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Cosmopolitanism and Global Politics

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A version of this is in Political Quarterly 18, 4, Autumn 2011

Is global politics the way to achieve cosmopolitanism? Cosmopolitanism can be a philosophy, or something in social attitudes or culture, or a type of politics. It’s about people in the world with different identities, beliefs and cultures living together, with respect for each other. Cosmopolitanism involves groups and individuals having obligations to one another and bonds of society uniting them, but also respect for plurality. This is in contrast to ideologies that value commonality over pluralism or instances where particular identities are valued over wider common bonds, as in the case, for instance, of nationalism.

In politics cosmopolitanism involves pluralism and commonality going together. This can be groups combining at civil society level and pursuing common obligations amidst their diversity. Or it can be in more centralised world governance where global groups work together in common institutions to solve shared problems, meet obligations to one another, and find ways of coming together whilst also maintaining their plural identities.

Cosmopolitanism has been pushed up the agenda in recent years by the idea that globalisation is bringing diverse groups in touch with each other via direct contact or just greater consciousness through global communications. This is together with the idea that we have more common global problems we need to solve, and obligations to others on the other side of the world.

This article focuses mainly on cosmopolitanism as a philosophy or attitude of obligations to others and cosmopolitan politics as a way of pursuing that. It is critical of the latter. It argues that cosmopolitan politics of the centralised sort mentioned above is not a good way for pursuing a philosophy of cosmopolitan values. Global cosmopolitan politics cannot achieve cosmopolitan goals.

An argument connected with this is that there are many types of cosmopolitanism and that being in favour or against some types does not mean being in favour or against the others. So being critical of cosmopolitan politics does not necessarily mean doubting cosmopolitanism in its normative, cultural or sociological forms – ‘normative’ meaning what you value and want to achieve and ‘cultural’ or ‘sociological’ meaning what cosmopolitanism already exists in culture and society. For instance, you can doubt cosmopolitanism as politics but still agree with it as a value. At the same time whether cosmopolitan politics can work does depend in part on whether there is cosmopolitanism in culture and society. So while you can be in favour of some bits of cosmopolitanism and not others they are still all connected.
Can cosmopolitan ends be achieved through global cosmopolitan means? The means I am looking at here are top-down political institutions. These include forums like Copenhagen and other climate change talks such as those in Kyoto and Cancun, on-going rounds of world trade talks, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty that is reviewed every five years, and the United Nations. These bring people together at a centralised level to forge global agreements. They are a sort of elite cosmopolitanism. They are based on the idea that we have a mutual fate and shared obligations. They involve inclusive negotiation, to agree targets, which all are expected to comply with. They aim to achieve agreement and consensus. So there is a dialogical element to them. They are politically equalising by giving everyone an equal vote. These are cosmopolitan dimensions to such forums. This sort of global cosmopolitanism is advocated by authors like Held, Beck, Kaldor and others. Cosmopolitan politics are argued for out of a belief in obligations to others. I will come back to that in a moment. They are also advocated because many problems nowadays are global and the nation-state is seen as having less and less capability to cope with them. So we are said to need global institutions to tackle issues such as climate change, global poverty, nuclear proliferation, world trade and economic regulation, all of which require combined action. In addition we have a democratic deficit because democracy operates at national levels, which are seen to be losing power, but not at global levels where the capacity to be effective is. So we need to move away from national levels and establish democracy at global levels. But is global politics the best way of meeting global obligations?

**Cosmopolitan philosophy and politics**

There are common criticisms of global cosmopolitan politics. One argument is that nation-states are still important – they have powers within their own borders and globally and so global politics is not as necessary as it is made out to be. Some argue that cosmopolitanism is just a form of westernisation, favouring liberal goals of individual rights over collective and socio-economic goals more important beyond the West. Cosmopolitanism tries to universalise such goals to the rest of the world. This is an uncosmopolitan thing to do, and affects the legitimacy of cosmopolitanism beyond the West where it is seen as just a type of imperialism. Power, inequality and conflict undermine cosmopolitanism. Global cosmopolitan governance will be used by the powerful for their own ends, and common goals cannot be agreed globally where there are so many severely conflicting interests. In this article I want to move on from such points, but some of what I will argue is related to them.

