A University of Sussex DPhil thesis

Available online via Sussex Research Online:

http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/

This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given

Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details
Statement

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another university for the award of any other degree.

Signature

..........................................................
SUMMARY

This thesis argues for a move beyond the division of contemporary western experiences into separate social and political spheres. This includes a comparative study of the theories of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault alongside historical and contemporary examples in support of the relevance of their theories and that of this thesis.

The synthesis between Arendt and Foucault made here corrects the respective weaknesses in each theory by using the strengths of the other. Furthermore, this synthesis informs a move beyond the social and political referred to above. The critique of sovereignty, the defence of plurality and the critique of instrumental reason are shown here as the most important parallels between the two thinkers and the central ways that people in contemporary western society are disempowered. This thesis argues for a reconsideration of these issues in order to redress this disempowerment.

The thesis also looks at the major divergence between the two thinkers which is shown to rest on their respective treatment of the social and political. This argument rejects the Arendtian argument for the separation of the social and political to favour Foucauldian resistance located on and within the everyday experiences of western individuals. This shown to be political action rooted in the social aspects of individuals’ lives and stands in opposition to the claims of Arendt regarding the social. However, this retains the political strengths of her vision.

The synthesis of the strengths of both theorists alongside the ultimate rejection of the Arendtian separation of the social and political that this Foucauldian resistance exemplifies is concluded as constituting a move beyond the social and political to have more relevance, meaning and ultimate empowerment for individuals because it more accurately reflects the realities of their everyday lives.
## Contents

Statement  
Summary  
Contents  
Acknowledgements  

- **Introduction**  

- **Chapter One: The Loss of The City Citizen: Arendt’s Critique of Sovereignty**  
  1.1: Introduction  
  1.1.1: Contemporary Forms of Fear: Insecurity, Anxiety, Uncertainty and Mistrust  
  1.2: Sovereignty as Leviathan  
  1.3: The Westphalian State  
  1.4: The (Non) Sovereign Individual  
  1.5: Conclusion  

- **Chapter Two: The Rise of The Shepherd-Flock: Foucault’s Critique of Sovereignty**  
  2.1: Introduction  
  2.2: Sovereignty as Leviathan  
  2.3: The Inversion of Clausewitz and the Isolated Individual at War  
  2.4: Conclusion  

- **Chapter Three: Arendt’s Defence of Plurality**  
  3.1: Introduction  
  3.2: Equality and Distinction  
  3.3: The Elimination of Spontaneity  
  3.4: Action as Speech and Deeds and Action as Resistance  
  3.5: Other ‘actions’: Natality  
  3.6: Outside the Plural: Isolation, Loneliness and Solitude  
  3.6.1: Isolation  
  3.6.2: Loneliness and Solitude  
  3.7: Conclusion
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Four: Difference, Discipline, Domination: Foucault and the Pastoralisation of the Plural</th>
<th>85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1: Introduction</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2: The Defence of Society: Permanent Purification and Techniques of Domination</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3: ‘Knowing Man’: Foucault and Assujetissement</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4: Divide and Rule: The Value of Distinction</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5: Permanent Purification: The Defence of Plurality via Agonism and Action</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.51: Foucault, Action and Speech</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6: The Coldest of all Cold Monsters: The Pastoralisation of the Plural and its Relevance to Today</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7: Conclusion</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Five: Arendt’s Critique of Instrumental Rationality</th>
<th>114</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1: Introduction</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2: Arendt’s Understanding of Means-Ends Rationality</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3: Arendt’s Critique of Violence</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4: Tyranny Without Tyrants: Arendt and Bureaucracy</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5: Banality and Evil: Instrumental Rationality and The Loss of Judgement</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6: Conclusion</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Six: Foucault’s Critique of Instrumental Rationality</th>
<th>138</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1: Introduction</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2: The Critique of Instrumental Rationality as Principle</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3: Political Rationality, Power and the Application of Agonism</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4: Sovereign Positivisms: The Critique of Instrumental Rationality as Form</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5: Dazzling the King: Foucault and Bureaucracy</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6: Instrumental Rationality in Modern Form: The Arendtian Aspect</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7: Violence and the Importance of Thought</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8: Conclusion</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Seven: Arendt: The Social and Political

7.1: Introduction
7.2: Misery and Want: The Curse of Poverty
7.3: Marx and the Socialization of Poverty
7.31: The Public/Private Distinction
7.4: The Arendtian Political
7.41: Promises and Forgiveness
7.5: Conclusion

165
166
173
174
182
186
190

Chapter Eight: Beyond the Social and Political: Political Agents in The Social Realm

8.1: Introduction
8.2: The Foucauldian Importance of Economy
8.3: Bio-politics: Political Domination Throughout Society
8.4: The Paradox of Neo-Liberalism
8.5: The Problem with Politics Today
8.6: Foucault and Ethics
8.61: Epimeleia Heautou: The Inversion of Power via Care of the Self
8.7: Politics as an Ethics
8.8: Conclusion: ‘The Political’ Over ‘The Social’

194
194
197
202
205
207
209
213
219

Conclusion: Empowering Everyday Lives

221

Bibliography

237
Acknowledgements

The first thanks I give are to my supervisor, Dr. Darrow Schecter, not only for his support in the usual sense of a doctoral supervisor, but also for his understanding regarding my situation, the interruptions that it caused and the impacts of this on the time it took me to complete. I would also like to thank Prof. William Outhwaite for his feedback on my early outline and all of the staff at Sussex University library, UWE library, University of Reading Library, Oxford Brookes library and Swindon libraries.

My colleagues at the Open University who must be thanked include the late Dr. Peter De Vries, Dr. Sandra Buckland, Dr. Claire Smetherham, Dr. Hazel Roberts, Mark Gillard for the Hardt article, Mark Kirby for the online debate that forced me to think even more clearly about Foucault and Dr. Teresa Willis for the book about the doctoral viva process. I also thank my contemporary doctoral hopefuls Dr. Emma Scott and Dr. Thanos Kastritis for their words of wisdom and support which have always been gratefully received.

When both sanity and patience was nearly lost to me forever, the 2R1 ‘gang’ was there for me with the same mirth as there ever was, proving that you can again have friends like the ones you had when you were twelve. I also thank Dee Harrad and Kirstie Jackman for the practical support of the gift of time when I needed it. I will never forget.

The value of some friendships simply cannot be captured in words. These are the people in whose company you fully understand Arendt’s emphasis on the plural and Foucault’s observation that good friendship doesn’t always need words. These people, who I will never really be able to thank enough (but thank here anyway!) for their patience with my infinite questions regarding ‘how it all works’ not to mention their inherent kindness, support and hospitality, are Dr. Steve Brown and Dr. Catherine Hollis. Steve and Pete Sherman-O’Neill are simply two of the best friends a person can have and I have always been grateful for their support, not least when I frequently needed good company to take my mind off of it all. Vital support came from the home-in-the-world of other very longstanding friendship, for giving me this sanctuary I thank Sarah Roberts and Donna Porter.

The best and most important thanks have been saved for last. I thank Mum and Dad, Danny, Ted and my grand parents for their support and understanding in everything that I have done. I love them all very much.

Many lifetimes would not be enough to express to Gary and Dylan how grateful I am for the support that they have shown for my PhD ambition over what has seemed the longest time. That they lived with less familiarity of exactly what it all meant, and yet showed understanding and patience to an extent that frequently outstripped mine just goes to show that brilliance comes in a multitude of forms and belongs to no specific years of age. It is no overstatement to claim that without their support this thesis would not exist, that it does is testament to the laughter we share and the support that they give. My heartfelt gratitude and unending love go to them both.
The Unknown Citizen.
(To JS/07/M378 This Marble Monument is Erected by the State)

He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to be
One against whom there was no official complaint.
And all the reports on his conduct agree
That, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, he was a saint
...Except for the War till the day he retired
He worked in a factory and never got fired,
...Yet he wasn’t a scab or odd in his views,
For his Union reported that he paid his dues,
(Our report on his Union shows it was sound)
And our Social Psychology workers found
That he was popular with his mates and liked a drink.
...Policies taken out in his name prove that he was fully insured,
And his health card shows he was once in hospital but left it cured
...he had everything necessary to the Modern Man,
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a Frigidaire.
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content
That he held the proper view for the time of year;
When there was peace, he was for peace; when there was war, he went
He was married and added five children to the population,
...Which our Eugenist says was the right number for a parent of his generation,
Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd:
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.

W. H. Auden (1960)
Do not go gentle in that good night.
Rage, rage against the dying of the light

Dylan Thomas (1952)
INTRODUCTION

In 1999 I criticized Michel Foucault (1926-1984) for not recognizing in his College de France lectures that his call for political philosophy to ‘cut off the king’s head’ (1980:121) had already been achieved by Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). Over the course of researching the above article it became apparent that there were both parallels and divergences between the two theorists to an extent that an article could not adequately explore. At that time, the comparison between these two theorists was a relatively under explored area within social and political thought. The exception to this was in feminist literature where the compatibility and contrast between the two had some provenance. It was still however restricted in terms of the potential that it offered. There was then a nagging intuition that there was something very original in taking a much deeper and more extended exploration of the work of these two theorists in comparison and contrast to one another, particularly by taking the wider approach of looking at comparisons between them in general, rather than the sociologically specific and by definition limited site of feminist politics.

Other reasons contributed to the desire to develop a thesis length argument around these two thinkers. There is also something very timely in the parallel observations that both make regarding the empowerment of individuals in the contemporary western world which in this thesis is used to apply mainly, but not exclusively, to Western Europe and North America. In actual fact, the points in this thesis would apply to any part of the world where the experiences of people’s everyday lives fit the descriptions made here. The concept of state used in this thesis is applied both in the sense of Max Weber’s definition of ‘an exclusive rule over a given territory’ (in Gerth and Mills 1974: 78) and as the set of shared practices and organisations that order everyday life. The thesis also grew out of the desire to demonstrate that in fact issues encapsulated in the umbrella term ‘the social realm’ should not be sidelined by the traditional cannon of politics, a notion of which Arendt can be considered to be representative, but that the social was immanent to and therefore inseparable from politics as is shown in the work of Michel Foucault. It is the ultimate aim

---

2 With the exception of Grumley (1998) and Dana Villa (1999). Both are however brief engagements with the subject.
of this thesis not only to point out the need to transcend this distinction given the disempowering experiences of the contemporary western world but also to suggest the way that this might be done. This thesis therefore is the consequence of these two theorists’ parallels to each other, important divergence from each other and the contemporary relevance that a synthesis of their strengths offers.

Despite the argument here originating from an appraisal of Arendt that led to a critique of Foucault, this thesis concludes with an ultimate critique of Arendt via an appraisal of Foucault. The structure of the thesis and the reasons for this will be explained in due course. Firstly, however, it is necessary to explain something about the ideological background of these thinkers, the way that this is employed in this thesis and the changing context of the secondary literature against which this thesis will be written.

Bellamy points to the political and social naivety of most recent liberal theorising of all persuasions (1992: 217) and in doing so he unintentionally pinpoints the problem in modern liberalism that both Arendt and Foucault malign and which it is important to clarify. Liberalism is not a straightforward ideology. For example, consideration must be given to the historical span of liberal ideas which range from for example Thomas Hobbes’ (1588-1679) seventeenth century advocacy for a necessary political authority in the body of the sovereign (1651) to John Rawls’ (1921-) twentieth century Theory of Justice (1971). Furthermore, there are also the different forms of liberalism that originate from different places. To further complicate the issue, different strands of liberalism can appear to argue very different things depending upon whether they primarily involve an argument concerned with the ‘social’ that is the everyday lives of individuals, ‘political’ issues that are the degree to which those individuals are empowered in their everyday lives, or the ‘economic’ sphere which pertains to material wealth.

There is extensive ‘cross-over’ between liberal thinkers, but drawing crude boundaries allows those arguments of Mill (1806-1832) concerning sexual discrimination, Hobhouse’s (1864-1929) importance of society (1911) and Rawls’ social justice (1971) to be considered a more ‘social’ form of liberalism. Likewise, the arguments of Hobbes for sovereign authority (1651), Rousseau (1712-1778) for the ‘general will’ (1743) or Weber’s (1864-

---

4 For an informative consideration of liberalism on this basis see Bellamy (1992).
1920) consideration of the state in Politics as a Vocation (1974) could be considered ‘political’ liberalism. Lastly, the twentieth century argument by Hayek (1899-1992) of the importance of the free market in opposition to planned economies would constitute a much more economic liberalism.

Explaining and understanding Arendt and Foucault’s critique in this respect is made all the more complex by the fact that at times both theorists present some liberal moments of their own. Arendt, for example, would concur in part with TH Green’s recognition of the importance of private possessions (in Bellamy 1992: 42) and in full with Hobhouse’s recognition of the importance of the plurality of people (1964: 7) and the effectiveness of people acting together via an equal share of power (1964: 30,40). She would likewise agree with Weber’s recognition of the twentieth century marriage of state politics and violence (1918: 78). Foucault coincides with Rousseau in seeing ‘men everywhere in chains’ (Rousseau 1968: 49) or Hobhouse’s assertion for the importance of freedom from compulsion by others (1964: 76). Both Arendt and Foucault find simultaneous liberal moments in their furtherance of Locke’s (1632-1704) respect for toleration and difference of opinion and emphasis on the value of pluralism (Bellamy 1992: 166), Bentham’s (1748-1832) argument for the accountability of the governors to the governed (in Held 1989: 118) and Mill’s arguments for anti-paternalism and anti-conformity (in Bellamy 1992: 24-6). Both would also concur with the Weberian description of the modern state as a ‘relation of men dominating men’ (1918: 78) and the increasing and damaging rationalization and bureaucratization of western life (Bellamy 1992: 166).

Despite these moments of convergence with liberalism there are clear moments where Arendt and Foucault critique other liberal principles thus standing in significant distinction to them. Both overtly reject the absolutism of Hobbes’ description of individuals as hostile and in need of sovereign authority. They also reject Rousseau’s belief in the unanimity of a general will (1968: 61) and the implicit elitism in Weber’s arguments regarding who can live ‘for’ politics (1974: 85). Both also reject the Enlightenment ‘faith’ in rationality such as Croce’s (1866-1952) trust in the rationality of the historical process (in Bellamy 1992: 142). Likewise, it can also be inferred that they would reject arguments such as that of
Locke (1690) that security can be found through man’s reason (1996: 271-2) and the possession of private wealth (1996: 272-3).

Arendt and Foucault’s relationship to liberal thinking therefore is a highly complex one. When the specific elements of liberalism that they reject are distilled and examined as they are in this thesis, theirs is a critique better described as being directed against liberalism since 1945, a notable point in the history of liberalism broadly supported by Bellamy (1992: 217). This is a particular type of liberalism that Foucault refers to as ‘neo-liberal’ (2004: 130) and which this thesis defines, in line with Foucault, as a form of ideology concerned with the free market, increasing privatisation at the same time as welfare reduction, and governance of the individual informed by principles of efficiency and competitiveness leading to self-interest (Kiely 2005: 63, 151, 224, 293). Held describes the liberalism of the modern state as one that ‘became absorbed with questions of sovereignty and citizenship’ (1989: 107), and to this Foucault would add the terms ‘security’, specifically economic security (2004: 130) and ‘population’ (2002: 132). These are additions to which the claims of Arendt would lend some support. Both theorists have as central concerns the points at which government informed by liberal principles become self-contradictory.

This thesis views Arendt’s critique of liberal principles as being directed against similar issues to those made by Foucault. This interpretation is supported by the examples that both use to illustrate their arguments. This thesis therefore considers that Arendt’s criticism of liberalism can be described as a criticism against neo-liberalism despite this being a term that she does not use. To this end, where the term ‘liberalism’ is used here in chapters pertaining to Arendt, it is used with this neo-liberal interpretation of it in mind.

Since 1999 the secondary body of literature that compares Arendt and Foucault has grown. This is both a curse and a blessing. It is a curse because the initial basis of originality upon which this thesis was first grounded has perhaps been undermined somewhat. However, it remains the case that the majority of comparative secondary literature are articles; there are only two other book length studies that consider Arendt and Foucault comparatively. The

---

5 This is to the best of my knowledge. See Kang (2005) and Kingston (2009).
blessing that arises from the increasing comparative body of work on Arendt and Foucault is that it has created a new basis of originality.

This new originality is achieved in three main ways. Firstly, this thesis is able to bring together in one place most of the existing comparative secondary literature on Arendt and Foucault. This goes beyond the limit of all other comparative pieces to make this thesis distinct. The second point of originality derives from the points of parallel and divergence between the two that are considered. These are not limited to sovereignty (Agamben 1998, Martel 2010), revolution (Grumley 1998), violence (Duarte 2007), the social (Pitkin 1998) or critical thinking (Kang 2005).

The argument here finds some kinship in the readings of Foucault and Arendt made by Kang (2005) and in terms of its ultimate conclusion the claims of Grumley (1998) and Kingston (2009) have some resonance. Further originality is provided on the basis that this argument pushes beyond the traditional dichotomy of individual versus collective (Braun, 2007, Kingston, 2009, Marquez, 2010) by overtly recognizing that although the collective aspect of social action is not unimportant (Grumley 1998, Braun 2007) it is not something to be limited by either (Gordon 2001, Kingston 2009, Marquez 2010).

The readings of Foucault and Arendt made here are original because of their distinction to a neutral reading of both theorists (Grumley 1998, Kang 2005). This thesis emphasizes a positive reading of Foucault’s power with the conclusion that this offers more accurate analysis and resolution for disempowerment in twenty-first century everyday life than the arguments of Arendt, whilst having the advantage of retaining the important empowering spirit of Arendt. However, there is also originality through the attention that is given to certain under-explored aspects of Arendt and Foucault’s work in the comparative secondary literature. For Arendt this is the ‘social’, something which this thesis considers some secondary literature to treat as ‘the elephant in the room’ in her work. The under explored aspects of Foucault that this thesis brings out is his critique of instrumental rationality.

The secondary literature on Arendt and Foucault as separate thinkers is limitless. For practical reasons this thesis largely focuses on the comparative secondary literature, although often because of what has been accurately described as ‘too simplistic a reading’
(Kang 2009: 8, 96) there are times where consideration is given to non-comparative secondary literature because certain claims therein warrant a response on this basis. Likewise, this thesis rejects any labels upon Arendt and Foucault that attempt to unnecessarily categorize them into the traditional canon (Klausen and Martel 2008). This is considered restrictive and not in the spirit of either theorist.

The first six chapters of this thesis look at the main parallels between Foucault and Arendt. These are selected because it is felt that they are the converging aspects of their theories that have the most relevance for those societies identified earlier. Chapters Seven and Eight looks at the ultimate divergence between the two, namely their differing approaches to the social and political. Given this thesis’ aim to demonstrate the relevance of aspects of these theories to the contemporary western world all chapters of this thesis use contemporary socio-political examples and data in support of the claims both of Arendt and Foucault and also of the thesis itself.

The use of the term ‘society’ in this thesis is used to refer to the collection of plural people within a state whose everyday lives are subject to the governance of the centralised authority of that state. This definition is supported by Foucault who recognises the importance of the ‘actual experiences’ (1998: 231) of ‘immediate everyday life’ (2003: 31). In addition to Arendt, other social and political thought treats the experiences of everyday life as an issue that can be separated from those of empowerment and uses the short hands ‘social’ and ‘political’ to represent these separated spheres (for example Schmitt 2007, Pitkin 1998, Schecter 2000). Although this thesis shows that both Arendt and Foucault use these concepts in highly idiosyncratic ways, it also shows that Arendt can be considered to be representative of this separation. As the ultimate contention of this thesis is that the misleading separation of these two concepts is transcended, the times when the terms ‘social’ and ‘political’ are used in this thesis is due to their value as short hands, not because they exist as genuinely distinct spheres.

The first chapter looks at Arendt’s critique of sovereignty in three ways. It offers a consideration that goes further than other secondary work which alludes to but does not fully explore this issue (Connolly 1997) or that ignores it completely (Martel 2010). It distinguishes Arendt from advocates of sovereignty such as Hobbes and Schmitt and is
therefore the chapter which demonstrates Arendt’s strength that ‘cuts off the head of the king’. This chapter explains Arendt’s regret at the loss of the city-citizen and sets this problem up as a weakness that Foucault’s work redresses.

Chapter Two explains Foucault’s critique of sovereignty as a parallel concern to that of Arendt. It shows that like Arendt, Foucault is distinct from Hobbes and Schmitt. This chapter also shows how this thesis is distinct from other comparative writers of Foucault and Arendt such as Marquez who sees their treatment of isolation as different (2010: 27-8). In addition to outlining this parallel, this chapter suggests that the reversal of the prevalence of the Foucauldian shepherd flock might contribute to the reinvention of the Arendtian city-citizen thus demonstrating that Foucault’s critique of sovereignty has a strength that Arendt lacks.

Plurality is always used in this thesis in the directly Arendtian sense of the human condition that more than one person exists; every person exists at the same time as other people (Arendt 1998: 4, 1993: 73, 1976: 455). Chapter Three moves on to look at Arendt’s defence of plurality in the face of what she sees as mass western society. This chapter explains that Arendt’s remedy for this will be found in the politicization of the plural and emphasizes the importance of this today. This chapter further explains isolation as a ‘political’ issue and loneliness as a ‘social’ one. The importance of this chapter is that it highlights the importance of plurality in two ways: the ontological situation of people and the plurality of perspective that this has immanent to it.

Chapter Four explains that Foucault also defends plurality through valuing distinction. It emphasizes the importance of his argument for a much more dynamic operation of power and the importance of rejecting models of warfare that lead to fear of the other. This chapter explores the importance for creating a new relational fabric between people. Chapters Three and Four also exemplify the relevance to contemporary societies of this parallel between Foucault and Arendt that is a strength in the work of both.

Chapter Five explains Arendt’s critique of instrumental rationality which is defined here as means-end rationality which is shown to be rejected by Arendt because such forms of thinking stifle the ability to make judgements. This chapter also shows Arendt’s
distinctions to theorists such as Weber and Schmitt through her discussion of bureaucracy and politics. Furthermore, these two aspects of her thought exemplify its contemporary relevance.

Chapter Six reads a critique of instrumental rationality into Foucault’s genealogy of social normalization. The Nietzschean influence on Foucault is examined here. The chapter also argues that there is a critique of instrumental rationality inherent in his analysis of pastoralisation. As with the previous chapter, it is shown how the Nietzschean and pastoralising aspects of Foucault’s work link through their contemporary relevance to violence and bureaucracy which are again used to show his clearest parallel with Arendt. This chapter also marks the point at which their divergences begin.

Chapter Seven examines the divergence between Arendt and Foucault. This chapter looks at Arendt’s argument that the social dominates the political to the extent that the latter ceases to count as politics at all. Because the social and political are connected so strongly in Arendt’s oeuvre this chapter looks at them both. The chapter also examines but ultimately rejects her argument for the separation of the social and the political on the basis that the experiences of everyday life for many people make this impossible. Despite this rejection of Arendt, this chapter offers a much more sympathetic account of her idea of the social than is offered by other secondary commentators (Pitkin 1998, Reinhardt 1998, Medearis 2004, Kingston 2009, Marquez 2010).

The final chapter of the thesis also looks at the social and political together through the arguments of Foucault and abandons these short hands in favour of issues of empowerment within everyday life. Foucault’s differing approach to that of Arendt that is captured in his notion of bio-politics is shown to be the ultimate distinction of his work from hers and this chapter states this as the ultimate strength that he offers in relation to her major weakness. The chapter suggests an approach to contemporary issues of empowerment in everyday life drawing upon Foucault’s politics as an ethics. It is claimed here that politics as an ethics shows the way to challenge the dominations of bio-politics and the way to transcend the separation of the social and political by taking on governance in its singular sphere of operation.
There would have been several different ways to approach a comparative study of these two thinkers, indeed the subject matter is not exhausted yet. There might have been more consideration of the intellectual history informing these two thinkers such as that of Kant, Heidegger, Jaspers, Blanchot and Rousset, a more detailed examination of Nietzsche and Foucault and Arendt’s respective critiques of Marx and Humanism. However, given the aim of this thesis to demonstrate the relevance of a synthesis of Arendt and Foucault’s work to the contemporary world it was not possible to both look forward and backward with respect to their theories. For this reason the decision was made to focus on the present, between past and future one might say. Despite the ultimate rejection of Arendt contained in this thesis, it also demonstrates that it is nonetheless the case that the best of her vision is preserved in many of Foucault’s analyses.
1.0 THE LOSS OF THE CITY-CITIZEN: ARENDT’S CRITIQUE OF SOVEREIGNTY

1.1: Introduction

The estimations of the number of states in the contemporary world have ranged from 178 (Nye 1993: 6) to 190 (McGrew in Held 2004: 132) to a more recent figure of 167 (Democracy Index 2010). National states are governed in different ways. For example, Saudi Arabia is governed by absolute monarchy, whereas North Korea is governed by dictatorship. In both states popular mandate does not form the basis of governmental legitimacy. Other forms of government established without popular mandate include theocracies such as Iran and Vatican City or a junta government such as in Niger. In the case of Somalia there is the claim (Bromley 2009: p404) that there is no de facto exclusive centralised government at all.

Sovereign states and state systems are described by Arnason as a ‘world order’ (1996: 212). 112 claim to govern legitimately through popular mandate (Democracy Index 2010). This popular mandate, more often than not, is expressed through a process of free and fair elections of political representatives and politics is carried out day to day in the form of those political representatives forming government, rather than direct political participation by the population themselves6. Generally speaking, this means to govern according to principles commensurate with liberal democracy (Ibid). The specific internal arrangement of government of this type varies. For example, Germany and the USA use a federal system of government whereas the UK and Canada follow a parliamentary system. Some liberal democracies have a separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers such as the USA and Italy whereas some have a fusion of powers such as the UK, Eire, India and New Zealand. France and the USA elect both their head of state and their government, whereas the UK and Australia have a non-elected head of state. Other liberal democracies such as Belgium use a complex political system based on the communities within. Some states include a monarch in their political system such as Belgium and Japan, whereas republics such the USA and France do not.

6 The two partial exceptions to this in the contemporary context are Switzerland and the USA which both involve some elements of direct political participation beyond voting for representatives.
Bellamy (1992: 160) identifies a ‘common pattern of development in liberalism of which English, French and German versions are variants’. Despite the numerous international variations of liberal democracy, all share common aspects that permit them to be conceived of by the term liberal democratic. For example, all have a territorially exclusive centralised government which draws its legitimacy from the individuals governed therein. Contemporary global state politics is therefore divided between states that follow a liberal democratic model for government and those that do not.

In Hannah Arendt’s political oeuvre the political ideology that informs government matters less than the form and institutions that government takes, such as a centralised and distant government as exists in sovereign politics. In other words Arendt’s critique of sovereignty applies across the ideological political spectrum. This chapter draws on this non-partisan strength and also seeks to emulate it in the examples provided herein. Arendt’s critique of sovereignty uses Thomas Hobbes’ (1588-1679) concepts frequently and although there are numerous other thinkers (Bodin 1596, Spinoza 1670, Filmer 1680 and Schmitt 1922) who advocate the importance of sovereignty to politics, it is to Hobbes as a representative of this argument that Arendt directs her critique. In order to understand the uniqueness of this critique, it is necessary to understand some of the political values behind sovereignty that Arendt uses Hobbes’ claims to represent. Later some of the ways that Arendt can be distinguished from other, more recent theorists of sovereignty such as Carl Schmitt (1888 – 1985) will also be identified.

Hobbes believed humans to be essentially anti-social creatures. As a result, states of war can potentially arise and these states of war can arise in two ways. The first way arises from a covetous individual’s attempts at acquisition from another which may well require aggression to succeed. The second may arise from the attempts of individuals to protect themselves from this within the ‘competition of ‘Riches, Honour, Command...that inclines toward Contention, Enmity and War’ (Hobbes 1651: 161). This ‘natural state’ between human beings is one of conflict in Hobbes’ opinion. The potential acts of violence immanent to the state of nature are legitimised by the ‘state of nature’ itself (i.e. both the

---

7 As does Foucault as the next chapter will show. Other secondary theorists who do the same include Gratton (2006; 448), Marquez (2010, 16) and Martel (2010, 156).
right to ‘take’ and the right to ‘defend’). In a famous statement Hobbes describes this as a situation of a war of all against all (Ibid).

In his body of political work Hobbes outlines the solution to this apparently inescapable situation. Hobbes argued that to guarantee each individual’s security and to banish the fear between individuals in the state of nature, submission of individual wills to a sovereign ruler should take place. This sovereign might be one man or representative body of men. Every individual would agree to obey decisions about their well being taken by the sovereign, and in turn the sovereign takes responsibility for the security of the people and thus individuals live free of the fear of conflict arising from the state of nature which simmers under the surface of all human interactions. The sovereign’s responsibilities are discharged via civil institutions and law. As a result individuals need no longer worry about participating in political life, as the undercurrent of conflict that the unchecked state of nature threatens to explode, set off by such triggers as precarious security, tenuously possessed private property and arbitrary negative freedoms, is held safely in abeyance by the sovereign power. The ordinary person’s political action is defined by the conference of power on a sovereign, and their political responsibility(ies) of obedience to a sovereign.

In this contract there is no longer a demand for the general population to participate in public life nor is there seemingly any need. Such political organisation appears to offer security and freedom. Individual wills are understood as one unitary will, the differences between the social bodies thereby represented are irrelevant because, politically speaking, they become ‘one’ and an indivisible union exists: sovereignty as the bedrock of freedom. This facilitates other ideas about how politics should be organized such as many can be represented as one, the sovereign protects and ensures individual liberty(ies) and security is a tenuous and fragile state that continually requires a fine balance of parental nurturing and alert watchfulness by a sovereign to ensure security continues. However, before moving on to consider Arendt’s criticisms of sovereignty it is necessary to give a brief preliminary explanation as to how the notion of ‘fear’ that Hobbes’ drew upon in his political model upon finds equivalence in the contemporary western world. This is so that subsequent claims of this thesis regarding the relevance of Arendt and Foucault’s criticisms sovereignty can be better understood.
1.11: Contemporary ‘Fears’: Insecurity, Anxiety, Uncertainty and Mistrust

Although not arising from the Hobbesian thought experiment of a human state of nature constituted by a war of all against all, versions of ‘fear’ can be identified in contemporary social and political thought and the Hobbesian notion of fear added to, updated and understood through the concepts of insecurity, anxiety, uncertainty and mistrust.

Dodsworth argues that in contemporary political life it is through a ‘language of security’ that new government powers are legitimised (2011: 10). She goes on to identify a ‘climate of insecurity’ around terrorism that has been promoted to introduce new laws (Ibid). This form of political insecurity can be added to by job insecurity (Dawson 2004, Layard 2003c: 6, Skellington 2010: 17) and insecurities around marriage, the family and social roles (Beck 1989: 87-88). Ecological insecurity and the crisis in the scientific expert are two further insecurities identifiable today (Ibid). Forms of insecurity are so numerous and prolific today that contemporary society is defined by Beck as a ‘risk society’ within which the motivating force amongst people is argued to be ‘I am scared’ (1989: 95). Indeed, Beck’s description of contemporary western societies is one mired in the language of ‘risk’ (1989: 86), ‘danger and threat’ (1989: 92), ‘fear’ (1989: 95) and ‘emergency’ (1989: 102). This claim is supported by the growth in the formal study of health ‘risk’ that is epidemiology (Carter and Jordan 2009: 83).

Besides insecurity, Layard (2003) points to other aspects of modern western life that exemplify different forms of ‘fear’. The increasing levels of stress within the UK and Europe (2003c: 6) is something that Layard argues is attributable to the liberal doctrine of ‘self-advancemment’ which is he argues ‘a formula for producing anxiety’ (2003c: 15); Fribbance (2009: 46) qualifies this anxiety as ‘status anxiety’ linked to an individual’s economic and social position amongst their societal peers. The Downey report cites a publicly perceived decline in the ‘professional trustworthiness’ of politicians and government ministers (Bell 2000: 169) and the work of Glaeser et al (2000) and Putnam (2003) demonstrate increasing self-reports of declining trust between people in the UK and USA (in Wilkinson and Pickett 2009: 54). Declining trust between people may well be linked to the uncertainty that many people experience from increasing urbanisation from which they experience a sense of loss of place (Hinchliffe 2009: 213). In turn, the
uncertainty connected to loss of place may partially explain the fear and insecurities that surround both indigenous and immigrant populations in situations of migration (Raghuram 2009: 160-170). Such fears are exemplified by the No Borders movement’s (Hayter 2000) condemnation of Migration Watch’s 2005 campaign to limit immigrants into the UK as a campaign urging people to ‘live in fear’ (in Raghuram 2009: 170).

In the above ways ‘fear’ finds a place in contemporary society. In fact, the list of examples could go on and subsequent chapters of this thesis add to it. What is important at this point is to demonstrate how these notions of fear, the focus of Hobbes’ concerns five hundred years ago, finds contemporary expression in the experiences of insecurity, anxiety, uncertainty and mistrust. As this thesis will go on to show, these can be argued to inform contemporary versions of sovereignty.

Hannah Arendt fiercely criticizes sovereign models of politics. In her essay ‘What is Freedom?’ she is unequivocal that sovereignty must be renounced for people to be free (1993: 164-165). For Arendt, the sovereign model bequeathed by writers such as Hobbes is the antithesis to freedom. This claim is explained in the following chapter using three main criticisms of sovereignty made by Arendt. These are sovereignty as Leviathan, the Westphalian state as sovereign and the sovereign individual. The chapter is structured in these three ways to highlight the particular relevance and therefore the distinction that Arendt’s argument has for the ways in which politics operates today in many of the political systems outlined earlier.

1.2: Sovereignty as Leviathan

The initial premise of the war of all against all that writers such as Hobbes founded a vision of a political system upon, is for Arendt the very beginnings of all that is wrong about a political system as embodied in a Leviathan (1976: 139). This is because the sovereign holds all power(s). Sovereignty is the least egalitarian arrangement of power. It is ‘[…] an authoritarian form of government with its hierarchical structure […] it incorporates inequality and distinction as its all permeating principles’ (Arendt 1976: 99). ‘On Revolution’ (Arendt 1965) outlines the problems with the Hobbesian version of a contract between individuals and a sovereign, a covenant that Arendt describes as ‘a fictitious,
aboriginal act on the side of each member’ (1965: 170). The requirement of this contract is that power is relinquished by individuals in society and transferred onto a ruling ‘body’. The end result of this transference of power is that the individual has consented to obey and consequently to be governed, so rather than a gaining of more power, the individual loses what little power s/he had.

In distinction to Hobbes, Arendt states that the ‘arbitrary’ power held by the sovereign does not remove the dangers of isolation that the individual is argued to face in the state of nature. Rather than solving the problem of isolation: ‘[…] it is precisely their isolation which is safeguarded and protected’ (1965: 171). Thus the isolation of each individual is perpetuated by this kind of system, guaranteeing, in a circular, symbiotic relationship, the requirement for a sovereign and therefore the sovereign’s existence. For Arendt therefore, sovereign systems of politics perpetuate the very situations believed by many to be prevented.

The isolation of each individual from their peers is an indication of the anti-political nature of this statist organisation of power. The very important political faculty of the capacity for spontaneous action within each individual is stifled (Arendt 1998: 188). The suppression of the individual’s capacity to act and the possibility that the system may fail to suppress this capacity to act locks both governor and governed into a relationship based upon fear, resulting in a tyranny (1976: 461). A political system based upon sovereignty requires further tyrannical measures via the implementation of violence to maintain order to suggest that the sovereign model provides security. For Arendt, this means that sovereignty is an illusion, wholly at odds with the very freedoms that the sovereignty supposedly provides (1993: 164). For these reasons, Arendt reaches her conclusion that far from being the guardian of freedom(s) for individuals, sovereignty is, in fact, antithetical to it.

A further problem that Arendt sees in terms of the sovereign political model centres upon how a single will as embodied in the ruler can be equated to the multitude of wills existent in the society below and this is a common problem from the strongest and most inflexible form of centralized authority such as dictatorships to those claimed as liberal democracies. In Arendt’s view, rather than the sovereign’s will becoming one and the same as society, it is really a submission to will and a suppression of one’s own will that the individual
endures in this system (1965: 164-5). The absolute most that the individual can hope for in this system is that his/her will is represented by the sovereign, but as Arendt notes, this does not equate with a direct action from the individual informed by their opinion (1965: 268). In the contemporary European context the value of Arendt’s argument regarding political disenfranchisement is supported by an independent survey carried out by the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (2004) that demonstrates a political apathy that characterises a decline in voting participation. All Western European countries except Denmark show a decline in voting participation in parliamentary elections. This is particularly the case in countries that have never had compulsory voting but is also true in some countries that have abolished it, for example, Austria. Peston (2005: 318) and Stephens (2004: 189) identify a rise in voter apathy in the U.K citing a 59 percent turnout (Peston 2005: 318) in the 2001 elections which saw only 40 percent of those under the age of 25 turn out to vote (Ibid). This marked the lowest voter turnout since the introduction of universal suffrage (Stephens 2005: 236). Heffernan (2011: 9) claims that this rose to 61% in 2005, rising to 65% in the 2010 election, a decline from the ‘75% post-war average’ (Ibid). In terms of presidential elections in western European countries, the DEA survey shows a decline in voting and a lower voter turnout than for the parliamentary elections.

The attempts to equate a sovereign will as the will of the people is another way such governmental models suppress rather than provide freedom. This system ‘strives to organize the infinite plurality and differentiation of human beings as if all humanity were just one individual’ (Canovan 1974: 24) and is described by Arendt as ‘total domination’ (1976: 467). Indeed, this is one of the biggest dangers of the sovereign model for Arendt and is the reason a whole separate chapter of this thesis considers it. Arendt distinguishes herself from thinkers such as Rousseau (1983: 61) by pointing out that the idea of a ‘general will’ that can be represented by a sovereign neglects the plurality of individual wills. This creates the ideal political conditions for totalitarianism to flourish. ‘A perfect totalitarian government’ is for Arendt, ‘where all men have become one man’ (Ibid).

Immanent to liberal democratic political systems, within which ‘liberalism became absorbed with the question of sovereignty’ (Held 1989: 107), is the belief that submitting

---

8 International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (2004).
individual political power to a sovereign is democratic. The process for choosing a sovereign is either done by *deus ex machina*, as in the case of previous centuries or by popular vote, as in the case of contemporary liberal governments. Either way, this becomes accepted as legitimate, either because of divine law or because of the will of the majority. For Arendt, not only do sovereign political models ensure the continued isolation of each individual whilst at the same time homogenise the people below into the body of the sovereign, but the system in which liberal democracies come by sovereign governments is undemocratic because

Even if there is communication between representative and voter, between the nation and parliament [...,] this communication is never between equals but between those who aspire to govern and those who consent to be governed. It is indeed in the very nature of the party system to replace the formula ‘government of the people by the people’ by this formula: ‘government of the people by an elite sprung from the people’ (1965: 276-7).

Arendt is unequivocal about the elite representatives that many political systems give rise to, arguing that the very system of representatives is un-political (1965: 277). She distinguishes herself from thinkers such as Weber (1974: 77) and Schmitt (2005: 6) by claiming that it is ‘untrue that the essence of politics is leadership’ (Ibid). This process removes the individual from the political process and hands it over to the ‘few’. This diminishes the need for people to communicate with each other and further contributes to their isolation from one another.

In ‘On Revolution’ Arendt draws upon the relatively youthful political system of America to exemplify her argument⁹. Arendt praised both Adams and Madison, two of the Founding Fathers of the American republic, who both argued for a balance and dispersal of power which minimizes the isolation outlined above that representation can lead to. Arendt’s celebration of this type of government is a consistent theme throughout her body of work. In ‘On Violence’, she re-iterates this praise of the American political system:

The United states of America is among the few countries where a proper separation of freedom and sovereignty is at least theoretically possible insofar as the very foundations of the American republic would not be threatened by it [...] as Justice James Wilson remarked in 1793 – “to the constitution of the United States the term sovereignty is totally unknown (1970: 5-6)

---

⁹ Blakely and Saward (2009: 366) more recently make a similar claim.
For Arendt the alternative to fully sovereign centred political systems is clear. There needs to be a non-hierarchical arrangement of political power and this is an idea which is taken up further in Chapter Six of this thesis.

In three ways then, Arendt sees problems with the politics of centralized models of governance. The first is the fact that statist politics perpetuates and guarantees the isolation of each individual. Rather than protecting the citizen from the hazardous state of nature, this perpetuates the imprisonment of citizens in an isolated ‘private’ sphere away from the more plural public space amongst their peers. There are elements of ‘tyranny’ here in that rather than facilitating freedom citizens’ freedom is limited. Secondly, politics based around sovereignty implies that there is a unitary ‘will’ amongst a society that can be and is represented in the sovereign. This is nonsense for Arendt as the notion of a society becoming one requires a repression of each person’s will and suppresses the diversity of wills present in the plurality of people. The third way in which this system is fallible is through the idea that it is in fact democratic. As evidence shows, government by representation removes political motivation from electorates, creating professional politicians and therefore eschewing the potential for participation amongst ‘peers’, so important to Arendt’s interpretation of freedom. The political inequality of the representative system is a further way in which the political isolation of citizens is guaranteed.

Thus, it can be seen how the sovereign statist arrangement of power within a given territory comes under attack from Arendt and can be linked to contemporary political models. However, this is not the only way in which Arendt finds fault in the investment of power in a single, unitary sovereign. Arendt observes that during the nineteenth century the nation stepped into the shoes of the prince (1965: 268). The importance of this is that it is not only within borders that problems arise via sovereign models of politics, but also between borders. This chapter now turns its attention to another facet of Arendt’s criticism of sovereignty, the national state as sovereign actor on the global stage. This manifestation of sovereignty has its history in the seventeenth century, yet in Arendt’s argument and the examples offered by politics today is just as pertinent to the politics of the twentieth century and forms another key way that Arendt has a unique relevance to contemporary politics.
1.3: The Westphalian State

The Weberian definition of sovereignty is exemplified in international politics today by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia (Nye 1993: 2). This treaty sees the state as a political actor free from interference from outside its own territory (Kegley and Wittkopf 1993: 119-120) and is another way that sovereignty comes under attack from Arendt.

Encapsulated in Richter’s statement ‘World politics is for a nation, what megalomania is for an individual’ (in Arendt 1976: 124) one finds an articulation of a consistent theme throughout Arendtian political theory. This asserts that the global organization of powers based around the Westphalian concept of sovereign nation-states holds dangers akin to those which are claimed to be present within a sovereign territory. For Arendt, the modern faith in such an organization of states since the Treaty of Westphalia was foreshadowed in the spirit of the French Revolution (1976: 272). The equation of ‘rights of man with national sovereignty’ which characterized this revolution led to issues in terms of the creation of relatively modern nation-states. Arendt exemplifies this in ‘The Origins of Totalitarianism’, making much of the peace treaties after WWI. She points out mistakes inherent in their caveats which relate to the creation of nation-states in Southern and Eastern Europe. In discussing the inadequacies of these peace treaties, Arendt gives us the insight that in her view the Westphalian nation-state system is fundamentally flawed. This is because state centred government struggles ‘to handle the new problems of world politics, both in countries with settled national traditions and worse still, areas which lack [...] the conditions for the rise of nation-states; homogeneity of the people and rootedness in the soil’ (1976: 270). This is a sentiment also echoed by more recent theorists such as Modelski (1972), Scholte (1997) and Giddens (1999) albeit for different reasons to Arendt.

In Arendt’s argument, one of the reasons for the fundamental impracticality of the Westphalian state system is exemplified by the creation of ‘new’ nation-states in parts of Europe after 1918. This involved a yet further denial of the plurality of the human condition because not only did the solution embodied in the peace treaties arbitrarily gather people

---

10 Arendt’s meaning here is in seeing the nation as having rights in the way that men have rights. For a more detailed explanation of Arendt’s view of nation, state and nationalism see Arendt and Nationalism by R. Beiner (in Dana Villa 2002).
together as ‘One’ on the basis of geographical locality, but the subsequent formation of the ‘sovereign’ body for this state was not representative of the diversity and inequality of peoples contained within the territorial border (1976: 270) nor the inequalities outside of it. Arendt’s examples of this include Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (Ibid). The dissolution of these two states in the early nineties (see Kegley and Wittkopf 1993: 459) also proves the more contemporary relevance of Arendt’s point here alongside numerous others such as Georgians in the former USSR, Hungarians in Romania and even Scots and Welsh in the United Kingdom. In support of Arendt’s argument, these examples all show a common pattern identified by Fuller (1991-2) as a ‘neo-nationalism […] that includes separatist sub-nationalism’ (in Kegley and Wittkopf 1993: 460).

Arendt points out that ‘the newly created states were promised equal national sovereignty with the Western nations’ (1976: 270). This perpetuated the two hundred and fifty year old idea of an equal dispersal of power across the globe, territory by territory, immanent to which is the understanding that each territory is free from outside interference. Arendt’s example of East Europe after the First World War therefore, can be used to explain her objections to all modern territories because

Modern power conditions [...] make national sovereignty a mockery except for giant states [and] undermined the stability of Europe’s nation-state system from outside. (1976: 269-70)

The strength of Arendt’s point here has been proven many times over on the world stage. The work of Troyer identifies the recent and ongoing situations in Iraq and Afghanistan as ones ‘where the prerogatives of sovereignty are most called into question’ (2003: 264). Likewise, Schwarz and Jüterstonke (2005) point out the discrepancy between international norms and practices due to the ambiguity of sovereignty. In these ways then, Arendt’s claims find a contemporary resonance.

In Arendtian theory there are other reasons why an arrangement of global power based on sovereign territories constitutes flawed political models. In Arendt’s view there is only one resolution to disputes in a world whose political units are defined by the autonomous right to govern a territory. In an essay entitled ‘Thoughts on Politics and Revolutions’ she argues that ‘Sovereignty means [...] that conflicts of an international character can ultimately be settled only by war, there is no other last resort’ (1972: 229). Referring to an ‘apocalyptic
chess game’ (1972: 3) that characterizes the global organization of political power, particularly in relation to global superpowers Arendt astutely observes the futility of the situation of individual governments’ right(s) to govern autonomously. She rightly claims that in a situation of conflict, ‘if either wins it is the end of both’ (1972: 3). At the time that Arendt wrote this the superpowers in question were the USA and the USSR. Although the USSR is no longer a global superpower per se, Arendt’s point is still relevant today. In fact, in terms of the greater proliferation of WMDs, Arendt’s claims are more relevant. The former BBC war correspondent and Independent MP, Martin Bell supports this claim by stating that we live in a culture in which warfare is seen as a ‘relatively cost free option’ and an ‘acceptable’ means of settling differences’ (2000: 123).

Arendt’s critique of this aspect of sovereignty therefore highlights a certain paradox in the modern organization of global politics that has perpetuated into the twenty-first century. The organization of landmass into sovereign nation-states creates a global situation akin to the one within territories that Hobbes was anxious for us to avoid. Nye (1993: 6) describes the characterization of the global order as anarchic and Kegley and Wittkopf (1993: 575) state the absence of a higher authority to the nation state. To put this differently, the concerns and solutions for potential states of war in the domestic political context do not appear to be applicable or necessary concerns or solutions in the global one.

In order to ensure that the individual sovereignty of nation-states is respected, deterrence via means of violence is the best guarantee of peace. On a global scale therefore in terms of our current organisation of power there exists the potential for conflict. Given the relevance of her claims to the contemporary situation, Arendt prophetically notes that ‘what had been hidden throughout the history of national sovereignty was that sovereignties of neighbouring countries could come into deadly conflict not only in the extreme case of war, but in peace’ (1976: 278). The examples of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the Bosnia-Croatia conflict (1992-1995) point to the contemporary value of Arendt’s point here as does the 22% increase in the worldwide sale of arms since 2005 (Skellington 2010: 17).

---

11 This concern is recognised by Ikenberry (2002), Troyer (2003), Houen (2006) and Martel (2010).
The paradox is therefore, that through the organization of contemporary global politics the people of the world are still bequeathed the very situation that the statist sovereign model of domestic politics supposedly averts but on a larger scale. The potential for a ‘war of all against all’ still exists most ostensibly on a global scale. Global not just in reference to the planet but also ‘global’ in terms of the potential for greater destruction than Hobbes could have ever envisaged because the growth of technology and its awesome destructive capacity (Arendt 1983: 83) has to be allowed for\(^\text{12}\). Arendt cautions that it should not be forgotten that such technological growth, for all of the advantages that this affords us, carries within its technological capacities the potential for ‘mutually assured destruction’. That is, no situation of war can ever in reality end any other way than annihilation for all concerned parties. This situation finds its zenith in a global order pivoted around a political culture that advocates the ‘right’ to defend territorial boundaries. In her recognition of this paradox, Arendt is distinct from political theorists such as Schmitt who claim that war is not the aim, purpose or content of politics (2007: 34). Furthermore, in this recognition Arendt’s critique of sovereignty has further value to contemporary politics and to this thesis.

Arendt herself identifies another paradox inherent in the notion of state as a sovereign actor. In the work ‘The Origins of Totalitarianism’ she documents the history of imperialism. Imperialism is defined as the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ pursuit of financial wealth across the world and the resulting imposition of the will of one sovereign, upon a land and a people far outside the territorial limit which would demarcate its claim to its own rights to exclusive rule (Arendt 1976: xvii). As in the previous section, we are directed again to the tenuous basis of any legitimate claim of sovereign rule. Arendt points out how the nation-state is least suited to successfully fulfil such expansionist aspirations, because ‘the [...] consent at its base cannot be stretched indefinitely’ (1976: 126-7). Moreover, a nation-state’s law however, is not ‘valid beyond its own people [...] and boundaries (Ibid).

\(^{12}\) A point made in much more recently by Nye (1993:7)
The paradox of this expansionism beyond the ‘legitimate’ borders results in a two-fold outcome, both of which are undesirable for the ‘expansionist’ Sovereign. Expansion by a nation leads:

 [...] either to the full awakening of the conquered peoples national consciousness and consequent rebellion against the conqueror, or to tyranny. And though tyranny, because it needs no consent, may successfully rule over foreign peoples, it can stay in power only if it destroys first of all the national institutions of its own people. (Arendt 1976: 128)

It can be argued that the USA/UK 2003 invasion of Iraq exemplifies Arendt’s very point here. As recently as 2010 it has been described by Andrew Murray of the Stop the War Coalition as an ‘illegal war’ (in Jones 2010). Even the British deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg described this war as ‘illegal’ (Ibid)\(^{13}\), a description used more recently in the UK by Liberal Democrat MP Michael Moore\(^{14}\).

The reference to the destruction of ‘all of the national institutions of it own people’ can be taken to mean the very concepts that justify the legitimacy of governments at home, namely democracy, freedom, security and legitimacy from below leading to a peaceful existence for each citizen. In seeking the extension of power via ‘predatory searches around the globe for new investment possibilities’ (1976: 132) the paradox of expansionism within the Westphalian system leads to the potential end of the conquering sovereign. This might firstly happen via war as a result of rebellion in the conquered nation and the concomitant loss of peace. Arendt’s insight can be supported by a former Gulf War commander who conceded that ‘You cannot bomb people into submission’ (in Bell 2000: 115), an idea furthered upon by a former Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff who points out that ‘History has not been kind to such an approach to war-making’ (in Bell 2000: 116). This is because any rebellion would need to be fought by the sovereign, or more accurately, the people over whom the sovereign governs, thus rendering obsolete the peaceful existence that the sovereign is supposed to provide. The second paradoxical outcome relates to the tyranny that will need to be employed to quash dissent in a conquered nation. For the conquering sovereign this again results in hypocrisy toward the very principles that

\(^{13}\) Other writers who see a pertinence of Arendt’s work here are Troyer (2003), Martel (2010) and Arato and Cohen (2009: 323).

\(^{14}\) Michael Moore, *Question Time*, BBC1, 10\(^{th}\) March 2011
ensure the sovereign’s existence at home. This can then only result in those principles being undermined. The previous example of Iraq also demonstrates both of these paradoxes.

Arendt’s claims about the weaknesses of sovereign systems are therefore far from untimely. Today global superpower(s) exist who stand financially and technologically more superior to other states in the system, and who can, and sometimes do, ignore the Westphalian principles of sovereign governance as their forebears did\textsuperscript{15}. Prophetically, on states of this type, Arendt writes:

\[ \text{[\ldots] the very notion of one sovereign force ruling the whole earth, holding the monopoly of the means of violence, unchecked and uncontrolled by other sovereign powers, is not only a forbidding nightmare of tyranny, it would be the end of all political life as we know it. (1983: 81)} \]

Again here, Arendt points out the potential of the imbalance of power between sovereign states and the consequences that are involved in this. It is therefore no great surprise to find that Arendt considers the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states outdated\textsuperscript{16}. Repeatedly, throughout her body of work she refers to the ‘undermining [by imperialism] of the foundations of the nation-state’ (1976: 15), its ‘political bankruptcy’ (1970: 6), and ‘the decline of the nation-state’ (1976: 4, 9). More recent international theorists echo this sentiment such as McGrew who has nicknamed the international political system ‘Westfailure’ (in Held 2004: 164).

In line with Arendt’s observations, international politics might therefore be described as ‘painted into a corner’. The Westphalian notion of sovereignty invites the concession, alongside the one made by Arendt (1970: 5), that there are not many alternative options. This situation ‘prompts us to ask whether the end of warfare, then, would mean the end of [sovereign] states’ (1970: 36) positing that there is only one conceivable way out of ‘the insanity of this position’ (1965: 4). She argues that ‘if war no longer serves [a] purpose, that fact alone proves that we must have a new concept of the state’ (1972: 229-30). One more recent alternative is that proposed in the arguments of theorists such as Rosecrance (1986) who argues that this new concept might be found peacefully through economic

\textsuperscript{15} For example, Duarte (2008: 2) points out the unilateral decision making of the hegemonic USA. Other writers who see this as a form of imperialism are Ikenberry (2002: 270), Arato and Cohen (2009: 323) and Martel (2010: 154).

\textsuperscript{16} A view supported in a more modern context by Connolly (1997: 15) and Arato and Cohen (2009: 323).
relations. Others might be found through the social sphere, via the increasing number of international NGOs (see Held 1999: 151, 2004: 138-9) and/or the existence of ‘transnational communities’ (McGrew in Held 2004: 26). It still remains the case however that ‘states still keep armies even in peacetime’ (Nye 1993: 4) and that the optimism of Rosecrance and others is belied by the twenty-first century examples given so far.

The world today is a global order organized around rights to exclusive government over a territory and where peace is only achieved in certain regions at certain times due to the fear of the scale of war that has the potential to erupt. In the international arena, what has arisen is a global version of Hobbes’ state of nature. Rather than peace being achieved through any genuine cooperation, it is based upon undercurrents of insecurity and fear backed up by weapons of world destroying capabilities. Arendt’s recognition of this paradox so early on in post-war international relations is central to the value and relevance of her critique of sovereignty today.

WMDs as solutions to disputes constitute ‘finality’ in every sense of the word, the end of all parties and so is in fact no real solution at all, making a mockery of the system itself. For Arendt, the international system of ‘mind your own business within your borders only and we will mind ours within ours’ will inevitably always back us in to this corner. Furthermore, there are important social and economic issues which concern geographical locations but which now have too many international dimensions to be effectively dealt with by the state (Beck 1989: 94, Giddens 1999). Examples which illustrate the problem of this notion of state sovereignty are terrorism (Lowenheim 2007), the Tragedy of the [environmental] Commons (in Pryke 2009: 115) and the international drugs trade (Booth 1996). Albert (2001 in Held 2004: 99) points out that 52 of the world’s 100 largest economies are corporations. This suggests, in line with Arendt, that new concepts for international issues are needed. This new concept may be found in a direction based more in international socio-economic issues and less in the politically flawed notion of ‘states as containers’ (Taylor 1995 in Held 2004: 133). The political value of the socio-economic field is revisited in the ultimate conclusion of this thesis.

The flawed concept of sovereignty thus far discussed also applies, Arendt argues, to the lives of those individuals who live under any political systems that promote the
maximization of individual liberty as a key function of government. In this way her critique is directed toward those versions of sovereignty that claim to guarantee a freedom measured in terms of individual sovereignty. The final aspect therefore of Arendt’s unique tripartite critique of sovereignty is through its application to individuals. It is also here that the purpose of this chapter comes to fruition and Arendt’s lament of the loss of the city-citizen can be identified.

