference; in other words, what is the agency of assemblages? Anthropocentric notions of agency, Jane Bennett argues, are conceptually and empirically inadequate to describe the ability of all, human as well as nonhuman, elements to produce an effect (Bennett, 2005:446). She proposes to theorize agency without presupposing human intentions and behaviours by focusing on the distributive as well as composite nature of agency of heterogeneous assemblages. In this understanding, the productive power behind effects such as a statement, a document, an event, discourses discussed here like human security, migrant health, and human trafficking, is always a collectivity. Put differently, the power to create emerges from the interplay of the differential elements that assemblages comprise including human bodies, intentions, intellect, feelings, political imaginaries, institutions, scriptures, computers, capital flows, virus, and logframes. Indeed, in Bennett’s compelling account, human agency itself is “always already distributed in tools, microbes, minerals, and sounds, it only emerges as agentic by way of a distribution into the ‘foreign’ materialities its bearer are eager to exclude” (Bennett, 2005:463). Thus, the agency of assemblages originates not in human initiative or any single element within it but results from its spatiotemporal configuration.

Nonetheless, according to Bennett, each element maintains an agentic capacity emerging from its membership in the collectivity. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari and Bergson, for Bennett, the ‘nonhuman’ itself exudes a ‘thing power’, a vitality and potentiality, irreducible to social constructions. While assemblages include humans and their constructions, in her narrative of enchanted materialism, they include also some very active and powerful nonhumans such as electrons, trees, wind, and electromagnetic fields. Some have “sufficient coherence to appear as entities”; others, “because of their great volatility, fast pace of evolution, or minuteness of scale, are best conceived as forces” (Bennett, 2005:446-7). Consider metal, a “conduct of all matter,” Deleuze and Guattari argue. It brings “to light a life proper to matter, a vital state of matter as such, a material vitalism” which they concede exists everywhere but does not normally figure on the human radar (emphasis added, Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:454). After all, metal is everywhere: even the waters, the grasses and varieties of wood, the animals are populated by salts or mineral elements. In this account, individual entities and singular forces,

and strategic reading of Foucault for purposes of emphasizing the heterogeneity (and especially the role of nonhuman elements) of assemblages/dispositives. Undoubtedly, there is much work still to be done in thinking the implications of a new materialist ontology vis-a-vis a Foucauldian (materialist) analysis which I plan to investigate in future work after the thesis.
human and nonhuman, each exercise energetic pulses which, in fact, constitute the self-organization and distribution of assemblages.

In fact, all actants maintain “an energetic pulse slightly ‘off’” from the agency of the assemblage (Bennett, 2005:447). Accordingly, assemblages are characterized by relations of exteriority. Actants composing the assemblage have a certain autonomy and may be detached from an assemblage and plugged into a different assemblage in which its interactions are different. Importantly, the properties of the components can never explain the relations which constitute a whole: “relations do not have as their cause the properties of the [components] between which they are established”. Yet, the agentic capacity of material elements alters the paths of the multiple lines of forces which determine the mode of relationality of assemblages, thereby also altering the effects that they help to constitute. Thus, the mode of agency of assemblages is nonlinear, non-hierarchical, non-subject-oriented. It is in this sense also that Bennett has referred to assemblages as ‘living-throbbing groupings’ whose “coherence always exists with energies and countercultures that exceed and confound it”. Indeed, assemblages are characterized by an open-endedness because of the agentic capacity of its differential elements (Bennett, 2005:445n2).

Bennett demonstrates the agency of the dynamic interactions between the ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman’ in the example of the North American blackout affecting over 50 million people in the United States and Canada in 2003. The electrical grid, in her description, is a “volatile mix of coal, sweat, electromagnetic fields, computer programs, electron streams, profit motives, heat, lifestyles, nuclear fuel, plastic, fantasies of mastery, static, legislation, water, economic theory, wire” and many more actants (Bennett, 2005:448). It becomes clear in her demonstration not only that the ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman’ cannot be separated – they are inextricably interlinked – but that the power blackout cannot be explained by human failure alone. It was the result of a cascade of events including voltage collapse, self-protective withdrawals from the grid as well as human decisions and omissions. Not only does Bennett identify an assortment of agencies complicit in the implosion of the electrical grid, she observes “a world where agency is distributed” (Bennett, 2005:451). Human intentions, she argues, although they very occasionally control, are always clashing with, the trajectories of other beings, forces, or institutions. Indeed, she concludes, although human thought is essential to political transformations, the nature of political change cannot be reduced to a function of humans. Politics is the combined effect of a range of bodies (Bennett, 2005:454). A similar tale is told by actor-network theorists. For example, in Aramis (Latour, 1996), Latour demonstrates how the material forces such as
electricity and magnets of machines as well as human bodies, words, regulations played an active role in the emergence and implosion of the assemblage of Aramis, an experimental mass transit system in Paris in the 1980s.

Distributive and composite accounts of agency unsettle traditional accounts of power since to distribute agency more widely entails the impossibility of a single, preformed agent (in the form of a person or institution) giving effect to power. Rather, power (and human agency) emerges in the relation between a heterogeneous set of actants. Put differently, a range of human and nonhuman elements must be mobilized in order to make a (political) difference. Following this conception of agency, notions like human security do not travel disembodied or are mobilized only in epistemic communities but are carried and enabled as well as disabled through specific materialities (including the human body) that are circumstantial, unevenly distributed, unpredictable and contingent. Secondly, reconceptualizing agency as distributive and composite begs the political question, who or what is to be held responsible or accountable for practices in the world? Bennett asks, “Does the acknowledgement of nonhuman actants relieve individual humans of the burden of being responsible for their actions?” Indeed, in drawing out the assembled nature of agency in, for example, security practice, can the human ever be held entirely responsible for the consequences of securitization? As I detail below, by arguing that the human element is never entirely in control, Foucault himself inadvertently claims that can never be held absolutely accountable for the political effects they attempt to engineer in the world (Foucault, 1980:195).

**The Microphysics of Power and the Excess of Strategy**

In fact, Foucault’s conception of a microphysics of power as the heterogeneous field of intervention mediating between the state and the materiality of bodies and forces can be read as exemplifying the subindividual dynamism in governmental assemblages constitutive of power effects as discussed above (Foucault, 1979:26). Specifically, in *Discipline and Punish*, he wrote a history of punishment against the background of “a history of bodies”. The body, he argued, is “directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs”. He exposed the minuscule and mundane techniques and everyday practices through which the human body is invested with power. He asked how the deployments of power are connected to the body; how is
the body disciplined and normalized. He analysed the ‘panoptic machine’ that is the French prison of the nineteenth century in terms of “the whole technique of forces and bodies” (Foucault, 1979:217) assembled in response to a new demand for productive labour. Crucially, it can be argued, his was an interrogation into the processes by which the mode of relationality pertaining to the human and nonhuman elements and forces comprising the machinic assemblage of the prison was rearranged towards the careful fabrication of ‘docile,’ analysable and manipulable, bodies.

For example, incorporeal norms of organization were distributed and solidified in material documentation through ‘a power of writing’ that concerned “the accumulation of documents, their seriation, the organization of comparative fields making it possible to classify, to form categories, to determine averages, to fix norms,” and, in the final instance, to render individuals legible and thus amenable to governance (Foucault, 1979:189-90). Secondly, by binding, through “instrumental coding,” “the whole surface of contact between the body and the object it handles,” e.g. a rifle, fastening them to one another, the forces of the materiality of the body and the rifle were intertwined in such a way as to constitute governable complexes of body-weapon, body-tool, body-machine (emphasis added, Foucault, 1979:153). For example (Foucault, 1979:153):

Raise the rifle with the right hand, bringing it close to the body so as to hold it perpendicular with the right knee, the end of the barrel at eye level, grasping it by striking it with the right hand, the arm held close to the body at waist level.

Thirdly, by organizing the prison into complex, at once architectural, functional and hierarchical, spaces such as ‘cell,’ ‘places,’ and ‘ranks,’ positions were fixed to permit strategic circulation. Foucault considered these spaces ‘real’ insofar as they “govern the disposition of buildings, rooms, furniture” and ‘ideal’ since they embodied an arrangement of “characterizations, assessments, hierarchies” (emphasis added, Foucault, 1979:148). Finally, by ‘striking’ the bodiless reality of the non-corporeal soul, that is, “the heart, the thought, the will, the inclinations” of individuals (Foucault, 1979:16), subjects could be brought into being “which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body” and its materiality and forces (Foucault, 1979:30).

Indeed, through “the concerted articulation of the elementary parts” comprising the prison assemblage such as in and through documents, repetitive training, strategic architectural designing, differential forces were composed to obtain “an efficient machine,” in other words a successful mode of governance, to maximize specific effects such as altered minds or the body-machine complex “which had to be superior to the sum of elementary forces
that composed it" (Foucault, 1979:163-4). Thus, material objects and forces, whether as tools such as documents, weapons, the human body, as architectural or spatial arrangements, or as ‘inclinations’ imprinted in human brains, play an intrinsic part in producing in combination power effects such as ‘docile’ subjects. Yet, the fabrication of ‘docile’ bodies was also physically resisted: relations of power traverse the body, exerting pressure on it; in turn, the body resists the grip that they have on it. Relations of power “are not univocal; they define innumerable points of confrontation, focuses of instability, each of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles, and of an at least temporary inversion of the power relations” (Foucault, 1979:26).

In *The History of Sexuality: Vol.1* published a year later, Foucault theorized power in terms of “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the field of intervention in which they operate and which constitute their own organization” (Foucault, 1998:92). Secondly, power is the *process* which, through countless struggles, transforms, bolsters, or upsets the multiplicity of immanent force relations. Power, then, is “the support these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another”. Ultimately, it is the strategies in which relations of force take effect in the world whose general design becomes embodied and institutionalized, for example, in the state assemblage (Foucault, 1998:92). Thus, power results not from a central point of sovereignty but from the dynamic base of local, differential, and unstable force relations (Foucault, 1998:93). A machinic assemblage such as human security is always both inscribed in the play of power and linked to specific coordinates of knowledge emerging from and conditioning it. It is in this sense that human security assemblages are of a strategic nature: they inhabit “a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilizing them, utilizing them, etc” (Foucault, 1980:196).

In fact, from this perspective, human beings are never entirely in control of the worlds they carve out to govern since the interrelation between actants produces differential effects that enter “into resonance or contradiction” with each other, perpetually calling for a “re-adjustment [...] of the heterogeneous elements,” producing new, and for the human element potentially unintended and undesirable, effects (Foucault, 1980:195-6). Foucault referred to this as a process of *functional overdetermination*. In other words, it is the process when the strategy becomes increasingly incongruent with the dynamic distribution of the assemblage. On the other hand, as Foucault has shown too, a readjustment of elements has resulted also in a readjustment of strategic imperatives. He
referred to this process as *strategic elaboration* (Foucault, 1980:195). In effect, the excess of strategic imperatives resulted in the (creative) elaboration of strategies. Thus, in the *Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault explained that "the logic of strategy is the logic of connections between the heterogeneous and not the logic of homogenization of the contradictory" (Foucault, 2008:42). For example, Foucault was able to demonstrate, the prison made mechanisms of detention appear to be the most efficient and rational approach to deal with criminality while what was in fact constituted was a delinquent milieu wholly different from what was intended or expected. This happened because the prison, according to Foucault, "operated as a process of filtering, concentrating, professionalizing and circumscribing a criminal milieu". However, Foucault also observed the way the existence of the delinquent milieu subsequently gave rise to the formulation of new strategies such as the organization of prostitution for profit (Foucault, 1980:195-6, Foucault, 1979:264-68).

Similarly, Timothy Mitchell has demonstrated the way governmental logics, mechanisms, and their readjustment are not the result of only human intentions and ideas but arise from a process of energetic manufacture whose ingredients are both human and nonhuman (Mitchell, 2002:42-3). In this process, as Foucault himself suggested, there are always forces which exceed the grasp of governance. In *Pandora’s Hope*, Latour similarly noted "the slight surprise of action" that is inherent to assemblages (Latour, 1999:281). It is in fact this excess which engenders new scientific expertise and governmental logics in so far as the tension inherent to the interaction between the elements calls for a (creative) readjustment of strategies (Mitchell, 2002:38). Specifically, Mitchell investigated the way a chain of events in Egypt involving war, disease, and agriculture led to the malaria epidemic in 1942-44. He argued that the disaster was the result of interactions between human agents and a variety of nonhuman agencies including the anopheles mosquito, the faciparum parasite, the chemical properties of ammonium nitrate, the 75mm guns, and the hydraulic force of the river (Mitchell, 2002:27-30).

In spite of the active involvement of nonhuman agencies in world events, however, it is usually only the human (the intellect, intentions and ideas) who appears as the agent. Mitchell explained this conundrum as a result of the power of the narrative of rationalization, of technological and social progress in Western development. The story of modern life, according to him, is resolved into the binary arrangement nature (materiality) versus human expertise (human ingenuity, science) (Mitchell, 2002:36): “Human beings are the agents around whose actions and intentions the story is written” (Mitchell, 2002:29). It is this "narcissistic reflex of human language and thought” that Bennett and
others wants to counter (Bennett, 2010). Drawing on Agamben, Martin Coward has noted that the roots of anthropocentrism can be traced to Descartes and Kant's formalization of Aristotle's *De Anima*. The core of the anthropocentric bias in modern discourses, he argues, is the belief in the primacy of the human over all other elements as a result of the human being the only element endowed with reason (Coward, 2006:421).

As the preceding chapter suggests, this anthropocentrism also defines the way human security is assembled: its biopolitical imaginary assumes human evolution (development), human calculations (statistics), human ordering (logframe), and human constructions (the state, sovereignty, networks) can tame the inexorableness of life. Material objects, on the other hand, appear as raw, brute, or inert instruments which are either indispensable for or disruptive of the functioning of human security. Informing the imaginary is a tendency to see the world as a binary of subject (vibrant life) and object (dull matter). Such differentiation motivates an anthropocentric focus on the rationality and self-reflexivity of agents or on the intersubjective relations of individuals in the production of identity and meaning in discourse, ignoring the vital role that matter and material formations play. What difference would it make to our understanding of the political significance of human security were matter to be figured not simply as an object of discourse but also and more radically as an actant?

As this chapter has shown, the power of incorporeals like human security inheres to heterogeneous assemblages. The vital role that digits, monies, and computer screens, human bodies and so on play in governing processes affects the way human security proceeds in the world. Against anthropocentrism and at the conscious risk of ‘appearing naive or foolish’ (Bennett, 2010:xiii), the account that I develop in this thesis is attentive to the constitutive role of human *and* nonhuman elements in the enactment of human security. As I suggested earlier, human security is embodied and exists in a myriad of material objects dispersed around the world including emails, computers, the internet, offices, institutions, management tools such as the logframe, capital, pixels, digits, and the river Mekong. Thus, it does not travel disembodied but is carried and enabled as well as disabled through specific materialities (including the human body) that render human security circumstantial, unevenly distributed, unpredictable and contingent. They give the struggle of human security concrete, albeit instable, form. Put differently, they are actively involved in the (mis)management of human insecurity which however is always also open to (creative, adaptive) readjustment (see also Aradau, 2010, Lundborg and Vaughan-
Adopting a relational ontology to the interpretation of human security as discussed in this chapter, in the following, I elaborate on a Deleuzian articulation of human security which informs my analysis of the fields that I discuss in chapters four and five.

**UN** Becoming Human Security

Human security materializes in dispersed sites. The move to analyse more fragmented geographies of human security that I suggest to do here challenges the dominant representational practices of the omniscient Cartesian perspective of world order in International Relations (Haraway, 1988, Hyndman, 2001). How to account for the emergence of human security as a situated political strategy? To begin with, as Foucault noted, governmental assemblages such as human security comprise ‘men and things’ (Foucault, 2007:96). The things which figure in these assemblages are the material givens that make up what he referred to at one time as the “the fine materiality of human existence and coexistence”. The things he identified that are of governmental concern include “natural givens” pertaining to geography, climate and physicality such as rivers, marshes, hills, air, dryness, fertility and “artificial givens” such as borders, qualities, groups of individuals, and houses (Foucault, 2007:21). The principal concern and strategic imperative of governmental assemblages is, as he suggested, what is “the right way of arranging (disposer) things in order to lead (conduire) them?” (Foucault, 2007:96). The way mechanisms and material things are distributed across an assemblage indicates the way governmental power traverses an assemblage. These invisible and unsayable lines

23 Adopting a new materialist analysis to human security, as I have done in this thesis, helps to explore how global human security localizes and materializes thereby also demonstrating the way the macropolitical logic underlying human security practices is always situated and instable, resisted and creatively readjusted, giving rise to ‘new’ and unintended (human security) effects. On the other hand, a focus on the (security) life of things may in fact detract from broader ‘global’ effects, e.g. in relation to how the localization and materialization of human security affects the macropolitical logic and practices? Moreover, a new materialist analysis to human security shifts attention away from some of the other approaches to analyzing security practices including institutional analyses as well as the analysis of the textual, linguistic (including speech act), performative and intersubjective character of human security regimes which helps to normalize concepts like human security. More generally, a new materialist perspective raises important philosophical questions such as in relation to the question of agency, accountability and responsibility in global politics which need still to be answered. Finally, a focus on the material life of security may lead to the radicalization of positivism insofar as it detracts from the many rewards of a social constructivist analysis of security including the constitution of subjectivities.
hold the assemblage together; they are the lines which act as go-betweens between seeing and saying, between one line and another. In the following, I set up an interpretative framework mindful of the way material givens (natural and artificial) play a vital role in the reconstitution of the relations, institutions and subjectivities of the Thai and Vietnamese states in global politics.

Human security is a strategic bricolage which acts like a machine that “make[s] one see and speak” such as the Foucauldian ‘panoptic machine’ of the prison (Deleuze, 1992). This collective body is a multiplicity that is made up of heterogeneous practices and things which establish contingent liaisons, relations between them (in Dialogues II, p. 69 as quoted in de Landa, 2006:121n9). The organization of the heterogeneous elements of the human security assemblages is characterized by a multilinear mode of relationality, the interaction between human and nonhuman actants, an uneven topography of relations of power, the lack of a central authority, and finally, rhizomatic impulses. The assemblage’s only unity, according to Deleuze, is that of “a co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a ‘sympathy’” (in Dialogues II, p. 69 as quoted in de Landa, 2006:121n9).

Firstly, human security assemblages are complex ‘multilinear ensembles’ composed of differential lines. Indeed, human security composes lines of force as well as lines of visibility, enunciation, subjectification, splitting, breakage, and fracture. The lines “criss-cross and mingle together, some lines reproducing or giving rise to others, by means of variations or even changes in the way they are grouped” (Deleuze, 1992:162). The lines of force flowing through human security correspond to the substrate of force relations which engenders states of power that Foucault was principally interested in tracing. It refers to the microphysics of power specific to human security. The individual entities and singular forces comprising human security each exercise agentic capacities. The interaction between different ‘spirited actants’ alters the paths of the multiple lines of forces which determine the system of agency of the assemblage, thereby also altering the subjectivities that they aim to constitute. In this sense, while the human agents carve out and attempt to organize fields of intervention – comprising heterogeneous elements including natural givens (e.g. rivers, marshes, hills) as well as artificial or social givens (e.g. houses and individuals) – in which it is a perpetual struggle of aligning and realigning the heterogeneous elements (with their forces) in order to render the field governable. The effectiveness of their intervention is always contingent on the dynamic forces emerging from the immanent interrelation with the heterogeneous elements which perpetually calls for readjustments.
Despite lines of force passing “through every area” in the assemblage (Deleuze, 1992:160), power is not distributed equally across the surfaces of human security assemblages: they exhibit “uneven topographies” because “some of the points at which trajectories of actants cross each other are more heavily trafficked than others” (Bennett, 2005:445n2). Indeed, human security assemblages are not governed by a central agency or power: no one material component “has sufficient competence to determine consistently the trajectory or impact of the group” (Bennett, 2010:24). Essentially, they are not organized in a linear but in a rhizomatic way. The differential lines flowing through at different speeds and viscosity “ceaselessly establish[…] connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances” relative to the struggle of human security (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:7). As such, assemblages are multiplicities of attractions and influences with no certain origin or genesis because a rhizome has “neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:23). Consider the recent conjuncture of the ‘swine flu’ pandemic: "We form a rhizome with our viruses, or rather our viruses cause us to form a rhizome with other animals. [...] transfers of genetic material by viruses or through other procedures, fusions of cells originating in different species" (2004:25).

