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The role of shame in motivating support for, and opposition to, intergroup reconciliation

Two forms of shame as separate predictors of positive and negative responses to ingroup wrongdoing

Jesse Allpress

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Psychology

University of Sussex

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis, whether in the same or different form, has not been and will not be submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature:

Jesse Allpress

22nd January 2012
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX

JESSE ALLPRESS, DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

THE ROLE OF SHAME IN MOTIVATING SUPPORT FOR, AND OPPOSITION TO,

INTERGROUP RECONCILIATION

TWO FORMS OF SHAME AS SEPARATE PREDICTORS OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE

RESPONSES TO INGROUP WRONGDOING

SUMMARY

This thesis deals with how group members respond to wrongdoing committed in their group’s name. In particular, I investigate whether individuals feel ashamed or guilty for these acts, and in turn, what motivational effects these emotions have. A review of the literature on shame and guilt turns up serious inconsistencies regarding both the characterisation of these emotions and the empirical evidence relating to them. In particular, shame is found to be related to both prosocial and antisocial outcomes, and guilt is sometimes associated with prosocial acts and sometimes not. My empirical work tests an explanation for these inconsistencies. Notably, I test a novel way of seeing shame, and propose that not only are there different forms of shame but that these different forms have divergent motivational effects. I focus on two important forms of shame: moral shame and image shame, which arise when one sees the ingroup’s actions as threatening one’s morality or reputation, respectively. I show that moral shame is consistently related to increased prosocial attitudes (support for apology and compensation) and decreased anger, avoidance and cover-up; whereas image shame is predictive of higher levels of anger, avoidance and cover-up. The effects of guilt are weak or non-existent in the presence of these two forms of shame. I also show that these emotions have a meaningful influence on how group members relate to unrelated minorities in society, borne in part of a feeling of moral obligation for past wrongdoing. A study is also reported that shows that, depending on their individual motivations, different group members prefer different emotional expressions within apologies offered by their leaders.
Acknowledgements

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None of this research would have ever happened if it weren’t for the funding that I received from the New Zealand Tertiary Education Commission’s Bright Future Top Achiever Doctoral Scholarship scheme. I have been extremely privileged to receive this opportunity.

Less academically, but no less important, I have also been privileged over the last three years to have the friendship and support of my partner Rita; family Matt, John and Robyn; and friends Brian, Linda, Pablo and Jonas.

My greatest appreciation, however, is to Rupert Brown, my academic supervisor and colleague at the University of Sussex. I made the risky decision to move to the other side of the world based on Rupert’s work and reputation and, thankfully, this decision ended up being a very good one. I have learned a great deal from Rupert. Now, at the end of this project, I am happy to say that I have had the pleasure of working with, not only a great mind in the field, but a thoroughly decent man.
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Introduction

“We should try to create the society each of us would want if we didn’t know in advance who we’d be” Krugman (2011)

By mere luck of birth, I was born white, male, and middle-class. I have not faced many of the difficulties that many from minority and disadvantaged groups around the world face daily, but I am acutely aware of the prevalence of such disadvantage. This awareness has developed as a result of growing up in New Zealand, a country that from the outside might seem a multi-cultural success, but which has its own sordid history of colonisation, land confiscation and war, and where discrimination and prejudice against indigenous Maori remains prevalent.

Although I bear no direct responsibility for the historical mistreatment of Maori, I inherited the fruits of that mistreatment in the form of the social advantage associated with being born white. So too have Maori inherited the disadvantage of their recent ancestors, by being born into a society in which they face the continuing effects of displacement from cultural land, social disadvantage and racism. Although generations have passed, the harm remains. It is my opinion that to fail to acknowledge this continuing harm is to be complicit in the original mistreatment. Of course, many do not see any connection between the (relatively recent) historical mistreatments of Maori by Pākehā (European) settlers and present-day social inequality. Instead, they see attempts at restitution and affirmative action as “reverse discrimination” by “Maori bludgers” and a focus on Maori grievances as “living in the past” and “political correctness gone mad”. These views both
intrigue and frustrate me and are, in many ways, the driving force behind my interest in social psychology.

The work presented in this thesis is not about New Zealand, although the brief account of intergroup relations in New Zealand I offer above is reflective of the situation that many perpetrator and victim groups find themselves in following intergroup conflict — in almost all cases there exists debate over the obligations of the perpetrator group and the appropriate reconciliatory actions (if any). Of particular interest to me is the way in which members of groups with both recent and distant histories of aggression respond to the actions of their fellow ingroup members. Specifically, what drives some members of a group which has perpetrated harm against another to feel ashamed and/or guilty for their group’s wrongdoing, and in what ways do these emotions drive group members to support, or oppose, restitution?

It is this latter question that I address in this thesis. The focus of this thesis is therefore on shame and guilt reactions to ingroup wrongdoing. My work at the University of Sussex has focused on two situations in which the British government or British armed forces were responsible for perpetrating harm against members of an outgroup.

The first is Britain’s violent decolonisation of Kenya. Many general histories of British colonial influence in Kenya have been written (James, 1997; Pakenham, 1992); here I provide only a brief overview of the response of the British colonial government to the Mau Mau revolution in the 1950s.

The Mau Mau revolution grew largely out of social and economic pressure on the Kikuyu population during the 1940s and early 1950s (Anderson, 2005; Berman, 1976; Throup, 1985). In the early 1950s Mau Mau members began destroying settler properties, killing a small number of white settlers and assassinating a larger number of loyalists — Indigenous Kenyans who had ‘conspired’ with and profited from colonial rule. In 1952 the colonial government responded by declaring a state of ‘emergency’ and increasing military
control over the country. The majority of the Kikuyu population was relocated either to
detention camps or to contained villages (Anderson, 2005; Elkins, 2005).

The atmosphere in these camps, which has been likened to both the Soviet gulags and
Nazi concentration camps, was one of ritualised dehumanisation, forced labour, physical
number of examples of the mistreatment of detainees that occurred, that include regular
beatings, forced sodomy among male prisoners, gang-rape of female prisoners, beating of
children and sleep deprivation. Official figures indicate that, in total, the Mau Mau killed
32 white settlers, over 2,000 African civilians and approximately 200 British soldiers. In
response, 1,100 Kikuyu were officially hanged and 11,500 were killed in action and in the
detention camps (Corfield, 1960), although Anderson (2005) estimates this figure to be
closer to 20,000. Elkins, however, estimates that the total deaths of Kenyans at the hand
of British-run security forces may be 100,000 or more.

The second context is, broadly, the most recent Iraq war, and more specifically, the
abuse of Iraqi prisoners by British soldiers. Reports of human rights violations began
soon after the 2003 invasion of Iraq by a US-led multinational force that included 46,000
British troops. Since that time there have been numerous accusations and reports that
British forces systematically used torture techniques on Iraqi prisoners, including the use
of threats and actual violence, stress positions, sleep deprivation, exposure to heat and
cold, hooding and threats to rape and murder detainees’ families (Amnesty International,
2007; Red Cross (ICRC), 2004; McGreal, 2006).

The most well known case of torture is that of Baha Mousa, a 26-year-old Iraqi hotel
receptionist who was arrested by British forces in September 2003, and who was found 36
hours later beaten to death. It later emerged that he suffered at least 93 injuries prior his
death. One British soldier was convicted and jailed for inhumane treatment to persons, and
the British Defence Secretary in 2008 admitted to “substantial breaches” of the European
Convention of Human Rights (Sengupta, 2008). While only one soldier was convicted, the evidence suggested that the practice of torture was widespread within British-run detention camps. In the years following Baha Mousa’s death, a large amount of video and testimonial evidence had been leaked that supported the assertion that torture use was widespread and systematic (Cobain, 2010). By late 2010, over 250 Iraqis had pending or ongoing claims against the Ministry of Defense, alleging physical assaults, sexual assaults and homicide (Cobain, 2010). The majority of studies in this thesis use such information as a precursor to questions regarding Britain’s responsibility to those harmed as a result of torture, and to the Iraqi people more generally.

So what can the reader expect over the coming chapters? Chapters 1 and 2 contain a review and critique of the literature on shame and guilt. A critical appraisal of this literature shows that there are stark inconsistencies in both theoretical and empirical accounts of shame and guilt. As a solution to these inconsistencies, I propose a new way of conceptualising shame and guilt. The focus, in particular, is on shame; here I argue for the notion that shame is intimately connected with self-important values and that the violation of different values can lead to different forms of shame. I propose that two forms of shame are particularly important in intergroup contexts: moral shame and image shame.

I then proceed to test this proposal empirically. In Chapter 3, I evaluate in what ways moral shame, image shame and guilt are associated with both positive (support for apology and compensation) and negative (anger, avoidance and cover-up) responses to ingroup wrongdoing. Finding an intriguing divergence in effects for image shame and moral shame, I then proceed in subsequent chapters to establish these findings using different methodologies.

In Chapter 4, I test the validity of the emotion scales used in prior studies by investigating lay perceptions of these scales. Here participants are asked to predict what
attitudes and reactions a target individual is likely to hold in response to ingroup wrongdoing, based on that individual’s responses to the emotion scales used in Studies 1—3. In Chapter 5, I evaluate the associations between emotions and outcome measures across time and replicate the relationships longitudinally.

In Chapter 6, the limits of these emotions are tested, by evaluating whether, for what reason and under what conditions feelings of image shame and moral shame with regard to one situation might influence interactions with unrelated outgroups. I test, in particular the idea that these emotions will have a ‘spill over’ effect, affecting attitudes toward unrelated minority groups when the unrelated minority and original victim groups are seen as similar to one another, and show that this spill over occurs, in part, because of a feeling of moral obligation for the ingroup’s original wrongdoing.

In Chapter 7, I switch from looking at the consequences of shame and guilt and evaluate how group members respond to apologies offered in their name that contain different expressions of shame and guilt.

In Chapter 8, I summarise and discuss the significance of the preceding work. In this chapter I focus on how the programme of research reported in this thesis contributes to a more complete understanding of the psychology of group-based shame and guilt, and reconciliation more generally. More importantly, however, I reflect upon and discuss how this research provides further insight into what drives real group members in everyday life to approach constructively, or to avoid destructively, their painful histories of wrongdoing, and how we as a society might foster greater openness to restitution amongst members of groups with histories of wrongdoing.
Chapter 1

Shame and guilt

Intergroup conflict is a pervasive modern phenomenon with socially divisive and damaging consequences in the societies in which it prevails. The harmful effects of intergroup conflict are often serious and long-lasting, particularly for the victims of such conflict. Often, those who suffer the most during intergroup conflict face a double burden, whereby their recovery – both emotional and economic – is retarded by the very severity of their initial victimisation. For this reason, factors that lead members of perpetrator groups to offer restitution for wrongdoing – and thus improve the conditions of the victim group – should be of great interest to anyone who desires to see decreased suffering amongst victim group members and increased intergroup reconciliation\(^1\). This interest is my interest, and in this thesis I attempt to illuminate how the different emotional reactions of perpetrator group members to ingroup wrongdoing can facilitate, or alternatively, impede, acts of restitution.

Recently, there has been a growing international recognition of the lasting effects of intergroup conflict and discrimination on those victimised in such conflicts, and an increasing willingness to address these issues (Barkan, 2000; Nobles, 2008; Thompson, 2002). In many countries, recognition of unjust past acts has led to offers of apology and repara-

\(^1\)I am using the terms ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’ here with the knowledge that in many intergroup conflicts a group can be both perpetrator and victim, particularly in prolonged, intractable conflicts. Nevertheless, it is common for one party — often the more powerful — to perpetrate a disproportionate number of crimes against another. In this case, I refer to this group as the perpetrator.
tions from groups with (both recent and distant) histories of wrongdoing. Such acts of restitution have the potential to promote reconciliation between groups and a more moral intergroup relationship (Barkan, 2000; Nobles, 2008; Thompson, 2002). For example, Queen Elizabeth II and a number of New Zealand prime ministers have apologised to Indigenous Maori for violations of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi; former U.S. president Bill Clinton issued an apology to Hawaiians for violations of their sovereignty in 1893; and the Canadian government has apologised to the Indigenous Canadian population for extensive historical mistreatment (for further examples, see Nobles, 2008).

Barkan (2000) suggests the rapid and widespread increase in restorative actions by powerful groups around the world points to a new moral awareness within the international community. Although there are a number of political, historical, economic and social conditions that have lead former perpetrator groups to attempt to make amends with the victimised, in this thesis I focus specifically on the psychological processes that motivate members of perpetrator groups to support restitution for past wrongs and desire reconciliation with members of ‘victim’ groups. Particularly, I focus on a relatively new concept within social psychology, group-based emotions, as motivators (or inhibitors) of collective reparative action (E. R. Smith, 1993).

Group-based emotions are emotions that are experienced when one’s group membership, and therefore social identity is salient, and when some outcome or action is perpetrated on or by the ingroup (E. R. Smith, 1993). These emotions, which may be either positive (e.g., pride) or negative (e.g., shame), can act as important motivators of intergroup behaviour. Group-based emotions are conceptually very similar to individual-level emotions, but do differ in two important ways. Firstly, they can arise in response to the actions of fellow ingroup members, even if the individual experiencing the emotions was not directly implicated, or was not even alive at the time (E. R. Smith, 1993). Secondly, the experience of these emotions can motivate behaviour toward members of an outgroup,
even if these members were not personally involved in intergroup interaction. My specific focus in this thesis is on the self-conscious emotions of group-based shame and guilt (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Fischer, 1995), which have been shown to be particularly important motivators of intergroup attitudes and behaviours following intergroup conflict (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004).

1.1 Distinctions between shame and guilt

So what are shame and guilt, and how do they differ? Academic works have primarily distinguished between shame and guilt in four ways: (a) shame is a public emotion, whereas guilt is a private emotion; (b) shame is about the whole self, whereas guilt is about specific behaviour; (c) shame is self-focused, whereas guilt is other-focused; and (d) shame is about failure to live up to values, whereas guilt is about violation of norms. These proposals are evaluated below and a novel distinction between shame and guilt is outlined.

1.1.1 Shame is public, guilt is private

The most long-standing distinction between shame and guilt relates to the role of public exposure. Philosophers as far back as Aristotle placed great emphasis on public exposure and the consequent loss of reputation in the experience of shame, defining shame as “a pain or disturbance concerning those ills, either present, past, or future, that are perceived to lead to disgrace” (Aristotle, cited in Konstan, 2006, p.98). In a similar manner, anthropologists have argued that while guilt is important in regulating private norms, shame is important in regulating what is socially unacceptable (Benedict, 1946; Mead, 1934). Sociological traditions, too, have followed the public-private distinction, noting the role of guilt in regulating specific, private behaviours (e.g., Lynd, 1956), while highlighting the importance of shame in the maintenance of social bonds (Cooley, 1922; Lynd, 1956; Scheff, 2000). The public nature of shame has also featured heavily in the psychological literature,
which has emphasized the role of public criticism in the manifestation of shame (Ausubel, 1955; Fontaine et al., 2006; Gehm & Scherer, 1988; H. B. Lewis, 1971; R. H. Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002; Wallbott & Scherer, 1995). There appears, therefore, to be consistency across disciplines regarding the particularly social nature of shame, compared to guilt.

How does this theoretical account fit with our intuitive conception of shame? Although capturing many shame episodes, such as when one feels ashamed for behaviour resulting in the criticism and judgement of others, what of private instances of shame, such as shame arising from failure to live up to a personally valued, yet social undesired standard? Moreover how does this conceptualisation account for shame might arise from behaviour that while violating one’s personal values, would lead to public praise (for a development of this argument see Deonna & Teroni, 2009)? One could argue, as H. B. Lewis (1971) originally proposed, that shame arises in privacy because one imagines the judgement of others and that it is this implicit judgement of others that is the elicitor of shame episodes. While expanding the number of shame episodes for which ‘public exposure’ is a key criterion, an appeal to imagined others still does not adequately account for situations in which exposure of one’s behaviour could never become public, or even if it did so, would not lead to public criticism. Intuitively, then, the appeal to public exposure appears not to fully account for many shame episodes that occur in private. What of the empirical evidence for this distinction?

Empirical evidence for the private versus public distinction has been rather contradictory. A group of studies conducted by Fontaine et al. (2006) did find some support for this distinction. Using a number of ‘typical’ guilt and shame scenarios, Fontaine et al. (2006) demonstrated that the gaze and reproach of others and the associated loss of reputation was reliably associated with shame in three different cultures (Belgium, Peru and Hungary). Moreover, guilt was related to intrapersonal factors, such as rumination
and self-reproach. In contrast to the findings of Fontaine et al. (2006), Tangney, Miller, Flicker, and Barlow (1996) found no evidence for the public versus private distinction. They analysed personal recollections of shame and guilt experiences and found that both guilt and shame occurred equally often in public and, furthermore, while both these emotions were primarily experienced in social contexts, a significant proportion of both guilt (10.4%) and shame (18.2%) experiences occurred in private. That these methodologies differed in terms of the use of constrained scenarios versus participant recollection may be an important key to understanding why the findings of these two studies conflict. I return to this point shortly.

Four studies conducted by R. H. Smith et al. (2002) provide some clarification on the relative importance of public judgement in guilt and shame experiences. Smith and colleagues (2002) demonstrated, using autobiographical reports (Study 4), literary examples (Study 3) and experimental manipulations (Studies 1 and 2), that public exposure appears indeed to be more strongly associated with feelings of shame than guilt, but that public exposure is not a necessary condition for the elicitation of either emotion. Their experimental work (Studies 1 and 2) is most important for the present discussion. These two studies showed, using manipulations of shame and guilt-related scenarios, that participants expected an actor to experience more shame when a moral transgression was publicly exposed than when kept private, whereas participants expected an actor’s guilt to be high in both public and private. Participants’ expectation of shame does appear to be connected to public exposure in a way that guilt is not.

An important qualification, however, is that the degree of shame expected remained high even in private (above the scale mid-point in both studies), indicating that public exposure itself is not a necessary condition for shame to occur. Interestingly, R. H. Smith et al.’s (2002) research pointed to a unique role of internalised morality as an influential force in the manifestation of shame in conditions of reduced public exposure. They showed that
the perception that an actor’s behaviour was inconsistent with his moral values predicted an increase in shame, independent of explicit public exposure. That is, what Smith and colleagues’ work shows is that while public exposure is relatively more important in the experience of shame than guilt, shame is also driven by a private concern with acting in a manner consistent with one’s values. In response to this finding they propose that their own evidence indicates that the word ‘shame’ may refer to two quite different emotional experiences: one a result of external criticism; the other of internal criticism of the self. This possibility is discussed and developed in some detail in the present thesis.

It appears, therefore, that although conditions of public exposure and external judgement may be relatively more important in the manifestation of shame than guilt, the finding that not only does shame occur in private, but that guilt commonly arises in public, highlights the inability of the public-private distinction to adequately differentiate between the two emotions. Collectively, the research suggests that public exposure is more typically related to shame than guilt, but that public exposure (or lack thereof) cannot fully explain each emotion’s emergence. As noted earlier, we propose that experimental methodology may be partly responsible for the continued over-emphasis on public exposure as a constitutive difference between shame and guilt. Because shame is indeed more intimately related to public exposure than guilt, research such as that of Fontaine et al. (2006) that uses constrained, ‘typical’ shame eliciting scenarios is liable to inflate the importance of public exposure in shame, because these typical situations fail to capture the importance of private factors in the manifestation of shame. There is circularity in this process: research that is designed to evaluate the constitutive differences between shame and guilt by using typical eliciting situations (i.e., situations that involve a lot of public exposure in shame) leads to the conclusion that public exposure is an important constitutive difference between shame and guilt. In sum, the evidence leads to the conclusion that public exposure is more typically associated with shame experiences than with guilt.
experiences, but that there is little evidence to suggest that the degree of public exposure is a sufficient criterion by which to distinguish between the two emotions.

1.1.2 Shame is about the self, guilt is about behaviour

A prominent distinction between guilt and shame within the psychological literature was provided by H. B. Lewis (1971). Lewis described both shame and guilt as negative self-focused emotions that arise from the violation of a moral or social code; she posited, however, that they differ in the degree to which the self is implicated in the behaviour. She proposed that guilt primarily results from a focus on how a person’s behaviour has negatively affected someone else, whereas shame results from a focus on how the behaviour reflects a globally flawed self. In short, guilt is posited to arise because one has performed a bad behaviour, whereas shame arises because one is a bad person.

There is support for Lewis’ distinction (Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991; M. Lewis, 1993; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Lindsay-Hartz, De Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995; Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney, 1991, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; Tracy & Robins, 2004). A study by Niedenthal et al. (1994) provided novel evidence for the self versus behaviour distinction by evaluating the role of counterfactual thinking in guilt and shame experiences. Participants imagined themselves in guilt or shame-related scenarios (Studies 1a and 1b) or recalled personal experiences (Study 1c) of these emotions. When asked to generate counterfactuals to change the outcome of the situation, participants tended to change aspects of the self in shame situations more than in guilt situations (“if only I weren’t”) and change aspects of behaviour in guilt situations more than in shame situations (“if only I hadn’t”). Consistent with these findings, Lindsay-Hartz (1984) conducted qualitative interviews and concluded that shame was related to a negative view of the whole self, whereas guilt was related to a specific behavioural violation of an important norm or standard.
In line with the conceptual analysis of H. B. Lewis (1971) and the findings listed above, Tracy and Robins (2006) evaluated how attributions of locus, stability and controllability were differentially predictive of guilt and shame experiences. They argued that unstable and controllable attributions represent well the notion of specific behaviours, and stable and uncontrollable attributions represent well ingrained aspects of the self. They found that internal, unstable and controllable attributions were more strongly correlated with guilt than shame, and that internal, stable and uncontrollable attributions were more strongly related to shame than guilt. Furthermore, in their fourth study they separately manipulated the stability and controllability of a student’s academic failure and asked participants to imagine themselves in one of their hypothetical situations. Participants reported expecting more shame than guilt when failure was attributed to either stable (e.g., ability) or uncontrollable factors (e.g., lack of ability that cannot be overridden by effort). Participants expected to feel more guilt than shame when failure was attributed to unstable (e.g., effort) or uncontrollable factors (e.g., lack of ability that cannot be overridden by effort).

The evidence presented above shows that the self/behaviour distinction is apparent not only in participants’ recollections of shame and guilt experiences, but is also prevalent in participants’ expectations of and counterfactual thinking after each emotional experience. Viewed collectively, the weight of the available evidence strongly suggests that the self versus behaviour distinction is a meaningful constitutive difference between shame and guilt. In Chapter 2 I argue that, while this distinction provides a useful way to differentiate shame and guilt, Lewis’s emphasis on the global nature of the self-focus in shame is unnecessary.
1.1.3 Shame is self-focused, guilt is other-focused

The third prominent distinction states that guilt, in contrast with shame, is a distinctly other-focused emotion that arises from interpersonal interaction. Although superficially the present distinction appears to conflict with the first distinction discussed, in which shame is seen as distinctly social, the two are not incompatible. This is because previously-discussed distinctions focused on the eliciting conditions of each emotion, whereas the present distinction addresses the associated actions or action tendencies of each emotion. Proponents of the present distinction argue that guilt motivates other-focused action whereas shame motivates self-focused behaviour, and these different motivations provide a meaningful distinction between the two emotions. For example, Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994, 1995, 2001) have proposed a theory in which guilt fulfils important relationship-enhancing functions. Guilt, they propose, functions to strengthen and enhance relationships in three ways: by motivating better treatment of a relationship partner by the guilty individual, by empowering a less powerful relationship partner through inducement of guilt, and by redistributing emotional distress within a relationship.

A limited number of studies directly comparing shame and guilt-proneness appear to support this contention. For example, Leith and Baumeister (1998) demonstrated correlations between guilt-proneness and perspective taking and between shame-proneness and personal distress. Consequently, they concluded that shame is harmful to interpersonal relationships, whereas guilt is beneficial. Studies on emotional dispositions provide further support for the seemingly constructive role of guilt and destructive role of shame (e.g., Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992).

Can the present account explain instances of guilt that do nothing to enhance, or potentially disrupt interpersonal relationships and instances of shame that promote relationship enhancing behaviours? For example, how might this distinction account for a
man’s shame that arises from the realisation that he has been a bad parent and motivates him to improve his relationship with his children? Likewise, how does this distinction account for a woman’s extreme guilt after accidentally killing a child that ran onto the road, guilt that leads to depression and complete withdrawal from society? The present distinction seemingly cannot account for such examples of shame and guilt.

Empirical studies, too, provide reason to question the present distinction. For example, de Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2008) demonstrated in four studies that shame episodes motivate pro-social, relationship-enhancing interpersonal behaviour in situations relevant to the initial shame episode. Evolutionary accounts also promote the social side of shame, arguing that shame fulfils an important conciliatory, appeasement function that maintains the social hierarchy and prevents conflicts degrading into violence (e.g., Fessler, 2004; Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Consistent with this thesis, Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, and Brown (2008) showed, on an inter-group level, that shame expressions lessen the insult experienced by members of a victim group when reparations are offered by a perpetrator outgroup.

There is evidence, also, that guilt is sometimes linked to maladaptive outcomes. Work has shown that ‘maladaptive’ guilt is linked to depression in both children and adults (e.g., Luby et al., 2009; Meehan et al., 1996). Further, research has also showed that guilt episodes are related to other negative, maladaptive traits, such as maladaptive perfectionism (e.g., Fedewa, Burns, & Gomez, 2005). In sum, the empirical evidence demonstrates that not only can shame can have adaptive, relationship-enhancing effects both at the inter-personal and inter-group levels, but that guilt can have a number of maladaptive effects. It appears, therefore, that the present distinction is both inconsistent with our intuitive conception of shame and guilt, and with the available empirical evidence.

