A product of their bargaining environment: Explaining government duration in Central and Eastern Europe

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Abstract

Since the transition to democracy in the early 1990s, more than 60 percent of governments in Central and Eastern Europe have terminated prematurely. This article seeks to understand why some governments in the region survive longer than others. I argue that the nature of party system development in the region has facilitated the emergence of a pattern of party competition which takes place in polarized blocs. As the party system structures the government bargaining process, it is contended that indicators of bargaining environment complexity are essential to understanding why some governments are more durable than others. The Cox proportional hazards model is used to estimate the effect of bargaining environment variables. The results show that ideological diversity of the bargaining environment and the length of the coalition formation process are both significant indicators of government duration in Central and Eastern Europe even after controlling for economic performance, majority status and the regime divide.
It has now been more than 20 years since the transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. In that time, a competitive party politics has emerged and across the region numerous governments have formed and fallen. However, it is striking to note that 62 percent of all governments in the region terminated for reasons other than the advent of regularly scheduled elections.¹ In Slovakia there were nine governments and just four elections between 1992 and 2006 while in Poland between 1991 and 2007, 15 governments served in office but only six parliamentary elections were contested (two of which were not regular scheduled elections).

A comparison of government duration in Western Europe and CEE shows that governments in the former survive on average 54 days longer than the latter (Somer-Topcu and Williams, 2008, p 316).

The distinct pattern of government duration in CEE leads us to ask: why do governments tend to be relatively short-lived in the region? Up until recently, studies of cabinet stability and survival in CEE adopted comparative case study approaches (Toole, 2000; Nikolenyi, 2004) but there are now a sufficient number of cases (governments) to permit the use of quantitative techniques that are routinely used in analyses of government duration in Western Europe. Thus far, two studies have emerged that use such methods in a CEE setting. The first, by Somer-Topcu and Williams (2008) focussed on the role of institutional variables and economic policy outcomes. The second, by Tzelgov (2011), found that coalitions that span the ‘regime divide’² and therefore contained a Communist Successor Party (CSP) plus a party or parties that were not affiliated with the ancien regime, tended to survive longer than other governments.

However, these studies overlook crucial structural attributes that the literature on party systems in CEE would suggest are extremely important. In this article I argue that the party
system is the essential structure of the coalition bargaining environment within which governments are created and that the complexity of the bargaining environment influences the nature of any government that emerges and ultimately affects its prospects for survival. Understanding the role of party systems in CEE is crucial since they have undergone – and continue to undergo – a process of development and transformation. In many respects party systems in the region are unstable which, in turn, can impact on government duration. For example, with a high degree of party turnover is it rational or even possible for parties to behave in a future-oriented way? If not then there may be an increased incentive for Party A to break a coalition with Party B and form a new one with a party that has better electoral prospects than Party B’s.

I focus on the role of ideological diversity on government duration in the CEE region as well as the fragmentation of the system and the number of days a government takes to emerge, which I use as a summary indicator of bargaining environment complexity. Party ideology requires particular consideration in CEE. Somer-Topcu and Williams (2008) did not specify any ideological variables in their analysis of government duration while Tzelgov (2011) relied on data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Klingemann et al., 2006) which is problematic for CEE countries (Benoit and Laver, 2007; Tavits and Letki, 2009; XXXX, forthcoming). Furthermore, Tzelgov only examined the ideological composition of the government, not the party system as a whole (Tzelgov, 2011, p 544).

Overall, this paper shows that bargaining environment complexity is essential to understanding government duration in CEE. The ideological range of the parliamentary party system and the number of days a coalition takes to form each add significantly to our understanding of government survival in CEE and should be considered alongside economic
indicators and the regime divide in future analyses. However, the fragmentation of the legislature is only marginally relevant to the length of time a government serves in office in the region.

**Bargaining environment complexity and government duration**

Contemporary empirical studies of government duration tend to focus on the influence of cabinet attributes and unexpected events rather than party system attributes (Taylor and Herman, 1971; Browne et al., 1984; Strøm, 1985; Warwick, 1994). The reasons for this are firstly, the government is the unit of analysis in duration studies so it is logical that attributes pertaining to the cabinet rather than the wider party system are deemed to be causally proximate to its longevity. Secondly, it is an often-repeated maxim that events are the thing most feared by a statesman. It is these unexpected events that can disturb an equilibrium, such as a previously stable and harmonious government, with consequences that can include a curtailed governing tenure. Taken together, cabinet attributes and unexpected events appear to provide a compelling account of government duration in parliamentary democracies.

Despite the preponderance of cabinet attributes and events explanations of government duration, bargaining environment attributes have tended to be included in most empirical studies, to a greater or lesser degree, even though they have not been the focus of the analysis. Furthermore, some *a priori* models have also made bargaining environment complexity central to the understanding of the coalition duration. Laver and Schofield (1990) theorised that complex bargaining environments produce inherently unstable governments because small changes in policy preferences or party strength can increase the incentive for
coalition partners to break up a government and seek a more advantageous alternative (Laver and Schofield, 1990, p 157).