1.4: The (Non) Sovereign Individual

For Hannah Arendt, the idea and celebration that is bound up in the notion that by being sovereign individuals we are free, is a cause for concern. Her political theory is concerned less with undermining the kind of liberties that classical liberalism emphasised, such as the Hobbesian freedom from attack or the Benthamite pursuit of ‘happiness’, and more with the narrow focus of ‘freedom’ that characterizes neo-liberal rhetoric and the methods advocated to achieve such freedom. For Arendt, such ills hit an apogee in the modern age. She argues that ‘What the modern age defended was never property as such but the unhampered pursuit of more property or of appropriation’ (1998: 110).

Here then Arendt identifies that peculiar to neo-liberal rhetoric is sovereignty understood as freedom to accumulate wealth. This Arendtian definition is upheld in the modern political rhetoric of the UK, where politicians marry economic insecurity and the threat from terrorism (Clegg, 2011) or argue that it is ‘important to hold property’ because it is ‘the bulwark between the power of the state and the freedom of the individual’ (Osborn 2001). Arendt attacks the contention that such accumulation of wealth creates secure and free individuals contra the state of nature. As an aside to the main debate, in ‘The Human Condition’ Arendt states:

I fail to see on what grounds in present-day society liberal economists (who today call themselves conservatives) can justify their optimism that the private appropriation of wealth will suffice to guard individual liberties – that is, will fulfil the same role as private property. In a jobholding society, these liberties are safe only as long as they are guaranteed by the state, and even now they are constantly threatened, not by the state, but by society, which distributes the jobs and determines the share of individual appropriation. (1998: 67-8)\(^\text{17}\)

\(^\text{17}\) It should be understood that Arendt distinguishes private property from the accumulation of wealth. The former guarantees a ‘place’ in the world and therefore some potency against tyranny, as in the spirit of the
Arendt recognizes that certain elements of political discourse not only condone, but actively encourage the accumulation and appropriation of wealth. This is reminiscent of the earlier observation about sovereignty that identify it as anchored to issues of individual security and this applies no less today. Besides conservatives, other politicians also speak in terms of ‘the promotion of both our security and our liberty’ (Brown 2011). The appropriation of wealth is encouraged in contemporary liberal thought because it appears to represent the guarantee of individual autonomy. However for Arendt this ‘autonomy’ always takes the form of negative freedoms, which are a limited form of freedom and not a genuine one in Arendt’s view. Negative liberties masquerade as individual sovereignty and this harbours dangers because although ‘[…] freedom can only come to those whose needs have been fulfilled, it is equally true that it will escape those who are bent on living for their desires’ (1965: 139).

There is then an identifiably anti-capitalist sub-text to Arendt’s work as well as her explicit critique of sovereignty. As a result of the encouragement of the appropriation of private property the statist system carries within its practices the justification for its continued existence. What the ‘modern age’ (1998: 110) does is ‘shield private owners from each other in a struggle for more wealth’ (1998: 69). This is necessary because the system itself cultivates a culture which successfully manufactures in individuals all the alleged guile and stealth characteristic of individuals in the state of nature, thus giving the illusion that the state of nature is a realistic possibility, something also recognised by Layard which he dates as particularly identifiable since the late seventies (2003c: 15). Ostensibly a long way from the cut throat world of capitalist endeavour Arendt observes that even the family man is indoctrinated with the same ideals and her assertion that

> We had been so accustomed to admire or gently ridicule the family man’s kind concern and earnest concentration on the welfare of his family […] that we hardly noticed how the devoted *paterfamilias* worried about nothing so much as his security. (1976: 152)

is borne out by the contemporary political sentiments given above.

---

Ancient Greek political system, complete with city-citizens, whereas the latter is the use of wealth to accumulate more wealth, as in the spirit of capitalism. This is expanded upon elsewhere in this thesis.

18 For reasons of brevity and relevance it regrettably cannot be elaborated upon in this thesis. See Kang (2005: 214-215) for a brief discussion of the anti-capitalism of Arendt.
Thus the core tenet of those doctrines that esteem personal security also dictate privacy as an ideal for maximizing security, something the Osborn quote demonstrates particularly well. Such a retreat into a private realm holds serious political consequences in Arendt’s view because of the disconnection from public life that the retreat into the private sphere fosters. As the examples of contemporary political rhetoric given here demonstrate, the serious political consequences that Arendt identifies have to be considered in contemporary politics no less and possibly a great deal more than at the time that she wrote about them.

The consequence of basing security upon individual sovereignty and sovereignty upon the accumulation of wealth and privacy as a measure of freedom undermines collective human experience. In order for individuals in the societies described so far to safeguard their property and security, a necessary level of suspicion about other individuals is promoted. This pushes many individuals into a more politically isolated life than necessary. This is the very opposite, in Arendt’s view of what is needed to really enjoy political freedoms.

The modern world, with its growing world alienation, has led to a situation where man […] encounters only himself […] this has left behind it a society of men who, without a common world which would at once relate and separate them, either live in desperate lonely separation or are pressed together in a mass […] human beings who are still related to one another but have lost the world once common to all of them. (Arendt 1983: 89-90)

The loss of the common world through sovereign politics continuously legitimizes sovereignty as a political system because alternative political relationships between individuals remain limited. The individual is left politically impotent, being both politically isolated yet compressed as ‘one’ in the name of the sovereign. For Arendt this embodies all the pre-requisites for a tyranny (1976: 454). The consequences of a political life centred upon the individual thinking his/her own thoughts are tyrannical because Arendt sees a tyranny as:

[…] a form of government in which the ruler […] had monopolized for himself the right of action, banished the citizens from the public realm into the privacy of their households and demanded of them that they mind their own private business. (1965: 130)

Arendt’s claim here is that there does not have to be an identifiable tyrant as the focus of power. Sovereign models of politics and their accompanying discourse thus far exemplified have tyrannical dimensions as they perpetuate the understanding that individuals should keep their own house in order without concern with or for others. This belief is no less
pertinent today than at any other time. Arendt herself claimed it as ‘characteristic of both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ (1965: 140) and the examples offered herein suggest its relevance to the twenty first century.

Arendt’s observations and the supporting examples of her claims pose the question of what freedom as a citizen means in countries that are governed according to a sovereign model when many of the individuals therein are politically isolated beings in a mass society? Citizenship is subsumed by individuality which in turn is subsumed by political axioms embedded in insecurity, anxiety and self-regard. This discussion now turns to another political disadvantage that the equation of freedom with individual sovereignty provides which is the elimination of spontaneity. This is because, as Arendt noted, aspirations to total domination ‘must liquidate all spontaneity, such as the mere existence of individuality […] regardless of how un-political and harmless these may seem’ (in Baehr, 2000: 136).

Arendt claims that the reason that spontaneity is often minimized in sovereign politics is the inherent unpredictability that spontaneity embodies. Total domination can not allow for any event that is not predictable as such an event may well carry within it potentials for change. Arendt tells us that ‘Total domination does not allow for free initiative in any field of life, for any activity that is not entirely predictable’ (1976: 339). There are several contemporary examples of this fear of unpredictability which interestingly span the ideological spectrum of current governments and therefore give weight to Arendt’s non-partisan criticisms of sovereignty. The 2010-2011 Jasmine Revolutions in Tunisia (Walt 2011) and Egypt appeared to show mass popular uprising against non-elected governments which resulted in the removal of that government. These events seemed to spark a domino effect of similar events across the Arab world, a phenomenon termed the Arab Spring (Hardy 2011)\textsuperscript{19}. The G20 protests in London in 2009, where one man died because of police action (Miekle et al 2009), and student protests in London in 2010 and 2011 saw police treatment of protestors, who included children (Foot 2011) and a wheelchair user (Casciani 2011), raise a level of public alarm and legal action against them (Morris 2011).

\textsuperscript{19} Within the Arab Spring, the examples of Libya and Syria suggest the fear that dictatorships have regarding spontaneous initiative and non-predictability (Hardy 2011). In Libya, a civil war between the Gadaffi political regime and critics of it raged for five months before Gadaffi and his closest allies fled (Ibid). In Syria, it is alleged over two thousand civilians have been killed by the government (Hardy 2011, Sinjab 2011).
These latter examples suggest the possibility that even in less autocratic sovereign systems this concern is no less present.

Arendt responds to the mistrust of spontaneity demonstrated by many governments by pointing out that all of the arguments against spontaneity simultaneously justify the need for an appeal to sovereignty. One example is the argument by Schmitt that sovereignty is the answer to unpredictability (2005: 6) through the power the sovereign has as the decisive entity (2007: 43-44) in terms of what is ‘normal’ (2007: 13) and what is the ‘exception’ (2005: 5). More recent theorists reiterate this by pointing to the inevitability of sovereignty (Reinhardt 1997: 146). In distinction to such claims, Arendt argues that such attempts to thwart spontaneity and unpredictability is to deny something essential about humanity:

 [...] it is indeed as spurious to deny human freedom to act because the actor never remains the master of his acts as it is to maintain that human sovereignty is possible because of the incontestable fact of human freedom. The question which then arises is whether our notion that freedom and non-sovereignty are mutually exclusive is not defeated by reality, or to put it another way whether the capacity for human action does not harbour within itself certain potentialities which enable it to survive the disabilities of non-sovereignty. (1998: 236)

For Arendt, spontaneous action and unpredictability go hand in hand with non-sovereignty. The unpredictability of human action is of value to political change. In each individual there exists the potential to spontaneously set in motion small changes that mark the beginnings of bigger changes once many people are involved; the example of the Arab Spring demonstrates this. Exhorting the alleged value of individual sovereignty measured in terms of the limitless accumulation of wealth and the perception of security that arises from political isolation is actually contra-humanity. In order to have the preconditions in place so that a different kind of political freedom can be suggested, it should be accepted that absolute sovereignty as individuals is not only impossible because of the plurality of people but also undesirable.

One apparent weakness in Arendt’s claim here is that she does not appear to consider the reduction in individual autonomy that this view implies, although she possibly alludes to it in the quote above as a ‘disability’ (Ibid). Indeed, she seems willing to accept this loss of autonomy when she states that this is the price for freedom.

---

20 Recognised by Kateb (in Villa 2002: 142)
Man’s inability to rely upon himself or to have complete faith in himself (which is the same thing) is the price human beings pay for freedom, and the impossibility of remaining unique masters of what they do, is the price they pay for plurality and reality. (1998: 244)

This weakness does not appear to account for the level of autonomy or individual sovereignty required for spontaneity. Even the most spontaneous of actions requires a certain amount of individual sovereignty to step outside of the confines of previous habits of thought or behaviour. To be more precise about Arendt therefore, the problem regarding individual sovereignty seems to arise when politics becomes overly focused on the ideal of individual sovereignty to the exclusion and detriment of the potential for politics that exists for individuals in the plural. Furthermore, the potential loss of autonomy in Arendt’s argument can be viewed as one that doesn’t arise from the inequity of the hierarchy of power present in sovereign political systems but one that is made in the more level situation of the plurality of human existence. In this way, even though Arendt’s arguments appear to offer no greater level of autonomy than other political arrangements and some query the notion of individual autonomy in modern society (Bellamy 1992: 250-1) anyway, the possible loss of autonomy implied by Arendt’s arguments could therefore be considered as one experienced in more equitable circumstances. A further solution to this weakness in Arendt’s argument will be considered at the end of the chapter.

The idea of individual sovereignty as a measurement of freedom is flawed. Despite this, many political systems promote this belief and this achieves a three fold effect that favours the sovereign or government over those who are governed. In the Arendtian view, the alleged sovereignty of individuals needs reconsideration. The suspicion that free market economic fields cultivate between individuals seeking security appears to give credence to the reality of the state of nature. This idea is compounded by many individuals’ retreat into a private domain. Where attention is focused inwardly onto the individual’s domestic sphere, negative freedoms are maximized and so is the perception of individual sovereignty. Conversely, the perceived threat of others appears minimized because this inward focus only involves concern with others in terms of the threats that they may pose. In this way the state of nature appears to be held in abeyance as the sovereign appears as both the protector and guarantor of security and freedom and so this system seemingly works.
Moments of political isolation should be belied by the plurality of the human condition but they are not, as evidence in this chapter has suggested. Governmental domination over plural political moments attempts to draw legitimacy from the assumption that non-sovereign subversive political action contains within it a spontaneity and consequence that cannot be predicted and so therefore must constitute a threat. In encouraging mistrust, insecurity and fearful anxiety around the spontaneity and unpredictability that is possible in plural politics, the chances of political change are eschewed, particularly changes to the political system which might mean a challenge to or reduction of power for the sovereign. Hannah Arendt’s political theory clearly indicates how the association of freedom conceived of solely in terms of sovereignty leads to associations which keep us trapped in an illusion. For as long as individual sovereignty is held as the exclusive measure of freedom, as it is in neo-liberal rhetoric, the potential for experiencing other potentially ‘freer’ forms of freedom is stifled.

1.5: Conclusion

Politics based upon realist models of sovereignty compounds the isolation of people from the political potential inherent in plurality. This isolation arguably feeds into a culture of anxiety, insecurity, uncertainty and mistrust from individuals towards others. In turn this feeds into the appearance of a sovereign as a necessity to political life, a necessity for safeguarding security thereby minimizing anxieties around security. This results in the suppression of alternative approaches to freedom rather than their creation and marks out a situation in which the city-citizen in the sense of a fully interested, motivated and empowered political actor has been forced into decline. The value of Arendt’s argument is in identifying the symbiosis between the end of sovereignty and the need for it.

In addition to attacking sovereignty on the above basis, Arendt simultaneously attacks it because it is unrepresentative as it is impossible that a multitude of wills can be represented in the single will of the sovereign and also because people are removed from engagement in politics because they become non-equals in the hierarchy created by representation, as

\[21\text{ Dana Villa recognizes this: ‘Our tradition has been unable to accept the absurdity of the simultaneous presence of freedom and non-sovereignty’ (1996:83)\]
some of the examples here have shown. This limits people as city-citizens. For both Arendt and the contemporary political experience of some, sovereignty is not only isolating and iniquitous, but also dominating, restrictive, disingenuous and artificial to the human condition.

Arendt’s thesis also has relevance in the contemporary international context through her implicit critique of globalization. She makes the prescient observation that the Westphalian state system contains problems that sovereign models of politics are alleged to avoid. Sovereign governments also magnify problems of un-representation. Furthermore, the absence of equality between nation-states in the global arena means that in reality it is only the powerful states who can fully exercise sovereignty. Ultimately, in this global system there is no alternative resolution to international disputes except war.

Finally, Arendt views sovereignty as weak in its application to the individual. The flawed idea that both positive and negative freedoms are enjoyed in equal measure because of the sovereign actually only results in negative freedoms which by definition are limited forms of freedom. This can be identified implicitly and explicitly in contemporary political rhetoric. The notion of individual sovereignty in this model of politics therefore is more accurately described as the promotion of individual privacy.

What is unique about Arendt are the different yet simultaneous ways which she criticizes state sovereignty. The trinity of her critique is still applicable to numerous contemporary forms of political experience. What is also unique about her argument is that the ideological or party political biases that underpin these political models do not matter. Indeed the examples that Arendt drew upon in her own work stretched from ‘right’ to ‘left’\(^2\)\(^2\). Arendt’s resistance to partisanship in her critique of sovereignty is one of her strengths. What matters is that those political systems that are based on a model of centralized, exclusive state governance share those common aspects and flaws outlined here. This is important because these issues can be seen to contribute to unnecessary limitations upon the political experiences of people living within them.

\(^2\) See Arendt (1976). This dimension of Arendt’s thought is captured forcefully in Agamben’s claim that ‘all modern sovereigns are totalitarian with democratic, monarchical, fascist and communist sovereigns made equal’ (in Singer and Weir 2008: 66).
Despite this strength however, this chapter has also pointed out some weaknesses in her argument. Firstly, she never makes explicit how the political changes that she recommends might occur. It is therefore difficult to see from within her argument how her call for a renaissance of the city-citizen can come about. It seems to be a rather vague hope that republican sentiment can just be re-cultivated amongst people. Furthermore, given Arendt’s unequivocal rejection of violence, class revolution would equally not be a possibility in bringing about the recreation of the city-citizen. Other weaknesses relate to her claims about individual sovereignty. Arendt’s charge that individual sovereignty is impossible in the face of the plurality of the human condition also undermines the concept of individual autonomy. The suggestion is made here that the loss of individual autonomy that might be made for the gain of a politics based in plurality would be preferable because of the environment of greater comparable equity to the loss of autonomy that is experienced by individuals who surrender it to a sovereign, which by definition is iniquitous.

This thesis asserts however that the weaknesses in Arendt identified in this chapter can also be addressed through the unique approach of another body of work. In a different, yet parallel way, it can be shown how the decline of the city-citizen, so central in the work of Arendt, can be compared to the rise of the shepherd-flock, so prevalent in the political writings of Michel Foucault and how aspects of his work can correct these Arendtian weaknesses. It is to this claim that this thesis now turns.

---

23 This is explained in Chapter Five.
2.0 THE RISE OF THE SHEPHERD-FLOCK: FOUCAULT’S CRITIQUE OF SOVEREIGNTY

2.1: Introduction

The chapter that follows explores the first important point of parallel between Arendt and Foucault by looking at the work of Foucault with particular focus on the critique of sovereignty embodied in his work on the rise of the shepherd flock. In exploring this aspect of Foucault several themes and claims seen previously will be illuminated. This begins immediately through explanation of Foucault’s genealogy of sovereignty which considers the arguments of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527) and shows that sovereignty has become the dominant rather than the necessary or only arrangement of power. Foucault’s parallel with Arendt also finds clear expression in his analysis and eventual rejection of Hobbes and his distinction from Schmitt. This reiteration of Arendt’s arguments is furthered later in the chapter through explanation of Foucault’s own recognition of the symbiosis between the end and the beginnings of sovereignty. However, as the chapter moves towards its close a point of divergence will be made apparent between the two theorists in that rather than phrasing the critique of sovereignty as a crisis of a decline of the city-citizen as Arendt does, Foucault shows it as the crisis of the rise of the shepherd flock. Although this momentarily moves away from the comparative observations between the two theorists, the chapter will argue that this divergence and Foucault’s particular claims about the rise of the shepherd flock suggests an answer to the frequently cited critiques of Arendt that question how the loss of the city citizen that she so laments could be reversed in a modern day context.

2.2 Sovereignty as Leviathan

“In short, we have to abandon the model of Leviathan” (Foucault 2003: 34)

In the College de France lectures, Foucault refers to the political arguments of Machiavelli, as expounded in *The Prince*. In Machiavelli’s sixteenth century, the main political...
problem centred on how a ruler’s sovereignty could successfully be maintained. Foucault explains that the fundamental questions for sixteenth century politics consisted of ‘How to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed, how to become the best governor’ (1991a: 87). These questions can apply to any individual who has the role of a leader, the head of a household, a teacher, a governor as well as the prince himself. What distinguishes the prince, and the juridical justification of his sovereignty that Machiavelli exhorts, from all of these other types is that the Prince remains external to his principality (Foucault 1991a: 90). Foucault states that between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries the nature of the political changes. There is a move by other political writers to distance themselves from the advice to the prince that characterises Machiavelli, objections that should not to be seen solely in terms of an outright rejection of Machiavelli’s arguments, but as a ‘shared common concern to distance themselves from a certain conception […] which, once shorn of all its theological foundations […] took the sole interest of the Prince as its object and principle of rationality’ (Foucault 1991a: 89).27

The new style of political treatise beginning in the sixteenth century seeks less to justify the external, unique supra-position of a (princely) sovereign and more to cultivate an ‘art’ (of governmentality) that gives the appearance of a seamless connection of the sovereign to the people. In his genealogy of political theory, particularly in the form of advice to the sovereign as represented by Machiavelli, sovereignty ceases to be exercised on ‘things’ and instead focuses on territory and those individuals who inhabit it (1991a: 93) through issues such as the government of personal conduct, of souls and lives and of children and pedagogy (1991a: 87). This is important because within this expansion of the focus of sovereignty it becomes directed toward land and people.

This new focus manifests in advice to the sovereign to cultivate the seamless connection between sovereign and the people by establishing ‘a continuity in both an upwards and

---

27 This reading of Foucault suggests that Singer and Weir’s critique ignores Foucault’s recognition that the object and principle in Machiavelli’s arguments are the ‘sole interest’ of the sovereign (and his recognition that for a while during this time the sovereign does indeed ‘remain external’ to his subjects (1991: 90). It is over the two hundred years between the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries that this changes into something else that then becomes governmentality.
downwards direction’ (1991a: 91). Upwards continuity is achieved by the ‘good’
government of the sovereign over the self. This is exemplified by the highest self-morality,
a good work ethic and government of money. At this point, explains Foucault, these things
become testament to an individual’s capacity for self-government and therefore fitness to
govern others. This is termed ‘forms of government’ (1991a: 90). The devolution of these
maxims to others in the state allows for a downwards continuity. Heads of families can run
their families and ‘individuals behave as they should’ (1991a: 92) not only for the good
government of the family, but also for the good government of the state, and therefore
‘common good’ (1991a: 95). This is something called ‘police’ (1991: 90). Foucault
identifies a key event that represents these changes in governmental thinking. La Mothe Le
Vayer’s advice in the seventeenth century to the Dauphin who later became Louis XIV of
France, reveals a ‘special and precise’ (1991a: 91) form of government that can be ‘applied
to the state as a whole’ (Ibid). At this point politics is conceived no longer as ‘advice to the
prince’ nor yet as the political science of late modernity, but as an intermediary stage\(^{28}\) of a
plurality of forms of government which are immanent to the state rather than the
transcendent sovereign of which Machiavelli writes (Ibid).

The point at which this form of government takes on the more familiar apparel of modern
political science is via a notion of economy, particularly economy over the individual self
and the family over which they are ‘head’. The policing of the state becomes established
via the good government of each person over their own self and family. Through this
cultivation of the pastoral, of endowing the individual with duties that they themselves had
to fulfil, economic and social citizens are created. This pastoralisation is the most important
aspect of the art of governmentality, rendering the individual monitor of his/her own life.
Since every individual does this, so does the whole population. Foucault calls this a
government \textit{omnes et singulatum}, government over all and each.

\(^{28}\) Foucault recognises then a clear hiatus between the establishment of the sovereign, as claimed by Singer
and Weir, and the seminal art of governmentality. The accuracy of Foucault’s reading and interpretation of
Machiavelli not withstanding, the subsequent epistemological differences between sovereignty and
governance that Singer and Weir claim on this basis (2008: 62) needs to be sustained within the bio-political
context of modern western life.
Thus, for Foucault, good management of the family becomes not only the object of the art of governmentality, but also its instrument. Foucault writes that slowly political economy moves away from issues relating to the family and takes on a ‘totally new sense’ (1991a: 101). Rather than making the Machiavellian problem of sovereignty disappear it becomes even more important (Ibid). This is because sovereignty does not cease to have a role once the (good) government of the self is established but paradoxically becomes more necessary and the ‘problem of sovereignty’ is posed with ‘even greater force’ (Ibid). Thus, the importance of Foucault’s work is his recognition that ‘sovereignty is far from being eliminated by the emergence of a new art of government, even by one which has passed the threshold of political science; on the contrary, the problem of sovereignty is made more acute than ever’ (Ibid).

Foucault’s work can be considered as an excavation of the tentacles of power that allows sovereignty to both operate and perpetuate. Foucault traces the history of governmentality and locates problems with the way that forms of ‘government’ came to be exercised and understood. In ‘Society Must Be Defended’, Foucault articulates this recognition explicitly, claiming that ‘in western societies, the elaboration of juridical thought has essentially centred upon royal power ever since the Middle Ages. The juridical edifice of our societies was elaborated at the demand of royal power, as well as for its benefit, and in order to serve as its instrument or its justification. In the West right is the right of royal command’ (2003: 25).

Thus we are brought back round to the opening statement of this section. Foucault’s genealogy, as expounded in the College de France lectures, clearly excavates certain problems inherent to sovereign political models as identified in Chapter One. This contemporary model of politics which will be shown later in this chapter as relying heavily on pastoralising methods of governance are identified in Foucault’s argument as having evolved from origins that sought to perpetuate the privilege and inequality of the sovereign as governor over people. For Foucault, this leads to two undesirable aspects of such a political model. The first of Foucault’s critiques of sovereignty that parallels with Arendt is directed toward sovereignty’s status as the purported arbitrator of human hostilities, such as embodied in the work of Hobbes’ Leviathan. As Foucault himself states
There is, of course, one name that we immediately encounter: it is that of Hobbes, who does at first glance appear to be the man who said that war is both the basis of power relations and the principle that explains them. (2003: 89)

As the following section will show Arendt and Foucault do not see exactly the same inherent problems with ‘sovereignty as Leviathan’. Nevertheless the arguments of both see the claim of sovereignty as a necessary and effective arrangement of power as a fallacy.

In his quest to answer the question ‘What are the rules of right that power implements to produce discourses of truth?’, by which he meant established practices that draw from and upon a validity that comes from being perceived as the ‘right’ or ‘best’ or ‘only’ way, Foucault makes some key observations about sovereignty and illustrates the misleading premise that underpins sovereign politics. Foucault explains that notions of ‘Right’ since the Middle Ages centred upon royal power. ‘Right’, centres on the problem of sovereignty, that is, how the legitimacy of the sovereign can be maintained and its practices legitimized. ‘Right’ is therefore essentially about domination. Sovereignty is ultimately the way(s) that domination can be ‘reduced or masked’ (2003: 26). The masking of domination by sovereignty is done in two ways. Firstly, there is the question of the legitimate rights of the sovereign and secondly, there are issues that surround the legal obligations to obey. In this way, Foucault illuminates the central position of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth century monarchical ‘art of governmentality’ behind the sovereignty seen today in many contemporary states (2003: 26) such as those exemplified in Chapter One.

Foucault explains that advocates of sovereignty, such as Hobbes, presuppose the individual and thus conceive of a multiplicity of individuals as a ‘multiplicity of powers’ (2003: 43) which are ‘capacities, possibilities and potentials’ (2003: 43). Sovereignty is needed to ‘unite’ these powers and historically has done so via the ‘face of the monarch’ and the ‘form of the state’ (2003: 44). In this way the theory of sovereignty ‘presupposes the subject’ (2003: 44) in that it is concerned with individuals, and is exercised on and through individuals. However, for Foucault, the understanding of sovereignty as the unification of subjects into ‘one’, misleads analyses of power relations. It misleads the analysis of the ‘one’ who represents the multitude, demanding questions about the ‘one’ such as “Who has the power? What is going on in his head?” (2003: 28).
These are misdirected questions because the parts (the subjects) are more pertinent than the whole. Foucault argues that sovereignty should not be understood as, ‘a Leviathan needed to sit above people and therefore looked at from ‘on high’ (2003: 28). What is needed is to examine and excavate the multiple power relations that exist between ordinary people who function below the sovereign. These are the real power relations that should be of interest to us, if we are to truly understand how power works. In recognition of this he argues

To grasp the material agency of subjugation [...] would [...] be to do precisely the opposite of what Hobbes was trying to do in *Leviathan*... rather than raise this problem of the central soul [...] we should be trying to study the multiple peripheral bodies, the bodies that are constituted as subjects by power-effects. (2003: 29)

What should really be done in an effective analysis of power is to understand how the ‘individual’ is manufactured into a subject and how ‘the various operators of domination support one another, relate to one another and how they converge and reinforce one another in some cases, or negate and strive to annul one another in other cases’ (2003: 45).

Foucault identifies practices within the dynamic of ‘Right’ that legitimises sovereignty which are really less to do with sovereignty and more to do with domination throughout society that feels such power effects. Foucault is both explicit and specific in what these practices actually are. He distinguishes several levels of social domination, a single individual over the masses, for example the sovereign in a central position or of one group over another of which contemporary examples would include non-smokers over smokers in the field of health in relation to longevity or around body size and shape such as is marked out by the label ‘obese’ (Sherman 2008), or the control of teenage sexuality (Williams 2011) or the creation of debt by increasing credit. For Foucault, it is practices such as these that are really of interest. In his words ‘the subjects in their reciprocal relations [...] the multiple subjugations that take place and function within the social body’ (2003: 27) are the dominations that an analysis of power must consider.

This rejection of understanding, examining and reducing politics to ‘the one who sits above us’ inverts traditional ways of thinking about politics such as that of Hobbes and marks out what is distinctive about Foucault’s argument. In arguing for the examination of the power relationships below the sovereign ‘one’, Foucault redirects attention to the much more immediate ways that individuals encounter sovereignty because although many
contemporary societies live with sovereign models of government, this form of government is always mediated through sociological, legal and economic policy that renders individuals ‘ill’, ‘obese’, ‘teenage parent’ or ‘debt risk’. Just as importantly, it also recognizes that this form of power involves subject to subject dominations which arise through social judgements and subsequent negative labelling of people as ‘malingering’, ‘unattractive’ or ‘chav’ (Hayward and Yar 2006, Tyler 2008). Because Foucault locates his argument in the multifarious sites or targets of this type of government rather than one specific and named site of subjection, he avoids limiting his argument to areas of governmental oppression that have traditionally occupied political thought such as class or nationalism. This makes Foucault’s argument much more relevant to politics today because it has both the flexibility and yet the specificity to be applied in terms of the multifarious social forms that subjection currently takes and also could take in the future.

Foucault then is clear in stating the fundamental problem of ‘Sovereignty as Leviathan’. We ‘see practices of domination as an overall unity and derive something like the statist unity of sovereignty from them’ (2003: 46) It is irrelevant ‘whether this unity of power takes on the face of the monarch or the form of the state’ (2003: 44) and like Arendt has strength because of the absence of partisanship. Conceiving of power in sovereign terms leads to a fundamentally flawed perception of the state, namely that it is somehow natural and necessary, a position taken by political theorists such as Schmitt who argues that ‘were the state to disappear, the political would disappear’ (Schmitt 2007: 45). This leads to the subsequent erroneous analysis of power and its practices. Foucault raises the point, contra Hobbes and Schmitt, that there are no pre-existing individual subjects in a state of conflict, who require arbitration by a sovereign. The real power tentacles of sovereignty work by inventing a subject, and then invents a much greater need for both positive and negative ‘rights’ than actually exists. The contrived requirement for pastoral care in the fields of health, sexuality, wealth and other aspects of life creates an illusion of sovereignty as the only possible political solution. In this recognition, Foucault makes the significant point that politics is exercised through social life. To put this more simply, in this recognition Foucault sees that rather than there being a genuine need for sovereign power to create political harmony, sovereignty invents the need for itself. With an assertion that
completely opposes claims such as that of Schmitt but which parallel with Arendt, Foucault tells us that we therefore need to

[...] abandon the model of Leviathan, that model of an artificial man who is at once an automaton, a fabricated man, but also a unitary man who contains all real individuals whose body is made up of citizens but whose soul is sovereignty. (2003: 34)

In order to do that, we need to adopt a different perspective when analysing power and step outside the confines of juridical sovereignty that sovereign politics imprisons us within. Ultimately, this thesis will suggest one way that this might be done.

In the claim to ‘abandon’ the model of ‘Leviathan’ and thus the traditional guise of modern day political forms of social control, Foucault concurs with Arendt. Despite this parallel between them it is Foucault’s argument which appears the stronger due to the socio-historical content of his genealogical method. This gives his arguments a greater empiricism than Arendt’s work. Foucault’s historical basis for his critique of sovereignty therefore offers a much more accurate socio-historical perspective than that of Arendt. Also, his argument is more applicable to politics today due to his recognition of the importance of society as the site for the ‘effective’ operation of political power. However, despite these empirical differences, the parallel between them regarding the futility of the system and the need for the rejection of sovereignty still stands and is important for social and political thought because it explores the alternative to a very widespread model of politics which seems to now be accepted as the ‘norm’ for how politics should be exercised, as the data in Chapter One of this thesis suggest.

This parallel between Foucault and Arendt points out that immanent to sovereign political models is a distance between sovereign and society and also a distance amongst and between individuals within society. In forms of sovereignty that involve elected government, these disconnections are not present any less due to the impracticality and inequity inherent to the structure of representation. This has considerable negative impact on the communication potential from electorate to government and accountability from representative to electorate. Despite this political distance, there is no such distance when it comes to the government of people’s everyday lives. Indeed conversely, the ubiquitous,
immediate and infinite political interventions in everyday lives mean that no equivalent political distance exists when it comes to the government of every individual.

Foucault’s observation of the disconnection immanent to sovereign politics parallels further with Arendt’s argument of the isolation of individuals. As we have seen, for Arendt this is perpetuated by sovereignty rather than prevented by it. Foucault makes a comparable observation in his critique of sovereignty, namely that one of the main consequences of the dominating social subjugations that uphold sovereignty is isolation.

2.3: The Inversion of Clausewitz and the (isolated) Individual at War

Foucault extends this claim by exhorting us to think about how domination is a relationship of force and how force can be reduced to a relationship of war? (2003: 46-7). He arrives at these questions via the historical study of the ownership of war from the sixteenth century (2003: 49) to the present day. Foucault claims that war changed its locus from being owned privately to becoming owned by a central body (the state) around this time. Once war became owned by a central power, Foucault explains that it only took place on the edge of states, waged only by state armies. The result of this shift is that the social body is ‘cleansed of its bellicose relationships’ (2003: 48). At the point that war shifts its owner and moves to the outer limits of states, a new political discourse enters understanding. Foucault identifies this as perhaps the first ‘historico-political discourse on society’ (2003:49) but which at the same time was still a discourse on war and was considered to describe ‘a permanent social relationship’ (2003: 49). Foucault exemplifies this claim in the eugenicists of the nineteenth century (Ibid) and observes that the end of war does not equate to the beginning of political power (2003: 50). He identifies that war is still connected to states, albeit in a different format. He points to the paradox that the end of war does not mark the beginnings of political power (Ibid) just as the inseparable law and sovereignty (1991a: 95) does not end war.

Foucault, therefore, inverts Clausewitz’s principle into ‘politics is the continuation of war by other means’ (2003: 48). In doing so he asserts, in distinction to political theorists of sovereignty such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau that rather than sovereignty keeping the wars between individuals at bay, war and sovereignty are inextricably and symbiotically
linked. War and sovereignty are locked together. Although the manner of their relationship has changed historically, the relationship endures. The mechanisms by which this relationship is maintained foreshadows further connections that can be made between both Foucault and Arendt that form the content of the rest of this chapter.

In excavating the emergence of an analysis of the state, its institutions and its power mechanisms, Foucault identifies that it occurs in binary terms (2003: 88). The social body, argues Foucault, is understood as consisting of two groups, which are completely distinct from one another and also in conflict (Ibid). Foucault identifies them at this time, using the example of English historico-political discourse, as supra-race and sub-race. However, what is important to Foucault in this analysis, is not the identity of the groups themselves, [which has been a point of misunderstanding of his point here (2003:88)] so much as the fact that the state draws its existence from the binary opposition of two groups. Foucault states that

[…] the conflictual relationship that exists between the two groups that constitute the social body and shapes the state is in fact one of war, permanent warfare. The state is nothing more than the way that the war between the two groups in question continues to be waged in apparently peaceful forms. (2003: 88)

These claims regarding the opposition of groups in society and the resultant continuance of war, offer an original discussion and re-evaluation about how the individual within society is posited in a supposed relationship of conflict. Foucault shows how Hobbes’ Leviathan does not actually begin with war (2003: 92) but that rather than the war within society being brutish and involving bloodshed via weapons or fists, what is actually present in Hobbes’ claims is a series of presentations based upon strength, will and courage (Ibid) that takes place between equals (2003: 90). If this were not so then peace would ensue from sufficient difference as the strong would vanquish the weak, or the weak would surrender in the face of the evident superiority of the strong (Ibid). This equality, or more precisely insufficient difference, gives the potential for war, or the belief in the potential for war to continue ad infinitum. What Foucault identifies as embodied in the claims of Hobbes, is an unending series of presentations that spring from a culture of fear about the apparent

\[29\] As an interesting aside Arendt’s argument around the tensions between state and nation (1976) foreshadow some of these ideas of Foucault. Ronald Beiner’s discussion of ‘Arendt and Nationalism’ (2002: 51) highlights salient aspects of Arendt that can be related to Foucault’s claims about this binary war.
potential for an endless ‘war of all against all’ (2003: 92). Foucault shows how in the real
terms of Hobbes Leviathan, we are not actually at war, but rather, in a state of war (Ibid).

With the above recognition, Foucault’s description of sovereign politics converges with
Schmitt’s view of the friend-enemy distinction as the sole determinant of politics (Schmitt
2007: 34, 35) whereby enemy is defined by difference (Schmitt 2007: 27) and viewed and
treated as ‘other’ or ‘stranger’ (Ibid). Foucault distinguishes himself from Schmitt,
however, in terms of the intractability of the friend-enemy distinction for all politics.
Schmitt argued that a world without the friend-enemy distinction would be a world without
politics (2007: 35). Foucault’s claims, on the other hand, imply that such a limited and
binary distinction is not inevitable, necessary or accurate for politics, as a later chapter will
show. However, such binary distinctions that mimic warfare as exemplified by modern
proponents of sovereignty like Schmitt are useful for understanding how sovereign politics
really works.

Foucault explains the significance of an archaeology that stretches back over the history of
the ownership of war, the birth of a discourse on society steeped in binary terms and the
presentations of war that masquerade as serious war-like intent throughout society. In his
lecture to the College de France on the 21st January 1976, he both posed a key question to
the auditorium, and at the same time gave the answer:

Why do we have to re-discover war? Well, because this ancient war is a permanent war. We really
do have to become experts on battles, because the war has not ended, because preparations are still
being made for the decisive battles, and because we have to win the decisive battle. In other words,
the enemies who face us still pose a threat to us. (2003: 51)

The ‘apparently peaceful forms’ with which the state mediates the presentations of war
with ‘unending diplomacy’ between us and the enemies who still ‘pose a threat to us’, is
achieved through one of the pivotal notions of sovereignty, namely rights. Foucault is
explicit on this point, identifying that:

The subject who speaks in this discourse [binary opposites, enemies who are a threat to us], who
says “I” or “we” is in fact not trying to occupy[...] the position of a universal, totalizing, or neutral
subject [...] that person is inevitably on one side or another: he is involved in the battle [...] Of
course he speaks the discourse of right, asserts a right and demands a right [...] These are singular,
and they are strongly marked by a relationship of property, conquest, victory, or nature [...] It is true
that this discourse about the general war [...] that tries to interpret the war beneath peace, is indeed
an attempt to describe the battle as a whole […] But that does not make it a totalizing or neutral discourse, it is always a perspectival discourse. (2003: 52 my emphasis)

In this way, the distinctiveness of Foucault’s argument in comparison to theorists such as Hobbes and Schmitt can be perceived in this identification of the opposition (mostly binary) of social groups as a cornerstone of discourse present in political systems involving sovereignty. Contemporary examples of this in the UK include Lord Freud who justified cuts in social housing benefit by stating that ‘[…] the government has a duty to the taxpayer to bring (social housing) costs down’ because ‘ordinary hard-working families’ cannot afford the ‘expensive housing’ that LHA recipients enjoy (in Kula 2011). In this example of political rhetoric the divisions are created between ‘ordinary taxpaying and hard-working’ and ‘non-working, non-taxpaying, non-ordinary’ families. Other examples are the ‘white and non-white’ groups identified by David Cameron (2011), Tony Blair’s (2010) identification of women, the young and disabled people as representatives of benefit recipient(s), the repetitive emphasis of ‘British-ness and British people’ by Gordon Brown (2011) or the cost incurred by those individuals who are not united in values\(^{30}\) (Neville-Jones in Gardham 2011). The full implications of these techniques of political domination are elaborated later in the thesis.

It is thus possible to identify some parallels between Foucault’s notion of the opposition of social groups and Arendt’s concern with the isolation of individuals. In Arendt’s view the basis of sovereignty both requires the isolation of each individual from his/her peers whilst also perpetuating it. In studying Foucault’s unique analysis outlined above, it becomes clear exactly how this is done. In using the concepts of ‘rights’ conceived from and sustained by the popularized belief that ‘war sits just beneath the surface of peace’, sovereignty is able to subtly and invisibly yet effectively set individuals against one another, not only on the basis of individual to individual social judgements, but also on the basis of the groups within which individuals identify themselves or are indentified by others. This perpetuates their isolation by undermining the connections that they would otherwise make. Foucault identifies the methods of this in the techniques of domination which are both the ‘real

\(^{30}\) Such desire for uniformity is criticized by one former MP as ‘a doctrine’ that is completely misplaced in a Parliament of ‘free people’ (Bell 2000: 121).
fabric of power relations’ and the ‘great apparatuses of power’ (2003: 46) particularly those that spring from the notion that ‘good self government’ is the pre-requisite for ‘common good’, a ‘good’ that Foucault defines by a ‘state of affairs where all the subjects without exception obey the laws, accomplish the tasks expected of them, practice the trade to which they are assigned, and respect the established order…in other words…obedience to the law, either earthly or not (Foucault 1991: 95). In this recognition Foucault explicitly identifies the shepherd-flock consequence of the conception of power as necessitating management and control through practices grounded in sovereignty. This is something that doesn’t escape Arendt either. Insinuating much the same idea she writes that ‘The unfortunate truth [about behaviourism and its laws] is that the more people there are, the more likely they are to behave and the less likely to tolerate non-behaviour’ (1998: 43). Arendt’s meaning is that ‘non-behaviour’, exemplified in this chapter as non-taxpaying, non-white, non-British or non-value sharing, creates divisions between people and in Foucauldian terms generates and perpetuates binary opposites between them.

This parallel between Arendt and Foucault highlights the possibility for a whole swathe of connections that can be made between what is in Foucauldian terms, the domination of individuals via subjugating practices and in Arendtian terms the political isolation of individuals. The ways in which this parallel is illuminating for social and political thought identifies that through being perceived as non-working or single-mother or young or disabled or non-white or non-Christian or non-British or any combination of them, ‘different’ social groups can be identified by political discourse, targeted by social policy and artificially marked out as negatively different or ‘other’ within the social body. This leaves that sub-group vulnerable not only to political oppression from the sovereign, but also to social oppression from other groups and individuals. These social divisions benefit the sovereign because a divided society, as Foucault pointed out, is one that is easier to govern. Contrived divisions diminish the cohesiveness of all those who are governed, thus compounding the isolation of groups and individuals, supported by the previously cited research of Putnam (2000) and Glaes et al (2003) (see Layard, 2003c). Arendt herself recognized the significance of this when she stated that ‘We are all modern people who move mistrustfully […] in public’ (1970: 72)
This parallel also illuminates the social and political importance of the question ‘What does it mean to obey the laws and respect the established order?’ In Hobbes conception of Leviathan it means for all to confer individual powers on the sovereign so that each individual need not concern him/herself with any other. This might take the form of concern meaning interest, or the wider, more literal ‘concern’ meaning care. In juridical terms this distils down into ‘rights’, respecting the established order means respecting each others ‘rights’: to privacy, property, and (negative) freedom. In short, what Arendt herself, if she were able to talk in Foucauldian terms, might identify as system of rights which inevitably, and destructively for other forms of politics ends in a ‘right’ to isolation.

Foucault can be interpreted like Arendt as using liberal concepts to form the basis of an attack on sovereignty. ‘Rights’ and the entire juridical discourse that is born of them, are the mechanisms of brutal and secretive domination that masquerade as sovereignty and thus enables it to perpetuate (2003: 27). Once again in distinction to proponents of sovereignty, he argued that ‘we have to bypass or get around the problem of sovereignty – which is central to the theory of right – and the obedience of individuals who submit to it, and to reveal the problem of domination and subjugation instead of sovereignty and subjugation’ (Ibid)

For Foucault techniques of domination are the sine qua non of sovereignty because they form the ‘uninterrupted battle that shapes peace’. Foucault shows how the presentation and perception of threats between groups and individuals allows the conception and gestation of fear and mistrust amongst individuals. This provides the basis for sovereignty and the culture for it to flourish. He states that ‘Sovereignty is always shaped from below, and by those who are afraid’ (2003: 96). Like Arendt, Foucault identifies a trinity. In his case it is the trinity of will-fear-sovereignty which applies whether there is ‘a covenant, a battle, or relations between parents and children’ (2003: 96).

The important parallel between Arendt and Foucault is their recognition of the negative dual role that social division and isolation plays in modern politics. Arendt rightly shows us an individual who remains politically isolated the whole of their lives, far removed from the city-citizen who would experience an alternative and possible more genuine political
freedom. The perpetuation of their isolation is achieved through insecurity and mistrust. Foucault’s work suggests the way that this insecurity, anxiety and mistrust is cultivated and sustained, so much so that in contemporary society they become part of the fabric of political discourse. This thesis’ reading of the treatment of isolation in the work of Arendt and Foucault differs from that of Marquez (2010: 27-8) who views the treatment of isolation in each theorist as different approaches. Given the bio-politics that characterises western life today the argument here is that it is a mistake to see it as such.

It is much more accurate to claim that Foucault gives this Arendtian observation a more contemporary dimension. The techniques of government, once used to ensure the legitimacy of a royal sovereign, enters public consciousness. In claiming and seeking to guarantee our juridical ‘rights’ against any individual wishing to infringe these rights, sovereignty is invested in as a political system without enough questions being asked of it. This continues because, despite the apparent peace that is achieved there is an undercurrent that an ever-present threat of ‘war’ comes from both outside and within the governed population. This leads us to internalise the ‘rule’ that we become ‘good citizens’. A ‘good citizen’ is one that obeys the laws. The institutions of sovereignty that bind all individuals in western societies demands that everyone must Behave as a ‘good citizen’ which really means to accept the rights, responsibilities and rules set out by the sovereign and reinforce them through the judgment of others, for example respecting the property of others by paying tax yourself, keeping concern limited to one’s own affairs and not deviating from the values of the sovereign and the ‘national character’ of the territory over which the sovereign governs. The perception of those who are not deemed ‘good’ citizens cultivates the mistrust and insecurity that diminishes the cohesion of the social body and augments the potential for isolation within it. This is what Foucault meant when he advised that ‘peace itself is a coded war’ (2003: 51). In Foucault’s description of sovereignty we are all at war with one another; ‘a battlefront runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently, and it is this battlefront that that puts us all on one side or the other. There is no such thing as a neutral subject. We are all inevitably someone’s adversary’ (Ibid).

---

31 This contradicts Arendt’s assertion (1965: 79) that the common enemy that resides in everybody’s heart is ‘nowhere to be found’.
The entity that appears to save society from its ever present war is the sovereign and the system which appears to prevent the acting out of the war—beneath-the-surface-of-peace is the system of rights that the sovereign guarantees to all who submit to its power. In this contract an illusion of individual sovereignty is manifested. Foucault, in a parallel recognition to that of Arendt, terms this ‘pseudosovereignty’ (in Bouchard 1977: 222). Since this refers to the superficial appearance of security and autonomy that ‘rights’ seem to grant every individual, pseudosovereignty can be understood as pseudo-freedom. Because of the culture of mistrust and insecurity that this ‘war behind peace’ fosters, self-governing citizens are created. The art of government is that of a shepherd. In dominating us to govern ourselves into taxpayers or ‘British’ people or value sharers as the examples here have shown, a docile and obedient flock is manufactured. In this moment the shepherd-flock element of Foucault’s critique of sovereignty is explicitly identified.

Arendt and Foucault parallel in the recognition of sovereignty as a political arrangement that involves a double betrayal towards those the arrangement is supposed to protect. Each of them identifies one crucial self-preservation exercise that sovereign political models achieve by sleight of hand. Firstly, proponents of sovereignty such as Hobbes and Schmitt perpetuate the understanding that it is only sovereignty which is the solution to an alleged state of nature, and on this basis complicit behaviour is ensured that allows it a relatively unchallenged existence, whilst at the same time, continually renewing and reinforcing the assumption(s) that adversaries surround us. Secondly, in doing so, it nurtures the circumspection of our societal neighbours that keeps individuals just far enough away from each other that they become and remain, isolated, protean units of protected ‘rights’ embodied in negative freedoms which in turn, prevents the kind of connections within collective existence that would give us alternative experiences of freedom.

This undeniable relationship led both Arendt and Foucault to parallel in identifying the beginning and the end of sovereignty as ‘circular’. When the attempt is made to envisage the consequences of a system not based on the principles of sovereignty it quickly becomes

---

32 Referred to by Agamben as ‘the curious oxymoron of the sovereign subject’ (1998: 124).
the case that the end of sovereignty is inconceivable because the end of sovereignty requires the beginnings of sovereignty (Foucault 1991: 95).

2.4: Conclusion

The importance of the contribution that Foucault makes to a critique of sovereignty is to recognize that the attempts to legitimate the position of the sovereign happen in a downwards as well as an upwards direction; that is historically such attempts at securing legitimacy has stretched from both divine ‘right’ and the ‘right’ provided by popular mandate through to the techniques targeted at and practiced on the social body which is the value of Foucault’s work for this thesis. Furthermore, his research shows his claims in this regard to be historically demonstrable in the instance of upwards continuity and sociologically so in the instance of downwards legitimation. In both directions the quest is to legitimate the inequity immanent to sovereign political systems and this is something that Foucault argues against. In this moment, his first parallel with Arendt can be seen. This parallel has value for social and political thought today in that it re-poses important questions about the inevitability and necessity of the arrangement of contemporary politics seen in many of the countries of the world. The parallel drawn here between Foucault and Arendt questions the actual political value of such an arrangement of power beyond its claims to prevent the worst excesses of the supposed state of nature. This parallel questions how politically effective large models of representation are and also highlights the doubts surrounding how democratic they can be when they create the career politician, an entity who from all positions on the ideological continuum has historically been shown to frequently abuse and disrespect the privilege of being elected. It also questions the purpose, validity and effectiveness of homogenizing the diversity of those who are governed in the reflection of the singular entity of the sovereign or centralized state. This parallel identifies that this political homogenization necessitates the manufacture of artificial social divisions amongst those who are governed to ensure a diminished cohesion of individuals to continue the inequity that the system depends upon.

Instead of the psychologisation of fear or enmity that is represented in the political arguments of advocates of sovereign systems such as Hobbes and Schmitt, Foucault politicises fear, mistrust and insecurity through his recognition of a historico-political discourse in which war forms the permanent backdrop that perpetuates the presentation of the need for a sovereign. In the next chapter, it will be shown how Arendt parallels this politicization of fear. However, in the Foucauldian account seen so far politics becomes exercised in the social realm through the invention and reinforcement of a symbiosis between sovereign as shepherd and those below who require saving from the hostilities of the ungoverned flock.

At the point at which the need for and position of the sovereign is legitimated in a downwards direction, Foucault identifies the rise of the shepherd-flock. It is through the common person and their behaviours and judgement that the notion of good self-government finds its way into the social realm. Extending out from the individual self towards groups this good government includes government of households and families. The analysis of the sovereign as the head of this power arrangement leads to an erroneous and misleading analysis of western political power. With this claim Foucault’s criticisms of sovereignty extend into criticism of analyses of it such as those of Hobbes and Schmitt, and make its clearest expression in the claim for the need to study the subjugations within and throughout the social body instead of the sovereign as the political focus. As this thesis will eventually show, the value of this distinct way of re-thinking the model of political power that exists in some societies, offers not only answers to some of the weaknesses of Arendt, but also the possibilities for moving beyond the unhelpful division between the social and the political.

Foucault calls for the abandonment of sovereign political systems and in doing so parallels with Arendt once again. Like Foucault, Arendt also politicises fear, insecurity and mistrust in her work. This thesis asserts however that there is a resolution to Arendt’s problem for how to re-invent the city-citizen that can be found by looking at the arguments that Foucault makes. This turn towards Foucault has merit in two ways. Firstly, due to the genealogical method that excavates a sociological basis for his political critique, Foucault
has the advantage over Arendt in that he bases his arguments on a much more precise socio-historical sensitivity.

The second point of merit for this thesis turning toward Foucault for an answer to Arendt’s weakness uses Foucault’s notion of the rise of the shepherd-flock to suggest the way in which it might be possible to begin a type of renaissance of the Arendtian city-citizen. This idea is based upon the decline of the city-citizen being coeval to the rise of the shepherd flock. This thesis argues that it is possible that this principle can be understood in reverse. Using a see-saw analogy, the rise of the city-citizen might well be the consequence of a focus on bringing about the decline of the shepherd-flock\(^{34}\). This, in turn, has a two-fold advantage. Firstly, the decline of the shepherd-flock is not as abstract an idea as attempting the stand alone rejuvenation of republican sentiments amongst people. Secondly, attempting to send the shepherd-flock into decline does not require anything like the scope of co-ordinated action required by social revolution, nor any of the violence of it. In this way the positive contribution to political thought of the integrity of both Arendt and Foucault’s anti-violence stance is kept intact.

What must be considered now therefore are the possibilities for how the decline of the shepherd flock might commence. Interestingly, there is another parallel in the work of both Arendt and Foucault that suggests the way that the decline of the shepherd-flock can be achieved, and this is their defence of the importance of the plurality of people. This defence will show that both theorists undermine Schmitt’s claim that pluralist theories ‘totally revolve’ in liberal individualism (2007: 45). In addition to the advantage suggested above, the celebration of plurality has the further advantage of de-politicising mistrust, insecurity and fear in the way that both Foucault and Arendt advocate without falling into the trap of psychologising it as happens with proponents of sovereignty. In doing so, this preserves the main aim of the first two chapters which is to outline for modern life the value of challenging the domination of sovereign political systems. The following chapter of this thesis temporarily turns away from the arguments of Foucault to draw once again upon Arendt and one of her greatest strengths, the recognition and defence of plurality.

\(^{34}\) This posits an alternative argument to Agamben’s implicit criticism of Arendt that ‘there can be no return from the camps to classical politics’ (1998: 188).
3.0 OASES IN THE DESERT¹: THE DEFENCE OF PLURALISM IN ARENDT

“Socialis est vita sanctorum” (Arendt 1983: 73)

3.1: Introduction

For Arendt ‘world’ refers to the space between people where each individual viewpoint and every deed has the opportunity to be heard and shared with other people. Furthermore, in the Arendtian ‘world’ different perspectives carry equal importance and so the ‘world’ is constituted by peers rather than a hierarchy. For Arendt, ‘the world comes into being only if there are perspectives’ (2005b: 175). What is troubling to Arendt and that which sits at the heart of her project is the concern that atomized individuals are estranged from the world.

This estrangement carries the potential for politically catastrophic consequences. Arendt remarks that the ‘success of totalitarianism needs an atomized and individualized mass’ (1976: 318) and that ‘totalitarian movements are mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals’ (1976: 323). Perhaps however in her most prophetic moment regarding the direction that she saw modern politics heading she described a certain vision of politics

[...] where we deal with people who either because of sheer numbers or indifference, or a combination of both, cannot be integrated into an organization based upon common interest, into political parties [...] or professional organizations or trade unions. Potentially, they exist in every country and form the majority of those large numbers of neutral, politically indifferent people who never join a party and hardly ever go to the polls. (1976: 311)

Given the evidence of voter apathy and low voter turnout seen in a previous chapter these comments suggest a political relevance to today that is worthy of consideration. Furthering the importance of this issue in terms of the isolation that can arise in contemporary politics she states ‘The modern age, with its growing world alienation, has led to a situation where man, wherever he goes, encounters only himself” (Arendt 1976: 89). Support for disconnections of this type in the contemporary context has been exemplified already through the work of Layard, Beck and Putnam. Other work supports increasing disconnection in contemporary society through migration (Hinchliffe 2009: 210-11) and disconnections between people because of a decline in industries with ‘jobs for life’

¹ From The Promise of Politics (Arendt 2005)
coupled with greater fragmentation in the employment patterns of the contemporary individual (in Dawson 2004: 101-103).

Arendt distinguishes in her oeuvre between the various ways that ‘man’ encounters himself and terms these solitude, loneliness and isolation (1976: 474-478). This chapter focuses upon the arguments of Arendt regarding her view of political stagnation that arises from the paradox of the atomized, yet compressed, isolated yet ‘mass’ society. Arendt emphasizes how the limitations on power that this situation can give rise to can be minimized. The way that this attempt is made is via a defence of plurality of perspective. This chapter will show that in doing this Arendt replaced the traditional psychologisation of fear or enmity in the work of writers such as Hobbes and Schmitt with a politicisation of plurality. The chapter also details the value of giving plurality a pivotal role in political life such as Arendt does and outlines the particular salience of a defence of a plurality of perspective for political life today. It concludes that all effective future politics at the minimum requires genuine appreciation of this.

For Hannah Arendt there are certain sine qua non conditions of plurality, identified by her as equality and distinction, and it is imperative that both equality and distinction co-exist in order that the political potential of plurality amongst humans is achieved. As foundations, one is meaningless without the other. This is because both equality and distinction, as stand-alone concepts, harbour a potential danger regarding the political realm. This chapter now turns to explaining more fully this element of Arendt’s defence of plurality, and will address her understanding of the importance of both equality and distinction that she makes a central part of her argument.