The effect of adopting the present distinction is to force the conclusion that episodes of guilt that are not adaptive and episodes of shame that are not maladaptive are not
guilt or shame experiences, respectively. This conclusion is unsatisfactory both on intuitive and empirical grounds, and must lead us to reject the present distinction as a constitutive difference between shame and guilt. To ignore this distinction outright would be unjustified, however, as the weight of evidence does seem suggest that, on average, guilt is associated with pro-social outcomes more so than shame. While this may be a result of study methodology, particularly in relation to the conceptualisation and measurement of shame, it does appear that pro-social action tendencies are more typical of guilt than shame (as it has been measured to date). I discuss this latter point further when outlining my alternative distinction between shame and guilt.

1.1.4 Shame is about values, guilt is about norms

The final distinction between guilt and shame has its roots in Freudian notions of the superego — a psychological mechanism through which society’s rules and prohibitions are internalised — and the ego-ideal — an image of the perfect self. Within this view guilt arises from violations of superego-imposed prohibitions and shame arises from failure to live up to standards set by the ego-ideal (e.g., Lynd, 1956). A similar distinction has been proposed by Higgins (1987) in self-discrepancy theory. Higgins (1987) and his colleagues (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985) focused on the discrepancy between how the self actually is with one’s own or others aspirations for the ideal self, or how the self ought to be. Specifically, Higgins (1987) proposed that a discrepancy between the actual and ideal selves results in shame, whereas a discrepancy between the actual and ought selves results in guilt.

Building upon Freudian and self-discrepancy theories, Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni (2011) and Teroni and Deonna (2008) propose a simplified distinction that does not require the use of outdated Freudian concepts: guilt is related to violation of norms, shame is related to a failure to live up to values. Guilt, in this sense arises because one’s be-
haviour is perceived as violating a binding societal norm. Shame arises because one’s
directives are perceived as seriously undermining one’s values. Indirect support for this
distinction has come from a number of psychological investigations into shame. In qualita-
tive interviews, Lindsay-Hartz et al. (1995) asked participants to recall shame and guilt
experiences. Through specific interview questions and their subsequent analysis, Lindsay-
Hartz et al. (1995) concluded that shame is particularly related to the self, whereas guilt
is related to behavior (in line with H. B. Lewis, 1971). They also concluded that shame,
particularly, is related to distinct and specific failures in the realm of one’s aspirations.
They concluded that direct violations of one’s ideals are central to the manifestation of
shame. Olthof and colleagues’ work on ‘unwanted identities’ also supports the connection
between shame and value violations (Olthof, Ferguson, Bloemers, & Deij, 2004; Olthof,
Schouten, Kuiper, Stegge, & Jennekens-Schinkel, 2000). They show that shame is related
to specific unwanted identities. Their conceptualisation of an unwanted identity — as a
specific aspect of the self that is deficient in some manner — is consistent with how one
would view the self following behavior that undermines a personal value.

A major advantage of the value/norm distinction is that it is able account for the so-
called heteronomy of shame (i.e., the occurrence of shame in seemingly disparate contexts)
in a way that other distinctions are not. This distinction can explain shame that arises
in private, in terms of violation of a private value, such as morality. It can explain shame
that arises publicly as a result of criticism of the self by others, even if one does not agree
with the criticism, in terms of violation of the values of image, reputation and privacy. It
can also explain shame that arises as a result of body dissatisfaction, in terms of violation
of one’s value of beauty.

I expand on this value vs. norm distinction, and the work of Teroni and Deonna, in
Chapter 2, where I outline further their novel distinction between shame and guilt and,
as a result, develop a number of novel hypotheses. First, I review the research on shame
and guilt.

1.2 Correlates of guilt and shame at the personal level

Research at the personal level has been dominated by work on general dispositions toward experiencing shame or guilt. These dispositions have become known as shame-proneness and guilt-proneness. The majority of research along these lines has been conducted by Tangney and colleagues, using the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1989). The TOSCA is a questionnaire-based measure, in which participants are asked to rate the likelihood they would respond in different ways to a number of pre-established scenarios. For each scenario, responses are viewed as representing either a guilt or shame response (other responses, such as pride, are also measured by the TOSCA, which I do not discuss here). Ratings representing each emotion are summed across scenarios to form indices of guilt-proneness and shame-proneness. This corpus of work now dominates the common view of shame and guilt and for that reason I review this work in detail below.

Tangney and colleagues have followed H. B. Lewis (1971)’s qualitative work in which shame is described as an emotion that is characterised by a global criticism of the self and feelings of shrinking, and being small, worthless and powerless. Guilt, on the other hand, is characterised by a focus on one’s specific behaviour and feelings of remorse and regret. Following from Lewis, Tangney’s work has shown that guilt-free shame-proneness (i.e., statistically controlling for guilt-proneness) is correlated with various forms of intrapersonal and interpersonal maladjustment, such psychoticism, anxiety, depression, externalised blame, anger, hostility and hiding. Shame-free guilt-proneness (i.e., statistically controlling for guilt-proneness) is correlated with various forms of intrapersonal and interpersonal maladjustment, such psychoticism, anxiety, depression, externalised blame, anger, hostility and hiding.
controlling for shame-proneness) is negatively correlated with the above, and is positively correlated with a number of pro-social factors, such as empathy and a desire to make amends.

For example, Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow (1992) conducted an investigation into the correlates of the TOSCA and Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (SCA AI; a measure closely related to the TOSCA) among university students. They found that guilt-free shame-proneness was correlated with psychoticism, paranoid ideation, obsessive-compulsiveness, hostility-anger, interpersonal sensitivity, anxiety (both state and trait) and depression. Shame-free guilt-proneness was largely unrelated to these indices of intrapersonal maladjustment, although a negative correlation with hostility-anger was observed. Using the same participants as above, Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, and Gramzow (1992) showed that proneness to shame and proneness to guilt also have negative correlates in the interpersonal sphere. In this analysis, guilt-free shame-proneness was correlated with externalisation of blame, paranoid ideation, and a number of forms of anger, including anger-hostility, indirect hostility, irritability, negativism, resentment and suspicion. Shame-free guilt-proneness was negatively correlated with externalisation of blame, anger-hostility and resentment.

In a similar investigation, Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, and Gramzow (1996) investigated the relation between guilt and shame-proneness and strategies to deal with anger. They showed, firstly, that shame-proneness was positively correlated, whereas guilt-proneness was uncorrelated with anger arousal. Tangney, Wagner, et al. (1996) also investigated what participants would feel like doing (i.e., their intentions) after being angered. Shame-proneness was reliably associated with maladaptive responses to anger, including physical, verbal and symbolic aggression; malediction; a number of forms of displaced aggression; and a desire to remove oneself from the situation. Guilt-proneness was negatively correlated with these maladaptive responses, and was weakly correlated
with a desire to discuss with the target — a seemingly adaptive response.

Four studies conducted by Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, and McCloskey (2010) suggest that the relationship between shame-proneness and aggression may not be as direct as is implied by the correlational evidence above. They found that the relationship between shame-proneness and aggression held only when aggression was self-reported: shame-proneness was unrelated to more objective measures of aggression, such as teacher reports, mother reports and jail records. Furthermore, the relationship between shame-proneness and self-reported aggression was indirect, as it was mediated by externalization of blame. Guilt, however, was negatively related to teacher and mother reports of aggression, providing stronger evidence for a negative relationship between guilt-proneness and aggression.

Qualitative (e.g., Lindsay-Hartz, 1984) and self-recollection studies (e.g., Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983) tend to support Lewis and Tangney’s proposal that shame and guilt are related to different outcomes and behaviours. Lindsay-Hartz (1984) conducted qualitative interviews and concluded that a desire to hide and escape was highly characteristic of shame, whereas approach and repair were characteristic of guilt. Wicker et al. (1983) showed that participants recalled wanting to hide and punish others more during shame episodes than guilt episodes, however this difference was relatively slight.

In summary, the work above shows guilt-proneness and shame-proneness as quite diverging emotional dispositions. Unfortunately, this work has led to a number of conclusions about the nature of shame and guilt experiences. It has led to shame being described as an intensely painful emotion that is associated with a multitude of maladaptive motivations. Shame, it is concluded, is linked to motivational influences such as externalisation of blame; anger; and a desire to hide, escape, and avert one’s gaze. Guilt is described as a less painful emotion that is associated with a recognition of, and regret for what one has done. Guilt is linked to motivational influences such as a desire to make amends and
apologize for one’s actions. There is real danger in drawing conclusions about the nature of temporary (state) experiences of shame and guilt from data on dispositional (trait) proneness measures.

One should take particular care to differentiate between shame-proneness and guilt-proneness as emotional dispositions, and shame and guilt as emotion episodes. Much of the literature on shame- and guilt-proneness has not made this distinction clear. The authors of this literature are guilty of drawing conclusions about “shame” and “guilt”, without being clear whether they refer to dispositions or episodes. This ambiguity increases the risk of making erroneous conclusions about emotion episodes from dispositional data and hinders our understanding of guilt and shame as emotional experiences rather than dispositions. These issues are discussed in more detail below.

1.3 Limitations/criticism of the Tangney et al. conceptualisation of shame

The data of Tangney and her colleagues certainly tempt a view of shame as universally maladaptive and guilt as universally adaptive, but might there be reason to question Tangney’s conclusions? I argue that her conclusions do not stand up to scrutiny for two reasons. First, as noted above, it is incorrect to draw conclusions about shame and guilt episodes based on data relating to shame and guilt dispositions (Deonna & Teroni, 2009; Teroni & Deonna, 2008). That is, much of Tangney’s work is based on shame and guilt-prone individuals, whose emotional dispositions may reflect a pathological tendency to respond invariantly across situations — this may be particularly problematic for ‘shame-prone’ individuals, who not only respond in the extreme manner reflected in the TOSCA shame measure, but they do so widely and across situations. In any case, it would be incorrect to infer that shame or guilt episodes would lead to similar outcomes as those
associated with a pathological proneness toward a particular emotional reaction. I believe this criticism is particularly relevant for shame and has led many to discount and ignore the pro-social effects of shame episodes.

Empirical comparisons between measures of proneness to shame and shame episodes partially support the above criticism (e.g., Allan, Gilbert, & Goss, 1994; Rusch et al., 2007). Rusch et al. (2007) showed that while shame-proneness was related to traditional measures of psychopathology, state shame was related primarily to state anxiety. Allan et al. (1994) found that trait measures of shame were markedly more strongly related to measures of psychopathology such as depression, anxiety, and social dysfunction than measures of state shame. In the realm of depression, Ghatavi, Nicolson, MacDonald, Osher, and Levitt (2002) showed that trait-guilt was specifically linked (along with trait-shame and low pride) to acute depression, while state-guilt was not.

The second criticism relates to serious methodological concerns about the measures primarily used by Tangney and colleagues. Fontaine and colleagues (2001; Luyten, Fontaine, & Corveleyn, 2002) provide evidence that shows that the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA) may only measure adaptive aspects of guilt and maladaptive aspects of shame. Conducting a principal components analysis of the TOSCA items, Luyten et al. (2002) showed that shame items primarily referred to low self-esteem, whereas guilt items primarily referred to reparative behaviour, and therefore showed that these scales confound each emotion with its possible consequences. They then followed this analysis up by creating new shame and guilt scales using only items explicitly related to self-esteem and reparative behaviour. Using these new scales, they largely replicated the associations of the full TOSCA scale with measures of anxiety, anger, depression, empathy, detachment and externalization. Given that research has linked low self-esteem to aggression, antisocial behaviour and delinquency (Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005), the confounding of shame-proneness and low self-esteem is particularly problematic.
Evidence suggests that it is the maladaptive (low self-esteem) and the adaptive (reparative behaviour) items that are likely driving the associations of the full TOSCA shame and guilt scales, respectively. Consequently, one can have little confidence that the TOSCA scales allow investigation into the pro-social effects of shame, nor the anti-social effects of guilt, because the scales do not measure these aspects of each emotion.

In addition to the criticisms listed above, I have already reviewed research by de Hooge et al. (2008), which shows that shame does not always have antisocial motivational effects. On the contrary, they demonstrated that shame episodes can act as an interpersonal commitment device in circumstances relevant to the original shaming episode. de Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2011) also show that guilt can motivate reparative actions at the expense of third parties, indicating that not only might the prosocial benefits of guilt be quite limited, but also that behaviour motivated by guilt can have wider antisocial effects for third parties not involved in the initial transgression. In summary, there is mounting reason to question the conclusions derived from the corpus of work presented by Tangney and colleagues. I now review the research focusing on shame and guilt at the group level.

1.4 Guilt and shame at the group level

Below I review the literature on group-based guilt and shame. Notably, in contrast to the majority of research at the individual level, the following studies measure emotion episodes, not dispositions.

By now, a reasonable number studies have investigated the effects of both emotions at the group level. In the first study to evaluate guilt at the group level, Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998) found that feelings of collective guilt among Dutch students predicted their willingness to advocate both personal and governmental compensation to Indonesians for past colonial injustices perpetrated by their group. Similarly, McGarty et
al. (2005) demonstrated that, although group-based guilt tended to be low among non-Indigenous Australians, it was strongly associated with support for an official apology to Aboriginal Australians for discriminatory practices occurring in both the 19th (Study 2) and 20th centuries (Study 1). A number of other studies have demonstrated the positive associations between guilt and support for reparation in diverse contexts. Examples include non-Indigenous Chileans’ treatment of Indigenous Chileans (Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 2008), intergroup relations in post-conflict Bosnia Herzegovina (Brown & Čehajić, 2008), illegitimate (majority) ingroup advantage in the USA and Europe (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Mallett & Swim, 2007; Swim & Miller, 1999; Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Leach, Iyer, & Pederson, 2006; Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006) and national involvement in war (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007).

Despite this evidence demonstrating positive associations between guilt and support for reparation, recent research suggests that the pro-social effects of guilt may be limited only to abstract support for restitution. For instance, Leach and colleagues (2006) showed that, with regard to Aboriginal Australians’ disadvantage within Australian society, Non-Indigenous Australians’ guilt predicted attitudinal support for compensation, but did not predict intentions to act on these attitudes after accounting for respondents’ prejudice and anger. Similarly, Iyer et al. (2007) found that feelings of guilt amongst American and British students over the Invasion of Iraq did not predict support for any reparative actions after accounting for feelings of shame and anger. Allpress, Barlow, Brown, and Louis (2010, Study1) built upon the above studies by demonstrating that, in the context of Australia’s apology to Aboriginal Australians, the predictive power of shame renders collective guilt an unimportant predictor of actual collective, political action.

There is less research into shame at the group level, and the findings of the extant studies provide a less-than-clear picture of shame’s effects. Schmader and Lickel (2006) demonstrated that shame (when controlling for guilt) for others’ misdeeds was associated
with a distancing motivation (a desire to be distanced from the event, to hide and to disappear). In a similar manner, Lickel and colleagues (2005) found that shame arising from a threat to one’s shared social identity was associated with a desire to distance oneself from both the situation and those responsible for the wrongdoing. Johns, Schmader, and Lickel (2005) demonstrated that U.S. citizens’ feelings of shame in response to prejudice exhibited against people of middle-eastern descent following September 11 was associated with a desire to distance oneself from the ingroup perpetrators of the discrimination and, in some instances, a desire to distance oneself from the ingroup in general. Finally, Iyer et al. (2007) found that British and American students’ feelings of group-based shame predicted action intentions to advocate withdrawal of British and American troops from Iraq.

It is clear that Schmader and Lickel’s (2006) findings that vicarious shame is associated with a desire to hide and withdraw indicate that group-based shame episodes can be maladaptive. It is unclear how to interpret some of these other findings, however. Can a desire to distance oneself from ingroup perpetrators, as Johns and colleagues (2005) found, be interpreted in terms of a desire to hide and shrink away, so commonly seen as characteristic of shame? One could certainly argue that distancing from perpetrators has pro-social undertones. Similarly, should Iyer et al.’s (2007) findings that shame motivates action intentions toward advocating withdrawal of troops from Iraq be interpreted in terms of maladaptive hiding and avoidance? This strategy could be interpreted in both adaptive and maladaptive terms. By and large, however, these findings have been taken as replicating the maladaptive effects of shame-proneness seen at the individual level.

To complicate matters, other work has explicitly found an association between shame and various pro-social outcomes. For example, Allpress and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that group based shame among white Australians was associated with both attitudinal and behavioural support for the first official government apology to the stolen
generations of Aboriginal Australians. Furthermore, in a second study focusing on British students’ reactions to their country’s violent decolonization of Kenya, they distinguished between two different forms of shame and demonstrated that these two forms differentially predicted pro-social attitudes (support for apology and support for compensation) towards Kenyans. Brown and colleagues (2008) conducted three studies in Chile investigating non-Indigenous Chileans’ feelings of shame for the treatment of the country’s largest indigenous group, the Mapuche. They found that shame had cross-sectional associations with attitudinal support for reparations to the Mapuche (a composite measure consisting of support for: apology, compensation, outgroup economic benefits and a tolerant society) and that this association was mediated by a desire to improve the reputation of the ingroup.

In a similar manner to the above studies, Brown and Čehajić (2008) found that Bosnian Serbs’ feelings of shame about their group’s actions during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia Herzegovina predicted attitudinal support for reparations to Bosnian Muslims (consisting of apology, compensation and a desire to assist the outgroup). Another series of studies, conducted in Norway and focussing on the historical mistreatment of the Norwegian Gypsies (called Tatere), highlights the pro-social associations of shame by providing evidence that shame predicts pro-sociality (empathy, restitution, desire for contact) when controlling for feelings of rejection (which predict self-defensive responses) and inferiority (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2010).

There is convincing evidence, therefore, that shame may be directly associated with pro-social outcomes. However, let us assume for a moment that the conclusions of Iyer et al. (2007), Johns et al. (2005), Lickel et al. (2006), and Schmader and Lickel (2006) are correct and that shame’s distancing motivation at the group level represents a mal-adaptive response. We must conclude that shame at the group level is associated with both maladaptive responses and adaptive responses. In the following chapter, I propose
an explanation for these seemingly contrary propositions.
Chapter 2

A solution to the inconsistencies in the guilt and shame literature

In the previous chapter, I outlined four popular ways that shame and guilt have been distinguished within the academic literature, and reviewed the empirical research on these emotions. Throughout the chapter, I hoped to make clear that popular distinctions, on their own, fail to capture fully the nature of shame and guilt and that a number of inconsistencies exist within the literature, particularly in relation to the effects of shame.

In this chapter, I outline an alternative way of distinguishing between guilt and shame originally proposed by Deonna and colleagues, and put forward a specific explanation for the inconsistencies in the shame literature.

2.1 A novel distinction between shame and guilt

The following distinction between shame and guilt draws heavily upon the work of Deonna et al. (2011) and Teroni and Deonna (2008). It represents a combination of two of the four distinctions reviewed in the Chapter 1.

As I noted in the previous chapter, neither distinction (1) shame is public, guilt
is private, nor (3) shame is self-focused, guilt is other-focused, adequately distinguish between shame and guilt. It appears that, although these criteria highlight the characteristics of common, typical shame and guilt experiences, neither criterion adequately describes the variety of different shame and guilt episodes. This means that, for instance, while shame that arises from the external judgement of others may be quite common, and is therefore seen as a typical shame episode, this public exposure is not necessary in order to experience shame.

The new distinction that guides much of the work in this thesis follows closely the substantial theoretical work of Deonna et al. (2011) and Teroni and Deonna (2008). Deonna and colleagues propose that the two distinctions that most convincingly distinguish between guilt and shame are criterions (4) shame is about values, guilt is about norms and (2) shame is about the self, guilt is about behaviour. They propose that a combination of these two distinctions provides the most satisfactory account of the differences between shame and guilt: shame arises when an important value is tarnished and is characterised by a focus on the specific aspect of the self associated with the value in question, whereas guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterised by a focus on the specific behaviour in question.

The most important distinguishing feature is the value vs. norm dimension, as it is this difference that drives the specific focus of each emotion. Shame is characterised by a focus on the self because of what Teroni and Deonna (2008) call the “value connection”; because values play an important role in determining how we see and feel about ourselves (e.g., Helm, 2001), when we think or behave in such a manner that seriously undermines a value that we hold important — and thus experience shame — the specific aspect of our self-concept that is connected with that value becomes the focus of our attention. It is important to clarify that the focus on the self that is characteristic of shame is different from the global negative focus on the self advanced by H. B. Lewis (1971). Here, because
of the value connection, shame is focused on a specific aspect of the self, rather than a more pathological global self-criticism. Because shame is associated with a focus on the specific aspect of the self that is related to the threatened value, and is therefore not globally overwhelming, we should not expect shame to have intensely negative motivational effects in all circumstances, as advanced by H. B. Lewis (1971) and Tangney and Dearing (2002). This latter point is an important one, and one to which I return shortly.

This novel distinction sees guilt, on the other hand, as characterised by a focus on a specific behaviour or action because of the special relationship between norms and behaviour. Because guilt arises when one sees a certain action as violating a societal-driven prohibition (i.e., a social norm), the focus naturally switches to the prohibited act. There is much less focus on the self with guilt because guilt arises in response to a prohibition — what one should not be doing — rather than the internal standards one holds for oneself, in the form of values.

Deonna and colleagues’ distinction is preferable to previous distinctions because it not only captures a wider range of shame and guilt experiences, but it also provides a possible explanation for the empirical inconsistencies within the literature. In Chapter 1, I noted that while popular distinctions between guilt and shame captured many instances of shame, none of them appropriately captured all instances of the emotions. This was particularly evident with regard to shame, a problem described by Teroni and Deonna (2008) as the “heteronomy of shame”: in some circumstances, shame might arise from the criticism of others, whereas in others from an internal dissatisfaction with oneself or one’s behaviour. The present distinction is able to account for this apparent heterogeneity because shame is seen as arising when the individual feels that the behaviour or situation in question seriously undermines an important value. Because, in this view, shame can arise in relation to any value, it is not inconsistent to find that shame arises in apparently disparate situations and for seemingly different reasons. The key is that in all circum-
stances, the individual experiencing shame perceives that an important self-relevant value has been seriously undermined. The notion that shame can arise in relation to different values may, I propose, provide the key to understanding the empirical inconsistencies in the shame literature. My core argument in this thesis is that the values to which shame is connected can influence this emotion’s motivational effect, in such a way that, depending on the value in question, shame can sometimes have positive motivational effects and sometimes negative motivational effects. I develop this argument in the following section of this chapter.

In summary, in line with Teroni and Deonna (2008), I am proposing that shame and guilt differ on two important dimensions. In shame, a person perceives their behaviour as seriously undermining an important value, and as a result, the shame episode is characterised by a focus on how the behaviour tarnishes how they see themselves in relation to that value. In guilt, a person perceives their actions as violating a normative prohibition, and as a result, the guilt episode is characterised by a focus on the specific behaviour that led to the norm violation.

2.2 A solution to the inconsistencies in the shame literature

The argument developed above suggests that shame may be elicited in relation to a number of different values. This, I believe, is the key to explaining the divergent findings reviewed in Chapter 1: The specific value that gives rise to shame determines the coping strategy by which individuals deal with their feelings, and different values are likely to lead to different coping strategies.

Two values that may be particularly important in the context of intergroup relations are image and morality. Feelings of shame that arise from the perception that one’s social image has been undermined — which I term ‘image shame’ — will probably have different motivational effects from shame that arises from the perception that one’s morality has
been undermined — termed ‘moral shame’ here. Because moral shame arises from an individual’s perception that the ingroup’s actions reflect a specific introspective threat to one’s moral values, the dominant coping strategy will be focused on acting in such a way as to restore the ingroup’s moral standing. In contrast, because image shame arises from an individual’s perception that the ingroup’s image in the eyes of others has been undermined, the dominant coping strategy will be focused on reducing or improving the negative image of the ingroup held by others. I develop specific predictions regarding the most likely types of coping strategies for moral shame and image shame later in this chapter.

While I am the first to explicitly propose the importance of these two different forms of shame (see Allpress et al., 2010, for an early formulation of this argument), previous work has alluded to such a possibility. While the ‘image’ form of shame, which has been widely emphasized as a crucial aspect of shame (e.g., Scheff, 2000; R. H. Smith et al., 2002), is captured by Branscombe and colleagues’ (2004) remark that “collective shame involves being publicly exposed as incompetent, not being in control, weak and potentially even disgusting in the eyes of others” (p. 29, emphasis in original), R. H. Smith et al. (2002), in their investigation into the effect of public exposure on shame, conclude that their data show that “the word shame may refer to two quite different emotional experiences; that is, there may be two types of shame” (p.157, emphasis in original). The two types of shame that Smith and colleagues identify reflect a concern with either morality or social image.

The distinction between moral shame and image shame is important because it can explain the inconsistencies in the shame literature in terms of the different motivational effects of each form of shame. I propose that moral shame is most likely to motivate prosocial outcomes, whereas image shame is most likely to motivate antisocial reactions. There are two important issues that arise from this proposal. Firstly, what is the psychological reality of these different forms of shame? Secondly, why do I predict that these different
forms of shame motivate different responses? I address each of these in turn and then
develop predictions that are used to guide the empirical research presented in subsequent
chapters.

