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Regional integration as diplomacy
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 05:27 authored by Maurice Schiff, L. Alan WintersL. Alan WintersRegional integration agreements are examples of second-best policies and have an ambiguous impact on welfare. This article builds a model in which regional integration agreements unambiguously raise welfare by correcting for externalities. It assumes that trade between neighboring countries raises trust between them and reduces the likelihood of conflict. The optimum intervention in that case is a subsidy on imports from the neighbor. The article shows that an equivalent solution is for the neighboring countries to tax imports from the rest of the world¿that is, to form a regional integration agreement¿together with some domestic taxes. The article shows that (1) the optimum tariffs on imports from the rest of the world are likely to decline over time; (2) deep integration implies lower optimum external tariffs if it is exogenous; (3) optimum external tariffs are higher before deep integration and lower thereafter if deep integration is endogenous; and (4) enlargement of bloc size (in terms of symmetric countries) has an ambiguous impact on external tariffs but raises welfare, and some form of domino effect exists.
History
Publication status
- Published
Journal
World Bank Economic ReviewISSN
0258-6770Publisher
Oxford University PressIssue
2Volume
12Page range
271-295Pages
25.0ISBN
0258-6770Department affiliated with
- Economics Publications
Notes
DOI 'Not Found': http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wber/12.2.271Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-02-06Usage metrics
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