Criticisms of cosmopolitanism don’t need to be just negative and lacking positive alternatives. They can lead to better ideas about how to achieve cosmopolitan ends. The criticism in this article is not of cosmopolitanism as a normative social and political philosophy. It is of cosmopolitan politics. My reservation is that cosmopolitan politics is not adequate for pursuing cosmopolitanism as a value or goal.

Cosmopolitanism as a social and political philosophy is about obligations being universal and global, to strangers, regardless of distance, not specifically to closer loyalties like ourselves, kin, locality or nation. It is about humanity as common, and obligations across
One way of judging this is by looking at whether empirically and sociologically, in society as it is, there is a basis for cosmopolitanism. If not then we may need a non-cosmopolitan approach for pursuing cosmopolitan ethics. We need to be careful not to slip from one cosmopolitanism to another, to presume that the political philosophy of cosmopolitanism (about the ends we want) needs to be achieved through cosmopolitan politics (the means for achieving them). Another way of saying this is saying that justice is different from politics. Cosmopolitan justice may not be best pursued through cosmopolitan politics.

So I want to distinguish different types of cosmopolitanism. Sometimes people pursue these together or see a criticism of one as a criticism of the others. But you shouldn’t lump cosmopolitanisms together as if being in favour of one dimension of cosmopolitanism commits you to the rest, or that a criticism of one form means opposition to the others also. Different types need to be distinguished analytically, but the links between them in empirical practice kept in mind. You can be for some sorts of cosmopolitanism (eg normative ideas about is desirability) but sceptical about others (eg political forms of it). At the same time whether one type of cosmopolitanism can work (eg the political type) may depend on whether it has a basis in other sorts (eg sociological forms in society).

**Social and cultural cosmopolitanism**

Is there a social basis for cosmopolitan politics? How does cosmopolitanism as a philosophy and a type of politics relate to cosmopolitanism empirically and sociologically? Sociological issues are about whether there are conditions for cosmopolitanism to be possible and prosper. A sociological approach looks at whether there is a basis in society for stable cosmopolitan institutions that can work, and for cosmopolitan justice. So, for instance, cosmopolitanism relies on cross-cultural openness to others, peoples’ engagement beyond the self-interest of their own state, and on whether there are political identities that are global enough to underpin global political institutions. So we need to look at whether these sorts of things are prevalent. The existence of cultural cosmopolitanism is important for political cosmopolitanism. What evidence is there of social and cultural bases for cosmopolitanism?

One perspective is that ecological problems are creating a global consciousness of risk and a sense of shared fate amongst people in the world, and so a greater cosmopolitan feeling of obligations to others. This is speculative and there is not good evidence for it. If there is a shared risk consciousness amongst the public globally it comes into conflict with the interests of oil companies and of carbon-emitting countries less affected by climate change and with an interest in maintaining carbon emissions, these often being richer states. This clashes with the interests of countries who are lower carbon emitters yet more affected by symptoms of climate change, like desertification and water loss. These are often poor and already hot places, for instance in Sub-Saharan Africa. So ecological problems involve uncospopolitan intentions and conflicting interests as much as cosmopolitan consciousness. If there is cosmopolitanism at the level of socio-cultural values, a shared
global risk consciousness, which is debatable, it is contradicted by conflicts at the level of material interests. I will come back to the disjuncture between culture and material interests. But let me look first at how far there are values of cosmopolitanism.

Pippa Norris has evaluated evidence from the World Values Survey to gauge the extent of cosmopolitan values. In the 1990s survey, people were asked to name two territorial entities they identified with out of the following five: locality/town, region/state, country, continent, and world. 47% chose locality or region as an important identity, 38% nation, and 15% cosmopolitan identity, the latter being a choice of world or continent. This assumes continental identities are cosmopolitan, which I would dispute, because this often involves putting the interests of your continent ahead of those beyond it.

People whose two chosen identities were both continent and world (what Norris calls pure cosmopolitans) amounted to 2% of respondents. Pure localists (the term for those who chose both local and region) made up 20%. There was not much difference across what were defined as post-industrial, developing and post-communist countries. There was a generational effect – cosmopolitan identity was stronger amongst the young. There was higher cosmopolitanism the more educated and urban people were. Overall this is mixed evidence on cosmopolitan identity. It does not show an absence of cosmopolitanism, or that cosmopolitanism is widespread. It shows a mixed picture of how prevalent it is.