Human security assemblages are always in the process of (un)becoming. Deleuze and Guattari divide the different lines of an assemblage into two groups: firstly, there are lines of becoming or territorialization, that is, "lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories"; secondly, lines of unbecoming or deterritorialization, that is, "lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification". It is in this sense that human security can present in two ways: on the one hand, it appears as a signifying totality; on the other hand, it appears as a body without organs which is “continually dismantling the [totality], causing asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate, and attributing to itself subjects that it leaves with nothing more than a name as the trace of an intensity” (2004:4). In his work, Foucault drew our attention mainly to the becoming of assemblages. That is, he looked at processes of sedimentation or consolidation of power effects such as rendering individuals legible and governable as docile bodies or as delinquents to the exclusion of alternatives as described above in the emergence of the ‘panoptic machine’. Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, were more interested in lines of unbecoming, that is, lines of breakage and fracture which dismantle seemingly established assemblages. These lines of flight arrives “from outside to break constraints and open new vistas,” that is, to open creative alternatives into the future (Massumi, 2004:xiii).
In this thesis, though I follow Foucault in emphasizing the processes, for example the documentation and training, by which human security effects including the state form and global order are stabilized, I also want to stress the material forces which render these effects precarious. In the preceding chapters, I suggested seeing global governance and human security not as pre-discursive givens and visible facts of global life but as ontological effects of governmental logics. As such, they are historically, both spatially and temporally, specific formations that emerged in response to urgent needs to govern. Travelling through multiple lines of force, subjectivation, and lines of splitting, breakage and fracture, governmental logics traverse these assemblages, assembling and reassembling elements in such a way that they can be directed in this or that direction (Foucault, 2007:96). The ‘multilinear’ relationality of these assemblages makes possible the (re)constitution and decomposition of objects, subjects and regimes of enunciations capable of governing whatever has been marked out as urgent problem. It is in this way, I suggested, that it is possible to conceive of human security as assembling orders of governance in which people are directed in what they can think and do.

Foucault, according to Deleuze, spoke about “lines of sedimentation but also of lines of ‘breakage’ and of ‘fracture’” in assemblages. His endeavour was particularly to untangle the lines within assemblages: “drawing up a map, doing cartography, surveying unknown landscapes [...] One has to position oneself on these lines themselves, these lines which do not just make up the [assemblage] but run through it, from North to South, from East to West, or diagonally” (Deleuze, 1992:159). How do nonhuman components with “their materiality and their forces” shape lines in vernacular human security assemblages (Foucault, 1979:26)? Following this, I examine human security by excavating, tracing, and mapping the little knowledges and mundane practices, techniques and material elements through which orders of human security are rearticulated. It is a heterogeneous field of intervention which mediates between the state and the materiality of bodies and their forces.

**CONCLUSION**

As this chapter has shown, interpreting human security as a governmental assemblage entails considering its open-endedness which always somehow escapes the biopolitical imperative within it. Firstly, following Foucault’s materialism, human security is not only partly generated by the intermingling of dispersed material and other (e.g.
spatiotemporal) processes but also dependent on the corporeal world which it comprises. Secondly, following a Deleuzian materialist conception of assemblage (partly via Bennett), human security's relation with material and other forces renders it, and the intended effects produced out of it including orders of governance and associated political subjectivities, always transient and subject to unintended and unforeseen change. In terms of understanding its politics, such an interpretative framework shows that the world cannot be explained only by analysing human intentions, omissions and programmes. In fact, only rarely does the human element have the power to tame contingencies arising from the interrelation between the parts of an assemblage. I use this interpretative framework in the following chapters to advance biopolitical accounts of human security. Indeed, it is thus also possible to pinpoint where creative readjustments of the political strategy have taken place. Human security is never a coherent, stable and totalizing logic but emerges in multiple and transient guises in the world.

As I suggested in the thesis' introduction, governmental notions which invoke the 'global' such as human security operate along dramatic distances. Tracing its materiality beyond governmental categories such as the state helps to locate the dynamic mechanisms and effects of human security. When the object of analysis is the global, a focus on the materiality of events helps to explore how the global is localized. At the same time, a focus on materiality opens up the opportunity to explore how the local materializes. This interplay between localizations and materializations disrupts the logics that underlie governmental processes. By looking at the emergence of the complex assemblages that human security comprises, tracing the multiple transactions and relations that assemble the heterogeneous elements including the material objects into nearly stable organizational and institutional practices, it becomes possible to capture where and how power operates and where human security is performatively produced. It helps to understand the distinctive interplay between the micro- and macropolitics of global human security. In the following, I develop two narratives of human security's dispersed emergence with and in the corporeal world. They engage with materiality in the form of viruses and technological artefacts such as logframes, software, and spidergrams as vibrant things that constitute orders of governance in global politics.
4 THE MIGRANT HEALTH ASSEMBLAGE

This chapter traces the emergence of human security in the struggle to manage the circulation of pathogens relating to Burmese migrant communities in Thailand. The situated struggle to improve the health conditions of Burmese migrants in Thailand presents an interesting example for how human security localizes and materializes in the *migrant health assemblage* in Thailand. The Burmese migrant embodies a double circulation problematic: on the one hand, her body is desired for the labour to be yielded, on the other, she is repulsed and criminalized for the diseases and illegalities her body is said to carry. I examine the migrant health assemblage in terms of its microphysical field situated between the institutions operative at the ‘global’ or ‘national’ level and the bodies with their materiality and their forces relating to those targeted at the ‘local’ level. Specifically, I trace the interactions of a multiplicity of forces including social, political, international, governing, viral and chemical forces which helped to bring forth and shape this assemblage in Thailand in the 1990s. The chapter documents the biopolitical mechanisms of the human security intervention in two of Thailand’s provinces. By enframing, ordering and depoliticizing the complex health world of Burmese migrants in terms of simple dichotomies in which ‘unruly’ nature (pathogens, diseases, bodies) is contrasted with human techno-scientific ingenuity (scientific evidence, technological innovations, managerial effectiveness), these mechanisms arrange the elements of the assemblage in a way which renders the circulation of pathogens amenable to biopolitical governance.

On the one hand, the struggle to manage pathogenic circulation through human security transforms the issue of migrant health into a technical matter concerned with the (self-)management of bodies and the governmentalization of the Thai state to the exclusion of important but difficult questions concerning a violent politics of exclusion. On the other hand, the tensions, contradictions and practical difficulties in biopolitical encounters arising from the interplay inherent in the assemblage attest to the productive power of human-nonhuman alliances in the manufacture of political decisions and subjectivities. They remind of the contingent and therefore precarious nature of human intentions and strategies encapsulated in initiatives like human security. Finally, I conclude with
reflections on the order of governance inhabited by the migrant health assemblage in Thailand. The chapter is based on research carried out in 2008 in Ranong town and Samutsakorn city, as well as Bangkok, Thailand, during September and November, 2008. The chapter draws mainly on interviews with persons from communities targeted under human security and relevant officials of Thai and (inter)national governmental and non-governmental and other private organizations. It also draws on publicly available documents and documents made available to me during my research. How does the biopolitical strategy of human security fare in the situated moment in Thailand? How are sources of finance, modes of investment, decision-making centres, forms and types of control, relationships between local powers, central authorities, and other powers as they present in this specific assemblage moved or modified in order to control global circuits of migrant health?

**Migrant Health as Emerging Assemblage**

Thailand shares a land and sea border stretching 2,401 kilometres with Burma and has become a reluctant host to increasing numbers of displaced people fleeing from civil strife, political oppression and economic stagnation. They travel accompanied by mosquitoes and other carriers of parasites (Beyrer and Lee, 2008), drawing on the support of their undernourished and abused bodies, ‘flimsy’ boats, and the ‘free’ flows of the Salween River. The number of Burmese people migrating to Thailand rose sharply following “a crackdown on urban, pro-democracy supporters” and Burmese government offensives against “sundry ethnic minorities along the Thai border” between 1980s-90s (Hynd, 2002, Lang, 2002). As of September 2009, Thailand’s Burmese migrant community is estimated at two to three million (Fry, 2009). Around 140,000 (Srithamrongsawar et al., 2009) are living legally in the few available “temporary shelter areas,” essentially refugee camps in the Thai borderlands. Most migrants, however, live and work illegally in Thai villages.

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24 The change from Burma to Myanmar is not accepted by the opposition, and use of the latter term is politically charged.

25 The UNHCR considers these shelters refugee camps. According to the UNHCR, refugees along the Thai-Burma border are recognised on a ‘prima facie’ basis in the absence of a Refugee Status Determination procedure in Thailand. Thailand is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees or to its 1967 Protocol. Thus, the Thai government sees the Burmese as displaced persons and does not process them as refugees. Due to Thailand’s position on the status of refugees, these people are largely seen as economic refugees despite their frequently mixed reasons for entering Thailand, and are classed as illegal migrant workers. While the Thai government is prepared to grant refugees temporary shelter while they wait for third-country resettlement or repatriation, it is not prepared to grant permanent residency or citizenship to any
and cities in and beyond Thai borderlands. Their living and working situations render them hugely vulnerable, mostly voiceless and anonymous, often highly exploited in sweatshops and on construction sites, as seasonal migrant labour, bar girls, and sex workers (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2004:55). Indeed, their aberrant existence in Thailand is perceived as an increasing threat to the Thai social fabric (Fry, 2009). Thus, unregistered Burmese find themselves “in a status of non-belonging, non-citizenship” (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2004:54).

Migrants are often forced to live in unsanitary and overcrowded conditions in which pathogens flourish (WHO, 2004):

Many lack access to latrines, safe water for washing and drinking, and means of disposing of solid waste. Some [...] are located above cesspools into which are deposited garbage and human faeces [sic.], where pathogens proliferate, and where disease-carrying mosquitoes breed.

Since they have limited or no access to appropriate healthcare including preventive care and vaccinations, they are considered more likely to contract communicable diseases (Jitthai, 2009:14). Indeed, experiences of Thai government crackdowns on ‘illegals,’ poverty-ridden conditions of life in Thailand, and violent exploitation in Thai work situations are just some of the stresses rendering Burmese migrant bodies particularly vulnerable to various health conditions. Migrants typically treat themselves; their bodies have to bear the illness on their own as long as possible (Archavanitkul et al., 2000:xii). Compared to Thais, migrants suffer from higher case fatality and morbidity as health statisticians have deduced from the limited accepted data and research available. Often, migrant bodies surrender to treatable health problems. In Ranong, for example, the “top five reportable infectious diseases” captured in 2003 were malaria, diarrhoea, pneumonia, tuberculosis, and food poisoning. The prevalence of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), passing through, amongst others, the body fluids of migrant sex workers and seafarers, was also recorded (WHO, 2004).

In the mid 1990s, HIV infection among migrants within and from Burma was found to be the highest recorded in the region (Porter, 1995). Since migrants are mostly integrated into the local communities where they co-exist, reside and work alongside Thais, pressure mounted to address migrant health needs, particularly those relating to communicable of the residual refugee population. Indeed, Thai authorities prefer not to use the term ‘refugee’ but use the term ‘displaced persons’ or migrant workers. Hynd, Michael. (2002) Thailand. In FMO Research Guide, p. 17. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre.
illnesses. There was fear that lethal pathogens not only take advantage of weakened migrant bodies but will pass through to, and circulate, amongst Thai communities. Since the mid 1990s, the public health community in Thailand has increasingly expressed concerns about “cross-border movement” since it raises problems concerning health but also citizenship, legal rights, and access to services and support (Archavanitkul, et al., 2000:3). From the intricate interplay between Burmese migrant bodies, pathogens and impromptu government initiatives, there has gradually emerged a distinct assemblage oriented towards the control of migrant health in Thailand. The emergence of Thailand’s migrant health assemblage has not been a process in which governance successfully extends itself across a field but involves fragile relays, contested locales and fissiparous affiliations (Rose, 1999:51). Indeed, much labour is spent on bringing the heterogeneous elements together, forging alliances between them and maintaining the connections when confronted with tension (Li, 2007:264). Tension arises, for example, from factors such as the mutability of pathogens and shifts in migration trends.

That the Thai government has not adequately adopted public health measures to cope with the burgeoning migrant population is considered an ongoing problem. Especially in light of the government’s efforts to promote migrant labour circulation through extending illegal migrant employment from 9 to 43 provinces in 1996 in order to meet the growing labour demand of the flourishing private sector (Archavanitkul, et al.:49, Hyndman, 2001). While encouraging labour circulation, the government was also seen as increasing the risk of ‘migrant disease’ circulation, further straining ill-equipped public health facilities. As the director of the Bureau of Policy and Strategy of the Thai Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) recently noted in the *Bangkok Post*, migration has increased the burden on Thailand's health services and manpower, adding challenges to the disease surveillance and outbreak control system (Fry, 2009).

In this respect, to this day, the Thai government is criticized for not having adequately addressed public health issues concerning the burgeoning migrant population in Thailand. Authorities have primarily been concerned with promoting migrant labour circulation. While encouraging labour circulation, this was also seen, in the absence of sustained public health initiatives, as increasing the risk of ‘migrant disease’ circulation, further straining ill-equipped public health facilities. In fact, the Thai government has attempted to manage migrant labour circulation through a series of registrations. Yet, few migrants have been in a position to take up the Thai government’s call for migrant worker registration required to legalise their status and grant them limited access to public services including healthcare. In 2007, only 532,305 migrants from Burma, Lao PDR and
Cambodia out of an estimated total of 1.8 million migrants registered (Srithamrongsawar, et al., 2009). This is because the registration process is selective, expensive, complex and dangerous. In fact, few have passports or other forms of identification, the funds, or knowledge of the Thai language to register. Moreover, the fear of deportation is very real.

Nonetheless, provincial health offices (PHOs), especially in border provinces, are treating a growing number of Burmese migrants in Thailand, of whom the majority are not registered and thus not accounted for officially. This has led to shortages of medication and equipment in health offices burdened by insufficient welfare budgets. This was compounded further by the protracted consequences of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 whereby public health budgets, including funds for medication, equipment, and welfare services, were drastically cut (Archavanitkul, et al., 2000:48). In response to these financial challenges, in 1998, the Thai government made the purchase of an annual health insurance card by migrant workers mandatory. This governmental thing, through which an attempt has been made to manage the health of migrants, has proven largely ineffective. Many employers have been found retaining health insurance cards in order to prevent migrants from ‘running away or changing jobs’. Meanwhile, several PHOs have initiated programmes targeting migrants involving the promotion of disease prevention and environmental sanitation as well as a reporting system tracking spread of diseases within communities. Some provinces have collaborated with NGOs, setting up clinics exclusively for migrants. Yet, these haphazard attempts to control migrant health have had little effect in dealing with the problem of migrant health in Thailand. Meanwhile, pathogens continue to develop in crowded and unhygienic spaces, feeding on weakened Burmese migrant bodies.

Interestingly, the MOPH began forging new alignments between Burmese migrants and government offices in the sense that it sought to link the health objectives of migrants themselves with those of government offices. It did so by promoting self-care guidelines for migrant workers “so that they can take care of themselves,” releasing dependency on public health services (Archavanitkul, et al., 2000). A similar strategy formed the core of the human security intervention discussed in more detail below. In 2004, indicating a shift, the MOPH launched the Healthy Thailand policy wherein there was recognition that it was “impossible for the country to achieve the Healthy Thailand goal when the health needs of some 2.5 million migrants remain unmet”. Recently, the MOPH has developed several key governmental strategies aiming to address the problem of migrant health including forging new alignments with neighbouring governments such as Burma. The strategies involved also developing governmental things such as information systems and migrant
health service systems. Essentially, these strategies and governmental things render the problem of migrant health a *technical problem*, that is, a problem of effective public health management.

Since at least the end of the 1990s, the Thai government has drawn heavily on the technical support and expertise of national and international migration and health experts in its efforts to deal with the issue of migrant health. The intimacy of this relationship is demonstrated by the Ministry of Public Health’s extending an invitation to the World Health Organization (WHO) to set up an office within the ministry compound, which resulted in the WHO being physically integrated into the political architecture of a Thai government ministry. Similarly, the process of establishing dedicated Migrant Health Units within Provincial Health Offices, a process beset with political difficulties, is partly due to the advocacy of International Organization for Migration (IOM) field offices. These Units, in which the politics of the Migrant Health assemblage takes concrete physical form, embody the shift in governing the health of migrants assembled over the last two decades. As I go on to show, international (non-) governmental organizations are in many ways formative of the field in which they intervene. The alignments that are being forged between these organizations and Thai NGOs are dealt at several levels, including at the level of authorising knowledges. Indeed, the ‘reality’ of migrant health is consolidated with the perpetual production of scientific knowledge by experts including statistics, analyses, and guidelines on which interventions are subsequently based.

Several major programmes have emerged since. Most notable in this respect are the IOM-led Migrant Health and the WHO-led Border Health Programmes. Indeed, strategies are converging: much like the MOPH strategies outlined above, the WHO programme is oriented to improving coordination among key players, data collection, technical training (e.g. emergency preparedness and response) and information sharing (e.g. the border health report containing health statistics, information on provinces and organisations). The activities these organisations carry out in migrant communities as well as with Thai state authorities are bound up with knowledges, practices, and things, associated with what Mitchell has termed a *‘techno-politics logic’* (Mitchell, 2002). Herein included are practices of categorization, measurement, monitoring and evaluation, lessons-learned, framing logically as well as the governmental things which began enframing and ordering the complex health world of Burmese migrants, turning the issue of migrant health into a simple, dualistic world of ‘unruly’ nature (pathogens, diseases) versus science, the human versus (biopolitical) machine, bodies versus hygiene (Mitchell, 2002:210). The relations that are forged in these activities connect in important ways, forming a web in which the
individual migrant is linked to local and central public authorities, public authorities of neighboring countries and (transnational) non-/inter-governmental organizations.

When the IOM and WHO applied in 2004 for funding to the global Human Security Fund (HSF) to run a co-managed migrant health project in two Thai provinces, migrant health was reframed in terms of the problem of human security and the baggage of actants it is inevitably loaded with – including logframes, cosmological realist perimeters, the biopolitical imaginary and so on – was plugged into the migrant health assemblage (e.g. Grayson, 2008). Articulating migrant health in Thailand through human security has had at least two effects. Firstly, it is arguably providing human actants a distinct grammar to think and articulate the complexities of contemporary migrant politics in Thailand. Indeed, human security’s governing logic to promote the life of unruly transnational populations in Thailand such as Burmese migrants now speaks directly to the security of the ‘Thai geobody’. In this perspective, improving the health conditions of migrant populations is understood to “benefit and assist with maintaining the health security” of the Thai people (emphasis added, Srithamrongsawar, et al., 2009:11), prompting an IOM expert to claim recently that the problem of migrant health is a matter of “national health security” (Jitthai, 2009:14). Secondly, and more important, Thai public health officials have begun rearticulating Thailand as a transnational state. It is a ‘transit state’ through which run flows of people and goods from neighbouring and distant countries. Since the flow of Burmese migrants into Thailand is considered difficult to stem, partly owing to the desired labour they constitute, their health insecurity, and by extension that of the Thai population, according to public health officials in Ranong, is best managed by including migrant health into public health considerations.

The intricate and complex interplay between Burmese traffic to Thailand, the ‘free’ flows of the Salween River, travelling pathogens, mosquitoes, crowded and unhygienic spaces, weakened and neglected refugee bodies, human intentions and desires, Thai refugee and migrant policy, ‘states of non-belonging’, fear and anxiety, failed governmental initiatives, sex work and body fluids, the problem of circulation, foreign aid capital, transnational agencies, inadequate health funds and the rise of global human security helped to bring forth and shape the migrant health assemblage in Thailand. The different properties of these various elements, involving “very different forces, agents, elements, spatial scales, and temporalities”, interlinked with and shaped each other, forming biological, ethical,

26 Interview with an officer of the Thai Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, Bangkok, Thailand (September 2008).
27 Interview with the Chief Medical Officer and Head of Migrant Health Unit, Ranong Provincial Public Health Office (September 2008).
discursive, techno-scientific, knowledge, transnational and political alliances that comprise the migrant health assemblage (Mitchell, 2002:27). In spite of the constitutive role of human–non-human associations in setting up and shaping the assemblage, the IOM and WHO represented the assemblage only in terms of the actions and intentions of human actors whose techno-scientific ingenuity could tame pathogenic circulation. That the assemblage's representation is itself a 'technical body', one that "must emerge from a process of manufacture whose ingredients are both human and nonhuman, both intentional and not, and in which the intentional or the human is always somewhat overrun by the unintended" – such as tensions and contradictions between policies, pathogen mutations and initiatives such as the health insurance cards – is not taken into account (Mitchell, 2002:42-3).

FRAMING LOGICALLY AND THE FORECLOSURE OF THE POLITICAL

Human security was plugged into the migrant health assemblage cleansed of politics; all but techno-(bio)political strategies were put forward to deal with the problem of migrant health in Thailand. In their proposal to the HSF, IOM and WHO experts argued migrants are “at high Human Security risk,” their health is “a particular Human Security concern”. Migrant health insecurity was due “in large part” to the inability of migrants "to access basic preventative and curative health services”. Three primary factors disabling migrants from accessing healthcare services were identified: security concerns (fear of arrest and deportation), socio-linguistic factors (the language barrier, citizen-denizen tensions and differences in health cultures) and economic factors (opportunity, travel and health costs) (WHO, 2004). While the problem of access is symptomatic of a violent politics of exclusion, the solution to the problem was seen as lying mainly with migrants themselves: they were to learn to care for themselves. This involved the making of self-governing migrant health subjects. It involved also the making of a migrant health information system (MHIS) developed by WHO officials and maintained by public health authorities to regulate the internal dynamics of this largely illegal population in Thailand.