When the bargaining environment has been considered in empirical studies they have largely focussed on indicators of fragmentation of the legislature such as the effective number of parties (Taylor and Herman, 1971; Warwick, 1994; Martinez-Gallardo, 2011). In the two analyses of government duration in Central and Eastern Europe that have been published thus far, the effective number of parties (ENP) is the only indicator of the party system or bargaining environment complexity assessed in both (Somer-Topcu, 2008; Tzelgov, 2011).³ Most scholars hypothesize that a highly fragmented bargaining environment will lead to a more difficult formation process. This will, in turn, produce governments that will be less likely to fulfil their constitutionally mandated term in office. However, some studies have found that the effective number of parties in parliament is not significantly related to government duration once the number of parties in government is added to any model (Warwick, 1992, p 339; Saalfeld, 2009, p 340; Tzelgov, 2011, p 544). Warwick (1992) suggests that highly fragmented party systems usually necessitate the inclusion of more parties in the government, which also increases the ideological diversity of the government. This is central to Warwick’s analysis of government duration as he states that such ideological diversity within the government leads to internal policy disagreements and an increased likelihood of premature termination (Warwick, 1992, p 347). Conversely, in their seminal study of government duration King et al. found that party system fractionalization did diminished cabinet duration, however, they failed to specify a measure of cabinet size other than its majority status (King et al., 1990, p 861).⁴
The fragmentation of the legislature is a direct measure of the effect of the party system on cabinet duration but simple fragmentation may not add up to a more complex bargaining environment. For example, if the policy space is relatively simple and party preferences are convergent then it may be straightforward to form a durable government regardless of the number of parties that may need to be included. Conversely, one can hypothesize a situation in which an inherently unstable government emerges from a party system characterized by low fragmentation if, for example, one or more of the parties in the system is uncoalitionable or simply an unreliable governing partner. We should therefore consider further measures of bargaining environment complexity. One such measure is the length of the government formation process. There is some disagreement on the causal relationship between the length of the formation period and a government’s prospects for survival. On the one hand, a protracted coalition formation period may indicate that negotiations were fraught and that the final governing settlement is a tenuous compromise that carries a high risk of unravelling (King et al, 1990, pp 858-9). On the other hand, a lengthy bargaining process could suggest that the governing framework that is agreed is highly detailed and that the difficulty in forming a government would oblige participants to stick with it and thus reduce the risk of instability (Warwick, 1994, p 37). Saalfeld has further asserted that drawn out bargaining processes can consist of a series of offers and counter-offers which have the effect of revealing more of the parties’ privately held preferences such as their hold-out and walk-away positions in negotiations (Saalfeld, 2009, p 369).

The complexity of the ideological space in the bargaining environment could also influence government duration. Research into the role of ideology in government duration has usually centred on ideological diversity within the cabinet (Warwick, 1992; 1994). While that has proved statistically significant in empirical studies of established parliamentary democracies,
Tzelgov (2011, p 544) found no support for the ideological diversity hypothesis in CEE. However, the ideological diversity of the party system as a whole has also been considered in many analyses of government duration. This has been measured in a number of ways including ideological range and polarization though interpretations of the effect of party system diversity have varied. Laver and Schofield (1990) suggested that ideological diversity indicated a more complex bargaining system that is susceptible to slight perturbations in policy preferences that can lead to government instability (Laver and Schofield, 1990, p 157).

Warwick offers an alternative interpretation which hypothesizes that an ideologically diverse bargaining environment can result in more stable governments if party competition is bi-polar in which each bloc of parties has relatively homogenous policy preferences (Warwick, 1994, p 53).

This overview of the literature on the relationship between bargaining environment complexity and government duration demonstrates that the causal direction of the relationship can be unclear. Diametrically opposed interpretations are offered of the effect of both the length of the government formation period and the ideological diversity of the bargaining environment on government duration; some claim that lengthy formation periods will lead to governments that terminate prematurely, others suggest that they result in more robust cabinets. Part of the reason for this lack of certainty over the direction of the causal relationship is the nature in which the study of government duration has developed. Formal theories of government survival are still quite rare. Instead, the study of government duration has largely taken place in the empirical realm where the focus has been refining the variables that are entered into quantitative models (Laver, 2003, pp 37-8). The relative dearth of a priori theories of government duration means that expectations of how variables will interact
with government duration can vary depending on the political context. It is this context that we turn to in the next section.

**The party system and ideology in Central and Eastern Europe**

The parameters of the government bargaining environment in parliamentary democracies are established by the party system, or more specifically, the parliamentary party system. The party system contains the essential information that ultimately determines the level of complexity in the coalition bargaining environment such as the legislative weight of the parties and their ideological positions or policy preferences. It is here that the relationship between parties is established and, in most cases, contested. It would therefore seem that to understand the bargaining environment we must also understand the nature of party systems.

In ‘new’ democracies where party systems are less stable and less established, the pattern of interaction between parties is potentially very different to that which is familiar from Western Europe. In such countries both party system turnover and electoral volatility can be high which means that it is difficult for parties to behave in a future-oriented manner. For example, can a party in a governing coalition count on its current partners to remain in parliament after the next election? If so, will they still have a comparable number of deputies and similar influence in the coalition bargaining environment? If not, then the relationship between the parties is likely to alter fundamentally.

Party systems in Central and Eastern Europe have often been characterized as unstable since the transition to democracy in the late-1980s and early-1990s (Markowski, 1997; Olson, 1998). In many cases this has been as a result of greater fragmentation on the Right of the
party system (Bakke and Sitter, 2005; Hanley, et al. 2008); a point which is emphasized by Tavits and Letki (2009) who demonstrated that 60 percent of all parties in the CEE region were ideologically right-leaning. Others have illustrated the level of this instability by drawing unfavourable empirical comparisons with the degree of party system stability found in Western European democracies using measures such as electoral volatility and party turnover (Mair, 1997, p 197; Lewis, 2000, pp 148-9). In their study of CEE democracies over the period from 1990 to 2007, Rose and Munro show that on average, 30 parties have contested elections but an average of just two parties have fought every election in each country which suggests that party formations have not been persistent and that party systems in the region were changeable animals (Rose and Munro, 2009, p 48).