Another indicator of cosmopolitanism is attitudes to immigration, because these measure openness to others. They provide a better guide to cosmopolitanism than world values data because they measure openness on a concrete issue rather than an abstract statement of identity, which can often be contradicted in actual practice. Data on attitudes to immigration is often negative, fluctuating from year to year. The 2009 Transatlantic Trends survey looked at attitudes to immigration in North America and Europe. 50% of Europeans thought immigration was more of a problem than an opportunity, up from 43% in 2008. 54% of Americans thought the same. People who thought there were too many immigrants ranged between 50-55% in European countries, and was 48% in the USA. People regularly overestimate by double or more the number of immigrants in their own country. Sizeable minorities in most countries thought immigrants take jobs, bring down wages, or cause crime. 43% believed in strong immigration controls and 7% in no immigration at all. As with cosmopolitan identities, there is mixed evidence on openness to others in this data.

Europe is sometimes given as an example of the highpoint of cosmopolitanism. States who not long ago were engaged in mass slaughter of each other’s citizens have shared trading relations and subject themselves to common rules via the European Union. These interconnections and mutuality are seen to show cosmopolitanism. But Europe is uncosmopolitan in many ways. Using openness to others again as a measure, it has selectively allowed migration internally but imposed greater restrictions on immigration from outside, including from very poor and desperate people. EU migration policy is concerned with its own but more closed to outsiders, often very vulnerable, despite proven economic and cultural benefits of immigration. This is quite uncosmopolitan. The EU subsidises its farmers on a large scale to help them compete with farmers from some of the poorest countries in the world whose need for earnings from agriculture is much greater.
So on issues of openness and obligations to others there is a lack of cosmopolitanism in Europe.

European unity is a step outwards from narrow nationalism, but it is nationalism writ large if it stops at Europeans looking out for their own interests against others, without expanding to wider concerns and more global inclusion. Furthermore Europe involves a regional and territorial concept of transnationalism. You forge shared links and obligations with others because they share a territory with you. Cosmopolitan internationalism should involve one based on ethical obligations rather than location. You have obligations to others as fellow humans wherever they are, irrespective of geographical proximity or other criteria such as race or nationality.

**From cultural cosmopolitanism in society to material interests in politics**

So it’s not clear that at an empirical sociological level there is a basis for cosmopolitan politics. As a result, cosmopolitan ethics may require non-cosmopolitan politics. In fact, surveys such as those discussed above may overestimate cosmopolitan attitudes. People are likely to understate their anti-cosmopolitanism. When asked in a survey whether they have attitudes of openness to others some could see a negative answer as reflecting badly on them.

Even if there is cultural cosmopolitanism amongst the public this may not be reflected in politicians’ behaviour, where they are motivated less by the cultural values of people and more by the perceived material interests of their state, leading to conflicts with other states.

Some advocates argue that cosmopolitan democracy is realistic rather than utopian not just because it has cultural bases, which I have discussed and questioned, but because political institutions for it already exist, from the United Nations to global economic organisations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, international human rights regimes, and international non-governmental organisations and global social movements. These could be developed, co-ordinated more and democratised. So there are political as well as cultural arguments that bases for cosmopolitanism already exist.

However, global negotiations over trade, debt, aid, nuclear proliferation, and climate change often fail because national interests override cosmopolitanism. World trade talks, for instance in Geneva in 2008, and 2010 climate change talks in Copenhagen are examples. The political basis for cosmopolitanism is undermined if there are clashing interests in political institutions. There need to be common material interests as well as cultural and political bases for cosmopolitanism. But common material interests for cosmopolitanism are difficult to find, as in these negotiations on such global issues.

It’s not surprising, therefore, that Archibugi, a cosmopolitan, says that since the end of the cold war the governments of western liberal states have made no major institutional reforms in a cosmopolitan direction apart from the International Criminal Court (which some of them do not support anyway). War, he says, continues to be a mechanism for
‘tackling controversies’, international law is violated and aid to developing countries has decreased.8

A key problem, then, is that cultural and political cosmopolitanisms can be undermined by material interests. Even where there are culturally cosmopolitan values at a social level, if there are, these may not follow through into politics because of clashing material interests there. If there are emerging political institutions for cosmopolitanism, these may be undermined by the same factor.

