Kant's argument for transcendental idealism in the transcendental aesthetic

Allais, Lucy (2010) Kant's argument for transcendental idealism in the transcendental aesthetic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 110 (1). pp. 47-75. ISSN 0066-7374

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Abstract

This paper gives an interpretation of Kant's argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. I argue against a common way of reading this argument, which sees Kant as arguing that substantive a priori claims about mind-independent reality would be unintelligible because we cannot explain the source of their justification. I argue that Kant's concern with how synthetic a priori propositions are possible is not a concern with the source of their justification, but with how they can have objects. I argue that Kant's notion of intuition needs to be understood as a kind of representation which involves the presence to consciousness of the object it represents, and that this means that a priori intuition cannot present us with a mind-independent feature of reality.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Depositing User: Lucy Allais
Date Deposited: 06 Feb 2012 20:17
Last Modified: 06 Jul 2012 11:08
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/25222
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