3.2: Equality and Distinction

‘[...] each of us is made as he is – single, unique, unchangeable’ (Arendt 1976: 301)

For Arendt, distinction and equality are the corner stones of plurality and on this basis constitute a non-instrumental form of politics (2005b: 62). It has been shown that the sovereign model of politics is deplored by Arendt because any potential for equality is destroyed; where one person rules, by definition, the establishment of equality becomes impossible. For Arendt equality is an important political precondition and she uses the term
in a very particular way. Drawing upon the Ancient Greeks for inspiration, Arendt argues that equality between humans comes from ‘equality of condition [...] the equality of those who form a body of peers.’ (1965: 30-31). With reference to the importance of the Greek system of isonomy, Arendt argues that ‘insonomy guaranteed [...] equality, but not because all men were born or created equal, but on the contrary, because men were by nature not equal, and needed an artificial institution, the polis, which [...] would make them equal’ (1965: 30-31). Thus, even though Arendt gives a pivotal position to the notion of equality in her defence of plurality, recognition of this between people from one person to another has to be created and encouraged, rather than a natural condition to be re-discovered. Arendt argues that people need to transcend, via a public sphere, the ontological inequality of humankind.

For Arendt then, equality is one of the cornerstones of plurality. Yet, the creation of equality within the public sphere will not constitute a genuine political sphere by itself. What exists alongside equality, and this time as an ontological facet of plurality, rather than something that must be created and maintained, is the fact of distinction:

> Human plurality [...] has the twofold character of equality and distinction. If men were not equal, they could neither understand each other and those who came before them nor plan for the future and foresee the needs of those who will come after them. If men were not distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is was or will ever be, they would need neither speech nor action to make themselves understood. (Arendt 1998: 176)

Every individual human is distinct according to Arendt. She writes that ‘In man,... distinctness which he shares with everything alive becomes uniqueness, and human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings’ (1998: 176). What Arendt means by a ‘paradoxical plurality’ is that we are all the same in that each individual is unique. Thus, in a strange way and seemingly contradicting her earlier claims that we are not ‘naturally’ equal, Arendt identifies an equality between plural humans, which is more accurately understood as ‘sameness’. This ‘sameness’ is based upon an individual’s distinction from every other being; ‘[...] we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is

---

35 Arendt inherits this notion from Heidegger. As explained in the introduction, this thesis has a more socio-political than philosophical angle which restricts the extent to which Heidegger can be considered here. The philosophical relationship between Arendt and Heidegger is considered by others such as Dana Villa (1992) and Schecter (2010).
ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live’ (Arendt 1998: 8). We are the same because we are not the same.

Arendt shows then how plurality is marked by the fact that we are distinct from everyone else. This includes not only our contemporaries but also our predecessors and our successors. These distinctions, which cut across, as well as within time, mark every one of us out as unique beings. Arendt writes that

Not the plurality of objects fabricated in accordance with one model nor the plurality of variations within a species – this shared human sameness is the equality that in turn manifests itself only in the absolute distinction of one equal from another. (2005b: 61-2)

For Arendt, the distinctness that makes us the same needs to be extended into a political equality, guaranteed and achieved by and amongst other people. The way that this equality is extended depends in part upon a revolution in the thinking processes of individuals; the rediscovery of the ability to exercise judgement, which in turn relies upon the possibility of thinking in solitude. That Arendt appeals to a vague hope that an appreciation of distinctness will come from a revolution in thinking such as this, is beset with problems. This seems to imply the need of a higher reflective ability and arguably by extension possibly imply an elitism which makes these claims problematic. These challenges are addressed in the latter chapters of the thesis.

Arendt’s recognition is that plurality, constituted by equality and distinction, is the ontology of humankind. With this recognition Arendt begins to conceive of the genuine political freedom that she charges the western tradition of failing to deliver. As far as Arendt is concerned, we are ‘only aware of freedom as a concept through experiencing others’ (1983: 148). The way that we experience freedom through others is because other people, in their distinction from us, yet their equality to us, offer the sharing of viewpoints. This sharing of perspectives is very important for showing what people commonly hold as important and what they do not. It also offers a balance against single minded approaches to problems and a form of objectivity toward the solution to them. Differing perspectives act as a series of checks and balances against bias and the potential for coercion immanent to the inequality that bias implies. Lastly, the space for differing perspectives also constitutes the space for the sharing of speech and deed. The importance of this for politics is tacitly and sometimes reluctantly demonstrated in arguments for the importance of referenda
Beyond the Social and Political

(Cameron 2010) and is supported in examples such as participatory budgeting (Saward 2009) and citizen’s juries (Shakespeare and Wakeford 2008). Arendt writes that ‘[…] there must always be a plurality of individuals or peoples and a plurality of standpoints to make reality even possible and to guarantee its continuation (2005b: 175). This is where the beginning of genuine politics can be found, amongst people in the plural, sharing distinct and unique perspectives on a given matter that in turn give that matter and indeed the world an objective quality.

The medium through which perspectives are shared is via speech. This is seen by Arendt as further testament to the irrefutable fact that plurality is the ontology of humans. Speech is meaningless unless it is heard, hearing requires other people. Not only does hearing require others for speech to be necessary, but it requires a common world to allow any kind of understanding of that which is spoken. For these reasons, in Arendt’s eyes, the existence of speech amongst humans, is further evidence firstly of the necessity of recognising plurality and secondly that plurality is the only valid basis of politics (1998: 4).

The importance of plurality to Arendt’s concept of politics allows the creation of ‘equality of condition’ amongst people. This not only allows the proper and full recognition of the ontological distinction of human beings, but also creates a ‘space’ for this distinction, carried in the form of plurality of perspectives, to be heard and therefore shared. In turn, this sharing and hearing of perspectives is how genuine political freedom can begin to be experienced.

Borrowing much from Montesquieu’s separation of isolation, loneliness and fear and the dangerous consequences of these situations, Arendt argues that it is only plurality that can safeguard us against these dangers because it is only in plurality that we can be seen and heard and our words and deeds remembered (1998: 95). This is something that she terms ‘action’. Arendt argues that the way to ‘transcend’ the problem of ‘freedom as sovereignty’ (Ibid) is to move toward a much more active appreciation of plurality which by its very components, that is the coordination of equality and distinction, leads to a non-sovereign

freedom. The value of this contribution to contemporary politics is explained in the remainder of the chapter.

3.3: The Elimination of Spontaneity

It is necessary to explain why Arendt seemingly stated the obvious about the human condition when she focused so much emphasis within her oeuvre on the plurality of individuals. The reason for this is that in her opinion genuine recognition and full appreciation of plurality, which once existed at very specific cultural and historic moments such as Ancient Greece, has since been lost (1998: 234).

Arendt identifies fear as a negative aspect in politics. This is crucial to an understanding of the Arendtian concept of plurality. This is because fear is both simultaneously destructive and creative. As shown in Chapter One, for Arendt ‘fear’ and tyranny are symbiotically linked. In explaining the consequences of the powerlessness of the many that results in certain forms of modern politics, she states that ‘Out of this general powerlessness, fear arises, and from this fear come both the will of the tyrant to subdue all others and the preparation of his subjects to endure domination’ (2005b: 69). This recognition can easily be extended to the contemporary ‘fears’ of insecurity, anxiety and mistrust. They diminish the potential connections than can be made in the condition of human plurality, and in doing so diminishes the potential for alternative political freedoms experienced with and through the presence of others. In the void created by the absence of a greater appreciation of plurality, the fear arising through insecurity and mistrust creates isolation and helplessness which open the space for ‘[total] domination (Arendt 1976: 438).

Arendt’s comments regarding this show the more tyrannical aspects of sovereign politics because of this negative impact on the political potential of the plurality of people. This links back to its circular nature and parallels with the causes of fear in Foucault’s argument shown in the previous chapter. This in turn, by definition, negates positive differences between people, reducing them to ‘bundles’ of ‘predictable reactions’ (Arendt 1976: 438). Any political system built upon this abolishes the possibility of any action or reaction not accounted for in the status quo, as demonstrated by the previous example of the 2011 protests in the UK. These examples demonstrate that the political arrangement that is
sovereignty requires predictability to be maintained to ensure successful domination. As a result, Arendt correctly identifies therein an inherent rejection of anything that could nurture unpredictability, such as the type of spontaneous actions seen in these examples. In her eyes, the difference between the unique perspectives that each individual holds but which are homogenized by presentation as one perspective is something that eliminates spontaneity. She exemplifies this by looking at issues of ethnic differences:

The reason why highly developed political communities, such as [...] modern nation-states, so often insist on ethnic homogeneity is that they hope to eliminate as far as possible those natural and always present differences and differentiations which by themselves arouse dumb hatred, mistrust and discrimination [...] the ‘alien’ is a frightening symbol of the fact of differences as such, of individuality as such, and indicates those realms in which man cannot change and cannot act and in which, therefore, he has a distinct tendency to destroy. (Arendt 1976: 301)

This makes the very important point that where distinction without accompanying equality is present, so too may be an inaccurate perception of danger. With this point the previous examples of ‘white and non-white’, ‘British people’ as a separate group from all people and the emphasis upon ‘unity in values’ can be recalled. Where Arendt writes about ‘differences by themselves’ she means that there can be the acknowledgement of distinction without an adequate recognition of ‘equality of condition’. This absence is a dangerous thing. This danger can be exemplified in the type of contemporary political rhetoric that places the concepts ‘white and non-white’ and ‘radical, extremist’ and ‘Islam’ in the same speech (Cameron 2011) thus consistently emphasizing specific differences which are supposedly indicative of danger.

Distinction without equality allows for oppression, cruelty and in the cases of certain political regimes in the twentieth century, genocide. This is why Arendt argues that for plurality to offer us genuine freedom, we must make the ‘decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights’ (1976: 301) which would offer protection from the potential catastrophes that unchallenged distinction might lead to. She envisaged that this might be possible through political organization at a much more immediate level than the sovereign state such as the council movement or the town meetings of New England, both of which Arendt valued for being smaller in size, more local and providing more practically sized space for the sharing of perspectives. This allows immediate political engagement and reward both in terms of direct political action and proximity to the effects of this decision
making process. The further advantage of these mutually agreed equal rights made in these contexts are that they would be ones that had been settled through discussion between those directly concerned with them rather than by dictation from distant government. This would make them more representative and therefore more meaningful. Arguably, the contemporary examples of participatory budgeting and citizen’s juries enjoy a level of success on this basis.

However, the weakness in Arendt’s idea resides in answering the question of what would be done about those individuals who do not agree with the principle of mutually agreed rights or the more likely scenario of not agreeing with specific formulations of those mutually agreed rights. For example, those with a high level of material resource might object to the agreement of a specified minimum standard of living for all, if maintaining this minimum standard meant that they had to relinquish some of their material wealth. A further problem might arise through the issue of ensuring a universal adherence to those rights if certain formulations of those rights happened to conflict with one or more of an individual’s particular prejudices toward religious or sexual orientation or national or ethnic appearance. Arendt, however, appears to give no direct suggestion for how mutually agreed rights might be upheld in these moments of a conflict of opinion(s).

In partial redress of this it is worth considering that under systems of rights supposedly ‘ensured’ by the sovereign, the observation and protection of those rights supposedly guaranteed by the sovereign ultimately rests upon observation and respect of those rights by people themselves rather than any overt, direct and continual external enforcement. The sovereign’s authority and punitive capabilities regarding the infringement of rights is actually only invoked après la lettre37. The changes in attitudes in the last twenty years towards greater acceptance, tolerance and changing legislation regarding sexual, ethnic and religious differences have come from civil society rather than the political sphere (Sampson et al., 2005, 675). In fact, in many cases the legislative and policy bodies within the political sphere are somewhat slow to catch up with the progress that individuals and groups make

---

37 Arguably the riots in London, Birmingham and Manchester in August, 2011 (BBC News, 10th August, 2011, 13:00hrs) illustrate this point. These moments of social disturbance demonstrate the consequences of an absence of respect for other people’s rights. The state, in terms of both police and government could only react to these situations after they had occurred by which time, in terms of the protection and guarantee of rights, it was arguably too late. See BBC News, 10th August 2011.
in these ways as women’s rights (Soule and Olzak 2004: 474), gay rights (Bachmann 2011: 79), and ‘Green’ and human rights (Reid and Toffel 2009: 1157) demonstrate. In this respect, it may be the case that in praxis large parts of society already approximate on a day to day basis toward the vision of mutually agreed rights that Arendt outlined.

Distinction and equality must exist simultaneously because of the dangers contained in situations where there is equality without distinction. For Arendt, the modern world consists of this imbalance, something that she terms ‘homogenisation’. This thesis exemplifies the contemporary form of this danger in more depth through the discussion of bureaucracy in Chapters Five and Six. For now it is sufficient to say that because Western Europe, North America and other developed countries are homogenised in political terms, the contemporary fears that are insecurity, anxiety and mistrust continue to play a greater role in politics than is necessary.

In making distinction central to her description of genuine politics, Arendt, like Foucault in the previous chapter, politicises rather than psychologises ‘fear’. The suppression of difference that exists in some societies feeds a mistrust of difference which frequently leaves people ‘outside the plural’. The modern age, characterised by this loss of plurality, is termed by Arendt as living in ‘dark times’ (1983: 30). The disconnection from knowing equality and distinction as two parts of the whole of plurality nurtures the fear of the ‘other’, the ‘alien’. In contemporary examples this means the person who doesn’t know what it means to be an ordinary taxpayer or to be British or white or non-Muslim or who subscribes to the ‘unity of values’ is constitutive of this Arendtian ‘alien’.

For Arendt, fear, mistrust and insecurity\(^{38}\) destroys all of the inherent political potential of plurality by allowing too unquestioningly the homogenisation of distinction to occur and the failure to cultivate the culture for equality that has the potential to be facilitated by an

\(^{38}\) The previous chapter on The Critique of Sovereignty elaborates on how sovereign political systems facilitate the isolation of the individual which in turn feeds and feeds on such anxieties. These techniques include amongst others the value of the unending pursuit of wealth/more property/appropriation (Arendt 1993: 24). This has also been referred to by Arendt in the previous chapter as ‘consumerism’ and her comment regarding those who are ‘bent on living for their desires’ (Ibid) easily translates into the global consumerist culture of the Western world today. Theorists such as Arato and Cohen criticise Arendt for not systematising the global implications of her theory more (2009: 319). In addition to the discussion in the previous chapter isolation as a pre-condition to circumvent the plural is discussed more fully at the end of this chapter.
appreciation of distinction. To underscore this point the homogenization of the plurality of people can be more accurately understood as non-difference and less as a ‘type’ of equality. This is not at all the equality that Arendt advocated, but a form of same-ness that serves only destructive ends. In destroying the political equality arising from the plurality of humans and facilitating the more shadowy form of equality or non-difference known as homogenization (white, British, united in values, ideal body size, acceptable credit rating), the entrenched political system monopolises power through the suppression of plurality; people are divided against one another. Through this recognition, Arendt foretells some of the claims of Foucault.

It is clear then, that the basis upon which Arendt laments the absence of genuine plurality is more accurately described as the loss of distinction and equality between people. What we are left with instead is fear, anxiety and insecurity around difference, rather than an appreciation of the benefits of it, such as the sharing of perspectives giving a reality to the world. Alternatively, we are left with a distorted form of equality that is more accurately a ‘squashing’ together of people into ‘one’, a homogenous mass allegedly represented by the ‘one’ in power above them. In situations of either type plurality appears not to exist and thus raises important questions regarding the level of freedom experienced therein.

In Arendt’s oeuvre, not only does genuine recognition of the plurality of humanity prevent political catastrophes, but plurality also offers positive political experiences in their own right. These include the fact that plurality itself constitutes the public realm (1958: 220), the public realm itself is the only real site for political action as political action needs other people (2005: viii) and people in the plural achieve greater power together than any one of them does on their own (1970: 44). All of these points are explored and exemplified in the remaining sections of this chapter. In addition to this, the following section makes further elaboration of how Arendt argued it would not only be possible, but necessary, ‘that humanity manifests itself in such [ways] most frequently in ‘dark times’ (1983: 13). The chapter turns now then to Arendt’s concept of Action something which is characterised by deeds and speech.
3.4: ‘Action’ as Speech and Deeds and Action as Resistance

‘Action alone is the exclusive prerogative of man [...] only action is entirely dependent on the constant presence of others’ (Arendt 1998: 23)

The reason that we only find genuine freedom in our plural condition is because of the fact that plurality is the only condition under which ‘words and deeds’ (Arendt 1998: 200) can find their full realization. In this moment Arendt further underscores the importance of the plurality of people for the sharing perspectives. Having traced the importance of ‘words’ back to Ancient Greece, Arendt explains that Aristotle ‘defined man as a being having the faculty of speech’ and that this faculty ‘distinguished the Greek from the barbarian and the free man from the slave’ (1983: 22-23). Like Aristotle, Arendt saw the political significance for the faculty of speech but more than Aristotle and therefore in distinction to him she saw it as fundamental for human experience rather than in establishing inequality. For her a life without the faculty of speech ‘...is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men’ (1998: 176).

So great is the value that Arendt accords ‘speech’ in the human experience, that she equates the loss of speech as a loss of human rights, claiming that the loss of human rights ‘entails the loss of the relevance of speech, and the loss of all human relationships, the loss in other words of some of the most essential characteristics of human life’ (1976: 297). Because of this, it is the loss of ‘speech’ that disempowers marginalised groups such as the poor, or stateless peoples, rather than the more visible burdens that they bear (Arendt 1965: 69). Later in this thesis this speechlessness is exemplified in its contemporary form through bureaucracy.

For Arendt, only plurality allows words as speech and deeds as actions to take on meaning. For Arendt, human existence as plural beings is testament to the political importance of speech and deed. For speech to be meaningful, other people are needed to hear and

---

6 Problematically, in the discussion of Arendt’s understanding of political action a distinction needs to be made between her use of the word when she uses it to convey her concepts of ‘deeds’ and when she uses it in the wider sense to describe genuine political action that is constituted when words/speech and deeds/actions take place within the public sphere. For the sake of clarity in this section, ‘action’ refers to ‘deeds’, whereas Arendt’s use of the word to denote the ‘higher’ activity of genuine politics is referred to as ‘Action’ – with a capital ‘A’.
understand the spoken word. Without others speech is also unnecessary. What is so politically powerful for Arendt and what needs greater emphasis in contemporary politics is that the speaking and hearing between plural individuals allows a sharing of perspective that augments the appreciation of distinction. Deeds as action and words as speech:

[…] create a space between the participants which can find its proper location almost anytime and anywhere. It is the space of appearances in the widest sense of the word, namely the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men [...] make their appearance explicitly. (1998: 199).

For Arendt, both action and speech are unimaginable without plurality (2005b: 61).

Arendt exemplifies this in her early explanations of the French Resistance in ‘Between Past and Future’. The political circumstances which gave rise to the resistance; namely the submission of Paris and the subsequent collapse of France to the National Socialist party of Germany, was Arendt argues, for the French a ‘totally unexpected event’ (1993: 3). This led the French people to be ‘sucked into politics as if by a vacuum’ (1993: 3). Despite the surprising nature of this situation, the French people ‘without premonition and probably against their conscious inclinations had come to constitute willy-nilly a public realm’ (Arendt 1993: 3). Historical sources, at least in part, support Arendt’s claims here. For example, an early resistant, Agnès Humbert, was surprised that Parisians were already rebelling within five weeks of the fall of France (2008: 8). Julien Blanc describes the ‘impetuousness’ (in Humbert 2008: 280) and ‘startling speed’ (in Humbert 2008: 282-3) with which this rebellion began. Cobb (2009: 4) points out that this rebellion consisted of ‘disparate groups’ who just felt ‘that they had to do something’ (2009: 61). Examples of this included the rapid formation of the Musée de l’Homme group of which Humbert was a part (Cobb 2009: 170) and the sweeping miners strike in May-June 1941 (Cobb 2009: 69).

The willy-nilly constitution of the public realm in this example happened because hidden from official sources ‘all official business of the country was transacted in deed and word’ (1993: 3). Arendt informs us in this work that this modern day example of a public realm did not last long. Upon the liberation of France, the people of the Resistance were ‘thrown back into […] the weightless irrelevance of their personal affairs […] into the ‘sad opaqueness’ of a private life centred on nothing but itself’ (1993: 4), a claim independently
supported by Cobb (2009: 283). What was important for Arendt, however fleeting the existence of this public realm, was that the people of the French resistance has discovered a ‘treasure’ (1993: 4), evidential for Arendt of exactly the things that she claims about politics when politics is done in the public realm. For her the treasure found by the French resistance was two-fold. One part of this treasure was that those who joined the resistance ‘found themselves’ (1993: 4) and that they ‘were no longer carping, suspicious actors of life’ but were able to be ‘naked’ (1993: 4). Because of this self-discovery the second part of the ‘treasure’ was found, that of a public sphere. In their nakedness, argues Arendt, the people of the French resistance were:

visited by an apparition of freedom […] because they had become ‘challengers’, had taken the initiative on themselves and therefore […] had begun to create that public space between themselves where freedom could appear. (1993: 4)

This view is once again independently supported, this time by Jean Cassou, founder of the Musée de l’Homme group. Cassou wrote that each of the résistants who went through the experience would have given it a ‘surprising name’ that did not apply to ‘the ordinary aspects of our lives’ (in Cobb 2009: 293). Although ‘some would have called it adventure’ Cassou called that moment of his life ‘happiness’ (Ibid).

Through her interpretation of this moment in French history, Arendt tangibly shows us both her vision of the public sphere and what it can achieve. In conditions that mirror Arendt’s prescription for the public realm, i.e. plural, political, in equality and in distinction, through word and deed, the women and men of the French resistance found their humanity and in Arendt’s view enjoyed, albeit momentarily, a fleeting glimpse of genuine freedom. This is given a contemporary relevance in recent events in the UK such as the protests against the sale of British forestry, against higher education fees (Morris 2011) and marches for the alternative to cuts in public funding (Casciani 2011, Kula, 2011).

There are, for Arendt, certain conditions that must be put in place so that such genuine political freedom can be achieved within plurality. It has already been explained earlier here how fear between humans strangles the opportunity for the fundamental political qualities of equality and distinction to reach their apogee. In recognising this fact Arendt shows that in certain circumstances ‘actions’ can be ‘unpredictable’ (1998: 243), by which she means that every action’s end ‘cannot be known in advance’ (Kohn in Arendt 2005b: ...
Equality and distinction when separated from each other can become catastrophes for human political experience. Arendt argued that in order that these catastrophes are expelled from the experience of humans in the plural, humans need to ensure that they afford each other the recognition of equality because ‘we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually agreed rights’ (1983: 30). This formal arrangement of rights, which allows the sharing of perspectives, characterises Arendt’s vision of the public sphere. Once a public sphere is established, the fear that equality and distinction can give rise to as seen in ‘dark times’ can be contained. The public sphere allows humans in the plural to share in words and deeds with an appreciation of the distinct perspectives that may be presented, yet also be reassured by their existence as equals. This in turn safeguards not only their perspective, but also a place in sharing that perspective. Each equal individual’s perspective is as valuable and worthy of being spoken and heard as any other. In this space a different approach toward genuine freedom and real political experience is made.

There are then three important reasons for Arendt’s defence of plurality. Plurality is the only condition that allows speech and deed to have meaning, speech and deed is the only medium that allows the sharing of perspectives, or more specifically political Action and Action is the only way that humans experience, not only genuine politics but also genuine freedom and their own humanity. It is therefore possible to understand Arendt’s insistence upon the ‘importance of speech (lexica) and action (praxis)’ (1998: 176), something that she termed ‘[...] not only the condition *sine qua non*, but the conditio par quam – of all political life’ (1998: 7).

In order that speech can be heard and thus take on meaning, and so that perspectives can be shared and appreciated through the balance of equality and distinction, there needs to be not only a recognition of but also an appreciation of plurality. Quite simply, power could not be claimed, negotiated, re-claimed, re-negotiated or seized without plurality. In the conclusion to this thesis this emphasis on plurality is retained as an important potential dimension of political action that can facilitate but does not limit the renegotiation of power.

Arendt prescribed other ‘actions’ besides simply engaging in speech and deed, other ways in which people could become ‘challengers’ like the men and women of the French
resistance. She strongly emphasised not only the political, but also the human value, of beginning something new. Very soon these other types of ‘actions’ (little ‘a’) will be explored. For now another type of Arendtian action is examined, that of natality.

3.5: Other ‘actions’: Natality

The political quality that Arendt sees in ‘Action’, the essence that really gives Action its inherently promising nature for politics, is that it signifies a beginning. Beginnings for Arendt are very important, because they set forth into the world actions and chains of events that are both irreversible and unpredictable (1998: 241-243). The irreversible and unpredictable nature of Action, the fact that the consequences of an action cannot be known in advance or at the time the action is begun, is something to be applauded because there is an infinite plethora of outcomes that may be achieved, and within this plethora, by the law of averages, there will always be positive outcomes. On this basis, it can be argued that every beginning at the same time equates to a possibility for the realization of change.

In the sense of beginnings, therefore, another element of Arendtian ‘Action’ is exemplified in the examples given above. Arendt tells us that the ‘treasure’ of plurality that the French resistance fleetingly discovered was quickly lost, brought to an end by the victory of the Allied forces and the reversal of the occupation of France by the Nazis. Deliberately, what Arendt doesn’t address is the contribution of the resistance to its own short lifespan. This is of no surprise as the people of the resistance could not have formed the resistance with the knowledge of where it would have led them, they just simply started it. The French resistance therefore exemplifies a beginning, something spontaneously set forth in response to and into the socio-political situation of the time and which created an effect in the challenge of power at many levels of everyday life.

For Arendt the eternal hope that beginnings offer all people stand as ‘miracles’ in the world. Even something that is as apparently as pedestrian as the birth of another human is a miracle for Arendt because it marks a ‘beginning’. Every new birth is an example of Arendtian Action, an action that she describes as ‘natality’ (1998: 247). Arendtian ‘Action’ is the political equivalent of natality (1970: 82). Action is how human beings can bring all of the potential and possibility for change offered by the birth of a child, into the world. It is
ultimately this fact about Action that makes anyone who engages in it truly political. She explains that ‘[...] what makes man a political being is his faculty of action [...] to embark on something new’ (Ibid.)

Earlier in this section, it was outlined how Arendt recognised in ‘Action’ its inherent irreversible and unpredictable nature. Arendt saw the positive in this, the fact that ‘Action’ cannot be controlled means it can lead anywhere. However, Arendt recognised that besides offering hope, the multitude of outcomes presented by ‘Action’ also offered the possibility of errors and mistakes, something referred to as ‘calamities of action’ (1998: 220). Her solutions to these issues are looked at more fully in a later chapter of this thesis.

Whereas some thinkers such as Schmitt (1922) reduce plurality to ‘liberal individualism’ (2007: 45) and others overlook it in favour of loyalties based on biological groups (Miller, 1999: 66), economic class (Gorz 1980: 280) or nationality (Arnason 1996: 212) Arendt distinguishes herself in seeing plurality as containing three fundamental qualities of Action. These are ‘the unpredictability of outcome, the irreversibility of the process, and the anonymity of its authors’ (1998: 220). These elements have the potential to be both troublesome yet also positive for political experience. Action permits moments of genuine empowerment to shine and be within the reach of all people. It is for these reasons that Hannah Arendt stated in varying forms over and over in the Human Condition that:

The only indispensable material factor in the generation of power is the living together of people. Only where men live so close together that the potentialities of action are always present can power remain with them. (1998: 201)

With this in mind it is possible to see how contemporary politics requires more political moments like the French Resistance and Budapest in 1956 to demonstrate the possibility of genuine Action, direct politics and alternative moments of freedom than the constricted type of ‘freedom’ offered by sovereign liberalism.

For theorists such as Arendt, we do not have to accept political inertia quietly. We are never really without hope, just without the awareness, the tools and the space to ensure our challenges to power can succeed. As Arendt argues, wherever men and women retain the capacity to reform as individuals within plurality, there will always be the chance that they can reclaim power and the political domain. This, however, requires more than the
gathering of people together in multiple numbers. There must be Action, characterised more specifically by numerous smaller ‘actions’: the recognition and genuine appreciation of others as equals who are at the same time distinct from us. There must be within this milieu, the sharing of words and deeds, which constitute ‘actions’ in their own right as well as facilitating the sharing of unique and distinct perspectives. There should also be actions which allow natality, a willingness to begin anew and a celebration of the potentials that this offers; an action in itself because in doing so, the old is condemned to history. Arendt makes the crucial point, however, that these actions will not fall to us from the sky. It is imperative that these faculties are understood, not only as actions, but pro-actions, steps that people must be prepared to take for themselves and towards and ultimately for each other. This in turn, will allow the discovery of oneself, and ultimately a non-sovereign form of freedom within the public sphere. Suggestions for how these pro-actions might be begun in the contemporary context are looked at in the thesis’ conclusion. Without an approach to plurality that fulfils Arendtian criteria, we are without reality because the reality of the world is ‘guaranteed by the presence of others’ (Arendt 1998: 199). However, we are also warned that it is only potentially there and ‘only potentially, not necessarily and not forever’ (Ibid).

3.6: Outside the Plural: Isolation, Loneliness and Solitude

‘A state [...] where each man thinks only his own thoughts is by definition a tyranny’ (Arendt 1983: 164)

The previous two chapters on Arendt have explained how insecurity and mistrust are contemporary forms of fear that take on too much political significance and therefore have more political influence than is necessary. Arendt also identifies three singular experiences for the human who dwells outside the plural. Understanding this can give further explanation to the relevance of Arendt’s ideas for today. Arendt defines these isolation, loneliness and solitude. These singular experiences are not genuine psychological problems but are the consequence of the hegemony of a certain way of thinking about democracy that allows them to be construed as psychological issues. These three concepts form the background to Arendt’s defence of plurality however there are important differences between them. Isolation and loneliness are two symptoms of contemporary society as has
already been shown by previous evidence. These symptoms hamper the success of plurality and the potential for political life that plurality offers. Solitude is necessary for political life, yet cannot be successful without the plural to illuminate it and act as a counter balance to it. Isolation, loneliness and solitude are also fundamental to the distinction that Arendt makes between power, strength and force. This section explains the singular experiences in which people are entombed when the ephemeral and finite ‘potential’ of people gathered together is not achieved and political reality lost. The first of these is isolation.

3.61: Isolation

Isolation relates to the political realm. It is defined by Arendt as the condition that arises when an individual cannot act because they have no-one to act with them (1976: 474). Without others their action(s) is denied reality and therefore meaning. For Arendt, isolation has a certain value up to a point. This concerns the ‘work’ of *homo faber* and the labour of *animal laborans* (1976: 474). Both work and labour are performed in ‘a certain isolation’ (1976: 474), and as a result isolation connects to certain ‘productive activities’ (1976: 474).

The isolation of people equates to powerlessness in Arendt’s oeuvre as when men are isolated they are deprived of the capacity to act (1998: 188). For her power is:

> a power potential and not an unchangeable, measurable, and reliable entity like force or strength […] power springs up between men and when they act together and vanishes the moment that they disperse. (1998: 200)

Power then for Arendt, is something very different from force or strength. Strength is a force possessed by the individual in isolation, and in a contest between two isolated individuals, strength and not power will dictate the victor (1998: 200). Force is the preparedness to use that strength. Power can not be possessed like strength or applied like force (1958: 201). Power is boundless. It has no physical limitation unlike strength or force. The only limit to power is other people. This is no coincidence as human power corresponds to the condition of plurality anyway (1998: 201). People retain power by remaining together after ‘the fleeting moment of action has passed’ (Arendt 1998: 201). So for Arendt, ‘power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert’ (1970: 44) and people, in doing so, discover together a potency greater than they do or could ever hold as individuals. In this way ‘[…] whoever, for whatever reasons, isolates
himself and does not partake in such being together, forfeits power and becomes impotent, no matter how great his strength’ (Arendt 1998: 201 my emphasis).

Thus, when people become isolated by the absence of an appreciation of plurality, and the research of Layard (2003) and others supports this possibility, a fertile ground is opened up for an abuse of power, for example its monopolisation, because the power that exists between people acting ‘in concert’ is lost. Arendt identifies that ‘in historical experience and traditional theory the combination of force and powerlessness is known as tyranny’ (1998: 202, 1976: 474). In this way it can be understood that where individuals are isolated from their plurality and are subsequently rendered powerless, yet subject to force, they are considered to experience tyrannical dimensions. The importance of this issue is taken up later on.

All systems that psychologise fear compound the separation of people from one another. This in turn reduces the power of every individual. In Chapter One it was shown how this separation takes the form of a rights based system in a political sense and capitalist endeavour in an economic one. Tyrannies then are defined as arrangements which keep people isolated in order to keep them politically impotent. To do this tyrannies destroy the public realm, although they leave the productive capacities of man intact. There are however other political systems that embody not only the monopolization of power but a monopolization of power to its worst excesses. These are the political systems identified by Arendt as totalitarian. For Arendt, such systems rely on isolation, but via the destruction of the private realm, introduce a second anti-political condition into the void left by the absence of a full appreciation of plurality. This second condition is the transformation of isolation into something new; something that spills over from the political field into the social field. This second anti-political condition, and the most serious for Arendt, is loneliness.
3.62: Loneliness and Solitude

In ‘The Origins of Totalitarianism’ Arendt explains that isolation and loneliness are not the same (1976: 474). She explains that ‘what we call isolation in the political sphere is called loneliness in the sphere of social intercourse’ (1976: 475). Loneliness is where we are ‘deserted by all human companionship’ (1976: 474). We can be isolated without being lonely and vice versa. We can be isolated, that is unable to act because there are no others to act alongside me, yet not lonely, and we can feel devoid of all human companionship, yet not isolated (1976: 474). For Arendt, loneliness concerns the entirety of human life (1976: 475). What is uniquely characteristic about totalitarian political systems is that besides basing itself on the isolation of individuals such as seen in sovereign political systems, it also ‘bases itself on loneliness – on not belonging to the world at all’ (1976: 475).

Loneliness is an effective tool in the domination over people because loneliness constitutes disconnection from the common human world. Arendt recognised this issue as relevant to old age and extended the issue of loneliness beyond it (1976: 478), an observation of American life that has been given more contemporary expression by Putnam’s (2000) term ‘bowling alone’. Recent studies show loneliness and its negative effect on individuals (Perplau and Perlman 1992, Stanley et al 2010, VanderWeele et al 2011) to be supported by studies of children and adolescents (Galanksi and Vassilophou 2007), sufferers of mental illness (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009, Gillies 2010) and the unemployed (Dawson 2004, Skellington 2010) an issue that Layard refers to as the ‘non-income effect of unemployment’ (2003: Lecture 3). As loneliness is based firstly on isolation from the political realm, the disconnection is fully completed by their detachment from the social realm that is loneliness. In this way, all possible potentials of plurality, of men acting in concert, are circumvented because ‘loneliness, once a borderline experience usually suffered in marginal conditions like old age, has become an everyday experience of the ever growing masses of our century’ (1976: 478).

Disconnection from the plurality of people as embodied by isolation and loneliness, are the corner stones of total domination. These two anti political principles foster the disconnection of people from each other, facilitating the domination of them. Arendt
explains why: ‘as fear and the impotence from which fear springs are anti-political principles, and throw men into a situation contrary to political action, so loneliness and the logical-ideological deducing the worst that comes from it represent an anti social situation and harbour a principle destructive for all human living together’ (1976: 478). In the absence of their political equals, which individuals experience in both isolation and in loneliness, rounded judgements become impossible under both conditions so that deducing the worst is made easier. Arendt writes that ‘what makes loneliness so unbearable is the loss of one’s self which can be realised in solitude, but confirmed in its identity only by the trusting and trustworthy company of my equals’ (1976: 477). Alongside the obvious loss of one’s equals, in loneliness the individual also therefore loses himself. In summarising the methods of totalitarian systems, Arendt concludes that ‘[…] it seems as if a way had been found to set the desert itself in motion, to let loose a sand storm that could cover all parts of the inhabited earth’ (1976: 478)

There is then something else about loneliness that leads Arendt to deplore it, besides its parallel with isolation. Loneliness is more than just the estrangement from the political world as embodied by isolation; loneliness is also the condition under which the individual can no longer keep connected to herself as well as her equals to allow the possibility for logic to become thought. In addition to isolation, loneliness is also distinct from something else. This condition is solitude.

For Arendt solitude is different to loneliness. Loneliness is only experienced in company, the company that highlights the absence of the individuals’ connections to it (1976: 476). In contrast, solitude is a condition where the individual is truly alone and therefore able to be ‘together with himself’ (2005b: 21). Arendt draws on Socratic philosophy to illustrate how living together with others begins with living with oneself (Ibid). This is because in addition to the fact that ontologically humans are plural, they ‘appear’ to others in the polis. To fully appreciate our appearance to others we appear to ourselves through our own consciences (Arendt 2005b: 21). In solitude the individual appears to themselves via an internal dialogue, he/she is not altogether separate from other people (Arendt 2005b: 22). In this way then, in solitude the individual is always connected in some way to plurality via the two individuals-within-one that exists within the self. Solitude therefore is a condition
where Arendt believed it would be possible to keep in touch with oneself, to translate cold logic into the warmer reflections of considered thought and judgement that could also at times be illuminated yet further by the presence of fellow humans whose perspectives could and would mediate the thoughts of the self and possibly turn the tide of sand threatening to spread the desert across the world. In addition to isolation and loneliness, solitude too is not without its dangers. In Arendt’s view solitude could become loneliness (1976: 476) and further highlights the imperative of the plural. Not only is plurality the background against which solitude necessarily functions in order to retain all of its valuable properties, but it is also the safeguard against solitude’s potential descent into the anti-political.

In distinction to loneliness then, despite all appearances to the contrary, a connection remains between the individual and plurality in solitude, a connection that is completely obliterated in conditions of loneliness. In loneliness the individual is left as ‘one’, completely alone, whereas solitude allows the individual to be ‘two in one’ when she is together with herself. To become ‘one’ again, however, solitude requires others and the fellowship between humans that can only arise through plurality. Arendt then makes solitude a socio-political state, rather than a psychological one. This argument about the self in relation to others is returned to regarding a later consideration of Foucault.

3.7: Conclusion

This chapter has explained Arendt’s defence of plurality which gives further explanation to her critique of sovereignty. Arendt’s strength is that she sees that a more meaningful politics begins from the fact that people exist in the plural and that this plural existence is a strength that they can draw on. The potential consequences of the anti-political climate that refuses to recognise this fact should not be underestimated. For Arendt, herself a person who witnessed and lived through the absence of politics created by the Third Reich in 1930’s Europe, there is no mistaking that ‘the preparation [for total terror] has succeeded when people have lost contact with their fellow men as well as the reality around them, for together with these contacts, men lose the capacity of both experience and thought’ (1976: 474). The modern world for Arendt consists of ‘The withering away of everything between us [...] described as the spread of the desert’ and only ‘plural political life is the oases’
(Arendt 2005b: 201-2). The importance of this to this thesis is the absolute importance of other people to a more comprehensive social and political empowerment.

The weakness, however, that arises from the points made in this chapter relate to the question of how individuals can begin to re-appraise genuine plurality and on what grounds they could be persuaded to do so? Arendt herself points out the answer to these questions but with a much more contemporary angle so does Foucault. This thesis turns now to the work of Foucault and his work in excavating the dominations in power relationships that history has hidden, particularly the history of certain ways of thinking, which have led to the suppression of plurality. Centrally for this thesis, Foucault’s arguments in the forthcoming chapter show how oppressive political systems can be rejected in the name of a defence of plurality whilst having the simultaneous merit of sending the shepherd-flock into decline.
4.0: DIFFERENCE, DISCIPLINE, DOMINATION: FOUCAULT AND THE PASTORALISATION OF THE PLURAL

4.1: Introduction

This chapter will show Foucault’s parallel with Arendt regarding the importance of defending plurality. Examination of this furthers and strengthens the contemporary relevance of a synthesis of their theories in terms of grounding this in aspects of everyday life. Salient aspects of Foucault’s defence of plurality include for example, the key importance of distinction. Distinction will be shown to be an especially crucial point because of his desire to instill an agonistic [...] sensibility to achieve bellum omnium contra omnes (Thiele 1990: 920-1). Drawing on the influence of Nietzsche’s support of the ‘international creed’ (1998: 85) Foucault emphasises the importance of pluralism because of the opportunity for provocation and struggle that it creates between different people and the circulation of power that this perpetuates. This is read in this thesis as a positive view of distinction absent from politics today.

Foucault, like Arendt, identifies a danger inherent when a positive view of distinction is lost. For him many modern forms of politics are very limited on the basis of totalisation (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 375). The loss of plurality that totalisation inevitably requires is key to the governmental art that he calls omnes et singulatum. Echoing Arendt’s observation of ‘man encountering only himself’ shown earlier, Foucault notes that ‘dividing practices’ where ‘the individual is either divided inside himself or divided from others’ has historically constituted ‘diseases of power’ such as ‘Fascism and Stalinism’ (2003: 327-8). Distinction is crucial because it allows agonism which in turn has the potential to circumvent the stagnation of power because it allows a constant negotiation of power39. In contemporary society distinction becomes ‘fear of the other’ which leads to partisan positions which maximize the potential for the imitation of warfare as previous examples have shown in terms of religious affiliation, physical appearance and disunity in values. The danger of imitating warfare is shown in the history of normalisation and the subsequent

39 The explanation of this in this chapter will show why writers such as Gordon (2001: 125-6) are incorrect in charging Foucault with the assumption that humans ‘can exit power’s web’.
pastoralisation of behaviours and attitudes that this process involves. In sentiments not unlike Arendt, Foucault opposes this with the potential for the enrichment of the ‘relational fabric’ between humans. This chapter will ultimately show that Foucault, like Arendt, is a pluralist who opposes existing forms of pluralism such as pluralism understood by political parties (Foucault 2003: 396) or social groups (Connolly 1969: 3).

Foucault’s attempt to ‘open up […] problems that approach politics from behind and […] cut across societies on the diagonal’ (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 375-6) begins with an explanation of the genealogy of normalisation. It is necessary to begin here because, in order for this thesis to effectively employ Foucault’s defence of plurality, it is imperative to understand what it is that plurality must be defended against. This chapter turns to Foucault’s explanation of early forms of social normalization that shed light on contemporary forms of social pastoralisation which further impede the potential of plurality.

4.2: The Defence Of Society: Permanent Purification and Techniques of Domination

In contrast to the philosophico-juridical discourse that informed the claims made about Foucault in Chapter Two, this chapter looks at another type of discourse identified by him. This is of interest not only because Foucault uses this as the basis of his criticism of Hobbes, and so the discourse becomes not only the discourse that ‘cuts off the kings head’ (2003; 59) but also because it is when this discourse begins to appear that the early stages of the later techniques of ‘normalisation’ (2003: 62) can be discerned.

In his 21st January 1976 lecture at the College de France, Foucault claimed to have ‘said a farewell to the theory of sovereignty […] as a method for analyzing power relations’ (2003: 43) because it ‘was not […] able to provide a concrete analysis of the multiplicity of power relations’ (Ibid). Instead, what he introduced was something that he termed a historico-political discourse (2003: 57). This discourse is tied tightly up with myth (2003: 56) and appeared twice, once in the seventeenth century in England with the Levellers and the

---

40 Thus my reading of Foucault’s notion of power in this thesis is a much more positive one than that of Martel and Klausen for example (2008: 26). Although these writers do refer to Foucault’s pluralism it is not examined in any detail (2008: 21).

41 Foucault (2003: 62)
Puritans, and later at the end of the reign of Louis XIV in France. This was a discourse in which ‘[...] truth functions exclusively as a weapon that is used to win an exclusively partisan victory’ (2003: 57). In distinction to Hobbes’ war of each person at war with every other person, Foucault identifies within the historico-political discourse, a ‘binary structure’ (2003: 51) defining conflict. By this he mean that it was two opposing groups or armies in conflict (2003: 51) rather than a ‘hierarchy of subordinations’ (2003: 51) established from hostile individuals.

Foucault was very clear about the defining features of the two conflicting groups, identifying them unequivocally as racial groups. He stated that

[…] war is the uninterrupted frame of history […] it takes a specific form: The war that is going on beneath order and peace, the war that undermines our society and divides it in a binary mode is, basically a race war. (2003: 60)

This race war has very particular features however, in that the conflict does not arise between an indigenous race and a conquering race but from within one race that splits into two and becomes confronted by its own history (2003: 61). These have already been identified in Chapter Two as the sub-race and super-race. Although once waged on the periphery, by decentred camps (2003: 61), the discourse of this struggle soon becomes re-centred and takes the form of a ‘centralized and centralizing power’ (2003: 61).

This point is Foucault’s identification of the birth of racial ‘normalisation’, the enfant-terrible of pastoralisation. The centralized power takes the racial discourse of war and wages a battle between a demarcated ‘one true race’ and all deviations from it (2003: 61). This discourse of racial struggle ‘functions as a principle of exclusion and segregation, and ultimately as a way of normalizing society’ (Foucault 2003: 61). The super-race or society now needs defending against the sub-race; the ‘other’, the ‘abnormal’. This conflict, laid out in this racially binary form, ‘forms the matrix for all the forms beneath which we can find the face and mechanisms of social warfare’ (Foucault 2003: 60). Eventually the racial element to this conflict begins to fade and instead global strategy(ies) of social conservatism arises. These are methods of purification which society turns inward against itself, from super-race toward sub-race. Foucault identifies this as the ‘internal racism of permanent purification’ which forms the basis of the dimensions of social normalisation (2003: 62).
At this point therefore Foucault identifies the beginning of social normalisation, the technique of domination so crucial to the contemporary arts of governmentality that he criticises. It has been shown that in bringing to light the historico-juridical discourse, Foucault simultaneously demotes the superiority of the philosophico-juridical discourse of power whilst showing the birth of the attack on plurality in the name of a centralized power. In explaining how a population splits into both sub-race and super-race, and in showing that the centralized power of the super-race is forced to defend itself by means of permanent purification against the threat to biological heritage (2003: 61) posed by the sub-race, Foucault pinpoints the basis of social normalisation.

With this recognition Foucault locates the beginnings of the attack on the plurality of society. The social normalisations that grew from permanent purification are still existent today. These can be found in the more contemporary examples of disciplinary codes more usually associated with Foucault, which in the main, revolve around madness/sanity, illness/health and legal/criminal. These three areas can be thought of as Foucault’s ‘big three’, meaning that these areas are early historical examples of normalisation that Foucault bases his arguments upon. In examining these, the importance that Foucault places on plurality can be further elucidated. The next section then will show how for Foucault, as with Arendt, the key feature of plurality is the distinction that it allows. Simply put, the reason why it is necessary to defend plurality against the ‘art of governmentality’ is that in defending plurality, distinction too is defended.

4.3: Knowing ‘Man’: Foucault and Assujetissement

The techniques of governmentality evolve to emphasise certain differences between people. Contemporary examples of these normalizations are the ‘ordinary’ hard working people exemplified earlier, those with a ‘healthy’ body size\(^{42}\) or those who become sexually active and/or parents at a socially ‘acceptable’ age (Williams 2011). This is done by the pastoral technique of normalising judgement looked at in Chapter Two. One function of normalisation is to minimise distinction, yet curiously and paradoxically, another task is to create distinction, however this is only a distinction of a certain type. Foucault’s argument

\(^{42}\) *BBC News*, 23rd May 2011.
is unique in linking these two functions together in modern society and in doing so shows how distinction underpins his defence of plurality. The ways that the techniques of normalisation work to undermine plurality are explained by the process that Foucault terms ‘assujetissement’ (1994: 331).

Assujetissement is a particular exercise of power that involves judgements. These judgements revolve around an axis of ‘normal/abnormal’ which arises from the meticulous observation of detail about ‘Man’ that eventually grows into a corpus of knowledge about ‘ordinary’ aspects of individuals lives that leads to the control and use of people. This becomes a pastoral power in the art of governmentality, focused on each individual, rather than a population as a whole, meaning that ‘the inner workings of individuals’ minds are known – implying a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it’ (Foucault 2003: 333 my emphasis). When Foucault claims that ‘the consequence of this is that pastoralisation results in the ‘objectivisation of the subject into dividing practices’ (2003: 327) he means that the subject is not only divided from others on the basis of social and moral judgements as exemplified in the previous chapter, but also carries division(s) within him/herself on the basis of self-judgement and self governance. Foucault offers the examples of this in ‘the mad and sane, the sick and healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys’ (Ibid). Such divisions are carried within each self because assujetissement is a [...] form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life. [It] categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth upon him that he must recognise and others have to recognise in him. It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects. (2003: 331)

Thus Foucault begins to clarify the oppressive nature of such a normalising power. There is a dual meaning to the word subject. ‘[...] subject to someone else by control and dependence’ (2003: 331) yet also tied to an identity via ‘conscience or self-knowledge’ (Foucault in Dreyfus 1982: 212). For Foucault both interpretations suggest ‘a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to’ (Ibid).

Once an individual is known about and knows about themselves – in short once a ‘subject’ in every sense of the term is created, all kinds of dominating practices open up that regulate
individuals in terms of their ‘ordinariness’, work ethic or fitness for parenthood for example. These are practices which are referred to via the concept of the ‘sovereignty of the visible’ (Foucault in Cranston 1994: 80). Sometimes these dominations are achieved via a negative exercise of power, for example in the subjugation of individuals embodied in the socially endorsed sequestration of the sick or the mad or the criminal behind the brick walls of the clinic, the asylum or the prison. This domination involves a positive exercise of power, in the creation of a moral discourse of sexuality, body size or the creation of codes of ‘good’ behaviour, a tool for the subject to know their conscience with and a cadre for them to measure their conscience against, which in turn prescribes to them regulations for behaviour. This regulation of behaviour eliminates the chance of ‘undesirable’ choices being made.

Because assujetissement means being made the ‘subject’ of a corpus of knowledge, the details of the individual and their ‘behaviours’ require connections and discourse to become corpora of knowledge(s). Assujetissement is achieved through a positive exercise of power explained by Foucault in ‘The Will to Knowledge’:

[…].never have there existed more centres of power; never more attention manifested and verbalized, never more circular contacts and linkages, never more sites where the intensity of pleasures and the persistency of power catch hold, only to spread elsewhere. (1998: 49).

Foucault recognises here that domination involves power as a creative force as well as an oppressive one. These modes of power are not ‘superstructural positions with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment’, but are ‘the immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities and disequilibriums which occur […] and are the internal conditions of […] differentiations […] they have a directly productive role whenever they come into play’ (1998: 94). Knowing ‘Man’ involves the creation of centres of power and sites of the operation of power. Contemporary examples that illustrate what Foucault means here include such ‘sites of power’ as the grid of information centred on the suitability of people in terms of body size or age to parent or the neo-liberal emphasis on the privatized prudentialism of the individual and the increased perception of everyday risk that is created by the over proliferation and high visibility of the insurance industry that results in

43 For other examples of this see Chapter Five.
insurance for hot water boilers, water pipes, extended warranties on material goods, pets, dental insurance, private healthcare, windscreens on cars, motorcycle leathers, home contents, identity fraud or mobile phones.

Ultimately though, any creative moments of the operation of power that is assujetissement inevitably descend into a negative force. Using sexuality as an example Foucault shows that assujetissement becomes a ‘negative relation’. In terms of assujetissement, there is ‘never a relation [between power and sex] that is not negative’ (Foucault 1998: 83). Even the creative aspects of power become ones that facilitate ‘rejection, exclusion, refusal, blockage, concealment or mask’ (Ibid). Assujetissement is a technique of domination that involves the creation of a code of behaviour and ‘can do nothing but say no…what it produces, if anything, is absences and gaps; it overlooks elements, introduces discontinuities, separates what is joined, and marks off boundaries; Its effects take the general form of limit and lack’ (Ibid). Foucault’s claims here are supported in the normalisations that surround body size. One contemporary form of such a refusal, blockage and exclusion is the proposal that ‘fat’ children should be taken away from their parents on the basis of child abuse (Sherman 2008).

Thus assujetissement as a dominating power has both a negative and a positive side. Assujetissement is ‘social normalisation’ exercised on each individual. This is not the earlier permanent purification on the basis of race (although this can easily be discerned in other twentieth century cases of total social domination such as that of Nazi Germany) but a form of this type of discourse which has pervaded certain aspects of society and transformed into permanent purification on the basis of a multitude of social ‘ills’ regulated by individuals themselves on the basis of, and with reference to, bodies of knowledge for subjects. These ‘subjects’ are both the social phenomena of madness, illness, homosexuality, criminality which are studied and recorded to become ‘subjects of knowledge’ such as psychiatry, medicine, sociology, risk assessment and also individuals themselves who become ‘subject’ to the dominating socio-political practices to which they give rise. In attacking the body of knowledge that is psychiatry, and speaking of the transformation of the discourse of permanent purification from a racial one to the social disciplines of today, Foucault sums this view up when he says
This transformation essentially made possible an immense process that has still not come to an end; the process that enabled psychiatry [...] to exercise a general jurisdiction [...] not over madness, but over the abnormal and all abnormal conduct. (2003a: 134)

In making this point about psychiatry as part of the corpora of knowledge(s) which can be traced to assujetissement, Foucault makes a bigger point about the power of all of the demographic bodies of knowledge created by assujetissement: criminology, sociology, psychology, anthropology and political science. Each body of knowledge builds its own demarcation of ‘normal’, and these become the focus of individual’s vigilance. Most are anxious to fall inside this ring fence and so their behaviour becomes disciplined on this basis. Those who sit outside these boundaries are marginalised because they are judged as ‘other’ by those who fall within the boundary. The ‘abnormal’ are subsequently labelled as such and castigated. Foucault states that ‘there is a difference between marginality which one chooses and marginality to which one is subjected’ (1991: 184).

In line with such ‘games of the institutions’ (1994: 369) the role of contemporary fears, anxieties, mistrust and insecurities in the art of governmentality are explained. It can now be seen more clearly how the issue of marginalization is the visible societal manifestation of the fear that Foucault argued allows sovereign political systems to flourish because war, insecurity and sovereignty are inextricably linked. These insecurities link to the permanent purification bound up in techniques of social normalisation, techniques shown in a previous chapter to be cultivated by governmentality informed by individualism and sovereignty.

It can now be fully explained how this thesis sees the defence of plurality as important to everyday life in many western societies. Contemporary incarnations of ‘permanent purification’ exemplified in lifestyle, physical appearance, work ethic or sexuality at different stages of life are ongoing techniques of social normalisation that fit with Foucauldian pastoralisation. These techniques of pastoralisation have been perfected between the need of the sovereign for permanent legitimation and the bodies of knowledge which have grown from the sciences of ‘Man’. Between these two stools is the exercise of general jurisdiction over all abnormal conduct and ‘the arbitrary unity/totalisation of ‘bodies of knowledge’ (Foucault 1997: 31). This allows the permanent purification of the population to be achieved through a social discipline exercised singulatum. As every
individual adapts their own behaviour to fit the cadre of normalisation, the behaviour of all becomes adapted to fit thus perfecting the sibling technique of the ‘art of government’, the governmental technique of *omnes.*\(^4^4\)

However, in facilitating amongst the population such normal/abnormal divisions, the sovereign becomes stuck between a rock and a hard place. This is because in introducing the separations of permanent purification between people, a new danger to the legitimacy of the sovereign presents itself. This is the danger of domination and repression born from judgements based on fear of difference. Foucault showed how the art of governmentality suppresses this danger too. The neutralising of difference is achieved through the government *omnes* identified by Foucault. In addition to the legality that prevents couples from adopting on the basis of body size are other examples of this such as the legality that prevents parents from exercising their discretion in terms of their children’s absences from school\(^4^5\) or the legality of sexual activity at age 16 in conflict with the cultural judgement that parenthood at school age is ‘too young’ (Williams 2011). This culminates in successful domination over people through homogenising people collectively, confining them to a manageable and predictable set of behaviours. Once again, we are shown by Foucault, in parallel with Arendt, that uncertainty in behaviour is eliminated.

\[]\ldots\text{the power of the norm imposes homogeneity [...] it is easy to understand how the power of the norm functions within a system of formal equality, since within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm introduces, as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual differences. (1991: 184).}\[\]

To translate Foucault’s point here into the terms that we have seen Arendt use, homogenisation eliminates difference and the elimination of difference eliminates spontaneity. Normalisation provides a simultaneous two-fold function in the art of governmentality. It gathers together the majority of people within the ‘normal’ boundaries set by the technique, homogenises them to neutralise distinction and at the same time uses the undercurrent of fear and insecurity to separate those who do not conform thus

\[^4^4\] This is presumably why writers such as Gordon (2001: 126) claim that Foucault’s ‘production by power lacks agency’. As this chapter will go on to show, Foucault’s view of power does anything but this.

\[^4^5\] What is interesting about this example is that in order to bring to order those people who do not respect the ‘rules’ regarding children’s attendance in compulsory education more rules are created. These penalise everybody rather than address the initial issue which begins from contravention of the rules. A vicious circle is thus created.
marginalising them. This process weakens connections between people in the plural and thereby diminishes the potential for power that they constitute.