To continue to favour cosmopolitan politics in the light of such problems is dangerous because it legitimates it. Disembedded from socio-economic bases discussed above, discourses of political cosmopolitanism advance it as a way of solving serious problems when it is not capable of doing so. They lead down blind alleys that may not work and are a diversion from solving problems by more effective means. Furthermore, cosmopolitanism as a discourse presents a world in which all have obligations to one another and have a say. It acts as if cosmopolitanism is not structured by power and inequality and, in doing so, disguises these. This allows cosmopolitanism to be used by the powerful for their ends, to reproduce and accumulate power at the expense of the most disadvantaged and least powerful, through cosmopolitan forums, while hiding their power by presenting this more benignly as cosmopolitan.

I have brought up material interests as important, and an obstacle to cosmopolitanism. A possible response to this is to become a sceptic. Criticism leads to deciding that cosmopolitanism cannot happen. Another response is to argue that it is so important it needs to be pursued anyway. Some cosmopolitans are utopian, in the best sense of the word. They say cosmopolitanism needs to be supported even if there are limited bases for it. Even if culturally and socially, or materially and politically, there are not many grounds for cosmopolitanism, it is so important you should pursue it anyway.

Robert Fine, for instance, argues for a cosmopolitanism that tries to reconcile an awareness of violence in the world with a normative vision of perpetual peace, and sees cosmopolitanism as much as a mode of understanding as a legal and institutional order. He argues for keeping in mind the normativity of cosmopolitanism in the face of violence in the modern age. Fine endorses Kant’s view that cosmopolitanism is right even if the public and state are not cosmopolitan and Arendt’s argument for taking bearings from the idea of cosmopolitanism rather than its actuality. Similarly Archibugi argues that in the face of the obstacles and reality facing cosmopolitanism, the latter should be defended in the name of being visionary9.

But this can leave you arguing for something which does not work, for which there are not adequate bases, that can then be misused by the most powerful for their own ends, justifying such misuse in the name of cosmopolitanism, while serious problems go untackled because this approach does not have an effect. I wish to argue that if clashes of material interests undermine cosmopolitanism then you need to look for shared material interests for cosmopolitanism rather than being utopian. Materialist approaches to
cosmopolitanism can be positive as well as negative. It may be possible to find material bases for cosmopolitanism as well as against it.

One way of doing this is to look for non-cosmopolitan means. This does not rule out cosmopolitanism. It means pursuing cosmopolitan ends through non-cosmopolitan approaches. Clashing material interests suggest you need to find non-cosmopolitan politics for cosmopolitan goals. Continuing to pursue cosmopolitan means which evidence casts doubt upon may undermine cosmopolitan ends. It is better to find an alternative route. Let us look at non-cosmopolitan means for pursuing cosmopolitanism, and then at what the experience of Copenhagen and financial crisis tell us about possibilities for cosmopolitan politics.

**Conflict versus consensus approaches**

What could an alternative means be? A conflict approach to politics can take into account clashing material interests, inequality and power. It can involve taking part in central global cosmopolitan institutions, but on the basis that cosmopolitan ends need to be pursued through conflict with opposed forces, rather than via consensus or agreement between actors who have contradictory interests. This involves a conflict model of society more than an approach that is optimistic about difference as a basis for consensus.

Entering into competition with others with conflicting interests also involves collaboration with those who are ideologically like-minded and have similar interests, to pursue bilateral alliances. This is international but below-global, because while it involves reaching out beyond nations to wider links it does not involve the inclusion of all, where some will be opposed. This is about pursuing cosmopolitan ethics and aims, but is different from cosmopolitan politics in that: a) it is bottom up - it involves alliances only with those who are likeminded lower down rather than with everyone at a global level; b) it is not inclusive - you only ally with those you can get agreements with; and c) it is based on conflict rather than cosmopolitan consensus - you see those with opposed material interests as opponents rather than in terms of commonality.

