File(s) not publicly available
Conceptual errors and social externalism
Åsa Maria Wikforss has proposed a response to Burge's thought experiments in favour of social externalism, one which allows the individualist to maintain that narrow content is truth¿conditional without being idiosyncratic. The narrow aim of this paper is to show that Wikforss's argument against social externalism fails, and hence that the individualist position she endorses is inadequate. The more general aim is to attain clarity on the social externalist thesis. Social externalism need not rest, as is typically thought, on the possibility of incomplete linguistic understanding or conceptual error. I identify the unifying principle that underlies the various externalist thought-experiments.
History
Publication status
- Published
Journal
Philosophical QuarterlyISSN
0031-8094Publisher
WileyExternal DOI
Issue
211Volume
53Page range
265-273Pages
9.0Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-02-06Usage metrics
Categories
No categories selectedKeywords
Licence
Exports
RefWorks
BibTeX
Ref. manager
Endnote
DataCite
NLM
DC