This level of instability is problematic for both governments and individual parties. The actors in CEE party systems have been subject to considerable change over the years and therefore, parties would have struggled to develop any significant degree of future orientation. Parties that were once allies, perhaps even partners in government, stood a reasonable chance of being reduced to insignificance in parliamentary terms or even removed from the legislature altogether as a result of poor electoral performance. In terms of government duration, as stated earlier, this means that senior partners in a coalition may have an incentive to break the government if a partner looks likely to be removed from parliament. Alternatively, a junior party in a government may seek to disassociate itself from an unpopular senior partner that is flatlining in the opinion polls and looks unlikely to be a contender for office following the next election.

However, it could be contended that the notion of party system instability in CEE countries is a hangover from the early years of the postcommunist period. As early as 2000 Toole (2000)
found evidence that party systems in some countries were stabilizing and that competition for government took place between defined Left and Right ‘blocs’. More recent studies provided further evidence of party system stabilization in the region, particularly in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (Bakke and Sitter, 2005; Tavits, 2008a, p 548). Allan Sikk (2005) has shown that party systems in CEE may even be more stable than they first appear, at least in terms of the participants. Sikk distinguishes between ‘genuinely new parties’ and parties that are a continuation of previous entities (Sikk, 2005, p 399). By measuring the gains and losses of genuinely new parties, he shows that party systems have been more stable than one might surmise from using the standard measure of electoral volatility. Even so, levels of overall electoral volatility have remained high across CEE. This leads Sikk to conclude that the cartelization of the party system, which has prevented genuinely new parties from establishing themselves, adds a veneer of stability to party systems while instability between the actors already in those systems remains relatively high (Sikk, 2005, pp 408-9).

Of equal relevance to changes in the identity of actors in the party system and their relative weight in the legislature, is the ideological persuasion of those parties. When party systems are so unstable with new parties entering the system and others leaving, it can be difficult for each party to know where the other stands on policy and ideological issues. New party formations may issue manifestos and make speeches but these rarely reveal a party’s holdout points and ‘red lines’ in policy negotiations. Furthermore, policy positions in CEE are not as straightforward as one might assume and do not necessarily fall neatly into established conceptions of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’. As a result, parties find it more difficult to use the heuristic shortcuts that many use when identifying a party as (e.g.) ‘left-wing’.
Conceptions of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ can have ‘nationally distinct, unstable, or unclear meanings’ in CEE (Evans and Whitefield, 1998). In particular, the definitions of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ are not necessarily tied as closely to economic policy in some CEE countries as they are in Western Europe (Kostelecký, 2002, pp 170-71). Parties of the Left have often adopted a liberal economic outlook more readily associated with the Right, particularly when those parties have ascended to government (Tavits and Letki, 2009, p 567) while many parties of the Right have sought to demarcate their ideological territory in social or cultural terms (Hanley, 2004, pp 17-19). Vachudova and Hooghe have highlighted a further distinction of the ideological space in CEE. They used the 2002 Chapel-Hill survey of party policy positions to demonstrate that party competition in CEE took place along an axis which at one pole combined a traditional left wing economic outlook with traditional cultural values. At the opposite pole liberal economics was bundled together with a greater social and cultural openness (Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009, pp 206-7).

The uncertainty over ideological positions naturally filters through to party policy platforms. In the early stages of democratization, parties were often characterized as having weak programmatic identities (Kitschelt, 1995) and in some countries there is evidence that parties still do not have well-defined policy platforms. This is partly due to the restrictions that the imperative of European Union accession in effect placed on competition over certain areas of policy together with the impetus to liberalize national economies (Innes, 2002). However, Kitschelt et al. (1999) have argued that party programmes crystallized over time, a view reinforced by recent research (O’Dwyer and Kovalčik, 2007; Hanley et al, 2008). Furthermore, Whitefield and Rohrschneider have shown empirically that there has been a great deal of stasis in party programmes which “indicates that by now issue positions are connected in predictable and stable ways” (Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2009, p 681).
Empirical studies of party politics in CEE have generally found that ideological considerations have only a marginal impact on political outcomes, including on coalition duration. The ideological diversity of coalition governments has been demonstrated to be irrelevant to their longevity in CEE (Tzelgov, 2011, p 544). In the related field of government formation, ideological factors have also been largely irrelevant. The earliest cross-national comparative study on this subject found that ideological considerations were secondary in government formation to whether or not parties had roots in the old communist regime (Grzymala-Busse, 2001, p 87). In examining the impact that previous defection from a coalition had on a party’s chances of forming a future coalition with the same partners Tavits found that both distance from the *formateur* and distance from the median were statistically insignificant (Tavits, 2008, pp 503-5). Glasgow et al. have shown that the median party – an indicator of ideological position within the bargaining environment – is not more likely to provide the Prime Minister of governments that have formed in CEE which is in contrast to their findings for Western Europe where the median party is a significant factor in determining which party provides the Prime Minister (Glasgow et al, 2011, pp 945-6).

Although the government formation literature is only tangentially related to government duration the evidence of these studies reinforces the notion that ideological concerns have generally been secondary to the point of irrelevance in CEE party politics.