By foreclosing politics to the exclusion of important but difficult and highly political questions such as legality, refugee status, labour exploitation, racism and citizenship, migrant health in Thailand was rendered but a technical problem for which a technical solution applies. The exclusion of sensitive political matter from their proposed intervention was a necessary condition for the intergovernmental WHO and IOM to
negotiate their entry into the field of migrant health in Thailand. Such a move not only enabled these organizations to work alongside and with the Ministry of Public Health in this situated matter of global circulation. Importantly, it also allowed the Ministry of Public Health, a government department, to work with the group of Burmese otherwise handled as legally aberrant (i.e., not generally qualified to receive public services) in Thailand. The Rendering migrant health technical, in which disparate datasets and expert knowledges, strategies and practices are assembled, saw the objectives of the Ministry of Public Health and the intergovernmental organizations converge.

This transnationalization of this particular Thai ministry was seen as necessary for taming the (global) circulation of pathogens said to originate in Thai migrant communities. The process of rendering migrant health a technical problem involved enframing the field of human security intervention ‘logically’. The conception of the project was organised around a logical framework, otherwise referred to as a logframe, now a standard requirement in applications to the HSF and widely used in the aid community (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005:1). This governmental thing, as mentioned in chapter two, is a project management tool that is considered in setting up a project (UNTFHS, 2008:9). Most importantly are the indicators which enable, it is argued, making more informed decisions throughout the process of a project (UNTFHS, 2008:9). In fact, as I have argued, the logframe is charged with political meaning. It sets the parameters of a project in no uncertain terms: objectives, namely in terms of method of intervention, targets, and outputs. As such, this thing called logframe obliges users, whether the project managers who design the project or field workers acting on it, to render a problem field in distinctly techno-scientific terms, i.e. in terms of mastering the pathogens.

The targets sites of the project were classed as high priority areas in two provinces in Thailand, namely Ranong and Samutsakorn. These Thai coastal provinces were argued to host large numbers of mostly Burmese migrant workers. Ranong is bordered to the west by Burma and the Indian Ocean. The town of Ranong is located opposite Kawthaung, Burma’s most southern town, from where most Burmese migrants in Ranong have entered Thailand. Many of those fleeing Burma since the pro-democracy protests in 1988 have remained in Ranong. They live in communities throughout the province (Archavanitkul, et al., 2000:14). Samutsakorn province is located just 50 kilometres south of Bangkok facing the Gulf of Thailand. It is recognised as the largest seafood producer in Thailand, employing a large number of registered and un-registered migrants in local fishing and fishing related businesses. Most migrants live within the urban area. Overall, approximately 9,500 migrants in each province were to be targeted directly through
“outreach, referral mobile medical clinics, and other healthcare services” (WHO, 2004). Approximately 20,000 additional migrants were to be targeted indirectly through health awareness campaigns. The target beneficiaries or target populations, understood as statistical cohorts, were considered “primarily employed in the sectors of seafood processing and fisheries, with others working as general labourers, sex workers, and agricultural labourers” (WHO, 2004). These migrant women and men and their dependents were to be targeted whatever their legal status in Thailand.

The main objective was loosely laid out in the proposal of the human security project: “To contribute to the improved Human Security of migrants in Ranong, Samutsakorn, and other provinces of Thailand, through enhancing their overall health standing” (WHO, 2004). For effective project management purposes, given the standard project life of three years, the ambitious human security objective to improve migrant health was rendered in solely technical terms. It was broken down into smaller and more manageable bits: activity clusters of sub-activities with sub-objectives, methodologies, outputs and timeframes involving extensive planning, data and information gathering, coordinating, supervising, training, campaigning, programming, and documenting (WHO, 2004). Buried under a string of technicalities, the politics of migrant health (be this donor politics, inter- and intra-organizational politics, immigration politics or gender politics) was mostly written out of the human security project.

Logframes, as I suggested in chapter two, are the epitome of a project management logic by which the demand to manage effectively establishes an exclusive claim to politics. As an inscription device, a logframe is the site where the complex health world of migrants and biopolitical subjectivities are written and contextualized in terms of the dichotomous logic of nature versus science and technology and body versus hygiene. It establishes an exclusive claim on a specific class of subjects, e.g. migrants (mostly Burmese and illegal in Ranong and Samutsakorn), on whom it writes forms of subjectivation in pursuit of managing pathogenic circulation. To experts of the WHO and IOM then, the migrant body presented a technical problem requiring effective public health management. This meant not only developing mechanisms such as training migrants to care for themselves, e.g. through hygiene, so that migrant health could be governed from afar. It meant also being able to account for all migrants (whatever their legal status), in terms of costing for (provincial, central) health budgets and monitoring disease trends in order to intervene in the regularities of migrant populations. Through the governmental thing of the logframe, human security presented in the space of a few paragraphs the migrant health assemblage
with a discreet problem, target population, evidence, strategies, methods, tools, funds, and solution.

MIGRANT COMMUNITY HEALTH WORKERS AND CARTOGRAPHIES OF THE SELF

Under the human security project, a network of dedicated Migrant Community Health Workers (MCHWs) and Migrant Community Health Volunteers (MCHVs) was established in the target provinces of Ranong and Samutsakorn under the steering of public health offices and IOM field personnel. The role of MCHWs in bringing migrant health under the primary control of the Thai government is substantial. They perform basic health services on targeted migrants. Secondly, they campaign for health awareness and behaviour change in targeted migrant communities. Thirdly, they observe disease trends in these migrant communities, standing in as pseudo disease surveillance officers. Finally, they conduct migrant community mapping, providing “informative evidence such as the location and distance between migrant communities and public health facilities” (Jitthai, 2009:35). The data recorded through social mapping exercises carried out by MCHWs is essential for feeding the computerised migrant health management system designed and programmed by the WHO in this project.

At least two thirds of MCHWs are Burmese. Importantly, these women and men are respected members of the migrant communities targeted for intervention under the human security project. They are informal practitioners such as traditional birth attendants, hospital translators, and health volunteers, recruited through existing networks by Public Health Offices (PHO) and IOM field offices. They speak Burmese and/or relevant languages/dialects and understand the cultural nuances of Burmese ways of life. Given the exclusionary political climate in which Burmese migrants navigate their lives in Thailand, MCHWs prove to be a valued resource for all parties involved. For targeted migrants, MCHWs are trusted healthcare providers. For public (health) authorities, MCHWs know and are able to penetrate targeted migrant communities in ways that public (health) authorities cannot. Indeed, MCHWs are employed by public health authorities with the funds of the donor, the Human Security Fund. Their (re-)training takes mainly two forms and is considered “an investment in the technical capacity” of targeted people. Firstly, MCHWs are trained in basic health knowledge. Secondly, MCHWs

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28 There are more than 10 languages/dialects among Burmese migrant communities in Thailand.
are trained in scientific methods such as survey data gathering for baseline surveys used later for the assessment of project impact. This is considered “a learning process in itself worthy of notice” (WHO, 2004).

While usually operating from public health centres or hospitals, “trained MCHWs,” clad in blue uniforms typical of Thai healthcare professionals, also administer community health posts in migrant communities, serving as “frontline service in target populations” (Jitthai, 2009:18). For example, some business owners and employers of migrants in Ranong and Samutsakorn have provided space in their workplaces to set up migrant health posts. Indeed, some MCHWs and MCHVs have offered a corner of their residence to be used as health corners (Jitthai, 2009:39). MCHWs also conduct home visits, following up patients to ensure treatment adherence. They perform medical translation during diagnosis and treatment as well as explain medication details in the appropriate native languages. Together with Migrant Community Health Volunteers (MCHVs), MCHWs are establishing an elaborate web of control points deep within migrant communities’, linking these to public (health) authorities aiming to manage migrant health. They are the “key catalysts for improving the reach” to migrant communities which they are able to do “more efficiently than public health personnel” (emphasis added, Jitthai, 2009:61).

MCHW posts within migrant communities are considered crucial to monitor communicable disease trends in migrant communities. Indeed, MCHWs are being integrated to District/Provincial Surveillance and Rapid Response Teams (SRRT). They have been drawn in by local health authorities to assist in outbreak assistance and control, supporting “government SRRT with translation services during the case tracing interviews” and “investigation measures such as rectal swab samples in suspected Cholera cases”. The state surveillance assemblage they helped set up is dispersed throughout targeted migrant communities. This assemblage functions as a disease trend monitoring system. Indeed, they are credited for the timely halt of the 2007 Cholera outbreak in Samutsakorn (Jitthai, 2009:58). It is in this sense that the head of the Migrant Health Unit at the Provincial Health Office in Ranong referred to MCHWs as small epidemiologists or out-break investigators.29 This strategy is being adopted by other organisations specializing in other aspects of migrant life. For example, in the case of avian flu, in the spirit of the governmental technology of the MCHW introduced by the IOM and WHO, the ILO recently pushed for Burmese migrant workers to “take on a greater role in detecting and stopping the spread of the deadly H5N1 virus” (Macan-Markar, 2009).

29 Interview with the head of Migrant Health Unit, Public Health Office Ranong (September 2008)
Following the Cholera event in Samutsakorn, when the *vibrio cholera* bacteria travelled through contaminated drinking water and food into migrant bodies, MCHWs “intensified health education efforts on Cholera, Diarrhea and sanitizing strategies” in the province (Jitthai, 2009:58). Indeed, they train in and campaign on a large scale on a number of health-related issues in targeted migrant communities. For example, the IEC material produced in Ranong included a bilingual version (Thai and local Burmese dialect) of the MOPH’s Maternal and Child Health Handbook which was distributed to migrant mothers to record growth and vaccination schedules of their children. At health centres in Ranong and Samutsakorn, bilingual posters remind Burmese migrants to wash their hands. MCHWs in Ranong also developed and delivered a bilingual puppet show to raise awareness about specific health issues. Using dramatization “to convey health messages and learning via entertainment” which is considered “an effective and popular strategy to internalize and disseminate” knowledge of health among migrant communities, according to the IOM (Jitthai, 2009:51).

Addressing the problem of migrant health in Thailand ‘effectively,’ however, is considered a two-pronged matter. Apart from the elaborate range of (self-)governing techniques involving MCHWs outlined above, including directing migrant health behaviour towards modes of *self-governing*, and erecting migrant-operated governmental assemblage of disease surveillance loosely bound and strategically dispersed in targeted communities, the human security intervention involved also developing public administrative information and service systems. In order for public health authorities to be able to act on migrant health in more than haphazard ways, it needed to be brought into the domain of government responsibility more determinedly. As will become clearer, this is a matter of finance, legality and politics, and technology. Foremost, provincial health offices lack the funds to provide health care to ‘non-registered irregular’ migrants that they are in the process of moving into their sphere of responsibility. They require a headcount to present to central authorities in order to get the allocation of government funds befitting the number of people for which they have assumed responsibility. The human security project introduced a system by which authorities were able to account for, that is, cost for unregistered, essentially illegal, migrants in (provincial and central) health budgets. In this way, sources of finance and decision-making centres were moved, and forms of control modified.

The public health management system introduced by the WHO, however, presupposes the availability of intimate details around migrants’ health. The kind of knowledge sought includes migrant movement, health and residence, the numbers of migrants and their
relations to one another, living conditions, and the types of disease circulating, medical history, immunisation and treatments received and so on. Given the aberrant status and therefore usually covert existence of migrants in Thailand, these details are notoriously difficult to come by. Indeed, “The scarcity of valid data to measure the health status of the migrant population in Thailand [poses] serious challenges in the effective planning of health programs (and policy-making) for migrants” (WHO, 2004). Here again, MCHWs prove valuable semi-public health officials. During their visits and consultations in migrant communities, MCHWs record information relating to migrants and their health situations in family health folders (Folder). Armed with these governmental things, MCHWs give an authoritative appearance as they enter the alleyways of Burmese migrant housings. Much like the MOPH’s Maternal and Child Health Handbook, with the Folder under their arm, MCHWs discipline migrants to confess their and their co-migrant health predicaments and histories as well as those of their co-migrants.

The visually impressive inscription device that is The Folder also disciplines the MCHW to take stock of health subjects. It bids trained MCHWs to map and characterise the health of co-migrants according to variables predetermined by public health systems standards of the Thai Ministry of Public Health and the WHO. MCHWs are trained by IOM field personnel in community or social mapping, a technique whereby they draw out the location of a migrant lacking an official address as depicted in the illustrated map below (figure 2). Social mapping is a visualisation tool, used to present information on neighbourhood layout, infrastructure, demography, ethno-linguistic groups, health pattern, wealth and other social issues. Indeed, these Folders were modelled on existing health folders for Thais. MCHWs map networks of co-residents, co-environments (access to safe water, cleanliness and so on), and health provider contact points within which the health of migrants is embedded.

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30 Although only part of this information is collected for the Thai population, prompting the argument that the migrant folder is more ‘advanced’ than the existing system for local Thais.
groups, health patterns, wealth and other social issues. MCHWs map networks of co-residents, co-environments (access to safe water, cleanliness, and so on) and health provider contact points. It is within these networks that the health of migrants in Thailand is to be found.

Figure 2: Map of location of one Burmese migrant in Ranong (September 2008) © Voelkner 2008
Figure 3: Filing cabinet for Thai (blue) and migrant family health folders (green) at a public health centre in Ranong (September 2008) © Voelkner 2008
Like Thai folders, migrants’ folders are filed in relevant public health centres, separated by colour from Thai family health folders (as shown in Figure 3), and are retrieved whenever the migrant visits the health centre or is visited by a MCHW. The separation between Thai (normal) and migrant (abnormal) folders filed away in large, open cabinets is to see when one enters the health centres. Although the agency of migrants – both MCHWs and the populations under their care – Thai health officers, and IOM and WHO officers in Thailand, Geneva and elsewhere is distributed in the tools (e.g. the Folder), colours (e.g. blue or green folders) and spaces (e.g. the location of the filing cabinet), in fact, as Bennett (Bennett, 2005:463) has suggested, human agency can only emerge by way of a distribution into these materialities.

The willingness to employ registered Burmese migrants as semi-legal subjects in the form of MCHWs, albeit with external funding, constitutes a significant alternate development in Thailand. Currently, there is no government policy which allows migrants from neighbouring countries to work as health workers. Migrants are only permitted to be “employed in unskilled or low-skilled work whereas health work is considered skilled work” (Jitthai, 2009:72). Moreover, there is no official MOPH national training curriculum and accreditation for MCHWs. The IOM noted after project completion that MCHWs (re)training has not been standardised at MOPH level (Jitthai, 2009:72). Nor has there been government budget allocation to these purposes. Nonetheless, local health authorities are willing to secure some budget in future by leveraging existing budget items in order to sustain MCHWs beyond WHO/IOM contributions.31

MCHWs indeed play a ‘catalytic role’ in “bridging the gaps between migrant populations and available public health services” (Jitthai, 2009:29). They make governing migrant health possible from afar while ensuring nonetheless the extension of the state in which ‘the state’ is by proxy ever-present in evasive migrant communities. They map the unmapped social that is the migrant populations targeted towards bringing to the fore and enabling intervention on the internal regularities of this population. MCHWs and the governmental things they employ such as the Folder are the supposed missing link between Burmese migrant communities, local and provincial offshoots of the MOPH, and global governmental organisations. As attracter and container of knowledge, however, the Folder is but one step in the chain linking together the various human and nonhuman elements including individual migrants, Thai state authorities, intergovernmental agencies, and a rationality of governing that is global in perspective.

31 Interview with heads of Ranong and Samutsakorn Migrant Health Units (September 2008)
THE MIGRANT HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEM AND THE DIGITIZATION OF MIGRANT HEALTH

In Ranong, the elaborate information recorded by MHCWs in Folders is logged by health personnel at local public health centres in an experimental computing system. This system collects and collates the information for “effective planning of health problems (and policy-making) for migrants” (WHO, 2004). While the MOPH had previously begun to develop such a Migrant Health Information System (MHIS), now with human security funds, it was possible to complete the development of a standardised system replicable in all provinces. The MHIS is to run parallel to the Thai Health Information System (HIS), intended eventually to be fused with the Thai HIS. Developing the MHIS is a “really difficult issue,” according to one WHO officer, “Not only [a] technical issue but in terms of capacity, coordination, and politically.” 32 Indeed, in Samutsakorn, the promotion of the MHIS is abound with tension and practical difficulties that are blamed on the absence of a political will to tackle the issue of migrant health and, interestingly, the built environment. Samutsakorn’s dense urban space had given rise to a central hospital that was managed through a central administrative system allegedly incapable of also running the MHIS.33

In Ranong, the information collected from migrant communities is brought back to local health centres, where it is uploaded to the new administrative software developed by the WHO. Health providers working at the health centres are trained by WHO personnel to input all the details of the Folders into the new database, as illustrated in Figure 3. The indicators by which the software computes migrant health include population (proportion of population by age and sex and district, crude birth rate), mortality, morbidity (acute and chronic diseases), nutrition and child health, insurance, service utilization, family planning (vaccination, contraception) and special disease surveillance (HIV). The computer that maintains the MHIS database and the Folder filing cabinet give the migrant health assemblage an almost physical presence in the room. The Burmese readily provide all of the required information because, first, the person asking is from their own community; second, they have indeed apparently benefited from better healthcare and services; and, third, they have experienced a change in attitude in terms of self-care and responsibility.

32 Interview with a WHO officer (September 2008)
33 Interview with a IOM field officer in Samutsakorn (September 2008)
towards oneself and one's community – for example, in relation to monitoring disease trends within the community.  

So far, it is their illegal or unrecognized political status which largely prevents migrants from entering the imaginary of public health administration in Thailand. Migrants do not officially figure in public (health) records and systems, even when out of necessity they must access health services. The system developed by the WHO, however, is designed to bring migrants, regardless of their legal status, into the domain of public health responsibility, rendering them governable through state authorities. As one Thai WHO official conceded, “If we want to achieve [...] health security, we need a good health

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34 According to interviews with Burmese health workers as well as members of NGOs, September 2008.
system”.\(^{35}\) Without this system, as the WHO/IOM penned proposal to the HSF read, “inefficiencies result and it is not possible to track health trends or compare data between different sites making it difficult to identify priority area” (WHO, 2004). Essentially, it is a *techno-(bio)political machine* served by state health authorities to facilitate the computation, statistical inference and decision-making regarding the regulation of the internal health dynamics of migrant populations in Thailand. Foucault termed this form of governing *biopolitics* which, in Ong’s words, refers to “the strategic uses of knowledges which invest bodies and populations with properties making them amenable to various technologies of control” (emphasis added, Ong, 1995:1243). Indeed, the unruly bodies of migrants are “recuperated through the language of numbers that allows these very bodies to be brought back, now counted and accounted, for the humdrum projects of [...] sanitation, education, welfare, and loyalty” (Appadurai, 1996:133).

Indeed, “when we talk about migrants in the health system, we have to divide them into categories. Then, [...] when it link[s] to the health determinants, we also can see what are their main health problems”.\(^{36}\) The properties invested in or (sub-) categories into which migrant and other aberrant populations are divided concern their (il)legal status in Thailand: 1) hill tribes (ethnic minorities) with identification cards (ID) beginning with ‘6,’ ‘7,’ and ‘8,’ the “ambivalent categories” (Toyota, 2007); 2) Registered migrants with IDs beginning with ‘0’; 2a) with work permit; 2b) without work permit; 3) Migrants without IDs; 3a) refugees; 3b) other; 4) nationally verified registered migrants from Laos and Cambodia; 5) Other (not mentioned above). Based on these migrant categories, the MHIS is said to be “capable of identifying, quantifying, and monitoring the health situation of migrants”. It is by quantifying the health of migrants and comparing these statistics to the ‘normal’ Thai population, its values and degree of ‘natural fluctuation’ that it becomes possible to infer whether or not the health of migrant populations is outlying or *abnormal*, therefore necessitating intervention to minimise statistical divergence. For example, in the HSF proposal, ‘irregular’ migrants are represented, by comparison to the local (and ‘normal’) population, suffering from higher morbidity, higher case fatality, and lower compliance with treatment for a range of health conditions, legitimating intervention in their health (WHO, 2004).

The governmental logic unfolding in the MHIS and MCHWs is at least twofold. On the one hand, migrants themselves in the form of MCHWs are recruited as semi-legal governmental subjects to make the health of their communities governable to public

\(^{35}\) Interview with a WHO officer (September 2008)

\(^{36}\) Interview with a WHO officer (September 2008)
health authorities as well as intergovernmental agencies. MCHWs do this not only by providing basic everyday health services and consolation. As campaigners, they promote voluntary behaviour change in terms of self-health care at the level of the individual as well as at the level of the population, e.g. the 20,000 additional migrants targeted through large-scale campaigns. As disease controllers, they are points of intervention into the regularities of migrant populations. As cartographers, MCHWs are making these communities legible to health interventions by drawing out maps of migrants and their health specificities that are convertible into indicators legible to biopolitical machines such as the MHIS. The MHIS is a machine served by public health authorities that is able to compute migrant health regularities now comparable to Thai health regularities. Intervention in the health of migrants takes the form of normalizing techniques unfolding in the activities of MCHWs. Regardless of their official political status in Thailand, as a result of the governmental strategies deployed through human security that are the MCHW and MHIS, Burmese migrants previously excluded from matters of public health administration now gradually come to be included in significant ways in Thai public health policy and administration in Thailand.