2.2.1 The psychological reality of shame and guilt

How much is a person aware of and what are they actually experiencing when they feel
ashamed or guilty in response to ingroup wrongdoing? While emotion researchers may
make sharp distinctions between emotions such as shame and guilt, an individual’s actual
experience is likely to be much less defined. While some awareness of specific emotions and
specific drivers of these emotions is likely, the primary identifiable experience is most likely
that of ‘feeling bad’. This ‘feeling bad’ reflects the coherent experience that results from the
simultaneous occurrence of different emotions (Russell, 2003). If probed, individuals may
be able to identify to a certain degree these constituent emotions, but this identification
will be secondary to the more generalised negative feeling.

Just as this individual’s ‘bad feeling’ is determined by multiple, specific emotions, so
to will his overall attitudes and action tendencies. That is, in any given moment, an
individual’s general attitudes and action tendencies are going to be influenced by the ag-
gregate of the different emotions being experienced. This summation process will lead to
coherent set of attitudes and action intentions, the direction of which will be determined
by the strongest and most dominant emotion(s). Therefore, how an individual feels, thinks
and acts in any given situation is the result of an averaging of the individual effects of
different, specific emotions. Overall, the individual is unlikely to have full awareness of
being pulled in different directions by these different motivating forces, although some
awareness is likely (Larsen & McGraw, 2011). To be clear, this view is describing the
subjective and coherent experience of an individual in any given moment, which, while
having many simultaneous causes, is likely to be experienced as psychologically coherent
and consistent. This does not preclude, however, the possibility that different emotions have divergent and different individual effects on the core affective experience, action tendencies and attitudes. Which of these emotions is most influential on the core experience depends, I believe, on the situation.

**Statistical implications**

There are some important statistical implications to seeing an individual’s experience as a mixture and coherent result of different and sometimes contrasting emotional experiences. The first is that, because these emotions are all contributing to the individual’s moment-to-moment experience they should be moderately correlated with one another. Secondly, caution should be exercised when interpreting the bivariate correlations of each specific emotion. Because the primary experience of the individual will be that of their overall, coherent feeling, their responses to individual emotion items — even if these items are specific and targeted — will, in part, reflect the lack of specificity that they are experiencing psychologically. As such, the bivariate correlations associated with each emotion scale should be uninterpretable because they are likely contaminated with the experiences associated with the other emotions. Because any ‘reaction’ to ingroup wrongdoing is likely to be a mix of different emotional experiences, it is only once we partial out the experiences of the other emotional variables that we can determine the true effect of each emotion. For this reason, statistical techniques involving multivariate analyses (such as multiple regression and structural equation modelling, SEM) are likely to offer a more reliable reflection of the true, individual effects of each emotion.
2.2.2 Different motivational effects of image shame, moral shame and guilt

Shame is an aversive experience, regardless of the reasons for its origins. Given its aversiveness, people will be motivated to think and act in ways that best reduce their levels of shame. In this way, the effects of any particular form of shame can be seen as representing a ‘coping strategy’, by which people seek to reduce the negative shame experience. Although an individual may have a number of different coping strategies available to them, they are likely to choose the strategy that they believe is most likely to reduce their shame. What determines which strategy is likely to be most effective? The answer to this question depends on the value to which shame is connected. Because shame arises when a self-relevant value has been seriously threatened, and individual is most likely to reduce the feelings of shame by adopting attitudes and behaviours that reduce the threat to this value and allow one or one’s group to be seen as living up to or consistent with this value. Which attitudes and behaviours achieve these goals is likely to differ for different values, and therefore types of shame. It is for this reason that I predict the different forms of shame will have different attitudinal and behavioural effects — individuals will strive to reduce these feelings in different ways because different forms of shame are related to different values.

In what different ways might individuals seek to reduce their feelings of moral and image shame? For image shame, because one’s concern is solely with the image and reputation of the group — and not the wellbeing of the victim group — the most successful way to restore the ingroup’s valued social image, and to reduce the shame that arises from the judgement of others, is likely to involve avoidance and withdrawal from the critical gaze of others, in a hope that the issue will blow over. An individual in this situation might also, if they believe such a strategy might reduce external blame of the group, adopt a defensive strategy of actively covering up the groups misdeeds.
It is also possible that an individual experiencing image shame might view a strategy of (disingenuous) support for apology and superficial acts of restitution as a useful way to buffer the ingroup’s reputation amongst third parties. I view this strategy as less likely, however, because acts of apology and compensation are likely to commit the ingroup to further and prolonged acts of restitution. As the concern in image shame lies with the restoration of the ingroup’s image, and not with the wellbeing of the victim group, an individual experiencing this form of shame is unlikely to support opening themselves and their group up to further reparative commitments. The initial preference, therefore, is likely to reflect an image-maintenance strategy characterised by avoidance and cover-up. It is only once this initial preference is shown to be ineffective that alternative strategies will be adopted.

It is not so easy, however, to avoid and forget the transgressions that give rise to moral shame, because these transgressions have high self-importance. The coping strategy that is adopted in relation to moral shame will therefore reflect the particular importance of one’s moral values. In this case, avoidance of the issue is unlikely to restore one’s personal value of morality, and is therefore likely to be a less fruitful activity for reducing moral shame. In order for moral shame to be reduced, an individual must be able to see themselves (or group) as moral. For this reason, an individual is most likely to adopt attitudes and behaviours that address the initial wrongdoing and restore the wellbeing of the victim group. Such a strategy is likely to include a (genuine) support for apology and compensations, and openness to discussing and addressing the original transgression.

How are my predictions for the motivational effects of moral shame different from the those derived from the conceptualisation of shame advanced by H. B. Lewis (1971), and more recently, Tangney and Dearing (2002)? The view of shame as a debilitating, subsuming emotion that motivates anger, fury, avoidance and withdrawal should be familiar to the reader. It should be no surprise that the feeling Lewis describes results in these
outcomes, because it reflects a view that the whole self is flawed, rotten, useless and disgusting. But this is not the moral shame I describe above and the predictions advanced by Lewis, Tangney and colleagues should not be applied to moral shame simply because it reflects a perception of moral failure. Moral shame, as I have highlighted throughout this chapter, reflects the view that one or one’s group has acted in violation of a valued standard of morality. It is a feeling of shame that results in a focus on the morality of the self in relation to the specific transgression, but does not ‘spill over’ into other aspects of our identity. Moral shame may be a painful and often intense emotion, but it is not debilitating. There is no reason to assume that an individual experiencing moral shame, for example as a result of cheating on a test, might as a result see themselves as flawed in other areas of their life, such as their role as a father, sportsperson, baker, or poet. The shame is restricted to the specific dimension in which the transgression occurred. This specificity allows an individual to react to their moral shame in an adaptive manner that re-establishes their moral credibility.

Whilst the two forms of shame have received the majority of discussion so far, the theoretical account of Deonna and colleagues also provides insight into the motivational effects of guilt. Their approach suggests that because of guilt’s connection with normative prohibitions, the reparation that is envisaged in guilt is limited to the compensation of the harm done, rather than further reaching soul-searching and self-questioning that moral shame invites. Because guilt arises from societal prohibitions, rather than internalised moral conviction, the prosocial effects of guilt are likely to be limited. This latter point is of importance for the distinction between moral shame and guilt. It is likely, given their respective eliciting factors that the effects of guilt will be much weaker than those of moral shame. This is because the threat to one’s valued self-conception as moral is likely to prove a more potent motivator of reparative behaviour than concern with normative sanctions.
In summary, I am proposing two forms of shame that have different motivational effects. Moral shame occurs in response to the violation of an important moral value and primarily motivates positive, pro-social behaviour. Image shame occurs in response to the violation of a group’s valued social image and primarily motivates anti-social, avoidance behaviour. I propose that these two forms of shame are able to account for the seemingly contradictory findings in relation to shame.

2.3 The Gausel, Leach and Vignoles conception of shame

While I believe the theoretical argument developed above (and the empirical substantiation that follows in later chapters) provides a convincing account of the inconsistencies within the shame literature, another group of researchers have been simultaneously developing their own account for these inconsistencies. This analysis, provided by Gausel and Leach (2011), is similar to mine in important ways, and thus reflects an important and united challenge to the orthodox conception of shame (as universally negative). Nevertheless, there are differences between our two positions, which I highlight below and then test empirically in Chapter 3.

Gausel and Leach (2011) argue that the mistake of the traditional view of shame has been to consider shame as constituting a global and all-encompassing sense of failure. Instead, they argue, it is possible to consider shame as comprising a more specific sense of moral defect, one which it would be most functional to undo with some form of reparative or self-corrective actions. These actions could include prosocial attitudes or actions towards the victim (group). They also suggest that other emotions can arise from an event in which the self (or the ingroup) has behaved immorally. These might be a feeling of rejection by others or a sense of inferiority. These two emotions, which Gausel and Leach (2011) regard as psychologically distinct from shame, are more likely to be managed by adopting such self-defensive responses as hiding from, avoiding or even blaming
the people or events that gave rise to the self-conscious emotions. In Gausel and Leach’s (2011) model, guilt arises from an appraisal of responsibility for the original misdeed which leads to a desire to repair. However, it is thought to be a somewhat weaker motivating emotion because it does not directly implicate one’s moral identity in the way that shame is considered to do. As a result, it may have weaker or less consistent links to prosocial responses.

Gausel and colleagues have managed to find reasonable support for their ideas. In two studies examining contemporary Norwegians’ feelings about the mistreatment of the Tater minority, Gausel et al. (2010) were able to demonstrate that it was possible to distinguish their new conception of shame from feelings of inferiority and social rejection. The latter emotion was positively correlated with tendencies to avoid or cover up the Tater historical issue and negatively related to prosocial orientations such as empathy for the Tater and a desire to make some kind of restitution. In contrast, shame revealed an opposite pattern: negative relationship with avoidance and cover up, positive with prosociality. Guilt proved largely unrelated to either outcome measure.

The similarities between this approach and the one presented in this thesis should be quite apparent. There is agreement that shame represents a concern with a specific aspect of the self, rather than a global criticism of the self. There is also agreement that shame can lead to adaptive responses, particularly when the actions in question are seen as immoral by the individual feeling shame. The disagreement relates primarily to the core definition of shame. I am proposing that shame arises when an individual sees that an important self-relevant value has been seriously undermined and, for this reason, shame can arise in many different circumstances. Gausel and colleagues, however, propose that shame can only arise when an individual sees their (or their group’s) behaviour as reflecting a specific moral failure. They go further to say that the conceptions of shame as being related to damaged reputation or social image are are wrong and that such instances of ‘shame’ are
actually instances of rejection. The implication of this assertion is that we must reject a substantial and interdisciplinary body of work documenting the connection between shame and reputation concerns. While I agree that we are yet to adequately understand the nature of shame, I am uneasy with dismissing all previous work linking shame with social image. In fact, I do not believe that such a dismissal is necessary, as feeling ashamed in response to external criticism is entirely consistent with the theoretical view advanced in this thesis, as individuals may feel their valued social image is tarnished and therefore feel shame.

Despite the important differences in conceptual details, it is clear that these two conceptions converge to a broadly similar conclusion. Both predict that there can be circumstances in which shame has positive implications for social relations. This hypothesis is rather at odds with that which is commonly deduced from the traditional conception of shame (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2004). While it was not my focus in this thesis to evaluate my theoretical position in relation to Gausel and colleagues’, I provide a preliminary comparison in Study 2, presented in Chapter 3. In this study I demonstrate that image shame and rejection do, indeed, appear to be distinct constructs and show that when compared simultaneously, image shame appears to be driving all of the negative effects present within the model.

2.4 The general hypotheses that guide the empirical work in this thesis

Each of the following chapters details empirical work that I have conducted investigating the various effects and associations of moral shame, image shame and guilt. The general predictions that guided this work are as follows: in the intergroup contexts in which these studies were conducted, moral shame is expected to be associated with adaptive,
prosocial outcomes; image shame is expected to be associated with maladaptive, antisocial outcomes; and guilt is expected to be weakly associated with limited prosocial acts. These general predictions are specified more precisely and empirically tested in the following chapter.
Chapter 3

Evaluating the motivational effects of moral shame, image shame and guilt

Building on the theoretical rationale developed in the previous two chapters, I sought to empirically investigate the predictions developed with regard to moral shame, image shame and guilt. In this chapter I report three studies, which reflect the first empirical substantiation of the conceptualisation of shame and guilt outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, and which form the basis for additional studies presented within this thesis. In Study 1, I test empirically the predictions in relation to guilt and the different types of shame; in Study 2, I attempt to experimentally induce moral shame and image shame; and in Study 3, I develop and expand the emotion and outcome measures and replicate the findings of the prior two studies.

To reiterate the primary guiding hypotheses, I expect these emotions to drive attitudes and behaviours in a way that is most functional for the ingroup, depending on the situation in question. The strategy that each emotion promotes will vary because the threat is
different for each emotion. For image shame, the threat is to the ingroup’s image in the eyes of others and so the response will reflect the best way, in the group members’ eyes, of reducing the threat to their image. For moral shame, the threat is to the ability to see the ingroup as moral, and so the response strategy will reflect the best way of re-establishing the ingroup as moral. For guilt, the threat arises from the perception that the ingroup has violated normative prohibitions, and therefore the response will reflect an attempt to bring the ingroup’s behaviour back in line with social expectations.

3.1 Study 1

Study 1 focussed on Britain’s violent mistreatment of the Kenyan population during de-colonisation. In the light of the arguments advanced above and in previous chapters, I tested the following hypotheses:

1. It is possible to measure separately the group-based emotions of image shame, moral shame and guilt.

2. These emotions will be differently related to positive and negative orientations towards the (victim) outgroup: Moral shame will be associated with increased support for positive orientations (support for apology and compensation) and with decreased negative orientations (anger and avoidance). Image shame will show the opposite pattern. Given that guilt is expected to be limited to the compensation of the harm done, rather than further-reaching soul-searching and self-questioning that shame invites, I predicted that it would be weakly associated with support for apology and compensation, but unrelated to negative orientations.
3.1.1 Method

Participants

Participants were 59 undergraduate psychology students from a British university. All participants (20 males, 38 females, 1 unreported) were British citizens. Their ages ranged from 18 to 42, with a mean of 22 years of age.

Procedure

Students were informed that participation was entirely voluntary. The questionnaire contained an article detailing information about the response of the British government to the Mau Mau revolution in Kenya, between 1952 and 1960. The article gave an account of the number of Britons and Kenyans killed during the uprising and information about the often-horrible conditions within the British-run detention camps. The article contained details of the beatings, starvation and torture that allegedly occurred within the camps, and provided details of a recent response to these allegations by the British government. The dependent measures then followed.

Measures

All items were measured on nine-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).

Moral shame was measured by asking participants how much they agreed (or disagreed) with the following two items, adapted from Brown et al. (2008): “I feel ashamed to be British for the way we have treated the Kenyan people” and “I feel ashamed for the damage done to Kenyan people by Brits”, $\alpha = .82$.

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1 An additional, but unrelated, purpose of the study was to evaluate how participants reacted to different types of government responses to historical crimes. As such, each participant read one of three articles, each detailing the same basic information but reporting a different response by the British government (i.e., apology, no comment, or refusal to apologise). Because this manipulation does not relate to the aims of the present study and because it did not influence any of the variables in the present study — all $F$s < 1, all $ps > .40$, — it is not discussed further.
Image shame was measured with the following two items, adapted from Brown et al. (2008): “To think how Britain is seen for its treatment of Kenyan people makes me feel ashamed”, and “I feel humiliated when I think of how Britain is seen negatively by the rest of the world for how it has treated the Kenyan people”, $\alpha = .78$.

Guilt was measured using three items, adapted from Brown et al. (2008): “I feel guilty for the manner in which Kenyans have been treated by Brits”, “Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behaviour of Brits toward Kenyans”, and “I feel guilty for the bad living conditions of the Kenyan people”, $\alpha = .89$.

Two measures of a positive orientation towards the outgroup were devised: Support for apology was measured with “The British government should issue a public apology for the atrocities committed against the Kenyan people”, and support for compensation with “I support the idea of British Government compensating Kenyans financially for past injustices”. These two variables were averaged to form an item reflecting a positive, pro-social response, $\alpha = .82$.

A negative orientation toward the issue scale was formed by averaging issue avoidance: “I wish that people would stop going on about Kenyan grievances”, and anger: “I am angry that the Kenyan situation is being discussed after all these years” items, $\alpha = .72$.

3.1.2 Results

Means and correlations between the variables are presented in Table 3.1. AMOS (version 16) was used to conduct confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) and SPSS (version 16) was used to test the effects of each emotion.

Hypothesis 1: Distinguishing among emotions

Confirmatory factor analyses were performed to assess the factor structure of the items measuring moral shame, image shame and guilt. In all models the factors were allowed
Table 3.1:
Study 1: Means of and inter-correlations among variables

<table>
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<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Moral shame</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.71**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>-.47**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Image shame</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>.54**</td>
<td>.27*</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Guilt</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td></td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
<td>-.62**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Positive orientation</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Negative orientation</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05; ** p < .01

to correlate but no observed items were allowed to cross-load. The hypothesised model, specifying image shame, moral shame and guilt as separate factors provided a very good fit to the data, $\chi^2 (11) = 12.01$, $p = .363$, CFI = .996, RMSEA = .034. I then compared this three-factor model to three other models. The first alternative, specifying moral and image shame items as loading onto a single “shame” factor and the guilt items loading onto separate a guilt factor, showed a significant decrease in fit, $\Delta \chi^2 (2) = 10.77$, $p < .01$, $\Delta AIC = 6.77^2$. A second alternative model, where moral shame and guilt items were combined onto one factor and image shame items was specified as a separate factor, proved also to be inferior, $\Delta \chi^2 (2) = 14.22$, $p < .001$, $\Delta AIC = 10.22$. Finally, a fourth model, in which all emotion items loaded onto one omnibus “negative emotion” factor was also a worse fit, $\Delta \chi^2 (3) = 28.79$, $p < .001$, $\Delta AIC = 22.79$. All comparison models fit the data significantly worse than the hypothesised three-factor model, thus demonstrating that image shame, moral shame and guilt can be separately measured.

**Hypothesis 2: Correlates of emotion measures**

To test the effect of moral shame, image shame and guilt, on positive and negative responses, two regression analyses were conducted in which positive (consisting of support for apology and compensation) and negative orientations (consisting of anger and avoidance) were regressed onto the three predictors.

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^2As a rule of thumb, an AIC difference of < 2 indicates no meaningful difference between models; between 4 and 7 indicates considerable evidence that the model with the lower AIC is better; and a difference of > 10 indicates substantial support for the model with the lower AIC (Burnham & Anderson, 2002).
Positive responses. The model containing moral shame, image shame and guilt explained 30% of the variance in positive attitudes, $F(3,55) = 9.31, p < .001$. Moral shame was, as expected, a significant predictor of support for apology and compensation ($\beta = .58, p < .001$). Neither guilt ($\beta = .09, p = .60$) nor image shame ($\beta = -.12, p = .39$) were significant predictors of support for an apology and compensation being offered to Kenyan people.

Negative responses. The model containing the emotions also explained a significant proportion of the variance in anger and avoidance responses, $R^2 = .24, F(3,55) = 7.15, p < .001$. Image shame predicted an increase in avoidance and anger ($\beta = .32, p < .05$), whereas moral shame predicted a decrease in such responses ($\beta = -.58, p < .01$). Guilt was not significantly related to negative responses ($\beta = -.11, p = .53$).

3.1.3 Discussion

The data of Study 1 showed that it is possible to separate moral shame, image shame and guilt as distinct emotions and to evaluate their unique effects. The predicted three factor model, where moral shame, image shame and guilt were separated, was clearly superior to the three plausible alternatives. Moreover, these different emotions had divergent associations with the two outcome variables. As hypothesised, moral shame was correlated with increased support for intergroup apology and compensation and decreased levels of anger and avoidance. Image shame, on the other hand, was positively correlated with anger and avoidance — two responses hitherto commonly considered characteristic of shame. These findings provide the first empirical support for the notion that shame is connected to values and that the specific value that gives rise to shame can determine its motivational effect.

Another notable finding of Study 1 is that guilt was not, as hypothesised, predictive of support for apology and compensation. Following the theoretical account advanced by
Teroni and Deonna (2008), I predicted that guilt would be weakly associated with support for actions that directly address the harm done, but unrelated to additional attempts to improve the intergroup relationship and to restore the ingroup’s moral standing. Although guilt was weakly and positively associated with support for apology and compensation, this relationship was not significant. While this result went against my predictions, it is not entirely at odds with previous research. As noted when discussing the limits of guilt, Iyer et al. (2007) have demonstrated the low predictive power of guilt once shame and anger are controlled for. Likewise, Allpress et al. (2010) found that the power of shame outweighed the effect of guilt in terms of motivating positive behaviour. It is possible that a similar process occurred in the present study, such that the potency of moral shame rendered guilt’s motivational effects impotent. I return to the issue of the correlates of guilt a number of times throughout this thesis.

While the present study is limited by its small sample size, it nevertheless represents a significant empirical step, as the first study to quantify the differential effects of image shame, moral shame and guilt on both positive and negative responses to ingroup wrongdoing. Studies 2 and 3 were designed to corroborate the findings of Study 1, and to improve upon its limitations. In Study 2, I increase both the size of the sample and its heterogeneity (students from many different disciplines, not just psychology, are recruited) and I attempt to experimentally manipulate moral shame, image shame and guilt.

Study 2 also addresses an important issue raised in Chapter 2, namely the differences between my (and Teroni and Deonna’s) conceptualisation of shame and that of Gausel and Leach (2011). While it must be stressed that our approaches agree on many important issues, such as the specificity (rather than global nature) of and pro-social correlates of shame — and therefore represent an important and united challenge to traditional views of shame — there are specific and important differences between our two approaches. The most significant difference relates to whether shame is arises for only one reason (as
a result of threatened morality, as proposed by Gausel and colleagues) or for as many different reasons as there are self-relevant values (as proposed by Teroni and Deonna and endorsed by myself). This difference is especially apparent when one considers whether shame can arise from the perception that the ingroup’s image has been seriously tarnished. While I believe that shame may be one emotion (out of many possible emotions) to arise in such a situation (if ingroup members value highly their ingroup’s public image), Gausel and colleagues contend that shame researchers are mistaken and that individual’s do not feel ashamed in response to a tarnished ingroup image; rather, they propose that feelings of ‘shame’ in these circumstances are in fact mis-identified feelings of rejection. In Study 2, I attempt to address this distinction, in part, by including a measure of rejection used by Gausel et al. (2010), in order to evaluate its relationship with the measure of image shame used in these studies.

3.2 Study 2

Study 2, and all subsequent studies, were conducted in the context of a contemporary intergroup conflict, the war in Iraq, in which reliable press reports and witness testimony agree that members of the ingroup (in this case, British soldiers) have consistently and systematically abused Iraqi prisoners under their charge (Amnesty International, 2007; Red Cross (ICRC), 2004). The present study was designed to replicate the findings of Study 1 and to experimentally induce moral and image shame. I tested the following hypotheses:

1. It is possible to measure separately the group-based emotions of image shame, moral shame and guilt.

2. It is possible to experimentally induce moral shame and image shame through the use of selective information presentation and a rumination task.
3. These emotions will be differently related to positive and negative orientations towards the (victim) outgroup. The predictions from Study 1 were retained.

4. It is possible to distinguish between image shame and feelings of rejection and measure their independent effects.

3.2.1 Method

Participants

One hundred and fifty nine participants were recruited from university accommodation on a British university campus. Of those recruited, 147 (73 male, 72 female, 2 unspecified) participants who self-identified as “British” were included in the final analysis. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions: moral threat (N = 44), image threat (N = 57) or control (N = 46). The ages in the sample ranged from 18 to 28, with a mean of 20 years of age.

Procedure

Data were collected in early 2009. Participants were asked if they would like to fill out a questionnaire on their attitudes toward Britain’s involvement in the war in Iraq. The questionnaire contained a newspaper article — ostensibly sourced from the Guardian, a reputable British newspaper — and a rumination task that were varied depending on the experimental condition. The article and rumination task were followed by the dependent variables. Completion of the questionnaire took approximately 10—15 minutes. If participants agreed to fill in the questionnaire, they were given one of three randomly-selected questionnaire booklets and the experimenter returned later to collect the completed questionnaires and to debrief respondents. Participation was entirely voluntary and anonymous; however, participants were given the opportunity to write their contact details on a separate sheet to enter a prize draw for one of two 30 prizes.
Each participant received one of three experimental conditions by way of the questionnaire booklet they were given (questionnaires were randomly ordered). These conditions are referred to as: ‘moral threat’, ‘image threat’ and ‘control’. The moral threat and image threat condition were designed to induce moral shame and image shame, respectively. Both the newspaper article and rumination tasks differed for each condition.

While all three newspaper articles (see Appendix A) were identical in the information they conveyed, they differed in their titles and introductory paragraphs, in an attempt to subtly direct participants’ reactions to the certain aspects of the article that followed. For instance, the first paragraph of the article in the control condition reads:

The U.K. government continues to ignore basic human rights conventions in Iraq, a recent Amnesty International report reveals. The report identifies many cases of alleged killings of civilians, continued torture of detainees and use of illegal munitions

Whereas the moral threat condition has an additional sentence added:

The U.K. government continues to ignore basic human rights conventions in Iraq, a recent Amnesty International report reveals. The report — which highlights systemic failings in British policy and which has provoked deep moral anguish on the part of millions of British people — identifies many cases of alleged killings of civilians, continued torture of detainees and use of illegal munitions

The image threat condition also contained an additional sentence:

The U.K. government continues to ignore basic human rights conventions in Iraq, a recent Amnesty International report reveals. The report — which has been publicised in 37 countries and which has aroused international criticism
of Britain as a nation — identifies many cases of alleged killings of civilians, continued torture of detainees and use of illegal munitions

The remaining three paragraphs of the article are identical across conditions and gave an account of prisoner abuse carried out by British soldiers in Iraq. There was similar variation in the titles of the articles, with the control title reading “Britain continues to flout human rights in Iraq”, the moral threat condition reading “Britain continues to flout human rights in Iraq: National soul-searching begins”, and the image threat condition reading “Britain continues to flout human rights in Iraq: British international reputation tarnished”. The difference between the rumination tasks for each condition was more substantial. Below are the instructions given to participants in each condition:

Control:

You have just read a newspaper summary of an Amnesty International report on Britain’s involvement in Iraq. Please summarise the article below in three points.