Foucault’s unique contribution is the recognition that such manufactured and exaggerated social dichotomies can be used to give rise to the notion of the battle, stating that ‘we must escape from the dilemma of being either for or against’ (in Martin 1988: 154). The dangers that arise from a contrived atmosphere of social ‘difference’ are the impressions of and anxiety about ‘war’ that add to insecurity, anxiety, mistrust and fear. This dynamic is reflected in polemic: ‘The polemicist […] proceeds encased in privileges that he possessed in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war […]’ There is something even more serious here; in this comedy one mimics war, battles, annihilations or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one’s killer instinct as possible’ (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 382-3). In outlining his rejection of those types of discussion that mimic warfare and parody judicial procedure (1994: 296) Foucault claims it becomes easy to treat alternative viewpoints as ‘enemies’ and therefore is both oppressive and dangerous.

The challenge of ‘differences between people’ to sovereignty has long been recognised by advocates of sovereignty. Bertrand de Jouvenel described that Hobbes ‘[…] could think of nothing worse than uncertainty in behaviour and this is encouraged by differences in opinion’ (1997: 288). Likewise, Bodin wrote that the sovereign had to have tools as his disposal to be able to deal with the unexpected in a juridical way; this could be achieved if all enforceable limits on a King’s authority were removed (Bodin in Franklin 1992: xxiv). These comments can be seen as giving a further credence to Foucault’s claim that there is a rationale exercised within sovereign political systems to both use difference to cultivate an undercurrent of danger defined specifically by the normal/abnormal distinction, or even distinction in general whilst simultaneously fearing the potential of such difference and taking active measures to repress those potentials.

This thesis seeks to draw upon Foucault’s rejection of the governmental art of individualization and totalisation that constitutes contemporary power structures to advocate challenges to contemporary examples of assujetissement such as increasing legality to address ‘disrespect’ to ensure social conformity or social policies which dictate
norms such as ‘healthy’ body size, optimum age for active sexuality and parenthood or work ethic. The importance of refusing this kind of subjectivity that has been imposed for several centuries by advocating new forms of subjectivity was seen by Foucault (1994: 336) as well as Arendt. Like advocates of sovereignty such as Bodin and Hobbes, Foucault recognised the challenges that difference might cause for the sovereign, but in distinction to them he applauded these challenges. This is because he wanted people to find a ‘new power relation, whose first temporary expression should be a reform’ (Ibid). Once more in comparison to Arendt, Foucault argues for the development of new power relations. The way to circumvent the difference-danger-discipline-domination cycle, Foucault claimed, was via an alternative view of difference which is another aspect of Foucauldian thought central to the argument of this thesis. In order that difference can be re-conceived it is firstly necessary to fully understand how the current view of difference can be understood and how ultimately this works against the empowerment of people.

4.4: Divide and Rule: The Value of Distinction

‘[...] prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity [...] mobile arrangements over systems’ (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 109)

What is of ultimate importance to this thesis is that for Foucault social sites of normalisation are paramount in resisting oppression and for cultivating a different view of distinction than that which feeds insecurities and anxieties around difference. Foucault argues that it is ‘a matter [...] of [...] studying what is rejected and excluded’ (in Kritzman 1998: 335). This argument asserts that one such thing that is rejected and excluded is a full appreciation of difference.

This thesis uses the parallel between Foucault and Arendt to highlight the possibility that the suppression of difference stands as testament to its anti-sovereign qualities. For Foucault, the infinite differences that are necessarily constituted where people exist in the plural have inherent value as a bulwark against hierarchical, oppressive forms of power. In

46 In this way Foucault offers something important that other theorists of oppression/repression do not. For example Marx’s criticism of economic oppression ignores many of the sites of oppression outside of the economic field. By definition therefore Marxist solutions to these issues are economically centred and require a co-ordinated resistance on a vast scale dictated by the economic realm and class tensions. Freud too is inadequate in analysing the repressive elements of power as he psychologises ‘fear’. Freudian solutions therefore require a psychological re-wiring at the deep level of the mind.
response to disciplinary society Foucault invites another view of individuality (Hooke in Smart 1994: 300) and ‘does seem to think about freedom in terms of the opportunity to exist as a self whose differences can be perceived and accepted positively rather than negatively [...] it is fair enough to say that Foucault supports a […] sense of the right to be different’ (Ibid: 293).

The discourse of the sovereign political model loads difference or distinction in a negative way such as ‘disease’, ‘danger’ or ‘struggle’, in other words as non ordinary and a cause for anxiety. Rather than homogenise everything into one negative over-generalisation about power or difference or struggle, this chapter argues that there is still a need in contemporary society for the Foucauldian suggestion to study specific rationalities (in Dreyfus 1982: 212) more. Foucault’s value for this argument is through his observation that the most effective sites where an alternative view of difference could begin and power can be opposed is found in actual experiences (1998: 231) such as health, sexuality, psychiatry and in the humanities. One such example, possibly Foucault’s most famous, is that of ‘the criminal’, the ‘prison’ and the corpus of knowledge that came to be criminology/penology. This for Foucault is a perfect example of a ‘specific rationality’ where power, in all its calcification, could begin to be opposed. Foucault claimed

[...] It is this form of discourse that ultimately matters, a discourse against power, the counter-discourse of prisoners and those we call delinquents - and not a theory about delinquency. (1998: 209)

Foucault did not limit his vision of challenging the ‘specific rationalities of power’ to prisons alone. He extended this claim to encompass many sites where knowledge had become a form of social discipline pivoting over the normal/abnormal division. His insight that ‘knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting’ (1997: 154) suggests the necessity to direct an incision against all such sites of power because ‘then all those on whom power is exercised to their detriment, all who find it intolerable, can begin the struggle on their own terrain and on the basis of their proper activity’ (1998: 216). The full value of this is examined in the final chapter of the thesis because it is this aspect of social and by extension political empowerment that part of this thesis’ argument is based upon.
Foucault explains that the art of governmentality can be challenged at precisely those points where the normal/abnormal division is at its most marked, where indeed the power of the state is most visible and contemporary examples of this visibility have been stated already in terms of judgements on body size and acceptable sexuality. These points of visibility really come back to a well established form of statecraft known as divide and rule. By locating points at which people can be divided from each other (normal/abnormal, bad/good, mad/sane, sick/healthy, workshy/hardworking) on terms that the sovereign or state can easily influence, the sovereign art of governmentality achieves the two-fold aim of ostensibly manifesting the might of its power and secondly planting and cultivating the seeds that grow into a self-imposed divisions between those it seeks to control, thereby weakening the power of the multitude by their own hand. These divisions are constantly fed by the backdrop of battle that underpins society because of the fear, uncertainties and anxieties of the marginalised by the ‘normal’ population. As a result, too many human relations, or more accurately the lack thereof, begin to mimic this bellicose model. This suppression of difference leads not to positive empowering experiences, but just as Arendt argued, to forms of domination with totalitarian aspects. Where differences in opinion, political stance or ideology take on the shape, praxis and ‘rules’ of ‘war’, in other words when difference collapses into polemic, the potential for resolve becomes more remote. Politics becomes more about the ‘game’ than the issue requiring resolve and ultimately in the pastoralising model ‘war’ supersedes ‘peace’.

4.5: Permanent Provocation\textsuperscript{47}: The Defence of Plurality Via Agonism and Action

‘I am neither an adversary nor a partisan’ (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 385)

The above claim was made in an interview when Foucault was asked ‘Where do you stand?’\textsuperscript{48} In a lengthy answer in which Foucault refused to ‘label’ himself, he outlined that ‘his way of doing things’ was not to engage in polemic or petty swiping at another. Instead Foucault ‘insists on […] difference as something essential’ because ‘a whole morality is at stake; the morality that concerns the search for truth and the relation to the other’ (in Rabinow 1991: 381). Therefore, if he ‘opens a book’ to find ‘that the author has accused an

\textsuperscript{47} Foucault (in Dreyfus 1982: 222)
\textsuperscript{48} With Paul Rabinow (1991: 385)
adversary of ‘infantile leftism’, he closes the book immediately (in Rabinow 1991: 381). This is because, he claims, there are problems in taking ‘sides’, in becoming part of a ‘we’ prior to any particular issue. In answering his question as to whether it is suitable to place oneself in a ‘we’? (in Rabinow 1991: 385) Foucault asserts that ‘a we’ must never be previous to the question’ (Ibid). This is in line with his rejection of polemic. Partisanship sets out in advance the problems to be addressed, the ‘truth’ to be found, the adversary to be accused and vanquished, the discourse in which to speak, the grid in which to work. In short, when an individual takes a partisan position, no matter what it actually is, they act as a conduit for all of the potential danger inherent in the warlike games of the institution. Polemic is futile, because as Foucault intimates, nothing new really comes from polemic (in Rabinow 1991: 383). No advance is made because the game of this institution only incites the participants to fall back continually on rights, defend a claimed legitimacy and affirm an innocence (Ibid).

This thesis employs the Foucauldian cutting capacity of knowledge in which a new perception of difference and distinction is carved out, to echo his argument for the abandonment of the perception of difference that becomes the limiting framework of partisanship. In contemporary society this is based in such perceived ‘oppositions’ as female versus male, hard working against non hard working, Christian against Muslim, law-abiding against ‘deviant’ or ‘Green’ against ‘Red’ against ‘Blue’. In such models that mimic war, such as partisan allegiance does, Foucault astutely noticed that for a polemicist ‘the person that he confronts is not a partner in the search for truth, but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat’(in Rabinow 1991: 382). Instead, he proposed that

[…] we abandon the game in which someone says something and it is then denounced as an ideologist of the bourgeoisie, a class enemy – so that we can begin a serious debate. If it is acknowledged, for example, that what I say about the crisis of governmental rationality raises a problem, why couldn’t we take that as the basis for broad debate? (1994: 296)

The value of Foucault here is his recognition that it is possible to escape from being ‘for’ or ‘against’ (in Rabinow 1991: 381-2) and is reminiscent of Arendt with the claim that dialogue can exercise as a creative process as opposed to a battle (Ibid). We can abandon the games of the institution by not viewing plurality and difference negatively, but by
valuing distinction. Foucault advocates a ‘struggle against the government of individualization’ (in Dreyfus 1982: 212) in order to rescue the positives that differences between people allow. Instead,

[...] it would be better to speak of an ‘agonism’ – of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle: less of a face to face confrontation which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation. (Foucault in Dreyfus 1982: 222)

Thus, Foucault recasts struggle as a basis for freedom. The permanent provocation to which Foucault refers is that which sees differences, distinction, and plurality as a positive force that can challenge and negotiate power, and to recreate\(^49\).

Thus like Arendt, Foucault considers distinction and difference as the fundamental principle that needs to be defended. It is the defence of the difference principle that necessarily requires that plurality is defended. This is then the basis upon which plurality is defended, and is ultimately what leads to the emphasis in this thesis on the parallel of Foucault with Arendt in the defence of plurality. For both theorists politics has little meaning without the correct appreciation of ‘difference’. We can see then how like Arendt, Foucault sees freedom and plurality as important to one another. The bond between freedom and plurality is ‘difference’ and ‘distinction’ that, by definition, incorporates agonistic tension that has the potential to offer resolution as long as descent into polemic or war is avoided. This is important because viewing difference in a positive way minimizes the proclivity for ‘war’ which necessarily requires sides. Furthermore, where the proclivity for war is minimized a space is vacated for consideration and resolution. To put this differently, minimizing polemic also minimizes the tribalism to which it can give rise.

The next section goes on to identify where the recognition of the power of plurality can take politics and this argument once again makes use of Foucault. It will show why, for him liberty is identified as arising from struggle yet ending with prolonged inactivity (Thiele 1990: 922) and this will parallel with Arendt’s notion of plurality as the \textit{conditio par quam} [...] of all political life (1998: 7). In the previous chapter it was shown why for

\(^{49}\) Thus Foucault outlines individuals not only as recipients of but also conduits and therefore challengers of power. This undermines Gordon’s limited reading of Foucault which sees individuals only as ‘effects of power’ (2001: 134) and therefore lacking agency. Kingston’s criticism (2009: 58) is one that he contradicts later in his thesis (2009: 74) in a parallel recognition to this chapter of Foucault’s ‘sophisticated account of resistance’ (2009: 96).
Arendt plurality is essential for speech. For Foucault plurality is essential for agonistic struggle. Both theorists termed their respective acknowledgements of this ‘action’$^{50}$. It is to the promise of the Foucauldian explanation of the potential for action offered by plurality that this chapter now turns.

4.51: Foucault, Action and Speech

‘There is not one, but many silences’ (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 310)

For Foucault, the importance of defending plurality is rooted within a need to resist any coalescence of power. Such coalescence is a threat because, in parallel to Arendt’s recognition, where power is permitted to concentrate, inequality is established. Foucault observed, through painstaking genealogy of governmental forms of power, an identical observation that defenders of hierarchies purport, which is that the natural differences which exist because of the plurality of people, have the potential to challenge the status quo.

Foucault saw that it is by far a less dangerous political system that is based upon the continual circulation of power rather than one that allows power to concentrate in one place inequitably. In addition, Foucault wanted people to free themselves from the bastion of the philosophico-juridical and historico-political understandings of power that lean heavily on the fear of war and difference. He argued against retaliatory action in politics, which is always dictated by the stance of the ‘we’, the rules of the game of polemic and the legacy of a canon of political thought that ultimately renders such ‘action’ futile. Once more with a sentiment that recalls Arendt’s defence of distinction, Foucault stated that tradition allows a reduction of the difference proper to every new beginning’ (1997: 21). He explained this in an interview when he said that

Discussions on political subjects are parasitized by the model of war: a person who has different ideas is identified as a class enemy who must be fought until a final victory is won. This great theme of ideological struggle makes me smile a little given that each individual’s theoretical ties, when they are examined in their history, are tangled and fluctuating and don’t have the clear definition of a border beyond which an enemy could be forced to flee. (1994: 297)

$^{50}$ This observation finds resonance in the work of Kingston who sees both theorists as ‘creative’ (2009: 17) and ‘comprehensive’ (2009: 31) in their study of action.
Instead he wanted people to ‘develop action, thought and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition and disjunction’ (1994: 108).

This section will examine some of the examples from Foucault’s oeuvre that shows how he believed this could work. Foucault’s vision will be shown to be one that requires that distinction and plurality is valued so that the potential that plurality offers can be maintained. On this basis, this section will also show therefore, how the Foucauldian emphasis on action as necessary for greater political freedom mirrors those claims made by Arendt as seen in the previous chapter, and lastly, why this thesis argues that such an approach would be both relevant and empowering for individuals today.

Foucault once wrote that he didn’t think ‘everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous’ which, he pointed out, ‘is not exactly the same as bad’ (1994b: 256). He went on to explain that ‘if everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper and pessimistic activism’ (Ibid). This activism for Foucault meant that those who were effected by the disciplining nature of the art of governmentality (and this is all of us to some extent or another as both previous and forthcoming examples show) but particularly those constrained by the most visible tentacles of the art of governmentality can and should ‘in their actions, their resistance, their rebellion, escape them, transform them, in a word cease being submissive’ (1994: 294). The way in which people should cease being submissive parallels with claims made by Arendt, and uses the faculty of speech\textsuperscript{51}. Foucault tells us that ‘The suffering of men must never be a silent residue of policy. It grounds an absolute right to stand up and speak to those who hold power’ (1994: 475). Foucault’s parallel with Arendt is furthered by his emphasis on a need for people as collectives as well as individuals to challenge the silences created by abuses of power, and Foucault extends this across geographical borders into something that he refers to as the ‘community of the governed’ which is obliged to speak out against abuses of power under all circumstances; in short to show mutual solidarity (1994: 474).

\textsuperscript{51} What can not be fully discussed here is that Foucault, at certain points in his work, emphasised the role of speech and the various functions that it performed in various societies, particularly within Ancient Greece. That speech has such an important role for humans and therefore has merited a place in the work of Foucault, is yet another way in which Foucault parallels with Arendt. See Foucault’s Fearless Speech (2001).
It can be seen here therefore why and how Foucault considered that this should be ‘a practice [...] a manner of being’ (in Rabinow 1984: 377). Foucault made this point in 1984 using the then current example of Poland. He stated that although it may seem as if there is nothing that can be done politically about the problem, people could and should raise issues in terms of a ‘non-acceptance’ (Ibid). This ‘non-acceptance’ Foucault argues, extends even toward the passivity of other governments toward foreign abuses of power (Ibid). It is through non-acceptance, verbalized in speech, that this takes on a political dimension in parallel to Arendt, because ‘it does not consist in saying merely ‘I protest’ but in making of that attitude a political phenomenon that is as substantial as possible, and one which those who govern [...] will sooner or later be obliged to take into account’ (Ibid). Foucault, in further comparison to Arendt, argues that ‘political action can be freed from all unitary and totalizing power’ (1994: 108) because political action does not rest upon ‘hidden laws’ that need to be liberated, but upon ‘a dispersion that can never be reduced to a single system’ with ‘absolute axes of references’ (Ibid). Instead it should strive ‘to operate a decentring that leaves no privilege to any centre’ (1997: 205). Foucault’s action therefore has several parallels with the political vision of Arendt all of which highlight the importance of not accepting something as necessary simply because it is established or most visible or has habitually or traditionally been done that way. His use of the concepts of speech and action is more implicit, yet present nevertheless in terms of suggesting alternative forms of power and resistance. Throughout his work, despite the multifarious subjects that he addressed, there exists at all times the intuition that Foucault advocated ‘action’, action that also often took the form of subversion of ‘silences’ achieved through ‘speech’, a necessary undertaking for Foucault, so that power is not allowed to stagnate, but is always under negotiation and renegotiation so that its essential dynamic quality is maintained.

---

52 Poland in the early nineteen-eighties went through much political turmoil, which historians now marks as the beginnings of the fall of Communism in the country (Michnik 2011). Continually rising food prices had led to a chain reaction of strikes that eventually became a general national strike. To combat this, a situation of martial law was declared. The attempts by the state to ‘break’ the general strike, and later on the new workers union ‘Solidarity’ that was created during the strike, saw many abuses of power including violence, murder and imprisonment against the union leaders.
In another parallel with Arendt, Foucault believes that there is much that needs to be challenged about the limited relationships that exist between people. Having stated that in terms of action he is ‘more interested in the interaction between ones-self and others than the encounter between technologies of domination of others and the self’ (1994b: 225), Foucault offered a critique of the limits that are placed on human relationships by the art of governmentality. In relation to the institutionalised face(s) of the art of governmentality of which contemporary examples are the hospital, the school, the university, the prison, the clinic and government itself as embodied in institutions such as the civil service or welfare system, Foucault points out that ‘we live in a legal, social and institutional world where the only relations possible are extremely few, extremely simplified, and extremely poor [...] because a rich relational world would be very complex to manage’ (1994b: 158). Foucault recognises that ‘there is [...] the relations of marriage and the relations of family’ (Ibid) but asks ‘how many other relations should exist, should be able to find their codes, not in institutions, but in possible supports, which is not at all the case’ (Ibid). In describing the consequences of such impoverished relations, Foucault speaks in terms that echo Arendt’s use of the concept of isolation, even though his terminology is different, thus underscoring the importance of this contemporary issue. In endorsing a re-conception of the possible relations between people\(^5\), Foucault picks up the current inadequacy of them, which this thesis argues is as much of a concern in the contemporary context, and in doing so underscores the importance of plurality for sharing perspectives with the overarching aim of engaging in agonistic struggle\(^4\). In these ways Foucault’s work resonates with the ‘Action’ of Arendt. This parallel holds particular salience for the western world today because the modern incarnations of ‘fear’ identified in the thesis as anxiety, insecurity and mistrust greatly contribute to the diminishment of plurality such as is constituted by limited relationships between people. The main issues identified by both theorists and explained in this and the previous chapters arguably characterize some societies today better than at the

---

\(^5\) Regrettably, once again issues of brevity mean that the potential of Foucault’s discussions of the importance of relationships cannot be explored in more detail. Kingston however offers valuable discussion of the importance of this aspect of Foucault’s work (2009: 6,179,184,185) albeit without some of the important comparisons with Arendt made here.

\(^4\) The importance of Arendt as an agonistic theorist is also recognised by Kingston although I would argue Kingston overstates Arendt’s goal (2009: 153) in this respect. Nevertheless, the principle of ‘agonistic contestation’ so prevalent in Foucault’s work certainly suggests how Arendt’s maxim to ‘think what we are doing’ might be begun. Bell (1996) also recognises this parallel regarding thinking.
time during which both Foucault and Arendt wrote. The next section looks at these main aspects of everyday western life which exemplifies the contemporary relevance of this parallel.

4.6: The Coldest of all Cold Monsters\textsuperscript{55} : The Pastoralisation of the Plural and its Relevance to Today

The parallel between Foucault and Arendt suggests that power may operate more equitably when it is disseminated horizontally rather than vertically. This is because vertical organizations of power limit the potentially diverse, rich human relationships that can be found in the plurality of people into flat, empty, disaffected experiences characterised by mass society. For Arendt, these include the enforced isolation of each person from another and for Foucault a limited and therefore impoverished set of human relationships. The purpose of this section is to undertake an examination of the relevance of this parallel whilst also drawing together the discussion of this and the previous chapter. The most compatible aspect of modern western life that exemplifies the ideas explained so far in this thesis is that of politics\textsuperscript{56}.

Foucault observed that ‘In European societies political power has evolved towards more and more centralized forms’ (in Rabinow 1984: 300). In making such a seemingly generalised statement he noted that the political organisations and experiences in the varying countries of the western world have as much that unites them as sets them apart. Foucault’s point can be used to understand that even when there may be variations in terms of political systems, for example power held by an elected party, power that comes as an elected head of state, systems that use PR or systems that use ‘first past the post’, all are modelled on a pyramid of power, with the one at the top and the many below. Even examples of devolution of power, for example from Westminster to the Welsh and Northern Irish assemblies and the Scottish parliament, have been cases of devolution from a huge centralised body into smaller, but still nonetheless large, centralised bodies. These are, in any case, arguably token devolutions because Wales requires the veto of Westminster on certain policy matters and the power imbalance of the West Lothian question is still

\textsuperscript{55} Michel Foucault (1994: 417) taken from Nietzsche (1997: 45).
\textsuperscript{56} Other contemporary examples, such as those regarding bureaucracy, are discussed in subsequent chapters.
unresolved (Stephens 2004: 134). Furthermore, in the case of both Scotland and Wales these devolutions have the potential to be reversed. Therefore, despite the many variant political systems, there are certain political systems that exemplify the parallel between Foucault and Arendt of the problems of vertical power arrangements. Foucault’s claim particularly is exemplified in those institutions such as the EU, the European Court of Human Rights and G8 (amongst others) in which power has become even more centralised since Foucault made his observations and recall Arendt’s warning that a consequence of such organisations of politics will be an unbridgeable void separating ‘the rulers and the ruled’ (2005: 97). It is easy to see other symptoms of the abyss separating the ruler from the ruled in contemporary political examples other than those given in Chapter One. The International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (2004) shows the political apathy that characterises the EU elections. In many countries the voter turnout for the EU elections is considerably less than the turnout for domestic elections. It is clear therefore that there is evidence that the bigger the gap between ruler and ruled, the greater the chance of a ‘political abyss’. In this case this abyss is characterised by political disenfranchisement manifested in lack of interest in taking the political step of electing representatives.

It is already a condition in contemporary western politics of modern day voter apathy shown most ostensibly, although not exclusively, by declining voter participation\textsuperscript{57}. This may be due to, but is certainly combined with a loss of faith in the ‘career’ politician. Bell (2000: 169) cites the Downey Report as showing that in terms of ‘professional trustworthiness’ politicians and government ministers came bottom in a public survey\textsuperscript{58}. This was no better exemplified in the UK than in 1997 when Martin Bell became the first Independent MP to be elected to the House of Commons for 47 years (Bell 2000: 15). This was further compounded by the fact that he was elected by a landslide majority\textsuperscript{59} to the fourth ‘safest’ conservative seat in the UK (Ibid). Bell (2000: 209) himself points to outside the UK and the ‘increasing emergence of citizen candidates’ in the USA as testament to a level of dissatisfaction with party politics (Ibid). Further examples are the rising number of Americans who register as Independents (Bell 2000: 210). In the UK, other instances have

\textsuperscript{57} As shown in chapter one and also by the 2004 IIDEA survey.
\textsuperscript{58} 14 and 11 percent respectively.
\textsuperscript{59} 29,354 votes to Neil Hamilton’s 18,277 (Bell 2000: 42)
compounded the crisis of the career politician and include a litany of ‘scandals’ in representatives of both the ‘right’ and ‘left’. These range from extra-marital sex scandals belonging to those who preached to the electorate about ‘back to traditional family values’⁶⁰, to those MPs with the most dubious use of their position including highly questionable financial arrangements such as ‘cash for honours’⁶¹, ‘cash for questions’⁶², questions around British passports for party donations⁶³, blatant abuse of the public purse in the name of job related expenses to the extent that some MPs and peers⁶⁴ have been jailed for between 12 and 18 months for their wrongdoing regarding this. In addition, parliamentarians have been jailed for perjury and perverting the course of justice⁶⁵. Other scandals include inappropriate financial patronage to party funds⁶⁶ and tax evasion by advisors in charge of tax policy⁶⁷. The endless blatant abuse of position and constant hypocrisy demonstrated by these examples accelerates the ever declining legitimacy of the ‘career’ party politician. ‘Incubating careerism’ is described by one former MP as the ‘second worst thing that political parties do’ (Bell 2000: 205). Comparably, Foucault also intimated such issues when he remarked that ‘one may wonder whether the political parties are not the most stultifying political inventions since the nineteenth century. Intellectual political sterility seems to me to be one of the salient facts of our time’ (2003: 396).

The declining faith in contemporary politics comes at the same time as the widely perceived absence of social, community and employment based relations as demonstrated earlier in the thesis. Arendtian scholars identify that this modern political situation is worrying because ‘[…] when […] inflation and unemployment dissolve old social relations, [there are] vastly increased numbers of isolated individuals’ (Canovan 1992: 4). The stultifying nature of modern, western politics has also been recognised by other contemporary academics such as Darrow Schecter (2000). In explaining the problem with

---

⁶⁰ A 1993 Conservative government campaign which extolled ‘morals’ to the electorate toward which several Conservative Party MPs showed no regard themselves (Assinder,1999).
⁶¹ See Bell (2000: 178-9)
⁶² Neil Hamilton’s corruption was upheld by the Downey Report (Bell, 2000, 193) and the British courts (Bell 2000: 197)
⁶³ See Bell (2000: 177) and Stephens (2004: 140-1, 250)
⁶⁴ There are six in total. Elliot Morley, Jim Devine, David Chaytor and Lord Taylor (Robinson 2011) and Eric Illesley (Davies 2011, Bates 2011) and Lord Hanningfield (Malik 2011).
⁶⁵ Jonathan Aitken (Leigh 1999) and Jeffrey Archer (Kelso 2001).
⁶⁶ See Bell (2000: 179) and Stephens (2004: 138, 140)
⁶⁷ See Bell (2000: 181) and Stephens (2004: 139)
modern party based politics, he writes that ‘Parties translate the highly plural experience of
the political that is bound to vary from individual to individual into the homogenous
language of vote totals […] Parties use people, by way of their votes, to get power, which is
very different from allowing a plurality of opinions and perspectives to achieve visibility’
(2000: 84). Thus, contemporary scholars such as Canovan and Schecter also underwrite a
contemporary relevance to the political issues raised by both Foucault and Arendt.

The above issue is thus illustrated directly through the examples given so far. However, the
underlying sentiment is extended by both Foucault and Arendt to relate to the social
phenomena of mass society. The contemporary examples of those issues that each discusses
are almost too many to list but some of the most obvious elements of ‘men being the
endless reducible repetitions of the same model’ (Arendt 1998: 8) can be seen in the
homogenous nature of the modern western ‘goods’ market; the clothes, food, music and
leisure activities that characterize mass consumerism. Moreover, many modern societies
can be understood in terms of the ‘knowing’ of man and the trends of people’s lives that
allow governments to discipline them by informing them of, amongst other examples, at
what age their sexuality (ies) can begin, how they are best educated, how much money they
should aspire to earn, the average age for marriage, having children, the health issues that
they will face and the type of health care that they will need, their expected age of
retirement and likely age and method of death. These ‘knowns’ that can be quantified so
minutely by virtue of the repetitious model of the ‘individual’ that is part of mass society
opens up other ‘knowns’ such as how much responsibility the [mass] ‘individual’ should be
allowed to have, which will then feed into issues such as the amount and type of risk to
individual security that s/he will face in a ‘lifetime’. These then feed back full circle into
further mass consumerism of services that are needed to safeguard against all known
contemporary dangers. Foucault and Arendt’s parallel clearly shows that where forms of
mass society can be identified so too can examples of conformism within an average or
‘normal’ margin. This facilitates estrangement between individuals within the context of
their everyday lives and the extent to which they are empowered whilst simultaneously
squashing them together into categories based upon their demographic qualities. Both of
these aspects result in the loss of an appreciation of distinction that has political and social
ramifications. Conformism, argue both theorists unequivocally, is a dangerous socio-
political instrument because of the domination that it permits. As if speaking for both of them, Arendt writes that:

The danger of conformism and its threat to freedom is inherent in all mass societies [...]. Under conditions of an already existing mass society [...] conformism could conceivably be used to make terror less violent and ideology less insistent; thereby, it would serve to make the transition from a free climate into the stage of a pre-totalitarian atmosphere less noticeable. (1998: 425)

Foucault states that ‘when we talk about power relations, we are not talking about right and we are not talking about sovereignty; we are talking about domination, about an infinitely dense and multiple domination that never comes to an end’ (2003: 111). This is because ‘[...] totalitarian government [...] substitutes for the boundaries and channels of communication between men a band of iron which hold them so tightly together that it is as though their plurality had disappeared into One Man of gigantic dimensions’ (Arendt 1976: 466). This is a ‘man’ of gigantic dimensions that can perhaps be exemplified by the monolithic entities of today such as supra-national or national political organisations or those economic ‘giants’ whose financial might surpasses the GDP of some countries. In UK foreign policy, one former UK Prime Minister put forward an argument for ‘One Nation’ politics (Stephens 2004: 114). In the instances where these examples overlap or join forces, Arendt’s one man of gigantic dimensions is bigger still, leading indeed to ‘despotism of massive proportions’ (Arendt 2005: 97).

Many aspects of contemporary western experiences demonstrate the relevance of Foucault and Arendt’s concern to defend the inherent human condition of the plurality of people. It has been shown how the hierarchical model of power that both Arendt and Foucault critique fits several aspects of western politics today. The stagnant nature of such politics belies the plural condition in which people exist. In expecting, quite myopically, that people will become an actively voting political collective choosing between virtually indistinguishable political parties results not only in the failed attempt to unite people at all, but to turn them away from politics altogether. What occurs instead is the situation that Arendt described more then fifty years ago, of politically isolated individuals, isolated not only from each other but from the political world. This estrangement is reinforced from within the social sphere, if not in the strictest sense of Arendt’s loneliness, then certainly in terms of the locus of Foucault’s government *omnes et singulatum*. It can be shown therefore that social conformism replaces the plurality of people, and when this happens in
a society, as the parallel between both Foucault and Arendt highlights, a very disturbing and dangerous socio-political stage is reached. For Foucault, the main characteristic of our modern rationality [...] is neither the constitution of the state, the coldest of all cold monsters, nor the rise of bourgeois individualism. I won’t even say that it is a constant effort to integrate individuals into the political totality [...] the main characteristic of our political rationality is the fact that this integration results from a constant correlation between an increasing individualization and the reinforcement of this totality. (1994: 417)

For Arendt the stage where conformism replaces plurality is the invisible transition to pre-totalitarianism. Contemporary examples that hint at those pre-totalitarian elements forewarned against by both Foucault and Arendt can be found in some of the methods used in the UK’s ‘War on Terror’.

In the broadest sense it is not difficult to see why and how the ‘War on Terror’ was considered not only necessary but morally right by those states who were directly attacked by the terrorist elements of Islamic fundamentalism. However, when considering the ‘War on Terror’ and all of the elements it has since involved, it is pertinent to consider Foucault’s question: ‘How can one not only wage war on one’s own adversaries but also expose one’s own citizens to war and let them be killed [...] except by activating the scheme of racism?’ From this point onward war is about two things: it is not simply a matter of destroying a political adversary, but of destroying the enemy race’ (2003: 257). The full salience of this question to this thesis will become apparent as this section moves on. It is first necessary, however, to examine some claims by Arendt.

68This is also recognised by Duarte (2007: 6)
69This is the phrase used by the former US President George W. Bush, Jnr. to describe the action that the US took in response to the attack on New York on the 11th September, 2001 by the Islamic fundamentalist group ‘al-Qaeda’. This refers not only to the immediate action taken by the US, but also the action to prevent further attacks by the group and also to locate the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, and his supporters. The attempts at locating Bin Laden took many forms and is argued by some to have been instrumental in the later decision of Bush and the US administration along with the UK government to invade Iraq and bring to end the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, who was believed by some to have given refuge to Bin Laden after the 9/11 attack. Some theorists refer to the ‘imperialism of America’ on this basis; see Ikenberry (2002: 44), Arato and Cohen (2009: 316) and Martel (2010: 154). A further attack by al-Qaeda on London on 7th July brought a British angle to the ‘War on Terror’. This added a new dimension to the issue because the ‘July 7th terrorists’, as they became known, were British Muslims who were raised in the UK. The British government was therefore forced to face the fact that Britain had encountered an ‘attack from within’. Recent media reports (Reynolds 2007) state that the term ‘War on Terror’ is now obsolete. Bin Laden was killed by US elite military force on the 2nd May 2011.
In her work ‘The Origins of Totalitarianism’ Arendt observed that one technique of totalitarian governments was to create isolation, and although it is quite a stretch to claim that any current western government is totalitarian, it is not so much of a stretch to see aspects that Arendt defined as pre-totalitarian (1976: 435). Where situations of mass isolation are facilitated or allowed to grow because of negligence towards them, immediately a move toward pre-totalitarianism is made. Arendt writes that ‘Isolation may be the beginnings of terror; it certainly is its most fertile ground; it always is its result. This isolation is as it were, pre-totalitarian; its hallmark is impotence insofar as power always comes from men acting together; isolated men are powerless by definition’ (1976: 474).

In this comment Arendt makes two points. She points out that isolation can be the beginnings of terror and also that it allows a fertile ground for the proliferation of terror. Terror is too strong a word for contemporary society, however its more contemporary corollary of fear characterized as insecurity and anxiety is much less out of place in the contemporary context; these too find a stronghold where individuals are isolated. The role that fear plays in the oeuvres of both Foucault and Arendt is already outlined by this thesis, so it is sufficient to say that the example of the ‘War on Terror’ further exemplifies this parallel concern of Foucault and Arendt largely because it takes place in societies characterised by political apathy and social fragmentation and thus where insecurity is an identifiable feature.

However, what is just as interesting about the ‘War on Terror’ from this parallel point of view, are the methods employed by the governments concerned to legitimate this ‘war’. What occurred almost immediately is that the ‘war’ became extended to combat a generic group of ‘terrorists’ rather than the particular group or individuals responsible for the actual attacks. Arendt wrote that ‘Deadly danger to any civilization is no longer likely to come from without […] even the emergence of totalitarianism is a phenomenon within, not outside, our civilization. The danger is that a global universally interrelated civilization may produce barbarians from its own midst by forcing millions of people into conditions which, despite all appearances are the conditions of savages’ (1976: 302). Like Foucault, Arendt meant that it is no longer necessary to have an ‘external’ enemy who threatens a state’s borders, because a perception of danger can be cultivated within those borders. Foucault
already offers the explanation of why this happens; because governments use pastoralising techniques of ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ in health, sexuality, body size, family size, working life and values to magnify and distort issues. The insecurities, anxieties and mistrust that takes hold where individuals are estranged from one another means that the connections between plural people which might contradict, reassure and thus reduce these anxieties and which are essential for negotiating power and thus the possibility for new, multiple or different forms of freedom are yet further damaged.

This point was superbly exemplified by the British government, which during its ‘War on Terror’ asked the British public if ‘their neighbour looked like a terrorist?’ and also which put posters in public places depicting the name plates and numbers in a block of flats. The poster advised the public that in terms of the domiciles shown ‘There were two ways to find out if it’s a terrorists base’ and then ‘invited them to call [a number] because the only other option would be to ‘let them do the unthinkable’\(^7^0\). Despite the vague use of the term ‘terrorist’ the British public were expected to know what a ‘terrorist’ looked like and upon spotting an individual who fitted this bill were then expected to make an objective assessment of them. Moreover, the request was made that the public ‘inform’ on those neighbours or domiciles that looked ‘terrorist-like’. Presumably, the cost to those individuals who were innocent despite their appearance was nothing in comparison to winning the ‘War on Terror’. Once more, as if Arendt herself had witnessed the discourse of the War on Terror, she captures it in her claim that the government ‘create’ the enemy through ‘The introduction of objective enemy – defined by the policy of the government and not by his own desire to overthrow it. He is never an individual whose dangerous thoughts must be provoked or whose past justifies suspicion, but a ‘carrier of tendencies’ like the carrier of disease’ (1976: 424)

At the opposite extreme, in contrast to the ridiculousness of the contemporary example above, is the suggestion that these instances constitute dangerous and arguably pre-totalitarian methods to combat the ephemeral contemporary social enemy now labelled the

\(^7^0\) Gloucestershire Constabulary Poster in Cirencester, Glos, September 2006. This issue is also recognised in the USA by theorists such as Troyer who identifies discourse relating to an ‘enemy within’ (2003: 267) that creates duties within the citizenry to ‘shop’ and ‘volunteer’ (2003: 269) to the extent that Bush’s administration is described by Troyer as ‘totalitarian’ (2003: 270).
‘terrorist’. This contemporary example can only have reinforced divisions within a body of people. When Arendt wrote that the emergence of totalitarianism comes from within, she was describing exactly this type of situation, the situation that Foucault would point out is ‘war’ waged within, and upon, society. Arendt elucidates for us exactly why the danger now comes from within. ‘It is during this stage (ferreting out secret enemies) that a neighbour gradually becomes a more dangerous enemy to one who happens to harbour dangerous thoughts than are the officially appointed police agents’ (1976: 422) and one could add, a more immediate and therefore damaging enemy than one outside the borders of a state. In this way then the salience of Arendt’s claim that barbarians are produced from a society’s own midst by forcing millions of people into the conditions of savages has relevance.

4.7: Conclusion

This chapter opened in stating that for Foucault, in parallel with Arendt, it is necessary to defend the plurality of people. This over-arching parallel was shown as being the result of other ‘micro’ parallels between the oeuvres of Foucault and Arendt. The chapter provided three functions, one was to outline Foucault’s defence of plurality, the second was to bring more detail to the parallels between these two theorists and the third was to point out the relevance of this parallel for modern politics.

The genealogy of the binary racial code excavated by Foucault implies that what may appear as a plural society is in reality a pseudo-pluralism, manufactured by the state and directed toward individuals and their place in society marked out by a form of social grouping that results from a governmental social matrix. This is a version of Foucauldian permanent purification, political rationality formulated as social normalisation and is exemplified herein by real world cases of the ‘enemy’ or ‘other within’. The ubiquitous perception of the risk to the individual that is both proliferated and managed through the paradox of the objectivisation of the subject or assujettissement, undermines the liberal notion of autonomy in the further paradox that individuals are not unrestricted in many aspects of their everyday lives nor in their potential to form connections and relationships with others whom they exist alongside. The political rationality of social normalisation is also anti-plural, and as such parallels with Arendt’s interpretation of what constitutes the
anti-political moments of modern life. Foreshadowing Foucault’s comment she hoped that a coming-of-age might yet occur and ‘people may prove insightful enough somehow to dispense with [modern] politics before [modern forms of] politics destroys us all’ (2005: 109).

It would be too easy to disregard the arguments presented here on the basis of the historical specificity of both of the theorists, more so perhaps with Arendt because her ‘time’ is the furthest away from ours. It is true that Foucault offers a more contemporary dimension than Arendt, and this strength in his work addresses a weakness in hers. However, the fact that neither theorist lived to see the twenty-first century does not render their claims irrelevant to today, indeed this thesis contends that it is the opposite. The overarching aim of this chapter is brought to fruition here, to make salient not only the futility of polemic but also the importance of a re-conception of struggle. This must involve the recognition that it is a major socio-political failure to equate the absence of struggle with the presence of consensus. This recognition is all the more urgent in contemporary western politics where the ‘partisan we’ should be abandoned and action undertaken on an issue by issue basis. Simultaneously at the societal level there must be a cessation of submissiveness and negative judgement and a fostering within every individual of the proclivity to identify the silences and resist them. To resist the spread of the desert examined in the previous chapter, this chapter has emphasised that the notion of difference needs to be viewed in less threatening terms rather than being contrived and manipulated for political advantage so that alternative forms of freedom can be created. As difference is found within the plurality of humans it is for this reason that this thesis emphasises the Foucauldian/Arendtian parallel that plurality must be defended.
5.0: ARENDT’S CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY

5.1: Introduction

The previously discussed parallels of Arendt and Foucault can be extended through the exploration of the critique of instrumental rationality, which begins in this chapter with Arendt’s critique. This is has pertinence for two reasons. Firstly, instrumental rationality may also be understood as means-ends rationality and this chapter uses these two terms interchangeably. It is also a form of rationality that results in imposing limits on political experience(s). However, an understanding of this type of thinking is important to this thesis in a secondary way, because it acts as a pre-emptive strike to certain criticisms of Arendt for example those found in the work of Wolin (1994) Connolly (1997), Reinhardt (1997), Pitkin (1998) and Medearis (2004). These criticisms usually revolve around the question of what purpose Arendt sees for politics carried out in a public sphere, given that she exhorts the abandonment of ‘social’ questions by this realm? Some mitigation of Arendt in relation to this criticism involves a detailed discussion of what Arendt truly meant by the ‘social’ in her oeuvre which is a question often sidestepped by many critics of her with the notable exceptions of Connolly (1997) and Pitkin (1998).71

This thesis attempts to gain a more accurate understanding of the problems for politics that Arendt identified in instrumental rationality. Through doing this the relevance of her critique of modern, western politics can be better understood. This new understanding will then be used to underscore the later claims of the thesis. This chapter examines how Arendt shows us that the ultimate expression of instrumental rationality is violence and this makes war the absolute political expression of instrumental rationality. This, it will be shown, is one of the characterising features for Arendt of modern politics, and connects well to many of the claims made in the first chapter about the sovereign state as international ‘actor’.

71 No discussion of instrumental rationality is made by these writers. Marquez (2010) briefly alludes to this aspect of Arendt’s work although does not develop it.
This chapter will also make use of contemporary examples to show how prophetic Arendt’s claims were on this basis, and thus how her arguments are relevant today.

The final part examines what is for Arendt, the consequence of a political sphere characterised by an instrumental rationality entangled with socio-economic issues. This entanglement takes the form of bureaucracy. One prominent theorist of bureaucracy is Max Weber (1864-1920). In his sociological lectures (in Gerth and Mills 1974: 196-245) Weber described the ‘modern officialdom of public and lawful government’ (Weber 1974: 197) or bureaucracy as a ‘rational’ form of organisation, where its rationality arises from the domination of ‘rules, means, ends and matter-of-factness’ (1974: 244). Weber saw bureaucracy as having a technical superiority over other forms of organisation (1974: 214) describing bureaucracy as analogous to a machine over non-mechanical modes of production (Ibid) and for these reasons as a form of organisation ‘welcomed by capitalism’ (Weber 1974: 216). As this chapter will show Arendt at times re-affirms this analysis of bureaucracy, but at other times she is quite distinct from it. This chapter now turns to a preliminary definition of what Arendt meant by means-end rationality.

5.2: Arendt’s Understanding of Means-End Rationality

‘ [...] utility established as meaning generates meaninglessness’ (Arendt 1998: 154)

‘The Human Condition’ is the best starting place for an understanding of what Arendt meant by means-end rationality. What becomes clear in this book, through discussion of the technology, science, violence and bureaucracy of the modern age is the rationalisation for or against something based on its perceived utility or function in a process directed towards a given ‘end’. This, for Arendt, is the defining feature of many aspects of modern thinking. In this book, Arendt traces this mode of thinking to the ideas and attitudes that lie behind *homo faber* or (hu)man as the ‘maker’ of artifice in the world rather than the ‘doer’ of Action (1998: 305) Arendt’s distinction here is easier to understand once the ideas and attitudes that lie behind *homo faber* are looked at in more detail.

---

72 This chapter once again uses the distinction of Action to describe genuine (Arendtian) Action and the term ‘acts’ for modern, western (contra-Arendtian) political ‘acts’.
Arendt marks out several aspects of instrumental rationality as being characteristic of ‘making’ rather than ‘doing’. Amongst these is the conviction that ‘every issue can be solved and every human motivation reduced to utility as a principle’ (Ibid). *Homo faber* is confident in his/her own sovereignty above everything else, thinking of nature as ‘an immense fabric from which we can cut out and re-sew whatever we like’ (Arendt 1998: 305-6) and has confidence in ‘[…] the productivity of the market of artificial objects, which therefore leads to a rationalisation that looks toward the ‘instrumentalization of the world’ (Ibid). This anthropocentric way of thinking means that there is an unquestioning faith in the all comprehensive range of means-end rationality, which then by definition results in contempt for all thought which is not ‘the first step […] for the fabrication of artificial objects’ (Ibid). The consequences for this type of thinking are disastrous for all other possible human activities because the result is ‘a matter-of-course identification of fabrication with action’ (Ibid). The (matter of course) identification of fabrication with action was referred to by Arendt as Philistinism, or *banausic* mentality (1993: 215).

Arendt implies (1993: 201-21) that this mentality involves an overarching loss of judgement in *homo faber* that sets him/her apart from both people of genuine political action and those who might undertake more creative endeavours and/or labours of love which are not undertaken with utility in mind, where there is no distinction between ‘means’ and ‘ends’ nor any value derived from functional utility in a means-end process. The real world consequence of this absence of judgement is examined in more detail later, through the example of Adolf Eichmann.

Arendt identified that instrumental rationality became ‘a key concept’ (1998: 297) of the natural and historical sciences. In ‘The Human Condition’, she critically wrote of this mode of thinking within the academic disciplines of both the historical and natural sciences, arguing that the study of history had evolved to become conceived of ‘as a process’ and that thenceforth all historical phenomena ‘derived their meaning solely from their function in the overall process (Ibid). Such insistence on the importance of ‘process’ shows the characteristics of fabrication, where the results can be that ultimately the ‘process surpasses the product’ (1998: 297). To put this more simply, the ‘means’ surpass the ‘ends’ to the extent that eventually the means subsume the end. As well as exemplifying how it is that
banalistic mentality has come to limit ways of thinking outside that of fabricating artifice, Arendt’s disappointment with this train of thought in the natural sciences also illuminates her critique of violence and the ‘technology’ of violence which is discussed in the next section.

Most pertinently for this thesis is her insight that instrumental rationality restricted the politics of the modern age. She offered many examples of this. ‘The Promise of Politics’ (Arendt 2005b: 4) contains an extract from a 1951 article that Arendt wrote for Denktagebuch. In this article, Arendt explained that to conceive of politics in the terms of means and ends was ludicrous because it leads to self-deception. This self-deception is the inevitable consequence of three issues that arise from understanding politics in instrumental terms. The first issue at which Arendt levelled a critique was that political acts undertaken as means to achieve an absolute end, examples of which in her Denktagebuch article are ‘true’ or ‘good’, are ‘not graspable’ (Ibid) because all ideals or absolutes are at one and the same time subjective to each individual and therefore unknowable in concrete terms. In this way, people deceive themselves in terms of the tangibility of the ‘end’ that they pursue. The second issue is that within this type of political rationality ‘anything will do as an absolute [such as] race or classlessness’ (Ibid) and thirdly in the pursuit of this absolute or end ‘all things are equally expedient [...] anything goes [...] reality appears to offer action as little resistance as it would the craziest theory that some charlatan might come up with. Everything [including bestial actions] is possible’ (Ibid). ‘Ends’ therefore cannot be used a yardstick because i) it does not yet exist in any other form than as ephemera, subjective, unknowable and as-yet-unreached and by virtue of this and ii) it encourages any means to be used to achieve it because it is perceived as the absolute – a notion which is self-delusional in that it is conceived as the ideal or perfect incarnation in which it can be ‘realised’ (Ibid).

The paradox here, points out Arendt, is that when the ideal is felt to be achieved, it is also abolished: ‘the realization of philosophy abolishes philosophy [...] and so finally the ostensible realisation of man simply abolishes men’ (2005b: 4). To capture the essence of what Arendt says in the 1951 article, it can also be said that another worrying paradox of instrumental rationality, in opposition to the subsuming of the product into the process (or
end into the means), is the notion of the ‘perfect’ end ‘justifying’ any means to achieve it, even those means which are its most blatant and total opposite. Arendt poses this issue most saliently when she asks in ‘The Promise of Politics’ (2005b: 196) ‘[…] what ends can justify means that under certain circumstances could destroy humanity and organic life on earth?’

Through the above question, Arendt reiterates Weber’s recognition that an ethic of absolute ends cannot stand up under the ethical irrationality of the world (Weber 1974: 122) to the extent that it is not possible to decree which end justifies which means (Ibid). This paradox can be illustrated if absolutes such as ‘justice’ or ‘peace’ are considered as examples. These ideals, which are indeed relative to whichever subjectivity conceives of them, are often used as modern political points of reference as an ‘end’ to be achieved. Examples of this would include making war in order to keep peace such as the British government’s 1999 bombing of Kosovo, the intervention in Sierra Leone to end civil war there (Stephens 2004: 6, 213) or Barak Obama’s sense of ‘justice being served’ provided by the death of Osama Bin Laden. Theoretically and factually these do allow and have allowed, the most unjust and non-peaceful means to be carried out in the pursuit of reaching them. This shows the paradox of the latter danger. The fact that in some contemporary examples such unjust and un-peaceful ‘means’ are now used as commonplace and automatic governmental techniques is the example of the paradox of the former danger that the ‘end’ is abolished by the ferocity of the means. ‘Justice’ and ‘peace’ as principles are abandoned by the practice and in the course of trying to achieve them as ‘ends’. Means and ends, or process and product are explained, rationalised and accepted in terms of their function or utility in relation to each other. This is the legacy that political thought in general, and modern politics in particular, has been bequeathed.

For Arendt, the proof of the persistence and ultimate success of the parasitisation of genuine political Action by instrumental rationality is

widely attested [to…..] by the whole terminology of political theory and political thought (1958; 229) [which...] makes it almost impossible to discuss these matters without using the category of means and ends and thinking in terms of instrumentality. (2005b: 197)

73 BBC News, BBC 1, 2nd May 2011.
Arendt qualified her critique by stating that it was not ‘the use of means to achieve an end as such’ but that it was the ‘generalization of the fabrication experience in which usefulness and utility are established as the ultimate standards for the life and the world of men’ (Arendt 1998: 157). What Arendt meant by this was that in fabrication, which can also be understood as the making of something new in the world that was not previously there, utility or the purpose of the object is the guiding reason for its undertaking and also the guiding principle for the process that leads to its manufacture. In other words utility reflects the reality of that object.

However, when utility or purpose becomes generalised into a guiding principle behind the reasoning for everything outside fabrication, such as the world, the lives of individuals and politics, it ceases to fulfil what it does in the sphere of artifice. This is because utility dictates that what can be made in artificial terms will be ‘real and true’ (Arendt 1998: 300), but can give no consideration for the unexpected which is the ‘very texture of reality within the realm of human affairs’ (Ibid) and where this has the potential to lead. The generalization of the fabrication experience is therefore inappropriate for human affairs because this ‘is where the wholly improbable happens regularly’ (Ibid). For Arendt using utility as a guiding principle for politics ‘is highly unrealistic’ and a modern political reason based upon this ‘founders on the rock of reality’ (Ibid). In this moment, Arendt extends Weber’s analysis of the paradox of instrumental rationality and distinguishes herself from him in her explanation of why it is a misplaced conception for human affairs.

For the purposes of this thesis, violence has the secondary, but certainly not lesser, advantage of being instantly recognisable as the overarching characteristic of modern political action. In this way, therefore, it also provides a direct and irrefutable link between this aspect of the political theory of Hannah Arendt and what passes for politics in the world today.  

---

74This is also noted in the work of Duarte (2007: 1)
5.3: Arendt’s Critique of Violence

‘[…] what needs justification by something else cannot be the essence of anything’
(Arendt 1970: 150)

Arendt understands violence in the everyday sense of physical harm born from aggression. In ‘On Violence’ she links it to wars, revolution, aggression, death (1970: 5) and brutality, torture, slaughter and genocide (1970: 14). Furthermore, Arendt’s analysis of violence is not one that can simply be labelled as a form of generic pacifism because far from being simply a reaction against war and aggression in general, Arendt analyses violence as the unique and specific instrument (1970: 11) that characterises modern politics. For Arendt, violence is the paragon modern political example of instrumental rationality. In this way Arendt agrees with theorists of instrumental rationality such as Weber in seeing politics and violence as linked (Weber 1974: 121). However, unlike Weber, Arendt always took great care to separate violence from power and force with which it is often confused, to show violence as fundamentally anti-political due to its instrumentality. Through this more nuanced consideration of politics and violence, Arendt marks out her distinction from both Weber and generic pacifism.

For Arendt, violence is completely un-political whereas power, achieved and experienced among people in the plural, is the epitome of genuine politics. In the close examination of this issue which forms ‘On Violence’ she pointed out that it is necessary to distinguish between ‘power, strength, force, authority and violence’ (1970: 43). For Arendt, violence and power are mutually exclusive forces (1970: 56). This idea stands in direct contrast to the modern understanding of violence as the manifestation of power or power defined by the willingness and capability to use violence. Arendt shows that the mutually exclusive aspects of violence and power mean that what characterises one is entirely absent from the other. Probably the biggest characteristic of violence, according to Arendt, is that it is ruled at all times by instrumental rationality. Power (and force and strength) are never ruled in this way. Furthermore, violence carries an arbitrariness which goes beyond the unpredictability of action (1970: 4). Arendt moves on to point out that this intrusion of the ‘utterly unexpected’ is not eliminated by simulations or by calling events ‘random’ (Ibid). For Arendt violence always stands in need of instruments that multiply the capacity for it.
This means that violence has no need for numbers; in Arendt’s words the technology of violence allows, *in extremis*, the standing of one against all, or the few against the many. In contrast, power never needs implements. Its only requirement is numbers and in its extreme form, power is the standing of all against one. Because of this, genuine power can only be found, used and perpetuated by the human ability to act in concert, as examined in Chapter Three. In testament to its inherently instrumental nature, violence and its aims are rendered useless by virtue of the means that are at its disposal. That is to say that technological developments within the means of violence that are possessed by contemporary sovereign states have reached the stage whereby their destructive capability renders the threat of violence meaningless because of the likelihood of the insane possibility of mutual destruction (1970: 4-6). The means of violence are such that all ends become irrelevant because no ends can survive such means ‘as in total war’ (Arendt 2005: 160). Violence is the best example of the earlier point that this type of rationality contains the potential for dangerous excess:

The very substance of violent action is ruled by the means-ends category, whose chief characteristic, if applied to human affairs, has always been that the end is in danger of being overwhelmed by the means which it justifies and which are needed to reach it. (1970: 106).

Further to its inherently instrumental nature due to the form of rationality upon which it is based, violence is also un-political because in all its manifestations, it marks out the point where speech has disappeared. Arendt tells us that ‘violence begins where speech ends’ (2005a: 308). Chapter Three has already explained how for Arendt, speech constitutes a genuinely political action. By this definition therefore, any form of politics that uses violence is a limited politics because Arendt points out ‘Violence itself is incapable of speech, and [...] speech is helpless when confronted with violence [...] because of this speechlessness political theory has little to say about the phenomenon of violence’ (1965:19). For this reason Arendt concludes that ‘[...] sheer violence is mute, and for this reason violence alone can never be great’ (1998: 26). Furthermore, because speech does not exist where violence exists, modern political theory is impotent when faced with it. This has pertinence for contemporary politics, and also bodes very poorly for it. Despite these immanent contradictions, however, violence retains a place in modern politics because it finds what passes for rationality in its instrumental nature. Arendt recognises this in ‘On
Violence’, stating that ‘Violence, being instrumental by nature, is rational to the extent that it is effective in reaching the end that must justify it’ (1970: 176 my emphasis).