Hugo Chavez, President of Venezuela, provides an example of such an approach. He pursues national solutions, nationalisation and redistribution at home, but also internationalism, yet not at an inclusive global level where opposed interests make this impossible. He pursues international politics with actors with whom he has ideas or interests in common. Also relevant are the politics of the non-aligned movement, the G77 group of developing nations in the UN, South-South alliances between developing countries, and alter-globalisation social movements in global civil society with agendas critical of neoliberalism and oriented to social goals to do with environment, human rights, health and development. These have cosmopolitan orientations but pursue them through non-cosmopolitan means politically – ie not via all-inclusive top-down politics but through alliances with those they have connections with, and in conflict with opposed interests.

**Copenhagen and the financial crisis**


What do developments of recent years tell us about the possibilities for cosmopolitan politics? Copenhagen and the financial crisis suggest the relevance of global regulation with cosmopolitan aims.

The financial crisis was global, linked to finance and lack of regulation. It provoked popular dissatisfaction with bankers and their risky and greedy rewards systems. Others blameless and not as well-off are having to pay the price for government spending to solve the problem, for instance public sector workers in rich countries where deficits were run up to bail out banks. Such public attitudes and the questioning of deregulation provide a good basis for greater controls on finance. It can be argued that this needs to be done at a global level because of the possibility of capital flight if individual states introduced taxes or restrictions alone.

There has been an ideal context for global regulation through combined action – cosmopolitan in the sense that it involves mutual action globally for the common good, and obligations to others in society placed on finance through globally agreed means. But responses to the financial crisis have been primarily through national governments and fiscal stimulus rather than restructuring – national reflation rather than global regulation. And individuals like bankers and politicians have got a lot of the blame rather than structures or ideologies like neoliberalism. Cosmopolitan intervention in what seem propitious circumstances for it hasn’t been pursued.

Climate change is often used as an example of where there is a basis for cosmopolitanism, as I have mentioned. At a cultural level it provides a basis for cosmopolitan consciousness, and politically it requires combined global action. But what it has involved in practice globally are divisions between the developed and developing worlds, and the possibility for single nations, the US in Kyoto and China in Copenhagen, to use their power to undermine agreements, in pursuit of national self-interests.

The failure of Copenhagen was blamed on weak leaders. But this individualises it too much. It was more structural, to do with an all-inclusive top-down politics disposed to failure because there are too many possibilities for clashes of interest and the use of power by the most powerful states. In addition there are not effective means for enforcement above national levels. The agreement was criticised for being non-binding. But at this level even binding agreements are not so, because there are no forces or sanctions for non-compliance.

Soon before Copenhagen, Australia and the US suggested that national laws provided a greater chance for agreement and enforcement than global ones and President Obama went to India and China and established bilateral deals on carbon reductions. Commentators argued that agreement between so many states at COP15, and enforcement, had minimal chance of success\textsuperscript{10}. They advocated instead building up from existing initiatives, national laws which can be made and enforced more easily, and bilateral agreements where there are less parties involved, so more chance of being achieved.
For instance, in China, Obama rather than setting targets, agreed practical action in areas where there were already initiatives, like a joint clean energy research centre, an electrical vehicles initiative, a plan on energy efficiency in buildings, and capturing Co2 from coal stations. Similarly he has pursued nuclear disarmament goals via talks with Russia as much as through the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty - unilaterally and bilaterally as much as multilaterally.

Multilateralism is undermined by clashing material interests. Trying to make tough deals between 195 nations or so is ambitious in a world which has become more multi-polar and with the growth of groupings and alliances to defend their interests, for instance amongst poorer states. This is exemplified by climate and trade negotiations in which breakdown or limited success is now almost a norm. Commitments between states are often not binding in practice. The most advanced transnational forum provides an example. In the EU, deficit, competition and subsidy rules are often not adhered to.

There are positive alternatives for achieving cosmopolitan ends. What can be pursued is unilateral action, pursued where possible through international collaboration, but not on the basis of involving everyone, or assuming cosmopolitan consciousness. On climate change examples of national action that can be built on include electrical vehicle and turbine initiatives in China, unilateral deforestation in Brazil, and solar power developments in India.

Ypi argues for ‘statist cosmopolitanism’, the state as the best level for pursuing cosmopolitan aims. Ferrara argues for universalizing from the ‘force of the example’, from initiatives on the ground as much as from agreements from above on not yet practiced objectives11.