Moral threat:

The recently published Amnesty International report reveals a number of systemic failings at the heart of British political and cultural life. Focus on what impact this information has on how British people might no longer be able to see themselves as a fair and moral society. Take a minute to write down how you feel about being British after these allegations.

Image threat:

This information has recently been publicised by Amnesty International in a number of different countries around the world. Focus on what impact this information has on how others might see Britain as no longer a fair and moral
society. Take a minute to write down how you feel about how Britain’s international reputation is being affected by these allegations.

In all three conditions the instructions were followed by half a page of empty lines containing three bullet points in order to encourage substantial thought and writing on the part of participants.

Measures

All items were measured on nine-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).

Manipulation checks. The effectiveness of the manipulations to temporarily induce different emotions was checked with three items. For moral shame: “Right now, our treatment of Iraqis makes me feel somewhat ashamed to be British”. For image shame: “At this moment, I feel ashamed because Britain’s image may be rather negative in the eyes of others”. And for guilt: “Right now, I feel guilty about the abuse of Iraqis by my fellow Brits”. Although I did not attempt to induce guilt in the present study, I included the guilt item in order to evaluate the specificity of any manipulation effects.

Moral shame was measured using the same two items as Study 1, adjusted in line with the intergroup context and with the exception that the first item (“I do not feel ashamed to be British for the way we have treated the Iraqi people”) was reversed (emphasis in the original item), $\alpha = .68$.

Image shame was measured with the same two items from Study 1 and one additional item: “I feel disgraced because the behaviour of British people toward Iraqi people has created a bad image of Britain in the eyes of the world”, $\alpha = .85$.

Guilt was measured using the same three items as in Study 1, $\alpha = .89$.

The measures for positive and negative orientations were very similar to Study 1, with some minor alterations in wording. Support for apology was measured with “I think that
the British government should apologise for the atrocities committed against the Iraqi people”, and support for compensation with “I think that the British government should compensate Iraqis financially for injustices that have occurred during the invasion”. These items formed a ‘positive attitudes’ latent variable within SEM analyses. A latent variable reflecting a negative orientation towards the issue consisted of issue avoidance: “I wish that people would stop going on about the invasion of Iraq”, and anger: “I am angry that the Iraq situation is being talked about so often”.

Rejection was measured using three items used by Gausel et al. (2010): “I feel rejected when I think about what has happened to the Iraqis”, “As a Brit, I feel withdrawn when I think about what has happened to the Iraqis” and “I feel alone when I think about what has happened to the Iraqis”, α = .78.

3.2.2 Results

Means and correlations between the variables are presented in Table 3.2. SPSS (version 16) was used to test the effects of the experimental conditions and CFA and SEM analyses were conducted using MPlus (version 6). Missing values were estimated using Maximum Likelihood (ML).
Hypothesis 1: Distinguishing among moral shame, image shame and guilt

As with Study 1, confirmatory factor analyses were performed to assess the factor structure of the three emotion scales. In all models the factors were allowed to correlate but no observed items were allowed to cross-load. The hypothesised three-factor model, specifying each emotion separately, provided a reasonable fit to the data, $\chi^2 (17) = 37.25, p = .003$, CFI = .969, SRMR = .037, RMSEA = .090. I again compared this three-factor model to three alternatives. The first alternative, specifying moral and image shame items as loading onto a single “shame” factor and the guilt items loading onto separate a guilt factor, showed a significant decrease in fit, $\Delta \chi^2 (2) = 39.72, p < .001$, $\Delta$AIC = 35.72. The second alternative, where moral shame and guilt items were combined onto one factor, proved to be more similar to the three-factor model but nonetheless still inferior, $\Delta \chi^2 (2) = 12.50, p < .01$, $\Delta$AIC = 8.50. Finally, the third alternative, in which all emotion items loaded onto one omnibus “negative emotion” factor fit the data markedly worse, $\Delta \chi^2 (3) = 101.07, p < .001$, $\Delta$AIC = 95.07. These analyses clearly demonstrate that the three emotion scales are separable.

Hypothesis 2: Evaluating the effect of the experimental manipulations

One-way ANOVAs on the manipulation checks showed that the different experimental instructions did not have their desired effects on participants’ current feelings. The main effect of condition was non-significant on all three manipulation check items, $F(2, 143) = 1.16, p = .32; F(2, 144) = 2.08, p = .13$; and $F(2, 144) = .73, p = .48$ on moral shame, image shame and guilt checks respectively. Additionally, I conducted one-way ANOVAs on the more enduring feelings of moral shame, image shame and guilt. The effect of condition was, again, non-significant, all $F$s < .55, all $ps$ > .58. These findings indicate that the manipulations were unsuccessful.

Given that the experimental manipulations influenced neither the manipulation checks
nor the more stable emotion measures, the sample was collapsed across conditions and all subsequent analyses were conducted on the sample as a whole.

**Hypothesis 3: Correlates of different emotions**

To test my predictions about the relationships among the three emotions and measures of negative (a latent variable consisting of avoidance and anger items) and positive (a latent variable consisting of support for apology and support for compensation) orientations, I evaluated the structural model shown in Figure 3.1. This model, in which all paths were specified between the three emotions and the two response types, provided a reasonable fit to the data, $\chi^2 (7) = 14.92, p = .037, \text{CFI} = .972, \text{SRMR} = .023, \text{RMSEA} = .088$. As hypothesised, moral shame was associated with an increase in positive responses ($\beta = .44, p < .001$), and a decrease in negative responses ($\beta = -.70, p < .001$). As with Study 1, image shame predicted increased negative responses ($\beta = .23, p < .05$), but was unrelated to positive measures ($\beta = .08, p = .42$). Although guilt was weakly predictive of positive attitudes ($\beta = .14, p = .24$), this relationship was not significant. There was no association between guilt and negative responses ($\beta = -.03, p = .74$).
Hypothesis 4: Distinguishing image shame from rejection

In order to determine the relationship between image shame and feelings of rejection, I conducted CFA and SEM analyses, similar to those reported above. A four-factor measurement model, with image shame, rejection, moral shame and guilt specified as separate factors, fit the data well, $\chi^2 (38) = 64.60$, $p = .005$, CFI = .969, RMSEA = .069. Crucially, this model proved to be far superior to a three-factor model where image shame and rejection were specified as one factor, $\Delta \chi^2 (3) = 89.32$, $p < .001$, $\Delta$AIC = 83.32, indicating that feelings of image shame are neither reducible to, nor better explained as feelings of rejection.

After establishing the separability of rejection and image shame I conducted a SEM to evaluate their differing effects. This model, which can be seen in Figure 3.2, also fit the data well, $\chi^2 (9) = 16.09$, $p = .065$, CFI = .984, RMSEA = .074. A comparison of this model with the smaller model not containing rejection (tested in relation to hypothesis 3) showed that, while these models did not differ according to the chi-square statistic $\Delta \chi^2 (2) = 1.17$, $p > .05$, the change in Akaike Information Criterion indicated that the model without rejection was superior, $\Delta$AIC = 15.27. From this it is possible to conclude that the inclusion of rejection in the model at best contributes nothing further to the model, and at worst results in an inferior model. This conclusion is made even clearer when we look at the regression weights leading from rejection to each outcome measure: rejection was not significantly related to either positive ($\beta = .14$, $p = .15$) or negative ($\beta = .05$, $p = .57$) orientations.

Further support for the separation of rejection from image shame can be seen in 3.2, which shows that the correlation between image shame and rejection ($r = .44$) is smaller than between image shame and both guilt ($r = .57$) and moral shame ($r = .55$). If

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3Note the the degrees of freedom differs from the previously-discussed four-factor measurement model because emotion scales were treated as observed variables within this model
4An additional model was also evaluated that contained rejection but not image shame. In this model rejection was still non-significantly related to both positive and negative responses
image shame and feelings of rejection were the same experience then we would expect the correlation between these two variables to be significantly greater.

3.2.3 Discussion

The data of Study 2 corroborate fully the findings of Study 1 by showing that, although the manipulations were unsuccessful, it was again possible to separate moral shame, image shame and guilt as distinct emotions and to show their unique effects. The pattern of results was identical across studies, such that moral shame was associated with increased positive attitudes and decreased anger and avoidance. Image shame, on the other hand, was associated with increased anger and avoidance. Guilt was unrelated to either response to ingroup wrongdoing. Furthermore, the data show that image shame is distinct from feelings of rejection and that it is the former that is possibly driving increases in maladaptive responses to ingroup wrongdoing.

The failure of the experimental manipulations is, of course, an important aspect of
the present study and deserves further discussion. This issue deserves further discussion not only on its own merits, but also because, I believe, it represents a wider and often un-reported limitation of the guilt and shame literature as a whole. Successful and specific manipulations of shame and guilt are, for all intents and purposes, non-existent. While some the studies have been able to manipulate and measure guilt (e.g., de Hooge et al., 2011; Doosje et al., 1998) or shame (e.g., de Hooge et al., 2008) in isolation, or have manipulated both guilt and shame to an equal degree (e.g., Harvey & Oswald, 2000), these studies are limited because they either manipulated both guilt and shame to the same degree, or induced feelings of guilt or shame but did not measure nor evaluate whether the manipulation influenced the other emotion(s) (i.e., when guilt was manipulated, shame was not measured and vice versa). Given that most, if not all guilt and shame researchers are likely to have attempted to manipulate these emotions at some point, I suspect that many of the correlational studies published are in fact the result of unsuccessful experiments. My suspicions are supported by a number of personal conversations with prominent researchers in the area of guilt and shame. Many of these researchers have detailed their inability to manipulate these emotions.

The combination of anecdotal reports of failed manipulations and the stark lack of published reports of successful, targeted manipulations of guilt and shame can only lead to the conclusion that guilt and shame are incredibly difficult or impossible to influence using traditional methods. Why might these emotions be particularly resistant to experimenter influence? It is possible that what dictates whether a person feels ashamed (be it moral, image, or other) or guilty may be so well ingrained through years of socialisation and personal experience that they are virtually unchangeable in an experimental setting. The impotence of an experimenter to change such deeply ingrained responses is not surprising when one considers the limited tools and time often at the experimenter’s disposal. Experimental manipulations are often limited to the manipulation of information and vari-
ous rumination procedures, which are typically required to last less than 10 minutes\textsuperscript{5}. It should not take too much convincing that a five-to-ten minute procedure is unlikely to make substantial changes, even temporary, to a reaction borne of a lifetime of experience and socialisation. This is also assuming the ideal situation of complete cooperation on the part of the participant, which is unlikely to be the case, given the particular adeptness of many at psychological denial (Cohen, 2001). An analogy may be drawn with long-standing ingroup identification, which is likely to be similarly influenced by years of socialisation, and which has also proven to be particularly difficult to experimentally manipulate in laboratory settings, presumably for similar reasons (Brown, personal communication).

Although the attempted manipulation in the present study was, apparently like many others, unsuccessful, I attempt to address the issues associated with the use of purely cross-sectional data, using alternative methods, in later chapters. In particular, in Chapter 5 I report a longitudinal study that was conducted to investigate how these emotions are related to various attitudes over time.

Collectively, Studies 1 and 2 provide good evidence for the conceptualisation of the two forms of shame advanced in the introductory chapters. Both studies, however, use relatively limited measures, and the Study 3 was designed, in part, to expand these measures.

3.3 Study 3

Given the novelty of the findings from Studies 1 and 2, their modestly-sized samples and somewhat limited measures, I thought it important to attempt to replicate these findings again, using improved scales. I therefore included additional items measuring moral and

\textsuperscript{5}It is worth noting that guilt and the two types of shame I am investigating here have also proved immune to different experimental manipulations in three different studies that I conducted during my PhD, but that are not reported in this thesis. One of these studies involved manipulating whether participants anticipated a future interaction with a victim of ingroup abuse. The other two involved manipulating whether participants believed the ingroup had apologised for past transgressions, using a similar design to Study 1. In all three instances analyses revealed no effect of condition on the three emotions measures.
image shame, in an attempt to more accurately measure these constructs. An additional facet of negative social orientation, the wish to cover up the crimes committed by the ingroup, was also included in this study in order to broaden this measure.

3.3.1 Method

Participants

A sample of 256 undergraduate psychology students participated in the present study for partial course credit. The survey was hosted on the Bristol Online Survey system and participants were invited to complete the study online via the psychology department’s SONA participant management system. Of those recruited, 252 (45 male, 207 female) participants who self-identified as “British” were included in the final analysis. The ages in the sample ranged from 16 to 43, with a mean of 20 years of age.

Procedure

Participants were informed that the survey was investigating attitudes toward Britain’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq and that their participation was entirely voluntary. They were presented with excerpts from a real BBC News article on the treatment of Iraqi prisoners (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8266699.stm), followed by the dependent measures\textsuperscript{6}. Completion of the study took approximately 25 minutes. Participants were debriefed following completion of the questionnaire.

Measures

All items were measured on seven-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Although many of the emotion items used were the same as in Studies

\textsuperscript{6}Participants were also assigned to one of five experimental conditions that asked participants to perform: a personal morality affirmation, a personal non-moral affirmation, a group morality affirmation, a group non-moral affirmation, or a control writing task. These experimental conditions did not affect any of the variables investigated in the present study, all $F$s < 2.04, all $p$s > .05, and are not discussed further in this chapter.
1 and 2, the combination of items reported in this chapter is used in subsequent chapters, and for this reason, all items are reported here for completeness.

Moral shame was measured using three items: “I feel ashamed because Britain’s actions with regard to Iraq have been immoral”, “I feel ashamed to be British for the way we have treated the Iraqi people”, and “I feel ashamed for the damage done to Iraqi people by Brits”, $\alpha = .85$.

Image shame was measured using five items: “I feel ashamed because Britain has a damaged reputation”, “I feel ashamed when I realise that other countries might think of Britain negatively because of our involvement in Iraq”, “I feel disgraced because the behaviour of British people toward Iraqi people has created a bad image of Britain in the eyes of the world”, “To think how Britain is seen for its treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel ashamed”, and “I feel humiliated when I think of how Britain is seen negatively by the rest of the world for how it has treated the Iraqi people”, $\alpha = .93$.

Guilt was measured using three items: “I feel guilty for the manner in which Iraqi people have been treated by Brits”, “Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behaviour of Brits toward Iraqis”, and “I feel guilty for the bad living conditions of the Iraqi people”, $\alpha = .89$.

Support for apology, support for financial compensation, issue avoidance and anger were all measured using the same items as Study 2.

Cover-up was measured with three items adapted from Gausel et al. (2010): “I think that we Brits should make it less clear what has happened to the Iraqi people”, “I think that we Brits need to be careful of sharing national information with other nations”, and “We Brits should make the Iraq issue become less important in the public awareness”, $\alpha = .79$. 
Table 3.3:
Study 3: Means of and inter-correlations among variables

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<td>1.29</td>
<td>.63**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td>-.18**</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
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<td>-.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
<td>-.13*</td>
<td>-.14*</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>.50**</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>4.35</td>
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<td>-.34**</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>3.22</td>
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<td>.66**</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>3.11</td>
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<td>8.</td>
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* p < .05; ** p < .01

### 3.3.2 Results

The means of and correlations among the variables can be seen in Table 3.3. I performed CFA and SEM analyses using AMOS (version 16).

**Distinguishing among emotion variables**

The three-factor model specifying image shame, moral shame and guilt provided a reasonable fit to the data, \( \chi^2 (41) = 100.01, p < .001, \) CFI = .972, SRMR = .036, RMSEA = .076. This three-factor model proved to be vastly superior to the three alternative models evaluated in the previous two studies: when image shame and moral shame were combined: \( \Delta \chi^2 (2) = 176.61, p < .001, \Delta AIC = 172.61; \) when moral shame and guilt were combined: \( \Delta \chi^2 (2) = 233.48, p < .001, \Delta AIC = 229.48; \) and when all variables were combined into one factor: \( \Delta \chi^2 (3) = 518.24, p < .001, \Delta AIC = 512.24. \)

**Relationships between emotions and social orientations**

I evaluated a structural model similar to that evaluated in Study 2, with the exception that cover-up was included on the negative social orientations latent variable (see Figure 3.3). This model fit the data very well, \( \chi^2 (13) = 15.89, p = .255, \) CFI = .996, SRMR = .032, RMSEA = .030. Moral shame was again associated with decreased anger, avoidance and, now, a desire to cover up the ingroup’s misdeeds (\( \beta = -.32, p < .001 \)). Additionally, moral
shame was again associated with positive responses (β = .60, p < .001). As with previous studies, image shame predicted negative outcomes (β = .20, p < .01). Intriguingly, in the present study, guilt (β = .25, p < .01) was positively associated, and image shame (β = -.18, p < .05) was inversely associated with positive outcomes. Guilt was not, however, significantly related to negative measures (β = -.13, p = .11).

3.3.3 Discussion

Study 3 provides further evidence in support of the conceptualisation of shame and guilt developed in Chapters 1 and 2. Once again, the three emotions proved to be empirically separable, and their correlations with the two outcome measures were consistent: Image shame was associated with negative social orientations and moral shame was correlated with a positive outgroup orientation. The findings of the present study did differ slightly from the previous two studies with regard to the positive orientation variable. Here image

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I obtained almost identical results in a separate community-based study (N = 288), using the same measures as Study 3, with the exception that the path between image shame and positive attitudes was not significant (β = -.18, p = .11). Despite this model fitting the data extremely well, I decided to exclude the study from this thesis because it suffered from possible issues of multicollinearity. Nevertheless, the results were strikingly similar to those found in the three studies discussed in this chapter, that the findings warranted, at least, a footnote. The multicollinearity issues are likely to have arisen due to the online sampling technique used. I return to the issue of multicollinearity and internet sampling in Chapter 5.
shame and guilt had their initially-predicted effects: image shame predicted decreased support for apology and compensation and guilt predicted an increase in attitudinal support. Why these inconsistencies between studies occurred is unclear, although the methodology of the present study (i.e., some participants self-affirmed prior to starting the study) is unlikely to have been influential, as a fourth study (see footnote 7) produced a very similar pattern of results with regard to guilt while using a purely cross-sectional design.

In summary, then, the effects of moral shame and image shame on negative orientations, and the effect of moral shame on positive attitudes is wholly consistent across four studies (when including the additional study reported in footnote 7). Guilt’s lack of association with negative outcomes is also quite clear across these studies. The effect of guilt on support for apology and compensation is significant (yet weak) in two of four studies and the effect of image shame on positive attitudes is even more inconsistent (being significant in only one study). When the data are viewed as a whole, the effects of guilt are weakly positive but inconsistent, which is in fact consistent with the theoretical rationale developed in prior chapters. This picture is consistent also with the literature on guilt, which shows its effects to be often limited in the presence of other, possibly more influential emotions, such as shame or anger (e.g., Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006).

3.4 General Discussion

The studies reported here provide good evidence for image shame, moral shame and guilt as distinguishable emotional experiences with different motivational effects. When controlling for image shame and guilt, moral shame had strong and consistent associations with an adaptive response set (increased positive and decreased negative orientations). Image shame was also consistently correlated with a negative orientation to the victim group.

While the consistency across studies should be convincing of the genuineness of these findings, a keen reader will have noticed a discrepancy between the reported bivariate cor-
relations presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 and the regression weights reported in Figures 3.1 and 3.3. Most notably, in all three studies the bivariate correlations between image shame and positive responses were positive, whereas at the multivariate (i.e., regression and SEM) level, these relationships became null or negative. Similarly the relationship between image shame and negative orientations was either null or negative at the bivariate level, but became consistently positive after controlling for the other variables. This reflects statistical suppression, and is wholly consistent with the theoretical position I am advancing in this thesis. The maladaptive motivational effects of image shame are, at the bivariate level, being suppressed by moral shame and guilt, such that image shame is correlated positively with adaptive outcomes and (sometimes) negatively with maladaptive outcomes in the bivariate statistics, but more accurate relationships are observed in the multivariate regression statistics. Likewise, while the bivariate relationships of guilt are significant and adaptive in sign, the true (weak or inconsistent) effect of guilt is observed in the multivariate statistics. It is only when we control for the ‘contaminating’ effects of other emotions, manifest in the form of the individual’s generalised affective reaction, that the true, individual effects of each emotion are revealed.

Why should we trust the regression coefficients over the bivariate correlations? The answer to this question is part psychological and part statistical. I believe the key is to understand the psychological reality of these different types of shame. I proposed in Chapter 2 that an individual’s psychological experience when facing ingroup wrongdoing is likely to reflect an aggregate of different emotional reactions and that, unless the individual is asked specific questions that identify the specific emotions being experienced, they are likely to remain largely unaware of the composition of this conglomerate of feelings. Rather, the individual is likely to identify that they simply feel ‘bad’ and be aware of the motivation to act in a certain manner. Indeed, this position is supported by research showing that it is possible, and indeed common, for individuals to experience different
emotions simultaneously (Larsen & McGraw, 2011). This research shows that such simultaneous experience can include emotions of different valence (e.g., happiness and sadness simultaneously). In light of these findings it is uncontroversial to suggest that people can experience simultaneously a number of related emotions.

Although the measures used in my studies are targeted in such a way that they measure specific emotional experiences, an individual’s response to these items will, in part, reflect the lack of specificity that they are experiencing psychologically. As such, the bivariate correlations associated with each emotion scale are uninterpretable because they are contaminated with the experiences associated with the other emotions. Because any ‘reaction’ to ingroup wrongdoing is likely to be a mix of different emotional experiences, it is only once we partial out the experiences of the other emotional variables that we can determine the true effect of each emotion measure. It is for this reason that the regression coefficients are a more reliable reflection of the true effects of each emotion.

Theoretical implications

These findings have a number of theoretical implications for understanding shame and guilt. I have outlined in this thesis a distinction between shame and guilt in which shame is characterised by threatened values and a focus on the self, whereas guilt is characterised by violated norms and a focus on specific behaviour (Teroni & Deonna, 2008). An important advantage of this distinction is that it allows consideration of different forms of shame that arise from threats to different values. The research presented in this chapter is the first to empirically substantiate the proposal that the values of social image and morality are important in motivating divergent intergroup attitudes and behaviours. Given the empirical inconsistencies within the shame literature, I believe that the distinction between image shame and moral shame is of particular importance for our understanding of shame.

Shame is commonly viewed as being associated with hiding, withdrawal and a host of
maladaptive outcomes (e.g., Tangney & Dearing, 2002), yet a growing number of studies have begun to challenge this view by demonstrating the pro-social correlates of shame (e.g., Allpress et al., 2010; Brown & Čehajić, 2008). The present findings allow me to add an important qualification to these findings, by showing that shame can be associated with both negative and positive outcomes. I have provided evidence that it is the value connected with shame that determines the direction of its motivational influence. The data are quite clear that shame arising from a threatened social image is associated with negative outcomes, whereas shame arising from threatened morality is associated with positive outcomes.

In what ways does the work reported in this chapter speak to the two approaches outlined by Teroni and Deonna (2008) and Gausel and Leach (2011)? Both sets of authors make strong and broadly similar arguments for the pro-social nature of shame and, quite importantly, the present data support strongly this common position. Where these positions differ, however, is in the conceptualisation of the nature of shame. Gausel and Leach (2011) propose that shame is one-dimensional in nature, and many experiences commonly thought to be shame can be more accurately seen as a distinct emotion from shame (such as rejection). The position of both Teroni and Deonna (2008) and myself differs from this view by offering the possibility that shame may arise for many different reasons and that these different forms of shame may drive behaviour in different ways. My research provides direct empirical support for this latter conceptualisation — that different forms of shame exist and can have different motivational effects. The studies presented in this chapter are inconsistent with Gausel and Leach’s (2011) claims that shame can arise for only one reason.

While there does appear to be a high degree of similarity between my conceptualisation of image shame and Gausel and Leach’s (2011) feeling of rejection, the findings of Study 2 point to the distinctiveness of these two emotions. Furthermore, the data indicate that it
is image shame, rather than rejection, that drives increases in anger, avoidance and cover-up. Of course, the data of Study 2 can not address all questions regarding the separability of image shame and rejection, and it remains somewhat unclear what relationship these two emotions have and how they differ phenomenologically. Although no mediation was observed in Study 2 (as rejection was not significantly associated with either dependent variable) it may be that image shame and rejection reflect different steps in a negative cascade of events that stem from threatened social image. No further empirical comparison between the Gausel model and my own is reported in this thesis, although I believe this is likely to be a fruitful issue for future research.

Political and practical implications

An important implication of these findings concerns the complex effects of ‘shaming’ on perpetrator group members. My data suggest that the public shaming of perpetrator groups can sometimes increase negativity by provoking such reactions as anger, avoidance and attempts to cover-up the ingroup’s wrong-doing. I speculate whether the common tactic of ‘naming and shaming’ employed by various organisations, such as human rights and environmental organisations, may not always promote positive reactions.