Using violence as an example helps to illustrate how Arendt saw that potentially genuine political motivations could degenerate into un-political ones and therefore why she endorsed political goals over ends. Violent action, which introduces into the world weapons made to coerce and kill, is always justified in modern politics by ends pertaining to self-preservation (defence), conquest or revolution. For Arendt these things are always ends and never the more politically effective goals (2005b: 193). As soon as violence or brute force is introduced into human affairs then politics takes on the face and means of instrumentality and is never genuinely political. Arendt replies to those critics of her view of genuine politics by contrasting politics that uses goals from bogus politics that uses ends. It is worth quoting at some length from ‘The Promise of Politics' to underscore this view, where Arendt describes how violence offers no hope for politics.

If a political action that does not stand under the sign of brute force does not achieve its goals – which it never does in reality – that does not render the political action either pointless or meaningless. It cannot be pointless because it never pursued a ‘point’, that is an end, but has only been directed at goals, more or less successfully; and it is not meaningless because in the back and forth of exchanged speech – between individuals and peoples, between states and nations – that space in which everything else that takes place is first created then sustained. What in political language is called a ‘breakdown in relations’ is the abandonment of that in-between space, which all violent action first destroys before it proceeds to annihilate those who live outside of it. (2005b: 193).

There are a multitude of reasons why violence contributes little to nothing to political endeavour. Firstly, violence is the antithesis to the manifestation of power achieved through the plurality of people. Secondly, violence is arbitrary. Dangerous excess is immanent to it because its rationality drives it to surpass everything in the pursuit of ends. Violence also relies on the technological intervention in the order of things that allows a magnification of capabilities that distorts and reverses all balances of power. This magnifies the potential for dangerous excess. Violence is mute, it destroys speech and because of this it renders political theory powerless when challenged by it. Lastly, violence transforms the motif of genuine politics, goals, into the abyss of instrumental politics, ends. This has the consequence of destroying all of the political potential offered by the relational space between humans.
As shown in previous chapters, the ultimate modern statist expression of violence is war. Predictably then, Arendt is critical of both war and revolution as political acts. This criticism means that the political theory of Hannah Arendt is as relevant to today’s western, politics as it was to the politics of fifty years ago. The following explanations will make abundantly clear how the political theory of Arendt can be used to make some candid assessments of politics today, and to show how and why it is vital to reconsider aspects of contemporary politics.

Arendt believes that ‘war is un-political’ (2005b: 165). This is easily understood because it is inseparable from violence. Wars (and revolution) ‘are not even conceivable outside the domain of violence […] and this sets them apart from all other political phenomena […] in so far as violence plays a predominant role in wars and revolutions, both occur outside the political realm’ (1965: 18-19). This means that through their use of violence, wars are contemporary real-world examples of political means-end rationality. The instrumental nature of war and its capacity to show exactly how the means surpass the ends, is most forcefully stated in Arendt’s posthumously published lectures The Promise of Politics (2005). Here Arendt marks out, that the face of war changed with the splitting of the atom and the discovery of nuclear energy. Such a ‘rape of nature’ (2005b: 157) represented ‘something absolutely new in the history of science […] a culminating point, achieved […] by one […] short circuit toward which events in any case had been moving at an ever accelerating pace’ (2005b: 154).

It also marked a new era in inter-national political violence. This new era of violence took mankind out of the limits imposed by nature, and into ‘supernatural’ (2005b: 158) processes brought to earth with both productive and destructive potential (2005b: 157) Where Arendt links the instrumental nature of science and technology, which is the modern manifestation of *homo faber*, and political violence, she observes with her characteristic incisiveness that it is no longer denied by anyone, even major powers, that ‘once war has broken out it will be fought with whatever weapons are at it’s disposal’ (2005b: 158) and these weapons include the nuclear bomb.

In creating the nuclear bomb, science and technology reflect the instrumentality of *homo faber* by the use of a perception of ‘superior sovereignty’ to cut and re-sew nature into the
devastating tool to achieve a given end. Nuclear arsenals are means which are used to reach an end, such as submission of an opponent in war (a sovereign state government), irrespective of the interim consequences that those means cause. In the case of the nuclear bomb these interim consequences range from the psychological terror and physical hardship endured by innocent people that have the misfortune to be involved in a ‘hot’ conflict, to the threat and reality of outright death for those within the most immediate vicinity of the nuclear explosion to consequences which even stretch beyond the achievement of the end. In nuclear war this would be both the geographical and temporal large scale destruction of entire biospheres caused by nuclear fall-out.

Such excessive means which have effects far beyond any original end prove that in politics ‘total war is a fait accompli for the whole world (2005b: 160) and war is ‘no longer the ultima ratio of negotiations’ (2005b: 159). The existence of people, animals and plants are what is at stake in the event of nuclear attack, and this cost cannot be considered within the sphere of negotiation. Arendt tells us that with nuclear technology ‘war truly ceases to be a means of politics and as a war of annihilation begins to overstep the bounds set by politics and to annihilate politics itself’ (2005b: 159).

In her work, Arendt uses the example of Hiroshima which proved that ‘threats of total destruction were not just empty words’ (2005b: 158-61). The devastation wrought on Hiroshima by one atomic bomb took only a few minutes to achieve an end that otherwise would have needed ‘months of air attacks’ (Ibid) to achieve. This led the way to a swift and unexpected end to the Second World War, in Arendt’s words, decimating ‘not only a people, but turning the world they inhabit into a desert’ (2005b: 154). Arendt also points to the later example of the ‘Cold War’, the ongoing threat of war between the superpowers of the USA and former USSR that started after the Second World War and lasted until the 1990s. In this stand off, where both powers held considerable nuclear power (the destructive capacity of which is what actually made them ‘superpowers’) Arendt observed once again that the violent means could potentially surpass the end as for both nations it would be unimaginable that either of these powers would survive a defeat if a ‘hot’ war occurred between them (2005b: 159).

75 See also Chapter One.
Lenin prophesised that the twentieth century would be a century of wars and Hannah Arendt agreed\(^76\), writing that ‘wars and revolution, not the functioning of parliamentary governments and democratic party apparatus have shaped the basic political experience of the twentieth century. To ignore them is tantamount to not living in the world in which we in fact live’ (2005b: 191). The above examples of Hiroshima and the Cold War are testament to Arendt’s insight that what characterised modern politics more than anything else was violence, to the extent that the modern western world now *equates* (my emphasis) political action with violence (2005b: 192) and not with the Action identified in Chapter Three of this thesis. Arendt felt that the glorification of violence that she witnessed in her lifetime was one of the direct reasons for the absence of genuine political power arising between people in the plural. This glorification was caused, in her words ‘by the severe frustration of the faculty of action in the modern world’ (2005b: 180).

Within the global political landscape of the last century there have been at least twelve major wars, fought on both western and non-western terrain with Europe being the most war prone continent. This means that the most devastating wars of all time have been fought in the most recent and supposedly most rational and enlightened century. Two of these wars were world wars where millions of military and civilian personnel have been killed. The death toll of the Second World War, with its nuclear technological means, exceeded the total death toll of all other wars throughout world history. Three quarters of all military personnel lost in the situation of hot conflict died in the last world war.\(^77\) There has also been an ideological Cold War, which in spite of being cold in Europe has led to bloodshed and violence in places outside Europe. Even the end of the Cold War was marked by war, death and destruction.

Hannah Arendt died in 1975, exactly three quarters of the way through the twentieth century. The fact the she was *in absentia* during the final quarter does not alter the relevance of her analysis of violence and contemporary politics. She didn’t miss any changes to the politics that she witnessed in her lifetime. In truth, all that she missed was further examples that strengthened her claims. At least three of the wars mentioned above

\(^76\) Arendt includes Lenin in her work because of this prediction about the twentieth century rather than any ideological stance that he may (or may not) have had.

\(^77\) All information from Nobelprize.org 2008.
have been fought since Arendt’s death\textsuperscript{78} and the beginning of the newest century is still marked out with political action embodied by war\textsuperscript{79}. It seems therefore that although the twentieth century was indeed a century of war, it wasn’t to be the \textit{last} century of war. Not three years since it began, the twenty-first century continues the legacy of the century before it. Arendt did not have to physically witness this to be able to accurately predict it politically, forewarning that ‘the practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world’ (1970: 177).

What is clear from Arendt’s critique of instrumental rationality and the examples used in this section is that whatever end violence is the political means to achieve, it is condemned to failure, unless of course the end required is further violence. This will always be the outcome for politics conceived of in instrumental terms for all of the reasons outlined in this chapter. Violence is characterised by an absence of speech. It is arbitrary, technological, super-natural, and it literally is single minded because of its location outside of the plural and within the hands of the few. Arendt’s analysis of instrumental rationality, where an absolute end can justify any means and means themselves can subsume any ends finds no better illustration than in the bloody and ultimately futile contemporary marriage of politics and violence. Arendt gives us the insight that both means and ends collapse into each other due to the tunnel vision that they induce. Where each collapses into the other, both lose any meaning connected to them.

Bureaucracy is another modern day example of instrumental rationality that gives Arendt’s work yet more contemporary relevance. This example of the application of instrumental rationality to the sphere of everyday lives will be seen to be just as destructive an example as violence is to the political world. Indeed, for Arendt it can equate to violence.

\textsuperscript{78} This applies to both Gulf Wars and the conflicts resulting from the collapse of the former Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe.

\textsuperscript{79} The Second ‘Gulf War’ of Bush-Blair, which began in 2003 and the fallout of which is still ongoing at the time of writing this. To date in Iraq and Afghanistan over 500 British military personnel have been killed (www.mod.uk) alongside countless indigenous and foreign civilians. This death toll does not account for the death toll of military and civilian personnel from countries outside the UK.
5.4: Tyranny without Tyrants: Arendt and Bureaucracy

‘Bureaucracy is rule through secrecy [. . .] real power begins where secrecy begins’ (Arendt 1976: 214, 403).

For the vast majority of developed countries there are both major and minor everyday challenges that are faced which relate to economic position within the capitalist economic system. Contingent to the economic position that individuals hold in this type of market are everyday problems that may be created or resolved according to a person’s economic location on this financial spectrum. The capitalist market is, by the very dynamics of it, numerically bottom heavy in terms of people, but top heavy in terms of wealth of resources. There is then an imbalance in both people and wealth at the opposing two ends of the continuum, with the lowest positions being *sine qua non* for the position of those at the highest. As capitalism involves, despite all of its apparent riches, a finite pool of wealth, this symbiosis between the top few and bottom majority of the hierarchy, is necessary for capitalism to grindingly perpetuate as an economic system. It has become the task of modern western government to administer and manage amongst their populations solutions to the constellation of everyday socio-economic problems that are the result of the position a person has in the capitalist hierarchy.

In the endeavour to ensure that individuals’ rights are kept intact, bureaucracy is the organisational face of governmental attempts to manage the above problems. So for example, it is the task of modern western governments to ensure that a person’s right to better themselves should not be impeded by lack of education, their right to life by ill health and poverty and their right to security by threat and danger. In short, it has become the responsibility of western governments to maintain each individual’s right to autonomy by policing all that may threaten that autonomy. All of these issues, when undertaken by a government on the scale of a national population, require efficient and accurate administration. Bureaucracy is the site where governmental policy attempts to expediently protect the rights of the individual from the impediments to it wrought by socio-economic problems. In other words to ‘administer’ its governmental social responsibilities, or in Arendtian terms to ‘govern by bureaucracy’ (1976: 243). This section will use the terms administration and bureaucracy interchangeably.
Bureaucracy is the site whereby contemporary political instrumental rationality collides with the day to day reality of individuals’ lives, for example through the workplace, education, healthcare, social security benefits and managing legal requirements that range from having an accurate drivers licence to completing a census every ten years. This shows bureaucracy to be a ubiquitous feature of contemporary western life. This is recognised by many commentators (Pitkin 1998: 254, Blakely and Saward 2009: 352). This section undertakes a discussion of the Arendtian critique of bureaucracy because it allows her comments on instrumental rationality to be tied even closer to western society today. This also adds more weight to Arendt’s criticisms of sovereignty as discussed in Chapter One. The forthcoming explanations also provide a basis for the ultimate conclusion of this thesis.

Arendt sees bureaucracy as a modern form of domination which has gathered particular strength in the last century (1970: 179). In On Violence she refers to several forms of domination seen in history such as one over the few in monarchy or the best over the few as in aristocracy (1970: 38). However, today we need to add to these the ‘most formidable form of such domination: bureaucracy […] where no men […] one or many […] can be held responsible’ (Ibid).

Arendt describes bureaucracy as ‘a substitute for government’ (1976: 185). This is because ‘government by bureaucracy is government by decree […] decrees remain anonymous […] and therefore seem to flow from some all over ruling power that needs no justification […] in government by bureaucracy decrees appear in their naked purity as though they were no longer issued by powerful men, but were the incarnation of power itself and the administrator only its accidental agent’ (1976: 243-4). She comments that for some theorists the idea of administration was supposed to mean the absence of rule, but she counters this by pointing out that in fact administration via bureaucracy is indeed rule. It is ‘a form of government in which no-one takes responsibility […] and in which the personal element of ruler-ship has disappeared and […] such a government may rule in the interest of no-class’ (2005b: 77). Thus for Arendt, bureaucracy is a form of domination ‘in which no men […] can be held responsible and which could properly be called ‘rule by Nobody’ (1970: 38).

---

80 In the Promise of Politics Arendt attributes this idea to Marx (2005, p77).
The rule by nobody has considerable political significance in that the absence of an identifiable ruler does not equate to an absence of rule or to no rule, indeed rule and constraint is achieved very effectively over all of those who are subject to it when looked at from their perspective. What is particularly disquieting about this Arendt points out is that ‘no-man-rule [...] has one important trait in common with the tyrant’ (2005b: 77-8). This important trait is elucidated by Arendt in the following way. Tyrannical power is traditionally defined as arbitrary power where no-one can be held to account. In situations of tyranny this translates into rules which owe no-one any responsibility, and this is true also, in the rule-by-nobody, because in a bureaucracy, ‘there are many people who demand an account, but there is nobody to give it, because ‘nobody’ can be held responsible’ (Arendt 2005: 78). With this analysis a further distinction from Weber can be discerned. Arendt’s identification of the rule by nobody opposes Weber’s claim that because the bureaucrat ‘cannot exercise discretion and can only regulate matters abstractly’ (1974: 198) [...] ‘the system of bureaucracy allows the possibility of appeal’ (1974: 197). The ostensible lack of will in the rule by nobody means that there can be no appeal.

In her discussion of bureaucracy, Arendt shows how the absence of a figure from who an account can be demanded results in the absence of speech. This completely parallels with the earlier absence of speech that occurs in violence and politics. Where violence destroys the space for individual relationships in the political sphere, so too does bureaucracy in the everyday sphere. The importance of a space where plurality can be experienced has already been shown in previous chapters, so this strangulation of the social space for plurality means that ‘as far as the ruled are concerned, the net of the patterns in which they are caught is by far more dangerous and more deadly than mere arbitrary tyranny’ (Arendt 2005: 78). In this quote Arendt puts government by bureaucracy as something beyond tyranny. The absence of any opportunity for recourse through speech reflects the claims in earlier chapters of the dangers of isolation and loneliness of the contemporary individual. Arendt emphatically denounces bureaucracy because ‘[...] organized loneliness is considerably more dangerous than the unorganized impotence of all those who are ruled by the tyrannical and arbitrary will of a single man’ (1976: 478). The danger of this organized loneliness is fully exemplified when the governmental bureaucracy in contemporary society is considered.
Given the proliferation of bureaucracy to many aspects of contemporary life in developed countries there is a large number of people who are at all times, on one level or another, subject to it. They will be familiar with the endless paper chain of form filling that individuals must undergo in order to qualify for any kind of help from the state or organisation acting on the state’s behalf. Form filling is only one example where human contact is minimized in the process of asking for help, but the lack of human contact in the process is compounded at each stage through the nameless and faceless entities within bureaucracy who take life changing and life saving decisions regarding people’s lives. Furthermore, that a person’s likelihood of receiving help depends upon such correctly following the minutiae of bureaucracies’ rules tasks such as standing at the only ‘right’ desk that there is by but not before or beyond an allocated time, or in finding the person in an organisation whose responsibility ‘it is’ amongst the multitude of people in the same organisation whose responsibility ‘it is not’ all adds a contemporary weight to the Arendtian claim that a defining feature of a bureaucracy is ‘the shifting of responsibility’ as ‘a matter of daily routine’ (2003: 31).

Many of Arendt’s observations can be discerned in the modern day bureaucracy. The application of universal rules are shown in the need to make an ‘appointment’ time to speak to an unoccupied employee who is sat at a desk with no-one else to see, or lining up several times in the same office to address multiple queries that a single person could answer, or the 100 or more assessments that are needed to receive special educational needs support (Gove 2011). The ‘haphazardness of universal rules’ (Arendt 2005b: 78) are seen in issues that range across a spectrum from something as trivial as rarely getting the same answer twice to the same question, depending on who you ask to more serious issues such as the length of time an individual has to wait to receive financial support to feed themselves and their dependents, if indeed they receive it at all, to the most serious examples such as ‘postcode’ lotteries for healthcare (Bungay 2005, O’Grady 2007, Parish 2011).

The bureaucratic process stumbles along because of the unquestioned assumption and faith in instrumental rationality that as long as each in the process is doing their role according to the ‘rules’, then no more is needed from them and the rules and the system work. Such unwavering and unreflective faith in the effectiveness of bureaucracy has continually and
frequently allowed the process to fail many of the very people it allegedly exists to protect. In these examples, we can see again Arendt’s claim that within instrumental rationality the means (bureaucratic rules) can surpass the end (social care). Inflexible rules create a restrictive and ultimately dangerous cage from which there is no escape. This aspect of Arendt’s analysis of bureaucracy as the paragon social example of instrumental rationality agrees with that of Weber that ‘management to rules is embedded in bureaucracy’s very nature’ (1974: 198). There is no room for manoeuvre within this cage, because the rules do not allow for judgement, flexibility or discretion, in fact they decree exactly the opposite in that judgement, discretion and flexibility are ‘outlawed’. This claim is revisited later in this chapter.

The rules of bureaucratic process are as debilitating for those who are employed by it as it is for those who have cause to appeal to it. In line with the means-ends symbiosis that characterises instrumental rationality, like Weber (1974: 228) Arendt conceives of bureaucrats as cogs within a machine. They become merely components or means in a greater process toward a given end. The bureaucratic process must perpetuate at all costs, so by this token the cogs in the machine are expendable. This means that ‘unfit’ cogs can be exchanged ‘for fitter ones’ (Arendt 2003: 58) with little or no consequence for the system itself (Arendt 2003: 29).

Indeed this way of thinking of people as cogs in a greater machine pervades all of modern life according to Arendt. She wrote of modern life that ‘[…] in the age of mass society […] everybody is tempted to regard himself as a mere cog in some kind of machinery – be it the well oiled machinery of some huge bureaucratic enterprise, social, political or professional, or the chaotic, ill adjusted chance pattern of circumstances under which we all somehow spend our lives (2003: 57). These points led Arendt to accurately conclude that ‘the rule of nobody […] is […] for this reason perhaps the least human and most cruel form of rulership’ (2003: 31). In doing so Arendt brings out a paradox that shows both cruelty and

81 There are many individual examples of the failure of a bureaucratic system to deliver, efficiently, or otherwise the ‘end’ that they are the means to achieve. In this plethora are cases such as the murder of children known by social services to be ‘at risk’ such as Maria Calwell in the seventies and Victoria Climbié in the nineties (see Parton 2004) and Baby P (Hughes and Milmo 2008). The Calwell and Climbié cases occurred because of ‘system failure’ (Parton 2004: 81) and were judged ‘inexcusable’ in the Laming report (see Parton 2004: 84).
de-personalisation in a regular contemporary social experience. These reasons exemplify why ‘Arendt came to understand that all rules – for good or evil, and regardless of their source – which purport to govern human action from without are apolitical and even anti-political’ (Beiner in Arendt 2005b: x).  

5.5: Banality and Evil: Instrumental Rationality and the Loss of Judgement  

‘[...] far more, and far more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of obedience than have ever been committed in the name of rebellion’ C.P. Snow (1961)  

The very real dangers of instrumental rationality are embodied in the inflexible and anonymous rule by bureaucracy, often carried out at ground level by people who believe in the sanctity of ‘the rules’ above all else. The unwavering obedience that follows the rules of the process so that an end can be achieved that fosters and actively cultivates the absence of judgement is something that Arendt refers to as philistinism. Beiner describes this well when he states that ‘the real danger in contemporary societies is that the bureaucratic, technocratic and depoliticized structures of modern life encourage indifference and increasingly render men less discriminating, less capable of critical thinking and less inclined to assume responsibility’ (1992: 53).  

Beiner refers here to a hideous psychological transformation that can happen to some human beings when unwavering faith in the infallibility of the process, obedience over resistance and rules over reflected judgement converges with the human life lived in sovereign privacy and the awareness that one is merely an ‘expendable cog’. This convergence is exemplified by Arendt in what is widely accepted as her most controversial work: her report and reflections on the trial in Jerusalem of the Nazi bureaucrat, Adolf Eichmann\(^2\) (1906-1962) (Arendt 1992a). In her examination of Eichmann, Arendt illustrates the prescience of the recognition that what characterises the bureaucrat is ‘faithful management in return for secure existence’ (Weber 1974: 199).

\(^2\) The example of Eichmann shows why Marquez (2010, 28) fails to recognise that not all elements of totalitarianism necessarily rely on violence. Arendt’s nuanced distinction between power and violence is also over simplified by Marquez.
Adolf Eichmann was a high ranking official in the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD); a branch of the *Schutzstaffeln* (SS) of the German Nazi party. Originally created as an intelligence service by Heinrich Himmler, the SD was eventually to take on ‘additional duties’ which resulted in a merger with the Gestapo (Arendt 1992a: p36). From a low position in the SD, Eichmann rose in importance until he became an influential member of this organisation, and it was as a result of this position in the Nazi party and his part in the organisation and execution of the Nazi ‘solution’ to the ‘Jewish question’ that led to his 1961 trial in Israel, for ‘crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity and war crimes’ (1992a: 21).

Arendt’s report on this trial, and in particular the psychological character of Eichmann himself, argued how easily, under certain specific yet not totally alien political conditions a human being could become a perpetrator of the most extreme and horrifying acts. What the trial of Eichmann and his own interpretation of what he had been accused of confirmed, is that the existence of ‘evil’ isn’t necessarily identified by a beast with two heads, or a trident and forked-tail. In other words, ‘evil’ isn’t an unanswered question of human nature. It can be found, created even, in the most unremarkable pedestrian and mundane, banal to coin Arendt’s term, of people.

It can therefore be discerned in Arendt’s discussion of Eichmann that he is a paragon example of the dangers of several of the problems of the modern era, that have been thus far discussed in this thesis. In his role as a cog in the process of the ‘Final Solution’, from which Arendt’s report makes clear Eichmann derived a great deal of meaning, Eichmann carried out his procedural role according to the rules regardless of what the consequences or ‘end’ of those rules were. Like all bureaucrats who carry the unquestioning legacy of *homo faber* that the absolute end justifies any means or that the means have to be carried out whatever the ‘end’, he demonstrated his unwavering faith in the effectiveness and therefore the sanctity of the rules which ‘had been laid down by the desk murderers, and […] seemed to exclude – probably they were meant to exclude – all individual initiative either for better

---

83 Eichmann sat at the top of the Nazi State chain of command receiving direct orders from Himmler and Heydrich who in turn only took their orders from Hitler (Das Fuhrer) and Goring (Das Reichsführer) (Arendt 1992a: 83-4). In this way, in true hierarchical fashion, Eichmann was very close to the top of the Nazi chain of command.
or for worse’ (2003: 250). Eichmann himself felt that all he had done was to try and do his job well, claiming that he ‘was not guilty in the sense of the indictments’ (1992a: 21) also that

> With the killing of Jews I had nothing to do. I never killed a Jew or a non-Jew […] I never gave an order to kill a Jew or a non-Jew. I just did not do it. (Eichmann in Arendt 1992a: 22)

Arendt herself points out that Eichmann indeed had no ‘insane hatred against the Jews’ (1992a: 26). What is clear from Arendt’s report is that it hadn’t occurred to Eichmann that in efficiently sending list A to that desk, or putting certain names on list B, in short in doing his job ‘well’, that he was nonetheless part of ‘administrative massacres on a gigantic scale’ (Arendt 2003: 243) and that killing people was indeed what he had done. It was this lack of reflection by Eichmann that led Arendt to conclude that ‘evil’ doesn’t necessarily arise as much from _mens rea_ as it does from the failure to think at all.

Eichmann had been a very dutiful ‘cog’ in a much larger process that had involved ‘doctors, lawyers, scholars, bankers, economists’ (1992a: 18) and as such was the perfect bureaucrat. As Arendt points out in her report, what becomes apparent from Eichmann’s own bizarre explanations of his role was that ‘Really he had done nothing. He had only carried out orders and since when has it been a crime to carry out orders? […] He [Eichmann] did not need to ‘close his ears to the voice of conscience’ as the judgement has it, not because he had none, but because his voice spoke with the voice of respectable society around him’ (1992a: 126). Indeed, by Eichmann’s own admissions ‘he would have had a bad conscience only if he had not done what he had been ordered to do’ (1992a: 25).

In a society which culturally values instrumental rationality, Eichmann was a paragon example of the professional bureaucrat chained to his activity by his entire ideal and material existence, a single cog who could not squirm out of this machine (Weber 1974: 228). Furthermore, this example suggests that behind him was a society with values similar to many societies today characterised by many aspects that Arendt deplores, such as a marked and inflexible hierarchy, distant central authority, individual privacy as a measure of individual sovereignty, concern with individual security and a manner of cultural thinking that prioritises means over ends no matter what the issue under consideration,

---

84 Malice aforethought
where obedience and acceptance is held in higher regard than resistance and critique and where homogeneity trumps diversity. The recognition of the common thread of instrumental rationality between these societies is not to claim that the bureaucracy that produced Auschwitz and Eichmann is the same as the DSS as clearly many aspects of each is totally different. However, it is possible to recognize that instrumental rationality can be viewed as a continuum, and the contemporary state welfare organisations would be positioned at the benign end of such a continuum whereas Auschwitz and Eichmann would be at the opposite end. Arendt herself alluded to this assertion when she wrote that:

> The transformation of the family man from a responsible member of society, interested in all public affairs, to a ‘bourgeois’ concerned with only his private existence and knowing no civic virtue, is an inter-national modern phenomenon […] the exigencies of our time can at any moment transform him into the mob man and make him the instrument of whatever madness and horror. (2005a: 129)

Arendt never sought to exculpate Eichmann for his deeds and non deeds, nor did she. At the end of her most controversial book she indeed thought that Eichmann should be punished by the Jerusalem court (1992a: 279) correctly pointing out that ‘[…] politics is not like the nursery; in politics obedience and support are the same’ (1992a: 279). The Eichmann example is of particular value to this chapter as he is a real world example of where the instrumental rationality of bureaucracy converges with the instrumental rationality of violence. This is to the paradoxical extent that a senior architect of the most horrifically violent end modern European history has ever seen was orchestrated at many points by such seemingly non-violent and banal means.

5.6: Conclusion

This chapter examined two examples that illustrate the problems with instrumental rationality, one from the modern political sphere and the other from the modern social sphere. In the political sphere the link between Arendt’s critique of instrumental rationality and modern politics is violence. This brings out implications for the modern world because rather than recognising the total incompatibility between power and violence, modern politics marries the two as identical; the capacity for one is the measure of the other. This means that modern politics, by an Arendtian definition, is instrumental, arbitrary, and unilateral because violence is all of these things. This recognition is supported by recent global events.
Violence is fundamentally non-political because it is locked in the futile means-end cycle, and to this end, so too is modern ‘politics’. Modern international violence carries a paradox in that the end can rarely survive the means in any case. Lastly, violence completely destroys the space for the essentially political action of speech and therefore so too does modern politics. This idea underscores the claims made in Chapter Three. For all of these reasons there are numerous implications for the political integrity of the modern state and Arendt’s critique of instrumental rationality finds the first basis of its contemporary relevance.

A contradiction can be identified in Arendt’s critique of instrumental rationality and this rests on a conflation by Arendt of ends (as absolute aims of the means) with consequences (which arise from means but have no connection to the ultimate end desiring to be reached). Arendt uses the term ‘consequences’ interchangeably with ‘ends’, referring to instrumental rationality on occasions as ‘reckoning with consequences’ (1998: 300). Just as Arendt went to great length to distinguish ‘ends’ from ‘goals’ this thesis proposes that it should also be noted that some consequences are related to the ‘end’ in sight through the means or process employed to achieve them. This idea is illustrated in this chapter through the example of nuclear war and the fact that the process leads to destructive interim ‘consequences’ in addition to the overarching, ultimate end of getting an enemy to submit. Indeed it is the destructive and self-contradictory results of non-end but means related consequences that fully show the paradox of the type of rationality that exhorts by any means as long as a given end is reached.

No doubt arising from Arendt’s desire to banish the problem of expectation or predictability from considerations surrounding the realm of human affairs, this inadequacy in distinction needs to be addressed because there are times when ‘reckoning with consequences’ is not only necessary but also in keeping with the exercise of judgment that Arendt exhorts. Indeed, in terms of means-end thinking, there should be a lot more reckoning with consequences when those consequences consider every effect of the process rather than the single-minded pursuit of an ultimate end. The link between ‘reckoning with consequences’ and the exercise of judgment is fully explored in the last chapters of the thesis.
The focus of Arendt’s critique of instrumental rationality within the social sphere is that of bureaucracy. When Arendt equates bureaucracy with a tyranny it is because within bureaucracy there is no-one that can be held responsible. The paradox of this is that bureaucracy, the rule by nobody, is simultaneously cruel yet de-personalised. Many of these aspects of Arendt’s description apply to the bureaucracy of contemporary society. There is the implication that in locating bureaucracy as an absence of power within society, it is at the same time a surfeit of authority that results in domination. Arendt appears to under – explore this positive view of power. As the next chapter will show Foucault strengthens this weakness in Arendt.

It was pointed out in this chapter that the society that facilitated the ignoble position from which Eichmann found such infamy is not vastly different to other western societies. This carries further implications for a need to fully understand exactly the type of socio-political environment that can allow such acts to go unchallenged by both the people given the task of carrying them out and also society itself. This socio-political space seems to be one where obedience is valued over questioning and submission is valued over resistance fostered by unwavering faith that comes from the application of utility as a principle.

There is, however, a further criticism that can be made of Arendt, and this relates to the fact that for all of the problems that she identifies with instrumental rationality, she gives very little explanation for how this can be reversed. It is in an attempt to address this issue that this thesis turns again to the work of Foucault where he demonstrates further strengths that Arendt lacks. The thesis now moves on to extract and explain the elements of Foucault’s theory that form a critique of instrumental rationality. This requires a great deal of interpretation because Foucault does not criticise instrumental rationality with the same overt disdain as Arendt. The following chapter looks in three ways at an implicit critique of instrumentality in Foucault, some of which parallels with Arendt whilst other parts have no parallel at all. Given these differences in the outward critique of instrumentality it is not surprising then that it is at this point in the thesis that the parallels between Arendt and Foucault begin to diverge. The following chapter therefore acts as the point where the questions that Arendt and Foucault might ask each other, if they were able, begin to be made visible.
6.0: FOUCAULT’S CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY

6.1: Introduction

This chapter shows that it is possible to identify a critique of instrumental rationality in the work of Foucault\(^{85}\) which argues against rationalities which operate in linear terms i.e. those which accept that ‘ends’ exist and therefore treat them as a final destination. Rather than talk overtly in terms of instrumentality, Foucault instead defines it as ‘strategy(ies)’: ‘[...] the means employed to attain a certain end; it is a question of rationality functioning to arrive at an objective’ (1994: 346). This chapter argues, therefore, that in those places where Foucault talks of ‘strategy’, it can be read interchangeably with instrumental rationality. The argument that follows is based on this premise.

Foucault’s critique of instrumental rationality can be discerned in three key ways which dictate the structure of the chapter. The first section argues that there is an identifiable critique of instrumental rationality which appears implicitly within Foucault’s work due to the influence of Nietzsche. This is a critique of instrumentality as a principle. This section looks in particular at two aspects of Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault, the value of agonism\(^{86}\) and the arguments for a genealogical approach to the history of ‘Man’.

The second section examines a critique of instrumentality in the way that it appears in social forms such as Foucault’s ‘big three’ of crime and punishment, medical positivism and sexuality. In addition, examples are also made of more contemporary forms of social domination such as the official judgement of individuals as ‘high risk’ or ‘free rider’ to more cultural judgements of individuals. This section also emphasises Foucault’s aim to subvert the power relationships that facilitate these social instrumentalities. In this section, Foucault’s agonism is located onto tangible areas of contemporary social life.

Contemporary examples of social instrumentalities fulfil the aim of the thesis to show the parallels that Foucault has with Arendt on this issue. To this end the third and final section moves on to take the previously explained social forms of instrumentality and bring them

\(^{85}\) In the course of researching this thesis the only other secondary writer found who also recognises this immanent aspect of Foucault’s work is Kang (2005: Chapter Two). This recognition however is brief and not developed in the detail it is here either solely in terms of Foucault or in comparison with Arendt.

\(^{86}\) This builds upon the discussion of agonism in relation to plurality seen in Chapter Four.
up to date with regards to discussion of how they exist in the socio-economic instrument that is bureaucracy. In this embodiment, Foucault’s critique of instrumentality shows its greatest parallel with Arendt. This can be understood as a critique of instrumentality in its contemporary socio-political form.

This section thus completes the two-fold purpose of this chapter. On the one hand there is the continuance of the aim of part one of this thesis to draw attention to aspects of Foucault’s work in which a parallel with Arendt can be seen. However, the point is also to show that there exists a point at which Arendt and Foucault’s political theories begin to diverge. The final section then identifies the divergence between Foucault and Arendt for the remaining chapters of this thesis.

6.2: The Critique of Instrumental Rationality as Principle

‘Any rational, uniform model leads too rapidly to paradoxes’ (Foucault in Kritzman 1998: 174)

Nietzsche emphasised the Ancient Greek notion of agonism, that is to say, the cultivation of the human self through a process of contestation and struggle. Agonism was an ethos in which citizens strove to surpass each other and to set new standards of nobility (Owen 1995: 139). Greek society therefore took an evolutionary approach to the development of the individual, which was informed by the principle that struggle between people would allow the continual improvement of each individual. In this way, the ancient Greeks were able to ‘bridle and restrict selfishness…and to cultivate their ego in contest’ (Ansell-Pearson 1994: 77). This development through struggle meant that individuals constantly improved themselves as individuals which in turn fed into the well being of the polis (Nietzsche 1998: 43).

From this ancient Greek principle Nietzsche developed his emphasis on the importance of the capability for the transformation of ‘Man’ undertaken by ‘Man’ himself, something that he termed ‘self-overcoming’ (Nietzsche 1997: 129, 1998: 23). This refers to the constant quest, through struggle, for individuals to surpass what they are at any given point in time. Nietzsche summarises this in Zarathustra, the tale of a wandering nomad who represents ‘Man’ as he currently is. Zarathustra proclaims ‘I am that which must overcome itself again
and again’ (Nietzsche 1997: 16, 17, 33, 192, 193). What Nietzsche means here is that ‘Man’ is not all he could ever be, and therefore ‘Man’ should not settle for this current incarnation. Instead there should be a process of constant ‘overcoming’, in the same way as there was in Greek agonism (Nietzsche 1993: 98). Nietzsche inherits from the Ancient Greeks the rejection of a sedentary stance toward ‘Man’ by ‘Man’ and in doing so promotes agonistic struggle as the driver for the evolution that is required for ‘Man’ to surpass what he is. This point allows Patten (1993) to make the assertion that ‘For Nietzsche the fundamental principle is not the goal but the process’ (in Owen 1995: 72). Likewise, for Foucault it is not the goal but the process that is important. In due course, those aspects of Foucault’s work where this agonistic principle can be seen will be shown. Prior to this, however, this section explains the other debt that Foucault owes to Nietzsche and this is the value of genealogical method.

For very similar reasons to those discussed above, Nietzsche placed an importance on genealogy as a method for understanding ourselves. For Nietzsche what was needed was a different method for reading history, one which critically reflects upon the contingent routes in history through which mankind has come to be understood. This is so that a context of meaning can be provided through which the ‘modern person’ can reflect how s/he has arrived at the point from which the study of history is made. In short, what Nietzsche advocated was a history of the present to reflect the present (Nietzsche 2003b: 2). Genealogy should be undertaken when ‘Man’ can no longer understand the present situation. It permits an understanding of the present situation and more importantly how it both limits and enables what people have become. In seeking to understand history in this way, mankind can open up space for new levels of self-understanding (Owen 1995: 39-41). Through genealogical method, therefore, as with agonism, Nietzsche offered another way in which ‘Man’ can engage in self-transformation. In aphorism 14 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche criticizes the traditional view of history (one which promotes a simplistic method of tracing events backwards through time with the effect of putting pins in a timeline) to reject a view of history which equates the temporal move forward with a universal progress and a concomitant betterment of mankind (Nietzsche 2003a: 44). In short, genealogical method rejects the primacy of a linear explanation of human history, where history in its entirety pushes with an overarching totalising telos to the present of
mankind. How a celebration of this method links to a rejection of instrumental rationality in the work of Foucault can be fully clarified through examination of his work.

Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche values the properties of genealogy as anti-scientific, by which he means not a seeking a unified, totalising and systemic answer to how humans become what they are: ‘They [genealogies] would not have been possible […] were it not for one thing: the removal of the tyranny of overall discourses […] Genealogies are, quite specifically, anti-sciences’ (2003: 8-9). In looking at Foucault’s approach to ‘history’ and ‘thought’ in this way, this section highlights a criticism of Foucault’s work that Foucault himself recognised. He pinpoints this when he said ‘[…] if there is an irritation […] it’s more because of an absence of schema. No infra or super structure, no Malthusian cycle, no opposition between state and civil society: none of these schemas which have bolstered historians operations explicitly or implicitly for the past hundred or hundred and fifty years’ (Foucault in Burchell 1991: 85). His response to criticisms of this type levelled at his work was blunt and reiterated his commitment to the anti-scientific nature of what he wanted to do ‘[…] I’m not interested in constructing a new schema, or in validating one that already exists. Perhaps it’s because my objective isn’t to propose a global principle of analyzing society’ (Ibid).

Foucault reiterates the Nietzschean view of history as ‘all too human’ (Nietzsche 2003a: 14) when he challenges the love of monotonous finality as perceived by certain traditions of thought. Foucault says ‘The great biological image of a progressive maturation of science still underpins a good many historical analyses: it does not seem to me to be pertinent to history’ (1996: 54). He further qualifies this rejection of applying a teleology to the history of mankind when he asserts that ‘what happens now is not necessarily better or more advanced, or better understood than what happened in the past’ (1994: 50) and drives his view on this fully home when he points out that

It is sometime since historians lost their love of events, and made ‘de-eventalization’ their principle of historical intelligibility. The way they work is by ascribing the object they analyze to the most unitary, necessary, inevitable and (ultimately) extra-historical mechanism […] we aren’t, nor do we have to put ourselves, under the sign of a unitary necessity. (in Burchell 1991: 77-78)

It is clear by these comments that Foucault recognises that there may well be no historical progress that exists independently of the human interpretation of one and for that reason
history, as with any epistemology, does not automatically show evidence of a continual improvement of the subject which it studies. In fact, it could be argued, as Foucault does like Nietzsche before him (Nietzsche 1998: 43) that history shows evidence of regression. An example of this is identified and elaborated in the final section of this chapter. For now, it is important to recognise Foucault’s rejection of the necessity for progression to take a linear form.

Foucault’s rejection of the historical tradition and its tendency to ascribe a telos to the course of history is exemplified in his circumspection regarding the Age of Reason, and what it actually bequeathed the modern world. In referring to the period of modern western history where scientific enquiry began to be recognised as the most valued epistemological form, Foucault points towards a rather disturbing consequence of developing ‘reason’ at the expense of every other form of knowledge. He asks

> Couldn’t it be concluded that the Enlightenment’s promise of attaining freedom through the exercise of reason has been turned upside down, resulting in a domination by reason itself, which increasingly usurps the place of freedom? (1994: 273)

and noted that ‘the men of the nineteenth century soon started wondering whether reason wasn’t getting too powerful in our societies. They began to worry about a relationship… between a rationalization-prone society and certain threats to the individual and his liberties, the species and its survival’ (1994: 298). As this thesis has already shown in previous examples, these issues culminate in the threat to the freedom(s) of the modern individual such as a full freedom to hold your own values or practice your sexuality. With this recognition, he reiterates the Weberian claim that ‘reason is not the handmaiden of freedom’ (Weber in Poster 1984: 14).

Foucault stated that ‘Even if the Enlightenment has been a very important phase in our history, and in the development of political technology, I think we have to refer to much more remote processes if we want to understand how we became trapped in our own history’ (1996: 300). Foucault’s definition of ‘more remote processes’ are the ways that modern individuals develop and use knowledge about themselves upon themselves and this has a clear resonance with Nietzsche’s claim to understand the present to change the present. The main point of this, for Foucault, ‘is not to accept this knowledge at face value but to analyze these so-called sciences as very specific truth-games’ (1994b: 224).
Foucault’s reference to ‘so called sciences’ refers once again to his circumspection about the Enlightenment and the model of rationality that it gave rise to, a model which seeks to emulate science in order to enjoy the high status of an episteme grounded in an objective system which endeavours to ‘reveal’ as-yet undiscovered truths. Emulating this model recreates the totalising functions of an entire system coupled with the idea that there are underlying, hidden ‘truths’ which need to be ‘discovered’. Foucault shows this to be his claim when he writes that ‘political practices resemble scientific ones; it’s not reason in general that is implemented but always a very specific type of rationality’ (1994: 313). The link between this high status episteme and Foucault’s political theory is his recognition that ‘there is an importance of scientific and technical rationality in the development of productive forces and the making of political decisions’ (Foucault 1994a: 469). Foucault went on from this claim to point out that once the pseudo-scientific claims of such knowledge is excavated, that is subjected to genealogical method, what can then be understood is ‘the importance assumed by scientific and technical rationality in the[...] making of political decisions’ (Ibid). This recognition is crucial because once realised, it shows that ‘it is possible to analyze political rationality, as it is possible to analyze any scientific rationality’ (Foucault 1994: 416).

Foucault’s Nietzschean roots are useful in bringing out his latent critique of instrumental rationality. By virtue of his use of genealogy we can see that Foucault rejects the necessity for identifying beginnings and endings. This can be translated into a rejection of rationalities conceived of in origin-means-end terms. On this matter, it is worth pointing out that when this point is distilled from Foucault’s oeuvre, a parallel with Arendt becomes much more salient, and marks out their distinction as political thinkers. Genealogists such as Foucault are committed to hostility toward the Platonic ideal, described by Arendt as the aim to ‘make sure that the beginner would remain complete master of what he had begun’ (1958: 220). In rejecting linear models in the explanation of the human condition Foucault’s distinction from Plato in this way parallels Arendt’s distinction from Plato when she states that it is ‘impossible to fit the entire world into rectilinear movement’ (1998: 128). Extending the earlier issue of Foucault’s application of agonism is important for understanding Foucault’s politics, and the claims of the next section, because it is his call to
resist such domination through agonistic techniques that greater depth is given to his critique of instrumentality.

6.3: Political Rationality, Power and the Application of Agonism

‘Every power relationship implies [...] a strategy of struggle [...] a point of possible reversal’ (Foucault 1994: 347).

For the purposes of fully appreciating Foucault’s critique of instrumentality, it is necessary to bring together as an overview the very distinctive way that he conceived of power, worth quoting at length. For Foucault:

Power is ‘not a substance or a mysterious property whose origin must be discovered. It is a certain type of relation between individuals [...] Many factors determine power – rationalization constantly works away at it. (1994: 324).

For this reason

one may call some systems of power strategy the totality of the means put into operation to implement power effectively or to maintain it. One may also speak of a strategy proper to power relations insofar as they constitute modes of action on possible action; the action of others. Thus one can interpret the mechanisms brought into play in power relations in terms of strategies. (1994: 346).

It is possible then to see that in this way Foucault’s description of the rationalities of power as ‘strategies’ equates them, using the claim of the introduction, with the ‘means’ that are constitutive of an instrument. The particular forms of these strategies are looked at in more depth in due course. The point is that for Foucault it is important to understand these strategies because they have the potential to become forms of social domination that prevent individuals from having or adopting children, fully exercising their sexuality or engaging in protest. This happens, as has been shown, when the freedom for the circulation of power becomes constricted (1996: 434). The ‘means’ therefore that are the strategies or techniques of power are recognised by Foucault as having the capability to quickly become immobilizing ‘ends’, thus completing a model based upon ‘means-ends’ rationality underpinning the rationalities that Foucault rejects.

It is at this point that Foucault’s application of agonism takes on its greatest significance. It is within his argument for the subversion of such means and ends that a critique of instrumentality can be pinpointed. It has already been shown in previous chapters that Foucault sees that ‘political rationality has grown and imposed itself all throughout the
Beyond the Social and Political

history of Western societies. It first took its stand on the idea of pastoral power, then on that of reason of state’ (1994: 325). His conclusion to the problem of the domination of reason bequeathed by the Enlightenment is ‘[...] that the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our day is not to try and liberate the individual from the state [...] but to liberate us both from the state, and from the type of individualization linked to the state’ (1994: 336, my emphasis), reiterating the Nietzschean claim (2003a: 39) that ‘[...] the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are’ (Foucault 1994: 336 – my emphasis).

Foucault had many suggestions for how it is possible to ‘refuse what we are’; all of them lean heavily on an agonistic principle. Such resistance begins with the recognition that even though ‘[...] there cannot be a society without power relations [...] it is not to say either that those which are established are necessary, or that power in any event constitutes an inescapable fatality at the heart of societies such that it cannot be undermined’ (1994: 343). The fact that Foucault recognises that power can be undermined allows the space for agonistic negotiation over domination by reason. This is why Foucault claims that we should adopt a constantly critical and pro-active vigilance in challenging the operation, freezing over and immobility of power and by implication those types of social practices exemplified thus far in this thesis. Foucault goes as far as saying that this agonistic negotiation constitutes all political questions, because such forms of domination are at the heart of many social relationships. Rather than accepting power practices as an ‘inescapable fatality’, Foucault sees ‘that the analysis, elaboration and bringing into question of power relations and the ‘agonism’ between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is an increasingly political task – even the political task that is inherent in all social existence’ (1994: 343). Such observations leave Foucault to conclude that of all relationships, ‘the most important is the relationship between power relations and confrontation strategies’ (1994: 346).

When the earlier example of the importance of plural distinction is recalled, it becomes possible to appreciate more fully all of the reasons for encouraging the agonism that this allows. Foucault uses the biased power relationship that forms the ‘means’ that are permanent purification to show how this technique becomes ‘frozen’ into an end. The end
that permanent purification becomes is in its broadest sense, an end that is social
normalisation. This is to say that social normalisation acts as a tool of exclusion and by
extension of limit and control. This is why Foucault explains and argues for the micro-
critique and resistance that constitutes permanent provocation. Engaging in permanent
provocation means that the movement of power should never be allowed to settle as an end,
but should always be negotiated, challenged and circulated through an agonistic contest, a
constant challenge to what ‘is’.

This is a very important point in the work of Foucault, because in recognising it he directly
provides a response to his detractors who he identifies as being those who challenge that ‘If
power is everywhere there is no freedom’ (see Foucault 1996: 441). Foucault firstly
counteracts this in his acknowledgement that ‘In order for power relations to come into play
there needs to be at least a certain degree of freedom on both sides...in power relations there
is necessarily the possibility of resistance because if there were no possibility of resistance
there would be no power relations at all’ (1996: 441). Hence immanent to the very dynamic
of power relationships is some space for freedom. When the space for freedom narrows,
power relationships become domination. They become ‘fixed in such a way that they are
perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom’ (Foucault,
1996: 441). When the space for freedom disappears altogether the relationship becomes
something very different to one of power. This is exemplified later through Foucault’s
comments on ‘violence’. Above all, what it is important to recognise about Foucault’s
analysis is that he sees that in all relationships of power there is always the space for
resistance because ‘[....] there is no relationship of power without the means of escape.’

Foucault’s reply to this criticism shows how it can be the case that freedom, albeit in very
limited forms, potentially exists in societies where many power relationships are
unchallenged. The aim of politics is to find the free space where resistance to the current
relationship of power can be challenged, and by taking an agonistic approach, the form of
power itself can be altered, reclaimed and even reversed. This is what is behind Foucault’s
claim that ‘[....] power relations are not something that is bad in itself (s/c), that we have to

---

87 See for example Habermas (1994) as well as secondary commentators who came later such as Grumley
break free of [...] the problem is to [...] play these games of power with as little domination as possible’ (1996: 446). This is how and why, according to Foucault, he emphasises ‘practices of freedom over processes of liberation’ (1996: 432).

It is possible to see then within the heart of Foucault’s oeuvre a very clear emphasis on two things which constitute the importance of a critique of instrumentality. The first element that brings out this critique is Foucault’s refusal to accept totalising, uniform and fatalistic explanations of our present such as those that appeal to the inevitable progression of history or science that follow a model of origins-means-ends. It is through the rejection of the ‘scientific’ model of explanation that is one way in which Foucault criticises instrumentality. This rejection of instrumentality is reflective of a partial critique of instrumentality in which a political need to apply agonistic critique to all frozen relationships of power is identified exemplified in the permanent provocation of Chapter Four. Permanent provocation translates into resisting the settling of power into an end, for example in refusing the necessity for holding ‘unity in values’ or to judge other people as ‘maligners’ or ‘too fat’. Foucault reiterates the importance of finding the space for freedom that inevitably exists in power relationships and the requirement to engage in constant struggle on the basis of the circulation of power that it allows. Furthermore, he exalts this dynamism because by extension it necessarily translates into the rejection of stasis. For Foucault, as with Nietzsche, stasis must be rejected. Failure to do so means that an end is created from which no thereafter can be conceived of. As long as agonism is engaged in there will never be a finality and a space is continually retained for improvement, transformation and change to become tangible possibilities. This is why for Foucault ‘freedom is less a possession than a form of exercise’ (Hooke in Smart 1994: 297).

By adopting agonism as a political principle, Foucault advocates that power should not be accepted in linear terms. This can be thwarted by the ongoing resistance and critique of an ‘end’. In appealing to the agonistic elements of Foucault’s work a response to Habermas’ question ‘if winning isn’t important, then why fight?’ (Habermas in Smart 1994) is found.

---

88 With this question Poster’s claim that ‘too many people put things in the black and white terms of pro and contra’ (1994: 113) is exemplified. Furthermore, this is why certain commentators conclude that through such evident instrumentality ‘Habermas is a hostage to the Enlightenment’ (Kang 2005: 17)
For Foucault, the challenge isn’t about winning and losing, but in fundamentally challenging and altering relationships of power. If the basis upon which the relationship of power is questioned, then a space for freedom has been either located or created. Once the space for freedom is located, then the potential for the relationship of power to be altered simultaneously exists. Even if this does not necessarily bring about a greater equity in power relationships, or in Habermasian terms ‘victory’ as an end, it certainly has the effect of preventing power settling as taken for granted, biased, long-term confrontations between two adversaries, or in other words, a form of domination. What it is clear that critics such as Habermas miss about Foucault’s argument, is that for him just like Nietzsche, the process is always more important than a goal or end because the continual challenge that this constitutes ensures that power is circulated much more frequently.

There are other identifiable aspects of Foucault’s oeuvre from which a critique of instrumental rationality can be discerned. These link to his recognition that ‘Political rationality is linked with other forms of rationality. Its development [...] is dependent upon economical, social, cultural and technical processes [...]. political rationality is always embodied in institutions and strategies’ (1994: 416). It is to these social institutions and strategies of domination, the instrumental rationalities themselves to which Foucault felt that agonism as a principle should be applied, that this chapter now moves.

6.4: Sovereign Positivisms: The Critique of Instrumental Rationality as Form

‘My problem is [...] the history of rationality as it works in institutions and on the behaviour of people’ (Foucault 1996: 299)

The quote above identifies something that Foucault has identified as a ‘problem’ for him. The problem that he terms the ‘rationalisation of the management of the individual’ (Ibid) is something that he links to a form of thinking which is able to bring itself to bear firstly on the behaviour of individuals, but ultimately on every aspect of their lives, where each individual governs him/herself according to certain rules that are deemed ‘acceptable’ and therefore ‘normal’. This thesis has already explained this as assujetissement.

It is now necessary to take another approach to the techniques of assujetissement using a slightly different perspective than previously seen in the thesis. This time the perspective
used is not the ‘why’ behind the arrangement of power as previously outlined, but the
critique that Foucault directs toward the ‘how’. What Foucault did was describe specific
rationalities that follow an overarching theme whereby they are all techniques directed
toward an objective, that of assujetissement. In this way each area of the rationalities of
assujetissement can be seen as *instrumentalities* in the plural. In understanding Foucault’s
work in this way, and in drawing upon the Nietzschean aspect of his genealogies, it can be
shown how Foucault’s oeuvre contains a further critique of instrumental rationality.

A substantial part of Foucault’s genealogy looked in detail at the techniques involved in the
‘subjectification’ of individuals and can be described as Foucault’s big three. These are
medical reason, crime and punishment and sexuality. In each of these areas, Foucault
identified, in painstaking empirical detail, techniques and practices which measured the
individual in terms of normalisation and judged their behaviour in relation to this. From
these subjectifications of individuals a totalised population of good citizens ensues.
Continuing his ovine analogy of the ‘shepherding’ of conscience Foucault termed this
pastoralisation.

As interesting as it would be to recount here each of Foucault’s discoveries and
observations of his ‘big three’ of prisons, medical science and sexuality, it would be a
diversion within the context of this thesis. What is important for this chapter is that these
subjectifications come together in the sense that they are all a form of instrumentality,
defined as such by their existence as strategies. They all fit the description that Foucault
gives [about his work on prisons] in that they involve a ‘regime of practices [...] being
here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the
planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect’ (1991: 75) and that they ‘possess
their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and reason’ (Ibid). Looked at
in this way, it can be claimed that what Foucault says about one of them in terms of
instrumentality likewise is applicable to all of them in the same sense.

In addition to the originality of his work regarding the pastoralisation of deviance, there are
endless examples of these instrumental rationalities at work which stretch beyond Foucault,

---

89 Foucault also included other social groups as subject to the same techniques such as women and
conscripted soldiers (1998: 216)
both in terms of his ‘big three’ and his historical context. The areas of contemporary western life which reflect the techniques of normalising judgement to direct the behaviour of individuals so that they are either amassed homogenously or marginalised on the basis of difference are commonplace. The former is exemplified in the furore of a man too large in body mass to adopt children, and the latter in studies that bring forth the western societal practice of ‘Oldering’, where people of a senior age are infantilised and therefore marginalised into what could be argued to be a form of second class citizenship (Brown 2005).

It can be established therefore that the instrumentalities that the art of government puts to use are many and varied, and yet, although varying in type, these micro-dominations are alike in their form, that is with the objective(s) to re-enforce a cadre of normalisation by acting upon the behaviour of people. These micro-dominations have one mantra common to all of them that ‘all forms [...] that border on unreason must be thrust into secrecy’ (1998: 68); this is why, argues Foucault,

[...] the age of reason confined [...] the debauched spendthrift fathers, prodigal sons, blasphemers, men who ‘seek to undo themselves’, libertines [...] in each of these cities we find an entire population of madness aswell [...] Between these and the others, no sign of differentiation. Judging from the registries, the same sensibility appears to collect them, the same gestures to set them apart. (1998: 65).

This historical sensibility which characterised the age of confinement and which has evolved into the pastoralising instrumentalities seen both in the ‘big three’ and very recent examples of body fascism and ageism are therefore clearly explicable as social instrumentalities; they exist to pastoralise individuals. Further strength is added to this claim when the agonistic arguments of Foucault seen in the previous section are recalled. Any and all of the social instrumentalities looked at here fit with the description that Foucault gave of exactly the kind of ossification of power practices that constrict the space for resistance through the application of agonism. Each of them exist as truth –claims about individuals on which attitudes toward him/her are based. Each of the ‘big three’ constitutes an overall discourse regarding the deviant from the norm that is claimed as a ‘discovered

---

90 Gordon (2001: 130) applies pastoralisation to the modern day context of the office cubicle frequently used in ‘open plan’ offices and the particular visibility to surveillance that these suggest. In turning this idea towards the modern workplace Gordon points out a Marxist application of Foucault’s pastoralisation which extends beyond industrialisation.
truth’ about the contemporary individual. On this basis, a type of scientific rationality informs political decisions first at the individual and then at the plural level. In these ways, the social instrumentalities of pastoralisation became the paragon examples of the loci of established power practices both official in the sense of psychology, medicine, social care and less official in the sense of person to person judgement to which Foucault also suggested this agonistic principle be applied.