This discussion of party system development in CEE since 1990 has illustrated just how complex the government bargaining environment is in the region. Party systems may have stabilized to some degree but high levels of electoral volatility persist even where the incumbent parties do not genuinely change. Furthermore, the ideological positions of political parties can be both ambiguous and unusual in that they do not conform to traditional
definitions of Left and Right, though that does not mean that these positions are not identifiable. Taken together, these factors suggest that bargaining environment complexity in the CEE region is potentially unusually high. In the next section I outline how this influences government duration and specify the hypotheses to be tested in the remainder of this article.

**Government duration and the bargaining environment in Central and Eastern Europe**

Government duration in CEE has been the subject of two cross-national empirical investigations, neither of which considered the coalition bargaining environment to be central to expectations for government longevity. Somer-Topcu and Williams (2008) concentrated on the role of economic change and the majority status of the government, finding that minority cabinets and increases in inflation significantly reduce a government’s tenure. Tzelgov (2011) hypothesized that the ‘regime divide’ was the primary determinant of government longevity in CEE. Furthermore, he showed that regime divide governments were in fact more likely to persist through economic downturns than non-regime divide cabinets (Tzelgov, 2011, pp 537-8). Both Somer-Topcu and Williams and Tzelgov included control variables for the bargaining environment but these were minimal: the effective number of parties and in Tzelgov’s case, the ideological diversity of the cabinet. Neither study showed that bargaining environment indicators were significantly related to government duration.

The results of those two studies leave us with a puzzle: if we know from previous literature that the bargaining environment can influence government duration (King et al., 1990; Warwick, 1994), and we also know that the bargaining environment in CEE is complex, why has this not been confirmed by empirical investigations? The answer to this question is
firstly, the omission of relevant variables from empirical models and secondly, the use of inappropriate data to measure certain concepts – in this case, ideology.

The study of government duration in CEE is still in its infancy. Although there are numerous studies of duration in established democracies to draw upon the models used in these may not be transferable wholesale to the specific context of CEE or democratizing states. However, the existing literature has influenced the choice of variables that have gone into models of duration in CEE. This has led to the exclusion of indicators of bargaining environment in CEE is distinct from, and potentially more complex than, those found in Western Europe due to the combination of instability, volatility idiosyncratic policy platforms.

**Fragmentation**

In order to test the bargaining environment complexity thesis in CEE I specify four hypotheses. The first hypothesis evaluates the effect of party system fragmentation on government duration. King et al. (1990) have demonstrated that governments formed from more fractionalized legislatures tend to have curtailed tenures. Warwick (1994) has also found that fractionalization influences government duration but it does so by facilitating the formation of cabinets with more parties that are more likely to be ideologically diverse. Indeed, many studies find that the fragmentation of parliament is rendered insignificant by inclusion of a cabinet fragmentation variable. However, the specific context of CEE needs to be considered when modelling duration. Table 1 shows that fractionalization in CEE legislatures is 24 percent higher on average than that found in West European parliaments. This higher degree of fragmentation in CEE suggests that there is value in revisiting the hypothesis of King et al. (1990) that greater party system fragmentation increases the
complexity of the bargaining environment thus leading to governments that struggle to fulfil their mandated term in office.

H1. Governments formed from more fragmented bargaining environments face an increased hazard of government termination.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

*Ideological diversity*

The literature suggests that party ideological positions in CEE are complex and, according to some, incoherent. It might therefore be asserted that parties are unable to make strategic decisions about coalition partners based on ideological compatibility. Tzlegov’s (2011) analysis certainly reinforces this interpretation in finding that the ideological diversity of the cabinet is not related to its prospects for survival. However, more recent literature indicates that party platforms developed coherence relatively quickly in CEE and are now readily identifiable.

One of the reasons that ideological factors have not been shown to be relevant thus far is the measurement used. Tzelgov (2011) relied on data from party manifestos to position parties in the ideological space. The data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Klingemann et al., 2006) has been shown to be unreliable for placing parties on a Left-Right ideological scale in CEE (Benoit and Laver, 2007; Glasgow et al. 2011; XXXX). This is due to the manner in which policy dimensions are bundled together in the CMP dataset. The ‘Left’ is associated with interventionist economic policy and expansion of public services
while the ‘Right’ is closely linked to liberal economic and traditional cultural values (Budge, 2001, p 56). However, in CEE notions of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ can vary; in some countries they are not associated with economic policy but instead more closely tied to social, cultural and religious outlook. Benoit and Laver have demonstrated via expert survey data that economic policy was the best predictor of party Left-Right positions in just six CEE countries while in the remaining countries social policy dimensions were the most accurate predictors (Benoit and Laver, 2007, p 93). Furthermore, the way in which economic and social issues are packaged together by parties can veer from standard assumptions; it is common for parties to advocate a more state-driven approach to economic policy yet retain a traditional approach to cultural and moral issues.

In this article, I revisit ideological diversity hypotheses with new data that is better suited to accurately located CEE parties in the ideological space. The first hypothesis is Warwick’s (1994) standard ideological diversity hypothesis. This states that more fragmented bargaining environments increase the likelihood that a greater number of parties will need to be included in the cabinet which in turn runs the risk of including ideologically more distant parties. The potential for policy disagreement within the cabinet is increased and therefore, the government is more likely to be short-lived.

H2. Greater ideological diversity within the cabinet increases the hazard of government termination.