**CONCLUSION**

Human security emerges as a situated political strategy to manage pathogenic circulation in Thailand through the intricate and productive interplay of a range of human and nonhuman elements that form a multiplicity of alliances with each other. However, in spite of the constitutive power of both humans and nonhumans in producing the assemblage, it is represented by IOM-WHO only in terms of human intentions, activities, and techno-science ingenuity that are to bring pathogenic circulation under control. Indeed, the techno-(bio)political mechanisms enframe, depoliticize, order, authorise knowledge in, and align the complex health world of Burmese migrants in terms of simple dichotomies of ‘unruly’ nature (pathogens, diseases, bodies) versus human technologies (scientific evidence, technological innovations, managerial effectiveness), rendering migrant health manageable. Tensions, contradictions, and practical difficulties in techno-(bio)political encounters arising from the productive interplay inherent to the Assemblage are explained away in terms of the mystique of the unruly ‘nature’. Nonetheless, they attest to the productive power of human-nonhuman alliances in the manufacture of political decisions and subjectivities. Moreover, they remind, by following trajectories of their
dynamism, for example when a virus mutates, the contingent and therefore precarious nature of human intentions and strategies encapsulated in initiatives like human security.

Human security is given concrete form through, amongst others, the Burmese migrant bodies and migrant behaviour, the pathogens, and the governmental things that are the logframe, and the Folder, filing cabinet, the information systems software and the personal computer stationed at the public health centres, which make possible the unfolding of the governmental logic of human security. Some of these objects are developed elsewhere and dropped by the circuits of global human security governance. Some are readjusted from existing repertoires and habits; they are accretions, bricolages (Li, 2007:265). They allow the health of Burmese migrants in Thailand to be rendered governable by mapping this unmapped population and by digitizing and *informationalizing their life* (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009) through which they are given properties and intervention into the regularities of their health/life dynamics becomes possible. As actants, these things are not so much social constructions as elements with constitutive power bearing in equally important ways upon the lives of Burmese migrants and MCHWs, Thai public health officials, WHO and IOM officials as well as the ‘gigantic, complex whole’ that is the migrant health assemblage. They make demands on the human agents (discipline, visualize, translate, delimit, obstruct) but these demands only come alive by way of a distribution into the material objects that help to shape the assemblage (e.g. Bennett, 2005).

In the struggle to manage pathogenic circulation, human security has transformed the issue of migrant health into a technical matter concerned with the (self-) management of bodies and the governmentalization and transnationalization of the Thai state to the exclusion of important but difficult questions concerning a violent politics of exclusion. The biopolitical subjectivity produced out of human security to manage pathogenic circulation embodied in the MCHWs and MCHVs is concentrated mainly in Ranong and Samutsakorn provinces where the human security intervention took place. Thus, since migrants live throughout Thailand, the governmental power unfolding through human security is momentarily unevenly distributed in the migrant health assemblage. The immersion of the Thai state into the transnational assemblage opened the possibility to imagine managing the health of displaced persons from Burma in spite of their illegal status and evasiveness in Thailand. Not only could the state materialise deep in migrant communities through the work of the MCHWs and their tools, it could also, through the work of the MHIS, calculate the (ir)regularities of migrant health in order to decide points of intervention. These developments fundamentally challenge, disrupt even, some Agamben scholars’ interpretation of migration life in Thailand as *bare life* (Rajaram and
Grundy-Warr, 2004, Tangseefa, 2006), under which the majority of migrants must navigate their life. If, as these scholars hold, the discourse of migrants in Thailand functions as the boundary-producing discourse instrumental to the task of statecraft, then the inclusion of the health of migrants into public health policy making can be understood as a mutation in Thai statecraft. Ong’s argument that we are moving beyond the citizenship-versus-statelessness model in “an ever-shifting landscape shaped by the flows of markets, technologies, and populations” is instructive here (Ong, 2006:499).

To be sure, however, the Thai state is not a ‘governance state,’ where “the international community exerts a good deal of control and oversight over the core economic, environmental and welfare functions of the state, that is, its core biopolitical functions” (Duffield, 2007:82). On the contrary, its absorption into the transnational Migrant Health assemblage need not be understood as an act of relinquishing to the international community control and oversight over its core biopolitical functions but a move by Thai authorities to extend control over ungoverned populations within Thai territory. Indeed, these mutations in statecraft can be read as indicative of the inherent flexibility of statecraft in global politics (Ong, 1999:214).

These small mutations in statecraft are fundamental to human security’s struggle for governmental management of global circulation. Migrant health in Thailand presents a situated example of circulation to be managed. On the one hand, the migrant body is desired for her labour, the circulation of which is to be encouraged. On the other hand, her body is a ‘menace’ insofar as it is constituted as a carrier of disease and illegalities, the circulation of which is to be contained or eliminated. The way human security resolves this dilemma is by bringing Burmese migrants not under sovereign but under governmental control. What is at stake in these governmental strategies is not the extension of sovereign power over territory, expressed in draconian border regulation practices, but a governmental concern for circulation. This concern, bound up as it is with and formative of the migrant health assemblage, is contributing to the extension and transnationalization of the already governmental Thai state. In a small measure, though only concentrated in the Ranong site, human security's political ambition of assembling a ‘global alliance’ and reassembling the link between ‘individuals [legal or illegal] and the state – and the state with a global world’ had been achieved (CHS, 2003:4).
"Marriage brokers charged with human trafficking" and "Four jailed for sale of young 'brides'" read two headlines published in December, 2009, in Vietnam's major and government-controlled daily English newspaper, the Viet Nam News (Viet Nam News, 2009, 2009). Three women and one man were arrested the year before "as they tried to get three women aboard a plane at [Ho Chi Minh City's] Airport" (Viet Nam News, 2009). They were reported to have "trafficked more than 400 young women" from Tay Ninh – the Vietnamese province bordering Cambodia – and other Mekong provinces to Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan to be "sold as brides" (Viet Nam News, 2009). According to the police in Tay Ninh, they were using "a matchmaking service as a front for a human trafficking scheme" (Viet Nam News, 2009). The alleged main players Yen and Phong were accused of keeping a house in Ho Chi Minh City "to select good-looking young women as 'mail-order' brides". Yen was said to have trained 'would-be brides' in foreign languages before they were sent abroad. Yen and Phong paid VND2 million (approx. USD 108 as per 07.01.2010) for each "victim" and sold the 'brides' for USD1,000 (Viet Nam News, 2009). This alleged case of 'human trafficking' is but one of a range of cases and related issues published in the same newspaper between 2008 and 2009 alone. Indeed, a quick search of the term 'human trafficking' in articles published online by the government-controlled newspaper yields a range of horrific cases. Apart from the trafficking of 'brides,' the paper reported on the trafficking of "unborn" children (2008), infant/child trafficking for the international adoption market, sexual exploitation, and trafficking in human organs (Viet Nam News, 2008, 2008, 2008, 2008).

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37 Viet Nam News began circulation in 1991, five years after the initiation of Đổi mới or ‘renewal,’ the government policy geared towards free-market reform and the integration of Vietnam into the global economy. See http://www.vietnamnews.com.vn/AboutUs.htm

In global trafficking parlance, Vietnam is considered a source country for men, women, and children trafficked for forced labour and prostitution (Secretary of State, 2009). They are believed to be trafficked to various destinations within and outside Vietnam. Circuits of human trafficking operate across the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) comprising Vietnam, Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, and beyond. These circuits cut across flows of people migrating through formal and informal networks across Southeast Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. For example, some Burmese migrants in Thailand, the subject of the last chapter, are thought to have been smuggled and/or trafficked to Thailand. ‘Human trafficking’ is considered a global problem insofar as it is regarded as a transnational criminal activity operating across borders around the world. Over the last two decades, it has given rise to a global anti-trafficking machinery formed of, and by, different alliances with distinct problematizations and problem-solving activities. Here, I focus on the problematization of human trafficking through labour exploitation and human security in relation to Vietnam. Specifically, I investigate the ILO-IPEC project to prevent human trafficking in Vietnam that was framed in terms of human security.

This chapter offers a snapshot of the way human security is emerging as a situated political strategy in the human trafficking assemblage in Vietnam. The chapter is based on research carried out in late 2008 in Phung Hiep Commune and Vi Thanh Town in Hau Giang Province in the Mekong Delta, in Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, as well as Bangkok, Thailand. The chapter draws mainly on interviews with persons from communities targeted under human security and relevant officials of Vietnamese and international governmental and non-governmental and other private organizations. It also draws on publicly available documents and documents made available to me during the course of my research. Whether understood as sexual or labour exploitation, the notion of human trafficking is a highly sensitive political matter in socialist Vietnam. Research into this area remains highly controlled. Access to communities is restricted, especially for foreign researchers. Moreover, those interviewed are careful about information they are willing to share. How does the biopolitical strategy of human security fare in this political environment? How is the prevention of human trafficking in Vietnam assembled?

39 Acts of smuggling and trafficking are difficult to distinguish. Differences are subtle. Indeed, smuggling and trafficking may overlap. Unlike smuggling, however, which is considered “a criminal commercial transaction between two willing parties who go their separate ways once their business is complete,” trafficking specifically “targets the trafficked person as an object of criminal exploitation. The purpose from the beginning of the trafficking enterprise is to profit from the exploitation of the victim. It follows that fraud, force or coercion all plays a major role in trafficking.” http://www.state.gov/m/ds/hstcenter/90434.htm (accessed 14.10.2010)

40 Interview with ILO field officer in Ranong, Thailand (September 2008)
Accordingly, I trace the emergence of human security as a situated political strategy for managing illicit circulation relating to the trafficking of women and children in and beyond Vietnam. Specifically, as I have done in relation to the migrant health assemblage in Thailand, the chapter focuses on the dynamism between the human and nonhuman elements that helped to bring forth and shape the vernacular micropolitics of human security in this site of practice. Much like in Thailand, this involved a multiplicity of forces including market, social, international, governing, viral and chemical forces which mutually interacted, helping to shape the emergence of the assemblage. Here too, biopolitical mechanisms were developed to prevent the occurrence of human trafficking. The complex world of Vietnamese women and child migrants was enframed, ordered and depoliticized in terms of simple dichotomies in which the 'unruly' life of those earmarked as at risk of human trafficking is contrasted with human techno-scientific ingenuity. In so doing, these mechanisms attempted to arrange the elements of the assemblage in such a way that the illicit circulation of women and children could be made amenable to biopolitical governance. Yet, in contrast to the Thai migrant health assemblage, the intervention was at first resisted by the Vietnamese state authorities. Moreover, the conditions of possibility for the successful enactment of biopolitics were found wanting: Vietnam did not operate according to the form of cosmological realism underpinning the knowledge practices of human security (Grayson, 2008). Finally, and partly in relation to this, central elements critical to the rearrangement of the assemblage either escaped or were discarded from the assemblage. Consequently, the assemblage clashed and, following a creative readjustment, hybridized with the situated precepts of 'social evil'.

**SOCIAL EVIL AS EMERGING ASSEMBLAGE**

Vietnam is on the move. Leaving behind high unemployment and poverty-ridden conditions of life, Vietnamese men, women, and children are on the move from rural areas to urban centres and from Vietnam across borders to neighbouring and distant countries in search of better opportunities. Their journeys and destinations are often beset by difficulties. They may opt to travel via formal channels (for example, labour export channels run by predominantly state-affiliated and private labour export companies), but subsequently end up in unsafe and exploitative working conditions (UNFPA, 2006). They

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41 In the 1980s, the Vietnamese government opened up the country to the member countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries such as the former East Germany, the Czech
may opt to travel via unofficial, informal networks and recruitment channels to evade restrictive immigration policies and tight border controls (O'Connell Davidson, 2008:9). They may incur debt in order to finance these journeys or to pay agents and brokers but subsequently find themselves in relations of debt bondage (Marshall, 2001). They may wed foreign men in the hope of security but end in the prostitution of their bodies or become domestic helpers in foreign countries such as in the epigraph above. They may have been made to believe they will obtain lucrative jobs only to find themselves with little or no pay, excessive working hours (Marshall, 2001), and performing sex work. As a young middle class Vietnamese lady\(^\text{42}\) in Ho Chi Minh City quietly recounts:

> My aunt borrowed money to pay for her daughter to go to Cambodia to find work. The girl was brought to a 'cave' [a brothel in colloquial understanding], where she could not get away for several years. We had no contact with her. Eventually, she escaped and returned to Ho Chi Minh City. She is now in Thailand working.

Experiences of exploitation "may not even be seen as such by the ‘victim,’ who may see themselves as being nonetheless better off than if they had stayed at home" (Marshall, 2001, see also Nguyen-vo, 2008).

Many of the mobilities within and out of Vietnam today are the effect of Đổi Mới, the path breaking governmental policy of market reform and the integration of the country into the global economy and polity.\(^\text{43}\) Đổi Mới has had an enormous impact on Hộ Khẩu, the household registration system introduced in 1954. Registration to the system involved gaining "access to rights, employment and services such as the distributions of rations and essential commodities" (Scott et al., 2006). The Vietnamese government used the system as a tool of regional planning which not only served to spatially enclose residents within Vietnamese provinces but also to police provincial borders in order to curtail massive southward migration following the partition of the country.\(^\text{44}\) Travelling within Vietnam henceforth required governmental permission. The development of private enterprises in

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\(^\text{42}\) Interview with Chinese-Vietnamese professional in her twenties, Ho Chi Minh City, October 2008

\(^\text{43}\) In 1986, ten years after the Vietnam War and the country's reunification under communist rule, the Vietnamese socialist government launched Đổi mới, literally 'renovation'. Over the next two decades, the government's renovation commitment to free market reforms involved a twofold process: state-owned enterprises opened up to market competition, on the other hand, though imbued with deep-seated suspicions of foreign elements owing to its turbulent recent history, Vietnam opened up to the global economy and polity (cf. Dixon and Kilgour, 2002).

\(^\text{44}\) The Geneva Conference in 1954 produced the Geneva Accords which saw the division of Vietnam into communist North and South Vietnam.
the reform period, however, “created a labour market which broke the tie between permanent residence and employment” (Scott, et al., 2006:22). The relaxation of Hồ Khâu has significantly increased mobility within and out of Vietnam.

Indeed, as Anh et al argue, “The increasing commercialisation of labour with capital inputs has been of major significance in releasing the rural workforce and prompting them to leave rural areas” (Anh et al., 2003). “The growth in labour intensive garment, shoe and other factories” (Scott, et al., 2006:21) as well as a flourishing pleasure industry developing in tandem with emerging market forces provided women with greater incentives and opportunities to live and work in urban centres. In Ironies of Freedom: Sex, Culture, and Neoliberal Governance in Vietnam, Nguyen-vo makes the compelling argument that the informal ‘hooking economy’ that emerged in the wake of the scramble for profit-making business opportunities gave rise to a booming pleasure industry. Entrepreneurs from the three sectors – state, private, and/or foreign – ‘hook up’ at Bia Ôm establishments, literally “hugging beer” venues, where business deals are agreed over food and sexual entertainment. Since the late 1990s, the problem of (growing) prostitution in Vietnam has been linked to a growing problem of HIV transmission. This viral force has led the government to utilise, among others, public health measures to address prostitution (Nguyen-vo, 2008).

Primarily, however, the Vietnamese government has responded to increases in drug abuse, prostitution and trafficking for sexual exploitation, and HIV/AIDS in contemporary Vietnam by framing these social issues in the language of social evils and linking them to the ‘downside’ of Đổi Mới. The language of social evils renders these issues a problem of morality affecting traditional Vietnamese culture and social order. Trafficking, according to the Vietnamese government, is the result of “the open-door policy, the change of economic management, the process of urbanization and the increasing exchanges with other countries, particularly with countries in the region” (Derks, 2000:46). In 1995, the government called for the “insertion of ‘order and moral principles into cultural activities according to our cultural content’ to “eliminate social evils” (as quoted in Nguyen-vo, 2008).

45 Comparing life in Vietnam to the USA, Linh Dinh writes in the Literary Review: “A typical bia om has private rooms where a group of buddies can sit on a couch in front of a big screen TV to warble their favorite hits and oldies. Each man has a hostess to help him ease a tune along. A case of beer sits on the floor. [...] There are also ‘bida om’ (billiards and a hug) and ‘hot toc om’ (a haircut and a hug). An 18-year-old girl in my neighborhood decided she wanted to work at a hot toc om. She assumed, innocently enough, that all she had to do was rub her breasts against a man’s whiskers as she gave him a haircut. She was required to do more than that and was fired after four days. ‘he place had six chairs. Three of these guys had their things out. One guy had two girls all over him. I was supposed to eat ice cream,’ she giggled. ‘And everyone was in the same room?’ ‘Yes.’” Dinh, Linh. (2002) Eight Postcards from Vietnam. Literary Review 45:812-22.
Vietnam was “to build a ‘progressive culture deeply colored with national characteristics’ by cracking down on the dissemination of ‘decadent, poisonous cultural products’ and the three social evils” (as quoted in Nguyen-vo, 2008:45). In the scheme of social evils, the source for “increasing drug dealing, prostitution, smuggling, and other criminal activities” is interpreted as a consequence of foreign influences and the concomitant corruption of traditional Vietnamese values (Dixon and Kilgour, 2002:604).

Consequently, social evils have been dealt with by intensifying propaganda about Vietnamese traditions, virtues, and moral mores, resulting in the stigmatization of those having experienced trafficking. The Vietnamese family unit plays a central role in this campaign, standing in as moral arbiter: “families may ‘turn a blind eye’ to the realities of the experiences of trafficked daughters or express shame towards daughters who have engaged in the ‘social evil’ of sex work, albeit against their will, in destination countries” (Vijeyarasa, 2010:S90). Yet, Vietnamese cultural values including filial piety, a central Confucian tenet, impose family obligations on girls, creating a desire to migrate, even if by unsafe and irregular ways, in order to be able to support the family through home remittances. In the end, the welfare of the family is an important factor in the decision to migrate within and/or out of Vietnam (Busza, 2004). It is in this sense that the effect of the language of social evils has been argued to have led to the criminalisation of those otherwise considered, under the global standards of human trafficking, victims of human trafficking (Vijeyarasa, 2010).

Considering the increasing exchanges with other countries, particularly with countries in the region, Vietnam now lies at the crossroads of regional and global circuits of human trafficking. According to the influential US-published Trafficking in Persons Report of 2010, Vietnamese men, women and children are trafficked to neighbouring countries (Cambodia, Thailand, and People’s Republic of China-PRC), to other parts of Southeast Asia (Malaysia and Indonesia), East Asia (Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan), Europe (Czech Republic, Russia, United Kingdom), and the Middle East (United States Department of State, 2010). In dealing with the social evil, from mid 1990s onwards, the Vietnamese government has drawn heavily on the technical support and expertise of both national and ‘foreign elements’ such as international organizations. In 1997, the Socialist Republic issued a directive calling for “a closer cooperation between government agencies, mass organizations as well as international and non-governmental organizations” as this relates to dealing with this social evil (Derks, 2000:46). In the end, the government’s

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46 The annual “Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in Persons Report” is submitted by the US Secretary of State to Congress.
decision to invite ‘foreign elements’ to resolve the problem of trafficking in and from Vietnam is linked with its open-door policy to promote Vietnam as a serious player on the world state. As such, it bowed to political pressures from the regional association ASEAN and other international organizations as well as to pressures arising from its bid for membership to the WTO.47

In the mid 1990s, both the Department of Social Evils Prevention (DoSEP) under the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA), and the mass organization the Vietnamese Women’s Union (VWU), in cooperation with international organizations, began developing tentative initiatives to eliminate the social evil of trafficking. In 1997, the VWU developed a Plan of Action on the prevention of trafficking in women and children. The Plan involved amongst other things the dissemination of information and education, research, and community-based prevention schemes in coordination with agencies and organizations in different localities, regional and international cooperation. Indeed, the human security project discussed below was implemented with the VWU as the primary local partner. Moreover, in 1999, in collaboration with the IOM, the VWU developed a national counter-trafficking campaign which included door-to-door campaigns, public meetings and performances, and training of journalists (Derks, 2000:47). Since this time, human trafficking has been seen officially as “a problem related to illegal migration and prostitution” (Derks, 2000:46).

The emergence of social evil as a political strategy arose out of the interactions between human and nonhuman elements comprising, amongst others, women and children, desires, agents, economic imperatives, HIV/AIDS, filial duties, forced marriages, Đổ Mới, make-up, Mekong river flows, foreign elements, Vietnamese virtue, politicians, border controls, the materiality of bodies, bars, drugs, and sex. The introduction of international organizations to govern the problem of the purchase and sale of women and children led the social evil assemblage to vacillate and undermine itself. Indeed, confidence in the governance of social evils was beginning to wane as foreign institutions were invited to rearrange the assemblage.

47 Vietnam became the WTO’s 150th member on 11 January 2007.
FROM SOCIAL EVIL TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING

In fact, it is only after the Vietnamese government invited international organizations to support its battle with human trafficking in the mid 1990s that human trafficking ‘came’ to Vietnam, insofar as the country was only then, through its promotion by international agencies, introduced to the concept and problem of human trafficking specific to Vietnam. It is in this sense that an IOM officer based in Vietnam exclaimed: “The name trafficking was given; the problem was created. Did the problem exist before the term came into use, who knows?!”. This is not to say that the acquisition, forceful movement, and exploitation of people did not exist prior to ‘human trafficking,’ or indeed to social evils. Indeed, celebrated Vietnamese poet Nguyễn Du (1765-1820) wrote two centuries earlier, at the turn of the eighteenth century, in the now epic poem *The Kim Van Kieu*: “And now the girl must meet that capital account... ‘Desist!’—she cries, ‘and in their place take me for bounty to be sold!” (Nguyễn, 2004:34).