Foucault saw that it is not necessary for individuals to fear difference and instead could appreciate it. It has also been explained that the way that he felt this could be done was through valuing of distinction. What can now be understood through this chapter which provides greater tangibility in terms of the contemporary situation is exactly how such a re-invention of distinction could be undertaken. In locating the forms of pastoralising instrumentalities as seen above, Foucault shows all of those areas of social life upon which his agonistic principle of ‘permanent provocation’ can be applied. Whether in the form of criminology and penology, or discourses and practices of mental and physical healthcare or the politics of sexuality or individual to individual judgements of a cultural kind, Foucault saw real possibilities to refuse repressive subjugations and create new forms of subjectivity (1994: 336). He tells us that the political double bind of hierarchical organisations of power, in other words the negative effects of the system (1994: 367) allow us ‘[…] to distinguish two tendencies. We can see that dependency results not only from integration, but also from marginalisation and exclusion. We need to respond to both threats’ (1994: 367). Those suggestions for how we can and should respond to these threats, in line with the agonistic position that he adopts, comes firmly from the position that as many forms of repression as possible should be attacked (1998: 224).

Foucault argued that conflicts could be made more visible and that individuals could seek to dis-embed them from ‘mere confrontations of interest’ (Foucault in Kritzman 1998: 156). So, rather than taking a partisan stance against something simply because it is ‘other’ or opposite to us, perceived threats could be resisted based on the specific repression that they embody. So, the parent could resist the repressive nature of every proscription for ‘correct’ parenting rather than judge those who parent differently themselves, and every individual could resist the push toward privatised prudentialism that is carried in the
ubiquity of the insurance industry that increasingly marginalises those who have recourse to welfare systems. People over a certain age have the potential to resist the societal push to sequester them at the end of what society perceives to be a useful life and people who are told that they are not the correct shape or size to adopt children could resist the body fascism that scrutinises them on an oppressive basis that every individual or parent isn’t subject to. In all of these sites of repression is the room, however limited, to act out Foucault’s identification of the ‘real task for politics’ of breaking through the constraints that limit us in order that we overcome ourselves. If each person uses a principle of agonism to critique constraining social norms then the self-transformation of each has the potential to become the self-transformation of all91. This idea is revisited and built upon further in the final chapter of the thesis.

Through the above examples it becomes clear that the instrumentalities of pastoralisation have a far wider reach in the modern day than Foucault originally described in his original examinations of criminology, health and sexuality. Individuals in the contemporary western world are subject to social repressions of many forms which shepherd their everyday existence and experiences. Foucault points out that this is because

[…] the activity of judging has increased precisely to the extent that the normalizing power has spread […] The judges of normality are present everywhere…it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based […] it’s system of insertion, distribution, surveillance, observation, has been the greatest support in modern society of the normalizing power. (1991: 304).

This argument now moves on to explain the significance of the analysis contained in the quote above for Foucault’s critique of instrumental rationality. The insertion, distribution, surveillance and observation of the social body, shows that ‘all the great administrative, economic and political organisms are charged with this regulation of the population (Foucault 2007: 16). This ‘essential issue in the art of government’ (1991a: 92) has been inherited from the notion of economy in the classical sense of the management of a family (oeconomy), and is most familiar to the contemporary western world as the ‘whole series of techniques of observation, including statistics’ (Foucault 2007: 16) which constitute modern bureaucracy.

91 This is also succinctly recognised by Kang (2005: 170) who states that where we are all governed one way or the other we are also in solidarity.
Modern bureaucracy is important because it shows the exact point where the social constrictions of pastoralisation become ‘reason of state’. Firstly, Foucault’s work on bureaucracy furthers the chapters’ aim of bringing out his critique of the instrumental rationalities of social pastoralisation. Secondly, bureaucracy brings Foucault’s critique of instrumentality into the most contemporary social form for modern western life. Thirdly and most significantly for this thesis, it is the area of Foucault’s work where his parallels with Arendt continue. Paradoxically however, it is also where their parallels cease.

6.5: Dazzling the King: Foucault and Bureaucracy

‘Life has now become, from the eighteenth century onwards, an object of power’
(Foucault 2007: 161)

As a result of the rising importance of the economy in the art of government, that is to say the means that attempt to strengthen the state, the notion of population takes on two key functions. The first of these important functions is population as a reflection of the sum total of the strength and productivity of all and each. However, for the purposes of this chapter, population takes on a second key function which is as the object of knowledge from which the tools for useful and efficient government must be drawn, thus creating a platform for accepted government. To govern legitimately, any government has to ‘know’ its citizens. This need for knowledge forces enquiries about and advice regarding economic issues such as ‘the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health etc [...] it is the population itself on which government will act either directly or indirectly’ (Foucault 1991a: 100). Poverty was the earliest focus of this realisation that knowledge was needed about the strength and productivity of the population *omnes et singulatum*.

The ‘visitor of the poor’ came to provide a vital early function in the art of governmentality. This visitor was ostensibly concerned with dispensing aid, acting as the instrument of the benevolence of the sovereign in the distribution of household relief. However, a dual function arose which saw the visitor of the poor also function as the ‘eyes’ of the sovereign, carrying out surveillance on sectors of the population and gathering knowledge about them. The ‘poor’ was an important ‘surveyed’ group within the population, who provided information to assist in effective government. This information
would have included where they lived, what their habits were and what aspects of character make up that of a ‘pauper’. Such studies of character become a vital part of effective social administration (Procacci 1995: 140). So, in an unwitting state of quid pro quo, the pauper provided knowledge at the same time as they accepted poor relief.

The dual technique of helping whilst at the same time accumulating knowledge is something that Foucault terms ‘policing’, it is a technique of Polizeiwissenschaft (1991: 92, 96). In assimilating the necessary and required knowledge about the pauper, knowledge surrounding the wealth of the state is also assimilated. The ‘visitor to the poor’ also became the eyes of the state. From Foucault’s point of view the ‘theory of police defines the nature of the objects of the state’s rational activity; it defines the nature of the aims it pursues, the general form of the instruments involved’ (1994: 314). Surveillance as an instrument in the art of government finds its footing. As Foucault observed, agents who act as the ‘eyes’ of the sovereign became figures ‘with a great future’ (1991: 165) and in doing so provided the answer to the question facing the rationality of the art of governmentality of how to introduce the economy into state management.

The policing of poverty within the population to foster strength, productivity and wealth, becomes instrumental as a prototypical form of bureaucracy. The ‘[...] antisocial problem of poverty becomes less of an issue’, because the ‘pauper’ becomes something entirely different, an economic and social citizen (Procacci 1996: 166). Foucault identifies that this moves even further and eventually a point is reached where government becomes exercised over more than economic issues. It can be shown then that for Foucault, economy has a crucial role in the development of governmentality in its entirety and as it is experienced in the developed world today. Foucault shows that economy is the reason par excellence for the acquisition of knowledge of the populace and thus the instrument par excellence of pastoralisation.

The ever increasing knowledge that grows from the surveillance of the multifarious aspects of individuals lives means that knowledge becomes crucial to the art of governmentality, and by this token therefore so do statistics and quantification. Foucault points out that the term statistics itself comes from its early function in governmentality.
‘The theory of the art of government was linked […] with knowledge of the state… questions which were termed precisely ‘statistics’ meaning the ‘science of the state’ (1991a: 96 my emphasis).

Thus economy is fundamental not only to the art of governmentality in general but also as an instrument of bureaucracy in particular. Foucault evaluates such knowledge in parallel to Arendt’s evaluations of it, describing ‘le bureau’ as ‘[…] hateful knowledge […] This too is a knowledge that can dazzle the king […] it is an administrative knowledge and above all a quantitative economic knowledge: knowledge of actual or potential wealth, knowledge of tolerable levels of taxation and of useful taxes’ (2003: 132). In short, the police state cultivated the pastoral.  

These issues of knowledge, the economy, and government of the two, clearly show the early stages of bureaucracy and as such illustrate how bureaucracy is a key instrument of all techniques of government including contemporary ones. From examples too numerous to exhaust, contemporary bureaucracy gathers knowledge by monitoring individuals through welfare, through taxation, through work, through the ten-year census, through recording crime, through the amount of savings that they do or do not have. The bureaucracy of the private sector gathers knowledge by recording income bracket, household income, consumption habits, insurance details, criminal activity, health, history of family health. Political bureaucracy gathers knowledge on voting habits, location of residence, local crime rates, marital and familial status. Not only do these bureaucracies gather this information ad infinitum, but they store them, sit on them, share them between themselves and use them on individuals as the means to reach the end of guiding and governing behaviour. This is an idea which is also visited by Arendt who says ‘statistics are relevant only to behaviour which is characteristic of social man, who participates in the process of biological life’ (1958: 42-3). Bureaucracy therefore is a vital component of Foucault’s analysis of the art of modern politics, just as it is for Arendt. In recalling the last section and all of the micro-social normalisations that Foucault identifies, it is easy to see how bureaucracy is the modern instrument in creating an individual who is self-monitoring, self-limiting and self-governing. As a modern tool of pastoralisation, bureaucracy is a major part of the process towards the ‘end’ of the invisible government of a population. For Foucault, as with Arendt

---

92 Other writers who look at Foucault’s genealogy of statistics are Donzelot (1991) and Gordon (1991)
in the last chapter, bureaucracy is the method *sine qua non* for the anonymous exercise of
government over the masses.

6.6: Instrumental Rationality in Modern Form: The Arendtian Aspect

There is then a parallel that can be discerned between Arendt and Foucault in seeing
bureaucracy as ‘rule by nobody’ and yet as paradoxically constituting a dominating force.
In echoing the discourse of the rationality of *homo faber* used by Arendt, Foucault
considers ‘domination to be any kind of power relation which regarding its goals and values
can be judged from a rational point of view as efficient’ (1996: 417) and this can clearly be
applied to bureaucracy. The possible parallel between Foucault’s analysis of domination
and that of Arendt was brought to Foucault’s attention when he was interviewed by Paul
Rabinow et al in April, 1983 (see Rabinow 1991: 377-79). Rabinow, using an over
simplistic model of Arendt’s ideas, asked Foucault where he stood in relation to Arendt’s
definition of power rather than his own. Foucault replied, in what reads as a critique of
Arendt, that the distinction that Arendt makes whereby domination is always dissociated
from power in the form of consensual politics does not liquidate the power relation,
although he did suggest that this distinction might well have been a verbal one. At other
times however, Foucault seemed to reflect power and domination in a much more
Arendtian way. In another interview in 1983, this time with Thomas Zummer (see
Lotringer 1996: 418), Foucault stated that domination is only one form of power relation.
He further stated that he would like to ‘disconnect the notion of power from the notion of
domination’ (Ibid) as he recognised that although many power relations have repressive
effects, there are also a lot of power relationships which have ‘something else entirely as
their consequence’ (Ibid). It seems as if Foucault never fully settles on a coherent
distinction of power and domination (in any case Arendt had already made one some time
before him). This partly has to be due to too simplistic a representation of Arendt’s
complex thought on Foucault’s behalf.

This section brings forth in more detail those areas of social commentary where Foucault
makes some strikingly similar assessments to Arendt, but also it marks the final point of
parallel between them. This final point of convergence is embodied in this section in
Foucault’s critique of violence and the importance that he places upon thinking. There is in his work a most tangible angle of a critique of instrumental rationality, discernable through his description of bureaucracy as the means of power that achieves the end of social control. This shows that bureaucracy is a dominating force because of the fact that its goals can be judged and described by the discourse of efficiency. Foucault’s critique of bureaucracy however goes beyond this and he points out, again in parallel terms to Arendt, how the values and very features of bureaucracy, such as those embodied in the ‘bureaucrat’ help to reinforce the social domination that bureaucracy perpetuates.

Foucault uses a concept that he refers to as ‘Grotesque’ (2003a: 11-12) to articulate his criticisms of bureaucracy. For Foucault, ‘Grotesque’ refers to a discourse or an individual who has ‘effects’ of power that their intrinsic qualities should ‘disqualify’ them from having (Ibid). This is of interest, argues Foucault, because the situation arises whereby the effects of power become maximised by the very unsuitability of such an entity for wielding such potency (Ibid). This is as much to say that there is a rationality that makes sense out of the paradox that if a seemingly inappropriate wielder of power exists, then the necessity of such a power dynamic must be very great indeed. The irony of this situation is something that Foucault sees as offering validity to it in the eyes of others.

Foucault extends this notion of the ‘Grotesque’ to apply to bureaucracy. As ‘one of the essential processes of arbitrary sovereignty [...] it is also [...] a process inherent to assiduous bureaucracy’ (2003a: 12). This is because, like Arendt, Foucault sees the bureaucrat, the ‘pen-pusher’ (Ibid) as a necessary part of the process which gives bureaucracy its ‘Grotesque’ status. He claims that the bureaucrat is an ‘essential feature’ of big, modern, western bureaucracy because bureaucracy works by using the ‘mediocre, useless, imbecilic, superficial, ridiculous, worn-out, poor and powerless functionary’ (2003a: 12). Furthermore like Arendt, Foucault links this issue to twentieth century political systems characterised by such ‘Grotesque’ individuals and institutions. Foucault writes that ‘The administrative grotesque is a real possibility for bureaucracy [...] the pen pusher is a functional component of modern administration just as being in the hands of a mad charlatan was a functional feature of Roman imperial power’ (Ibid). Foucault adds that what he says about ‘modern bureaucracy could also be said about many other mechanical forms of power such as
Nazism or Fascism’ (2003a: 13). Figures ‘like Mussolini’ argue Foucault, embody his notion of the grotesque, because they are inherent to the mechanisms of power, and this is because power ‘provides itself with an image in which power derived from someone who was theatrically got up and depicted as a clown or a buffoon’ (Ibid). In this way, like Arendt, Foucault identifies in a distinctly Weberian vein (Weber 1974: 214) the inverse relationship between the bureaucrat as a powerless cog and the real world potency of the bureaucracy as an organisation. This leads to a situation of ‘the unworthiness of power, from despicable sovereignty to ridiculous authority’ (Foucault 2003a: 13).

Foucault argues however that showing power to be this way does not result in limiting its effects. Instead, it gives a striking form of expression to the unavoidability and inevitability of power which can function with even more rigor at the extreme end of its rationality, even when in the hands of one who has been discredited (2003a: 13). The ridiculousness of the sovereign only serves to strengthen their power. From Nero the founding father of the despicable sovereign down to Hitler, Foucault points out that ‘you have the whole outrageous functioning of the despicable sovereign’ (Ibid). In this description, Foucault repeats the claims of Arendt on Eichmann, that modern western societies accept arrangements of power whose very dynamics allow the ‘banal’ individual or ‘buffoon’ an excessive political potency. This led Foucault to conclude that his experience of growing up in France at the end of WW2 was the experience of a society which had met Nazism and ‘[...] had lain down in front of it’ (1994: 247). On this basis Foucault saw, in parallel to Arendt and her experience, the ‘urgent need of a society radically different than the one we were living in’ (Ibid).

From its seminal stages in issues regarding population and poverty to its most modern incarnation in bureaucracy and the paradox of the powerless/powerful bureaucrat, the tools of the ‘police’ were early but vital instruments in the rise of governmentality. Over time, this rationality adjusted to leave pauperism behind and another concept in its stead, that of the socio-economic citizen. In this way economy became a vital tool in the arsenal of the

---

93 To fully illustrate the buffoonery of the despicable sovereign Foucault describes Hitler as ‘the little man with the trembling hands crowned with forty million deaths, who from deep in his bunker, asks only for two things; that everything above him be destroyed and that he be given chocolate cakes until he bursts (2003a: 13).
art of government. The contemporary face of economic knowledge about individuals is bureaucracy. As the contemporary agent and repository of knowledge about the modern population, bureaucracy is the modern instrument of the rationality of how best to govern, and therefore the modern instrument of control. Bureaucracy is therefore for Foucault, as with Arendt, the method of anonymous government, whereby the micro-instrumentalities of control are embodied at state level but implemented at societal level. Another aspect of Foucault’s critique of instrumental rationality which sits at the level of ‘reason of state’ is violence. Violence is an area where Foucault’s criticism of scientific and technical rationality(ies) manifest in modern political form. Interestingly, this focus on violence echoes those claims of Arendt seen in Chapter Five. For this chapter however, this example provides another example of Foucault’s critique of instrumental rationality.

6.7: Violence and the Importance of Thought

Foucault, like Arendt, made a distinction between violence and power and like Arendt he defined violence as a physical violation, a ‘primitive form of instrumental power’ (Foucault 1994: 340-1). In seeking to define the character of power relations, Foucault stated that power is something that acts upon conduct whereas violence is not. Violence acts upon a body or upon things. It allows no space for resistance by forcing, breaking, bending, destroying and closing down all possibilities. In fact, when violence meets with resistance it has no choice but to try and break it down (Foucault 1994: 340). In contrast, power does not work directly or immediately on others. In a relationship of power there are always two necessary participants and the ‘other’ is recognised and maintained as a subject who acts. Faced with a relationship of power there is always the potential for a whole field of responses, reactions, results and possible inventions and reinventions. In power relationships there is always the space for freedom, for the opportunity to resist, refuse and challenge, in short to re-negotiate the bases of the power relationship. This is why when the space for resistance disappears from the power relationship entirely, a power relationship ceases to exist and instead transforms into something else.

In their parallel nuanced analyses of violence and power both Foucault and Arendt distinguish themselves from political theorists such as Schmitt, who describes power as physical force (Schmitt 2005: 17) rather than violence. Schmitt makes no such distinction
between the important modern political phenomena of power and violence. In this sense, Schmitt’s political theory is crude in comparison to Foucault and Arendt, and this observation becomes more salient with particular regard to contemporary politics.

Foucault saw the connection between a certain type of rationality which has prevalence in the modern, western world and the core of political power, which independently supports an earlier claim in this thesis. This connection is violence. He stated that ‘The relationship between rationalisation and the essence of political power is evident. And we should not need to wait for bureaucracy or concentration camps to recognise the existence of such relations’ (1994: 299). That Foucault refers to concentration camps here shows that he, in parallel with Arendt, also connected this modern type of rationality to politics characterised by violence and indeed also noted that rationalities of this type had a most dangerous potential. Drawing upon his disdain of the Enlightenment, Foucault explained this when he said:

> What is most dangerous in violence is its rationality [...] the deepest root of violence and its permanence come out of the form of rationality that we use. The idea that if we live in the world of reason we can get rid of violence [...] is quite wrong. Between violence and rationality there is no incompatibility. My problem is [...] to know what is this rationality so compatible with violence? (1996: 299)

A weakness in Foucault’s work becomes apparent at the point that he articulates this question. Had he demonstrated a greater awareness of the detail of Arendt’s work, he would have found a more than adequate answer to his question of what the rationality behind violence looks like. He would have known of her analysis of it as being the legacy of *homo faber* which is ‘ends’ driven at all costs and valued by utility as a principle and also as a rationality that permeates modern, western thought to the point where it marries politics with violence. Arendt’s analysis shows why rationality and violence are so compatible and why it is easy today to see so much evidence of anti-enlightenment thinking in what passes as modern politics. With or without this recognition of Arendt’s work however, with the claim that ‘...those who resist or rebel against a form of power cannot merely be content to denounce violence or criticize an institution. Nor is it enough to cast the blame on reason in general. What has to be questioned is the form of rationality at stake’ (1994: 324), Foucault seems to prescribe a need in thinking that Arendt already fulfils. The importance of this for social and political thought is explained in the remainder of the thesis.
Beyond the Social and Political

Foucault should also have noticed that as a fellow thinker who drew upon Nietzsche, Arendt endorsed the importance of thinking and judging in terms other than instrumental. This parallels with Foucault’s own emphasis on the crucial role that thinking must take on in the agonistic challenging of accepted power practices. He sees thought as ‘[…] the very form of action’ (1994b: xxxv) and like Arendt therefore understands ‘[…] thought as the exercise of freedom’ (1994b: xvii). Foucault recognised that thought can exist independently of system and frameworks of discourse, even though it may not be visible. This thought is one ‘which always animates everyday behaviour. There is always thought even in the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even in silent habits’ (in Kritzman 1998: 155). In answer to this, and in keeping with his advocacy of the cutting capacity of knowledge and agonism as a principle of resistance to instrumental ways of thinking, Foucault prescribed that thought needs to ‘work upon itself’ (in Kritzman 1998: 156).

Failure to do this means that ‘modes of thought, that is to say modes of action, have not been altered, [and] whatever the project for reform, we know that it will be swamped, digested by modes of behaviour and institutions that will always be the same (1994: xxxv). According to Foucault, hope lies where ‘one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them’ (Ibid). When this happens ‘transformation becomes […] very urgent, very difficult and quite possible’ (Ibid). Foucault exemplifies this possibility by applying this type of agonistic thought to governmentality itself stating that ‘Governmentality should not be exercised without a critique far more radical than a test of optimization. It should inquire not just as to the best (or least costly) means of achieving its effects but also concerning the possibility and even the lawfulness of its scheme for achieving effects’ (1994: 74). In this way, Foucault’s observations echo Arendt’s claims that critical inquiry should extend way beyond the shallow measure of means to ends efficiency.

Foucault’s insight for resisting the instrumentality of a certain type of rationality takes on a further Arendtian aspect through his discussion of the importance of judgement as a key form of thought working upon thought. For Foucault, judgement is a particular type of thinking which frees itself from the knee-jerk reactionary judgement which abounds in the

capillary network of social normalisation. This judgement might be better described as agonistic critique. Unequivocally, he asserted that ‘Criticism that hands down sentences sends me to sleep. I’d like a criticism of scintillating leaps of the imagination. It would not be sovereign or dressed in red, it would bear the lightning of possible storms’ (1994: 323)

In recognising the ubiquity of normalisation throughout society, Foucault remarks at how ‘It’s amazing how people like judging. Judgement is being passed everywhere, all the time. Perhaps it is one of the simplest things mankind has been given to do’ (1994b: 323).

However, recalling that even when the power grid behind social normalisation appears to be creative, it is in fact repressive; Foucault envisages a different form of judgement. Far removed from the negative judgement of social normalisation there is the possibility of genuinely creative assessments, ones that don’t ‘judge’ at all:

I can’t help but dream of a kind of criticism that would try not to judge but to bring an oeuvre, a book, a sentence, an idea to life; it would light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind and catch the sea foam in the breeze and scatter it. It would multiply not judgements but signs of existence; it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. (Foucault 1994b: 323)

The type of critical thinking that Foucault exhorts is positive, creative and life-affirming and not one which acts as the judgemental, divisive instrument for the negative and exclusionary ends of pastoralisation. In possibly the last instance where the two theorists parallel, Foucault echoes Arendt with his sentiment that ‘we must free ourselves from the sacralisation of the social as the only reality and stop regarding as superfluous something so essential in human life and human relations as thought’ (Ibid).

6.8: Conclusion

This chapter has shown how it is possible to identify a critique of instrumental rationality in the work of Foucault. Although Foucault doesn’t offer his critique of instrumental rationality in the same overt way that Arendt does, an anti-instrumentalist argument nevertheless exists in his oeuvre. The Nietzschean elements of Foucault’s anti-instrumentality rest on the use of genealogical method to reject uniform, linear models of explanation, as exemplified in all disciplines who seek to emulate ‘science’ and also from the adoption of agonism in Foucault’s work. The overarching implication of these aspects is that both equate to a resistance of ends. In these ways, Foucault not only uses agonism as
a principle against instrumentality to silence some of the critics of his work but also in
doing so parallels with Arendt in terms of her rejection of instrumental rationality.

In directly identifying assujetissement as a set of strategies, it can be shown how they are
equally micro-instrumentalities. These plural instrumentalities, which are exemplified both
in Foucault’s ‘big three’ and more contemporary examples, can all be seen as ‘means’
toward the end of social domination. This chapter brings these forward as specific and
appropriate sites for permanent provocation, and in doing so, shows them as vehicles for
how we can engage with Foucault’s notion of ‘hyper-activism’ so that we may ‘refuse what
we are’. This parallels with Arendt’s argument that people should become challengers.

Foucault’s parallels with Arendt become much more manifest at the level whereby the
micro-instrumentalities of assujetissement become the more monolithic ‘reason of the
state’. These parallels are most easily seen through Foucault’s discussion of bureaucracy,
which for him is the object *sine qua non* of pastoralisation. It is also the most modern
incarnation of pastoralisation where many of the micro-instrumentalities of the art of
government are gathered together. This is because bureaucracy is the ultimate instrument of
the police state. Like Arendt, Foucault draws a connection between systems which rely on
the imbecilic bureaucrat and totalitarian systems. Foucault’s explanation of bureaucracy as
an instrument of the police state and as an instrument of social control is another way that a
critique of instrumental rationality that can be found in his work.

A further parallel between Foucault and Arendt shows violence as a key aspect of modern
politics and points out the need to understand the rationality behind the use of violence,
which for Foucault defines a situation where the freedom inherent in power relationships
has disappeared. This question, however, illustrates a weakness in his theory, in that it
implies a lack of awareness or recognition of Arendt’s rich examination of the legacy of
* homo faber*. The parallel continues with Foucault’s emphasis on the importance of thought
instead of judgement. Like Arendt, Foucault identifies this as a key weapon in subverting
instrumentality and also as an important factor in transforming human relationships. This

---

95 This reading of Foucault therefore challenges McNay’s (1991: 125) assessment that Foucault reduces social
agents to passive bodies.
underscores his argument for society to be transformed beyond what it currently is, for society to ‘refuse’ what it is.

An analysis of contemporary forms of political rationalities is achieved by Foucault’s parallel with Arendt in the identification of violence as a political instrument. Likewise, there are also parallels between them through his description and critique of bureaucracy, which is the institution upon which the social, economic and political spheres converge. Bureaucracy however, throws up a paradox of its own in the comparison of Foucault and Arendt in that it is in this area that the questions that Foucault and Arendt might ask each other begin to take on a more tangible form. This means that the final angle of comparison between these two theorists, such as bureaucracy is, at the same time also stands as the basis upon which the ultimate divergences between them can be shown.

The ultimate divergence between these two political theories can be found in their explanation of bureaucracy. This is because Arendt sees bureaucracy as a substitution for power or in other words the instrument through which the genuinely political is displaced, replaced and restricted by issues relating to the social. Foucault, however, sees it in entirely the opposite way, as a very immediate entity in people’s lives and as the instrument through which the political becomes omnipresent through the colonisation of the social. It is this ultimate divergence between Foucault and Arendt that is examined in the rest of the thesis in more detail. What will be shown is that the polarisation of the two theorists regarding the separation of the social and political is what distinguishes their theories from each other. In addition, the thesis will set out its ultimate argument for why there is a necessity to move beyond it.

---

96 It is due to my reading of Foucault in this way that I cannot agree with writers such as Marquez. Marquez’ substitution of the idea of ‘social games’(2010: 12) in place of Foucault’s relationships of power as outlined in this chapter present the issue as more benign that it actually is both in Foucault’s work and real world instances. Coercion and domination do not only rest on acceptance but can be identified where acceptance isn’t given but resistance isn’t made as the example of bureaucracy shows. Marquez’ description of bureaucracy as ‘sites of joint action’ (2001: 19) appears to miss both Arendt’s and Foucault’s crucial recognition that it is the anonymity of bureaucracy which is its most insidious facet.
7.0 ARENDT: THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL

7.1: Introduction

This thesis now breaks away from the parallel strengths of Arendt and Foucault to focus on their significant divergences. These can be considered to be significant because besides the parallels between them, what is just as striking about the two thinkers is the very different conclusions that they reach regarding the social and political. This chapter will show that Arendt sees that the social has come to dominate and constrict the political sphere whereas the final chapter of the thesis shows that Michel Foucault sees the political as constraining the social. The final two chapters look at each theorist’s diverging argument regarding this relationship. Arendt unequivocally saw genuine politics as a space free from social considerations. That is to say that for genuine politics to exist, at all times and in all situations a separation of the social and political had to be maintained. This chapter ultimately asserts that although this is not as easy as Arendt made it sound, neither is it as far-fetched as some interpretations of her imply (Reinhardt 1997, Pitkin 1998, Kingston 2009, Marquez 2010a: 18).

The following chapter is the thesis’ attempt to respond to the questions and intuitions posed in the introduction whilst also examining what is perceived as certain injustices towards Arendt’s work. This still results ultimately in a critical view of Arendt’s claims for the separation of the social and the political, but one which takes the original step of at least pointing out other interpretations of her weaknesses. This includes considering what it might have been that Arendt meant when she talked of the social, by paying particular attention to her use of misery and poverty in the politically revealing moments of revolution. This aims to add an angle to the interpretation of Arendt’s social not often covered by other commentators (Reinhardt 1997, Pitkin 1998, Grumley 1998, Medearis 2010).

---

97 This is an idea that was originally discussed in a journal article (see Edwards 1999). Other theorists who also remark on divergences between them include Agamben (1998), Grumley, (1998), Medearis (2010).
98 Medearis categorises Arendt’s treatment of the social as a ‘naive sociology’ (2004: 470). What this thesis has shown in previous chapters and in the current chapter is that Arendt’s ‘social’ is actually a complex historical, economic, political, psychological and sociological phenomenon. Therefore, Medearis’ rudimentary equation of Arendt’s social with ‘necessity’ (2004: 471) is too narrow because of its neglect of all of the above. For the best recognition of the complexity of Arendt’s ‘social’ found during the research of this thesis see Connolly (1997: 15-16).
2004). The second section looks at the consequences that Arendt’s argument has for contemporary politics. This includes responses to other criticisms of Arendt’s work to finally offer a more sympathetic critique of her arguments regarding the social and political.

For Arendt, the movement of the ‘social’ into politics takes place at a very specific historical moment which she identifies as ‘the modern age […] when, and not before, men began to doubt that poverty is inherent in the human condition’ (1965: 22). The modern age and the Arendtian social therefore coincide and it may well be that the point in history where she sees this coincidence take place, marks out the beginning of the modern age for Arendt. There are two important aspects for Arendt’s ‘social’ discussed in this chapter. The first of these is her analysis of poverty, misery and want.

7.2: Misery and Want: The Predicament of Abject Poverty

Arendt’s critique of the social is a theme which pervades her oeuvre. Pitkin has given the metaphor of Arendt’s use of the social as both ‘a monster from outer space’ (1998: 4) and a ‘superhuman entity’ (1998: 15) to describe the way that Arendt uses the concept. This is the view demonstrated in ‘The Attack of the Blob’ (Fenichel Pitkin, 1998). This thesis makes the point that such a representation of Arendt’s complex idea of the social can be seen on many levels to be a disservice to it, not least because Pitkin seems to limit her analysis of Arendt’s social to only those explanations made in The Human Condition and in doing so neglects many of the qualifications above that Arendt made to her idea of the social in other works, most notably ‘On Revolution’. Pitkin’s narrow focus has been repeated by both Medearis (2004) and Kingston (2009).

The social question pervades the whole of the book ‘On Revolution’, mainly through Arendt’s comparison of the American and French revolutions. This thesis argues that ‘On Revolution’ is vital for providing an important insight into what Arendt meant when she used the concept of ‘social’. The first explanation for the differing outcomes of the American and French revolutions that Arendt gave is the American attitude to politics which saw every individual in that country engaged in the political process (1963: 119) in an environment whereby ‘the majesty-in-diversity of the plural multitude was
celebrated’ (Arendt 1965: 93). In Arendt’s view the American experience exemplified many genuine political qualities. The French experience by contrast lacked such political qualities and instead became mired in ‘at best representative governments for, rather than of or by, the people […] and at worst the usurpation of sovereign power’ (1965: 75). This comment may well refer to Robespierre in the first statement and Napoleon Bonaparte in the second. If this analysis is correct this reflects Arendt’s recognition that the actors of the French Revolution were very different characters who were politically unsatisfactory even at the extremes of their difference. However, for this chapter it is the second key differential between the two revolutions which is of pertinence here, because for Arendt, not only did the two revolutions contrast in terms of the above, but in addition they were separated by something that Arendt calls the ‘social question’ (1965: 24) and within this most specifically, the particular components of poverty and misery. In this sense, the French Revolution can be used as an early example of Arendt’s criticisms of a politics constricted by the ‘social question’.

Poverty and misery are two key issues in ‘On Revolution’. Arendt marries them as the issues that constitute the social question exemplified in the French Revolution. She writes that poverty in France was about more than mere deprivation, it involved a constant want and misery that dehumanized its sufferers (1965: 60). This combination of want, misery and dehumanization meant that the poor of the French Revolution were perpetually under the ‘dictate of their bodies’; they were enslaved by necessity and as such experienced totally abject conditions (Ibid). Such was the level of poverty and misery amongst most of the French revolutionaries that the new republic in France was ‘stillborn […] freedom had to be surrendered to necessity and to the urgency of the life process itself’ (Arendt 1965: 60). Arendt concludes that this immediate imposition of ‘social’ issues into the revolutionary process in France ‘sent it to its doom’ because it’s goal changed from ‘the foundation of freedom to securing the ‘happiness of the people’ (Ibid). By this, Arendt

---

99 This is supported by historians’ recognition of the ‘choice of a plural […] interpretation of independence’ in this revolution (Black 2001: 45) and the emphasis in the Declaration of Independence of the ‘equality of men’ (Almond 2002: 26 my emphasis). Beiner (2000: 55) states that Arendt saw the success of this revolution because the ‘nation’ had been removed from the nation state.
100 Almond (2002: 37) gives a similar interpretation of the French Revolution
meant the satiating of necessity, meeting the needs of biological life. There was in this shift a move away from the freedom of the political into the constriction of the social.

In contrast, the American Revolution was ‘the symbol of a society without poverty’ (Arendt 1965: 23). She adds that the problem that had long been ‘the most urgent and the politically least solvable of all problems to all other revolutions […] the terrifying predicament of mass poverty’ (1965: 24) or ‘the social question’ (Ibid) played little to no role in the American revolution meaning that this revolution ‘did not devour it’s own children’ (1965: 44). Black independently supports this interpretation, stating that in America there was ‘less of a social contest’ (2002: 266). Arendt, however, qualifies this difference further. For her it is not only a case of abject poverty being omnipresent in the French revolution whereas in the American one it was not. What is also apparent to the close observer of her work is that there was a differing attitude, a contrasting cultural psyche, which separated the two historical events and their agents. Arendt firstly identifies this in the French revolution through her distinction of compassion, pity and solidarity (1965: 75).

For Arendt one of the defining features of the French revolution can be seen at the point where a difference is established between the people and their representatives. In her analysis of this revolution, Arendt saw that liberation only happened for a few, many people were still ‘loaded down by misery’ (1965: 75). The revolution in France moved away from the establishment of a res publica and instead focused on the happiness of many (Ibid). Arendt notes that ‘le peuple’ became the phrase of people exposed to the sufferings

---

101 It may seem that this ‘rosy’ view of America neglects the racial issues that are part of America’s history. For Arendt these issues were complex but certainly not irrelevant. In ‘Reflections on Little Rock’ she saw aspects of the race debate in America as a social issue, yet at others it was a political one, such as when social discriminations were enforced by legislation which she deemed not only ‘unconstitutional’ (in Baehr 2000: 236) but also persecutory (in Baehr 2000: 240) and completely against her belief that every person should be given the opportunity to engage in public affairs (1972: 233). There is no space to explore this issue further here, but these points show that Arendt was by no means ignorant of the race issue or wedded to elitism. She reflected the reality of these issues into her criticisms of Marxism (1965: 226) and in letters to Jaspers she stated that the 1964 Nobel Peace Prize should go to someone ‘trying to make peace between the races’ (in Kohler 1992: 558, 1354), writing that she found the radically conservative Republican Barry W. Goldwater a ‘dangerous fool’ (Ibid). On a more personal level, Arendt never visited the southern states of America because she found the racial discriminations there an ‘unbearable situation’ because she had ‘sympathy’ for the Black Civil rights movement as she did ‘for all oppressed or underprivileged peoples’ (in Baehr 2000: 231-2).
of others, yet not a victim of those hardships themselves. Neither however, were these sympathizers active participants in government. This form of sympathy, from an in-between group of people, Arendt terms compassion (Ibid). Its damage to the course of the French Revolution as a political moment was done when it led the ‘sympathisers’ (who Arendt uses Robespierre to represent) to neglect the issue of forms of government to instead focus on the issue of the ‘happiness of the people’ (Ibid). Once again, Arendt reiterates that the maxim ‘Il faut une volonté UNE’, stood no chance of establishing stability (Ibid). For Arendt, the compassion that led to the catastrophe of the French revolution can be understood as a ‘passion’. It is speechless, made up by ‘gestures of countenance’ rather than words (1965: 89). This lack of words and speech means that compassion abolishes the politically necessary distance between people and is thus irrelevant to politics (Ibid).

Arendt extends her explanation of compassion to discuss the perversion of it which she terms ‘pity’ and the positive alternative to it, ‘solidarity’ (1965: 88). In Arendt’s analysis she sees pity as attracting ‘political’ agents to weak people whereas solidarity dispassionately creates a community of interest with the oppressed and exploited (1963: 88). This is particularly noteworthy because Arendt indicates here that she does indeed see that certain issues of necessity merit political attention. This point weakens criticisms of her work, such as those by Reinhardt, who appear to take a far too simplistic approach to what Arendt meant in her use of the term ‘social’ (1997: 155, 158). What critics such as Reinhardt appear to miss or neglect, is that it is of vital importance to Arendt’s definition of the social how attention to the oppressed and exploited is formed. In the trinity of compassion, pity and solidarity, Arendt places pity over compassion but solidarity over them both (1965: 89). This is because solidarity, in her opinion, partakes of reason (rather than sentiment), can comprehend a multitude conceptually (rather than as a nation or

---

102 Further testament to Arendt’s recognition of this revolution as a microcosm of the failings of modern politics can be seen in the fact that there are very few places in the western world at least, where these issues are not the rule in some or all ways. It is important however to recognise that prevalence is no measure of success, captured in Arendt’s insight that a mistake is no less a mistake just because it is repeated many times (1965: 94, 218) or as Dubos (1975) asserts ‘trend is not destiny’ (Kegley and Wittkopf 1993: 535)

103 Other commentators such as Pitkin recognize the complexity of Arendt’s use of ‘social’ in ‘On Revolution’ (1998: 217) but still only devote less than ten pages of discussion to it (217-226) in which it must be noted, the focus is more on Arendt’s comments about the political institutions of the two revolutions, than the explanation of the social that Arendt gives.
people), is aroused by suffering but not guided by it and comprehends the rich and the strong no less than the poor and the weak (1965: 88-9). Arendt concedes that this may seem ‘cold and abstract in comparison to pity […] but [it] remains committed to ideas such as honor and dignity’ (1965: 89). For her, then compassion is a passion, pity is a sentiment and solidarity, a principle (Ibid). The course of the French Revolution displayed rather too much of the former, and not enough of the latter (1965: 90-1).

In contrast, the American Revolution showed the opposite, an absence of compassion and a great deal more solidarity whereby the Americans ‘opposed public opinion […] and celebrated the plural and diverse multitude and the exchange of opinion between equals’ (1965: 93)\(^{104}\), a realm which for Arendt, ‘disappears with unanimity’ (Ibid). Unanimity such as that seen with *Les Malheureux* in the French revolution seems plausible under conditions of abject poverty (Ibid), but really what happens is that the ‘mighty forces of misery and destitution’ become misused in the struggle against tyranny and repression (1965: 112). This, claims Arendt, has been the fate of every revolution since the French one, with the notable exception of Hungary, 1956 (Ibid).

There are several reasons why Arendt may have approved of the Hungarian Revolution. Sebestyen describes many events in this revolution as spontaneous, from the initial Bem Square protest (2007: 111) to the action of peasants bringing food for the freedom fighters (2007: 162) to the ‘spontaneous formation of revolutionaries during the fire-fight on the 24\(^{th}\) October, 1956’ (2007: 127). The protest in Parliament Square on the 23\(^{rd}\) October, 1956 was not only ‘spontaneous’ but also ‘entirely peaceful’ (Ibid). That the only violence in this public demonstration ‘came from the secret police’ (Ibid) rather than the activists themselves, and the characterisation of the whole revolution as ‘moderate’ and lacking ‘brutality’ (2007: 197) would have been another aspect of this revolution of which Arendt approved. Other facets would also have pleased Arendt such as the involvement of workers councils which Sebestyen describes as ‘extraordinary examples of direct democracy’ (2007: 116).

---

\(^{104}\) Almond supports this claim describing the American Revolution as emphasising ‘limitations on the power of government’ (2002: 31). Black states it knew such equality that ‘the Governor would wait in line behind the cobbler’ in a barber’s shop (2001: 267).
243). This example repeats many of the genuine political moments perceived by Arendt in the French Resistance.

In her description of the compassion that arose in the French example, Arendt also passed comment on the psyche of the sufferers themselves, a psyche ‘driven by the needs of their bodies’ (1965: 59). This contaminated the political with issues of the social. Arendt says that this French ‘predicament of poverty’ was absent from the American Revolution (1965: 68). At this point it becomes vital to draw attention to Arendt’s use of the terms ‘predicament’ and ‘abject’ as prefixes to poverty in her differentiation between the French and American revolutions. When greater consideration is given to Arendt’s admittedly inconsistent application of these concepts it is possible to resolve some of the issues in ‘On Revolution’ that lead critics of Arendt to state that Arendt’s discussion of the two revolutions is ‘incoherent’ (Pitkin 1998: 219) resulting in ‘On Revolution’ being a ‘confusing and confused book’ (Pitkin 1998: 225).

Pitkin can be forgiven for reaching this conclusion about ‘On Revolution’ because there are times when Arendt seemingly does contradict herself. For example, she states that abject poverty was missing from the American scene (1965: 44) only to seemingly later state that poverty actually was present in America (1965: 68). It is precisely at these points that Arendt’s use of the prefixes ‘predicament’ and ‘abject’ assume their full relevance. Arendt uses these terms in conjunction with poverty to demonstrate that at times something more than the issue of material inequality between people separated the two revolutions. What was present in the French Revolution, but absent from the American one, were the issues of misery and want.

Arendt argues that although both revolutions experienced sufficient material inequalities between people that poverty did exist in both situations, what distinguished the American from the French experience, was that ‘misery and want’ were absent from America; the Americans were poor but not miserable and therefore were not ‘driven by want’ (1965: 68), whereas throughout the French revolution liberation was enjoyed by only some. In America the issues which drove the revolution were always concerned with the form of government, and thus retained the political and ignored the order of society (1965: 68). This ensured
that in America the political system was such that the poor were able to be participants in it\textsuperscript{105} thus ensuring they did not suffer the fate of the poor in France who were imprisoned in their abject predicament by the short sighted political system of representation. As explained earlier, for Arendt political representation only ensures negative freedoms which although will ensure the poor’s self-preservation, at the same time and by extension prevents them from participating in political life. The lives of the ‘represented’ therefore are ‘without political consequence’ (1965: 69). This, argues Arendt, means that eventually ‘darkness, not want, is the curse of poverty’ and as such ‘can only be reversed by the opening up of the political realm’ (Ibid).

In these ways it is possible to see that Arendt’s ‘social’ carries a much more complex meaning than can ever be gathered from using the term in it’s most generic sense or in equating it simply to the existence of ‘poverty’, or mistaking its complexity for incoherence, a mistake made by commentators such as Pitkin and Marquez (2010a: 18).\textsuperscript{106} Indeed, Arendt does herself a disservice by stating, in what appears to be her own shorthand for her complex meaning, that ‘the social question is what we may better and more simply call the existence of poverty’(1965: 60) before then moving on to eventually explain it in the greater detail outlined above.

One weakness that can be seen in Arendt’s occasionally throwaway use of the term ‘poverty’ is that it doesn’t reflect poverty’s relativity. This is of interest because recognizing that poverty is relative would add further strength to Arendt’s claim against the concept of ‘poverty’ crystallizing into an absolute that is the social question. This is because the relative aspects of poverty create different perspectives which in turn feed the plurality necessary for the public sphere. Nevertheless, what is crucial in the explanation of the social question in On Revolution is that Arendt uses ‘social’ in a sometimes wide, but always highly idiosyncratic sense. Arendt’s ‘social’ does not equate to the mere existence

\begin{footnotes}
\item[105] The poor in America could participate politically at the local level, through such public spaces as town council meetings in New England (Arendt 1965: 166). At other levels in America, political participation was/is given through the election by the people of ‘county, township and municipal governments’ (Calleo, 1968: 17), state governors and governments (Calleo 1968: 101), congressmen and senators (Calleo 1968: 18, Conway, 2000, 6-7) and also the election of the President as a head of state (Calleo 1968: 14, Conway 2000: 6-7). The opportunity for political participation in the USA exists to the extent that despite his criticism of the ‘impotence of congress’ created by the separation of powers (1974: 108), Weber recognised the ‘high degree of democracy there’ (1974: 110).
\item[106] In Marquez’ case in particular however, this is no reason not to try to understand it.
\end{footnotes}
of poverty but also to the attitudes of both sufferers and witnesses toward poverty and it is these things combined which make the ‘social’ attitude to it. Support for this chapter’s distinctive and more nuanced interpretation of Arendt’s social can be provided by considering the ways that she distinguishes herself from Marx.

7.3: Marx and the Socialization of Poverty

Arendt points out that the young Marx became convinced that the reason the French revolution failed to found freedom was because it had failed to solve the ‘social question’ (1965: 62). However for Arendt, Marx transformed this social question into a political one using the concept ‘exploitation’, his idea that poverty is the result of the ruling class’ possession of the means of violence (Ibid). Arendt is critical of Marx on this point claiming that this relationship was only valid as a description for the early stages of capitalism (Ibid). Arendt challenges Marx with being more interested in history than politics, leading him to forget that the original intention for the men of the revolutions was the foundation of freedom (1965: 61). Arendt doubts the value of Marx’s claims, stating that if Marx did help the poor, it

was not by telling them that they were living embodiments of some historical or other necessity, but by persuading them that poverty itself is a political, not natural phenomenon, the result of violence and violation rather than scarcity. (Arendt 1965: 63).

Arendt sees that poverty is natural between people because scarcity is natural, in the same ways that inequalities of physical strength or intellect are. All of these differences between people contribute to a natural inequality between people. That is not to say that Arendt felt that nothing should be done about poverty, indeed, as this thesis as has shown, her oeuvre is strewn with claims and exhortations against a multitude of repressions, and this chapter has shown that she included poverty within this. The vital importance that Arendt placed on recognising relative poverty as an ontologically occurring phenomenon was because doing

---

107 Arendt refers to Marx’s notion of the ‘creation of Man through labour’ from the Jugendschriften, specifically the Kritik der Hegelschen Dialectik (1998: 86 n14) and also cites a deleted phrase from the Deutsche Ideologie: ‘Der erste geschichtliche Akt dieser Individuen, wodurch sie sich von den Tieren unterscheiden, ist nicht dass die denken, sondern dass sie anfangen ihre Lebensmittel zu produzieren’(1998: 86 n14). Further testament for Marxist preoccupation with history is cited by Arendt as Engels’ preface to ‘Ursprung der Familie’ and the 1876 newspaper article ‘Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man’ (Ibid). Arendt also stands by this assessment of Marx in her 1970 interview with Adelbert Reif (1972: 211) and her lectures 1953-4 and 1973 German writings that became the Promise of Politics (2005b: 153).

108 Arendt states this view of Marx explicitly in a letter to Karl Jaspers (in Kohler 1992: 216,1142)
so meant that it would have a priori acceptance to the genuinely political space, rather than becoming an unsolvable and therefore omnipresent issue for the political space. The translation of poverty into a non-issue, in that it has no precedence over any other, acts as yet another way that equality, one of the cornerstones of genuine politics, can be ensured. This politically equalizing measure offers both rich and poor freedom, rather than attempting to mitigate or solve poverty by a social revolution that iniquitously prioritizes the poor over the rich, in the case of Marx, or through over sentimentalized social attitudes that lead to representative politics as in the French revolution. These latter approaches may lessen poverty to different degrees but they will never end it. They will however limit freedom. The importance here of Arendt’s distinction between the social and pseudo-political in contrast to the genuinely political can not be underestimated. For this reason the genuinely political is returned to later in the chapter.

Arendt’s conclusion to this criticism of Marx is that he was mistaken in seeing poverty and freedom as incompatible (1965: 62). This, however, was not the only moment in which he contributed to the rise of the social in the history and the course of political thought, in Arendt’s opinion. The chapter now moves on to explain another important issue for understanding Arendt’s concept of the social and another angle from which she is distinct from Marx. This time it is Arendt’s use of the social in the Human Condition which is considered.

7.31: The Public/Private Distinction

‘The rise of society brought about the simultaneous decline of the public as well as the private realms’ (Arendt 1998: 257)

Intrinsic to Arendt’s definition of the social, in addition to the above, is her public/private distinction. This is important because maintaining a divide between the public and private realms keeps questions of necessity out of the public, i.e. the political, realm. In the private sphere, each individual has the benefit of a space where necessity is dealt with, but where they can exercise solitude and develop their own perspective(s). These are practices which are vital for full engagement in public life as equals beside but distinct from their peers. For

109 An oversight that Kingston (2009: 116) makes when he claims that Arendt exclusively focuses on the political.
110 The other side of this interpretation is that there is no necessary compatibility between wealth and freedom.
Arendt, the separation of the private and the public realms simultaneously guarantees the purity of genuine politics and at the same time allows a space which safeguards the distinction of every individual. Arendt’s concern with the public/private distinction can be understood in part, through criticisms she made of Marx’s failure to distinguish work from labour, his association of property with the bodies of men and the implications of his maxim for the revolutionary re-appropriation of private property, further ideas that led his arguments ultimately, in Arendt’s opinion, to ‘socialize’ mankind.

Arendt claims that Marx bases his whole oeuvre on the nature and role of labor (1998: 84 n14) and this is done ‘independently of its location in the private or public realm’ (1998: 88). What Marx fails to do she argues, is to distinguish between ‘animal laborans’ from ‘homo faber’; that is the distinction between work and labor (1998: 85). Instead, other distinctions are conceived, such as skilled and unskilled work, manual and intellectual labour and lastly, Marx’s own identification of productive and unproductive labour (1998: 85). This for Arendt translates all forms of work into labour in the arguments of Marx (1998: 87)111.

In Arendt’s interpretation of Marx all labour possesses a productivity of its own on the basis of the surplus that is not exhausted once labour’s subsistence is ensured (1998: 88). For Arendt, this is because in Marx’s ultimate vision of communism, the ‘labor of some suffices for the life of all’ (1998: 88)112. The labouring of some meets the demand of necessities of all because each individuals’ labour power carries a surplus beyond meeting that individuals own need which allows the reproduction of more than one life process (Ibid). The Arendtian reading of Marx therefore sees Marx’s vision of ‘labor’ taking on a social angle, in the sense that the life processes of all can be sustained from the labour of a few. This is equivalent to a vision of ‘socialized mankind’ (Arendt 1998: 89). So on the basis of the labour power of every individual where labour solely and primarily reproduces

111 Arendt claims this hope accompanied Marx from beginning to end. She quotes Marx in the Deutsche Ideologie ‘Es handelt sich nicht darum die Arbeit zu befreien, sondern sie aufzuheben’ and in Das Kapital ‘Das Reich der Freiheit beginnt in der Tat erst da, wo das Arbeiten...aufhört’ (Arendt 1998: 87 n17). Other sources used by Arendt are Die Klassekampfe in Frankreich, 1840-185 (1965: 64 and 2005b: 191), Ökonomische – Philosophische Manuskripte, Marx und Engels’ Gesamtausgabe and Die heilige Familie’ (Arendt 1998: 86 n14).

life, Marx gives ‘the purely social viewpoint [....] its most coherent and greatest expression’ (Ibid).

The conflation in Marxism between work and labour takes on further significance for Arendt because every man’s own ‘labor power’ constitutes Marx’s concept of property (1998: 70). This source of property is located in Man himself, in his possession of a body and the ownership of that body’s strength (Ibid). That the location of property in Marxism is situated on the individual means that for Arendt the worldly character of property is lost (1998: 70). This worldly character is lost because in Arendt’s opinion there are important distinctions that need to be made and understood behind the idea of ‘private property’ so central to Marx. Arendt makes a vital distinction between the very familiar capitalist idea of private wealth, which she points out ‘has grown to such proportions that it is almost unmanageable by private ownership’ (1998: 70) and private property in the sense of a ‘tangible, worldly place of one’s own’ (1998: 70). The importance of this worldly place of one’s own exists, says Arendt, because there are certain qualities of privacy that would be catastrophic to lose; that is, there are important positive aspects that the private realm gives to human beings, that cannot be achieved in any other way and which are *sine qua non* preconditions for a genuine political life. These are identified by Arendt in *The Human Condition* as the non-privative qualities of privacy (1998: 70-1), and she sees these qualities in two distinct ways.

The first non-privative quality of privacy is connected with a need in genuine political life for a ‘home’ for necessity, a place where the over-riding urgency that necessity brings can be satiated before the ‘desires and aspirations of man’ in the public realm can be considered (1998: 70). Arendt goes on to qualify this contention further by pointing out that necessity and life are so intimately related and connected that life itself is threatened where necessity is altogether eliminated. For the elimination of necessity, far from resulting automatically in the establishment of freedom, only blurs the distinguishing line between freedom and necessity. (Arendt 1998: 71).

Arendt’s insistence that necessity be restricted to the household can be better understood through this statement. For her necessity and life are so fundamentally connected that to eliminate one is to eliminate the other. Furthermore, if necessity were to be eliminated it would not result in the creation or discovery of freedom, but would make freedom
indistinguishable as an ontological state. The elimination of necessity would actually render freedom a more remote possibility. Necessity in the private sphere is required to maximize freedom firstly by distinguishing life from political freedom and secondly by keeping the private space as a pre-requisite for the constitution of distinction. This gives deeper insight into why Arendt said that Marx was mistaken in seeing freedom and poverty as incompatible. In this way for Arendt, Marx did not only fail to solve the social question, his theoretical contributions exacerbated it.

Arendt’s criticisms of Marx go further than this because of the second crucial non-privative aspect of the private sphere that Arendt wished to retain. This relates to privacy as a hiding place from the common world. For Arendt, there are aspects of human lives that should remain hidden and which can only remain so if there is a private sphere in which to hide them, against those that have a place in the ‘light’ of the public arena. This further guarantees the distinction of individuals and thus avoids a loss of depth of perspective found in subjectivity. This is because ‘a life spent entirely in public is shallow’ (1958: 71). Although it may be a visible life, it loses ‘depth in a very real non-subjective sense’ (Ibid). Thus, Arendt articulates the importance for her of a public/private distinction, to retain the important political quality of perspective, and gives very real reasons as to why Marx can be argued to destroy it. The elimination of the private realm becomes a real possibility (1958: 70) because of Marx’s advocacy of expropriation, that is, the seizing of private property during the process of revolution. The Marxist revolution requires the expropriation of private property; the reclamation of Man’s own labour power and the ‘fruits’ of that labour power under communism. This ‘socialization of Man’ (1998: 72) leads to the sustenance of all life via communist labouring. The consequence for Arendt of each individual reclaiming his/her labour power during the revolution, and moving from this point into the socialised existence of communism, is the collapse of the private/public distinction, which is coeval for Arendt to complete domination by the social. She testifies that Marx himself noted the collapse of this distinction when he ‘predicted….with an unjustified glee …the withering away of the public realm’ (1998: 117).

Arendt points out how ‘Neither abundance of goods nor the shortening of time spent laboring are likely to result in the establishment of a common world’ (1998: 117). Referring
to a type of ‘cruel privacy’ (1998: 117), distinct from the non-privative qualities of privacy that she exalts, Arendt argues that ‘[…] the expropriated animal laborans becomes no less private because he has been deprived of a private place of his own’ (1998: 117). This is because in Marxism ‘socialised men […] spend their freedom from laboring in those strictly private (my emphasis) and essentially world-less activities that we now call ‘hobbies’ (1998: 118).113 Thus, not only does the public realm collapse as the result of the proletarian revolution, but this loss is compounded yet further by the subsequent retreat of men into a world-less, private existence. By definition, this interferes with the genuine plurality of people.