On the other hand, other evidence suggests that if a perpetrator offers reparations that are seen to be sincere and which are accompanied by expressions of shame, rather than by guilt or no emotions at all, then they may be more favourably received by their victims (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2008). Although the version of shame that was expressed in Giner-Sorolla and colleagues’ studies reflected more a global criticism of the self, it was probably perceived closer to moral shame than to image shame. Because moral shame is likely to signal a genuine morally motivated distress is being experienced and hence may weaken the power position of the perpetrator (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), it is likely to be responded to more favourably by victim groups. I develop upon the work of Giner-Sorolla
and colleagues (2008) in Chapter 7, where I more finely manipulate the emotional content of an ingroup apology, including the two different forms of shame.

The preceding analysis highlights the particular importance of shame experiences and expressions in instances of intergroup wrongdoing. The present data show that the common conception of shame as a universally maladaptive emotion does not capture fully the diversity of motivational effects to which it is connected. Shame that arises from a tarnished social image is indeed associated with avoidance, anger and cover-up, and is likely to have negative effects on intergroup relations. On the other hand, shame that arises in response to violations of the ingroup’s valued moral essence is strongly associated with a positive pattern of responses and is likely to have strong, positive effects on intergroup relations.

**Limitations and further research**

In light of the failed manipulation in Study 2, all three studies are cross-sectional and, given the correlational nature of the data, we must obviously be cautious about drawing causal conclusions. Experimental manipulation of these emotion forms would permit such causal inferences, although manipulations appear difficult. In an attempt to circumvent some of the difficulties associated with experimental manipulation, I report a longitudinal investigation into the effects of image shame, moral shame and guilt in Chapter 5. This analysis allows a better understanding of the nature and direction of the causal processes at work and of the temporal course of these emotions over time. The following chapter focuses on a study conducted to further evaluate the validity of the emotion scales used in the present studies. Here I investigate the lay perceptions of these scales.
Chapter 4

Evaluating the validity of the image shame, moral shame and guilt scales

The studies presented in the previous chapter provide convincing evidence that moral shame, image shame and guilt have reliable and different cross-sectional associations with a number of important responses to ingroup wrongdoing. What remain unclear from these studies are the causal effects of these emotions. The inability to manipulate each emotion proves somewhat of a problem because successful manipulation would provide a strong and convincing case for the separability of each emotion and, therefore, the validity of the emotion scales used. While there may be valid reasons why such manipulations have failed, I conducted this study to address any misgivings regarding the validity of the emotion scales used in prior studies. Therefore, given the inability to experimentally manipulate each emotion, the present study was designed to test, using an alternative methodology, the construct validity of the emotions scales. This validation test was achieved by investigating lay perceptions of the emotion scales used in Chapter 3.
4.1 Study 4

This study was designed not to manipulate or induce emotions within each participant, but rather to evaluate what attitudes and behaviours participants expected to be associated with particular patterns of responses to the three emotion scales. To achieve this aim, the study was designed as a ‘role play’ task, where participants were told that they would be evaluating the thoughts and feelings of three different individuals, on the basis of their responses to a questionnaire. Participants were shown the questionnaire responses of three different individuals and were asked to ‘get in the head’ of these individuals and to guess what the target individual is likely to be thinking, feeling and doing. This methodology was used in order to evaluate whether a target individual’s responses to the moral shame, image shame and guilt scales were seen as being diagnostic of different patterns of behaviour.

Each target individual’s responses were ostensibly given after reading an article outlining the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by British troops during the recent occupation of Iraq. Thus, the questions and context were the same as the previous two studies.

Participants were presented with three images, each containing the questionnaire responses of one individual (Person A, Person B and Person C). Each image (see Appendix B) showed questions used to measure moral shame, image shame and guilt, and the target individual’s answers to these questions. The responses to these questions differed systematically for each individual. Person A responded with agreement to all of the image shame items and disagreement with all moral shame and guilt items. Person B responded in agreement only with the moral shame items and Person C only with the guilt items. In this way, the specific effects of each emotion type (condition) could be evaluated. Participants were asked to predict, based on the target individuals’ questionnaire responses, what sort of attitudes and behaviours the target individual was likely to hold and display, with regard to: support for apology, support for compensation, avoidance, anger cover-up, perceived immorality, ingroup glorification, ingroup pride, moral disengagement, image
concerns, victim blame and social distance.

Hypotheses

I predicted, broadly, that participants would be able to predict the target individuals’ attitudes with reasonable accuracy, from each individual’s questionnaire responses, and that the mean differences between conditions would reflect the relationships observed between emotions and outcomes in Studies 1-3. More specifically, I hypothesized that participants would expect the target individual in the moral shame condition to display the most positive responses (consisting of support for both apology and compensation) and the target individual in the image shame condition to display the least. The degree of positive responses for the target individual in the guilt condition was predicted to lie between the moral and image shame conditions, reflecting a general lack of association between guilt and positive responses found in prior studies. I predicted the reverse pattern for negative responses (consisting of anger, avoidance and cover-up), such that the target individual experiencing high image shame condition would display the strongest negative response, whereas the target in the moral shame condition would display less negative responses. The guilt individual, again, was predicted to lie between these two conditions in terms of displayed negative responses.

In an extension of the hypotheses above, I also predicted that the image shame condition would be associated with a generally ‘antisocial’ collection of responses, including a perception that the army’s actions were moral, and high pride in the military, moral disengagement, victim blame, social distance and a concern with Britain’s international reputation. On the other hand, I predicted that the moral shame condition would be associated with a generally ‘prosocial’ collection of responses, reflected in opposite responses on the aforementioned variables. Scores in the guilt condition were expected to lie between these two conditions.
4.1.1 Method

Participants

Sixty three psychology students participated in the study online, for partial course credit. The sample consisted of 58 females and 5 males; the majority of participants were white (58), with a minority identifying themselves as Indian (2), Asian other (2), Chinese (1) and Other (2) (participants were free to select more than one ethnic identification). The ages in the sample ranged from 18 to 40, with a mean of 20 years of age.

Design

The study utilised a within-subjects, repeated measures design. Participant exposure to the three conditions was counterbalanced, such that six different versions of the questionnaire were created: ABC, ACB, BCA, BAC, CBA and CAB. When participants signed up to the study, they were presented with a link that directed them to a webpage that contained a Javascript code that randomly assigned them to one of these six counterbalanced conditions and automatically redirected to the selected study’s web page.

Procedure

Participants were able to complete the study online, and were told that it would take approximately 20-25 minutes. The study’s electronic sign up page instructed participants that they would be presented with electronic images of three questionnaires that were filled out by three different students (Person A, Person B and Person C). Their task was to determine what each person was thinking and feeling when they completed the questionnaire and to guess what type of behaviour they were most likely to exhibit. They were told that the questionnaire responses that they were about to see were in response to information outlining abuse of Iraqi prisoners by the British army during the most recent occupation of Iraq. Each individual had apparently just read information detailing
the widespread use of illegal torture techniques on Iraqis by the British army, including hooding, holding in stress positions and beatings. Following this information, they were presented with the first image, showing one of the individual’s responses. Each image contained responses to the moral shame, image shame and guilt scales used in Studies 1-3. In each condition, one group, or scale of questions was unanimously agreed to strongly, while the other two scales were unanimously disagreed to strongly. Thus, Person A strongly agreed with all image shame items but strongly disagreed with all moral shame and guilt items; Person B agreed with all moral shame items and disagreed with all image shame and guilt items; and Person C agreed with all guilt items and disagreed with the items from both shame scales. Although perhaps less likely in real life, this pattern of questionnaire responses was chosen in order to focus participants on the key differences between emotion scales. Immediately following each image, participants were presented with questions relating to the individual’s thoughts, emotions and motives. After they had completed these questions they were presented with the image of the second individual’s responses and the relevant dependent variables, and subsequently with the third individual’s responses.

Measures

All items were measured using seven-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The first group of dependent measures was selected to reflect the outcome measures used in Studies 1-3. Here, positive responses were measured with two items: ‘Person A/B/C supports Britain apologising for the mistreatment of Iraqis’, and ‘Person A/B/C supports Britain compensating Iraqis who were mistreated by the British army’, all \( \alpha \) values were between .82 and .91. Negative responses were measured with three items: ‘Person A/B/C is angry that the Iraq situation is being talked about so often’, ‘Person A/B/C wishes people would stop going on about the invasion of Iraq’, and
'Person A/B/C would prefer to cover up what has happened in Iraq’, all α values were between .66 and .71.

An additional group of dependent variables was included to evaluate the perceived connection between the emotion scales and a number of variables that are likely to have an important impact on intergroup reconciliation. These additional constructs were each measured with only one item. *Perceived immorality* with ‘Person A/B/C thinks that Britain’s actions in Iraq have been immoral’; *glorification* with ‘Person A/B/C thinks the British army is the best army in the world’; *pride* with ‘Person A/B/C is proud of the British army’; *moral disengagement* with ‘Person A/B/C thinks that compared to the attacks of Iraqis on British troops, the treatment of prisoners was not that extreme’; *image concerns* with ‘Person A/B/C is concerned with Britain’s reputation’; *victim blame* with ‘Person A/B/C thinks that Iraqis have at least some responsibility for their predicament’; and *social distance* with ‘Person A/B/C thinks that Iraqis should be sent back to their home country if jobs become scarce in Britain’.

### 4.1.2 Results

Means of all relevant variables are presented in Table 4.1. To analyse the data I conducted a number of repeated measures ANOVAs, specifying condition as the within-subjects factor (with three levels: moral shame, image shame and guilt). For the following analyses, Mauchly’s test of sphericity was assessed prior to evaluating the tests of within-subjects effects. For all but one dependent variable (perceived immorality) Mauchly’s W test statistics were non-significant, supporting the assumption of sphericity. For perceived immorality, Geenhouse-Geisser adjusted degrees of freedom were used for within-subjects effects. All post-hoc tests were conducted using the Sidak correction for multiple comparisons. Initial analyses were conducted on the dependent variables used in previous studies: positive (support for apology and compensation) and negative (anger, avoidance and cover...
Table 4.1: Study 4: Mean differences among conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>F statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive responses</td>
<td>2.66&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.57&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative responses</td>
<td>5.25&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.28&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived immorality</td>
<td>2.14&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.35&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glorification</td>
<td>4.98&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.78&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride (military)</td>
<td>5.25&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.89&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral disengagement</td>
<td>4.92&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.11&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image concern</td>
<td>6.68&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.41&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim blame</td>
<td>5.02&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.06&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social distance</td>
<td>4.83&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.92&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

up) responses to ingroup wrongdoing. Further analyses were subsequently conducted on the novel dependent variables, perceived immorality, glorification, moral disengagement, pride in the military, image concerns, victim blame and social distance.

Positive and negative responses

The data show that the strength of positive responses were significantly different among the three conditions. Post-hoc tests showed that all three conditions differed, with positive responses highest in the guilt condition, moderate in the moral shame condition and low in the image shame condition. Scores on the negative responses were also different among the three conditions. The composite measure of anger, avoidance and cover up was significantly higher than in the image shame condition than levels in the guilt and moral shame conditions. The later two conditions did not differ significantly.

Additional dependent variables

In addition to investigating the effect of condition on the dependent variables used in prior studies, I also included a number of additional variables that play an important role in the maintenance or exacerbation of intergroup hostilities. With regard to these variables, I predicted that the image shame condition, in particular, would be associated with a general ‘antisocial’ tendency. The analysis supported many of these predictions. All of
the repeated-measures ANOVAs showed significant differences among conditions. As can be seen in Table 4.1, participants believed the individual in the image shame condition would see the army’s actions as relatively moral and would have high levels of pride in the military, moral disengagement, victim blame, social distance and concern with Britain’s reputation. In all cases the scores in the image shame condition were significantly different from scores in the moral shame and guilt conditions.

The predictions with regard to moral shame were partially supported. Means in the moral shame condition were all significantly different from those in the image shame condition, such that participants believed the individual in the moral shame condition would show higher levels of perceived immorality of the army’s actions and lower levels of pride in the military, moral disengagement, victim blame, social distance and concern with Britain’s reputation. Moral shame proved distinguishable from guilt on the measures of perceived immorality, glorification and pride. In these cases means in the moral shame condition were significantly different from those in the guilt condition, such that moral shame was associated with greater levels of perceived immorality of the ingroup’s actions, lower levels of ingroup glorification and lower levels of pride. The differences between moral shame and guilt for the remaining variables were less pronounced. These two conditions did not differ significantly on moral disengagement, image concern, victim blame or social distance.

4.1.3 Discussion

The present study provides support for the cross-sectional findings in Studies 1-3. The results paint a clear distinction between image shame and moral shame, in which the former is strongly associated with perceived immorality of the ingroup’s actions and a desire to make amends for this wrongdoing (through apology and compensation), and strongly associated with low levels of negative responses, including anger, avoidance, a desire to
cover-up the ingroup’s misdeeds, glorification, moral disengagement, victim blame, social distance, pride and image concerns. Image shame, on the other hand, was associated with the opposite response on all of the above mentioned variables. The prosocial effects of moral shame and the antisocial effects of image shame are thus clearly evident.

The effects of guilt were also clearly distinguishable from image shame, with scores in the image shame condition being notably more antisocial in nature, across all dependent variables. The differences between guilt and moral shame were less distinct, with scores on dependent variables differing in intensity, but not direction. Scores in the guilt condition were either statistically equivalent or more moderate than moral shame for all but one dependent variable. In opposition to predictions, the level of positive attitudes was higher in the guilt condition. More in line with predictions, mean levels of perceived immorality, glorification and pride were significantly lower in the moral shame condition than in the guilt condition. The overall pattern of these results appears to imply that, while guilt may be slightly more strongly associated in the eyes of participants with support for apology and compensation, moral shame is associated with lower levels of other responses to ingroup wrongdoing (perceived morality, glorification and pride).

The inconsistencies between lay perceptions of guilt found in this study and the observed relationships found in Studies 1-3 are intriguing. It is clear that participants’ estimations of the positive effects of guilt on subsequent behaviour are inconsistent with what was observed in the three cross-sectional studies presented in Chapter 3. This inconsistency perhaps reflects a generalised tendency to over-estimate the positive effects of guilt within everyday life, or at least the semantic conflation between guilt and moral shame in everyday usage.

As an additional point regarding the conceptualisation of moral shame, guilt and image shame, the finding that perceived immorality is a key variable upon which the three emotions can be distinguished is particularly important for the characterisation of these
three emotions. In fact, the observed pattern — with moral shame strongly linked to perceived immorality, guilt moderately linked (but close to the neutral scale mid-point) and image shame strongly linked to perceived *morality* of the events — supports strongly the theoretical account of these emotions that I have developed in Chapters 2 and 3.

In summary, the present study, by investigating lay perceptions of the emotion scales used in prior studies, provides support for the validity of these scales. Participants’ predictions regarding expected attitudes and behaviour were, in general, very close to what is observed using multivariate modelling techniques. This ‘accuracy’ was particularly pronounced in relation to image shame, which participants saw as consistently related to defensive, anti-social attitudes and outcomes. Participants were less able to distinguish between moral shame and guilt, although they did make some distinctions on four variables. This later finding possibly reflects the close semantic relationship between moral shame and guilt in everyday usage, reinforcing the importance of evaluating the effects of guilt and various forms of shame simultaneously, so as to partial out their shared variance. In the chapter that follows, I report a longitudinal study, designed to test the relationships among emotions and outcomes measures across time.
Chapter 5

Longitudinal evidence for the effects of image shame and moral shame

As shall be clear from the review of the literature in Chapters 1 and 2, not only are findings with regard to group-based guilt and shame rather inconsistent, but they are also, almost without exception, correlational in nature. Successful experimental manipulations are rare, and those that are reported either focus only on one emotion without measuring others, or have an equal effect on both shame and guilt. This represents a serious limitation of the guilt and shame literature. There is a distinct lack of data that allow causal conclusions to be drawn regarding the separate and independent effects of shame and guilt. The study presented was designed to go beyond the correlational data that is common within the field, by evaluating the longitudinal effects of guilt, moral shame and image shame.

The lack of experimental data is, of course, not for want of trying, and a handful of papers have reported attempted experimental manipulations of guilt and shame (Doosje et al., 1998; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; de Hooge et al., 2011, 2008; Iyer et al., 2007).1

1As mentioned in Chapter 3, it is likely that many more researchers have tried, and failed, to manipulate
Harvey and Oswald (2000), for instance, attempted to induce shame and guilt by having participants watch a civil rights video and complete a self-affirmation task. Their procedure was indeed effective at inducing guilt and shame (compared to those who watched the civil rights video and completed a filler task), but it induced both emotions equally, thus making it impossible to disentangle the effects of each emotion.

de Hooge et al. (2011) used a number of procedures to induce guilt. For instance, they induced guilt by asking participants to image acting in a way that hurt another person compared to imagining that no such harm occurred. Although they found strong effects of their manipulations on reported feelings of guilt, they did not measure shame and therefore we cannot rule out the possibility that the manipulation induced (unmeasured) shame to an equal degree. de Hooge et al. (2008) used similar procedures in an earlier study; this time however, they investigated only shame. In much the same way, Doosje et al. (1998) successfully induced guilt by manipulating the (minimal) ingroup’s treatment of an outgroup. As with de Hooge et al., Doosje and colleagues also only measured the effects of their manipulations on one emotion (feelings of guilt in this case). It is therefore possible that the manipulations used by the handful of authors above had a non-specific effect on both shame and guilt and therefore do not speak to the need to disentangle the effects of guilt and different forms of shame. Iyer et al. colleagues (2007) did however find a specific effect of their image threat manipulation on shame but not guilt. It is unclear whether this manipulation affected any additional variables, however, as only structural models were reported.

Longitudinal studies are less common still. To date, the only longitudinal studies of group based shame and guilt have been conducted by Brown et al. (2008). These authors tested the longitudinal effects of guilt and (undifferentiated) shame, and found that while both guilt and shame predicted support for restitution cross-sectionally, only shame and guilt. Anecdotally, it appears that many of the published, correlational papers are a result of failed manipulations.
guilt was associated with increased support for restitution over time. They also found an interesting circularity in the relationship between guilt and support for restitution, with support for restitution at time 1 also predicting guilt at time 2. While the findings of Brown and colleagues’s studies are notable, they did not distinguish between different aspects of shame and therefore it is difficult to determine what effects moral and image shame may have longitudinally.

5.1 Study 5

The present study was designed to address this gap in the literature by investigating how moral shame, image shame and guilt influence positive and negative responses to ingroup wrongdoing over time. The study used a full cross-lag, longitudinal design. Although such a design does not permit absolute causal conclusions, it does provide stronger insight into the directionality of observed relationships (Bijleveld & Kamp, 1998; Finkel, 1995). The present study was similar to Studies 2 and 3, but run at two time points. This design therefore allowed an investigation into the relationships among variables over time.

Hypotheses

I predicted that a similar pattern would be observed longitudinally as was found in Studies 1-3. That is, I hypothesised that moral shame at Time 1 would predict increased positive responses and decreased negative responses to ingroup transgressions at Time 2. Image shame at Time 1, on the other hand, would predict increased negative responses over time. Given the lack of effect of guilt found in previous studies, no specific predictions were made for this emotion.
5.1.1 Method

Participants

Data were collected at two time points, approximately four weeks apart. At Time 1, a community sample of 427 was recruited via an online survey. Of these respondents, 28 participants were excluded because they did not identify as “British”, leaving a final Time 1 sample of 399 participants (246 males and 153 females). The ages of this smaller sample ranged from 19 to 81, with a mean of 48 years of age. This survey was run through a rewards-based online shopping network, in which users receive rewards points for completing surveys, entering competitions and purchasing items through the system’s website. Participants were awarded points to the approximate value of 2 for completing the survey. The survey was hosted on the Bristol Online Survey system and participants were invited to complete the survey through an external link.

Four weeks after completing the initial questionnaire, the 399 participants who identified as British were sent an invitation to complete a follow-up study. They were again paid the equivalent of 2 for their participation. A total of 293 (73%) participants completed the survey again at Time 2 and was used in the final analysis. The ages of the 186 males and 107 females who completed the study Time 2 ranged from 19 to 81, with a mean age of 48 years of age. In order to evaluate whether there was any difference between those individuals who completed both time points with those who completed the study only at Time 1, I evaluated potential differences on age, gender, moral shame, image shame, guilt, apology support, compensation support, anger, avoidance and cover-up. To test this, I conducted a MANOVA on the T1 data set, splitting the sample based on whether the participant completed T2 or not. Using Pillai’s trace, there was a significant omnibus difference between the split samples, $V = .05, F(10, 388) = 1.87, p = .048$. This omnibus effect was qualified by a difference between samples on only one variable: anger that the
issue was being discussed. Perhaps unsurprisingly, those who chose not to repeat the study at T2 were more angry at Time 1 ($M = 3.89$) than those who later completed the survey again ($M = 3.55$), $p = .056$. The sample did not differ significantly on any other variable of interest.

**Design**

The study utilised a full cross-lag design. Participants completed identical questionnaires at both time points.

**Procedure**

Data were collected in late 2010 and early 2011. Participants were invited to participate in a survey that was being run by the University of Sussex. They were told that the survey was for university research purposes only and would not be used in any political context; they were encouraged to feel free to state strongly their disagreement or agreement with any of the questions contained in the survey. Participants were informed that they would be asked to read a BBC newspaper article relating to Britain’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq and to answer some questions about their thoughts and feelings about the war. The survey took approximately 15 minutes and it was made clear that the study was for British respondents only. Finally, they were told they were free to stop participating at any time without giving a reason and that by continuing, they were giving their consent to participate.

After electing to continue, participants were asked to read a BBC News article on the maltreatment of Baha Mousa and other Iraqi prisoners by the British army (see Appendix C). This article was used to bring the issues of Iraqi prisoner abuse to the forefront of

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These instructions were given because informal feedback from a study not reported in this thesis showed that some participants felt the study was one-sided in the types of questions asked and were concerned that their responses would be used in support of a left-wing political agenda. To further address this potential concern, I also included additional questions in this study which allowed participants to express pride and support in the army and government.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8266699.stm
participants’ minds. The article was followed by the dependent variables.

British participants who filled out the survey at Time 1 were invited four weeks later to complete a follow-up study. They were told that they had recently completed a survey on their attitudes toward Britain’s involvement in Iraq and that we were interested in how their attitudes may have changed over the last month. They were also informed that some of the questions may be similar to the survey they filled out previously. They were asked to answer each question with how they were feeling in that moment. The subsequent instructions, article and questions were identical to the survey at Time 1.

**Measures**

All items were measured using seven-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

*Moral Shame* (α = .94), *image shame* (α = .96), *guilt* (α = .90), *support for apology*, *support for financial compensation*, *issue avoidance*, *anger* and *cover-up* (α = .78) were measured using the same items as Study 3. As with Study 3, support for apology and compensation were treated as indicators for the latent variable ‘positive responses’; issue avoidance, anger and cover-up were treated as indicators for the latent variable ‘negative responses’.

**5.1.2 Results**

The following analyses were conducted using SPSS 16.0 and AMOS 16.0. Means, standard deviations and correlations of all relevant variables are presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. As can be seen from this table there was a slight decrease in mean levels of all variables over time. A repeated measures MANOVA revealed that there was a significant omnibus effect of time, $F(5, 288) = 2.85, p < .05$. This omnibus effect was driven by significant decreases in both moral shame, $F(1, 292) = 11.02, p < .01$, and positive responses, $F(1,
Table 5.1: Study 5: Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations among principle variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$M_{T1}$</th>
<th>$SD_{T1}$</th>
<th>$M_{T2}$</th>
<th>$SD_{T2}$</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Moral shame</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Image shame</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>-.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Guilt</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Positive responses</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 5. Negative responses    | 3.48     | 1.30      | 3.46     | 1.29      | -.36|-.20|-.29|-.53|-

Note: Above the diagonal are cross-sectional correlations at T1 and below the diagonal are cross-sectional correlations at T2. All correlations are significant at $p < .01$

Table 5.2: Study 5: Intercorrelations among principle variables at Times 1 and 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Time 1 variables</th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time 1 variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Moral shame</td>
<td></td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>-.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Image shame</td>
<td></td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>-.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Guilt</td>
<td></td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>-.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Positive responses</td>
<td></td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>-.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Negative responses</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Columns represent Time 1 variables, whereas rows represent Time 2 variables. All correlations are significant at $p < .01$

$292) = 5.17, p < .05$ from Time 1 to Time 2. It is not clear why this decrease occurred, however such changes in mean levels are uninformative for the specific hypotheses of this study; to test these hypotheses, I looked at the relationships among variables over time.

To test my hypotheses about the effects of emotions at Time 1 on measures of negative and positive orientations at Time 2, I evaluated the structural model shown in Figure 5.1. In this model, positive and negative responses at Time 2 were predicted by the three emotions scales at Time 1, controlling for both positive and negative responses at Time 1 (Bijleveld & van der Kamp, 1998; Finkel, 1995)\(^4\). This model provided a very good fit to the data, $\chi^2 (42) = 51.62$, $p = .15$, CFI = .997, SRMR = .023, RMSEA = .028. Moral shame at Time 1 predicted significantly less negativity at Time 2 ($\beta = -.22, p < .05$), while image shame at Time 1 predicted more negativity at Time 2 ($\beta = .18, p < .05$). No other path between the emotions at Time 1 and responses at Time 2 was significant.

\(^4\)In this analysis the emotion measures were treated as observed variables, whereas positive and negative responses were treated as latent variables. This is because, unlike the emotion measures, positive and negative responses reflect more generalised response types and are not expected to be singular, unitary constructs.
Less surprisingly, positive and negative responses at Time 1 also predicted these same responses at Time 2. The test-retest associations were strong for both positive and negative orientations ($\beta = .80$ and $\beta = .69$, respectively, both $ps < .001$). Positive responses at Time 1 also predicted decreases in negative responses at Time 2 ($\beta = -.22$, $p < .05$). Negative responses at Time 1 not predict positive responses at Time 2 ($\beta = -.06$, $p > .05$).