Rather, as one ILO officer based in Bangkok at the ILO Subregional Office for East Asia insightfully contends:

people say trafficking is on the rise, and now it's a big issue [...]. I mean, isn’t it just because we are able to see it now, we have trained ourselves to see it. I mean, I think there [was] a lot of things that we could define as trafficking like 100, 200, 300 years ago [...]. But it was not called ‘worst forms of child labour according to convention one and two’, it was not called trafficking and Palermo Protocol. So, it’s because we have identified things differently, so we changed.

The term human trafficking is said to have first emerged from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). According to the UNODC, human trafficking is “the acquisition of people by improper means such as force, fraud or deception, with the aim of exploiting them”. Much like the emerging global migrant health assemblage, the global anti-human

48 Interview with an IOM officer, Ho Chi Minh City, October 2008
50 Interview with an ILO officer, Bangkok, September 2008
51 Human trafficking is, according to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, or deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of giving or receiving payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
trafficking machinery, constitutive of actors, institutions and alliances, of problematizations, reflections and analyses, of strategies, standards and practices, of tools and devices as well as expert jargon, has given rise to an array of biopolitical activities seeking to normalize what it considers ‘irregular’ transnational mobility. Indeed, the reality constituted in and through the processes of human trafficking governance is distinct from the Vietnamese reality constituted by the governance of social evils. Since the working practices of the social evils approach of Vietnamese state officials and institutions are markedly different from the biopolitical practices to ‘combat human trafficking’ propagated by IGOs and other transnational organizations, much of the latter’s efforts in Vietnam have concentrated on authorizing and disseminating expert knowledges about governing human trafficking as well as taking minuscule steps in training Vietnamese officials in the situated management of the global battle against human trafficking. Specifically, as I demonstrate below, this has involved attempts to authorize knowledges and align the desires and needs of those considered at risk of trafficking as well as Vietnamese state officials and institutions with the strategic imperatives of the ‘global’ anti-trafficking machinery. The encounter between governing through ‘social evil’ and the governance of human security is in fact causing the social evil assemblage to vacillate, leading to the gradual hybridization of governing the issue of migrant deceit and exploitation in and from Vietnam.

At the turn of the millennium, Vietnam drew mainly on three expert intergovernmental organizations operating across the Greater Mekong Subregion on the ‘technical’ issue of human trafficking. Most influential in this respect has been the IOM which has been active in Vietnam since the late 1980s. The IOM’s promotion of the management of migration flows within the Mekong subregion has been the precursor for more extensive collaboration between the five countries in the subregion. The IOM continues to promote a system of migration management which it argues not only is an organizational tool to “help governments and civil society focus on the complexities of the growing migration portfolio” (IOM, 2010). It is also handled as a framework for public discussion which “offers principles for managing migration in an orderly way and for controlling irregular migration” (see also IOM, 2010, Oelgemoeller, 2011, 2010). The IOM has been instrumental in developing the growing, scientifically verifiable, human trafficking portfolio and, importantly, in identifying emergent properties such as ‘at-risk of trafficking’ and victims of trafficking in/from Vietnam as well as elsewhere. It recently supported MOLISA in developing guidelines in ‘victim identification’ and has proposed

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conducting formative research to “investigate the reality of trafficking of persons in Vietnam, including its potential link with labor exploitation” as well as to develop a comprehensive database of migrant profiles in order to support “policy makers, government implementers, destination countries and migrants” in managing (irregular) migration (IOM - Mission in Vietnam, 2008).

Secondly, the United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP) was established in 2000 to facilitate a stronger and more coordinated response to trafficking in the GMS and beyond. It aims to pool the expertise and efforts of several UN agencies including the IOM, ILO, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). UNIAP is managed by a regional office in Bangkok, with country project offices in the capitals of Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Burma, Thailand and Vietnam. Its core function is to coordinate the policy and operational response to human trafficking within the Sub-region in collaboration with GMS governments at different levels, local NGOs, UN agencies and IN(N)GOS including Save the Children, Oxfam, and World Vision. Through the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking (COMMIT), it aims to support governments in the institutionalisation of approaches to combat human trafficking. Through the Strategic Information Response Network (SIREN), it aims to deliver comprehensive data and analysis on cutting edge issues within the global anti-trafficking machinery, especially as this relates to the GMS. By the time of my visit to the region in 2008, the UNIAP had managed to span a web of collaboration on combating human trafficking anchored at key country nodal points, bringing together senior government officials including police, border guards, women’s organizations, NGO and IGO officials, of five GMS countries across the GMS.

Finally, together with the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), the International Labour Organization (ILO) was engaged in the region from 2000-08 implementing a USD 20m UK Department for International Development (DFID)-funded project entitled The Mekong Sub-regional Project to Combat Trafficking in Children and Women (TICW) involving five countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and China). Over the eight-year period, the DFID-funded TICW sought to ‘combat human trafficking’ as a regional labour phenomenon. The HSF-funded human security project that is the subject of this chapter constituted a small component of the larger DFID project and was implemented in two countries only, namely Vietnam and Cambodia. The overarching aims of TICW were to develop national frameworks, structures, policies and processes to
address human trafficking in each of the targeted countries (phase II); to establish a transnational governmental network across the region to share information (phase II); and to facilitate the mainstreaming of ‘good practices’ in ‘community-based prevention’ initiatives by governments (phase I). Similar ‘combat’ strategies were adopted in all targeted countries in the region.

What is striking about the constitutive work of all three IGOs is the intricate governmental web that they are spinning across the GMS to combat human trafficking, relying on a reality of human trafficking manufactured out of knowledges and frames of thinking which take for granted the value of scientific truth. In the process, the human trafficking assemblage in Vietnam is extended across nominal scales from the ‘local’ to the ‘global’ level, linking the women and children deemed ‘at risk of trafficking’ with government officials and institutions at the ‘local,’ ‘provincial,’ and ‘national’ level with I(N)GOs operating at the ‘regional’ and ‘global’ level.

Trafficking remains a “sensitive issue to be addressed with care” – until recently, for example, men were not recognized as ‘victims’ of trafficking. Following the development of haphazard policies and resolutions which formed part of a national policy to “address and prevent trafficking and prostitution of women and children” in the 1990s (Derks, 2000:46), by 2003, a change could be registered in the governing ethos of the Vietnamese government towards a more realist representation of society reflecting emerging market, social and governing forces. The ‘propatainment’ movie Bar Girls was released as part of “a new wave of Vietnamese state-sanctioned cinema that mixes sensational story lines with the Communist Party’s campaign against ‘social evils’” (Johnson, 2003). As Nguyen-vo has argued, “An emerging commercial popular culture in Vietnam now takes over some of the production of ideology in its response to [market forces emerging in Vietnam since the open-doors policy] through its representation of society in a self-proclaimed social realism” (Nguyen-vo, 2008:215). The movie is set in the nightclubs and slums of Ho Chi Minh City and follows Hoa, a heroin-addicted rich girl working as a prostitute in nightclubs


52 The Trafficking in Persons Report 2008 reported of 200 Vietnamese men and women recruited by Vietnamese state-run labour agencies for work in apparel factories in Jordan who were allegedly “subjected to conditions of fraudulent recruitment, debt bondage, unlawful confiscation of travel documents, confinement, and manipulation of employment terms for the purpose of forced labor at their worksite”. When workers began to strike and clashed with Jordanian police, they are said to have faced threats of retaliation by Vietnamese government officials and employment agency representatives. According to the Trafficking in Persons Report, “There were no reported efforts by the Vietnamese government to consider any of the repatriated workers as possible victims of trafficking”. United States Department of State, The. (2008) Trafficking in Persons Report 2008.
to satisfy her addiction, and Hanh, a gentle character who hopes for a better life, to their dramatic end. In the first few months of its screening, Bar Girls took in USD 1m, becoming "Vietnam's highest-grossing film ever". As the deputy director of the government’s Cinematography Department, Nguyen Thi Hong Ngat, noted: "We need more skilful, subtle propaganda. [...] More like Hollywood films" (Johnson, 2003). What is interesting in this development is the gradual shift towards a social realist stance in relation to the sex and trafficking industry in Vietnam.

In 2004, the Vietnamese government issued an Approval of the National Plan of Action against Crime of Trafficking in Children and Women during the period of 2004-2010 (Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem, 2004). Though the plan continued to use the language of social evils and social cohesion: trafficking, it argued, is an “urgent and pressing problem, badly affecting the society, customs, tradition, social morals and Government laws, destroying family happiness, increasing the risks of HIV/AIDS transmission and resulting in potential impacts on national and social security” (Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem, 2004). The Plan set out a four point programme to combat trafficking of women and children: firstly, "education and communication in the community on prevention"; secondly, criminal investigation; thirdly, reintegration of 'victims of trafficking'; and finally, developing and strengthening the legal framework (Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem, 2004). A governmental agency was appointed to lead each program point. Given its mandate and experience, the VWU was put in charge of prevention. Under the Prime Minister's Decree 69 relating to marriage and family relations with 'foreign elements,' steps were taken to protect Vietnamese women from deceit or trafficked circumstances in brokered marriages including increased due diligence in issuing marriage certificates and ensuring that the marriage is voluntary. For example, the VWU began a programme in collaboration with the South Korean Women's Union to set up pre-marriage counselling centres and hotlines in key source areas of Vietnam.

In sum, Vietnam is indeed on the move. Considered a major ‘supplier’ in men, women, and children to global circuits of human trafficking, Vietnam has joined the quest to contain and normalise this form of ‘irregular’ transnational mobility. As the governance of social evil gradually is brought into and formative of the governance of human trafficking in Vietnam, it is also gradually transforming into the technical problem of human trafficking. The reality created by the campaign against social evil gradually is being replaced by the reality of ‘human trafficking’ in which the techno-scientific and managerial objects and ‘rituals of truth’ need first to be learned. Through their technical training in managing the problem of trafficking (beginning with their participation in the designing, planning, and
project managing process) Vietnamese state officials are re-conceptualizing the object of governance as knowable only through expert knowledge. As to the men, women, and children who may or may not be trafficked, they are subject to a range of governmental ‘good practices’ to combat human trafficking. What this involves specifically is discussed below in relation to the ILO-IPEC human security project to prevent women and children from trafficking.

As with the human security project to improve health conditions of Burmese migrants in Thailand discussed in the last chapter, the human security project in Vietnam emerged from and was formative of the Vietnamese human trafficking assemblage. The human security project, entitled Prevention of Trafficking in Children and Women at a Community-Level in Cambodia and Vietnam, was an integrated part of the already running ILO-IPEC Mekong Sub-regional Project to Combat Trafficking in Children and Women (TICW). With additional funding of approximately USD 1.2m from the Government of Japan through the UN’s HSF, ILO was able to extend over a three-year period (2003-06) ‘community-based prevention’ activities in two countries, namely Vietnam and Cambodia. In this sense, human security slipped into an already established field of governmental practices and problem spaces to which it related in terms of ‘logical’ reinforcement. As with the Burmese migrants in Thailand, the practices employed in this human security project are bound up with a range of intergovernmental and transnational nongovernmental activities that are subject to mandates, expertise, standard procedures, funding conditions, and last but not least the material things including artefacts, devices, and the bodies of ‘at risk of trafficking’ women and children. As such, this chapter is concerned with the micropolitics of the Vietnamese component of the human security project, taking into account also the circumstantial and historical origins of the human trafficking assemblage as presented above. Specifically, I am interested in the order of governance and associated political subjectivities that are emerging in relation to controlling ‘irregular’ mobility in and from Vietnam as conceived through the lens of human security.

The concept of human security, noted in late 2008 Tan, the then deputy director of the Institute for International Relations, Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is “not popular in Vietnam”. Though the American Asia Foundation helped organize the first workshop on human security in Vietnam in mid 2008 at the University of Ho Chi Minh

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human security remains an imported concept with little substantial traction in the country, he argued. In Vietnamese policy, there is virtually no mention of human security. However, in Tan’s view, the Vietnamese notion of social security is equivalent to the broad understanding of human security promoted by the UN. Indeed, he pointed out, “social evils disrupt social security”. In this sense, human security in Vietnam falls within the realm of community rather than individualistic society. In his terms, human security refers to community security. In this perspective, “The state has the largest role to protect individuals”. Moreover, “The state is still the centre”. MOLISA stands for the “Protection of human securities”.

**FRAMING LOGICALLY AND LOGICAL PARTICIPATION**

Human security entered the emerging human trafficking assemblage, as with the migrant health assemblage, loaded with an entourage of actants and forces. Recalling the epigraph to chapter 3 above, the Vietnamese project comprised from the outset emails, devices such as computers, the internet, offices, institutions, and management tools such as the logframe, capital, pixels, digits, and the river Mekong which extended across scales, helping to make possible and shape this intervention in Vietnam. To reiterate, I argued that human security is embodied in for example an email exchange between the HSU in New York and the ILO headquarters in Geneva and the ILO Regional Office in Bangkok, in which documents including the logframe were exchanged, led to the transmission of USD 1.5m from New York to local project partners along the Mekong. Here, I want to focus on the possibilities afforded by the logframe since the logframe sets out how an intervention is to be assembled. The logframe is the site where the complex life world of Vietnamese women and children was written and contextualized. It is where their (migratory) desires are given biopolitical properties such as ‘blind migrants’ and ‘at risk of trafficking’. The logframe establishes an exclusive claim on a specific class of subjects such as girls aged between 8 to 12 years in the Mekong Delta province of Hau Giang, on whom it writes forms of subjectivation in pursuit of managing illegalized circulation such as human trafficking. To technical experts of the ILO then, the ‘at risk of trafficking’ body presented a technical problem requiring effective public measures. This meant not only authorizing knowledges and aligning the desires and needs of those considered at risk of trafficking.

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but also of those in positions of authority such as Vietnamese state officials and institutions with the strategic imperatives of the ‘global’ anti-trafficking machinery.

In its proposal to the HSF in 2002, the ILO argued that trafficking is “inevitably linked” to the significant movement of people across economies and markets within the Mekong subregion in search of livelihood. Women and children who live in “particularly vulnerable to trafficking” communities “live at or below the poverty line,” are ‘likely’ to have little or no access to basic services, and have “little or no chance of expanding their livelihood potentials” (ILO/IPEC, 2002:3). They migrate and are “vulnerable to trafficking”. The sites and forms of exploitation are said to vary considerably including services provided to the commercial sex industry, street begging, labouring in the manufacturing sector, and domestic services. Since the HSF was argued “to aim at helping most disadvantaged groups of people, victims of trafficking and those at risk of trafficking are obviously among those”. As such, the ILO’s ‘trafficking project’ was considered “very much along the line with the goal at which the Fund is aiming, namely, to create and sustain societies that enable individual human beings to realise their potential” (ILO/IPEC, 2002). The difference between TICW and the human security component, according to an ILO officer, lay in the emphasis on providing ‘direct assistance’ to people, that is people-centrism, rather than assistance to the government or state-centrism.

Specifically, the human security project was to extend on the TICW's Mekong Challenge to prevent human trafficking in the Mekong subregion by creating the conditions under which people are “empowered to take greater control over their lives” (ILO/IPEC, 2002). In the words of an ILO officer, “While there are many approaches to fight what is now commonly referred to as ‘modern-day slavery’ ideally, the best way to tackle the trafficking of children and women is to prevent it from happening in the first place”. In Vietnam, on the one hand, this involved raising awareness about trafficking and providing the credit and skills training to ‘at risk persons’ to set up businesses, on the other hand, this involved providing the training to governmental organizations to develop coordinated responses to prevent trafficking (Bowen et al., 2006:2). In effect, while the problem of “a growing market for clandestine migration services, including smuggling across borders, faking travel documents, and arranging marriages,” is symptomatic of a violent politics of exclusion in the “ever more restrictive immigration policies and tighter border controls by

56 Human Trafficking. The Mekong Challenge. It's about prevention... is the title of a brochure by the International Organisation of Labour, published as part of the Mekong Sub-regional Project to Combat Trafficking in Children and Women (TICW) of which the human security project discussed here was a component.

57 Interview with ILO officer, Bangkok, October 2008
affluent, migrant-receiving countries” (O’Connell Davidson, 2008:9), the solution to the problem of human trafficking in Vietnam was seen lying mainly with persons ‘at risk’ and their government. They were to become alert entrepreneurs and their government a better manager.

A primary concern highlighted in the logframe related to the “dearth of reliable information and data on trafficking and migration” in the two targeted countries in the human security proposal (ILO/IPEC, 2002). Effectively, the reality of human trafficking is stabilized with the perpetual production of scientific knowledge by experts including statistics, analyses, and guidelines on which ‘logical’ interventions are based. Scientific knowledge is difficult to come by in Vietnam. On the one hand, “very few statistics are kept by the local government or police forces about internal or cross-border trafficking” (Cacioppo, 2006); on the other hand, owing to its sensitivity, human trafficking is a notoriously difficult phenomenon to research in Vietnam. Indeed, a significant part of the ‘trafficking’ work carried out by intergovernmental and transnational non-governmental organizations in Vietnam relates to mapping the problem of human trafficking and developing the expert knowledge based on which ‘logical’ interventions are conceived. Hence also the ILO’s development of a portfolio of ‘good’ prevention practices out of TICW (IPEC/ILO, 2008). Work of this kind includes the influential Save the Children UK report on A Rapid Assessment of the Situation of Migrant Children in Vietnam (Scott, et al., 2006) and the ILO rapid assessment of Can Tho City, Hau Giang Province, and Tay Ninh Province in Southern Viet Nam. The Situation of Migration and Trafficking of Children and Women (Cacioppo, 2006). As mentioned already, the IOM is currently awaiting the outcome for a proposal submitted to the European Commission for the Development of Migrant Profiles and a Comprehensive Migration Database.

It is on the basis of ‘reliable’ information that ‘evidence-based’ interventions are designed and planned. ‘Evidence’ on the nature and whereabouts of the “most disadvantaged groups of people” are used to select the target sites and populations for intervention. Thus, the “dearth” of reliable information and data on human trafficking in Vietnam led the ILO to rely on a situation analysis and on the activation of ‘local knowledge’. The situation or baseline analysis of trafficking in children and women in Vietnam was based on a comprehensive review and collation of the literature on TICW issues produced by various Vietnamese and international organizations in Vietnam over the preceding decade.

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58 Conversations with members of other organisations suggest the lack of reliable data is considered a chronic problem to containing and controlling human trafficking in Vietnam and the GMS more generally. Interviews in Bangkok, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, September-November 2008
59 Interview with a European academic, Ho Chi Minh City, October 20, 2008
Although not noted or made explicit in the logframe, this information was complemented or influenced by international conventions and standards\textsuperscript{60} as well as expert knowledge on the dynamics of human trafficking in the GMS available at the time (e.g. Skeldon, 2001).\textsuperscript{61}

The ‘local’ knowledge was gained through stakeholder ownership exercises which involved the participation of ‘local’ people in the project design and planning process. Indeed, as Triantafillou and Nielsen have argued, “through the intertwinement of anthropological knowledges and radical action research, knowledge about the local has become an authoritative mode of veridiction (regime of truth) in development interventions” (2001:63). The National Stakeholder Ownership Exercise (NSOE) was carried out in 2002. The exercise was held with wide participation of members of “state departments, mass organizations, and NGOs (Vietnamese and international)” who selected the provinces “for project intervention” (ILO/IPEC, 2002:21). The three provinces selected for intervention, namely Can Tho, Hau Giang, and Tay Ninh, were classed as “high risk migrant sending and receiving areas”. Based on this, further Provincial Stakeholder Ownership Exercises (PSOE) were conducted in the selected provinces in 2002. The selection of 10 communes and wards in these provinces for intervention was argued to be based on the “knowledge and experience of local members” (Cacioppo, 2006). The activation of ‘local’ knowledge constitutes a recasting of governance in which the target population including governmental officials experience governing based on the logic of human security.

\textsuperscript{60}The ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour adopted in 1999, and the first World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Stockholm in 1996

\textsuperscript{61}Interview with ILO officer, Bangkok, November 2008
Can Tho City is the Mekong Delta's largest city, located 170 kilometres south-west of Ho Chi Minh City. It is the hub of Southern Vietnam's transportation network, including "its paved roads to Cambodia". Tay Ninh Province, already mentioned in the Viet Nam News reports in the introduction, borders Cambodia to the west and Ho Chi Minh City to the east, providing the main link between Phnom Phen, the Cambodian capitol, and Ho Chi Minh City, the largest urban area in south Vietnam. Hau Giang province lies 240 kilometres south of Ho Chi Minh City in the centre of the Mekong Delta. The province is divided into five districts, including Phung Hiep, and one provincial town, Vi Thanh. The majority of Hau Giang residents belong to the mainstream Kinh ethnic group. Four-fifth of Hau Giang residents depends on rice farming to generate income. Less than twenty percent of the population is engaged in small-scale industries, trade, or services (Cacioppo, 2006). Research for this chapter was conducted in this province.

