Kripkean counterpart theory

Ramachandran, Murali (2008) Kripkean counterpart theory. Polish Journal of Philosophy, 2 (2). pp. 89-106. ISSN 1897-1652

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Abstract

David Lewis's counterpart-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic is motivated originally by worries about identifying objects across possible worlds; the counterpart relation is grounded more cautiously on comparative similarity. The possibility of contingent identity is an unsought and in some eyes, unwelcome consequence of this approach. In this paper I motivate a Kripkean counterpart theory by way of defending the prior, pre-theoretical, coherence of contingent distinctness. Contingent identity follows for free. The theory is Kripkean in that the counterpart relation is in a sense stipulated rather than grounded on similarity, and is such that no object has more than one counterpart at a world. This avoids a number of objections Fara and Williamson have recently levelled against counterpart theory generally; their other objections are addressed by enriching the theory with special quantifiers and actuality operators.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Depositing User: Murali Ramachandran
Date Deposited: 06 Feb 2012 19:55
Last Modified: 04 Jul 2012 16:00
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/22992
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