**Reverse causal direction**

The results above suggest that both moral and image shame may have causal effects in predicting levels of negative orientations to ingroup wrongdoing. Given that longitudinal designs do not permit absolute causal conclusions, it is also possible that individuals’ positive and negative responses at Time 1 may have been affecting the emotions at Time 2. To test this possibility, I created a second model predicting Time 2 moral shame, image shame and guilt from Time 1 positive and negative responses, controlling for Time 1 emotions. This model, which can be seen in Figure 5.2, did not fit the data well, $\chi^2 (28) = 190.34$, $p < .001$, CFI = .938, SRMR = .235, RMSEA = .141. Negative responses at Time 1 did not predict any of the emotions at Time 2, all $ps > .65$. Intriguingly, though, positive responses at Time 1 did predict both T2 guilt ($\beta = .29$, $p < .001$) and T2 moral shame ($\beta = .15$, $p < .01$), but not T2 image shame ($\beta = .07$, $p = .20$).

The emotions at Time 1 also predicted emotions at Time 2. T2 moral shame was significantly predicted by T1 moral shame ($\beta = .47$, $p < .001$), T1 guilt ($\beta = .14$, $p < .05$), and by T1 image shame ($\beta = .20$, $p < .01$). T2 guilt was predicted by T1 guilt ($\beta = .52$, $p < .001$) but neither T1 moral shame ($\beta = .11$, $p = .16$), nor T1 image shame ($\beta = .08$, $p = .32$). T2 mage shame was predicted by T1 image shame ($\beta = .50$, $p < .001$), and T1 guilt ($\beta = .20$, $p < .001$), but not T1 moral shame ($\beta = .07$, $p = .35$).
Figure 5.1: Effects of emotions at Time 1 on positive and negative responses at Time 2.  
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Note, error terms for items making up positive and negative response tendencies were allowed to covary over time, but these caovariances are not shown in this diagram for the sake of clarity. That is, apology support at T1 was allowed to covary with apology support at T2, cover-up at T1 was allowed to covary with cover-up at Time 2, and so on (variables were only allowed to covary with the same variable across time, no cross-loading was allowed). This was done to reflect the stability over time of aspects of these variables that are not captured by the latent variables measuring positive and negative response tendencies.
Figure 5.2: Reverse causal direction: Effects of positive and negative responses at Time 1 on emotions at Time 2.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$
5.1.3 Discussion

The present study provides strong evidence that moral shame and image shame are meaningful drivers of negative response tendencies. The results showed that moral shame measured at Time 1 predicted a decrease in anger, avoidance and a desire to cover up the ingroup’s misdeeds one month later. Image shame measured at Time 1 had the opposite effect, leading to an increase in subsequent anger, avoidance and cover-up. These findings provide support for a causal mechanism, implying that one’s feelings of shame have a causal effect on negative responses to ingroup wrongdoing — either decreasing or increasing such feelings depending on whether moral shame or image shame is experienced. It is interesting to note that contrary to my initial hypothesis, moral shame did not predict positive responses longitudinally. This is surprising as the cross-sectional relationships between moral shame and positive responses were both consistent and strong across Studies 1-3.

Intriguingly, the evidence suggests that the cross-sectional relationships observed between moral shame and positive responses in Studies 1-3 may not in fact be reflecting a causal effect of moral shame on positive responses, but rather the opposite causal path. The second structural model, set up to test the reverse causal direction, showed that positive response tendencies at Time 1 predicted increased feelings of moral shame at Time 2. This effect was admittedly weak. These same responses at Time 1 also, and more strongly, predicted guilt at Time 2. The meaningfulness of this latter effect is unclear, as the studies reported in this thesis have, by and large, shown that guilt has negligible effects when in the presence of moral and image shame, both longitudinally and cross-sectionally. It is, however, interesting to note that the effect of prior reparation support on subsequent guilt was also found by Brown and colleagues (2008), indicating that asking group members whether their group should apologise and compensate victim group members may play an important role in the development of guilt over time. The implication of this finding
is that we should be particularly wary of interpreting cross-sectional associations between guilt and reparation support as reflecting a causal link from guilt to support. In fact, these findings implicate the alternative causal link (but do not rule out influence from other, unidentified variables).

In hindsight, the finding that positive responses are T1 have effects on guilt and moral shame at T2 may not be so surprising. It is possible that being asked to consider whether the country as a whole should apologise and compensate Iraqis harmed by the British army may have triggered a deeper and/or prolonged consideration of the issues related to the war in Iraq, which influenced subsequent guilt and moral shame reactions. Indeed, I received a small number of emails from individuals who had completed the study at the first time point, who noted that they found the survey interesting as it prompted them to reflect on the issues in ways not considered before. It may prove interesting to test how this possible causality might develop over a longer period of time. For example, a study with three time points might evaluate whether positive responses at time 1 influence subsequent feelings of moral shame at time 2, which in turn influence subsequent negative responses at time 3.

One important point to note about this study is the high correlations among predictor variables, which is a possible indication of multicollinearity. There are four points to note about this issue. Firstly, the findings of the present study were strikingly consistent with the studies presented in earlier chapters. Secondly, the relatively large sample size of the present study offers some protection against the disruptive effects of multicollinearity (O’Brien, 2007). Thirdly, regression analyses (not reported here) show that the collinearity statistics were all within normal ranges, all variance inflation factors < 4.20 and tolerances > .24. As such, the evidence suggests that multicollinearity did not unduly influence the results of the present study. One possible reason for the inflated correlations among variables in this study is the sampling method used. While previous studies were
conducted with a student population (both online and in person), the present study (and that presented in Chapter 6) were conducted using an online survey company where survey respondents complete surveys for retail credits. It is my suspicion that the motivation of a certain number of participants (to complete the survey quickly in order to maximise monetary gain) resulted in, on average, a lower level of concentration and consideration, and therefore participants were more likely to respond to all emotion items similarly (and thus increasing the correlations amongst variables). Indeed, if this suspicion is correct, it may be even more impressive that a meaningful pattern of results were found that were consistent with other studies.

So how do the present findings fit in with previous research? Most pertinent is a comparison with the findings of Brown et al. (2008), who evaluated the longitudinal effects of both collective shame and guilt. Unlike the findings of Brown and colleagues, I did not find any effects of guilt longitudinally. Rather, moral shame and image shame drove the longitudinal observed effects. It is important to note that the effects observed in the present study were found only on negative responses, which Brown et al. did not measure. I found no effects of any emotion on my measure of positive responses. The reason for this inconsistency is unclear, although differences in the victim-perpetrator relationship between research contexts may play a role, such that the utility of reparations may have been seen differently in each context. Apology and social compensation may have been seen as much more valuable and useful acts within the context of historical mistreatment of the Mapuche in Chile than for Iraqis in Iraq. In the context of Iraq, group members may, upon reflection, have seen decreases (or increases) in avoidance, anger and cover-up as being more valuable responses in this intergroup context.

Although the above explanation may account for the lack of effects observed in the present study in relation to support for apology and compensation, why then were the two types of shame, but not guilt, driving the effects on negative response tendencies?
One explanation is that Brown and colleagues used a measure of shame that did not separately distinguish between moral and image shame, and therefore their measure may have occluded a more subtle investigation of the different effects of shame by effectively combining (and therefore cancelling out) both the positive and negative aspects of moral and image shame within their one shame scale. Additionally, when evaluated in the presence of these two separate forms of shame, the observed effects of guilt may have weakened to non-significance.

The connection between the present study and research that has attempted to manipulate guilt and shame is less direct. This is because some the studies have attempted to manipulate guilt (e.g., de Hooge et al., 2011) or shame (e.g., de Hooge et al., 2008) in isolation, or have manipulated both guilt and shame to an equal degree (e.g., Harvey & Oswald, 2000), and therefore are unable to adequately address the distinct effects of guilt and (different types of) shame (cf. Iyer et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the present finding that guilt has no effects longitudinally, nor indeed cross-sectionally in Studies 1-3, is inconsistent with the above experiments that reported positive effects of guilt. Given the number of differences between the above-mentioned studies and the present longitudinal study, it is difficult to explain this inconsistency. Despite this difficulty, it is possible that the effects of guilt found in the studies reviewed above may have reflected more an (unmeasured) moral shame response. An obvious task for future research would be to attempt more thoroughly to manipulate separately moral shame, guilt and image shame. In the following chapter I test the limits of the these emotions by evaluating the idea that a (both recent and distant) history of ingroup wrongdoing will have important and influential effects on how we think about and interact with unrelated contemporary outgroups, and that our past has this effect on us because of lingering emotional reactions to the original misdeed.
Chapter 6

Never again? How feelings of shame for ingroup wrongdoing affect attitudes toward unrelated minorities

It is a frequently expressed view that collective remembrance of ingroup transgression, such as the Holocaust perpetrated by Germans or war crimes perpetrated by one nation toward another, will prevent future transgressions from happening. For example, in a speech marking the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in 2005, Horst Khler, then Federal President of Germany emphasised the connection between past and future actions: “We bear the responsibility to keep the memory of all this suffering and its causes alive and we have to ensure that it never happens again.” Implicit in the view that remembrance of ingroup transgressions will prevent future transgressions is the assumption that people’s feelings and thoughts about harmful injustice done to one group will be linked to their attitudes towards other, unrelated groups. This should be true
especially for individuals directly or indirectly associated with the original injustice who, because of their group identification, may continue to feel a sense of shame or guilt for their ingroup’s past misdeeds (Doosje et al., 1998). However, research on such group-based emotions has so far focused exclusively on the link between collective guilt and shame and restitution responses directed specifically at the harmed outgroup, such as willingness to apologise or make reparations (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Iyer & Leach, 2008; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006).

To grasp the broader consequences of the remembrance of contemporary and historical crimes, we need to understand not only the complexity of group-based emotions but also their associations with people’s attitudes toward outgroups other than those originally victimised. By addressing this issue, the present chapter is focused on a phenomenon that has long been assumed but is far from trivial: the link between group-based emotions concerning harm done to one outgroup and attitudes towards another, unrelated minority. Here I will show how the shame and guilt investigated in earlier studies are related, in a systematic way, to attitudes towards a minority outgroup not associated with the original transgression.

The study presented in this chapter was conducted in collaboration with Jonas Rees, a social psychology masters student at the University of Sussex\(^1\). Rees (2010) was intrigued by the widespread use of the Holocaust in seemingly unrelated debates about Turkish immigrants and sought to investigate what effect these historical reminders might be having on attitudes toward Turks. To address this issue, Rees investigated whether Germans’ shame and guilt about the Holocaust — using the moral shame, image shame and guilt scales reported in this thesis — influenced attitudes toward contemporary Turkish immigrants in Germany. This issue is important because prejudice and discrimination are still prevalent problems in Germany, and Turkish immigrants are amongst the commonly

\(^1\)The present work, along with Rees’ study, is currently under its second review at Political Psychology. The collaborative nature of this work is reflected in my use of “we” rather than “I” in this chapter.
targeted minority groups (Wagner, Christ, & Pettigrew, 2008).

Rees (2010) noted that reference to the Holocaust is commonly employed by supporters as well as critics of immigration policies. While supporters of ethnic diversity and immigration appeal to Germany’s “historical responsibility” associated with the Holocaust, critics of immigration openly deplore reminders of the German Nazi past and paint continued reminders of German war crimes as an injustice imposed on Germany, often by interfering third parties (see Kulish, 2010). Interestingly, then, both proponents and opponents of immigration, and Turkish immigration in particular, appear to be attempting to use reminder of the Holocaust to support their own position.

Rees makes a convincing argument that references to the Holocaust are used by politicians and public figures to support and add emotional content to their arguments. What remains less clear, however, is how such reference might consequently influence Germans’ emotional reactions and attitudes within contemporary contexts, particularly with regard to contemporary minority groups. Rees tested this idea by evaluating how moral shame, image shame and guilt for the Holocaust predicted social distance from and attitudinal support for Turkish immigrants. He found that the three emotions were clearly separable in this context (using CFA) and that both forms of shame, but not guilt, had meaningful relationships with attitudes toward Turkish immigrants. As can be seen in Figure 6.1, moral shame positively predicted supportive attitudes ($\beta = .59, p < .05$), whereas image shame positively predicted social distance from Turks ($\beta = .44, p < .01$). In addition, the negative paths from moral shame to social distance ($\beta = -.39, p = .07$) and from image shame to supportive attitudes ($\beta = -.25, p = .06$) were very close to conventional levels of significance. Both paths from guilt were far from significance ($ps \geq .80$).

This was, as far as we were aware, the first study to show that different feelings of shame might be associated with attitudes toward a seemingly unrelated outgroup. It remained unclear, however, why such a relationship might exist. The present study was
designed to investigate why. While it is possible that feelings of shame should influence attitudes towards all outgroups equally, we do not believe this to be the case. Rather, we suggest that shame feelings will most strongly influence attitudes towards outgroups that, although not directly connected with the original victim group, are perceived as similar to the harmed group. Furthermore, we propose that any positive effects of emotions about ingroup wrongdoing on attitudes towards an unrelated outgroup (i.e., the effects of moral shame) will be explained, at least in part, by the perception that the ingroup has a particular moral obligation — an outstanding moral debt to repay as a result of the ingroup’s original transgression. Thus, we proposed that the association between group-based emotions and attitudes towards an unrelated outgroup should be driven (mediated) by feelings of moral obligation, and would be stronger (moderated) when the outgroup is seen as similar to the originally harmed group. I sought to investigate these ideas in this study.
6.1 Study 6

The present study, as with the other studies in this thesis, was conducted in the context of the war in Iraq, where the systematic abuse of Iraqi prisoners has given rise to considerable public outcry in Britain (BBC News, 2004). The minority immigrant group investigated in the present study was Pakistani immigrants, who, much like Turks in Germany, are recipients of ongoing discrimination (BBC Radio 4, 2004; Department for Work and Pensions, 2009).

**Hypotheses**

We predicted that

1. British people’s moral shame with regard to the Iraq war would be negatively linked to social distance\(^2\) from Pakistanis living in Britain. Image shame would function inversely.

2. The effects for moral shame would be positively, whereas the effects of image shame would be negatively mediated by a sense of moral obligation for human rights violations in Iraq.

3. This mediation would be moderated by the perceived similarity between original outgroup (Iraqis) and target outgroup (Pakistanis), such that the participants’ sense of moral obligation would be more strongly related to attitudes towards Pakistanis when Pakistanis are seen as similar to Iraqis. We did not expect guilt to be related to social distance, once the two forms of shame were controlled.

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\(^2\)We chose to use only one dependent variable in this study, social distance, because of the high conceptual consistency across contexts (i.e., social distance from Turks in Germany reflected well social distance to Pakistanis in Britain) and due to the complexity of evaluating moderated mediation with more than one dependence variable.
6.1.1 Method

Participants and Procedure

A community sample was recruited via an online survey company\(^3\). The survey was run through a rewards-based online shopping network, in which users receive rewards points for completing surveys, entering competitions and purchasing items through the system’s website. Of those recruited, 301 participants (36% female) who self-identified as “British” were included in the final analysis. The ages in the sample ranged from 19 to 81 (\(M = 48, \ SD = 11.4\)).

Measures

The measures used in this study were similar to those used in previous studies. The items were as follows:

**Guilt:** “I feel guilty for the manner in which Iraqi people have been treated by British.”, “Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behaviour of British towards Iraqis.”, “I feel guilty for the bad living conditions of the Iraqi people.”; \(\alpha = .92\).

**Moral shame:** “I feel ashamed because Britain’s actions with regard to Iraq have been immoral.”, “I feel ashamed to be British for the way we have treated the Iraqi people.”, “I feel ashamed for the damage done to Iraqi people by Brits.”; \(\alpha = .93\).

**Image shame:** “I feel ashamed because Britain has a damaged reputation.”, “I feel disgraced because the behaviour of Brits towards Iraqi people has created a bad image of Britain in the eyes of the world.”, “I feel ashamed when I realise that other countries might think of Britain negatively because of our involvement in Iraq.”, “To think how Britain is seen for its treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel ashamed.”, “I feel humiliated when I think of how Britain is seen negatively by the rest of the world for how it has treated the Iraqi people.”; \(\alpha = .97\).

\(^3\)The present dataset was taken from the Time 2 sample of the longitudinal study presented in Chapter 5.
Table 6.1:
Study 6: Overview of main variables and their inter-correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Guilt</td>
<td>3.61 (1.61)</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Moral Shame</td>
<td>3.99 (1.60)</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Image Shame</td>
<td>4.03 (1.60)</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social Distance</td>
<td>3.84 (1.81)</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Moral Obligation</td>
<td>4.69 (1.27)</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Similarity</td>
<td>3.56 (1.53)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All correlations significant at $p = .01$

Social distance was assessed with a scale parallel to that used in Rees (2010): “I would have problems moving into a district where many Pakistanis live.”, “Too many Pakistanis live in Great Britain.”, “Pakistanis should be sent back to their home country if jobs become scarce.”; $\alpha = .93$.

Moral obligation was measured with three items: “Britain has an ethical obligation to make up for its actions in Iraq.”, “I am concerned that British troops acted immorally in Iraq.”, “Britain has absolutely no moral obligation to the Iraqi people.” (reversed); $\alpha = .77$; and perceived similarity with one item: “How similar are Pakistanis and Iraqis?”.

All items were assessed using a seven-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”, with an exception of perceived similarity, which was measured using a seven-point scale ranging from “very dissimilar” to “very similar”. An overview of the measures and their inter-correlations is given in Table 6.1.

6.1.2 Results

The following analyses were conducted using AMOS 16.0. In preliminary analyses, the hypothesised factorial structure of the three group-based emotions was, again, supported in CFAs (see Table 6.2). Alternative models fit the data significantly worse, replicating not only the findings of previous studies and showing again that it is possible to separate moral shame, image shame and guilt. The three-factor model (model 1) was a significantly better fit to the data than the other models: A two-factor model (model 2) specifying
Table 6.2:
Study 6: Fit indices of models tested in confirmatory factor analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\chi^2$ (df)</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>AIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Three factor model</td>
<td>117.02 (41)</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>167.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Guilt vs. omnibus shame</td>
<td>281.47 (43)</td>
<td>.947</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>327.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Image shame vs. moral shame and guilt</td>
<td>293.28 (43)</td>
<td>.944</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>339.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. One factor model</td>
<td>499.25 (44)</td>
<td>.898</td>
<td>.186</td>
<td>543.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

guilt and omnibus shame (moral shame and image shame combined); a two-factor model (model 3) specifying an image shame factor and a factor combining moral shame and guilt; and a one-factor, negative emotion model; all $\Delta \chi^2 ps < .001$.

The effects of emotions on social distance from Pakistanis

A basic model predicting social distance from feelings of guilt, moral shame and image shame regarding British misdeeds in Iraq provided a good fit to the data ($\chi^2 (71) = 167.06, p < .001$, CFI = .982, RMSEA = .067, SRMR = .023). Moral shame ($\beta = -.59, p < .01$) was negatively, whereas image shame ($\beta = .45, p < .01$) was positively linked with social distance. Guilt was not significantly related to attitudes toward Pakistanis ($\beta = -.22, p = .12$). These findings replicate those of Rees (2010), by showing that Britons’ shame reactions to ingroup wrongdoings in Iraq are related to attitudes towards a seemingly unrelated minority group, Pakistanis living in Britain.

Mediation by moral obligation

A model was then created in which moral obligation mediated the effects of the three emotions. This analysis can be seen in (see Figure 6.2). This model also fit the data well, $\chi^2 (109) = 257.05, p < .001$, CFI = .974, RMSEA = .067, SRMR = .042. Bootstrapping analyses showed that the indirect effect from moral shame was significant, $p < .01$. The predicted negative mediation of image shame by moral obligation was not significant ($p = .18$). Unsurprisingly, given the lack of direct effect, the indirect effect for guilt was also

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4Latent factors were used in this and subsequent analyses.
Figure 6.2: Mediated structural equation model of generalisation of guilt and shame.

**Note.** Manifest indicators and their error terms are not displayed for the sake of clarity. Direct (un-mediated) effects are in parentheses.

not significant ($p = .08$). We also tested the mediation model without the direct paths from moral shame and guilt to social distance. This nested model explained the data equally well as the full model ($\Delta \chi^2 (2) = 5.81, p > .05$), thus showing that the effect of moral shame on social distance was fully mediated by a sense of moral obligation for the ingroup’s wrongdoing.

**Testing the moderated mediation hypothesis**

As the reader will recall, we did not expect feelings of moral and image shame for ingroup wrongdoing, and the accompanying sense of moral obligation, to influence attitudes towards all outgroups indiscriminately. Rather, we predicted these feelings would specifically influence attitudes towards outgroups that are perceived as *similar* to the original victim group in core aspects. To test the hypothesised role of perceived similarity, we designed a moderated mediation model according to Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes’ (2007) Model 3. We assumed that while moral shame and image shame should always be asso-
ciated with moral obligation (but in different directions), the effect of moral obligation on social distance from an unrelated outgroup would depend on perceived similarity of the two outgroups. Following Kline and Dunn (2000) and to avoid multicollinearity and linear dependency of the constructs in the model, the interaction term of moral obligation and similarity needed for this test was computed as the product of the two centred variables (see also Aiken & West, 1991). The model fit the data well ($\chi^2(133) = 284.35$, $p < .01$, CFI = .974, RMSEA = .062, SRMR = .040). Both perceived similarity and the similarity x moral obligation interaction term emerged as meaningful predictors of social distance from Pakistanis ($\beta = .14$ and $\beta = -.11$, respectively, both $ps < .05$), thus qualifying for the theorised moderated mediation. The direct path from image shame to social distance ($\beta = .36$, $p < .05$) remained significant, paralleling the mediation analysis reported above and indicating that the moderated mediation effect reflects a moderation of only the moral shame mediation. Further analyses confirmed that the links from moral obligation to intergroup attitudes were especially pronounced for individuals perceiving Pakistanis to be similar to the original outgroup, Iraqis: when the sample was split into a high and low similarity group (by a median split), the paths from moral obligation to social distance remained significant for both groups but were considerably higher for the former ($\beta_{\text{High Similarity}} = -.68$ vs. $\beta_{\text{Low Similarity}} = -.39$; both $ps < .05$).

6.1.3 Discussion

This study replicates and extends the findings from Rees (2010) and thus further supports the idea that effects of group-based emotions in response to specific ingroup wrongdoing can be linked to attitudes towards a seemingly unrelated outgroup, which is the target of contemporary discrimination. The emotions of guilt, moral shame and image shame concerning the British involvement in Iraq were, again, found to be clearly separable constructs and showed the predicted links to attitudes towards Pakistanis living in the
Furthermore, our analyses showed that the effects of moral shame were mediated by a sense of moral obligation. These mediation effects were more pronounced (moderated) when individuals judged the Pakistanis to be more similar to Iraqis. As with the majority of studies presented in this thesis, guilt was unrelated to the outcome measure. This finding with respect to guilt is in line with the theorising of Deonna and colleagues (2008, 2011) who predict that while guilt may sometime motivate direct actions to make amends for the specific ingroup wrongdoing, it will be unrelated to wider and more general attempts to restore the ingroup’s morality.

These findings not only have theoretical implications — by both supporting the separation of moral shame, image shame and guilt, and by furthering our understanding of the effects of these emotions — but also prove to be practically meaningful, by showing that reactions motivated by feelings of moral shame could be supportive of wider intergroup relations. Behaviour motivated by image shame, on the other hand, may trigger actively anti-social responses such as wishing to maintain social distance from other, socially devalued outgroups. These findings are meaningful because they point the potential importance of individuals’ emotional responses to their group’s history as drivers of attitudes and behaviour in seemingly unrelated intergroup situations.

The data from the present study show more clearly than previous studies in this thesis that the effects of image shame and moral shame are driven by different mechanisms. Not only did this study corroborate the findings reported in previous chapters by showing that image shame had negative effects, and moral shame positive effects, on intergroup attitudes, but it highlighted that the effects of moral shame, alone, are driven by a concern for the ingroup’s morality and a perception that the ingroup has an ethical obligation to make amends for its wrongdoing. While the effects of moral shame were fully mediated by a sense of moral obligation, image shame retained a direct positive link with social distance, indicating a different mechanism. It is my speculation that the relationship
between image shame and social distance may reflect, at least in part, displaced aggression onto a weaker outgroup (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). This idea is supported by Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, and Miller (2000), who show that the displaced aggression effect is moderated by perceived similarity, such that greater displaced aggression is observed when the provocateur and target are perceived to be similar. It remains unclear, of course clear who the provocateur would be in the case of image shame (the victim group, or the third-party critics?). Further research is needed to investigate these conjectures.

As with Study 5, the issue of multicollinearity is relevant, quite likely due to the internet sampling used. Again, however, the findings are so closely in line with not only Rees’ 2010 data, but also with previous studies in this thesis, that they cannot simply be discounted due to multicollinearity concerns. Furthermore, as with Study 5, regression analyses (not reported here) show that the collinearity statistics were all within normal ranges, all variance inflation factors < 5.0 and tolerances > .15.