The integration of 'local' people in the design, planning as well as managing of a project has become 'good' practice since the emergence of the participatory and sustainability logics in development discourse. Under the human security project, apart from the SOEs,
the ILO involved members of targeted populations in monitoring processes. The measurability of project progress and impact for monitoring and evaluation purposes is assured by pre-determined performance indicators. Participatory monitoring, according to the ILO, is “not just monitoring as in ‘checking’ for impact”. Local participation is seen as beneficial since “‘learning’ at the lowest possible level by project stakeholders” may “lead to better future interventions” (ILO/IPEC, 2005:39, 2002). In fact, the conceptualization process of the human security project itself was beset with practices common to the aid community. These practices are suffused with the same techno-scientific and managerial logic upon which the subsequent community-based prevention activities of the project were predicated.

The ‘target recipients’ identified were “children and women at high risk of trafficking along with their families and communities”. Their risk profile presented in the proposal locates them in areas at high risk – as identified by the SOE – and “in circumstances that render them vulnerable to trafficking for labour exploitation”. Children aged 10-14 and 15-17 were considered “particularly at risk of entering exploitative labour, leaving home or, in the case of the younger group of children, at the point of doing so within the next few years” (ILO/IPEC, 2002). In fact, the ‘at-risk of trafficking person’ is not an a prior, objective or legal category of persons (O’Connell Davidson, 2008:12) but functions as an object of biopolitical governance. This object is subject to an array of ‘corrective’ programmes discussed below which aim to contain human trafficking by normalising the mobility behaviour of ‘at-risk of trafficking persons’. The biopolitical subjectivity of persons ‘at risk of trafficking’ is first written and contextualized in the logically framed project proposal. The expert knowledge “about probable futures in the present” that is risk (Aradau, 2004:269) and the prevention of what are considered probable aberrant futures is characteristic of the logic of risk (Dean, 1999, O’Malley, 1996). The preventive intervention in human trafficking of the human security project was at the point of the mobility behaviour of persons ‘at-risks of trafficking’.

Indeed, a “positive outcome” of the intervention was when persons ‘at risk’ have become “alert to traffickers,” and the number of ‘blind migrants’ – “those that accept carelessly an offer to leave the village for employment opportunities elsewhere” had been reduced (ILO/IPEC, 2002). The success of the project was measured according to numbers in output performance. As one ILO officer conceded, “We always want to measure things, so we can measure and report to donor, and we can measure the impact”. The Vietnamese component of the project was successful if ten existing People’s Committees were strengthened, 360-400 families received direct assistance, 1,400-2,000 families (7,000-
10,000 individuals) were aware of the risks of trafficking and teachers made regular use of
awareness raising materials, and a minimum of 200 girls and boys have been prevented
from being trafficked.

In the space of a few paragraphs, a technical assemblage interlinking various officials of
‘global,’ ‘regional,’ and ‘local’ organizations with the women and children targeted under
this project was programmed and framed logically with a discreet problem, target
population, evidence, strategies, methods, tools, funds, and intentions. The
conceptualization of this human security project was contingent on multifarious
microphysical problematizing activities. It involved embedding and defining, specifying,
delimiting, categorizing, and linking disparate elements such that the intervention could
be considered ‘logical’. It is in this sense also that stakeholders and ‘persons-at-risk’ were
invited to participate in the designing, planning, and project managing process with the
aim not only of gaining data – local ‘evidence’ – but also training in how to manage. As in
the case of migrant health in Thailand, politics was foreclosed in favour of technical
measures. Managing human trafficking through the logic of risk involved the
normalization of the dynamics in the behaviour towards mobility of ‘at risk’ populations as
is discussed below. Put differently, the aim was to decrease the number of ‘blind’ subjects
and increase the number of ‘alert’ and self-caring subjects.

THE FLIGHT OF THE SPIDERWEB

Given that the problem of human trafficking was introduced into Vietnamese
governmental discourse only recently, much of the time, funds and energy that flow into
activities relating to the prevention of human trafficking are dedicated to training people
in the ‘reality’ of human trafficking as well as in the ways of governing this reality. This
endeavour has not been without difficulties. Indeed, the human security project was beset
with specifically Vietnamese political and governmental obstacles as I go on to detail
rendering the effect of the intervention minimal. Unlike the migrant health assemblage,
then, through which ran a multitude of lines of segmentarity that territorialized the
assemblage, lines of breakage and fracture, “causing asignifying particles or pure
intensities to pass or circulate,” have threatened to dismantle an otherwise seemingly
consolidated human trafficking assemblage. The deterritorializing processes resulting
from the clashes encountered by the assemblage leave the multiplicity of constituted
subjectivities such as the ‘risk-averse migrant,’ with “nothing more than a name as the
trace of an intensity” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:4). It is in this sense that human security appears as a body without organs plugged into the human trafficking assemblage.

Specifically, the human trafficking assemblage was plagued by lines of breakage which materialized in the struggle between the language of social evils and the language of human trafficking. The project implementation process which was planned for a three-year period (2003-2006) as per common aid short-termism was severely reduced due to the ideologically problematic language of labour exploitation used in the project plan. As mentioned, the Vietnamese government issued in 2004 an Approval of the National Plan of Action against Crime of Trafficking in Children and Women during the period of 2004-2010. The first National Plan of Action (NPA), however, was not issued until 2007. In spite of this, the human security component of TICW, scheduled to run between 2003 and 2006 as per the proposal submitted to the HSF, went ahead before the issuance of this first NPA, incurring severe delays. For one, the timing of the human security project coincided with the drafting of the Approval of the NPA. In fact, due to political sensitivity with the language of labour exploitation employed in the discussion about trafficking pushed for by the ILO, the project was not approved until 2005.

Secondly, lines of deterritorialization emerging from the clash between standard project short-termism and government reorganization threatened the actualization of the intervention in Vietnam. The aid sector in Vietnam is highly controlled. Development agencies must work with allocated government partner agencies. By 2005 and following the Approval of the NPA in 2004, the ILO was forced to change its main government partner the MOLISA for the mass organization the VWU which had been appointed to lead the prevention programme point in the NPA. Having previously developed good relations with MOLISA, the ILO had to start anew developing a working relation with its new partner organization. The actual project implementation period was for just a little over a year, 2005-2006. Activities on the ground ran for approximately 10 months (Bowen, et al., 2006:13). Two years (or two thirds of the project life span) were spent waiting for approval from the Vietnamese government (Bowen, et al., 2006). Thus, the ILO encountered in Vietnam a difficult, complex and highly political field in which the conditions of operation were largely found wanting.

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62 This manoeuvre followed the ’recommendation’ of the Ministry of Planning and Investment which also manages the Vietnamese international aid scene.
63 Interview with an ILO official, Hanoi, October 7, 2008
64 Interviews with ILO officials in Hanoi and Bangkok, September-November 2008
The reality of human trafficking is knowable only through expert (i.e., scientifically verifiable) knowledge, and governable as intervention through management (framing logically). In order to ensure the management of the problem of human trafficking, Vietnamese state officials were to be aligned with mechanisms standard to governing through the lens of human trafficking. This involved a lot of training. Training, according to the ILO, is the "process of acquiring knowledge, skills and attitudes that are needed to fill the gap between what people want to do, and what they are able to do now" (ILO/IPEC, 2005). "When we say training, actually it's rather saying training the trainers," that is conducting training for trainers. ILO/IPEC operates under the 'cascade training' scheme, whereby knowledge and skills are argued to be passed on from one level to the next. ‘Direct’ is more adequately understood as ‘subcontracting’ the work of training to local service providers who in turn train other trainers: “when we do trainings and workshops and things like that, [...] we give them the tools, develop the tools, which might be guidelines or whatever it is, or training manuals and so on that they can use". Eventually, knowledge and skills are thought to trickle down to the people that the project targeted.

In the human security project, training was to strengthen “technical and implementing capabilities for all partner organizations and managerial and technical skills among community level mechanisms”. In the Guidelines for Practitioners in the Fight against Human Trafficking, A Tool to Tackle Human Trafficking, trainers are encouraged to use a variety of communication methods including a range of visual aids, plenary discussion, group work, role-play and so on: use ‘ice-breakers’ if “you do not know participants well,” for example games, songs etc. For contrast and clarity, “play a bad facilitator versus a good facilitator” in role-plays. Be sure to “have eye contact, stand up and move around, speak slowly, use your voice (intonation)”; “use humor if natural for you, and smile”; be sure to calm participants “who are over-excited, particularly children” and so on (ILO/IPEC, 2005). In this way, communities considered ‘at risk’ of human trafficking were trained about how to manage effectively the problem of human trafficking.

The human security intervention proceeded with the governmentalization of the state by linking human security with the Vietnamese National Plan of Action (NPA) to combat trafficking. The project management was based within existing structures concerned with trafficking and child labour prevention. In fact, the provincial project steering committee was built on the structure of the NPA provincial steering committee. Members of the

66 Interview with ILO officer, Bangkok, September 4, 2008
NPA/project steering committee were officials from a range of government agencies including the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), MOLISA and the Department of Social Evils Prevention, Border Guard Command, Ministry of Education and Training, Committee for Population, Families and Children, Vietnam Youth Association, Ministry of Culture and Information, Social Policy Bank, Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Vietnam General Confederation of Labour, Vietnam Cooperative Association. Members of these organizations were trained in the management of the problem of human trafficking. In principal, to “implement effective and multi-sectoral anti-trafficking interventions” (Bowen, et al., 2006:1). They were trained to develop their own Action Programmes based on their situation. Similar processes also occurred at the community level through local community decision making on anti-trafficking activities and beneficiary selection.

In October 2008, two years after project conclusion, the Phung Hiep Commune Steering Committee assembled following a call by the VWU. Over twenty members attended. Two years earlier members of this committee had been trained in ‘project management and participatory monitoring and evaluation.’ However, the material produced in this training session, namely, the spidergram in Figure 6 – the graph in which the Committee was assembled – was discarded from the assemblage. It was no longer, if ever it held that position, in line with the strategic imperative of human security to govern aberrant mobility. This is because its power to set up the order of governance for preventing human trafficking was weakened the moment the village community stopped referring to it. It had been locked away in a drawer until the day of the 2008 assembly of the Phung Hiep Commune Steering Committee where it re-entered the assemblage to attract funds through this researcher to develop the infrastructures of the village more generally. The spidergram is a managerial tool through which the elements in the human trafficking assemblage are assembled and the relationality between the elements inscribed and transferred in training sessions with the target population itself. In other words, it is a tool which sets up the assemblage according to the dominant strategic imperative, in this case the biopolitical governance of human trafficking.
Figure 6: Reproduction of the Phung Hiep Commune spidergram (2008)

The inscription in the very left corner of the original spidergram read: CECEM. The Center for Community Empowerment or CECEM is a private training organization based in Hanoi, whose training services are subcontracted by local and international organizations. The spider web was material left behind by the trainer of CECEM who had run a course on with some members of the steering committee. The spider tool, as this management tool is referred to by Save the Children UK, is “intended to promote reflection, analysis, sharing, dialogue and action planning within organisations” (Feinstein and O’Kane, 2005). Indeed, it is a tool that is gaining momentum in measuring ‘capacity building’ across the global aid assemblage (Gibbon et al., 2002, Smith et al., 2003). The name comes from the use of a graph in the shape of a spider web. It is a managerial mechanism by which villagers in this human security project were trained to assemble the commune steering committee for the prevention of human trafficking. It was to assist them in organizing themselves through ‘networking and coordination’, ‘village planning and decision making processes’.

CECEM is the product of an initiative by eight mostly UK-based NGOs operating in Vietnam to meet their own training needs. When funding for the training centre dried out in 2002, the Centre went private. The organization provides training, “consultancies and implementing projects in the fields of adult learning, participatory project management, organization development, and small and medium enterprises development”. Their
Clientele include INGOs and Vietnamese NGOs. They are trainers in bilateral and multilateral projects as well as development projects funded by the embassies, public organizations, and small and medium enterprises in the rural area. Trainers hold Masters degrees in Organisational Change and Development, Small Enterprise Promotion and Training, Development Management, Economics and Business Administration from the University of Manchester, Leipzig University and other centres of expertise. The list of courses on offer is long and varied. This year, the organization offers training in the management of consultants, project management, conflict management, training for trainers, need assessment for development projects, presentation skills, effective leadership skills, customer relation management, project design, planning and proposal writing, organizational strategic planning, social dialogues facilitation, supervisory management skills and behaviour change communication.

Participants at the CECEM course included staff from different levels of the VWU, Department of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (DOLISA) – the provincial arm of MOLISA –, the National Committee for Population, Family and Children (CPFC) and the police. The objective of the course was to train participants in how to design a project, write a proposal and plan monitoring and evaluation (for which the professional acronym is M&E). After providing participants with the “necessary skills and methods in project/action plan management/implementation and M&E”, the participants were considered ‘capacitated’ to develop their own action programmes on preventing trafficking as part of the human security project (Ngo and Nguyen, 2005). Apart from practicing the use of the spider web tool, the selected group was trained also in mapping, semi-structured interviewing and monitoring meetings. Villagers were trained also in ‘pooling of resources’ and improving access to existing services. The general focus was on ‘good governance’. They were trained also in data collection and analysis. Finally, it involved ensuring effective linkages and networking to higher level authorities (at provincial and national levels).

Effectively, members of the project steering committee were instructed in the art of organizing and analysing “their knowledge in a manner that enables an inscription of reality susceptible to a certain level of calculation, priority-setting and intervention” (Triantafillou and Nielsen, 2001:73). Much like the Migrant Family Health Folders by which MCHWs in Thailand were disciplined to interpret, map, and order the health of the lives of fellow migrants in a way amenable to biopolitical regulation, spidergrams were introduced in targeted communities as the tool through which task units were to be

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67 For more information, see http://www.cecem.org/
assembled. In contrast to Thailand, where the folder was utilized regularly to an extent that it was and it became MCHWs, the spidergram in Vietnam was a dead inscription device insofar as it seemed without purpose and lifeless. Its physical presence meant little more than the end of the human security logic. Here was a governmental device through which the governmentality of human security traversed and reached a momentary dead end. Training commune staff in using the tools was difficult according to the project staff. The Project Coordinator in Vietnam found the need to assist considerably in the training process although “the process was helpful for the participants to better understand the project and improve ways of working, but that reporting and analysis was a great challenge” (Bowen, et al., 2006:31).

In the manner that Vietnamese state officials take technical training in managing the problem of trafficking, beginning with their participation in the designing, planning, and project managing process discussed earlier, they are assembling the governance of human trafficking according to the biopolitical imperative to which they have become subject. The art of organizing the elements comprising a problem space such as human trafficking in Vietnam in fact highlights the way the human security strategy is underscored by both an emphasis on integrating the target population itself in self-governing activities and a cosmological realist approach to problem-solving, that is, emphasizing calculability and precision, as identified by Grayson (Grayson, 2008).

VIETNAMESE FEMININITY AND HYBRID FORCES

Under the human security project, a broad range of awareness raising activities was organized by dedicated teams of women of the governmental Vietnamese Women’s Union (VWU). The role of the VWU in alerting target populations about the dangers of trafficking and labour exploitation, and guide individuals in their choice to migrate is substantial. The Vietnamese organization was considered ideally placed to oversee awareness raising activities. Firstly, the VWU’s intricate structure for community development work, with networks extending from national to village level, stretched deep into communities. It claims a membership base of “nearly 11 million belonging to 10,331 local women’s union in communes and towns throughout the country”. It is “divided into 4 levels, comprising the Central level (Hanoi), the Provincial and Municipal level (61 units), the District level

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68 Interview with ILO officer, Hanoi, October 11, 2008
(601 units), and the Commune level. Secondly, the propaganda or IEC (Information, Education, Communication) units of the VWU are experienced campaigners. Coupled with its extensive network, the VWU is able to mass mobilise. Thirdly, as arbiter of Vietnamese femininity, the VWU bears significant moral authority over the women targeted in the trafficking project. Interestingly, in the human security project discussed here, the VWU operated under a hybrid logic of social evil and human trafficking. Finally, although a union, the VWU is a state organization with links to the highest political office. Thus, the structure and facilities of the VWU allowed the message of human trafficking to trickle through various levels of Vietnamese society.

The VWU campaigned for responsible and risk-free migration. They carried out a wide range of awareness raising activities. Under the guidance of the VWU, the IEC networks utilised traditional IEC and awareness approaches at mass level including using multiple TV broadcasts, radio, columns in local newspapers, leaflets, posters, traditional cultural performances such as poetry and folk songs, competitions, morning assemblies under the flag, and communal loudspeakers (Figure 7).

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69 Propaganda in Vietnamese does not carry the same negative connotations as in other places. Interview with VWU members of Vi Thanh Town in Hau Giang province, October 7, 2008
70 The regular chatter of the governmental loudspeaker across rice paddies or in the busy centre of Hanoi is a traditional IEC technique keeping people abreast with latest propaganda subjects. People hear but do they listen?
The mass organization also campaigned at the local level through family visits, children’s forums in schools and small group discussions in communities. The issue of human trafficking was integrated in school curricula. The VWU was also trained by ILO staff in innovative approaches including programmes made to fit specific audiences such as the ILO’s *Supporting Children’s Rights through Education, the Arts and the Media* (SCREAM). SCREAM was widely used in secondary schools in both target and non-target communes (Bowen, et al., 2006). Through these large scale campaigns and minuscule activities, the

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71 Interviews with members of the Phung Hiep Commune Steering Committee, head teacher and pupils of a commune school, Hau Giang Province, October 2008
VWU teams attempted to imbue the reality of human trafficking throughout ‘at risk’ communities.\textsuperscript{72}

In its propagandistic efforts to promote responsible behaviour and risk-free migration, the VWU operated under a hybrid logic in which it collapsed the fault line between governance through social evil and governance through human trafficking. Throwing the weight of its moral authority behind the campaign to prevent human trafficking, the VWU disciplined ‘at risk’ women through what Foucault referred to as ‘normalising judgements’ (Foucault, 1979). The VWU promoted an image of a “healthy, knowledgeable, skilful [sic], dynamic, innovative, cultured and kind-hearted Vietnamese woman” (VWU, 2010) against the ‘loose minded’ and irresponsible woman that it presented as particularly ‘at risk of trafficking’.\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, it is the traditional role of the VWU to “raise women's awareness and encourage them to preserve and develop cultural traditions and morality” (ILO/IPEC, 2002:32). As the VWU president said at the Eight Congress in 1997: “we preserve the traditional role of women” (as quoted in Nguyen-vo, 2008:137). This is emphasised also in the Vietnamese government’s Nation Plan of Action against trafficking, where the role of the VWU as leader of the prevention programme is, amongst other, to develop “cultural families, healthy communes, streets without social evils” (Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem, 2004:7).

The emphasis on ‘healthy communes’ is also stressed in the VWU’s widely distributed leaflet about trafficking in women and children prepared under the human security project. In a society which values social cohesion highly, the leaflet reminds that it is not only individuals but also communities that are affected by trafficking. Accordingly, individuals bear a responsibility to themselves and their communities to be risk aware and to migrate safely. Similarly, communities are responsible to look out for risks in their midst. This is a culture in which government agencies reward actions for social cohesion, such as the absence of prostitution in a family or dedicated commitment to VWU campaigns, with certificates of commendation that are proudly born.\textsuperscript{74} In this respect, the role of the VWU, as set out in the NPA, involves “communication and education on laws and policies, tricky practices of traffickers in order to enhance the local people’ awareness and vigilance” (Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem, 2004:4). Indeed, the campaign to prevent human trafficking through social evil is played out at the level of identity, tradition

\textsuperscript{72} Indeed, according to the evaluation report of the human security project, commune leaders believe that community awareness of the risks of exploitation facing migrants has improved. Local people had become more alert to recruiters and have changed their practices when they consider migrating to other provinces or abroad.

\textsuperscript{73} VWU leaflet

\textsuperscript{74} Interview with WVU officials, Hau Giang Province, October 10, 2008
and culture. As part of the human security project, an anti-trafficking leaflet was prepared in cooperation with the VWU.

Figure 8: VWU anti-trafficking leaflet in Hau Giang Province (October 2008) Image © Voelkner 2008

The campaign to prevent human trafficking in Vietnam promoted in the ILO’s human security project also operated under the logic of human trafficking to promote the tenets of safe, read ‘normal’ as opposed to aberrant, migration within the country and across the border. As the ILO argues: “TICW aims to end trafficking, not migration”. The freedom to move, especially for the sake of livelihood, is a fundamental right which the ILO intends to protect “through programming that makes migration safer”. Such programming relates to the campaigning of risk-aware behaviour in the migration process carried out by the VWU for which members of the organization were trained—as is discussed below. The desire to migrate, according to the ILO, becomes a risk factor when the conditions under which people can move freely are not established. For example, the risk of trafficking is high when “legal migration channels are closed, inaccessible, or unknown to the person seeking to move” and they seek out “irregular channels” which are “brokered by recruiters, illegal
transporters, unscrupulous employers or other intermediaries” (IPEC/ILO, 2008:13). While conditions to move freely remain inadequate, persons at risk’ are to be made aware of “legal and protected migration channels”. This reduces the likelihood, read risk, that “they are deceived by recruiters or trafficking brokers” (IPEC/ILO, 2008:20). Thus, the ILO was seeking to normalize migration.