Although Arendt is critical of Marx in these ways she does not favour capitalism instead. For her capitalist as well as communist economies can be defined by the consequences of both socialized and isolated mankind. For Arendt ‘wordlessness’ as exemplified in earlier chapters occurs both in slavish and ‘free’ existence (1998: 118). This worldlessness suggests why Arendt may have been more correct than Marx in claiming that ‘World alienation, and not self-alienation […] has been the hallmark of the modern age’ (Villa 1996: 171) and this ‘hallmark of worldlessness’ has already been exemplified in the thesis through the many limits of sovereign based politics, the various suppressions of plurality and the political isolation created by bureaucracy. Once again, almost prophetically, Arendt saw that:

A hundred years after Marx, we know the spare time of the animal laborans is never spent in anything but consumption, and the more time left to him the greedier and more craving his appetites […] so that consumption is no longer restricted to the necessities, but on the contrary, is mainly concerned with the superfluities of life (1998: 133).114

The realities of this situation, points out Arendt, are disturbing for the private/public distinction because that which we are left with is only the depth-less visibility via consumption by animal laborans. This clearly is not ‘a true public realm’ (1998: 134) but only ‘private activities displayed in the open’ (Ibid) no matter whose standards are used.

---

113 Deutsche Ideologie (Arendt, 1985: 118 n65)
114 The prescience of Arendt’s analysis in this point can be supported by the characterisation of modern, western societies as ‘consumer societies’. From many too numerous to list, see the arguments of Baudrillard (1998), Taylor and Tilford (2000), Bauman (2001), Daunton and Hilton (2001) and Hetherington (2009).
If Arendt’s criticisms of Marx are correct, then greater clarity is provided for what her overall concept of the social entails. Although the rise of the social in the modern age did not occur through a communist revolution, it bears many of the catastrophes Arendt thought communism promised. Firstly, the idea that poverty and freedom are incompatible implies that freedom must always be dependent on the resolution of this issue. This narrows the potential for freedom massively. Seen in this way, a belief is maintained that until the issue of poverty is resolved there can not be freedom for all. This maxim serves capitalist rhetoric as well as it does communist rhetoric. Moreover, it is a belief which may well not be true. What it does give the social is a basis in the idea of the labour of some sufficing for the life of all to eliminate the issue of poverty. This results in the view of all people as one huge family which equals one huge household (Arendt 1998: 28). The administration of this household constitutently forms the social via bureaucracy and consequentially homogenises plurality. Arendt defends private property in the sense of a space of one’s own, and certainly does not defend the endless accumulation of property revered in capitalism. It is vital to recognize that an argument for one place of one’s own is not an argument in favour of many places of one’s own. The private sphere is necessary as a bulwark against the social because it acts as a place for solitude giving a basis for distinction and perspective, which continually refreshes the plurality of perspective existent in the plurality of people. In these ways therefore there is nothing incoherent or confused about Arendt’s claims. The private and public sphere contrast to one another and in doing so give support to each other.

There is, however, a different weakness that exists in Arendt’s argument which needs addressing and that is to answer how exactly poverty can be mitigated by the private sphere when that private sphere may lack resources and the public sphere has no concern with it? What Arendt doesn’t explain fully and clearly when she asserts that ‘nothing […] could be more obsolete than to attempt to liberate mankind from poverty by political means […] nothing could be more futile or dangerous’ (1965: 114), is to how exactly, given that she has already asserted that poverty is inherent in nature, the differing affluences of every household could possibly deal with the questions of necessity privately? This omission by her makes this aspect of her separation of the two, easy to attack as an argument for the privatization of poverty, and in doing so an argument that speaks in the spirit of the worst kind of liberalism, that is to say the isolating individualism that Arendt is at such pains to
attack in other parts of her work outlined previously in the thesis. This is a question that requires an answer from all who make the claim that ‘genuine action cannot concern itself with the social’ (Marquez 2010a: 31). Furthermore, sticking to her maxim for poverty to remain outside of the public, that is, the political sphere, would mean that only those households who have sufficiently satiated the most basic demands of necessity can fully participate in public life. This is tantamount to the privatization of politics as well as poverty, and is seemingly therefore a self-contradictory and self-undermining aspect of Arendt’s oeuvre, leaving the door open for critics who see her ‘quest for purity as doomed’ (Reinhardt 1997: 158). As will become apparent however, in the fullness of this thesis, there is a solution to Arendt’s oversight on this matter which relies neither on the arguments of Marx nor the overriding self-interest of liberalism.

For Arendt, the private sphere is imperative only as the foundation upon which differing perspectives are formed and renewed so that a better politics can exist, and not at all in a liberal sense. Recalling Arendt’s anti-sovereignty provides the reminder that she argues against certain liberal axioms (1976: 454) such as the limiting nature of negative freedom, which she sees as a facilitator of the accumulation of wealth rather than a guarantor of freedom itself (1998: 69, 1969: 67-8) and the exacerbation of individual isolation (1983: 89-90) leading to the destruction of the political world (1976: 454). In her opinion the modern rise of the social is concomitant to the collapse of both the public and private realms, and does not equate to either. The modern age has a false privacy when cast in liberal terms, individual activities which are visible but not politically meaningful. These have no real meaning on any level. The isolating nature of this modern form of privacy is therefore seen as being ‘as sharply opposed to the social realm as it is to the political’ (Arendt 1998: 38) and as the following section will show, the ‘political’ referred to here can be taken to mean the genuinely political as Arendt saw it.

The destruction of the political space between people leads to a situation of representation which is not equal political participation by all people. All potential for the genuinely political is destroyed, whilst many are also excluded by the pseudo-politics of representation. To add to this, in an extension of the ‘social attitude’, the sufferers of poverty themselves, enraged by their exclusion from the political sphere and the
perpetuation of the want and misery that it involves, constitute a force\textsuperscript{115} which greatly assists in the revolutionary seizing of power. The wretchedness of the ‘abject poor’ and the tour de force which they constitute increases the ease with which they can be used to overthrow power\textsuperscript{116}. Where they are not part of a genuinely political sphere, as they were not in France in 1789 for example, their exclusion from whatever masquerades as the political is compounded, keeping them in ‘darkness’.

By understanding Arendt’s use of the concept ‘social’ in this way it is possible to see that for her it is also attitudes toward poverty and of the poor themselves that can lead to the problematic of the social question, rather than simply the mere existence of poverty alone. Arendt saw that this problem contained in the social question continues into modern western society. She wrote that social scientists frequently assume that ‘those who belong to the lower classes of society have […] a right to burst with resentment, greed and envy’ (1965: 73). Taken out of the context explained in this section, this bald statement appears overly harsh, but what Arendt meant was that more could be done to remedy the resentment that ensues from economic inequity through the chance for pro and inter-action in a public sphere which illuminates their perspectives and therefore gives them value, than the inactive condescension of pitying countenance that she believed kept them in darkness\textsuperscript{117}. Arendt most certainly was not blind to the issue of poverty and want, as is implied by some critics (Reinhardt 1997: 145). She observed that it was no longer possible to avert one’s eyes from the misery and unhappiness of people in places such as some parts of Europe, and nearly all of Latin America and Africa as it was in eighteenth century Paris or nineteenth century London (1965: 73). What can be understood at this stage about Arendt’s disparagement of such sentimentality is that is that she saw that it largely contributed to the socialization of human suffering rather than the genuine politicization of it.

\textsuperscript{115} Arendt quotes Saint-Juste to make this point stating ‘Les Malheureux sont la puissance de la terre’ (1963: 112)
\textsuperscript{116} Schecter (2000: 84) reiterates the value of citizens in a public sphere rather than an easily manipulated mob in a faceless society.
\textsuperscript{117} More of Arendt’s view of this can be read in her discussion of John Adams (1963: 69). Arendt’s reading of the Founding Fathers however attracts criticism from some particularly regarding her reading of Jefferson and Hamilton (see Arato and Cohen 2009: 312-3).
7.4: The Arendtian Political

This chapter has added to previous explanations by showing how the modern political experience of individuals is inseparably enmeshed with the social\textsuperscript{118}, facilitating a proclivity towards conformist behaviour. This equates to continuity of the destruction of plurality. Pitkin captures this idea of Arendt’s restricted political when she says that people are the power, yet they do not have it (1998: 62). Arendt’s social also relates to a cultural attitude that overall is condescending toward poverty by its confusion of compassion, pity and solidarity. The thesis has shown that modern politics is disingenuous politics because it lacks a distinction between the public and private spheres. For all of these reasons, Arendt’s view of modern politics is that it is pseudo-politics, a machine, not simply enmeshed with complex issues that she terms social, but one that is dominated by them.

The view of the domination of the social over the political is what has led thinkers such as Pitkin (1998) to refer to Hannah Arendt’s view of the social as an attack by a ‘Blob’. Almost the whole of Pitkin’s book is devoted to this unnecessary caricature of Arendt’s social as ‘Blob’, including the superficial reading of Arendt’s explanation of the social in On Revolution referred to earlier\textsuperscript{119}. This seems to largely arise from a desire by Pitkin to link Arendt’s thought to fifties film culture and other unnecessary biographical details of Arendt, in order to create a gendered interpretation of Arendt’s thought. Although Arendt’s biography is not irrelevant to her thought, it offers no more relevance or insight than would any other thinkers’ biography. In fact the question has to be asked as to whether Pitkin’s need to explain Arendt’s thought via a continued appeal to Arendt’s situation as a woman has a decidedly anti-feminist outcome? The first eleven chapters of Pitkin’s book result in more of a parody of Arendt’s use of the concept of ‘social’ than an adequate or fair explanation of it. Such an investment in setting up the social as ‘blob’ is confused yet further by Pitkin’s ultimate conclusion that there is no ‘blob’ (1998: 252 - it is Pitkin herself who injects this image into Arendt’s thought in any case) and agrees with Arendt that ‘there is a very real problem...called the social and we are it’ (Ibid). Pitkin also makes some incisive and valuable comments about Arendt’s vision of the genuinely political,

\textsuperscript{118} Hence why contra to writers such as Marquez (2010) ‘the social’ is the only realm within which action can take place and have any real-world meaning.

\textsuperscript{119} See footnote 114.
beginning with her recognition that Arendt was right to see the problems in politics that she did (1998: 6) and the later stages of her book help with the task of better separating Arendt’s genuinely political from the social.

The best example for gaining insight into the alternative politics such as that envisioned by Arendt can be achieved through consideration of the Ancient Greeks. In her opinion, the Greek attitude toward politics held as its essence everything that politics could and should be, for this reason Arendt frequently used the Greek model as an explanation for her own political vision. At times, Arendt’s use of Ancient Greek politics invites circumspection of her claims on the basis that Greek life rested on a master-slave relationship and was patriarchal because women were second class citizens and therefore excluded from the political sphere. As these aspects of Ancient Greece are clearly retrograde in terms of twenty-first century social and political life, it is easy to write off Arendt’s focus on Ancient Greece as at best fanciful and at worst irrational. It is important to recognize that Arendt does not use Ancient Greece as a model society (women, slaves and foreigners were condemned to non-citizen status) but uses it as a blueprint of the political space that can be created when people are seen and respected as ‘equal yet different’ that successfully operates as a political space without ‘social’ questions. It is with this in mind that Arendt’s use of Ancient Greece should be viewed, and with this sentiment that this thesis employs it.

For Arendt, the idea of *isonomy* constitutes the absence of a hierarchy. This guaranteed a space for citizens alongside their equals. The fact that *isonomy* allows this space for equals or peers to come together makes the space profoundly *political* in Arendt’s view. What she shows, through this real world historical example, is that it entirely possible for full citizens to come together and share a space of perspectives. The fact that in Ancient Greece full

---

120 As represented by more literal interpretations of her argument about this such as that of Agamben (1998: 188).
121 This aspect of Arendt is also recognized by Isaac (1994: 159), Reinhardt (1997: 148), Martel (2010: 160) and Kang (2005: 132). The best interpretation however is given by McClure who explains that Arendt’s use of the Ancients was ‘not to expect a modern jackass to run like an Ancient horse, but to caution modern horses not to behave like jackasses’ (in Kohn 2000: 127 n4).
citizens happened to be rich men does not negate the value of the political insight that Arendt offers here. It is not far-fetched to transpose onto the modern context, as Arendt did, the widening out of the political space to allow people from ‘all walks of life’ who ‘had a taste for public happiness’ (1965: 275) to enter therein and this has been glimpsed in the French Resistance, the Hungarian Revolution and most recently the Democracia Real Ya protest in the Plaza Del Sol, Madrid (Charnock et al 2012).

The notion of the self-selection of political participants such as described by Arendt has attracted the commentary from writers such as Honig (1993), Wolin (1994), Connolly (1998), Medearis (2004) and Reinhardt who states that Arendt’s vision of politics in this way means that it is a political model where politics is done by a ‘self-selected elite’ (1997: 163) because of Arendt’s recognition that only few would engage in politics. It is hard to understand the basis upon which these theorists, particularly Reinhardt views Arendtian self-selection as questionable for democracy. Reinhardt readily admits that Arendt ‘quite plausibly…recognizes that anyone could enter politics […] although most will not’ (Ibid).

The democracy of Arendt’s vision therefore can be seen in the fact that anyone can enter politics. That not everyone will is not an issue of democracy but of the perennial issue that some are more moved politically than others. This makes the self-selected aspect of politics inevitable but in no way elitist. In any case, Arendt herself gives an answer to accusations of elitism in ‘On Revolution’, when she points out that self-selection, by definition, means self-exclusion (1965: 280) thus putting a ‘tangible limit on those involved in politics’ (1965: 275). In Arendt’s political vision, no-one is excluded from politics in any other way than by their own design. Furthermore, given her emphasis on unpredictability and spontaneity no individual’s self-exclusion need remain indefinite.

In addition to equality, Arendt’s vision of genuine politics involves plurality as a constitutive aspect of the political sphere. Arendt used Ancient Greece once again as a

---

122 Most non-governmental political action today is done by self-selection anyway by participants who self-motivate on the basis of common interest and includes people from all walks of life. Participants span the socio-economic spectrum such as pensioners and teachers, women such as ‘Mothers against Murder and Aggression’ (MAMA) and men as Father’s for Justice and people from different ethnic and religious groups such as Southall Black Sisters and the Muslim Council of Britain. Other groups span the whole spectrum of social diversity such as the Countryside Alliance. This is no different from the basis of politics that Arendt envisioned and by anybody’s standards can not be described as elite. In professional politics, however, it is very different in that many contemporary politicians and certainly those that form government, arguably self-select on the basis of private, not public interest. Contemporary politics is therefore elitist.
template to demonstrate the importance of the public sphere. In drawing further on the Ancient Greek system and adding weight to the necessity of a private/public distinction for genuine plurality, Arendt recognised that ‘the polis was distinguished from the household in that it knew only ‘equals’, whereas the household was the centre of the strictest inequality’ (1983: 32).

This underscores the necessary contrast of the darkness of the private sphere against the ‘light’ of the public sphere. Arendt reveals that we deny our very humanity by the absence of a public sphere (1998: 38). The public sphere is thus a luminous space. In creating this space where people are established as ‘equals’, one of the important pre-conditions of plurality, that is to say our human condition, is recognised and is permitted to realise it’s full political potential. Equality in Arendt’s model refers to equality between peers and not equality of condition (Arendt 1965: 30) further underpinning her point about poverty and freedom being entirely compatible. The two are compatible because in a genuinely political, that is plural sphere, inequalities of social condition aren’t the singularly necessary motivations for acting politically (in fact they need not be any motivation at all, a point fully made in the final chapter). Arendt saw that the isonomy achieved by the polis ‘by virtue of its υόμος’ makes people equal (1965: 30-31) as political participants but distinct as individuals so that perspective retains meaning. In an extension of the comments in the last section in which it was shown that Arendt lamented the destruction of the public/private distinction by social questions, it becomes clearer still how and why the separation of public and private is so very vital to Arendt’s political.

Another aspect of the genuinely political as Arendt viewed it was the importance of non-instrumentality, or means-end thinking. This is Arendt’s view that politics could be done for its own sake, literally for the joy or art of political engagement, the sharing of perspectives between peers rather than have as its sole purpose the need to resolve social issues. This element of Arendt’s political is a source of misunderstanding illustrated in accusations like ‘Arendt empties out the spaces that she takes such care to construct’ (Reinhardt 1997: 145) or that her exclusion of the social fosters the effects that she resists (Connolly 1997: 17). To ask with regard to political action ‘what is to comprise [its] substance?’(Reinhardt 1997: 163) shows that a politics conceived of in this way
immediately sets up agendas, participants, methods, routes and prohibitions for all political experience. As soon as this question is asked politics immediately assumes limits and begins to be led by something other to and very different from the sharing of perspectives of the participants therein.

For Arendt, genuine politics only arises when plural people get together without an ‘end’ in mind. In the Arendtian public sphere the speech that people engage in orbits around goals, something to be approximated toward rather than a final end to be achieved. When Arendt wrote of the lost treasure of the revolution (1963), and exemplified it with the French resistance, her ‘treasure’ was the moments when people spontaneously came together to speak and act with no vision of the future rather than anything intrinsic to revolution or resistance itself. The neglect of this aspect of Arendt’s work means that certain writers fall into the very trap of instrumental thinking that Arendt was so keen to avoid.

Arendt’s rejection of sovereignty as a political principle now takes on further clarity because it is mired in means-end rationality. The need to predict in advance where a decision or an action will arrive (this can not ever be known) and to strive to be efficient in that action or decision above all else, results in a dominated politics and a politics that dominates to give the impression of predictability and control, as outlined in the first chapter. Arendt’s vision of what politics genuinely is requires none of these things. Such a form of non-sovereign politics need not be disregarded because a solution to its unpredictability and irreversibility is found in the faculties of promises and forgiveness.

7.41: Promises and Forgiveness

‘There are a hundred ways of beginning’ (Arendt 1998: 98)

Part of the reason why Arendt is able to ‘cut off the head of the king’ in a turn away from a sovereign model of politics, is because she sees that within a community of equals certain actions permit the issues of unpredictability and irreversibility to be minimized. These political actions which Arendt argues circumvent the risks contained in spontaneous debate and action are the ‘faculties’ of promises and forgiveness:

The remedy against the irreversibility and unpredictability of the process started by acting […] is one of the potentialities of action itself […] The possible redemption from the predicament of
Forgiveness then is the answer to irreversibility and making promises is the antidote to unpredictability. The faculty of forgiveness counteracts the irreversible nature of ‘Action’ because it allows men to be freed from actions which they ‘did not, and could not, have known what [they] were doing’ (Arendt 1998: 236). Forgiveness allows them the chance to ‘undo’ errors and mistakes that might arise from Action. Arendt tells us that ‘Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would be confined to one single deed from which we would never recover’ (1998: 237).

Therefore, forgiveness allows us the space to move on from mistakes, and to reverse the seemingly irreversible. In Arendt’s terms, forgiveness brings forth yet another form of natality; we are able to begin anew.

Forgiveness is the exact opposite to vengeance. Vengeance needs to be avoided because rather than allow a new beginning ‘by putting an end to the consequences of the first misdeed’ (1998: 240) vengeance will keep ‘everybody […] bound to the process, permitting the chain reaction contained in every action to take it’s unhindered course’ (Ibid). Arendt contrasts forgiveness to revenge and argues that forgiveness is far superior because whereas revenge is a ‘natural, automatic’ (1998: 241) reaction to a wrongdoing, that can be predicted, forgiveness ‘can never be predicted, it is the only reaction that acts in an unexpected way and […] retains […] something of the original character of action’ (Ibid). Therefore, not only does forgiveness provide an answer to one of the difficult characteristics of Action, but for Arendt, it actually constitutes a political action in its own right.

‘The ability to make and keep promises’ (1998: 237) is the antidote to the unpredictable nature of Action. For Arendt, promises and the faith in the making and keeping of promises, allows each person to know where they stand so that ‘the chaotic uncertainty of the future’ (1998: 237) becomes rescued because promises ‘set up in the ocean of uncertainty […] islands of security without which not even continuity, let alone durability […] would be possible […] between men’ (1998: 237). Identity can be found and fortified for Arendt by the role of ‘the one who promises and the one who fulfils’ (Ibid). The effect
of making promises counter-balances the uncertainty of human Action in two ways. It guards against the ‘darkness of the human heart’ (1998: 244) which is as much to say the unreliability of humans: ‘men who never can guarantee today who they will be tomorrow’ (Ibid) and also the consequences of acts that will be numerous amongst people who all have an equal capacity to act (Ibid).

Unlike forgiveness which is held with circumspection, due perhaps to its theological tone, the action of making promises already has a long history in our political tradition (1998: 243). Because of this, the value of promises has long been known. Arendt exemplifies this by citing biblical covenants, the treaties of the Roman legal system and the ‘variety of contract theories since the Romans’ (1998: 243-4) as situations that have used the making and keeping of promises. The faculty of keeping promises is what lies behind Arendt’s call for the ‘mutually agreed rights’ that are necessary in the public realm. Thus Arendt explains how light can be shone over the darker side of Action. Unpredictability is remedied by promises and irreversibility by forgiveness. For her the two faculties ‘belong together’ (1998: 237) so that the negative aspects of Action can be banished from the public realm, yet the positive aspects of that unpredictability and irreversibility allowed to remain.

In pointing to the value of forgiveness and promises Arendt offers another justification for her defence of plurality. In order that they take on meaning and effect for the political world, Arendt points out how both faculties can only be realised within the plurality of people:

Both faculties […] depend on plurality […] for no-one can forgive himself and no one can feel bound by a promise made only to himself; forgiving and promising acted in solitude or isolation…can signify no more than a role played before oneself. (1998: 237)

In this respect Arendt draws a distinction between the moral code offered in the Platonic notion of rule; a code established from a relationship between me and myself (Ibid) whereas the moral code offered by the faculties of forgiveness and promises ‘rests upon experiences which nobody could ever have with himself, and, which are entirely based on the presence of others’ (1998: 238). In addition, these faculties fulfil Arendt’s desire for non-sovereign political experiences. They are ‘the only alternative to a mastery which relies on domination of one’s self and rule over others; which corresponds exactly to the
existence of a freedom which was given under the conditions of non-sovereignty’ (Arendt 1998: 244).

Arendt cautions against the misuse of ‘promises’ arguing that there are inherent problems that can stem from the misuse of this faculty. Promises as political scaffolds and moral codes use the unpredictability of human Action as it is, rather than trying to compress or annihilate it into predictable behaviour as is the case with the domination by a sovereign. For Arendt as long as promises remain ‘as isolated islands of certainty in the ocean of uncertainty’ (1998: 244) they will keep their binding power and hence their neutralising power against the unpredictability of Action. Arendt states that if the faculty of promises is misused to ‘cover the whole ground of the future and map out a whole path secured in all directions’ (1998: 244) all positive qualities inherent in the faculty of making and keeping promises will be lost.

Action then, for Arendt, is two-dimensional. Arising in its genuine form amongst plural people Action’s spontaneity and unpredictability is both that which Arendt exalts and recognises as calamitous. Those aspects of Action which Arendt terms calamitous are the same things which are sought to be negated by advocates of sovereignty. In the right condition, that is the condition of plurality, the added ‘actions’ of making and keeping promises and the willingness to forgive that depend on plurality permit the ‘calamities’ of Action to be banished. In Arendt’s analysis of it, the individual gains as much power via mutual promises, as s/he loses under sovereignty:

The mutual contract by which people bind themselves together in order to form a community is based on reciprocity and presupposes equality [....] Such an alliance gathers together the isolated strength of the allied partners and binds them into a new power by virtue of ‘free and sincere promises. (1965: 170).

Arendt’s vision of genuine politics as non-sovereign politics that must involve a community of equals can now be fully understood. Arendt’s political is a vision based not upon surrender to a sovereign in a hierarchy but on reciprocal obligation between people. This can only be achieved in a situation of political equality. Forgiveness is the opposite action to vengeance, and as such underscores Arendt’s positioning of instrumental rationality and violence firmly outside the realm of the political. Promises exist as the counterbalance to uncertainty that sovereign politics is so often justified with. That both
faculties can only function alongside their sibling actions of speech and deed mean that they too underscore the importance of plurality and by definition the rejection of hierarchy, and thus a much less dominated political experience. Alongside the previous explanations in this thesis, it is with this final understanding of Arendt’s political that it can truly be seen that she ‘decapitates the king’.

7.5: Conclusion

This chapter has shown that there already exists, within Arendt’s work, the answer to the question of whether society for Arendt is a mere mentalité or an objective reality? (Pitkin 1998: 141). For Arendt it is both, omnipresent through the ‘socialising’ attitudes of members of western society and the realities of the tools and methods of what masquerades as politics therein. One might concur that it is perhaps spurious to compare the outcome of a revolution in a new world, where space and natural resources are plentiful relative to the population and political institutions immature enough to be flexible to change, with a revolution in an overcrowded, impoverished city with an aristocratic oligarchy which had been entrenched for many hundreds of years. This isn’t the basis, however, upon which Arendt’s analysis is usually challenged. Instead it is characterized as ‘incoherent’ (Pitkin 1998: 219) and ‘logically incompatible’ (1998: 225) in relation to its multifaceted examination of poverty and misery within the two revolutions. It is worth pointing out here that within the complex canvas that constitutes the history of any set of human relations, varying explanations will simultaneously be entirely possible and logically compatible. Indeed logic and compatibility are not really applicable to socio-political history at all. Nowhere in the past will there be two situations so alike in every respect as to render their comparison easy. Arendt saw something in the French revolution that foredoomed the modern political world as she knew it, that she saw as absent from the American experience. Furthermore, she saw more evidence of the solutions to those problems in the American experience than she did in the French, and for her this is what separated the two. There is, therefore, an argument to be made that those critics who parody Arendt’s analyses of the French and American Revolutions need greater nuance in their accounts of Arendt’s argument.
There are aspects of contemporary politics, however, that pose some unanswered questions regarding Arendt’s separation of the social and political through the complex issue of necessity. It can be settled in accord with Arendt that inequality of resources is inherent to the human condition, and to recognize this is not to argue that nothing should be done about it. It is even possible to agree that pity and condescension towards this inequality ultimately does nothing toward removing it from the political agenda or social experience in any way. It is harder, however, to see how issues of necessity can be restricted solely to the private sphere. Given that economic inequality exists, not all households will have the means to deal with this. This makes scarcity and necessity economic issues, and in the context of the contemporary, western world where most states offer a minimal level of welfare to their citizens, a political issue by extension. When seen in this way, it is hard to agree with Arendt’s treatment of this issue. This objection also has merit on a global scale when comparing for example the ravages of biological necessity in the developing world.

However, the issue of welfarism also throws up a paradox because generally speaking, within neo-liberal societies issues of necessity are already confined to the private sphere. Those people dependent upon state welfare (that is a resolution from the public purse for the issues of necessity) are a minority compared to those people who are financially self-sufficient. This is one of the most basic demands that neo-liberalism makes (Kiely 2005: 63). Furthermore, the majority of households who do rely upon state welfare to survive, in all but the rarest cases, satiate the most basic demands of biological necessity to the extent that scarcity is a misnomer. So there is somewhat of an irony in that Arendt’s idea of restricting biological necessity to the private sphere is arguably already ‘solved’ between the practices of neo-liberal self-sufficiency for the majority of people and social democratic welfarism for the rest.

Given this, and in light of the evidence used in this thesis so far, the question then arises as to why modern societies are characterized so definitively by such impoverished political experiences for the majority of subjects? The answer to this must be that neo-liberalism fails to encourage the free and equal public sphere that Arendt envisaged and the reason why there still political apathy. The contemporary experience shows that even when issues

---

123 As Connolly rightly observes, nothing is more dangerous than to bracket the social question from politics (1997: 17).
of necessity are confined to the household through privatized prudentialism or welfarism, this ‘meeting of the demands of biological necessity’ is not enough by itself. There is something in the contemporary experience that is still fundamentally anti-political and independent of resolution of issues of necessity.

Although many contemporary societies that follow liberal democratic principles weakly and unintentionally partially fulfil one aspect of Arendt’s vision through the restriction of biological necessity to the household, the paradox is that every other aspect of her political vision is denied. Arendt’s treatment of the social and political highlights important issues in relation to this. It therefore makes more sense to view the Arendtian discussion of poverty and necessity as one better described as incomplete than incoherent. Arendt should have given greater clarification of the issues of necessity and poverty, particularly by distinguishing between the absolutely fundamental in relation to biological requirements and what is perceived as ‘poverty’ in a relative sense. Indeed, this would have also helped minimize the apparent incoherence of her analysis of the American and French revolutions.

Other critics of Arendt extend these ideas into a wider perspective stating that her arguments are ‘unpersuasive for what cannot be politicized and why’ (Reinhardt 1997: 155). Reinhardt extends this observation when he goes onto say that social order is crucial to politics, particularly through the ‘governance of contemporary relationships’ (1997: 158). The problem with Reinhardt’s observation of this, like others such as Grumley (1998: 65), Gordon (2001: 135), Marquez (2010a: 19, 31, 2010b: 10) is that there is a failure to admit that social order is also the limit of relationships, not least because, as Arendt saw, social order was not only the basis of the most repugnant inequalities but also the framework within which the chances to change them were circumvented. This, at least, is recognized by critics such as Connolly (1997: 16), Kang (2005: 170) Duarte (2007: 6) and Kingston (2009: 74) who echo Pitkin’s recognition that ‘society is no paper tiger’ (1998: 33). In spite of certain inaccuracies therefore, aspects of criticisms are accurate about two things in Arendt’s work. Firstly, that the social is indeed a limiting and oppressive force and one that suffocates the political. The paradox of this however is that in contemporary life it is the social upon which the political acts, therefore rendering the two inextricable from each other. Arendt’s theory, in a contemporary context at least, therefore has a serious
flaw. The need to find a resolution to this conflation is clear, but Arendt’s theory alone cannot show the way to do this.

The remainder of the thesis outlines the way that this weakness in Arendt’s theory can be overcome. The claim here is that there is a way to combat the problem that Arendt sees in the conflation of the social and political which also retains the strengths of her political insights. The solution to this exists in the work of Michel Foucault. Realistic about the problems of neo-liberal thought and contemporary social experience, Foucault recognizes the conflation of the social and political instead of attempting the impossible task of separating them. This results in his argument as the domination of the political over the social. The remainder of this thesis takes up this claim to argue that since it is the political that dominates the social, the movement beyond the separation of the social and political may be found in taking on this unhappy conflation of the two and renegotiating and reclaiming the political within its sphere of operation.

124 It is unclear why certain scholars never fully develop this. Pitkin makes unacknowledged Foucauldian adjustments to her comments on Arendt’s work (1998: 178, 179, 180, 181) and also uses Foucauldian terminology (1998: 257). Reinhardt admits the relevance of Foucault to many of the criticisms that he makes of Arendt, yet for some reason consistently underplays them (1997: 149, 155, 156).
8.0: BEYOND THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL: POLITICAL AGENTS IN THE SOCIAL REALM

8.1: Introduction

Michel Foucault makes no distinctions between the social and the political of the kind that Arendt does and it is this which characterizes the divergence between them. The social for Foucault, rather than being something needing to be separated from the political, as argued for by Arendt, is seen in Foucault’s work as the conduit of the political. For this reason examples of the social and political cannot be discussed separately as in the previous chapter on Arendt. Instead, they are considered simultaneously, through Foucault’s biopolitics. This chapter is written with this major contrast between the two theorists in mind to inform the ultimate aim of moving beyond the conception of the ‘social’ and the ‘political’ as two separate spheres.

The conflation of the two spheres in the work of Foucault, as opposed to the unrealistic and impractical separation of them in the work of Arendt, is such that he can be considered to address this major weakness in her work. To show this the social and political are sometimes referred to here in the Arendtian sense that is as two separate and distinct spheres. As this thesis has already shown, Foucault’s understanding and challenging of the political as it works on and through the social, and the ways in which this argument still has relevance today, points to the way that the social and political can be transcended in a modern day context. This is because it is the ultimate contention of this thesis that in line with Foucault, and contra Arendt, that as many repressions on people as possible should be challenged irrespective of where in the traditional social/political/economic divide they are situated.

8.2: The Foucauldian Importance of Economy

‘[...] the theory of wealth is linked throughout to politics’ (Foucault 1997: 205)

In theorizing the social and the political, the very first moment that Foucault’s divergence from Arendt can be encountered, is via the emphasis that he places on the economy as the inescapable link between the two. Rather than viewing the social as a colonizing entity

---

which has subsumed and destroyed genuine politics through the concerns of economic
‘housekeeping’, Foucault views the economic as the field of governmental concern which
has and does allow the art of governementality to become concerned with and influential
upon individuals’ everyday lives or what is more usually called the ‘social’. In this sense
Foucault can be argued to present the economic sphere as a link between the social and the
extent to which people are (dis)empowered. Foucault presents this in more passive terms
than Arendt, so whereas Arendt sees the ‘social’ in an almost parasitic sense, debilitating
the political, Foucault views it as an area of governmental concern that has evolved
throughout the haphazard course of history to become a bridge between the two. Despite
this more passive account of the economic as the link between the social and political, it
nonetheless remains for Foucault, a link which assists in the most potent governmental
intervention(s).

In the recent English publication of his lecture series of 1977-78 and 1978-79 from the
Collège De France (Foucault 2004), Foucault elaborates on this claim in the genealogy (ies)
of the eighteenth century rise in the economic disciplinary techniques of European
mercantilists and physiocrats through to the German ordoliberalists of the Weimar republic
and American liberalism. He includes in these lectures an examination of the economic
issues of scarcity and the fluctuating price of grain, issues of production, imports and the
behaviour of the consumer and producer to name a few. Foucault points out that all of
these early economic concerns, which are driven by concern over the wealth of the state,
take place simultaneously with legal prohibitions. On these pivots therefore, the issues of
economic security for the state begin to become entwined with the behaviour of individuals.
This concern is furthered in the development of the concept of population and as a result
the centralized concerns for the economic security of that population as an asset of the state.
Economic security applies therefore in both a singular and a collective sense.

Foucault’s argument for the tripartite relationship between liberalism’s economic concerns,
the behaviour and discipline of individuals and the concept of population, identifies how

126 See for example the Bio-Politics lecture of the 18th January, 1978 (Foucault 2004)
127 Foucault exemplifies this in the federal interventionism of the FDR administration as well as those of
Truman, Kennedy and Johnson and saw these as connected via the influence of Keynes. See the lecture of the
31st January, 1979 (Foucault 2004)
128 See the Bio-Politics lecture series, particularly the lecture of the 1st February 1978 (Foucault 2004)
contemporary neo-liberalism is inextricably tied to modern, western life in three ways. In the first of these ways, modern liberalism continues to be occupied with issues of economic security. In this way modern liberalism is nothing more than ‘the reactivation of old, second hand liberal theories’ (Foucault 2004: 130) such as those of Locke for example. Additionally, the connection with legal prohibition also continues into modern liberal practices. This leads Foucault to assert that ‘economic freedom…and disciplinary techniques are completely bound up with one another’ (2004: 67). This observation has implications for the far reaching stretch of the disciplinary techniques of the art of governmentality that contemporary forms of liberalism give rise to and have already been exemplified in earlier chapters.

The genealogy of liberalism outlined in the 1977-79 lectures allows the identification of the exact moment that state policy is ‘no longer […] simply indexed to the problem of the material investment of physical capital’ (2004: 232). In addition to the investment in physical capital the art of liberal governmentality becomes ‘focused […] precisely on one of the things that the West can modify most easily, and that is the form of investment in human capital’ (Ibid)

The above points foretell the second and third ways that neo-liberalism becomes tied to modern life through economic concerns. It is within the development of the concept of human capital that economics through the market thus becomes ‘the general index in which one must place the rule for defining all governmental action’ (2004: 121) which is the second way that Foucault sees liberal ideology as inextricably tied to modern, western life. This is something that Foucault identifies as the sociological aspect to neo-liberalism (2004: 130) which is seen through its concern to establish strictly market relations in society and which gives rise to the modern day phenomena that is identified by Foucault as ‘the social market economy’ (2004: 144). This gives grounding to his conclusion that there is only one true and fundamental social policy; that of economic growth (2004: 144).

The third and final field where Foucault sees the tie between neo-liberalism and western life taking place is in political terms (2004: 130). For him this is ‘no more than a cover for a generalized administrative intervention by a state which is all the more profound for being insidious and hidden’ (Ibid). Western, contemporary liberalism therefore becomes
something more than the classical liberalism of Locke or Rousseau, and this something more makes it something new and worthy of different considerations; something where ‘more is at stake’. (Foucault 2004: 117). Foucault termed this something more which was at stake ‘Biopolitics’ and he gave this term as the title of the 1978-79 series of lectures (2004).

The Biopolitics lectures that trace the genealogy of the art of liberal governmentality into the modern, western world show how liberal doctrine becomes enmeshed as a set of practices which find a field of discipline affecting each of the economic, social and political aspects of everyday western life. Bio-politics in general and these lectures in particular mark a seminal moment in two ways given the focus of this chapter. Firstly they chart, with historical demonstrations such as seventeenth and eighteenth century mercantilism (Foucault 2004: 5) or the New Deal programme of FDR and subsequent Democrat presidents (2004: 79) the genealogy of the practices and techniques of the modern, western liberalism that can also be identified in the contemporary western world and secondly, and just as importantly for this thesis, it marks the point where concern for economic security spills out into the social and political elements of everyday life^{129}. By the time Foucault completes his lectures on biopolitics, he has demonstrated how modern liberalism is inextricably tied together with the socio-political through the field of economics (2004: 103-105)^{130}, naming the new field of governmentality ‘society, economy, population, security and freedom (2007: 354). In this moment Foucault demonstrates in full distinction to the conclusions of Arendt, that it is not the social that dominates the political in modern life, but to borrow the Arendtian separation, it is the political that dominates the social.

8.3: Biopolitics: Political Domination Throughout Society

‘Power is not a commodity, a position, a prize, or a plot: it is the operation of the political technologies throughout the social body’ (Foucault 1994: 185)

In bringing forth the way(s) in which Foucault radically diverges from Arendt on the relationship between the political and the social it is necessary to briefly revisit some of the previous aspects of Foucault pointed out in this thesis. The difference in this chapter however is not to repeat these things under the guise of issues of sovereignty, or plurality or

^{129} Duarte, in an Agambenian vein, also recognises the ‘modern liberal paradox of life as supreme good combined with the degradation of life’ (2007: 7).

^{130} See the lectures of the 31st January and the 7th February, 1979 (Foucault, 2004)
the instrumental reason bound up in all too familiar modern day experience of bureaucracy, but to see them now through the lenses of what is traditionally cast as ‘politics’, ‘society’ and ‘economics’ so that their contribution to the differing levels of empowerment within everyday life through the art of governmentality can be fully understood and exemplified.

Issues of disempowerment are there from the very beginning of the practice identified by Foucault as governmentality. On the basis that it is people that are governed (Foucault 2007: 122, my emphasis), political practice becomes an art of government that evolves to realise the social as its target. It has already been shown that Foucault identifies the earliest example where this crossover to the social happens is in the governance of the poor. Poverty then becomes a very specific application of politics in the social realm. The visitor of the poor provides aid to the pauper, and at the same time gathers information about the pauper’s health, habits, lifestyle in order to best administer aid, comfort, cure; in short to ‘manage’ poverty. What the poor therefore represent in terms of the more general encroachment of the political into the social, they also represent more specifically as the beginnings of political concerns over ‘life’, the beginnings of biopolitics.

This coincides with the arrival into everyday consciousness of the political maxim that to govern effectively means to govern oneself and one’s family well. This practice eventually moves wider than but not away from poverty to take in more and more aspects of social life to the point that the people who must be governed fear being judged and adjust their behaviour to meet approved behavioural codes. Everyday lives thus become the subject and object of concerns of government. Once again, the art of governmentality is concerned with life, but what really drives this political impetus forward is not the desire to eradicate poverty, or disease or to ensure that all families behave in a way befitting a king but a political impetus that is fully focused on maximizing the economy of those people who are governed.

This thesis has already explained how economy is the field of intervention of governmental rationality. Foucault’s genealogy of liberalism fully explains the history and the role of economics in this. This is because new principles introduce themselves into the attempt to establish continuity in legitimizing the position and the power of the sovereign. These principles are not ones of government however, but economic ones identified by Foucault
as beginning with the early practice of mercantilism and which evolve and expand to feature those economic questions of the kind outlined earlier in this chapter.

Thus, Foucault claims that a form of political practice arises where every aspect of individual ‘life’ in the widest sense of the term falls under the radar of government and becomes biopolitical. Throughout his sociological genealogies of prisons, hospitals and sexuality, Foucault gave many real world examples of how the biopolitical practice of governmentality could be seen. This focus on the individual can be illustrated nowhere better than the place of the ‘body’ as a biopolitical target. Foucault wrote that ‘the body is a biopolitical reality; medicine is a biopolitical strategy’ (1994: 137) and he offered examples of where the biopolitical focus on the body could be seen. He once described Swedish society as over-medicalized and protected and where subtle and clever mechanisms mitigated social dangers. He also saw Polish society as a society with different types of mechanisms of confinement (1994: 258). Foucault went on to add that both medicalizing and confining societies ‘would become an obsession for western society’ (Ibid)\(^\text{131}\). To link these examples to contemporary western society this observation holds merit given that issues of crime and punishment by confinement still occupy prominence on the liberal political agenda. In 2001 Tony Blair promised to be ‘tough on crime’ (in Stephens 2004: 245) which led to a rise in the prison population to ‘record levels’ (Ibid). This claim is supported sociologically through prison overcrowding as an ever increasing UK phenomenon\(^\text{132}\). This is coupled with the consistent medicalization of perceived ‘social dangers’ such as children’s behaviour, drug abuse, smoking addiction, teenage pregnancies and childbirth in general, under-age sex and euthanasia. All of these perceived dangers not

\(^{131}\) The examples of Sweden and Poland are based on Foucault’s personal experiences and his subjective interpretations of these countries. As such there is no reliable way to validate the accuracy of this claim. However the familiarity of the sociological prominence of both medicalization and confinement (see note 143 of this thesis) as political issues to those of us in other European societies suggests something noteworthy in Foucault’s prediction based on these experiences.

\(^{132}\) Skellington (2011: 11) states that the 1993 UK prison population was 44,268 and by 2010 was 85,085. With a comparable population size to the UK, France’s prison population is 59,655 (Ibid). The ONS identifies a steady rise of 25,000 people in the UK prison population between 1990 and 2003. The rate of imprisonment in England and Wales is the highest in Western Europe (178 per 100,000 people), which is higher than Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary (Skellington 2011: 14). HMP service supports this trend quoting the 2004 prison population at 74,777 rising to 85,097 by 2010. Garside (2010) supports this claim whilst also stating a corresponding decline in crimes from 18.5 million in 1993 to 10.7 million in 2008/09. This trend is also reflected in data from the Howard League for Penal Reform (July 2010). Denscombe (1998, 2002, 2003) adds that the Home Office predicts that the UK prison population may reach 100,000 by the end of the decade, a rise of over 50% (in Lawson et al 2010: 283).
only demonstrate the prevalence of this zeal in medicalizing and confining generally speaking, but also the contemporary governmental practice of ‘the body’ as the target of biopolitics. Foucault points out that ‘society’s control over individuals was accomplished not only through consciousness or ideology but also in the body and with the body. For capitalist society, it was biopolitics, the biological, the somatic, the corporeal that mattered more than anything else’ (1994: 137)

The art of governmentality is not just a form of politics that dominates the social through behaviours, choices and lifestyles but this rationality of government becomes one that crystallizes in a form of politics that is literally focused on the bodies of individuals themselves and targets such biological situations as gestation, childbirth and child development, death and bodily pleasures. Foucault expands therefore outside the specific institution of medicine, psychiatry, prisons, and sexuality to identify a ‘global, totalizing institution that is [...] the state (2007: 118). What converges therefore in Foucault’s concept of biopolitics is both his macro-analysis of the art of the governmentality of the state and also the specific instances of micro-power where that biopolitics focuses. There is no ‘space’ between these two Foucauldian moments:

[...] there is not a sort of break between the level of micro-power and the level of macro-power and that talking about one does not exclude talking about the other. In actual fact, an analysis in terms of micro-powers comes back without any difficulty to the analysis of problems like those of government and the state. (Foucault 2007: 358)

Thus, with the arrival of biopolitics also comes the recognition that power relations have come more and more under state control (Foucault 1994: 345), despite their dispersal across many social sites. Therefore for Foucault modern ‘government is more than sovereignty, it is supplementary in relation to sovereignty, and it is something other than the pastorate (2007: 237). Biopolitical power is ‘the power that’s exercised through the whole social body, through extremely different channels, forms and institutions’ (1994: 283) and which forms ‘the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy’ (2007: 1) but also whereby the three spheres of political, social and economic cease to be distinguishable from one another in modern, western life. This interpretation sets up a very interesting and difficult question, in

133 This makes Grumley’s claim of the logic of politics being different to that of self-government (1998: 65) one that is difficult to agree with in the contemporary western political context.
relation to the resolution that Arendt gave for the problems of modern, western society. Foucault’s explicit articulation of this interesting and difficult question can be found in his view of civil society.

Foucault described civil society as something that became ‘quickly called society’ (1994: 296) and later became understood as ‘nation’ (Ibid). He argued that civil society was not a philosophical idea but a concept and correlate of a technology of government, the rational measure of which must be juridically pegged to an economy (2004: 296). This was important for Foucault because he saw politics and the economy as ‘things that do not exist and yet which are inscribed in reality and fall under a regime of truth dividing the true and the false’ (2004: 20).

Further to this recognition Foucault asked ‘With what must the state concern itself? (2007: 350). Foucault posited that in addition to the concern with economics the principle concern for governmentality is the theory of civil society (2004: 286, 295). He further supported this idea by concluding that the answer to this question was not that the state concerns itself with ‘a primitive nature as it were’ or even ‘a set of subjects indefinitely subject to a sovereign will and submissive to its requirements’ (2007: 350) but that ‘the state has responsibility for a society, a civil society, and the state must see to the management of this civil society’ (Ibid). This recognition, in addition to all of those things outlined above, led Foucault to the assertion that ‘the distinction between state and civil society can be seen as a form of schematization characteristic of a particular technology of government’ (1994b: 75). In this moment Foucault asserts the complete opposite to Arendt, in that he sees the political art of governmentality dominating the social. However in addition to this contrasting conclusion with Arendt, he diverges not only descriptively from her, but also by stating the opposite in terms of where resolution might be found.

Arendt recommended that the social and the political be separated for genuine politics to flourish under the conditions of plurality. Foucault explicitly rejects this notion, firstly through rejection of the tradition upon which it is based ‘I think that the theoretical opposition between state and civil society , on which political theory has been laboring for hundred and fifty years, is not very productive’ (Foucault 1994: 290) and also for the disempowerment of society that this implies. On this basis therefore, Foucault indirectly
makes an important criticism of Arendt’s argument for the separation of the social and the political, and also gives an unwitting suggestion as to how this major weakness might be addressed. In seeing the separation of the state and civil society as necessarily disempowering for society, there is the concomitant recognition that pervades all of Foucault’s work that society and the social are sites of political power(s). This means that rather than separating the ‘social’ from ‘politics’ in order to rescue genuine politics, as is argued by Arendt, Foucault suggests that political power can be found, fought and reclaimed in the sphere in which disempowerment operates which is the Arendtian ‘social’. This idea is elaborated in the remainder of this chapter and the remainder of the thesis.

Firstly, however, it is necessary to make some comments explaining the paradoxes that Foucault identifies in neo-liberalism and the current climate that characterizes contemporary politics. This is so that the remainder of the chapter and the conclusion of the thesis can be justified through the context of the western political experience of today.

8.4: The Paradoxes of Neo-Liberalism

In examining Foucault’s view of neo-liberalism several paradoxes can be identified. The first paradox of neo-liberalism that is outlined is in the different but simultaneous forms that it occupies. Foucault has identified liberalism as both a regulative scheme of government practice and as the theme of a sometimes radical opposition (1994b: 75).

Both of these aspects are the reason for liberalism’s ‘polymorphism and its recurrences’ (Foucault 1994b: 75). Foucault firstly shows us that neo-liberalism has been a tool for criticizing the reality of a previous governmentality that one tries to shed, and also secondly, a current governmentality that one attempts to reform and rationalize by stripping it down (Ibid). There is a tension in neo-liberalism, therefore, that it has been different things at different times. Foucault encapsulates these paradoxes in defining liberalism as [a] ‘new type of calculation that consists in saying and telling government: I accept, wish, plan and calculate that all this should be left alone’ (2004: 20) or ‘I am going to produce what

---

134 Examples of the radical opposition of liberalism in addition to those already presented in this thesis are the American Revolution’s opposition to unjust British rule and taxation epitomised in Henry’s 1775 declaration to be given ‘liberty or death’ (Black 2001), Emmeline Pankhurst’s Suffragette movement at the turn of the twentieth century (see Unwin 2008: 437, Purvis 2011: 87), Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 economic liberalisation of Communist China, the 1968 student protests seen in Mexico City, Bangkok, Paris and Chicago (in Harvey, 2007: 1-5) and most recently elements of the Arab Spring have been identified as ‘liberal’ (Guardian, 22nd March, 2011). Liberalism as opposition is also recognised by Hobhouse (1964: 14).
you need to be free’ (2004: 63). With these comments Foucault hints at the most modern and familiar liberalism of today being a particular type of governmentality, one which is also a ‘governmentality that one opposes and whose abuses one tries to limit’ (1994b: 175).

This idea is qualified in greater detail when he explains that ‘liberal rationalization starts from the assumption that government cannot be its own end’. (1994b: 74). It is ‘a way of doing things – a practice - oriented toward objectives and regulating itself by means of sustained reflection’ (Ibid). As has been shown these objectives are located firmly in the social realm due to economic motivations. The genealogy of this shows up the second paradox of modern liberalism in that it is both the continuation of old forms of concern to maximize the sovereign’s wealth whilst at the same time being also about something else; it is yet at one and the same time something that needs to be grasped in its singularity (2004: 130). The singularity of modern neo-liberalism is identified as ‘the overall exercise of political power being modelled on the principles of a market economy’ (Foucault 2004: 131); notions such as the body as a unit of human capital, production and consumption, and the social discipline(s) that constitute biopolitics are now a familiar discourse within modern governmental rhetoric, example phrases of which include economic security, efficiency and risk. Therefore modern liberalism is seen by Foucault not only as evolving from the assumptions, techniques and practices of various liberal moments throughout history but also as being characterised by a concern with human capital that means it also encroaches into numerous aspects of everyday life. The second paradox in modern liberalism is that it is at one and the same time both ‘old’ and something singular making it a ‘rationalization that obeys – this is its specificity – the internal rule of maximum economy’ (1994b: 74). This specific concern with maximum economy means a maximum economy in and from politics, economics and society. This means that the new art of liberal governmentality firmly and inextricably ties the social, political and economic spheres together.

The firm connection that is achieved between politics, economics and society by the modern neo-liberal art of governmentality often leads, as shown by examples in this thesis, to a form of government whereby individuals are governed ‘by minimum rather than maximum’ which Foucault sees as ‘the perfection of Raison d’Etat’ (2004: 28). This gives
rise to another paradox within neo-liberalism because ‘the question of the frugality of government is indeed the question of liberalism’ (2004: 29). This relates back to the domination of the political over society, through the pastoralising techniques of normalization and the political management of life that is biopolitics. The art of governmentality is an art whereby the population governs itself, through the bio-policies of the state. In this paradox, therefore, the state is both absent due to individuals ‘good’ government of themselves and omnipresent in the need to renew biopolitical mandates. This leads Foucault to conclude that the third paradox of neo-liberalism is that ‘the state is at once that which exists, but which does not yet exist enough’ (2004: 4).

Foucault’s attention to neo-liberalism as a historically singular art of governmentality does more than just point out its incoherence. In tracing this genealogy, he points out many problems that still need to be solved, and the relevance that his work holds for today. He observes that a continuing interest in this form of governing is necessary ‘because the problem of liberalism arises for us in our immediate and concrete actuality’ (2004: 22).

Moreover, what is required to be thought about now is the way in which the specific problems of life and population were raised within a technology of government which without always having been liberal…was always haunted since the end of the eighteenth century by liberalism’s questions. (1994b: 79)

The remainder of this chapter looks at the way that the specific technology of contemporary western government problematizes, regulates and disciplines everyday lives and how this might begin to be challenged using Foucault’s idea of politics as an ethics. In examining this idea, it will be shown that politics as an ethics recognizes the more accurate contemporary situation of the domination of everyday lives by the disempowering practices of liberal governmentality. In this respect politics as an ethics can be considered to circumvent and therefore address the weakness with Arendt’s theory that impractically and therefore unrealistically calls for the separation of the social and the political. However, discussing politics as an ethics has even greater merit for this thesis in that by looking toward this as a way in which contemporary forms of disempowerment can be challenged, it also fulfils the demand to transcend the Arendtian social and political division. This move must begin with an understanding of the problems that Foucault saw as inherent in modern political thinking.
8.5: The Problems with Politics Today

‘[...] we are suffering from inadequate means for thinking about everything that is happening’ (Foucault 1994b: 325)

For Foucault the general mechanisms of power in our society affect societal relations at several levels. They infect ‘human relationships [...] verbal communication [...] amorous, institutional or economic relationships (1994b: 292) and create ‘relationships in which one person tried to control the conduct of others ‘(Ibid). The perceived fatalism of the operations of power that exist in western societies can be exemplified in the several ways outlined elsewhere this thesis. One such way is the notion of ‘society’ as a unified and homogenous whole. Foucault labels this idea ‘utopian’, linking its origins to the ‘highly individualised’ history of western capitalism. From this, he argues, comes the conclusion that ‘the least we can expect of experiences, actions and strategies is that they take into account the ‘the whole of society’ (1998: 233). However, this notion is flawed because ‘the whole of society is precisely that which should not be considered except as something to be destroyed. And then we can only hope that it will never exist again’ (Ibid). In this very specific way, the claims of Foucault momentarily resonate again with the observations of Arendt.

The limits that a fatalistic understanding of existing forms of power places on the possibilities of empowerment allows governmental techniques and practices to rapidly transform into social and political ‘truths’. This is something that Foucault not only argued should not be accepted, but also something that should be actively resisted. The practices and techniques of modern, western political rationality played out over and within society emerge as truths that belie the fact that ‘these power relations are mobile, they can be modified, they are not fixed once and for all’ (1994b: 292). Foucault condemns the history of political thinking for leading western humanity into this catastrophe stating that ‘none of the grand discourses that have been pronounced on the subject of society are convincing enough for us to rely on’ (1994: 285). He goes on to qualify this by stating that:

Centuries have convinced us that between our personal ethics, everyday life and the social, political and economic structures there were analytical relations and that we couldn’t change anything [...] without ruining our economy and democracy and so on. (in Rabinow 1991: 350)
Thus, some of the possible answers for the political and social stagnation of western societies reside in the realization that the dominations of everyday lives are reversible. On these bases, a very real new approach is needed.

Foucault qualifies that it is not a question of seeking the removal of all power relations from society, pointing out that this is impossible (1994: 343), but that it is vitally important to recognize that the dominations that do exist are not necessary, or inevitable or that they cannot be subverted (Ibid). What the new social, economic and political obligation requires is not the removal of power relations but their resistance (1994: 344). Where political maxims such as there will ‘always be governments, the state will always be there and there is no hope of having done with it’ (2007: 355) are still accepted there needs to be a much more widespread and much more multi-faceted subjection of such maxims to a consistently renewed political obligation of agonistic resistance. Foucault describes the result of such a re-conceptualisation of what is politically and socially acceptable as ‘a society transparent to itself’ (2007: 357).

Foucault’s work in this area enlightens further the call that he makes to understand the oppressive aspects of power, but more importantly the creative aspects of it. He shows us that ‘power relationships are not something […] bad […]that we have to break free of’ (1994b: 298) but that what is needed is a re-conception of the political played out in a radically different obligation amongst, between and from people within their everyday lives. What is needed is something innovative, which isn’t known about as yet and therefore that doesn’t yet exist, a destruction that is at one and the same time a creation (1994: 275). Foucault was unequivocal on this matter, recognizing it as ‘the political task that is inherent in all social existence’ (1994: 343)

The remainder of this chapter explains the possibilities that Foucault highlighted for the empowerment of everyday lives created by this problem and applies it to those contemporary dominations such as constrictive interactions with the bureaucracy surrounding social benefits, the corporeal subjection of health advice or the over proliferation of privatized prudentialism. This is an obligation which doesn’t seek the removal of power from society but its reconfiguration via a celebration of the mobility and changeability of power relationships through the non-acceptance and active resistance of
the domination of everyday lives. Foucault gave this proposal the specific label of ‘politics as an ethics’ (in Rabinow 1991: 375). What will be shown is that rather than bringing forth ‘catastrophe’ in the contemporary western context, Foucault’s ‘politics as an ethics’ not only permits a re-thinking of the relationship between the social and political by recognizing that in the daily lives of most people the two are almost inseparable, and in doing so fulfil the proscription that Arendt set out for modern politics but also sketches out a starting point for many potential reversals of the domination of social issues by political means.