6.2 Implications for wider intergroup relations

In this chapter I have investigated the novel notion that a link exists between group-based emotions concerning one intergroup episode and attitudes towards another unrelated outgroup. These findings show that emotional reactions for ingroup wrongdoing may have important effects on wider intergroup relations. If perpetrator group members feel moral shame for their group’s misdeeds then this is likely to have positive effects on the wider treatment of minority groups. This finding provides support for the notion that collective remembrance of large-scale historical atrocities such as the Holocaust may prevent future transgressions from happening.

However, a risk is that shaming a group for their actions (and thus inducing image shame in the perpetrator group) may have wider and more extensive negative effects than
originally thought. In previous chapters I have provided evidence that image shame is associated with a host of negative outcomes connected with the initial shame-eliciting situation, and raise concerns that, for this reason, shaming may be an unproductive strategy to encourage groups to address their misdeeds. The present findings provide additional cause for concern, by showing that shaming may have additional, negative effects on how the perpetrator group treats other minority groups within the wider society.

6.3 Future Research

I believe the present chapter, and the work of Rees and Brown, presents a fertile base for future research. By demonstrating that the effects of shame and guilt with regard to harm done to one group are not confined to attitudes towards that originally victimised group, I hope to have broadened the scope of research into group-based emotions. Although our analyses presented in this chapter provide initial insights into the conditions under which shame and guilt may influence attitudes to unrelated outgroups, future work should continue to test and document the mediating and moderating mechanisms, particularly in relation to image shame. I have offered the possibility earlier that a desire to maintain or bolster the ingroup’s status, or a desire to displace anger and frustration may account for some of the negative effects of image shame. Further work may find it fruitful to experimentally manipulate important variables, such as perceived similarity or moral obligation (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007).
Figure 6.3: Moderated mediation model

** p < .01 * p < .05

Note. Manifest indicators and their error terms, non-significant direct paths (p > .10) as well as correlations of moderator with predictors and mediator are not displayed for the sake of clarity.
Chapter 7

Examining perpetrator group members’ reactions to apologies containing expressions of different forms of shame and guilt

Throughout this thesis I have made an implicit assumption that apologies offered by perpetrator groups will act as powerful catalysts of intergroup reconciliation — it is for this reason that support for apology and support for compensation have been labelled as reflecting a ‘positive response’ to ingroup wrongdoing. Indeed, this is an assumption that is widely shared, in both lay and academic circles. The idea that intergroup apologies are positive is so widely accepted that surprisingly little empirical research has looked into what effects, if any, actual apologies have. Rather, the vast majority of researchers have investigated the antecedents of apologies or support for apologies and have simply assumed that an apology will have a strong, positive influence on intergroup relations.

This situation is not surprising, of course, when one considers the widespread im-
importance placed on apologies by victims themselves (Barkan, 2000; Nobles, 2008; Thompson, 2002). Indeed, apologising does appear to be crucial in interpersonal relations, by promoting forgiveness and restoring trust between the individual victim and individual perpetrator (McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2001). The situation at the group level is often more complicated, however: the conflict can be long and protracted; the harm can be indirect and systemic — perpetrated via abstract social systems rather than individuals; damage can be perpetrated by a few against many or by many against a few; and, quite commonly, the harm may have occurred long ago, such that the original parties may no longer be alive. These situations raise important questions about historical responsibility and group continuity (Thompson, 2002) and, more practically, about who does the apologizing and to whom the apology is offered (Nobles, 2008).

Despite the complexities associated with intergroup conflicts, apologies are nevertheless widely viewed as essential to the process of intergroup reconciliation (e.g., Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). What research that has been conducted has produced mixed findings (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2008; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008, 2011). Philpot and Hornsey (2008), for instance, found in four studies that participants who were told that an outgroup had apologised for an offence perceived that the outgroup was more remorseful and were more satisfied with the outgroup’s response to the wrongdoing. They found no evidence, however, of increased forgiveness of the offending outgroup.

These authors argue that their findings imply that intergroup apologies, at least on their own, may not be an effective tool for promoting reconciliation because they do not promote forgiveness within the victim group. This conclusion rests on the assumption that forgiveness is the preferred response from the victim group. We may wish to question this assumption however, as it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which instant forgiveness would be detrimental to the process of intergroup reconciliation. For instance, where one group has committed a serious offence against another, it would seem unwise for the
victim group to hastily forgive and absolve the perpetrators of further responsibility after a simple apology. There would certainly be additional, and crucial, factors of criminal justice, material reparation and continuing power discrepancies that would require addressing before true forgiveness and therefore reconciliation could occur. In this instance, while beneficial, an apology may symbolise merely the beginning, rather than the end, of the reconciliation process and therefore forgiveness would be an inappropriate dependent variable.

An additional and important consideration is whether the types of apology vignettes used by Philpot and Hornsey (2008) adequately captured the reality of intergroup apologies. Anecdotal experience, as least, tells us that apologies — especially group apologies — can come in many different forms and can vary widely in their meaning and underlying intent, such that some are seen as genuine and ‘heartfelt’, whereas others may be regarded as insincere and self-serving. Notably, in three of the four studies reported by Philpot and Hornsey (2008), rather dry apologies were used, containing no emotional content (in Study 4 a more emotional apology was used, but even in this case the emotion expression was limited to remorse and regret). It may be that the two different types of apology used by Philpot and Hornsey did not adequately alleviate participants’ suspicion that the apology was being offered for self-serving reasons, and it is this suspicion that prevented these apologies from promoting forgiveness. Supporting this contention, victim group members did report high levels of suspicion of the outgroup’s apology across all four studies.

So what factors might lead people to view an apology offered by a perpetrator group as more genuine and heartfelt? One important factor, alluded to above, may be emotional expression. To date, only one published paper has investigated the role of emotions within apologies (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2008). Giner-Sorolla and colleagues investigated the specific influence of shame and guilt expressions within apologies. Using hypothetical scenarios...

1The type of shame expressed was consistent with Lewis' (1971) conceptualisation of shame as a global criticism of the self
involving corporate environmental negligence, they found that expressions of shame (but not guilt) reduced feelings of insult amongst victim group members in response to an offer of reparations by the perpetrator group. They also investigated the effects of guilt and shame expressions when participants imagined they were members of the perpetrator group, but found no effect. One explanation for this latter null effect is that they failed to measure a key moderating variable, such as prior attitudes toward the utility of the ingroup offering an apology. This explanation is tested in the present study.

Although the studies by Giner-Sorolla and colleagues (2008) and Philpot and Hornsey (2008) provide an interesting starting point, it is clear that more research is needed to investigate the multitude of ways in which apologies are offered and delivered by perpetrator groups and how such apologies are received by both victim group and perpetrator group members. How apologies are viewed by perpetrator group members is, I believe, particularly important. Given the often impassioned debate within perpetrator groups regarding the culpability of the ingroup and the need (or not) for their group to apologise, it may be important to investigate how perpetrator groups members react to different types of apologies by a representative of their group. This is interesting because the reactions of perpetrator group’s members to an intergroup apology may, collectively, mobilise subsequent support or opposition to further reparative actions. That is, should ingroup members perceive an apology negatively (or positively), their reactions are likely to decrease (or increase) their subsequent willingness to support future reparative actions and actions that more generally contribute to improved intergroup relations. In the present study I investigate how different emotional expressions by an ingroup representative influence the reaction of ingroup members to an apology.
7.1 Study 7

The present study was therefore designed to extend the work of Giner-Sorolla et al. (2008) and Philpot and Hornsey (2008) by investigating how perpetrator group members respond when an ingroup representative offers an apology containing a moral shame, image shame, or guilt expression (or no expression of emotion). Furthermore, the study was designed to test the idea that reactions to different apology types would differ systematically as a result of prior attitudinal support for an apology (i.e., individuals who initially oppose an apology will react differently to an actual apology than those who initially support such an apology). While the studies reported in earlier chapters have shown that moral shame, image shame, and to a lesser extent guilt, have meaningful effects on attitudes regarding various reparative behaviours, the present study evaluates how perpetrator group members react to apologies containing expressions of these emotions. As with the previous studies in this thesis, the study was conducted in the context of the British army’s mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners during the most recent invasion of Iraq. Here, participants were asked to react to a hypothetical apology offered by the British Prime Minister, David Cameron to Iraqi citizens unduly harmed by the British army.

Why am I proposing that prior apology support is an important determinant of group members’ reactions? In short, I believe that individuals with high prior apology support will have different motives and will desire for an apology to fulfil a different function than someone with prior opposition to an apology. The former individual is more likely to want an apology to represent the expression of sincere remorse over the ingroup’s actions and to represent the start, rather than the end of reconciliation. An individual with low prior apology support is likely to feel very differently; they are likely to want any apology (if one must be made) to simply appease the victim group (and any important third parties) and to represent the end of the ingroup’s commitments to reconciliation. I am proposing that prior apology support will act as a key moderator of individuals’ responses to the
different apology types because they will see the different emotional expressions contained within the apology as advancing one of the general orientations described above (i.e., sincere remorse vs. appeasement). I believe that individuals are likely to view an apology containing an expression of moral shame as representing sincere remorse and an openness to the process of reconciliation. For this reason, a moral shame apology is likely to be preferred by those with high prior apology support. Apologies containing image shame or guilt, on the other hand, may be more likely to be seen as fulfilling an appeasement function and are therefore more likely to be preferred by those who do not initially support the ingroup offering an apology.

Given the broad range of responses that may be exhibited by perpetrator group members in response to an apology, I investigated a number of key dependent variables. These included perceptions of how emotionally affected Cameron was seen to be, how genuine the apology was seen to be, how satisfied the group members were with the apology, whether the apology was seen as closing the chapter on the ingroup’s wrongdoing, and how much moral disengagement group members reported.

The collection of dependent variables listed above was chosen in order to reflect the numerous ways an ingroup member might react to an apology. Perceptions of how emotionally affected Cameron is, how genuine the apology is seen to be and how satisfied the participant would be with the apology reflect, for want of a better term, intra-group reactions to an apology — the consideration is with one’s own reaction to the apology and how one sees the ingroup member who offers the apology. Furthermore, how an individual sees the outgroup and the intergroup conflict more generally may have an important impact on willingness to address issues of ingroup wrongdoing in the future. I included two variables, moral disengagement and perceptions that the issue is a closed chapter (Peetz, Gunn, & Wilson, 2010), in order to evaluate what effect an apology might have on wider perceptions of the outgroup and the intergroup situation. These latter two variables were included
because they have both been shown to be related to a decreased willingness to redress ingroup crimes, and therefore if a specific apology has the effect of increasing perceptions of closed chapter or moral disengagement then this would have serious implications for further intergroup restitution and reconciliation.

**Hypotheses**

Given the number of dependent variables, the large number of possible interaction effects, and the exploratory nature of this study, two general hypotheses were developed:

1. Those individuals showing support for a apology initially will react more favourably than those who were opposed to an apology being made.

2. This prior attitudinal position will moderate reactions to the different emotions accompanying the apology: those supporting an apology will respond most favourably to an apology that is accompanied by moral shame; those opposed to an apology will respond less favourably to this condition.

### 7.1.1 Method

**Participants**

Participants were 240 psychology students who participated online for partial course credit. The sample consisted of 196 females and 44 males, whose ages ranged from 17 to 49, with a mean of 21 years of age. In addition to all participants identifying themselves as ‘British’, the majority of participants were white (224), with a minority identifying themselves as Indian (4), Bangladeshi (1), Asian other (2), Black Caribbean (2), Black African (3), Black other (2), Chinese (2) and Other (12) (participants were free to select more than one ethnic identification).
Design

The study utilised a between-subjects design. The content of the apology differed in each condition. All conditions contained the initial information:

Prime Minister David Cameron today made a formal apology on behalf of the government for the treatment of Iraqi prisoners documented in a recent report by the Chilcot Inquiry. The report details the routine use of illegal interrogation methods by British troops.

“Some members of our armed forces acted wrongly. On behalf of the Government — and indeed our country — I am sorry.”

The information that followed differed between conditions. The control condition contained no additional information. The other conditions contained the following quotes from David Cameron:

Guilt:

“I feel very guilty about what happened and regret that the Government had not taken more measures to prevent it. The treatment of Iraqi prisoners by members of the British Army makes me feel guilty. The army’s actions were wrong.”

Moral shame:

“I feel very ashamed about what happened and regret that the army acted in a way that is incompatible with Britain’s core moral values. The treatment of Iraqi prisoners by members of the British Army makes me feel ashamed about what it means to be British. The army’s actions were immoral.”

Image shame:
“I feel very ashamed about what happened and regret that the army acted in a way that has tarnished Britain’s international reputation. To think how the treatment of Iraqi prisoners by members of the British Army has affected how Britain is seen by the world makes me feel ashamed. The army’s actions have damaged Britain’s reputation.”

**Procedure**

Data were collected in late 2010 and early 2011. Participants were able to complete the study online, and were told that it would take approximately 15 minutes. The study’s sign up page instructed participants that they would be asked how they would feel about the British government offering an apology to the Iraqi people. After signing up for the study, participants were presented with a link to complete the study. This link initially directed them to a webpage that contained a Javascript code that randomly assigned them to one of the four conditions and automatically redirected them to the survey page of the selected condition.

On the study webpage they were instructed that the study involved reading a fictional article that depicts an apology by David Cameron to the Iraqi people and answering some questions about how you would feel after reading the article. Before reading the apology, however, participants answered some questions measuring their belief that the British government should apologise for wrongdoing in Iraq and how much they would support such an apology. After answering these questions, participants read the apology. They were told that they would read a short article depicting an apology by David Cameron, for some of the actions of the British army in Iraq. They were asked to imagine that they had read the news snippet in the newspaper that morning and to be aware of what their thoughts and feelings would have been while reading the article. The content of the apology constituted the experimental manipulation. After they read the article they were
presented with the dependent variables.

**Measures**

All items were measured using seven-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 strongly agree).

*Prior apology support* was measured using three items: ‘I think that the British government should apologise for actions committed against the Iraqi people’, ‘I think that the British government should apologise for some of the actions of the British army in Iraq’, and ‘I oppose an apology by the British government to the Iraqi people’ (reversed), $\alpha = .78$.

*How emotionally affected David Cameron was seen to be* was measured with one item: ‘Judging from the article, to what degree has David Cameron been emotionally affected by the events in Iraq?’

*Genuineness* of the apology was measured with two items: ‘I would feel the apology is genuine’ and ‘I would feel that the apology is sincere’, $\alpha = .94$.

*Satisfaction* was measured with one item: ‘I would feel satisfied with the apology’.

*Closed chapter* was measured with two items: ‘I would think that the invasion of Iraq is now a closed chapter in British history’ and ‘Britain’s involvement in Iraq is still an open book with ramifications for the future’ (reversed), $\alpha = .74$.

*Moral disengagement* was measured using four items: ‘I would think that compared to the atrocious things Saddam Hussein would have done to our troops, the treatment of Iraqi prisoners was very mild’, ‘I would think that taking embarrassing photos of Iraqi prisoners is no big deal when you consider the harm Iraqis have brought to so many people’, ‘I would think that humiliating Iraqi prisoners is not too serious considering that they would have killed our soldiers on the battlefield’, and ‘I would think that compared to the attacks of Iraqis on British troops, the treatment of prisoners was not that extreme’, $\alpha = .89$. 
Table 7.1:
Study 7: Means (and standard deviations) across conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Guilt</th>
<th>Moral</th>
<th>Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low prior support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotionality</td>
<td>3.12 (1.56)</td>
<td>4.57 (1.36)</td>
<td>4.05 (1.43)</td>
<td>3.90 (1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genuineness</td>
<td>3.35 (1.28)</td>
<td>4.38 (1.31)</td>
<td>3.10 (1.07)</td>
<td>3.36 (1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>3.04 (1.21)</td>
<td>4.52 (1.40)</td>
<td>3.40 (1.27)</td>
<td>3.67 (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed chapter</td>
<td>2.48 (.97)</td>
<td>2.71 (.86)</td>
<td>3.35 (.84)</td>
<td>3.36 (1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral disengagement</td>
<td>3.21 (1.44)</td>
<td>3.27 (1.25)</td>
<td>2.89 (.88)</td>
<td>2.96 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                  |         |       |       |       |
| High prior support|        | 20   | 18    | 22    | 19    |
| Emotionality     | 2.75 (1.52) | 3.56 (1.58) | 5.05 (1.59) | 3.79 (1.90) |
| Genuineness      | 3.55 (1.27) | 2.94 (1.25) | 4.07 (1.72) | 3.53 (1.32) |
| Satisfaction     | 2.80 (1.28) | 3.11 (1.64) | 3.55 (1.87) | 3.63 (1.77) |
| Closed chapter   | 2.13 (.84) | 2.50 (1.40) | 2.16 (1.11) | 1.82 (.711) |
| Moral disengagement | 2.09 (.84) | 2.54 (1.35) | 1.80 (.84) | 1.54 (1.00) |

7.1.2 Results

Means (and standard deviations) of all relevant variables are presented in Table 7.1

Manipulation check

A one-way ANOVA conducted on the extent to which David Cameron was emotionally affected by the events in Iraq revealed a significant main effect of condition, \( F(3, 236) = 10.62, p < .001 \). Tukey’s HSD tests showed that Cameron was seen as less emotionally affected in the control condition (\( M = 2.89 \)) than in the three emotional expression conditions (all \( ps < .001 \)). The moral (\( M = 4.41 \)), image (\( M = 3.95 \)) and guilt (\( M = 4.04 \)) conditions did not differ significantly. Thus, the manipulation of emotional expression appears to have been successful.

Main analyses

To test the hypothesized effects of apology content on the dependent variables, a condition*prior support MANOVA was conducted, specifying prior apology support as a continuous covariate. Using Pillai’s Trace, there were significant effects of condition, \( V = \)
.17, $F(15, 690) = 2.70$, $p < .001$, prior support, $V = .20$, $F(5, 228) = 11.41$, $p < .001$, and condition*prior support, $V = .16$, $F(15, 690) = 2.56$, $p < .01$. These effects are unpacked for each variable below. To do so, the sample was split into thirds based on scores on higher and lower prior apology support. A new categorical variable was then created from the low and high thirds. This dichotomous variable is referred to below in subsequent analyses as prior support.

**Emotion**

As detailed in the manipulation check above, condition had a significant effect on how emotionally affected David Cameron was seen to be. In addition to this manipulation check, I also evaluated additional main and interaction effects. There was no main effect of prior support, $F(1, 159) = .27$, but a significant condition*prior support interaction was found, $F(3, 159) = 3.01$, $p < .05$, as seen in Figure 7.1. Tukey’s HSD tests showed that for individuals who had strong prior support, Cameron was seen as most emotionally affected when offering a moral shame apology. For individuals with low prior support, however, Cameron was seen as most emotionally affected when offering a guilt apology.

**Genuineness**

Both main effects were non significant, indicating that participants saw the four apologies as equally genuine regardless of condition, $F(3, 159) = .09$, or prior support, $F(1, 159) = .02$. A significant condition*prior support interaction was found, however, $F(3, 159) = 3.56$, $p < .05$. This interaction was qualified by a significant difference between high prior support-guilt and low prior support-guilt conditions, and two marginally-significant post-hoc differences, between moral shame and guilt conditions amongst individuals with low prior support; and between moral shame and guilt conditions amongst individuals with high prior support. These differences can be seen in Figure 7.2, and showed that

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2Almost identical findings were obtained when analysing the data by median split.
Figure 7.1: How emotionally affected David Cameron was seen to be
Starred differences reflect significant Tukey’s HSD post-hoc comparisons
participants with high prior support found a moral shame apology to be more genuine than a guilt apology, whereas the opposite was true for participants low on prior support. The levels of perceived genuineness in the two control and two image shame conditions were not significantly different from any other condition.

**Satisfaction**

A significant main effect of condition showed that satisfaction with the apology differed across conditions, $F(3, 159) = 3.06, p < .05$. Post-hoc tests showed the level of satisfaction were lower in the control condition than the guilt, image shame and moral shame conditions. Satisfaction did not differ between the three emotion conditions. There was also a marginally significant effect of prior support, $F(1, 159) = 2.88, p = .09$, with those
who initially supported the apology ($M = 3.27$) overall being more dissatisfied than those who initially opposed the apology ($M = 3.66$). The two main effects were qualified by a marginally significant condition*prior support interaction, $F(3, 159) = 2.29$, $p = .08$, seen in Figure 7.3. This interaction was influenced by a marked increase in satisfaction amongst individuals with low prior support who were presented with a guilt apology. In fact, this condition was the only one where mean levels of satisfaction were above the scale mid point ($M = 4.52$), indicating that participants were dissatisfied in the seven remaining conditions. Satisfaction in the low prior support guilt condition was significantly higher than both control conditions and the high prior support guilt condition.
Closed chapter

Although no main effect of condition on perceptions of the war in Iraq as a closed chapter was found, $F(3, 159) = 1.56$, a significant main effect of prior support was observed, $F(1, 159) = 26.79, p < .001$. Participants who were low on prior support agreed more that the war in Iraq is a closed chapter in British history ($M = 2.95$) than those who were high on prior support ($M = 2.15$). This main effect was qualified by a significant condition*prior support interaction, $F(3, 159) = 3.81, p < .05$ (seen in Figure 7.4). Further analysis of this interaction showed a number of significant effects that, collectively, revealed that closed chapter ratings were highest for individuals low in prior support who had been presented with either a moral shame ($M = 3.35$) or an image shame apology ($M = 3.26$). For individuals high on prior support the opposite pattern was observed, with closed chapter ratings lowest in the image shame ($M = 1.82$) and moral shame ($M = 2.16$) conditions.

Moral disengagement

Two significant main effects were found for moral disengagement. Unsurprisingly, moral disengagement was higher in individuals with low prior support ($M = 3.08$) than those with high prior support ($M = 1.99$), $F(1, 159) = 40.29, p < .001$. A significant main effect of condition was also found, $F(3, 159) = 2.92, p < .05$. LSD post-hoc tests showed that moral disengagement was significantly higher in the guilt apology condition ($M = 2.91$) than in both the moral shame ($M = 2.34$) and image shame ($M = 2.25$) conditions, $p < .05$. The guilt apology condition was also higher than the control condition ($M = 2.65$), although this difference was not significant, $p = .29$. No condition*prior support interaction was found, $p = .59$. 
Figure 7.4: Agreement that Britain’s involvement in Iraq is a closed chapter in British history.

Starred differences reflect significant Tukey’s HSD post-hoc comparisons.
7.1.3 Discussion

The present study shows how different apologies are received by fellow ingroup members. A clear pattern of results emerged, showing that different individuals within a group — with different prior attitudes toward the ingroup offering an apology — prefer different expressions of emotion with an apology. In general, the results show that those with high initial apology support prefer expressions of moral shame within an apology: when this type of apology is offered they not only see the apology giver as more emotionally affected, but also feel that the apology is more genuine. Individuals low in prior apology support, on the other hand, tend to prefer guilt expressions within an apology: for these individuals it is this type of apology that is seen as more genuine and is associated with perceptions that the apology giver is more emotionally affected, and with greater satisfaction with the apology.

Why are moral shame apologies preferred by some individuals and guilt apologies by others? I believe the key lies in the different underlying motives associated with varying degrees of prior support for apology. As noted earlier, individuals with high prior apology support are likely to genuinely desire that the ingroup make amends for its wrongdoing and consequently are likely to prefer an apology that reflects these desires. An moral shame apology, which emphasises the incompatibility of the ingroup’s actions with the group’s moral principles, is likely to reflect this genuine desire to make amends. Individuals who are initially opposed to an apology being given are likely to have very different motives. Their focus is likely to be on maintaining the ingroup’s status and avoiding costly acts of restitution. If an apology has to be offered, these individuals will most likely prefer an apology that strikes a balance between offering enough to the victims in terms of perceived genuineness while not committing the ingroup to further acts of restitution. A guilt apology is more likely to fit the preferences of such individuals. It is interesting that participants low in prior support did not prefer image shame apologies (nor control
apologies). It’s possible that both of these apologies were not seen as genuine enough to be received as acceptable by victims and interested third parties.

An interesting finding was observed in relation to perception of the Iraq war as a ‘closed chapter’ in British history. These findings indicate that shame expressions may have a polarising effect on individuals. While those low in prior support take the opportunity to close the book on Britain’s obligations, those high in prior support become more resolute in seeing the issue as ongoing. This may again reflect the different underlying motivations of these two groups. For those low in prior support, an expression of shame is enough to warrant closing the chapter on the ingroup’s responsibility. For those high in prior support, such an expression is likely to be seen as merely a starting point.

What can these results lead us to say about apologies containing moral shame or guilt expressions? Although mean levels of support within the ingroup for each type of apology may be comparable, the present findings indicate that different ingroup members will prefer one apology over the other. This is not an arbitrary preference; their preferences are likely to reflect important underlying motives regarding the utility of apology. Individuals who support moral shame apologies are more likely to be open to further reconciliation attempts, while those who support guilt apologies less so. This view is supported by the finding that moral disengagement was highest in individuals exposed to a guilt condition. Might we also be able to make any conclusions about apology givers who elect to use either guilt or moral shame expressions in their apologies? If these individuals are similar in orientation to those who prefer each apology type then there may be some cause for concern regarding offers of apology that contain guilt expressions, as accompanying such an apology may by a resistance to additional participation in the process of reconciliation. One may be wise to question further the motives of those who elect primarily to express guilt. And indeed, it appears that victims might be sensitive to the possibility of such unsavoury motives. It is interesting to note that Giner-Sorolla and colleagues (2008)
showed that victims found guilt expressions as more insulting than shame (or a no emotion control apology).