As the social evil gradually is brought into and formative of the transnational assemblage of human trafficking, it is transformed into the technical problem of human trafficking. In operating under the logics of social evil and human trafficking, the VWU rendered governable the women and children targeted as ‘at risk’ persons under the human security project. Constituted as responsible and risk aware subjects, the women and children were brought under control of the transnational assemblage of human trafficking oriented to containing and normalizing aberrant migration. The solution to the problem of human trafficking was seen lying with persons ‘at risk’ themselves. Apart from campaigning to be responsible and risk-aware subjects, targeted populations were trained to become entrepreneurs, “empowered to take greater control over their lives” (ILO/IPEC, 2002). The constitution of entrepreneurial selves proceeded on the basis of a series of training modules. ‘At-risk’ persons were to train for life. The kind of life for which they were trained was the life of an entrepreneur under the dictate of the logic of market.

The type of life skills required were determined “based on local market demand” (ILO/IPEC, 2002:i). Vocational training programs were provided by local training schools and employers coordinated by the DoLISA, and contracts with training providers were signed with the People’s Committee. The main types of training offered were dressmaking, hairdressing/beauty, motor repair, animal raising and handicrafts. Under this scheme, for example, a new cottage industry of mat weaving was set up by the VWU in Hoa My commune of Hau Giang, selling to overseas markets they had identified through a similar enterprise in Can Tho city. The group of 30 original trainees has expanded to 60 through trainees transferring skills to others, including adult family members and children working in the home of the trainer (Bowen, et al., 2006:27).

75 The ILO recently developed Recommended Guidelines for Migrant Recruitment Policy and Practice in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region
The 'community-based model' to combat human trafficking at the level of communes in the human security project also involved providing the alternative of receiving credit for household production. New economic opportunities were identified based on market analysis. The training involved included training in income generation including in rural skills such as in farming, animal husbandry and food-processing for 'food security'. The provision of credit was carried out through the Bank for Social Policy which handed out loans based on approved business plans. Loans were provided to families with children in the target age range and considered to be 'at risk'. The local poverty criteria were used to select and focus on 'poor' or 'near poor' families. The project used an existing government loan source, subsidised by the state as part of its poverty reduction strategy. Students were trained by the bank on bank loans regulations and received skills training in technical production skills and business skills. For instance, if a family planned to raise fish, training was provided by local agriculture department staff. Animal husbandry (e.g. cows, pigs, poultry), fish raising and small trade were common income generating activities.
Finally, it included also training and services for ‘group formation assistance’ and small business development and improving access to credit and markets. These activities were intended to increase ‘economic security,’ which was reasoned as decreasing the pressure for women and children to leave.

“As a result of combined awareness raising, village mobilization, income generation interventions,” according to the ILO, “target beneficiaries are now alert to traffickers and the number of ‘blind’ migrants-those that accept carelessly an offer to leave the village for employment opportunities elsewhere” – had decreased” (ILO/IPEC, 2002:i). Implicit in the bias towards the entrepreneurial self in ‘combating human trafficking’ is the epistemological grounding of the human subject in the market in which ‘rational’ decision-making behaviour is endorsed. The constitution of self-governing selves in the reality of human trafficking does not, however, indicate a transfer of power from the Vietnamese state to the individual. Rather, these Vietnamese women and children are invested in a microphysical field of power-knowledge or governmentality in which they are governed primarily through the logics of risk and the market. This is significantly different from governance in the reality of social evil in which the emphasis is put on propaganda and the constitution of moral subjects of femininity.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter traced the emergence of human security as a situated political strategy within the human trafficking assemblage in Vietnam. Specifically, as I have done in relation to migrant health in Thailand, the chapter acknowledges the role of the human and nonhuman forces which helped to bring forth and shape the vernacular micropolitics of human security in this site of practice. Much like in Thailand, this involved a multiplicity of forces including market, social, international, governing, viral and chemical forces which mutually interacted, helping to shape the emergence of the assemblage. Here too, biopolitical mechanisms were developed to assemble the assemblage in such a way that the occurrence of human trafficking is prevented biopolitically. The complex world of Vietnamese women and child migrants was enframed, ordered and depoliticized in terms of simple dichotomies in which the ‘unruly’ life of those earmarked as at risk of human trafficking was contrasted with human techno-scientific ingenuity. In so doing, these mechanisms attempted to order the elements of the assemblage in such a way that the illicit circulation of women and children could be made amenable to biopolitical
governance. Yet, in contrast to the Thai migrant health assemblage, the intervention was at first resisted by the Vietnamese state authorities. Moreover, the conditions of possibility for the successful enactment of biopolitics were found wanting: specifically, Vietnam did not operate according to the form of cosmological realism underpinning the knowledge practices of human security. Finally, and partly in relation to this, central elements such as the spidergram and the leaflet critical to the rearrangement of the assemblage presented as de-territorializing elements either escaped or were discarded from the assemblage. Consequently, the assemblage clashed and, following a creative readjustment, hybridized and re-territorialized with the situated precepts of ‘social evil’.
Like any word, human security slips and slides. It escapes any singular grip or definition. It does not command that of which it speaks, or what is spoken through it. Indeed, the concept of human security conveys both more and less than what it is to signify. It does this both, because it has a history and because when we use human security we set it off again on its historical way, "in the unpredictable ways in which anything which lives in the way that it is received through time remains intractable to the designs that might be made upon it" (Dillon, 1996:114). Indeed, though the dangerous designs that were made upon human security as I discuss in chapters one and two could be traced in the assemblages and associated orders of governance to which it gave rise, this thesis has also shown the way its multiple materialization in the world is situated, messy, contingent, and only partially a successful mode of governance. Nonetheless, though the assemblages are circumstantial and contingent, the thesis also demonstrated the way this did not render them ineffective. On the contrary, I contend, human security is effecting a reconstitution of global order which, however, is not total but particular, concentrated in the assemblages scattered around the globe.

The thesis began by examining the taken-for-granted truths of human security’s dangerous enframing which pass through sites of practice. In chapter one, drawing on Foucault and some of the poststructuralist literature in International Relations, I argued that the regime of truth that is global governance sets up the political subjectivities (heterarchical order, the state, the ‘international community’, and the individual) which advocates take to be real and act upon. This was important in order to set the stage for examining the particularities of human security. Chapter two examined the presuppositions which direct and circumscribe narratives and practices of human security. Specifically, I argued that human security, in aiming to foster life, is a form of biopolitics which has the goal to regulate targeted populations globally through the notion of global governance. As such, I suggested that human security operates on a metanarrative of ‘complexity’ which helps to constitute a specific kind of imaginative geography. This dangerous geography informs the kind of problematizations, spaces, agents and mechanisms through which human security governs. Indeed, it necessitates a
heterarchical order in which self-governing networks and trained subjects manage human insecurity. Specifically, I argued, human security engineers systemic self-governance through learning and training. Moreover, I argued that its dangerous ontology commits human security to a re-configured Hobbesian state which operates on contingent sovereignty. In so far as this narrative is carried forward into its practices, human security is a form of statecraft. Finally, I examined the logframe as a governmental thing which sets up the multiplicity of situated human security assemblages.

In chapter three, I considered how interpreting human security as an assemblage entails considering its open-endedness which always somehow escapes the biopolitical imperative within it. Drawing on Foucault's own materialism, I argued human security is not only partly generated by the intermingling of dispersed material and other (spatiotemporal) processes but is also dependent on the corporeal world which it comprises. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari as well as Bennett's materialist conception of assemblage, I argued that human security's relation with material and other forces renders it, and the intended effects produced out of it including the political subjectivities it engenders, always transient and subject to unintended and unforeseen change. I concluded that a focus on assemblages demonstrates the ways the world cannot be explained only by analysing human intentions, omissions and programmes. Only rarely does the human have the power to tame contingencies. This interpretative framework informed my field analyses in chapters four and five in which it became possible to pin point where creative adjustments to the political strategy took place. I concluded that human security is never a coherent, stable and totalizing logic but emerges in multiple and transient guises in the world.

As I suggested in the thesis' introduction, governmental notions which invoke the 'global' such as human security operate along dramatic distances. Tracing its workings beyond governmental categories such as the state helps to locate the dynamic mechanisms and effects of human security. When the object of analysis is the global, a focus on the materiality of events helps to explore how the global is localized. At the same time, a focus on materiality opens up the opportunity to explore how the local materializes. This interplay between localizations and materializations disrupts the logics that underlie governmental processes. By looking at the emergence of the complex assemblages that human security comprises, tracing the multiple transactions and relations that assemble the heterogeneous elements including the material objects into nearly stable organizational and institutional practices, it becomes possible to capture where and how power operates and where human security is performatively produced. It helps to
understand the distinctive interplay between the micro- and macropolitics of global human security. Chapters four and five are two narratives of human security’s dispersed emergence with and in the corporeal world. They engage with materiality in the form of viruses and technological artefacts such as logframes, software, and spidergrams that constitute contingent orders of governance in global politics.

This concluding chapter offers some reflections on the political and biopolitical implications for analyzing human security through the notion of machinic assemblage. In what follows, the chapter draws on the field-based analyses carried out in chapters four and five in order to conclude the thesis with a reflection on the political implications of human security for global politics. By constituting orders of governance comprising a set of political subjectivities, human security is reconstituting global order at the molecular level. Specifically, the chapter analyses the sets of biopolitical processes which aimed to render dangerous circulations manageable and the implications these have for the understanding of global order. These include processes of technicalization and depoliticization, ordering, enframing and mapping, authorizing knowledges, and training. By drawing out the differences between the biopolitical enframing of human security prepared at the outset and the processes and effects in the materialization of human security, the chapter notes how a focus on the materialities of the assemblages of power allows for an understanding of human security at the molecular level.

INSTABLE ENFRAMINGS

Enframings of the world such as the biopolitical imaginary of human security discussed in chapter two serve to map the terrain upon which debates and activities are intended to occur. In the case of human security, this concerns an ontology of othering inextricably linked with the production of identity, that which is to be secured, and alterity, that which is to be eliminated or regulated. In human security, this is expressed in a governmental concern with ensuring, but also with controlling for dangers inherent to the contemporary ‘complex’ reality in which the state remains central to resolving the problem of political order. However, as I argued in chapter three, if debates and activities are inextricably enmeshed with nonhuman agencies, and if the intentions of those endorsing and/or applying human security can be enforced only if accompanied by a vast entourage of nonhumans, then it seems pertinent to analyse the politics of human security not in terms
of the intentions of the programmatic enframing and agenda but in terms of the “public” coalescing of actants around a human security problem.

To begin with, the Burmese migrants in Thailand and the women and children designated as ‘at risk of trafficking’ in Vietnam (and in four other Mekong subregional countries) are a case in point. They constitute, since at least the 1990s, as I demonstrate in the preceding chapters, contingencies of circulation. On the one hand, the steady flows of displaced Burmese to Thailand and of Vietnamese women and children as well as men allegedly trafficked in and out of Vietnam are seen as humanitarian catastrophes. Their journeys represent flows of survival, loss, sorrow, (un)fulfilled dreams, violence and uncertainty. On the other hand, their journeys are handled also as flows of unskilled labour feeding booming industries, for example, the fish-processing industry in Samutsakorn, the sex industry in Bangkok, Manila or New York, the garment or hooking industry in Ho Chi Minh City, the mail-order brides to Taiwan, South Africa and the United Kingdom. In this context, Burmese migrants and Vietnamese women and children constitute flows of monetary capital, finance, remittances and laundered money as well as flows of goods (food, garment, brides) and services (domestic helper, factory worker, sex worker). At the same time, they are dealt as flows of viruses and disease (HIV, Avian flu), of crime and social disintegration (drug abuse, separatism), as flows of social evil and immorality (prostitution).

These flows stream through and across provincial, national, regional and global infrastructures, boundaries, sovereignties and imaginaries. They do so in the figures of the refugee, the displaced person, the victim, the shrimp peeler, the sex worker, the bride, the daughter sending a salary home, the sale, the shirt, HIV carrier,. Thus, the multiplicity of flows also presents a multiplicity of subjectivities which speak to different but overlapping cultures of circulation. As noted by Lee and Lipuma, each circulation has “its own forms of abstraction, evaluation, and constraints, which are created by the interactions between specific types of circulating forms and the interpretive communities built around them” (Lee and LiPuma, 2002:192). Finally, and importantly, the flows connect the lives of people in remote Thai and Vietnamese villages with lives in places as close as Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City and as distant as Taipei, Adelaide and San Francisco.

Enframed as such, the Burmese in Thailand and the Vietnamese women and children attracted vernacular variants of human security including mutations in statecraft. In both cases, human security appears as an ideal condition for an entrepreneurial form of life in which the circulation of humans and nonhumans is regulated by governmental
assemblages. With this condition as the template, human security entails the creation and displacement of subject positions, relations and institutions, sometimes disturbing, sometimes reinforcing, existing links and imaginaries of the self, the state and the world. Specifically, this has involved the extension and transnationalization of the state.

ARRANGING HUMAN SECURITY

It is always at the level of materiality that human security takes effect – even when it is ‘merely’ a policy discourse as shown in chapter two. To paraphrase Foucault, human security has its locus and it consists in the relation, the coexistence, the dispersion, the overlapping, the accumulation, and the selection of material elements (Foucault, 1981: 69). It is not the act or the property of a body; human security is produced as an effect of, and within, a dispersion of matter including materially different tracings of phonemes, ‘sense-perceptive elements’ and ‘someone’s memory’. To be clear, the materiality of human security does not correspond to the individual materials or substances of artefacts or sounds through which it is articulated or expressed, though as I demonstrate they are nonetheless important. It refers to, amongst others, the set of materials, material processes and relations which come to define what is (im)possible in human security practice. While following Foucault’s observation that “trying to define with the documentary material itself unities, totalities, series, relations” (emphasis added, Foucault, 2002:7), it is possible to argue that the political imaginary of human security co-emerges with documents such as the HDR 1994 and the CHS’s report Human Security Now. Equally, as the accounts in the preceding two chapters show, the materiality of the assemblages both enable and disrupt the potential for human security to take effect in the way programmed or intended.

Human security only materializes in the moments when it responds to specified problems. These are presented as contingencies of circulation which connect elements in vernacular ways, albeit ‘logical,’ as illustrated in the preceding two chapters (Appadurai, 1996, Oke, 2009). This raises the question, what makes up the materiality of the assemblages? The answer is multiple. The material objects that human security comprises include both humans and nonhumans; inscription devices such as the logframe and the spidergram; built or information infrastructures such as filing cabinets, computers, systems and software; as well as nature, geography and culture. Some of the material objects embodying human security are developed in other geographical places and are dropped
by the circuits of global human security governance into situated sites to manage contingencies of human life. Recall the email that was sent from a computer connected to the internet at the office of the HSU in New York to an online computer at the ILO headquarters in Geneva. The same process occurred in the communication between the HSU and WHO concerning the problem of migrant health in Thailand, only here, the email was bounced back between New York, Geneva, India, Philippines, Bangkok, and Ranong and Samutsakorn. Other examples were the transfer of funds from New York to Geneva to Bangkok; the logframe, the template of which can be downloaded from a central server; the virus; the MHIS; and the spidergram. Some of the material objects are reassembled from existing repertoires and habits, they are accretions, bricolages (Li, 2007:265, Scott, 1999). These actants connect in unique vernacular ways to resolve the problematics embedded in migrant health in Thailand and human trafficking in Vietnam.

The strategic imperative of governmental assemblages, or as Foucault put it, what is "the right way of arranging (disposer) things in order to lead (conduire) them?," is ultimately to govern populations (Foucault, 2007:96). In human security, the best way to arrange the scriptures, actors, things, images, fantasies, strategies, states, techniques, methods, and so on, comprising the assemblages, is to order, enframe, connect, and map the elements, as well as to authorize the ‘right’ knowledges and train the humans involved. This is so to depoliticize the problem identified, for example migrant health and human trafficking, as a way to realign objectives in alterity with the governmental aims of human security. Many of these processes depend on, but are also rendered contingent upon, the differential dynamism of the material objects. In this sense, it can be said that the governmentalization of assemblages is not "a process in which rule extends itself unproblematically across a territory [geographical or otherwise], but a matter of fragile relays, contested locales and fissiparous affiliations" (Rose, 1999:51). As Li argues in relation to community forest management in Indonesia, much hard work goes into “drawing heterogeneous elements together, forge connections between them and sustain these connections in the face of tension” (Li, 2007:264). It is these tensions that are “the energies and countercultures,” which Bennett contends, “exceed and confound” an assemblage (Bennett, 2010:445).

This also invites the question of who or what is to be rigorously policed, warred-against and excluded to secure human security? In other words, who is targeted? Thinking or imagining space, time, and people of human security, as one geography, is a governing process suffused with ontological preconceptions, desires, and fantasies about what constitutes defensible and indefensible life, ‘human’ life, and the ‘not human enough’ life. In chapter two, I suggested that the exercise of mapping, a process in which identity and
alterity are constituted, in fact says more about the thinkers than the nature of that which is being thought or imagined. Mapping encloses identity and difference. It is already in this process that the boundaries of forms of life, between self and other, are constituted. It is in differentiation with the other that human security constitutes the ‘human’ that it sets out to secure and the ‘not-human enough’ that it sets out to tame. In this way, maps are abstractions which invest bodies and populations with properties, rendering them legible and amenable to control (Scott, 1999). In the field, logframes, situation analyses such as the National and Provincial Stakeholder Ownership Exercises, Migrant Health Folders, the MHIS as well as awareness-raising leaflets are maps whose preparation involved gathering and ordering specific types of information in order to determine specific spaces, times, and people that must be targeted to secure a specific form of life. In this sense, maps circumscribe how one is to think and act upon a specific imagined field of intervention.

Human security maps, of whatever kind, rely on expert and statistical knowledges which are indispensable for the strategic differentiation of what counts as defensible and indefensible life. Indeed, as Grayson has argued, there is a salient belief that “Human security and the conditions that generate human insecurity – material, ideological and discursive – can be discovered, identified, classified and transformed into unmediated knowledge within appropriate contexts” and made amenable to global governance (2008:393). Accordingly, the complex realities of problem fields such as migrant health and human trafficking, are stabilized with the perpetual production of scientific knowledge by experts including statistics, analyses, and guidelines on which ‘logical’ interventions are subsequently based (Porter, 1995). In fact, fields that are marked out for intervention such as migrant health and human trafficking are considered ambiguous and dangerous, partly because of a lack in verifiable knowledges. As the Thai and Vietnamese cases illustrate, while the emergence of new problems also demands knowledges, the only knowledges which ‘count’ are statistical and scientific, expert knowledges rendering ‘local’ and other knowledges unreliable unless sieved through scientific mechanisms. Moreover, human security is charting territories yet unmarked. These are territories that are vacant or anonymous in which sensitive information, such as intimate health details of populations or migrant movements considered illegal, is difficult to come by or missing altogether. In this sense, mapping exercises convert the vacant or anonymous reaches of distance into meaning for us (Said, 1978:55).

Importanty, statistical knowledges including indicators (devices which indicate a value or a change in level, speed, or similar) and indices (values, which enable comparability) delineate the target populations. These are statistical cohorts such as ‘women in the age
group 18 to 24 in Can Tho province, Vietnam, and ‘registered/unregistered migrant men of Burmese origin in Ranong, Thailand’. Populations in this case are cohorts, not communities, although this is not to say that they do not simultaneously constitute communities and overlapping subjectivities which undermine the properties with which bodies and populations are invested by human security mechanisms. A case in point is the Vietnamese women and children who decide to take the risk and migrate through informal and risky channels in order to fulfil filial duties and the desire for a better life. The simultaneous power and fallacy of statistical knowledge is that it reflects ‘truth,’ that it produces observable facts, when everyday encounters with complex worlds such as migrant health and human trafficking as I demonstrate not only expose the subjective and lax gatherings of ‘facts’ but also belie the statistical values on which interventions are designed and violently pushed ahead.

The logical framework or logframe paramount to circumscribing thought, planning, and practices in the field, as the Thai and Vietnamese projects show, depends on a variety of forces including the ‘truth’ represented in statistical information and the desire to plan. Moreover, the process of completing a logframe is contingent on a multiplicity of foregone negotiations, considerations and translations, on state of the art mechanisms, approaches and logics, on organizational mandate and political contexts. For example, there is the donor to please. As an ILO officer argued, there is a political reason for why donors are involved, “why they spend money”. Regardless of whether a project is articulated in terms of human security or other, donors, according to this officer, are tied to expectations at home, national or regional security considerations. But then, “we cannot think only in terms of donors”. Considerations must be given to available technical expertise, to organizational mandate, to existing good practices, and lessons learned from other projects.76

It is through the logical framework or logframe that a section of the messy field is circumscribed, the alleged variables determining the dynamics as well as related knowledges of this particular field established and problematized, thus preparing for managed intervention. While being a management tool, the logframe provides the structure for the design and planning of an intervention. It calls for defining not only the human security context based on which intervention is rationalized but also for determining the target populations, strategies, outputs and more, as well as the expert partners (agencies, institutions) involved. As such, it is already at the point of completing a logframe that the perimeters are set for what is the problem, what are the areas and the

76 Interview with an ILO officer, Bangkok, September 3, 2008
accepted means of intervention and so on. Put differently, the logframe sets out what is possible and permissible in relation to the human security intervention.