Kingston claims that a turn toward Foucault is not political (2009: 117). This thesis however distinguishes itself from this by arguing that a turn towards Foucault is political and correctly so given contemporary western life. Moreover, by promoting the resistance of such dominations of society through individuals’ everyday lives, this thesis fulfils its overarching aim to attempt the transcendence of the traditional separation of the social and political spheres via an abandonment of those categories that misleadingly imply that society and politics can be conceived of and dealt with in distinction to one another. To explain the way that this thesis applies Foucault’s politics as an ethics, that is as something that preserves what is valuable in Arendt, it is necessary to explore Foucault’s particular understanding of ‘ethics’.

8.6: Foucault and Ethics

‘[…] ethics is a practice, ethos is a manner of being’ (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 377)

In a 1984 interview Foucault alluded to the problem with the history of political thinking. When asked to clarify whether a previous answer of his referred to a process of liberation, he replied that he was suspicious of the idea of a process of liberation because it implied that there is an underlying base or nature to humans which remains hidden until conditions coincide to release it (1994b: 282). The problem with this understanding, Foucault explained, was that it implies that ‘all that is required is to break […] repressive deadlocks and man will be reconciled with himself’ (Ibid). Foucault recognized that history has

---

shown the situation of liberation in the strictest sense exemplified by him as the liberation of colonized peoples but, he reasoned, such moments of liberation from immediate and overt repressions do not translate into liberation in the widest sense by allowing, in his words, ‘the capability for defining all the practical forms of freedom’ (1994b: 283). What these points show is that Foucault took a very definite and radical turn away from seeing freedom as something ‘concealed’ which needs to be ‘revealed’ and which in that moment of liberation humans become complete because they are reconciled with a previously enslaved self (Ibid).

Instead, Foucault argued, freedom could be created via ‘thought’. Thought, according to Foucault, ‘must be analyzed in each habit of speaking, doing and behaving in which the individual appears and acts as subject conscious of himself and others’ (in Rabinow 1991: 335). The importance of this could not be understated for him. In applying thought to internalized habits of behaviour and conduct it would become the ‘basis for accepting or refusing rules’ (1994b: 200). In this way thought and thinking ‘constitutes human beings as social and juridical subjects’ and most vitally becomes ‘what establishes the relation with oneself and with others’ (Ibid). In this suggestion, Foucault proposes an alternative to the idea of processes of liberation allowing the human individual reconciliation with the true self. In a semi-Arendtian vein, Foucault intimates that the relation with the self is created in the same moment as the relation with others. The relation of the self with the self, and the relation of the self with others is very specific according to Foucault. The application of thought and thinking to the resistance of internalized norms, behaviours and ideas means that ‘a variety of subjects in the play of false and true’ are established (in Rabinow 1991: 334). The human becomes ‘a subject of learning’ (Ibid). The basis of the refusal of rules, establishes a relation with oneself and with others’ and this, in Foucault’s argument, creates the human being as an ethical subject (in Rabinow 1991: 334, 1994b: 200).

Foucault asked ‘What is ethics if not a practice of freedom, the conscious practice of freedom?’(1994b: 284) answering that ‘ethics is the considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection’ (Ibid). Foucault is at pains to point out that his use of the term ‘ethics’ is not meant in a prescriptive or moralizing sense. In both an interview with Stephen Riggins (1994b: 131) and with F. Ringelheim (1983) he declared that he had
‘always made a point of not playing the role of the prophetic intellectual who tells people what they ought to do […] and prescribes a conceptual framework for them’ (1994: 384). However, somewhat at odds with this declaration, he also said, in relation to the modern, western situation, that what people have to do today is make ‘the ethicopolitical choice […] every day […] to determine which is the main danger’ (in Rabinow 1991: 343) from the multitude of threats to empowerment which this thesis has highlighted such as the repressions by sovereign politics, the domination of the plural condition and the instrumentality to which social and economic life is continually subjected. However, further dangers exist such as the disappearance of the maxim and practice to take ‘care of oneself’. This loss has profound implications that not only facilitate the governmental domination of many lives but also stifle the resistance to it.

8.61: Epimeleia Heautou\textsuperscript{136}: The Inversion of Power\textsuperscript{137} via Care of the Self

In his analysis of the modern situation Foucault observes that ‘Know thyself has eclipsed care for thyself, care of the self has become absorbed into know thyself’ (1994b: xxiv, 234, 226). For Foucault, the disappearance of the ethic of caring for the self contributed to the techniques of the art of governmentality because the rise of the maxim to know oneself has ‘the explicit/implicit context to ‘govern oneself’ […] oneself becomes the object of actions, the domain in which [self-government is] brought to bear’ (Ibid). Knowing the self ‘allows individuals to effect by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, their own souls, their own thoughts, their own conduct, and this is in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves and to attain a ‘certain’ state of perfection, happiness, purity, supernatural power called the technologies of the self’ (1994b: 177).

Because this involves a simultaneous loss of the ethic to care for the self, the field of experience for the individual is narrowed and so too are the ways in which governmentality might be resisted. Taken together, the increase of technologies of the self at the expense of caring for the self further compounds the disempowerment of individuals. For these reasons, Foucault makes the renaissance of the ethic to care for oneself pivotal in his argument for the creation of freedom through thought. By care of the self Foucault means a

\textsuperscript{136} Foucault, (in Rabinow 1991: 359)
\textsuperscript{137} Foucault (1994b: 288)
turn back toward the self ‘being sufficient to oneself, profiting by and enjoying oneself’ (in Rabinow 1991: 365). The return towards care by the self by the self can form, Foucault argues, a starting point for change in each of the habits of speaking, doing and behaving and in which the individual appears and acts as subject conscious of the self. In this way new power relations begin to be created and old ones left behind, which can be seen as the beginning of resistance. Foucault states that an ethic to care for the self is not the same thing as what he terms the ‘Californian cult of the self’ which means ‘to discover ones true self through psychoanalysis’ (in Rabinow 1991: 362). For Foucault, the Californian cult of the self is the modern west’s equivalent of the nineteenth century maxim ‘tell me your desires and I’ll tell you who you are’ (1994b: 128). In other words, the Californian cult of the self is an exercise in knowing. This makes it an extension of the political tools that dominate social lives and as such should not be confused with caring for the self.

Foucault’s claim for a return to greater care of the self is not without its critics. Kathrin Braun terms Foucault’s concept of self-transformation ‘self-centred and philosophical’ (2007: 20)\(^{138}\). However, Foucault answers charges resembling this by stating that care toward the self doesn’t mean being interested in oneself nor in having a tendency to self-attachment or self-fascination’ (in Rabinow 1991: 359). Most importantly, he has also explained that it doesn’t mean ‘a form of self-love […] selfishness in contradiction to care of others’ (1994b: 285)\(^{139}\).

Inaccurate interpretations of care of the self as selfish and ignorant of others such as is represented by writers like Braun are simply reflective of Christian morality in the criticism of ‘philosophical’ and the Californian cult of the self in the criticism of being ‘self-centred’. Foucault explains that it is ‘only a bastion of Christianity that says that care of the self is immoral and which requires a moral renunciation’ (1994b: 228, 282, 285). For Foucault, therefore, the ‘care of the self is ethically prior in the sense that it is ontologically prior’ (1994b: 287). On this understanding, it appears as if Foucault may be in complete divergence to Arendt in placing the ‘self’ before ‘others’. However, it is worth considering

\(^{139}\) The symbiosis between self and other in Foucault’s work is also recognised by others such as Gordon (2001), Kang (2005), Gros (2005), Duarte (2007) Kingston (2009) and Hardt (2010).
Foucault’s claims about this a little further to explore the idea that there may actually be a parallel between these two thinkers on this point.

Foucault frequently and clearly rejects outright any interpretations of care for the self as negligent towards others. He shows in his work how thought exercised through care for the self creates a subject conscious of others and therefore how a relationship with them can be established. This is because the ethos of freedom that is contained in the care for the self ‘allows one to engage in interpersonal relationships, in listening carefully to guides, counsellors, friends’ (Foucault 1994b: 287). It therefore carries with it a pluralist dimension in terms of the ‘unity of community’ (Ibid). For Foucault therefore the issue of others is ever present in the care for the self (Ibid); there exists within this ethic the postulate that those who care for themselves ‘by the same token would be able to conduct themselves properly in relation to others and with others’ (1994b: 287).

As has been shown Arendt sees plurality as the ontological condition of humankind because plurality offers the space for the sharing and understanding of viewpoints between distinct yet equal people. Only in this ‘world’ do our distinct viewpoints have meaning, the condition par quam for all political life. The consequence of exile from this world is the entire loss of the ‘self’ because identity cannot be confirmed without the company of trusting and trustworthy distinct equals. Thus, for Arendt the self depends on the existence of others and for others to have meaning to and for us plurality is needed. The two are symbiotic.

Foucault’s comments about care of the self parallel this idea rather than diverge from it. In his recognition of the importance of caring for oneself as opposed to knowing oneself, Foucault underlines the importance of the self for meaningful relationships with others, or to make the point Arendtian, the sine qua non to plurality of the distinct identity of the self which does not exclude plurality but has it immanent to it. He too describes a symbiotic relationship between the two where lack of care for the self degrades the ability to form relationships with others that in turn narrow the individuals’ field of experience and by extension the potential to reclaim and resist power. Therefore, Foucault’s care of the self not only permits care for others, it also implies it. The parallel between Arendt and Foucault in their observations of the self and others is that there is political and social
sufficiency, profit and enjoyment from this symbiosis. There is therefore an undeniable pluralistic element in Foucault’s care for the self that critics such as Braun neglect; the *epimeleia tonallon*\(^{140}\) within the *epimeleia heautou*\(^{141}\) (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 359) that preserves something valuable about Arendt.

Braun also criticizes Foucault’s argument for the care of the self because she also doubts how it can ‘point to an alternative conception of politics, one that enables us not only to analyse, but to overcome politics’ (2007: 20). Braun never fully establishes quite why she sees it as the case that politics needs to be overcome. It is far more accurate to argue that it is the political oppressions conducted upon everyday lives that need to be overcome, rather than politics itself, which is an unrealistic aim and not reflective of Foucault’s project in any case. In contrast to claims such as Braun’s and in parallel with the claims of this thesis, writers such as Dolan recognize and point out the need for ‘more not less politics’ (2005: 373). Connolly (1997) and Kingston (2009) recognise the value of Care of the Self, something which is missed in the work of scholars such as Marquez (2010: 21, 2010a: 11) in the haste to rescue Arendt. Hardt (2010: 160) explains that Foucault did not have time to fully develop his ideas about this.

Care of the self therefore ‘is an inversion of power’ (Foucault 1994b: 288) and this inversion of power occurs in more than one way. Firstly care for the self stands in resistance to the modern technique of governmentality to ‘know oneself’ and therefore resists the self-government immanent to this. Thus, contemporary power begins to be inverted through resistance of knowing oneself. The beginning of resistance that this action marks out by definition constitutes an exercise of freedom. This exercise of freedom is extended through care of the self through changing habits of speech, action and thought. Secondly, care of the self considers others in the same moment that the self is considered and in doing so subverts the isolating technique of the art of governmentality outlined elsewhere in this thesis. Care of the self is also the raising of awareness of the self and through this strengthens the potential for the relationships with others and also strengthens the connections in those relationships themselves. This further constitutes an exercise of

---

\(^{140}\) Care of others

\(^{141}\) Care of the self
freedom in an Arendtian sense through i) the plural dimension that exists within care of the self and (ii) the necessity for effective Arendtian pluralism that care of the self constitutes.

Because of these things care of the self can be argued to have an immanent Arendtian political dimension due to its recognition of plurality which translates into an inherent sociability, and Foucault identified a political dimension for the ethic of care for the self which addresses both *epimeleia heautou* and *epimeleia tonallon*. Foucault stated that what really interested him is ‘politics as an ethics’ (1984: 375) which incorporates the ethic of ‘the relationship you have to yourself when you act’ (1994b: 131) and which in that moment of action demonstrates a further reflective and conscious practice of freedom. It is to an explanation of ‘politics as an ethics’ as a way to further transcend the social and political that this chapter now turns.

8.7: Politics as An Ethics

‘I emphasize practices of freedom over processes of liberation’ (Foucault 1994b: 283)

Foucault refers to other ways that freedom can be created and care for the self further exercised, through the adoption of politics as an ethics. As will be shown in the following section this understanding fulfils the observation that Foucault made for the need of a new economy of power relations (1994: 329). The contention here is that politics as an ethics has political merit on several bases. In addition to this, the chapter will show why objections to Foucault’s work that claims that he ‘fails to offer an adequate account of the conditions that make individual resistance […] possible’ (Allen 2002: 143) actually misses the whole point of Foucault’s project because western society today is constituted by the very conditions that not only make resistance possible, but more often than not actually demands it.

In a somewhat prophetic sense, Foucault seemed to anticipate criticisms of his work such as the one above when he stated that he rejects ‘the opposition between a power-wielding state that exercises its supremacy over a civil society deprived of such processes of power’ (1994: 290). In this statement, Foucault rejects a model of the western world which sees the

---

142 Kingston (2009: 93) also rejects similar claims.
zero-sum situation of the state as an omnipotent political entity existing at the expense of an impotent society. This is in line with his rejection of the mystification of power and his absolute refusal to see any power arrangement as necessary, inevitable or intractable. On this basis he argued that it was possible and indeed desirable to resist dominating power arrangements in any way possible. The importance of this recognition is that although it may be the case that some people are unable, through time or lack of resources, to ‘do something political’, it was instead possible to subvert power arrangements through a practice of non-acceptance (in Rabinow 1991: 377). Although, he likened this idea to a type of dissidence, Foucault ultimately rejected dissidence as a description of his political vision (2007: 201). Instead he argued for a resistance of power arrangements that he reluctantly termed ‘counter-conduct’ (Ibid). Counter-conduct won out as the favoured description of his vision of political resistance because it contained some important elements necessary for the successful forms of political challenge required in the western world today and also offered possibilities that are not limited to any one western country (Foucault 1994: 329). It was chosen, he explains, because ‘counter-conduct’ has the sole advantage of allowing reference to the active sense of the word ‘conduct’ (2007: 201). It can be seen therefore, that Foucault’s politics as an ethics is something active; it requires that things are done or not done with a deliberate consciousness behind them ‘in the very general field of politics or power relations’ (2007: 202).

Foucault identifies three main moments of counter-conduct. The first counter-conduct is the affirmation of an eschatology that civil society will prevail over the state (2007: 356), the disappearance of governmental strategies and techniques from the lives of individuals. For Foucault it will be society itself that ends ‘governmentality’ […] when civil society frees itself of the constraints and controls of the state’ (2007: 356). In this explanation Foucault makes his divergence with Arendt obvious. In Foucault’s argument the challenge to the politics of the contemporary, western world will come from the area of people’s lives termed by Arendt as ‘social’. From a Foucauldian point of view this gives ‘the social’ an imperative role in political resistance because as has been shown elsewhere in the thesis, ‘power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus’ (Foucault 1994: 343). The active ‘politics as an ethics’ that counter-conduct constitutes makes the inescapable recognition that ‘the state is not a supplementary structure over and above society […] whose radical
effacement one could perhaps dream of’ (Ibid), but that ‘a society without power relations can only be an abstraction’ (Ibid). On this matter therefore, Foucault contrasts with Arendt in his recognition that the social and political can not be separated and this thesis argues that because of this he strengthens this major weakness in her oeuvre. One of the major strengths of politics as an ethics therefore is that it recognizes as potential sites of empowerment those aspects of everyday lives that Arendt would term ‘social’ and therefore outside genuine political action.

For Foucault it is through non-acceptance that ethics takes on a political dimension, in his words by ‘making “I protest” a political phenomenon’ (2001: 377). This realization brings forward the second ‘great form of counter-conduct’ (2007: 356) in this argument which is identified as the arrival of ‘an eschatology that will take the form of the absolute right to revolt, to insurrection, and the breaking of all bonds of obedience’; the right to revolution itself (2007: 357). At this point it is worth exemplifying the wide and varied forms that this insurrection can resist. Far beyond, but certainly not excluding, the most historically and globally familiar form of strident subversion that is coordinated or spontaneous collective insurrection (Foucault 2007: 357), Foucault’s examples of the forms that politics as an ethics could take includes any action that individuals can take to ‘break the bonds of obedience’ (2007: 356). Out of the many possibilities that this suggests, this might include the refusal to judge […] the list of those so subjected […] the indigent, the degenerate, the feeble-minded, the aboriginal, the homosexual, the delinquent, the dangerous or even, and much more generally, the minor’ (Dean 1999: 134) and/or the active turn away via a celebration of plurality from all and any attempts to homogenise society. The economic-in-the-social that is rampant consumerism can be resisted by ticking the boxes that deny companies the permission to call you at any time, selecting mail preferences to avoid junk mail, not stopping for commercial surveys in the street, using a credit union instead of borrowing from banks.143

Arguably, however, these things are a form of ‘doing something political’, but other possibilities for engagement with politics as an ethics of resistance might include demanding that what should be expected of social security is that it is to be freed from

dangers and from situations that tend to debase or subjugate us’ (Foucault 1994: 336), or by asking questions and by making it a maxim that if the question isn’t fully answered then asking the question again (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 377). Indeed any resistance within everyday life helps in the cessation of submission to pastoralising forces and therefore will at one and the same time facilitate the resistance of the techniques of governmentality, or bio-politics to call them by their modern name. In terms of this thesis this also results in resisting the traditional division between what is political and what is social such as identified by Arendt and taking action that transcends this division.

These forms of resistance based in the everyday experience of people’s lives bring forward the third and final form of counter-conduct, which is the resistance to the biopolitics of the modern age. Via episodes of micro-resistance as exemplified above, the foundations of whole network of the biopolitical become less rigid and therefore so too do all of the arts of governmentality. To engage in counter-conduct is to act ‘against the theme of the state as the possessor of truth’ (Foucault 2007: 357) and applies regardless of the ideological basis of a government. This applies not only to each individual within the population, but also the population as a whole. Via these counter-conducts the idea that at a given moment the nation itself must be able to possess the truth of what it is ‘will be opposed (2007: 357).

These examples, however, are only part of the story of Foucault’s vision of counter-conduct. As he accurately points out ‘resistance is more than saying ‘no’ – mere negation. It is productive, creative – to be an active member of a process. No is decisive but is also the minimum form of resistance’ (1994b: 168). In this sentiment, Foucault refers to yet more potential for counter-conduct. Referring to his recognition that power is creative as well as destructive, productive as well as repressive and rarely immutable or intractable, he also pointed out that counter-conduct can likewise take a productive form, which can also result in innovation within people’s everyday lives. Such examples of creative counter-conduct include the creation of ‘new forms of life, relationships, friendships in society, art, culture and so on’ (1994b: 164). The potential here is also as infinite as in the previous examples of counter-conduct and amongst many others will include becoming involved in your community to create a new, or revive an old community, to make demands on public servants that they fulfil the roles they have been elected to fulfil, to foster relationships of
the family(ies) of our own choosing\textsuperscript{144}, to cultivate and celebrate our plural identities without a concomitant rejection of an ‘other’. Foucault observes that through ‘sexual, ethical and political choices, [we] not only affirm ourselves as an identity but as a creative force’ (1994b: 164). Once again, such action\textsuperscript{145} would resist the traditional division of social and political by remarking the boundaries upon which action takes place. This redrawing of the boundaries would arise because action takes place in the form of a pro-action in addition to a reaction.

At this point it would be prudent to return to the critique of Foucault referred to at the beginning of this section that queries what the conditions might be that make such counter-conduct possible. Foucault acknowledges that some of these forms of counter-conduct will not be achieved easily and that what he claims ‘rests on a postulate of absolute optimism’ (1994: 294). He recognizes that it will take ‘years, decades of work and practical imagination’ (1994: 288) working at the ‘grass roots’ (Ibid) with some of ‘those in society who are the most directly affected’ (Ibid). He also recognizes that ‘only then will we succeed perhaps in changing a situation that with the terms in which it is currently laid out only leads to impasses and blockages’ (Ibid). Fortunately however, this does not excuse those in society less directly oppressed by governmentality, but who are affected by it nonetheless. Foucault’s observation that we are all members of the community of the governed means that in every individuals’ everyday situation there will be at least one, yet probably more than one, reason to resist, and in every relationship of power there is the opportunity to do so no matter whether at the level of people in the plural or an individual level.

This reading of Foucault leads the argument of this thesis to contrast with Arendt/Foucault scholars such as Marquez (2010), Gordon (2001) and Kingston (2009). Marquez for example claims that power is at all times collective (2010: 9). This assertion underplays the point that source(s) of oppression can come through the real or perceived subjectivizing ‘gaze’ of other people, that is it fails to recognize (2010: 4) that a horizontal as well as

\textsuperscript{144} For an interesting exploration of the potential for relationships with others based on Foucault’s ideas here see Kingston (2009).

\textsuperscript{145} Foucault’s neat description of this as ‘falsifying the currency’ has recently been revived by Hardt (2010: 160)
vertical oppression can exist. Gordon makes the same error (2001: 35). By viewing institutions such as the ‘university’ in much too literal terms (2001: 27) he ignores the power relationships that exists between students themselves (Ibid). In this joint error both Marquez and Gordon fail to recognize that the horizontal forms of power relationship that exist in these moments therefore also provide spaces for resistance, not only at a collective level, but also at an individual one too.

This error is repeated by Kingston (2009). Despite some parallel observations to those outlined here, Kingston settles on the value of Foucault’s ethics at the point of community. The error that Kingston makes, which is seemingly a common one in the body of comparative work between Arendt and Foucault, is to cast the individual approach to action as necessarily exclusive of action undertaken by individuals in the plural (2009: 5, 31). As this thesis has already shown there is a value for empowering people in the claims of Arendt, but the weakness in the false dichotomization of individual or collective exemplified by writers such as Kingston, is that the initiation of resistance fails to be explained. It is thesis’ contention that all resistance must begin somewhere, and particularly in the case of the contemporary west that ‘somewhere’ has to be with people themselves at both the plural and individual levels. These writers’ failure to take adequate account of this results in an avoidance of the Foucauldian project through an Arendtian appeal to collectives such as small communities at the expense of the potential of the individual. It is important to note that this thesis’ focus on politics as an ethics from each person as the locus for cultivating counter-conduct still permits a space for collective resistance.

Furthermore, in contradiction to critics such as Allen (2002) one of the major strengths of Foucault’s arguments for counter-conduct is that the individual’s resistance can be ‘cut’ to fit the space and resources of their situation, for example by the choice between counter-conduct as outright resistance such as the G20 protests or the recent reactions or the opening of a Tesco’s store in Stokes Croft, Bristol (Kingsley 2011) to counter-conduct as a creative form such as finding and following ways to care for the self (and others by implication) through such things as meditation, growing your own produce or cultivating new relationships and plural connections. This idea is exemplified, although by no means

146 Bell (1996: 92) and Grumley (1998: 60) also recognise this.
147 This is recognised in different ways by Grumley (1998), Gordon (2001) Marquez (2010).
exhaustively, by the ‘People’s Supermarket’, an alternative to the four main UK mega supermarkets that sells produce local to it at affordable prices and is owned by the community and staffed by volunteers. It is also not the case that these two versions of counter-c conduct are mutually exclusive, both outright individual and collective resistance and creative individual and collective resistance can be engaged in. What is very evident through all of Foucault’s work and which this thesis seeks to retain, is the point that there are no universal ‘conditions’ which make resistance possible. Instead there are ‘a thousand things that can be done, invented, contrived by those who recognizing the relations of power in which they are involved have decided to resist them or escape them’ (Foucault, 1994, 294). In a pre-emptive strike against criticisms such as those of Allen, Foucault declared that gay people ‘have to create a life [...] to become. That is something without limits’ (1994b: 163). In an extension of this, this thesis argues that there is no reason why this ‘limitless becoming’ can not apply to all individuals as ‘political’ agents in the ‘social’ realm ‘to posit the possibility of an eschatology [...] of a suspension or completion of historical and political time when, if you like, the indefinite governmentality of the state will be brought to an end and halted’ (2007: 356). This is possible because the apparently monolithic state is nothing but ‘a way of governing….a type of governmentality…an episode in governmentality’ (Foucault 2007: 248).

8.8: Conclusion: ‘The Political’ over ‘The Social’

Foucault recognized that certain elements of neo-liberal governmentality such as security, utilitarianism, maximising efficiency, human capital and privatized prudentialism rests at the present time as a form of governmental techniques that focus upon individuals through bio-politics, which equates to those aspects of their lives that theorists such as Arendt would see as completely outside the political realm. The genealogy that Foucault traces has thus bequeathed a legacy whereby any thinking pertaining to the political, economic or social spheres necessarily has to take all three into account at the same time. This thesis has exemplified how this still applies in many contemporary situations. The implication of this is that a new direction for thinking about and acting upon the domination of everyday life is required. This is one where the impractical and traditional endeavour to separate the

---

spheres is abandoned and a much more realistic approach is adopted. This should recognise and reflect the basis upon which these spheres are actually experienced in contemporary western societies and use them as the basis for challenge and resistance.

In looking toward this new direction, the dominating art of governmentality is challenged and resisted on the individualizing and collective oppressions and dominations of governmentality over and within the ‘social’ world. This thesis argues that it is imperative that the social or what should more accurately be termed ‘everyday life’ becomes the site of both political and economic resistance which equals new forms of empowerment. Foucault’s politics as an ethics empowers people by fully politicizing all aspects of their lives, offering the possibility for ‘more not less’ politics. In politicizing the ‘social’ in this way, the scope exists for both individual and collective resistance. No-one is excluded by prior qualities or lack of qualities that distinguish and discriminate on the basis of a ‘we’. A more attentive reading of Foucault shows the answers to criticisms such as those raised by McNay (1991), Gordon (2001), Allen (2002), Braun (2007). The conditions for resistance already exist; contemporary bio-politics is both defined by the conditions that allow resistance and also by those that demand it. As the conclusion to the thesis will show, the approach to political resistance that a Foucauldian ‘politics as an ethics’ offers circumvents the impractical proscription to separate the social and political as seen in arguments like those of Arendt. In this sense, ‘politics as an ethics’ has the potential to galvanize contemporary (bio)political resistance in a way that is achievable for and sensible to most people and which also speaks to them in the sense of their everyday life experiences because it is on this basis that it is challenged.

\[149\] Recently Hardt (2010: 159) made a similar observation.
CONCLUSION: EMPOWERING EVERYDAY LIVES

This argument grew out of an article that looked at how Arendt demonstrates a strength that Foucault lacks in terms of ‘cutting off the head of the king’. The research undertaken for this showed that there were many parallels between the two theorists which have relevance to societies within Western Europe and North America and for these reasons an important argument about contemporary experiences could be made via a synthesis of these strengths in their work. This synthesis of their work however has also allowed aspects of Foucault’s work to correct major weaknesses in the arguments of Arendt.

This thesis is original in three main ways. Firstly, it is one of very few book length comparative studies of these two thinkers. Secondly, it has also looked at the majority of existing comparative secondary literature on Arendt and Foucault which means that it goes beyond the limit of these two other comparative pieces. The third point of originality derives from the parallels between the two that have been considered.

The first parallel considered here was the critique of sovereignty between Arendt and Foucault. This made the argument that contemporary sovereignty is iniquitous, dominating and therefore a limiting form of politics. It also made the point that this form of politics, although existing in different places in slightly varying forms, is a common organisation of power generally in terms of the nation-state and universally in terms of liberal democratic countries in particular. It also showed how some societies of the contemporary developed world had equivalent forms of fear and insecurities to the ones written about by advocates of sovereignty.

The importance of Foucault and Arendt’s work for informing a critique of contemporary sovereignty was shown to reside in their parallel distinction from advocates of sovereignty. Their respective arguments make it clear that advocates of sovereignty make two mistakes. The first is in putting an assumed human nature as a priori to politics. This assumes that humanity has an inevitable and unalterable nature that creates problems to be addressed or managed retrospectively rather than as a situation in which the human plural condition and political issues co-exist in symbiosis. The second mistake is in treating assumed human nature in a negative sense only, in terms such as fearful, greedy, brutal and violent which
leads theorists of sovereignty to view political solutions to this human nature as necessitating an arbitrator of friend or enemy. This rhetoric of hostility was shown to be repeated in contemporary politics.

This parallel has further value because of the refusal to view people in such negative terms. This means that the perception of the inevitability of hostility between people is resisted as is fear of the other. The parallel brought out in this thesis showed that politics informed by sovereignty dis-empowers people in their capacity to act. Arendt blames this disempowerment on the contract between people and sovereign and rejects the contract on this basis. Foucault rejects the contention that war ends due to the sovereign. This thesis claims that this parallel rejection of sovereign politics opens up alternative possibilities for politics within societies.

A critique of sovereignty is therefore relevant to the contemporary context and this can take place on several levels. These include the parallel recognition that all people are not equal but that inequality is in fact immanent to sovereignty which furthered Foucault and Arendt’s distinctions from Schmitt and also marked out their distinction from Weber. The inequality immanent to viewing the sovereign as an inevitable and inescapable ‘power on high’ leads to a misanalysis of the way that power really operates and neglects the societal dominations and political isolations that it creates. These creations include the manufacture of an individual, the presentation of difference in negative terms and exaggeration of the threats that this embodies. This maximises ‘fears’ and encourages normalising judgements between and amongst people at societal level which prevents important connections between people. This thesis showed that this joint recognition of such separations within society could be demonstrated through contemporary cultural and political examples.

Arendt’s contemporary relevance was shown through her claims that state sovereignty in a global context is flawed. The recognition by Arendt of the modern marriage of politics and violence distinguishes her further from Schmitt and in a further paradox, shows the Hobbesian problem of the state of nature as one that is unresolved in an international context. This thesis has also used contemporary examples of these issues to question the necessity of the international model of ‘state as container’ rather than empowerment through greater pluralism.
The claims made here have gone further than Bell’s recognition that Arendt and Foucault ‘pause before the comfort of liberalism’ (1996: 95) to show that both offer a much more forceful critique than this. Both use liberal concepts to form a specific attack on the notion of sovereignty of the individual, a particularly neo-liberal focus which is defined in this thesis as the focus on individual security and efficiency to the exclusion of all other socio-political considerations. On this basis, this thesis demonstrated these criticisms to be relevant to contemporary politics. Equally as relevant is their parallel recognition that these concerns only ensure negative freedoms which are also limited freedoms because when measured in these ways individual sovereignty compounds the perception of insecurity within individuals’ everyday lives.

A weakness was identified in Arendt’s argument that relates to her failure to account for the loss of individual autonomy that could occur when individual sovereignty is lessened. This issue was mitigated by pointing out that the amount of autonomy individuals actually have given their existence as plural beings is not something that can easily be decided, but this notwithstanding, Arendt’s concern with individual sovereignty is one that is only invoked when it is to the exclusion of all else, namely other people. Furthermore, any loss of autonomy that occurs as a result of a reduction in individual sovereignty would take place from equitable rather than hierarchical circumstances if other aspects of Arendtian politics were also in place.

The greater weakness in Arendt’s argument was related to the ‘vague hope’ for the renaissance of the city-citizen, a weakness that is repeated in secondary literature which attempts an Arendtian corrective of Foucault. This thesis pointed out that social revolution will not be a possibility in initiating this given Arendt’s unequivocal rejection of violence,. It suggests the possibility that the resolution to this weakness can be sought in the argument of Foucault because of his strength in locating his argument within, and not apart from society, and the circumvention of the limits of a politics based entirely on collectives such as nations or class that this pluralism allows. Further strengths of Foucault’s argument were attested to here through his more precise socio-historical sensitivity than Arendt which as well as being more relevant to contemporary societies also gives his arguments a form of flexibility because disempowerment can take many forms both within and across time.
Using a see-saw analogy this thesis situated Foucault’s rise of the shepherd-flock as a modern and contemporary phenomena that is coeval to Arendt’s decline of the city-citizen. As a response to these two phenomena this thesis retained the see-saw analogy by suggesting that the rise of the city-citizen, that is a more politically interested, motivated and empowered individual might be the consequence of the decline of the shepherd-flock constituted by a socially and politically dominated population. This suggestion was argued to have two advantages. Firstly, in not being as abstract an idea as attempting the stand alone rejuvenation of republican sentiments amongst people in the Arendtian sense and secondly that sending the shepherd-flock into decline does not require co-ordinated action or violence. In this moment, Foucault’s argument was shown to preserve Arendt’s principle of anti-violence whilst strengthening this weakness in her work.

In parallel distinction to contract theorists like Rousseau, Foucault and Arendt also recognise that a multitude of opinions and wills cannot be adequately represented by a single entity. A further common strength therefore exists through both theorists’ celebration of plurality. Plurality is important to the argument in this thesis because it is vital for the alternative forms of empowerment offered through connections with other people. On this basis, the argument was made that another strength in the work of both theorists is the politicisation of plurality rather than fear.

This was shown to reduce fear of the other by celebrating rather than disparaging the differences between people. In this recognition both theorists were shown to distinguish themselves further from advocates of sovereignty who disparage these differences on the basis of the unpredictability and uncertainty that such differences pose. This thesis demonstrated that it is evident that some contemporary political systems try to suppress these aspects of plurality giving further relevance to this parallel.

This argument also explained that assujetissement remains relevant to contemporary western societies and examples of where this can be identified in everyday lives were given. Arendt and Foucault’s parallel concern with poor and limited relationships, disconnections and ultimate disempowerment between people that are connected to assujetissement is used in this thesis to further support the argument for a greater appreciation of plurality. This, it has been argued here, can be informed by Foucault’s
axiom to be neither for nor against which equals a rejection of preconceived boundaries limited by binary opposition. Once again, in line with a central concern of this argument a space is opened out for a variety of relationships between people which can foster a greater appreciation of distinction and opportunities to challenge disempowerment.

This argument emphasised the importance of equality in the work of both theorists. For Foucault this as an ontological condition whereas Arendt sees it as one that must be guaranteed by others, however both agree that it is imperative to recognise others as peers or members of the community of the governed rather than as a hostile ‘other’. In addition to further reducing the bellicose model that informs modern and contemporary sovereign politics, equality also acts as a bulwark against the anti-political state of hierarchy. This thesis reiterates the importance of these things for alternative approaches to empowering individuals within their everyday lives.

This thesis claimed that a positive view of distinction is necessary for reasons besides those above. Agonism is permitted when the sharing of viewpoints takes place within a space of equals which creates politically proactive spaces. These are politically proactive because people are more visible both in their individuality, in their solidarity with other people and via an immediacy to the results of their actions. This space also opens up the potential for spontaneity whilst also being at one and the same time a flexible and portable space. In support of this contention, this thesis has offered contemporary examples of where this too infrequent approach to politics has successfully taken place.

This thesis paused before Arendt’s contention for a higher reflective ability amongst those who enter the public space of the world because it implies elitism. However, this argument suggested that Foucault’s permanent provocation shows a non-elitist approach to politics because anyone can engage in it. His argument for this hyper activism recognises that plurality is diminished via the assujetissement of the societal sphere and this gives his work more contemporary relevance than Arendt as well as avoiding elitism.

Arendt and Foucault also recognise in parallel that it is quite possible to escape the current limits of politics and this is also something that has been emphasised here. Their belief that an alternative politics can be created through the politicisation and celebration of the
differences that are found within the plurality of humans marks their parallel distinction from theorists of sovereignty such as Schmitt who argue that the state and politics are inseparable. This thesis has used this to show that a significant distinction exists between the perception of difference as something to be feared and judged as opposed to a celebration of difference without the limits of enmity. It is for this reason that this thesis makes the defence of plurality a central part of the synthesis of their work in the argument for new approaches to empowerment.

The synthesis between Arendt and Foucault was furthered by their parallel critique of instrumental rationality. Both recognize a post-enlightenment form of rationality conceived in means-ends terms. This is a scientific rationality, measured only in terms of optimization or utility that has now become a ubiquitous form of rationality in all aspects of human affairs and these joint arguments allowed this thesis to show that in the realm of human affairs this rationality is one intrinsically linked to various forms of domination.

The application of instrumental rationality toward people shows that such a form of rationality cannot stand up to the irrationality of the world. Both Arendt and Foucault extend this point further however to distinguish themselves from theorists such as Weber by showing in more detail where this type of rationality leads for example to forms of social domination such as bureaucracy or anti-political strategies such as violence. Both define violence as physical harm, directed towards bodies not conduct, and both theorists distinguish themselves from Schmitt through a more sophisticated account of politics whereby they separate violence from power. Their parallel demystification of power is important to this thesis because of the conviction that there is always space to renegotiate power. This can be through other people in their plurality in the case of Arendt and by individual resistance in the case of Foucault.

Foucault’s discussion of violence was shown here to have a weakness in comparison to Arendt in two ways. Firstly, he makes the implicit criticism of her consensual view of power only to return to its more positive aspects at a later date thus demonstrating too simplistic a representation of her thought. Secondly, without consideration of Arendt, as with his call to ‘cut off the head of the king’, he identified the need to understand the rationality behind the use of violence which was something that she had already fulfilled.
This oversight of the already existing Arendtian analysis of violence implies at best a lack of awareness of Arendt’s work and at worst a neglect of it by Foucault.

Foucault and Arendt’s analysis of violence was shown to be relevant to contemporary politics and thus this thesis in two ways, beginning with violence as the superlative expression of modern political instrumental rationality. Further to this, it is the superlative expression of contemporary political rationality as this thesis exemplified both in Chapter One and the chapters on instrumental rationality. Foucault and Arendt’s parallel definition of politics that use violence is that of a limited politics. This thesis also recognises this. Drawing on these arguments this thesis made the claim that the real task for empowering people is in challenging and resisting the ossifications of such instrumental rationalities such as those that suggest that forms of power are a possession or necessary or final or a fatality. What this thesis emphasised was that these were not ‘truths’ but moments when the circulation of power becomes blocked and so power can and should be challenged to ensure its constant circulation. This maxim is also a central part of the synthesis of their work in this argument for new approaches to empowerment that move beyond the social and political.

Bureaucracy is a political rationality that administers everyday lives beyond the point of either absolute or relative subsistence by creating both dependency and marginalisation. Another way that Foucault and Arendt’s parallel critique of instrumental rationality was shown as relevant to contemporary society was through contemporary forms of reasons of state such as criminology, risk and cultural judgement; in short the judgements of normality. The value to this thesis of the parallel analysis of bureaucracy lies in the recognition of it as the rule by nobody which uses a ridiculous form of authority whereby the power that it uses appears to emanate from nowhere and no-one. This means that no-one can be held to account and is therefore a rationally organized socio-political form of absence of speech. Besides the contemporary examples of this that were given this analysis included Arendt’s discussion of Eichmann, who demonstrates what the consequences are when a desire for security beyond all else, a willingness to conform and a refusal to exercise judgement crystallizes at a single point. This example showed what becomes possible when the instrumental rationality of bureaucracy meets the arbitrary efficiency of
the instrumental rationality that is violence. The point was made in this thesis that despite the case that the contemporary bureaucracy of the western world does not result in the extreme consequences characteristic of Eichmann the unreflective, inflexible instrumental rationality behind them both belong to the same continuum.

Two weaknesses in Arendt’s critique of instrumental rationality were demonstrated in this thesis. Despite locating bureaucracy as constitutive of an absence of power, Arendt neglects a full exploration of it as a surfeit of societal authority and domination. This thesis showed that Foucault’s more attentive treatment of the domination of bureaucracy over people corrects this weakness in Arendt further suggesting why a synthesis of their work helps to conceive of alternative ways to empower people. This thesis also identified however that for all of the problems that Arendt identifies with instrumental rationality, she gives very little explanation for how this can be reversed. This thesis argued that this is the ultimate strength that Foucault demonstrates in comparison to Arendt. Bureaucracy therefore formed this thesis’ final point of comparison between the two theorists as it is was shown to be the area where the questions that they might ask each other become more tangible and where the ultimate divergence between them begins.

The early part of this thesis reflected the recognition that for some of us politics is closer to worldliness than to government, law or administration (Dolan 2001: 441) which encapsulates the main basis for the synthesis between Arendt and Foucault regarding their respective strengths. However, this thesis showed the main divergence between Arendt and Foucault to be found in their respective and differing views of the social and political. This thesis therefore used the differing strengths of each regarding this issue to correct the weaknesses in the other which further informed the synthesis between them given here.

The explanation of their divergence in this way began with an exploration of Arendt’s ‘social’ to show her strengths in this that other writers sometimes miss, thus distinguishing the argument here from other secondary writers because it is more sympathetic to her claims in The Human Condition. It rejected the characterisation of Arendt’s social either as a ‘blob’, a simplistic concept or as confused and incoherent, although it did recognize that Arendt contradicted herself at times in her explanation of this. The argument here asserted
that the majority of secondary work looking Arendt’s ‘social’ needs more nuance. This thesis distinguished itself from these interpretations by offering this greater nuance through comprehensive consideration of Arendt’s analysis of revolution. This led this thesis to clarify that her discussion of the social allows Arendt to make a case for the empowering potential of solidarity, an important aspect of her work retained in the synthesis with Foucault. Further strengths shown here was Arendt’s distinction from Marx in terms of her criticism that he destroys plurality through the socialization of both poverty and mankind. This recognition was important to this synthesis for the following reasons. Firstly Arendt’s recognition, contra Marx, that poverty and freedom are not incompatible extends the empowerment of everyday lives to anyone regardless of their position in or experience of society. This recognition resonates with Foucault’s claims. Secondly, Arendt’s arguments support the contention of this thesis that challenging the pastoralisation and isolation of individuals has to be attempted by more than simply challenging the economic context in which they exist.

To highlight a further strength in Arendt this thesis explained how an alternative form of empowerment amongst plural individuals can work in praxis. By clarifying Arendt’s real world example of Ancient Greece and also by identifying rare contemporary examples of the sharing of perspectives it was suggested that it is possible for a politics amongst equal, self-selected and motivated individuals to be undertaken for its own sake rather than efficiency, use value or ends. The importance of plurality was also underscored here through the examination of promises and forgiveness. This thesis uses these Arendtian ideas to suggest that the existence of other people can help to resist domination because promises between equal participants counteract the hierarchy of non-plural politics. In addition, they act as political actions in themselves because they constitute beginnings. As, promises are already used in contemporary politics this thesis pointed out that Arendt’s claims regarding this, just as with her explanation of Ancient Greece, are not as far fetched as she is sometimes made to sound and was another way that this thesis distinguished itself from other secondary works.
The difficulties with Arendt’s view of the social and political were shown to arise from her claims that poverty must be solved by the private sphere and was shown to be easy to attack as an argument for the privatization of both poverty and politics. This argument made the point that it is impossible for poverty to be resolved in private spheres which have differing levels of resources. This issue was shown to be complicated further by the contemporary situation that economic necessity is a political issue by extension yet one which is already a privatised concern between liberal demands for self-sufficiency and welfare policy which is directed at households.

If Arendt was correct in the solution to the domination of politics by the social in this way this thesis posed the question as to why, contemporary societies are still characterized so definitively by such impoverished political experiences as exemplified herein? The argument here claims that this question leads to the inevitable conclusion that privatizing necessity as Arendt proscribed is not enough to instigate more fulfilling political experiences because there are additional anti-political experiences such as those exemplified in earlier chapters that this proposal from Arendt ignores. This issue therefore represents a much bigger issue in her work which is that her theory alone cannot provide the solution to the oppressions and limits on modern life that she outlines in her theories nor the wider problem of her analysis that the social dominates the political. With the recognition of this contradiction in Arendt it has been claimed that a different direction for politics is required than that of the separation of the social and political spheres set out by Arendt.

The new direction for politics must reject the Arendtian attempt to separate these spheres because in the contemporary western world these ‘spheres’ are inextricable from each other. Her solution is therefore both impractical and unachievable. This thesis claimed that this weakness in Arendt’s work can be transcended via an appeal to strengths in the work of Foucault. This thesis showed that as well having merits in its own right, such as offering the solution to some of the problems identified by them both without recourse to Marx or liberalism, Foucault also provides an alternative to criticisms that pluralists ‘socialize the self all the way down’ (in Whitebook 2001: 280). Furthermore, in relation to the Arendtian problem of the social dominating the political, a synthesis of their work that looks at this
issue from a Foucauldian point of view has the advantages not of abandoning Arendt wholesale but of preserving all of the strengths of Arendtian politics hitherto celebrated in this thesis whilst also fortifying the weaknesses in it.

This thesis has contended that the work of Foucault gives a much more realistic approach to solutions for contemporary political problems because his work is grounded in the ways that issues pertaining to ‘politics’, ‘society’ and ‘economics’ are actually experienced. This strength has been shown to arise through his analysis of the modern version of liberalism that he identifies as neo-liberalism which he ties to modern life in three main ways.

Foucault’s shorthand for these three ways are shown to be encapsulated in his concept of bio-politics, shown here through examples to be the contemporary form of government omnes et singulatum, a form of government beyond sovereignty. This explanation demonstrates his greater contemporary relevance than Arendt.

This thesis has used Foucault’s bio-politics to support the claim that there is an inescapable and link in contemporary life between the art of governmentality and the disempowerment that individuals experience within their everyday lives. To state this in Arendtian terms this thesis has asserted that there is an inextricable connection between the ‘political’, ‘economic’ and ‘social’ spheres. The argument made here therefore is that attempts at reversing the limited political experiences of contemporary western societies such as those outlined by the parallel strengths of these theorists have to take this into account when considering how to alter this disempowerment.

Given the bio-political focus on individuals in contemporary, western societies it is clear that it is inaccurate to continue to view aspects of western life as either economic or political or social and treat them as belonging only to these three distinct spheres. It is more accurate to approach and conceive of the levels of (dis)empowerment that individuals experience in their everyday lives irrespective of what these problems may involve. This thesis proposes therefore that these inaccurate and unhelpful short hands are abandoned and the levels of empowerment in everyday lives are negotiated from within everyday lives. To put this in Arendtian terms this means the argument here is one for challenging political and economic dominations from within, rather than apart from, the Arendtian ‘social’. This
thesis asserts that this approach redresses this main weakness in Arendt and also provides the answer to contemporary forms of disempowerment.

The strength of this claim of the need to transcend this Arendtian separation has been supported through the explanation of Foucault’s concept of civil society as a technique of government, and politics and economics as regimes of truth inscribed in reality. Foucault’s distinction from Arendt has been shown here to reside in his recognition that the opposition of civil society against the state is unproductive. This has shown that his assertions about this poses important questions to Arendt in that this aspect of his work clearly identifies a domination of the political over the social, to borrow Arendtian terms, as opposed to the opposite as viewed by Arendt.

This thesis extends the above claim to show therefore that this opposition is both unproductive and disempowering within the contemporary western context. The limited empowerment of individuals has been shown to take place from the false opposition of society and state because it leads to the acceptance of fatalistic truths about society, examples of which are that societies are homogenous entities or that challenges to sovereignty will damage the economy or democracy. This thesis has shown that the importance of Foucault’s contribution to challenging these ideas arises from his assertion that forms of power are never fixed, irreversible or immobile but can be challenged, resisted and renegotiated in several ways. These have been shown in this argument to include the refusal to judge the other in negative terms, the resistance of a prior ‘we’ in discussing political problems and the resistance of the maxim to know oneself in favour of a maxim to care for the self. In distinction to other secondary theorists this thesis rejected care of the self as a notion that is self-centred instead explaining it as something that immanently considers other people. This more plural aspect was shown to often be missed by other writers in their haste to rescue Arendt. Making a synthesis with Arendt on this basis helps to address Foucault’s understatement of this plural aspect of his theory by bringing it out more. Furthermore, through reiterating these forms of resistance, this synthesis also points out how new, different and better relationships with others can be undertaken thus marking points for the possible reversal of dominating practices.
These points illustrate that this thesis has made Foucault’s resistance to the fatalism of power arrangements a central aspect of its argument. What has been claimed as both convincing and valuable about Foucault’s argument is his recognition that power can be reconceived and renegotiated through agonistic forms of resistance. A destruction of the old can occur simultaneously with creation of the new and this point brings the thesis to its most important point and ultimate conclusion, which is that the transcendence of the problematic Arendtian separation of the social and political can be further informed using the specific principles of Foucault’s politics as an ethics.

Foucault’s politics as an ethics corrects the main weaknesses in Arendt regarding the separation of the social and political because its principles are based on the constant renegotiation of power directed towards the dominations of everyday lives and therefore sited within everyday lives. It is these principles that form the final aspect of the synthesis of their theories given here and is therefore informed by a positive view of Foucault’s power. This thesis is therefore distinct from the neutral comparison between them made by other secondary theorists.

The principles of politics as an ethics that inform this synthesis are based upon Foucault’s call for resistance to become an ethic of practice in the everyday lives of individuals. By resistance, Foucault was shown to mean the identification, refusal and challenge toward the bio-political dominations of everyday life that arise within western societies and which could be achieved both through resistance as outright refusal but also more creative forms of resistance. This argument has also highlighted that these forms of resistance should not be limited to resisting vertical, formal conceptions of power but also to horizontal, informal ones that can also dominate everyday life such as that from one person to another. This showed freedom to be based upon a practice of everyday life rather than something hidden needing to be revealed.

The dynamic principles of counter-conduct were used as a way of resisting the disempowerment of everyday life and examples were given for how this could be done in a

---

150 Interestingly both other book length comparisons of them favour Foucault over Arendt.
contemporary context. Not only does this argument view the contemporary experiences of everyday lives as making resistance to disempowerment possible because of the multifarious ways in which it occurs, it also claimed that contemporary experience demands such resistance. In distinction to other secondary theorists therefore the emphasis here was that this turn toward Foucault for empowerment within everyday lives through resistance is an unashamedly ‘political’ one because its central concerns are ones of empowerment.

A synthesis between Arendt and Foucault using these principles honours the strengths of both theorists because the success or failure of the act of resistance is not as important as the act of resistance itself. What is important is that the moment of resistance forms a challenge and therefore a re-negotiation of the relationship of power. Applying this to everyday life in the ways that this thesis suggests subverts the principles of instrumental rationality that only sees value through means and ends.

The importance of plurality is another strength honoured in this synthesis because politics as an ethics permits the space for both individual and collective resistance. Individuals can resist on the basis of their own everyday disempowerment but where people have everyday dominations in common, more than one individual can counter conduct. This opens up therefore a form of conscious resistance against all social oppressions singulatum in the first instance, but always with the promise to challenge and change oppression omnes. On this basis this form of resistance is also inclusive. As it is arises from and is directed within the everyday lives of individuals, the basis upon which it is undertaken does not derive from pre-existing social divisions nor act, recruit or propose solutions on such a basis. There are therefore no prior qualities or lack of qualities that distinguish, select and discriminate on the basis of a ‘we’; all individuals irrespective of their situation can engage in this.

This synthesis is therefore distinct from other secondary work on the two theorists that try to conserve Arendt’s separation of the political from other concerns through erroneously dichotomising individuals against collectives. To proscribe political action solely on the basis of collectives or communities not only limits social action in a way that it is rarely experienced, but it also misses something vitally important regarding Foucault’s work that
this thesis recognises, which is that politics as an ethics does conserve something importantly Arendtian both in terms of plurality and natality.

This thesis has recognised therefore that the individual is the starting point of all social and political resistance but not the limit of it. This shows the further strength of demonstrating how a politically engaging and proactive individual, who practices forms of resistance informed by the principles of politics as an ethics, initiates a point of reversal to the shepherd-flock and problems that it brings. The claim here has been that the pro-action involved in this could reinvent Arendt’s city-citizen in a sense more relevant to the contemporary context because of the alternative forms of empowerment created.

The principles of politics as an ethics also recognize and embrace the idea that people’s everyday lives are dominated in many ways that range from the most formal vertical operation of power such as that of the sovereign to the subtle informal horizontal cultural judgements made by other people and these operations of power can be demonstrated in the contemporary western context. Therefore, in both a Foucauldian and contemporary western context Arendt’s impossible separation of the social and political has been demonstrated as inaccurate. Politics as an ethics views everyday lives as the site of bio-political domination and therefore the only meaningful site that resistance can take place. In this way it is used in this synthesis to transcend the Arendtian separation of the social and political.

The everyday lives of contemporary western individuals are disempowered in many ways which include limited political systems, the domination and government of new forms of relationships and the narrow form of rationality informing these two other things. The art of government to which many individuals are subject knows nothing and does nothing outside of the space of everyday life. Recognizing the relevance of this to contemporary experiences means also to recognise that the division between the social and political is false and therefore is something that has to be transcended. The only way to transcend this inaccurate division is for people in either their singularity or their plurality to react to and resist these disempowerments from within their everyday lives because it is only in this way that disempowerment or new empowerment becomes comprehensible for most people because it speaks, relates, motivates and acts in the direct sense of their everyday lives. On this basis infinite possibilities are opened up for ways to ensure that power settles unequally
less often, greater connections between people are made and forms of rationality become constantly challenged.
Bibliography


Researcher’s Interpretations of Some Voices of Third Age Learners’ in Generation Review,
Volume 15, No. 4: 8-12.
Bungay, Hilary. 2005. ‘Cancer and Health Policy: The Postcode Lottery of Care’ in Social
Policy and Administration, Volume 39, Issue 1: 35-48
in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)
Byrnes, P and Holden, L (eds). 1995. Companion Encyclopaedia of Theology (London and
New York: Routledge)
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press)
Calleo, David P. 1968. The American Political System (London: The Bodley Head Ltd)
Cameron, David, ‘Rebuilding Trust in Politics’, Full Speech, 2010,
Cameron, David, ‘Full Speech on Radicalisation and Islamic Extremism in Munich’ 2011
[accessed 06th September, 2011]
and Sons)
57-95
Casciani, Dominic, ‘Wheelchair Protestor: IPCC Partially Upholds Complaint’, BBC News,
24th August 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14651735> [accessed 03rd September
2011].
Charnock, Greig, Thomas Purcell and Ramon Rubera-Furnaz. 2012. ‘Indignate!: The 2011
Popular Protests and the Limits to Democracy in Spain’ in Capital and Class, Volume 36,
Issue 1: 3-11

Clegg, Nick, ‘Full speech of the 3rd March 2011’


Cranston, Maurice. 1994. ‘Michel Foucault’ in Michel Foucault: Critical Assessments ed. by Barry Smart, Volume I (London and New York: Routledge)


Davies, Caroline, ‘Ex Labour MP Jim Devine Sentenced to 16 Months in Prison for Expenses Fraud’ in Guardian, 31st March 2011


Democracy Index 2010


Edwards, Claire. 1999. ‘Cutting off the King’s Head: The Social in Arendt and Foucault’ in *Studies in Social and Political Thought*. 2nd ed. Issue 1: pp 3-20


Foucault, Michel. 2001. *Fearless Speech* (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e))


Beyond the Social and Political


Gove, Michael. 2009. BBC News, BBC 1, 9th March 2011

Grós, Frédéric. 2005. ‘Le Souci de Soi Chez Michel Foucault’ in *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 31 (5-6): 697-708


HMP Service website <http://www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk> [accessed 15th July 2010]


Houen, Alex. 2006. ‘Sovereignty, Biopolitics and the Use of Literature: Michel Foucault and Kathy Acker’ in *Theory and Event*, Volume 9, Issue 1


Howard League for Penal Reform <http://www.howardleague.org/take-action> [accessed 15th July 2010]


Marquez, Xavier. 2010a. ‘Spaces of Appearance and Spaces of Surveillance’


[http://guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/02/g20-protests-man-dies-london] [accessed 03rd September 2011]


Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2003a. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future


Nikolinakos, Derek D. 1994. ‘Foucault’s Ethical Quandry’ in Michel Foucault: Critical Assessments ed. by Barry Smart, Volume II (London and New York: Routledge)

Nobelprize.org website <http://www.nobelprize.org> [accessed on the 17th June 2008]


O’Grady, Sarah. 2007. ‘Care for The Elderly Is Still a Postcode Lottery’, London Express, 14th July 2007


Poster, Mark. 1994. ‘Foucault, the Present and History’ in Michel Foucault: Critical Assessments ed. by Barry Smart, Volume I (London and New York: Routledge)


Tyler, Imogen. 2008. ‘Chav Mum, Chav Scum: Class Disgust in Contemporary Britain’ in Feminist Media Studies, Volume 8, Issue 1: 17-34