The practical implications of these findings for group leaders looking to apologise for ingroup wrongdoing are also important. Such leaders should be aware that different group members are likely to support and possibly advocate for different types of apology. Being aware of the reasons for divergent preferences amongst fellow ingroup members would allow leaders to more successfully deal with opposing motivations. The present study does not speak to the possible effects of combining expressions of both moral shame and guilt within one apology, which may be one way to respond to competing motivations within the group. It is possible that such an apology may satisfy both camps, but of course it is also possible that it may satisfy neither. The effect of a mixed-emotion apology on the victim remains an empirical question.

There are two additional methodological points of importance that require discussion. The first relates to the apology content, the second to the apology giver, David Cameron. I criticised Philpot & Hornsey (2008) in the introduction for using apologies that failed to capture the possible diversity of intergroup apologies, but can the criticism be applied to my own research? To some degree, yes. Although I believe I more successfully captured the different emotional content of apologies, the necessary brevity of the apologies (particularly the control apology) may be inconsistent with what might be expected of an actual apology. This may be the reason that a counterintuitive (marginally significant) effect of prior apology support was found on levels of satisfaction where those who initially supported the apology were more dissatisfied than those who initially opposed an apology, regardless of apology type. Unfortunately, the need for experimental control precluded the use of longer, more elaborate apologies. Future research might benefit from the use of longer, more ecologically valid apologies.

The second point, while not a limitation of the present study, relates to the legitimacy
of David Cameron, the current prime minister, as the ingroup representative from whom an apology is offered. Reading participants’ written feedback it became obvious that some of people objected to the apology because they did not see Cameron as a legitimate apology giver. They argue that as he was not in government when Britain decided to go to war in 2003 he has no obligation, nor right to apologise on behalf of Britain, despite holding the current post of prime minister. As noted in the introduction, such concerns are particular to intergroup conflicts and apologies and result is complex debates about historical continuity and obligation (Nobles, 2008). Future work should attempt to investigate what effect, if any, representative legitimacy has on both support for and reactions to an ingroup apology.
Chapter 8

Conclusions and implications for understanding intergroup reconciliation

I was motivated to complete the work presented in this thesis for two main reasons. The first was to address and explain the inconsistencies within the literature on shame and guilt, at both a theoretical and empirical level. The second, and personally more important motivation was to contribute in a meaningful way to the collective understanding on intergroup conflict and reconciliation. In this chapter I focus on these two motivations and discuss in what ways the work in the previous eight chapters does, or does not, speak to these motivations. Within this chapter I also discuss wider issues related to intergroup emotions research and possible directions for future work.
8.1 Explaining the inconsistencies in the shame and guilt literature

As I spent some time discussing in Chapter 1, the empirical research on shame is quite inconsistent. On the one hand, there are numerous studies at both the individual (e.g., Miller & Tangney, 1994; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; R. H. Smith et al., 2002; Tangney, Miller, et al., 1996) and group (e.g., Johns et al., 2005; Lickel et al., 2005; Schmader & Lickel, 2006) levels that show shame is associated with a desire to distance, withdraw and hide. On the other hand, different studies have found positive correlations between forms of both individual (e.g., de Hooge et al., 2008) and group-based shame (e.g., Allpress et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2008; Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Gausel et al., 2010) with support for reparation and other pro-social responses. The picture for guilt too, is somewhat confusing, with many studies finding a positive relationship between guilt and reparation attitudes (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998) and others finding no such relationship (e.g., Iyer et al., 2007).

In Chapter 1 I argued that these findings are likely to have been driven, in part, by the use of shame measures that have been heavily influenced by pre-conceived views on what shame should be rather than what it actually is. I argued that the TOSCA (Tangney et al., 1989) in particular suffers this problem, being developed in line with a theoretical view of shame as a powerfully aversive emotion with universally negative effects. The development of the TOSCA shame items in line with this theoretical view has led to a scale that appears to measure only the negative consequences of shame and is simply unequipped to measure any possible positive consequences (Luyten et al., 2002). A similar inconsistency exists with regard to the TOSCA guilt scale, whose items have been shown by Luyten and colleagues (2002) to be conflated strongly with reparative outcomes. For this reason, and for the fact that the TOSCA and similar measures evaluate dispositions
rather than emotional states, we should be wary of concluding that shame (or guilt) has only negative (or positive) effects.

Despite the issues associated with some dispositional measures of shame, the issue still remains that shame is linked with antisocial responses in some studies and prosocial responses in others. My research has provided a solution to this problem. By building upon Deonna and colleagues’ theoretical account of shame and guilt, I have proposed that the motivational effects of shame are driven by the value to which shame is connected, and it is only when we have an understanding of the causes of an individual’s shame reaction that we can accurately predict its effects. I have argued that two forms of shame — moral shame and image shame — are driving the divergent findings within the literature.

I tested this main proposal — that moral shame and image shame are driving the divergent findings within the literature — in Studies 1-3, conducted in the contexts of abuse of Kenyans during British decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s, and the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by British forces during the most recent invasion of Iraq. Here I developed scales to differently measure these emotions, and showed that moral shame, image shame and guilt are reliably distinguishable from one another using factor analytic techniques. Using both regression analyses and structural equation modelling I uncovered an intriguing divergence in effects for image shame and moral shame. While image shame predicted an increase in negative responses characterised by anger, avoidance and a desire to cover-up the ingroup’s wrongdoing, moral shame predicted the opposite response. Unlike its image-based relative, moral shame predicted decreased anger, avoidance and cover-up and increased support for apology and compensation. Guilt was weakly associated with support for apology and compensation only in Study 3.

Study 4 was designed to evaluate the face validity and to investigate lay perceptions of the scales used in Studies 1-3. The divergent effects of each emotion were borne out in participants’ lay perceptions of the scales used to measure guilt, moral shame and
image shame. That is, participants are able to imagine, with reasonable accuracy, how an individual is likely to respond to his group’s wrongdoing based on his responses to the emotion scales used in the present research. This study supports the validity of these scales by showing that a target individual’s response to shame and guilt items is diagnostic of attitudes and behaviour, even in the eyes of third parties.

In Study 5 I provided a stronger test of the motivational effects of each emotion by evaluating their predictive effects over time, using a longitudinal cross-lagged panel design. The positive effects of image shame and negative effects of moral shame on anger, avoidance and cover-up were stable longitudinally, providing stronger support for a causal argument. Interestingly, when evaluating the reverse causal direction, reparation attitudes at Time 1 predicted guilt and moral shame at Time 2, indicating that being asked to consider one’s attitudes at one time may influence one’s feelings of moral shame and guilt at a later time. This study provided an intriguing comparison with the longitudinal work of Brown and colleagues (2008), who found that guilt but not (undifferentiated) shame predicted reparation attitudes longitudinally, and who also found a causal circularity between guilt and reparation attitudes, whereby the latter at time 1 also predicted guilt at time 2. It is quite possible that the differences between findings with regard to shame came about because of either the way shame was measured by Brown and colleagues (containing both image and moral essence components, which may have effectively cancelled each other out), or the dependent measures used (support for acts of reparation only), or both. What cannot be ignored, however, is the consistent association between reported attitudes at time 1 and increased guilt at time 2, indicating that a circular causality may exist. The important implication of this finding is that at least some of the commonly-observed positive, cross-sectional relationship between guilt and reparation support may reflect not a causal influence of guilt on attitudes, as is commonly assumed, but the opposite causal influence of attitudes on guilt.
In Study 6 we (Rees, Brown and I) began to test the limits of these emotions. We conducted two studies, the latter of which is presented in this thesis, that evaluated the idea that how we feel about the ingroup’s past transgressions influences how we respond to members of unrelated outgroups. Conducting the first study in Germany, Rees (2010) found that feelings of image and moral shame for the Holocaust did indeed predict support for and social distance from Turkish immigrants in contemporary Germany. In the second study (Study 6 of this thesis), we attempted to explain why feelings of shame for one event may influence reactions to unrelated minority groups. We found that the effects of moral shame were mediated by feelings of moral obligation for the ingroup’s initial misdeeds. This effect was largest when the outgroup was seen as similar to the original victim group.

Finally, in Study 7 I evaluated how people react to intergroup apologies that are offered on behalf of the ingroup and that contain either expressions of guilt, image shame or moral shame. The results indicate that certain subgroups within the ingroup prefer different types of apology. In particular, those who initially support the ingroup apologising prefer an apology with an accompanying expression of moral shame, whereas those who are initially low on support for such an apology prefer an apology with an accompanying expression of guilt.

How do these findings solve the inconsistency within the literature? They do so by showing that feelings of ‘shame’ might have quite different motivational effects depending on the cause of the shame. These findings imply that the conflicting results within the literature may not be in conflict at all, if we adopt the way of conceptualising shame advanced both in this thesis and by Deonna and colleagues. Differences among previous findings may have been found because participants were responding to different value threats in different circumstances/studies and therefore their responses to the shame items might have reflected moral shame in some circumstances and image shame in others.

The findings also shed light on the relative importance of guilt. Although guilt was
associated with some acts of restitution in Studies 3 and 4, in all other studies (excluding Study 7) it was unrelated to any outcome measures. Moreover, the longitudinal design of Study 5 showed that reparation attitudes at Time 1 were a significant predictor of guilt at Time 2, indicating that feelings of guilt may in some way be driven by an individual’s attitudes toward reparations, rather than the other way around — a result consistent with some of the longitudinal findings of Brown and colleagues (2008). Nevertheless, the general pattern of null associations of guilt is quite consistent with the theoretical predictions derived from Deonna and colleagues’ view of guilt and shame. One would expect, following this view, that guilt would have selective and limited effects on one’s desire to repair the damage done. It is likely that the effects of guilt became non-significant in many cases when the individual effects of guilt and moral shame were partialled from one another. When contrasted with moral shame, which is predicted to motivate wider attempts to restore the ingroup’s morality, it is perhaps unsurprising that guilt’s effects pale in comparison.

8.2 Wider issues for intergroup emotions research

While the results presented in this thesis provide some solutions to the empirical inconsistencies noted above, there are a number of more general, but nevertheless important issues about intergroup emotions research that deserve discussing.

In particular, it is worth reflecting again on what these results mean for understanding the subjective experience of the individual. Psychologists are often guilty of artificially separating an individual’s experience into distinct and tidy emotional episodes in order to evaluate the separate effects of each emotion, without acknowledging that these artificially separated emotions may be experienced either as an undifferentiated or coherent whole by the individual in question. While this artificial partitioning is useful and necessary for evaluating our theoretical predictions regarding specific emotions and experiences, it
has the effect of obscuring the psychological reality of the individual. This, unfortunately, appears to be a topic that receives very little discussion within published papers.

So what is the psychological reality of the shame and guilt experiences investigated in this thesis? Do people have insight into the specific drivers of different shame and guilt experiences? To some degree the answer must be yes, for participants are able to respond to guilt, moral shame and image shame items differently, and these answers are predictive of different responses. But it is less likely that an individual will have full insight into the different shades of shame and guilt being experienced (hence why different emotions scales tend to be moderately correlated) and will be aware of and be able to articulate the effect of competing motivational processes associated with each emotion. What then determines which responses an individual chooses to make in any given situation? It is my belief that individuals are likely to be sensitive to both the relative strength of simultaneously-experienced emotions and to the situational factors that determine the most appropriate response. That is, in a given circumstance, an individual will have a sense of which emotion being experienced is most important and will be motivated to act primarily in accordance with that emotion. The degree of people’s awareness into their own emotional experience is an interesting empirical issue in its own right. While the possibility that individuals have only limited insight into their own complex emotional experiences should not stop us attempting to investigate specific emotions, we should be aware of this fact and be open to honest discussion regarding the implications for our work.

One of the primary implications of the above issues relates to how we use and interpret bivariate and multivariate analyses for testing our ideas. The statistical implication of an individual having partial, but not full, introspective insight into their own experiences, is that we should be particularly wary of taking at face value bivariate correlations between specific emotion scales and various outcomes measures. We should be cautious because less than perfect introspective insight is likely to result in bivariate relationships
that are influenced to a larger degree than normal by other factors. This is because an individual’s response to any given item is likely to be influenced in part by other, simultaneously experienced emotions. We should therefore trust more strongly in analyses where multivariate analyses are used, because such analyses control for the influence of other emotions when evaluating specific relationships between specific emotions and outcomes. For example, while it may be common to find positive bivariate correlations between guilt and reparation support, it is likely that at least some of the strength of this correlation is being driven by factors other than guilt, possibly such as by more intense feelings of moral shame. Perhaps it is for this reason that the significant bivariate effects of guilt become nonsignificant when we control for moral shame using multivariate methods. The implication is that we should prefer larger models that control for more variables, as they result in more accurate partialling of the specific effects of each emotion.

### 8.3 Future research

The research presented in this thesis raises a number of issues that may prove to be stimulating topics for future research. One important question, in my mind, is to what degree the ideas and research presented in this thesis are compatible with the theoretical and empirical work of Gausel, Leach, Vignoles and Brown (2010; Gausel & Leach, 2011). As I discussed in Chapter 2, Gausel and colleagues have too been working on a solution to the issues with regard to shame. Their approach differs from my own, however, because they see shame as arising predominantly, if not solely, in response to the appraisal that the ingroup has a specific moral flaw. The consequence of this view is that research investigating ‘shame’ in relation to anything other than a specific moral failure has not actually been investigating shame, rather the ‘shame’ investigated in these instances is more accurately seen as a different response (such as rejection). Adopting this position unfortunately forces us to discard and discount a large body of work linking shame with
reputation and social image. The theoretical argument in Chapter 2 and the data presented in Study 2 suggest that we can indeed parsimoniously account for a shame-social image link, and indeed different shame experiences.

Indeed, in Study 2 of this thesis I evaluated the relationship between different feelings that might logically arise from a damaged social image. Because I believe that image shame is a common and logical response to such a threat, and Gausel and colleagues believe that rejection, not shame, is the real response, I compared these two experiences. The data clearly show that image shame and rejection are separate experiences and that when evaluated in the same structural model, image shame, and not rejection, appears to be driving the associations with negative, defensive responses to ingroup wrongdoing. The implication of these findings is that feelings of image shame appear not to be simply reducible to feelings of rejection. Nevertheless, it still remains unclear how image shame and rejection might be related, and how more generally how the measures used in Gausel and colleagues’ work relate to the measures used in my and others’ studies.

This uncertainty regarding the relationship between different measures of shame and guilt points to an important and more widespread problem of variation between and duplication of shame and guilt measures within the literature. Primarily reflecting debate over the theoretical distinction between shame and guilt, few researchers can agree on how to best measure these constructs. This has led to a multitude of different emotion measures, each reflecting the authors’ own view on what it means to experience shame and guilt. It is possible that part of the confusion in this area of research relates to this inconsistency amongst scales, for it is possible that some authors have characterised ‘shame’ more in line with image shame and moral shame in others. It is also possible that how some researchers have measured guilt is more in line with moral shame. There is no easy solution to this problem, although we (Wohl, Čehajić, Brown and myself) are in the process of attempting to address this issue by comparing within one study a number of
commonly used emotion measures.

Another particularly important goal for future research should be selective experimental manipulation. I have noted in Chapter 3 the widespread difficulty in experimentally manipulating shame and guilt. While some researchers appear to have been successful in increasing negative self-reflective emotions in general (e.g., Harvey & Oswald, 2000) none have been able to selectively manipulate shame but not guilt, or vice versa. I believe the reason for this is that while it may be relatively easy to frame a situation as good or bad, the reasons a person might experience one form of shame over another, for instance, are deeply ingrained and deeply personal. For this reason, developing experimental manipulations that induce one emotion leaving unaffected other, closely-related emotions is particularly difficult, because the subtle experimental manipulations used in social psychology are overwhelmed by the individual’s strongly-internalised, and typical interpretation of the situation in question. Despite this difficulty, it is likely that the field of intergroup emotions will be limited in its theoretical and empirical progression without some form of experimental manipulation. The key reason for this is that the ability to gain real insight into the psychological experience of individuals is limited without being able to selectively influence specific aspects of that experience.

In addition to addressing the problem of experimental manipulation, greater attention should needs to be paid to the mediators and moderators of the effects of different forms of shame. In Study 6 we saw the value in testing a mediator and a moderator of the effects of moral shame. This investigation provided important insights into why moral shame was driving the specific relationship in question (due to a feeling of moral obligation) and under which circumstances the relationship is strongest (when outgroups are seen as more similar). It would be valuable to investigate similar processes for image shame and guilt and for moral shame in other contexts.

Another issue that deserves further discussion is what effect the anticipation of image
or moral shame has on an individual’s attitudes and behaviours, and specifically whether
the effects of anticipating these experiences are different in some way from experiencing the
emotion itself. This is a particularly important issue with regard to image shame, which by
all accounts, seems to have negative effects for intergroup restitution and reconciliation.
But it might be that the anticipation of image shame might play an important role in
regulating individuals and groups within society. That is, it is possible that individuals
are less likely to perform or support behaviour that may bring about criticism from others
and therefore image shame. In this case, while the experience of image shame itself might
lead individuals to withdraw and act defensively, the anticipation of this state might play
an important role in self-regulation of negative, antisocial behaviour. Such an argument
was made by Jacquet, Hauert, Traulsen, and Milinski (2011) who showed that the threat
of public exposure (which they describe as shaming, but did not evaluate in terms of
reported or anticipated shame) increased cooperation in a community donation game.
The implication here is that while the effects of image-related shame itself might be a
highly negative, the threat of such shaming might act to increase cooperative behaviour
within the wider community.

It may also prove interesting to investigate how we as a society may encourage per-
petrator groups to experience moral shame while minimizing image shame. Perhaps an
approach that emphasizes the effects of the perpetrator group’s actions on the victim
and the humanness of the victims, and minimizes judgement, criticism and blame of the
perpetrator group might foster the most beneficial pattern of responses. Such a strategy
forms the basis of non-violent communication, as system of communication designed to
reduce conflict and violence and increase empathy and cooperation (Rosenberg, 2003).
8.4 Contributions to a wider understanding of intergroup conflict and reconciliation

Ultimately, the research presented in this thesis was driven by a desire to understand, and contribute to the improvement of intergroup relations. On a broad level, the studies presented in the preceding chapters reflect an important shift in social psychological research away from a purely attitudinal approach to intergroup relations to considering the important influence of emotion in such relations (Smith, 1993). This shift is important because it encourages an understanding of intergroup relations that includes the rich and influential effect of emotions.

While the research in this thesis has been more theoretical than applied, I believe there are some important implications for how our society deals with perpetrators of harm and wrongdoing. These implications relate, in particular, to the systems of retributive justice common throughout the western world, where judgement, blame and punishment of offenders are institutionalised and encouraged. Such systems are based on the idea that punishment of offenders in order to satisfy the psychological needs of the victim and wider members of society is the best and most appropriate response to wrongdoing. The work in this thesis suggests that such a system is unlikely to result in long-term rehabilitation of individuals who have committed crimes, as such punishment relies primarily on shaming and social exclusion. Perhaps it is not surprising that offenders commonly respond with anger, avoidance of responsibility and, ultimately, further reoffending.

Such concerns obviously also apply to intergroup situations in which crimes have been committed but where legal sanctions are less clear cut. Here it may be particularly important for victim and perpetrator groups to enter into a dialogue that is centred around emphasizing how harmful acts have impacted on the victimised and avoiding external judgments of character directed at the perpetrators. Dialogue that emphasises the humanness
of both parties may be more likely to give rise to constructive emotions such as moral shame, while minimizing image shame-related responses. Similar consideration should be made when attempting to hold perpetrator groups to account when such attempts originate from external parties, such as human rights advocates and foreign governments. What may be necessary for these groups is to strike a delicate balance between taking forceful steps to stop perpetrators of violence and harm from offending while being careful not to shame, humiliate and isolate them in a way that promotes a(n image) shame-fuelled self-defensive backlash.

Returning then, to the first paragraphs of this thesis written so many pages ago, what insight does the work presented here give us as to why some members of perpetrator groups openly acknowledge their group’s wrongdoing and act to make amends, while others deny any such wrongdoing and act to avoid the issue? My research has focused on one factor that influences whether an individual pursues a path of acknowledgement and redress or a path of denial and avoidance — feeling ashamed. While there are no doubt numerous other motivators of such behaviour, my research shows that feelings of shame can have potent and important effects on an individual’s response to their group’s wrongdoing. If we are to better understand why reconciliation sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails, we would therefore be well advised to consider the emotional consequences of group membership.
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Appendix A

Figure A.1: Study 2: Moral shame condition
Britain continues to flout human rights in Iraq. British international reputation tarnished

Rebecca Williams and James Reffren
The Guardian

The U.K. government continues to ignore basic human rights conventions in Iraq, a recent Amnesty International report reveals. The report — which has been published in 37 countries and which has aroused international criticism of Britain as a nation — identifies many cases of alleged killings of civilians, continued torture of detainees and use of illegal tactics such as cluster bombs and depleted uranium.

An example is the case of Baha Musa, 27, who in 2003 was tortured and beaten to death by British soldiers during “routine” questioning. Although one soldier was recently convicted, the judge in the case noted that beating detainees, keeping them in stress positions and depriving them of sleep had become “standard operating procedures” within the battalions responsible.

The death of Baha Musa is not an isolated case, although it is one of the only instances where anyone has been held accountable. Many other detainees are thought to have died from maltreatment in British custody and hundreds of civilians, such as 22-year-old Shamus Kullbom Kuri and 5-year-old Hanna Suleh Naatred, have allegedly been killed by British forces.

The Amnesty report also indicates that the abuse of women has sharply increased since the invasion in 2003, indicating that the coalition forces have failed to fulfill their promise of liberating the people of Iraq. Gender segregation is now widespread, the number of female suicides is increasing and religious “honour” killings of women who are “not Muslim enough” are rising. The British government has not yet responded to these allegations.

Figure A.2: Study 2: Image shame condition
Figure A.3: Study 2: Control condition
Appendix B

Figure B.1: Study 4: Experimental stimulus for the image shame condition
Our treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it means to be British.

I feel ashamed to be British for the way we have treated the Iraqi people.

I feel ashamed for the damage done to Iraqi people by Brits.

I feel ashamed for the aggressive tendency of Brits.

It shames me when I realise that Brits could be intolerant by nature.

I feel ashamed because Britain's actions with regard to Iraq have been immoral.

I feel disgraced because the behaviour of Brits toward Iraqi people has created a bad image of Britain in the eyes of the world.

I feel ashamed when I realise that other countries might think of Britain negatively because of our involvement in Iraq.

Sometimes it shames me how others can see Britain as immoral for our involvement in Iraq.

To think how Britain is seen for its treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel ashamed.

I feel humiliated when I think of how Britain is seen negatively by the rest of the world for how it has treated the Iraqi people.

I feel ashamed because Britain has a damaged reputation.

I feel guilty for the manner in which Iraqi people have been treated by British.

Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behaviour of British toward Iraqis.

I feel guilty for the bad living conditions of the Iraqi people.

Figure B.2: Study 4: Experimental stimulus for the moral shame condition
Person C

Our treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it means to be British.

I feel ashamed to be British for the way we have treated the Iraqi people.

I feel ashamed for the damage done to Iraqi people by Brits.

I feel ashamed for the aggressive tendency of Brits.

It shames me when I realise that Brits could be intolerant by nature.

I feel ashamed because Britain’s actions with regard to Iraq have been immoral.

I feel disgraced because the behaviour of Brits toward Iraqi people has created a bad image of Britain in the eyes of the world.

I feel ashamed when I realise that other countries might think of Britain negatively because of our involvement in Iraq.

Sometimes it shames me how others can see Britain as immoral for our involvement in Iraq.

To think how Britain is seen for its treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel ashamed.

I feel humiliated when I think of how Britain is seen negatively by the rest of the world for how it has treated the Iraqi people.

I feel ashamed because Britain has a damaged reputation.

I feel guilty for the manner in which Iraqi people have been treated by British.

Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behaviour of British toward Iraqis.

I feel guilty for the bad living conditions of the Iraqi people.

Figure B.3: Study 4: Experimental stimulus for the guilt condition
Appendix C

UK army 'rotten', Iraq probe told

British soldiers who abused an Iraqi detainee who died in their custody were not just “a few bad apples”, a public inquiry has been told.

There was “something rotten in the whole barre”, Rabinder Singh QC said. Troops in Iraq routinely used banned interrogation methods they did not think were illegal, lawyers told the inquiry into the 2003 death.

The inquiry, led by Sir William Gage, is focusing on Baha Mousa’s death, detainees’ treatment and army methods. Mr Singh, counsel for Mr Mousa’s family and the other Iraqis detained alongside him, said: “This case is not just about beatings or a few bad apples.

“There is something rotten in the whole barrel.”

In 2007, Cpl Payne was jailed for a year and dismissed from the Army after being con-
On Monday, Mr Singh told the inquiry: “The official version of events was that nothing on that video was in fact illegal.

“What we saw was a soldier trying to implement official policy, forcing detainees to get back into stress positions when they were clearly moaning and unable to maintain those positions.

“They are all shown hooded, again in accordance with orders, again illegally.”

**Hotel arrest**

Mr Mousa and nine other civilians were arrested at a Basra Hotel on 14 September 2003 by soldiers from the former Queen’s Lancashire Regiment who found weapons on the premises.

Two days later Mr Mousa was dead. A post-mortem examination showed he suffered asphyxiation and had at least 93 injuries to his body, including fractured ribs and a broken nose.

David Barr, counsel for the Ministry of Defence, said the “appalling” behaviour of British soldiers in the case “disgusted” the Army.

He told the inquiry: “It is with huge regret that the Ministry of Defence acknowledges the way in which some of those techniques were used on Baha Mousa and those detained with him.”
“The brutality was completely unacceptable. It has stained the reputation of the British army.”