As I illustrated in chapters four and five, logframes are the epitome of a project management logic by which the demand to manage effectively establishes an exclusive claim to politics. As an inscription device, a logframe is the site where the properties of Burmese health and Vietnamese women and children ‘at risk of trafficking’ are written and contextualized. It establishes an exclusive claim on a specific class of subjects, e.g. migrants (mostly Burmese and illegal in Ranong and Samutsakorn), on whom it writes forms of subjectivation in pursuit of managing indefensible or dangerous circulations. To technical experts, then, migrant health and human trafficking presented a technical problem requiring effective public management. Through the governmental thing that is the logframe, human security presented in the space of a few paragraphs the migrant health and human trafficking assemblages with a discreet problem, target population, evidence, strategies, methods, tools, funds, and solution. Yet, the discreetness in which the problems of migrant health and human trafficking were presented obscures the multifarious microphysical problematizing activities including embedding, defining, specifying, categorizing, delimiting and linking disparate and spirited elements such as viruses, render the discreet narrative and functionality of the logframe contingent. In this sense also, the emergent properties that logframes delineate are contingent upon the modes of relationality productive of and mediated by them.

Mapping carries on in the field through the activation of ‘local knowledge’ collected by those targeted themselves. It involved the participation of ‘local’ people in the project design, planning process, and implementation which provided interventions with a powerful mode of veridiction (regime of truth) for its differentiation between defensible and indefensible life in mapping exercises. In Thailand, MCHWs were recruited to map the unmapped social, making legible the usually covert existence of Burmese migrants in Thailand in order to render this population governable. As members of these evasive communities, MCHWs prove invaluable to cartographers for the purpose of gathering ‘informative evidence’ including intimate details concerning the complex health world of migrants including migrant movement, health and residence, the numbers of migrants and their relations to one another, living conditions, as well as the types of diseases circulating. Much like the logframe, by collecting and ordering this knowledge, target populations were made amenable to governance: the information gathered, the ‘data,’ was fed to the computerized MHIS through which the health regularities of migrants could be monitored and interventions into the health regularities peculiar to migrant communities planned.
In Vietnam, stakeholders and ‘persons-at-risk’ were invited to participate in the designing, planning, and project managing process with the aim not only of gaining data – local ‘evidence’ – but also training in how to manage in terms of ‘rational decision-making’. As Ralph Pettman has argued, human security must be cast “first of all in the politico-cultural terms that are dominant in our day, namely, the terms set by Rationalism. [...] it means articulating human security set by the analytical languages that Rationalism provides” (2005:139). On the basis of risk profiles – not originary or self-evident categories but a function of governance – a first round at the national level resulted in the selection of target provinces in which a second round at the provincial level established the communes which were considered particularly at risk of human security.

In fact, even if ‘local knowledge’ is drawn in, these various mapping exercises say more about the preconceptions, desires, and fantasies about what constitutes defensible and indefensible life for those promoting human security at the centres of power such as the UN, the WHO, ILO and IOM than it does about the target subjects. As Grayson (Grayson, 2008:394-5) has argued,

> the obsession with unmediated precision directly relates to a far-reaching fetish within (human) security studies for a vulgar understanding of ‘policy-relevance’.

The intended audience for research remains the policy community – primarily defined as those in positions of authority within state, interstate structures and/or the civil society institutions that have been acculturated within them. [...] the field of human security has been shaped by the perceived needs of the intended audience.

Indeed, the differentiation between self and other evident in every map produced in either intervention is more meaningful to the geographer than it is to those for whom it is meant. These maps help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by creating a chasm between the values to be protected and the experiences of targeted subjects, i.e. Burmese migrants in Thailand and Vietnamese women and children. It is in this way that one can read the hasty affixing of anti-trafficking leaflets onto living room walls in a local farm house along a Mekong canal in Vietnam upon the arrival of myself and the entourage of government officials minding my steps. My arrival was interpreted as an inspection visit from an associated member of the international organization ILO which had invested capital in the area to promote preventive mechanisms against human trafficking. The leaflet symbolized a bygone intervention for which appearances must uphold.
A similar push can be observed in the variety of training mechanisms developed in the fields of migrant health and human trafficking. The emergence of new problem fields and governing solutions in Thailand and Vietnam through the advocacy of international organizations meant that, much of the time, funds and energy that flow into human security activities relating to the regulation of the health dynamics of Burmese communities and the prevention of pathogenic circulation in Thailand, as well as the prevention of illicit mobility in Vietnam, are dedicated to training people in the alleged 'reality' of these circulatory problems as well as in the 'right' ways to govern circulation. In particular, targeted populations are trained in the logics of science and management. Training was arranged among a strategic spread of people identified under the 'cascade' training scheme to establish a network of control points where knowledge and skills could be passed on from one point to another. People identified included government officials, professionals, consultants, police, NGO workers, village elders and other representatives, as well as members of populations. Training facilitated “concerted articulation of the elementary parts” comprising these assemblages with the effect of realigning the objectives of those in receipt of the training. In this way, differential forces were composed to obtain an efficient machine to maximise effects such as self-governing Burmese or Vietnamese women and children, as well as state officials, as circulatory managers.

In Thailand, MCHWs were trained in basic health knowledge, recording data, as well as emergency preparedness and response. They were trained in awareness raising campaigns in order to disseminate ‘facts’ about health care among Burmese communities, for example, the benefits of maintaining growth and vaccination schedules of their children. There were also scientific methods such as survey data gathering for baseline surveys used later for the assessment of project impact – “a learning process in itself worthy of notice” (WHO, 2004). In turn, MCHWs acted as trainers training Burmese migrants in basic health objectives such as hygiene. They utilized dramatization techniques and tools dropped by the circuits of human security governance to convey health messages and learning via entertainment in order to effectively ‘internalise and disseminate’ the message. Thai provincial health workers based at health centres in villages and towns were trained in recording the intimate data collected by MCHWs on Burmese migrant communities on the newly developed MHIS also dropped from elsewhere. Thus, training proceeds through a range of material objects.

In Vietnam, a wide spread of mainly government officials take technical training in managing the problem of human trafficking, beginning with their participation in the designing, planning, and project managing process, thereby learning that the object of
governance is knowable only through expert knowledges. Management tools like the spidergram are introduced. The spidergram was to be a way for officials to come together and organize as a steering committee and realign their objectives in unison to preventing the occurrence of human trafficking. They are introduced to a variety of communication methods including visual aids, plenary discussion, group work, and role-play developed elsewhere to increase the efficacy of learning the global method of governing human trafficking. Women are trained to develop entrepreneurial skills to release them from the supposed burden of migrating for labour opportunities. Training mechanisms tend to be narrated in terms of a top-down and consequent vertical flow, in the sense that professional trainers are dispatched from the centres of power like the ILO regional headquarters in Bangkok to instruct ‘local’ trainees who forward skills in how to manage ‘their’ problem such as human trafficking into the depths of communities. Yet, experience in the field is often marked by encounters with clashing logics of governing. As is evident in the dynamics of the Vietnamese human trafficking assemblage, the imported logic of governing through human trafficking gradually incorporated elements of the logic of governing through social evil.

The analyses of the migrant health assemblage and the human trafficking assemblage discussed in chapters four and five not only illustrate the way human security’s dangerous geography materializes, they also show how the material as well as spatio-temporal coordinates of the assemblages render the effects of situated human security processes always transient and subject to unintended and unforeseen changes. Indeed, the lens of machinic assemblage demonstrates that the success of grand theories and totalizing policy initiatives such as human security rely on the ability of contemporaries to recognise some determinate rule of constitution and differentiation that allows them to identify what counts as human security and what as human insecurity. Failing to speak to this common language, the dangerous discourse that is human security would collapse under the ambiguities and indeterminacy surrounding any totalizing representation including conflicting interpretations, transgressed boundaries, disputed boundaries, resistances, and exceptions. In this sense, the perspective of human security, to quote Ashley, is “no more powerful than claims to the effect that the world is, say, a machine, an organism, a communication web, or a spaceship Earth-or a plate of spaghetti, for that matter” (Ashley, 1989:292-3).

Through the lens of machinic assemblage, human security materializes as a “living, throbbing grouping whose coherence coexists with energies and countercultures that exceed and confound it” (Bennett, 2005:445). Since it is not governed by a central power,
“no one member has sufficient competence to fully determine the consequences of the activities” of the assemblage (Bennett, 2005:445). As illustrated in Thailand and Vietnam, the contingency of these ad hoc groupings does not, however, render it lacking in efficacy.

Unlike the migrant health assemblage through which ran a multitude of lines of segmentarity that territorialized the assemblage, lines of breakage and fracture, “causing asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate,” have threatened to dismantle an otherwise seemingly consolidated human trafficking assemblage. The deteritorializing processes arriving from outside the assemblage leave the multiplicity of constituted subjectivities, e.g. the ‘risk-averse migrant,’ with “nothing more than a name as the trace of an intensity” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:4). It is in this sense that human security appears as a body without organs plugged into the human trafficking assemblage. Firstly, the human trafficking assemblage was plagued by lines of asignification which materialized in the struggle between the language of social evils and the language of human trafficking. In fact, due to political sensitivity with the language of labour exploitation employed in the discussion about trafficking pushed for by the ILO, the project was not approved until 2005. Secondly, lines of deteritorialization emerging from the clash between standard project short-termism and government reorganization threatened the actualization of the intervention in Vietnam. The ILO encountered in Vietnam a difficult, complex and highly political field in which the conditions of operation were largely found wanting.

EMERGING ORDERS OF GOVERNANCE

The migrant health assemblage in Thailand and human trafficking assemblage in Vietnam show the way the governmental logic of human security is concretely redrawing the boundaries of the contemporary global order. Considering the mutations in Thai and Vietnamese statecraft discussed in the previous chapters, the challenge of human security cannot be explained “within the conceptual antinomies offered by territorial sovereignty and supra-territorial globality” underpinning the debate about the state in human security I presented in chapter two (Coward, 2005:856). First, the state is not the source of governmental power but is inserted into governmental assemblages concerned with the management of transversal flows, for example the double circulation of low-skilled labour and microbes in Thailand. As such, the state appears as the conduit for global governance. Second, sovereignty within the space of these assemblages is not gained through territory
but is conditional on population. This is not to say that these states do not elsewhere still draw their legitimacy from territory such as in relation to the mentioned border issue between Thailand and Cambodia. However, it is fast becoming human security's legacy that contemporary problematizations of security are not simply about seizing territory or controlling resources but about "securing the changing and manifold processes of global circulation as such" (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008:284).

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the migrant health and human trafficking assemblages operate among a multiplicity of other assemblages with which they are liable to clash. Stefan Elbe, for example, has differentiated between three kinds of security regimes which operate on different logics and mechanism including traditional national security, human security, and risk management (Elbe, 2009). Taking further the interpretative framework developed here, human security assemblages will inevitably clash with either of the other heterogeneous regimes, resulting in readjustments and hybridizations and the emergence of novel practices.

An implication of the redrawing of global order is that human security operates as a vector for governmental power. This is evident, for example, in the use of human security discourses and practices in order to reconstitute relations, subjectivities, and institutions when moving through the fields of migrant health and human trafficking. An implication of this process is what can be called the foreclosure of the political. Human security was plugged into the assemblages cleansed of politics; technocratic strategies were put forward to deal with the problems of migrant health and human trafficking. By foreclosing politics to the exclusion of important but difficult and highly political questions such as legality, refugee status, labour exploitation, racism, citizenship, emigration and immigration policies, the problems of migrant health and human trafficking were rendered as technical problems for which a technical solution applies. While local government institutions remain one of the key elements in these assemblages, activities are negotiated with and through various other elements including international (non)governmental organizations.

The exclusion of sensitive political matter from proposed interventions was a necessary condition for the intergovernmental organizations to negotiate their entry into the field. Not only did this move enable these organizations to work alongside and with the relevant government institutions in the management of these situated moments of dangerous circulation. Importantly, it also allowed the institutions to work with evasive communities to which they otherwise had little access. The reduction of migrant health and human
trafficking to ‘merely’ technical questions in which disparate datasets and expert knowledges, strategies and practices are assembled saw the objectives of the MOPH in Thailand and the VWU, MPS and other Vietnamese government institutions converge with the intervening IGOs. This transnationalization of the Thai Ministry was seen as necessary in order to tame the circulation of pathogens said to originate in Thai migrant communities and of illicit mobilities said to originate from Vietnamese women and children.

What is at stake in this mutation in statecraft that human security entails is the shift from an exclusive focus on sovereign control of the territory towards a governmental concern with circulation. The state as a way of governing (Foucault, 2007:277) in global politics is reoriented towards managing circulation in order to create human security. Circulation, as Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero suggest, “is concerned with flows, but flows have to be monitored and regulated” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008:268). This involves changing the basic routines, transactions and practices of governing institutions, as is evident in the two empirical chapters of this thesis. The resulting assemblages are not controlled by any one actor, state or supra-national organisation. As the Thai and Vietnamese cases have shown, the state is only one of many elements which figure in these governmental assemblages. Within this context, the process of mapping self and other undergirding human security mechanisms, becomes a problem of the West managing the form of life for and of those marked as the other. The implications of such a project concerns the subjectivation of key populations, the modification of minds, behaviours, and mechanisms in order to contribute to the regulation of dangerous circulations through their good health, safe migration, and so on. To achieve this, in contrast to the geopolitical spatialization of power concerned with demarcating the boundaries of government around a fixed territory, the geo-biopolitical spatialization of power is concerned with demarcating the boundaries of government around shifting and de-territorialized populations.

By thinking and studying key categories of emerging global politics as mobile effects of power, this thesis calls for a mode of critique that can describe the historical, discursive, and material conditions of possibility for principles and practices of contemporary global politics. The thesis finds that the governing processes and their effects are only partially apparent in the policies designed at centres of power such as the Human Security Unit at the United Nations headquarters in New York, the Ministry of Public Health in Thailand, or the Ministry of Public Security in Vietnam. More so than at these institutional centres which regularly attract the eye of political scientists, the governing processes are
localizing, as Appadurai has suggested, insofar as they take effect in the encounters with the everyday of communities targeted by the policies. The everyday events unsettle, disrupt even, the governing activities of actors, rendering the self-evidence of power questionable. The frameworks of thought used to make sense of the world inform, legitimize even, policies and practices which intervene, sometimes violently, in the different forms of life of individuals and communities around the world such as the Burmese in Thailand and the Vietnamese women and children targeted under human security.

The material I gathered on site in Vietnam and Thailand disrupts in many important and exciting ways the image of a logical and coherent rationality at work as is the subject of so many analyses of governmentality. In my opinion, many such analyses are able to posit rationalities (liberal or other) as logical and coherent only by largely excluding the multifaceted ways that rationalities are lived. Experience is one way to approach this. Indeed, although the obligatory claim is made that rationalities are products of and always subject to contingent events, experiences and practices, only rarely is this fully appreciated and taken further analytically. By not taking up this challenge, however, the lived experience comes to be thought as something outside or beyond governmental rationalities that leads us into the old binary trap of the programme/practice or theoretical/practical. In fact, the vague conceptualization of human security encourages multiple actors at various levels 'to own' the concept, thus, giving rise to a whole array of loose networks of actors, institutions and organizations with distinct, possibly contradicting, intersubjective norms, analyses and reflections as well as procedures of operationalizing human security.

**HUMAN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

What are the political implications of human security for global politics? As I have shown in this thesis, the publication of Foucault’s lectures series, *Security, Territory, Population* and *The Birth of Biopolitics*, has further opened up the possibility for the critical analysis of governmental assemblages and their relation to broader questions of power and world order. As I demonstrated in relation to human security in chapters four and five, the analysis of power in the sites where power is thought to emanate, namely, at headquarters of international agencies, is limited if not complemented by an investigation of sites of practice where power operates and is performatively produced – at the molecular level.
Specifically, by shifting attention away from the agents brandishing sovereign power (states, politicians, bureaucrats) to their constitution through micro-practices of power, it is possible to return to the general problem of political sovereignty and global governance. Unlike the tendency of governmental accounts in International Relations to reflect only on programmatic rationalities and top-down flows of power, deemphasizing the incoherence and contingency of power as well as the invention of governing practices from below, this thesis has shed light on the variability and precariousness of governmental flows. Specifically, it demonstrates the way governance, and the governance of life in particular, in spite of the sustained confidence in human mastery, is but a telos. Life always somehow exceeds governmentalization (securitization). On the other hand, it is this excess of governance that engenders creative readjustments. In this sense, (global) governance is always ‘merely’ becoming.

By suggesting human security is a specific logic which is to be disseminated throughout UN activities, the Chief of the HSU inadvertently drew attention to the subtle ways that order is created, maintained and transformed in and beyond formal institutions. In the field, I observed the way human security emerged as a messy, contingent and at times absurd political strategy which was in the process of setting up and arranging a set of heterogeneous elements around specific problems such as migrant health and human trafficking including situated knowledges and expertise, programmes, technocratic processes, mechanisms of ordering, recording, presenting, and, crucially, their materiality. Thus, analysed in terms of governmentality, human security is a more or less calculated and rational activity, carried out by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge which aim to shape behaviour by working through desires, interests and beliefs with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes (Dean, 1999:2). Put differently, within the de-territorialized governmental assemblages it comprises, human security needs to be considered as a productive network that traverses whole social bodies comprising the assemblage such as Burmese communities in Ranong, Thailand and the targeted hamlets in the Mekong delta. Indeed, human security does not merely speak for but applies itself to the immediate everyday life, categorizing individuals and communities, imposing regimes of truth on them. Human security, then, is an all-pervasive enabling process in which subjects and objects are constituted.

In order to understand the political implications of the problematization of the governance of global spaces as presented by human security, namely, as governance beyond the state, I chose to adopt an analytics of assemblages by drawing particularly on the Deleuzian
conception of machinic assemblages in which the materiality of collective wholes is particularly emphasized. Rather than taking for granted existent categories of political rule such as the state and the inside/outside divide, an analytics of governmental assemblages sheds light on how such articulations emerge from the elementary dynamism inherent to the assemblage. When the object of analysis is the global, tracing the materiality of events, as this thesis has done, helps to explore how the global is localized in, for example, articulations of political sovereignty such as the state and the human. At the same time, tracing materialities opens up the opportunity to explore how the local materializes. While it helps to see the way the micro and macro-political logics and processes of governance are intimately related, it also highlights the way the interplay between localizations and materializations disrupts the logics that underlie governmental processes. For example, it points to the need to take into account the differences in interpretive environments otherwise obscured as was evident in the emergence of migrant health in Thailand and human trafficking in Vietnam. Not only do ‘global’ programmes only tangentially become adaptable to ‘local’ settings but governance is frequently also invented from below, producing hybrid forms of governance in which ‘global’ and ‘local’ governance (security) cultures become intertwined. Consequently, by drawing attention to the diverse human security assemblages that seek to order reality, the thesis demonstrates aspects of global governance usually occluded in the discourse of global governance. Specifically, it shows the way human security gives rise to precarious political subjectivities including the human and political order.

Succinctly, this thesis shows how the political effects of human security are circumstantial, unstable, always in the process of becoming, forever absorbing new elements. These effects invite reflections on what can International Relations learn from the mutations of statecraft that result from the operation of human security strategies. First, there is a clear lesson in terms of the study of biopolitics. The thesis has demonstrated that the life that biopolitics seeks to regulate always exceeds as well as adapts the strategies of regulation. This implies, as is generally accepted by Foucauldian scholarship, that studies of biopolitics must be attentive to the microphysics and capillaries of life. Such attentiveness must focus in particular on the precarious nature of life, as its referent of analysis, and the contexts within which it develops. By focusing on the materiality of human security, this thesis has contributed to such an enquiry in showing that if human security is inextricably enmeshed with nonhuman agencies, and if the intentions of those endorsing and applying human security can be enforced only if accompanied by a vast entourage of nonhumans, then, it seems pertinent to analyse the political implications of human security not in
terms of the intentions of the programmatic agenda but in terms of the collectivity coalescing around a human security problem.

Second, International Relations can learn more by giving credence to the materiality of the vernacular. In terms of the political implications on global relations, the thesis has shown that initiatives like human security, which problematize the governance of global space, engender governmental assemblages that give rise to emerging relations of power in the vernacular. Based on the field research, it was demonstrated here that while narratives of the global appear coherent, totalizing and successful, their materialization in vernacular contexts gives rise to circumstantial and precarious assemblages of power. This entails an encounter between contending ways of imagining what it means to govern life.

Thirdly, there is a contribution that arises from the use of materiality as a category for analysis. An emphasis on materiality allows for a shift in the traditional emphasis of international relations, from the state to a relational ontology of power. As used in the analysis of human security presented here, a focus on machinic assemblages makes it possible to problematize the empirical ground upon which political analysis is conducted. This relational ontology poses questions to the theory of International Relations that deserve to be explored in further work.

Finally, I would like to identify some emerging lines of research to further develop a research agenda on the assemblages of human security within International Relations. This project has opened up, for example, the opportunity to explore in greater detail the localization and materialization of other forms of global governance. It also enables analysing in more detail the productive excess which results from the enactment of governmental strategies. As the thesis has demonstrated, the excess prompts a readjustment of strategies which help produce innovations in policy, science and art. It has also opened up the possibility of exploring the governance of the human, particularly of other narratives of the human in global relations such as the localization and materialization of migration management, human rights and the governance of vitality such as neglected diseases like elephantiasis and leprosy, stem cells, human genome and so on.


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