A swing-state theory of trade protection in the electoral college

Muûls, Mirabelle and Petropoulou, Dimitra (2013) A swing-state theory of trade protection in the electoral college. Canadian Journal of Economics, 46 (2). pp. 705-724. ISSN 0008-4085

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Abstract

This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re-election probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of Business, Management and Economics > Economics
Depositing User: Dimitra Petropoulou
Date Deposited: 22 May 2012 09:55
Last Modified: 13 Mar 2017 12:15
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/22528

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