International action could be less oriented to agreeing abstract binding commitments and more to do with building on existing local action. This involves building from energy at local and national levels and moving the results up to the global level, rather than creating global deals in an impossible situation of inclusive conflicting interests and going downwards from there. It suggests an alternative type of global politics, not against international agreements but going from the bottom up, based on unilateral initiatives, rather than on an inclusive top-down basis, assuming cosmopolitanism.

Bottom up, national and bilateral forms of internationalism, to pursue cosmopolitan ends, have a better chance than top-down inclusive cosmopolitan politics. This should include civil society. Global social movements have been important in bringing cosmopolitan concerns to the fore – for example, the exploitative practices of MNCs, debt, and the Tobin tax. All of these were pushed on to the agendas of governments by alter-globalisation or global justice movements.

There is too much division between sceptics and supporters of cosmopolitanism. The issue is more complicated than for or against. There is often the assumption that critics of cosmopolitanism are just negative with no positive alternative, who put a cynical attitude ahead of making the world a better place; while cosmopolitans are well-intended and
concerned about the world’s problems and cultural harmony and are proposing routes for solving them. But a defence of cosmopolitan politics can send us down blind alleys and distract us from better ways in which such problems can be solved. At the same time critics of cosmopolitanism need not be rejecters, and criticisms of cosmopolitan politics can lead to forms of politics better equipped to achieve cosmopolitan ends than cosmopolitanism itself. This has been my intention in assessing cosmopolitanism, to see what are the best ways of achieving its ends.

Conclusion

Cosmopolitanism is not unitary. It needs to be looked at in its different dimensions, and there is stronger or weaker evidence for it in each area, and differing conclusions in terms of how viable it is normatively. Different dimensions of cosmopolitanism include normative, philosophical, socio-cultural, political and material ones. In some there may be more foundations for cosmopolitanism than others. However they are not separable. For instance, the chances for normative or political cosmopolitanism are linked to whether there are bases for them at a socio-cultural level or in material interests.

I am saying we need to detach cosmopolitan justice or cosmopolitanism as a social and political philosophy from cosmopolitan politics. A critique of cosmopolitan politics should not be assumed to mean a critique of cosmopolitan values or philosophy. Cosmopolitanism as a social and political philosophy of obligations to others is normatively desirable, but cosmopolitan political institutions are not equipped for delivering these, at least not alone.

People defend cosmopolitan politics against criticism that it is unrealistic by saying it has political and cultural bases. I have discussed the cultural, political and material conditions for cosmopolitanism. Evidence for these is mixed. Even if there are political and cultural bases for it, there are clashing material interests at a political level. So if cosmopolitanism is looked at not just as a philosophy but as embedded in socio-economic bases its politics look doubtful, despite the desirability of its values.

One possible response to this is to be utopian about cosmopolitanism, to say that it is so important that it should be pursued anyway. But to favour cosmopolitan politics where it often cannot really work legitimate a discourse that can then be misused by the powerful for their ends, and diverts us from more effective means.

Criticisms of cosmopolitanism sometimes seem dismissive, not facing up to problems humanity faces, and opting for easy cynicism. But the critique of cosmopolitanism need not, as Kiely argues, be negative. In fact, it can be about finding the best way of fulfilling obligations to others, being better at cosmopolitanism. Because clashing interests undermine cosmopolitanism, a best way to pursue it is not to aim for inclusive consensus at a central global level, but to see cosmopolitanism in terms of opposed material interests, best pursued as some interests against others, through a politics of conflict rather than consensus.
This should happen at below-global levels from the bottom up, because top-down action involves inclusive agreement that is not going to progress in a context of conflicting interests. The experiences of Copenhagen and the financial crisis suggest the need for such an alternative.

These questions are empirical ones. But there are conceptual issues about disentangling types of cosmopolitanism and arguments for it. Dealing with these can help with practical politics. My argument is critical and sceptical, but it is positive about cosmopolitan social and political philosophy and my aim is to think about the means through which this can be pursued, whether cosmopolitan or non-cosmopolitan. It suggests cosmopolitan justice without cosmopolitan politics; cosmopolitan ends without cosmopolitan means. Cosmopolitanism may be best aimed at through other kinds of politics – bottom-up rather than top down, selectively inclusive rather than all-inclusive, and conflictual rather than consensual.


7 Eg Held 2000 op. cit.

8 Archibugi 2004 op. cit. p438