A further ideological diversity hypothesis arises due to the nature of party system development in CEE. It has been suggested that the manner in which party systems crystallized in the region led to the development of polarized ‘blocs’ of parties. We have also
seen that despite high levels of volatility within the party systems, many of the apparently new parties are in fact continuations of old organizations in all but name (Sikk, 2005) and in that respect, they are perfect substitutes. This indicates that bloc competition takes place within CEE party systems but that the identity of parties that represents those blocs is subject to change. If party competition for government does take place in blocs, then we would expect that parties will form ideologically compact cabinets in CEE but that the bargaining environment itself is very diverse. Under such conditions, government duration will be inversely related to the ideological diversity of the party system (Warwick, 1994, p 53).

H3. Bargaining environments that are more ideologically diverse will reduce the hazard of government termination in CEE due to the nature of bloc competition among political parties.

*Formation time*

While fragmentation and ideology are structural attributes of the bargaining environment, our final hypothesis of bargaining environment complexity is something of a summary indicator. One way in which the complexity of the bargaining environment can be summed up is the difficulty of forming a government. King et al. (1990) included two such indicators in their original model of government duration: formation attempts and formation time. In this paper I consider only formation time. The number of government formation attempts is a problematic indicator as it can be difficult to distinguish between formal formation attempts (i.e. investiture votes in the legislature) rather than failed negotiations. Certainly within CEE, few potential governments attempt to undertake an investiture vote unless they are sure of
success. The length of the coalition bargaining process is far more straightforward to determine.

As stated previously, expectations regarding the influence of the length of the bargaining process are mixed. On the one hand a long bargaining process could indicate a difficult negotiation that produces a sub-optimal coalition that is inherently unstable (King et al., 1990, pp 858-9). On the other hand, a protracted period of negotiation could suggest that the parties involved have produced a detailed working arrangement that is likely to lead to a more durable government (Warwick, 1994, p 37; Saalfeld, 2009, p 369). These are completely inverse expectations and for the sake of parsimony I specify just one hypothesis:

H4. Governments that emerge from a longer bargaining process are likely to be more durable.

Data and methods

This study draws on data for governments in five CEE countries over the democratic period from 1989. The countries included in this analysis are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The choice of these countries is logical and pragmatic. Firstly, these countries democratized at approximately the same rate if one considers accession to the European Union as a benchmark of democratization. Furthermore, these countries were considered to be consolidated democracies according to the 2011 Freedom House Nations in Transit report. Secondly, these five countries belong to the Central European bloc of former communist states and may be said to share similar cultural, historical and political
trajectories. Finally, and on a pragmatic level, the data from which party ideological positions are derived covers only these five countries.

The time period covered by this analysis is 1990 to 2006. I employ the data provided by Conrad and Golder (2010) to determine the duration of each government over that period. Lijphart’s criteria are used to determine when a government ends and a new formation opportunity arises, these are: if there is a change in the party composition of the government; a parliamentary election is held; the Prime Minister resigns; or the cabinet resigns (Lijphart, 1984, p 267). Caretaker governments are excluded a priori as I consider these to be apolitical formations that are not intended to govern for extended periods. The final dataset covers 36 governments over a 16 year period resulting in 778 observations.

The dependent variable is the duration of the government in months. The four independent variables have been operationalized as follows: fragmentation of the bargaining environment is measured as the effective number of parties (ENP) in parliament (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979). The ideological diversity of the cabinet is the range of the two most distant parties in the government. Similarly, the ideological diversity of the bargaining environment is the range of the two most distant parties in the legislature. Finally, the length of the government formation process is measured as the number of days between the fall of the previous government and the investiture of the new government.

A number of control variables are also included in the models of government duration. Firstly, an indicator of the government’s majority status is specified. The literature on government duration has often shown that minority governments are less likely to fulfil their constitutionally mandated tenure in office. I therefore include a dichotomous indicator of
minority governments in this investigation. Secondly, Warwick (1994) has found that the fragmentation of the bargaining environment can be superseded by indicators of the fragmentation of the government. As such, I control for the number of parties in the cabinet which is operationalized as a simple count. Thirdly, following Tzlegov (2011) I control for the ‘regime divide’ which is a binary indicator coded 1 if a government contains parties from both sides of the regime divide and 0 if it does not. Fourthly, Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) state that cabinets in the last 12 months of the constitutional interelection period (CIEP) are more likely to terminate due to short-term factors related to the proximity of the next election. This is also a binary variable indicating the final 12 months of the CIEP. Fifthly, I control for the existence of a constructive vote of no-confidence. This procedure requires a new government to be ready to immediately take over following a vote of no-confidence in the incumbent. Governments that existed under such rules are coded 1, all other governments 0. Finally, many studies of government duration have found that the economic performance of government can affect its longevity. Both Somer-Topcu and Williams (2008) and Tzelgov (2011) found this to be the case in CEE. I therefore specify control variables for inflation, unemployment and GDP. Inflation and unemployment are measured as monthly rates in each country while GDP is operationalized as GDP per capita in US dollars. Monthly Consumer Price Index inflation data was acquired from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, monthly unemployment data was drawn from Eurostat and the International Labour Organization, and GDP per capita was accessed via the World Bank. Summary statistics for all variables are provided in Table 2.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Measuring ideology in Central and Eastern Europe
Two of the hypotheses relating to bargaining environment complexity are associated with measures of party ideology. As stated previously, measuring party ideology in CEE requires a degree of sensitivity to the specific context of party politics in the region. Content analysis of manifestos has not provided a satisfactory measure of party policy positions in the region (Benoit and Laver, 2007) however, expert surveys have also been used to collect data on party policy and ideology (Benoit and Laver, 2006, 2007; Whitefield et al, 2007).

The drawback of existing expert surveys is that they have tended to be a snapshot of party policy positions which tell us little about how those positions have changed over time. In 2003-04 I collected an expert survey of party policy positions similar to that of Benoit and Laver (2006) and Laver and Hunt (1992). However, this survey followed the example of Ray (1999) and asked respondents to place political parties on each policy dimension at every election since 1990. This method of data collection has some inherent drawbacks. For example, the number of experts that are capable of providing considered responses is naturally quite low. Rather than sending the questionnaire to every political scientist in a given country, the survey was targeted at experts of party politics of many years standing in each country. The overall response rate to the survey was 23 percent from 110 questionnaires which is slightly lower than the 28 percent response rate obtained by Benoit and Laver (2006) but given the exhaustive nature of the survey this represents a reasonable return.

A further drawback of the survey lies in the limited resources available. Funding, time, and manpower constraints meant that data was collected for parties in five countries in CEE rather than every postcommunist state in the region.
The mean and standard errors of expert’s estimates for all parties in each country are shown in Table 3 together with a composite score for the Left-Right scale in each country. The Left-Right dimension is used to test the ideological diversity hypotheses in this study. It is crucial to note that this scale differs markedly from that derived from manifesto data. The Left-Right scale used here takes into account the specific meanings of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ across the region so for example, in Hungary the terms Left and Right are more closely related to differences in social policy. In the Czech Republic the Left-Right dimension carries more familiar economic connotations. To test the robustness of the Left-Right estimates derived from this survey I have compared it to party Left-Right scores from two other expert surveys: Benoit and Laver (2006) and the Chapel-Hill Survey (Hooghe et al., 2010). The Left-Right measure from the survey used in this research correlates extremely highly with both of these surveys; the correlation with the Left-Right dimension from the Benoit and Laver survey is $r=0.86$, $p<0.01$ and with the Chapel-Hill survey it is $r=0.82$, $p<0.01$.

**Results**

The dependent variable in this analysis is the duration of governments in months, therefore, I use the Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) model (Cox, 1972) to estimate the effect of bargaining environment complexity on government longevity. PH regression is a form of survival analysis that is used to estimate the effect of covariates on the ‘time to’ a specified termination event, in this case, a government’s removal from office. The PH model has become the standard form of analysis in government duration studies as it does not specify a
particular distribution of the underlying hazard function which means that it is less demanding of the data (Warwick, 1994; Martinez-Gallardo, 2011). The entries in the tables below include the coefficient of the models and the hazard ratio. The hazard ratio offers a more intuitive interpretation of the PH model as it is similar to the odds ratio produced by logit models. If a covariate is judged to have absolutely no effect on the risk of termination in a specific month then the hazard is one and all hazards are judged against this baseline of no effect. So, if a hazard ratio is 0.75 then this indicates that that covariate reduces the risk of termination by 25 percent, while a hazard ratio of 1.65 indicates a 65 percent increased risk of termination.

Two separate models of government duration in CEE are estimated. The first is an analysis of every government in the dataset. The second model excludes the first governments in each country. The reason for this is that in most cases, the first governments of the democratic era were umbrella organizations of anti-communist parties. In this regard, they existed outside of ‘normal politics’ to some degree and can be regarded as transition governments rather than partisan coalitions.  

The results of the analysis (Table 4) show that there is very little difference between the two models with no change in the direction of the coefficients for any variable and only one change in significance of note. That change in significance is important as it relates to the test of my first hypothesis. Drawing on the previous literature it was hypothesized that greater fragmentation in the bargaining environment would result in less durable governments. Table 4 tells us that the ENP in the legislature has only a marginal effect on government duration in CEE. Using the full dataset in model one of Table 4 it is indeed shown that the greater fragmentation of the bargaining environment does produce governments of a shorter duration,
however, this effect is significant only at the p=0.10 level. Furthermore, model two shows that when the first governments are removed from the dataset, the effect of bargaining environment fragmentation is rendered insignificant. This is not especially surprising since previous research has shown that the ENP in parliament has not been significantly related to government duration in CEE (Somer-Topcu and Williams, 2008; Tzelgov, 2011). The established literature also indicates that the ENP is often replaced in models of government duration by both the number of parties in government and the ideological diversity of the government (Warwick, 1994). That is not the case in this analysis as Table 4 shows that both of those variables have no significant effect on government duration. What this result does allow us to conclude is that the greater fragmentation of party systems in CEE that was observed in Table 1 has not had an adverse effect on the lifespan of governments.

The fragmentation of the bargaining environment is just one measure of its complexity; another that is potentially more important is ideological diversity. Policy and ideological positions determines how parties interact with one another. Parties that exist at opposite poles of the ideological spectrum are unlikely to find the common ground that will allow them to govern together. On the other hand, those parties that do share a degree of ideological compatibility may find it easier to negotiate a pathway to success in the coalition bargaining process. Ideology is particularly important in CEE, and possibly in new democracies in general. Parties had to form quickly following the transition to democracy and the norms of party and voter behaviour developed with equal rapidity. It has often been intimated that ideology simply does not matter in the CEE region; parties did not develop coherent policy platforms and few had effective organizations which resulted in parties behaving like classic office-seeking entities. In terms of government formation and duration, the result would have been the creation ideologically disparate coalitions held together by little more than a shared
thirst for power. However, I have shown earlier in this paper that parties in the region did in fact develop coherent policy platforms relatively early. Moreover, it has been shown that parties also tended to form coalitions with ideologically proximate partners (XXXX, forthcoming).

If we start from the proposition that ideology does matter in CEE then how does this affect government duration? I hypothesized that greater bargaining environment complexity leads to the creation of more diverse governments that have a greater hazard of termination. The models in Table 4 demonstrate that this is not the case: the ideological diversity of the government has no impact on its duration.

It could be the case that bargaining environment complexity does not have the same effect in CEE as it does in Western Europe. There is evidence to indicate that the development of party systems in the CEE region has resulted in the emergence of ‘bloc competition’ among political parties (Toole, 2000). Rather than attempting to conquer the ideological centre ground in a typical Downsian fashion, parties have located themselves on one side of the ideological spectrum and the search for potential governing partners takes place within these blocs rather than across them. This results in complex bargaining environments that are ideologically diverse but which produce governments that are robust because they are formed within these tight blocs (Warwick, 1994, p 53). Table 4 shows that this is exactly what has happened in CEE over the democratic period. The ideological diversity of the parliamentary bargaining environment significantly reduces the risk of government termination in both model one and model two. Moreover, the hazard ratio shows that the risk of termination is reduced by at least 66 percent for each extra degree of ideological space that separates the
two most distant parties in the party system. This effect is significant at the highest level in model one and is only marginally reduced in model two.\textsuperscript{14}

The finding that the ideological diversity of the bargaining environment reduces the risk of government termination is important for our understanding of party politics in CEE. As indicated previously in this paper, many formal analyses of political processes in CEE have produced results that show ideological variables as insignificant, which is contrary to the literature on parties and party system development. The results of this analysis allow us to understand how ideology affects at least one political process in the region, and it does so in a way that may be unexpected. Instead of bargaining environment diversity increasing the likelihood of government termination, the data presented here shows that it reduces the risk of premature termination because it is indicative of polarized party systems that are characterized by competition between distinct blocs of parties. Governments that emerge from these blocs are naturally more robust, partially due to their compatibility but also because of the fact that parties within these blocs have nowhere to go should they seek to defect – it is not simple for a party to cross from one bloc to another. There is therefore an imperative to maintain existing party alliances, including governing coalitions.

The final indicator of bargaining environment complexity that I test is the length of the government bargaining process. It is suggested that long bargaining processes indicate a thorough negotiation which produce governing arrangements that are detailed and will be more robust than governments that emerge from shorter negotiations. Governments that are formed from lengthy bargaining processes may also have an incentive, or feel a duty, to sustain the arrangement due to the effort expended in coming to a settlement in the first place. Table 4 shows that in both models one and two, the length of time that a government takes to
form is inversely related to its risk of termination. In other words, governments that emerge from longer and more complex bargaining processes are significantly more likely to serve longer in office. The hazard ratio shows that the risk of termination is reduced by three percent for each extra day that the government formation process lasts.

Figure 1 illustrates the survival function for governments above and below the average length (27.30 days) of the bargaining process in CEE. Governments that took longer than average to form have around an 85 percent probability of survival by the 10th month of their governing tenure while cabinets that formed from shorter than average bargaining processes have just over a 60 percent chance of survival at the same point in time. The risk of termination for governments from shorter bargaining processes exceeds 75 percent after around two years (24 months) in office while it is 43 months before cabinets that form following longer bargaining processes cross that threshold.

Taken together, the results of the statistical analysis presented in this paper show that bargaining environment complexity is a significant influence on government duration in CEE. Although fragmentation of the bargaining environment is not especially relevant, particularly in the period of ‘normal politics in the region, the ideological diversity of the party system is a significant indicator of how likely a government is to fulfil its term in office. Furthermore, the length of the government formation process, which is a summary indicator of the complexity of the bargaining environment, has a highly significant effect on government duration in the CEE region. Governments that arise from long and complex bargaining processes are likely to survive in office longer than those that are formed from shorter coalition negotiations.
The control variables in the models each have the expected effects on estimates of government duration. Rising inflation is significantly associated with an increased risk of government termination. The analysis also shows that governments in CEE run a much greater risk of termination in the final 12 months of the constitutional inter-election period. One of the most important control variables included here is the regime divide. This is of relevance specifically to CEE and was the subject of analysis in Tzelgov’s (2011) study of government duration in the region. Similar to Tzelgov, I too find that regime divide governments are significantly more durable than non-regime divide cabinets.

Conclusion

The question of why some governments survive longer than others is one that is especially pertinent in Central and Eastern Europe where almost two-thirds of cabinets terminate prematurely. Previous studies of government survival in the region have fallen back on established models of duration that were constructed to explain cabinets in Western Europe. Variables such as economic performance, majority status, and the regime divide have all been assessed with each proving to be significant to a greater or lesser degree. However, these existing studies overlook crucial aspects of government duration due to a failure to take into account the specific context of party politics in CEE. In any analysis of political processes that involves parties, the development of those parties and party systems must be considered; this is particularly relevant in new democracies where both parties and party systems have developed in tandem with democratization.

In this article I have argued that party system development has significantly influenced government duration in CEE as the party system sets the parameters of the government
bargaining process from which cabinets are formed. Party systems in CEE have developed in a manner which has facilitated the emergence of bi-polar competition among political parties which leads to highly ideologically diverse and complex bargaining environments. These diverse bargaining environments may be characterized as polarized in that parties have coalesced around poles on either side of the ideological spectrum with few parties capable of crossing from one bloc to the other. This has resulted in a political landscape where more complex bargaining environments produce more durable governments.

The notion that bargaining environment complexity can influence government duration is not new but it is often overlooked, particularly if one directly transplants empirical models designed to explain West European governments to a new political context such as CEE. Given what we know about the process of party system development in CEE four hypotheses were specified to test the assertion that bargaining environment complexity structures government duration in the region. Two of these provided little support for the bargaining environment complexity thesis; the ideological diversity of the government is not associated with its duration in any way while party system fragmentation has a marginal effect on government durability.

Stronger support was offered by measures of ideological diversity of the bargaining environment and the length of the negotiation process, which was used here as a summary indicator of bargaining environment complexity. Governments that were formed from ideologically diverse bargaining environments were more durable than those formed from more compact environments. This supports the view that party competition in CEE takes place in polarized blocs. In this scenario governments are more durable because parties have fewer incentives to destabilize the government as their prospects for participating in an
alternative coalition are limited due to their ideological distance from parties in the opposing bloc.

The length of the government bargaining process also influences government duration in CEE. In this case, longer, more complex bargaining processes result in significantly more durable governments. Why longer bargaining processes lead to more durable governments is uncertain though it has been hypothesized that drawn out bargaining processes are an indicator of a thorough governing arrangement rather than one that is hastily put together with important details overlooked (Saalfeld, 2009). Parties involved in long coalition negotiations may also feel a greater duty to maintain that government once in office (Warwick, 1994).

Overall, this article has shown that bargaining environment complexity is central to explaining government duration in CEE. Other factors are also significant, such as the regime divide and economic performance, but these must be considered together with bargaining environment indicators that are linked to party systems in the region.
References


Tables and figures

Table 1. Bargaining environment fragmentation in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western Europe</th>
<th>ENP</th>
<th>Central and Eastern Europe</th>
<th>ENP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>Mean</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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</table>

*Mean* 3.57

Source: Data for West European countries is taken from Taagepera and Sikk (2010). Data for Central and Eastern Europe is taken from Tzelgov (2011)
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Mean</th>
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<tr>
<td>Constructive vote of no-confidence</td>
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<td>GDP per capita (US$)</td>
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<td>5740</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%)</td>
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Table 3. Results of an expert survey of party policy positions

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<th>Poland</th>
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<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
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<td>(0.43)</td>
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<td>(0.49)</td>
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<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
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</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

The range of values for each policy dimension is 1 to 11. The endpoints for these values can be found in XXXX (forthcoming). The Left-Right dimension is based on a factor analysis of the policy dimensions in the table. The minimum value is -1.93 (Left) and the maximum is 1.81 (Right).
Table 4. Bargaining environment complexity and government duration in Central and Eastern Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Effective number of parties</th>
<th>Ideological range of parliament</th>
<th>Ideological range of government</th>
<th>Length of bargaining process</th>
<th>Minority government</th>
<th>No. of government parties</th>
<th>Regime divide government</th>
<th>Inter-election period</th>
<th>Constructive vote of no-confidence</th>
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<th>Inflation rate</th>
<th>Observations</th>
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<td>778</td>
<td>2.17 (0.00) *</td>
<td>1.85 (0.00) *</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model Two</td>
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<td>-3.99 (0.15) **</td>
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<td>0.84 (0.00)</td>
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<td>712</td>
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</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p=0.01, **p=0.05, *p=0.10
Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier survival function of Central and East European governments by length of the coalition bargaining process.
Notes

1 Based on data from Conrad and Golder (2010), excludes Croatia.

2 The regime divide, first proposed by Grzymała-Busse (2001), describes the division between parties that were affiliated with the former ruling Communist Parties in each country and those that were not.

3 Tzelgov also considered the ideological diversity of the cabinet as discussed further in this article.

4 Majority status refers only to whether or not a government holds a parliamentary majority; it does not indicate the size of that majority.

5 There are, of course, notable theoretical studies of government termination such as Laver and Shepsle (1996) and Lupia and Strøm (1995).

6 All references to the party system in this article refer to the parliamentary party system.

7 Tavits does not separate her analysis by region so the results for CEE parties alone are not published though country dummies are included in all models.

8 In total eight former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe were considered to be consolidated democracies, the five chosen countries plus Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and the Balkan states were not considered to be consolidated democracies.

9 It should be made clear at this point that Conrad and Golder consider a government’s duration to have ended upon the date of an election. Although the convention in most countries is for that government to continue in office as an acting Executive until a new government is formed, Conrad and Golder categorize these as periods of unofficial caretaker rule.

10 Due to missing data, in some cases monthly unemployment data were generate through linear interpolation of adjacent quarters. GDP per capita is reported annually. In this case, monthly data were generated by cubic spline interpolation from data for adjacent years.
The initial source for building a list of potential respondents was contributors to the European Journal of Political Research annual yearbooks, however, personal contacts of colleagues in XXXX at the University of XXXX were also drawn upon extensively.

A more detailed discussion of the Left-Right positions of political parties in CEE, and a further discussion and validation of this expert survey can be found in XXXX (Forthcoming).

The exception to this is Poland, the data for which begins in 1991 after the period of the transitionary government.

The actual significance value for this variable in model two is $p=0.02$ though for notation purposes it is marked as $p<0.05$ in Table 4.

I also specified models of government duration without time dependent covariates. In these models I replaced monthly GDP with the change in GDP from the beginning a of a government’s tenure to its end. These models show that the total increase in GDP over a government’s tenure significantly reduces its risk of termination. These results are available from the author on request.