How believing can fail to be knowing

Ramachandran, Murali (2006) How believing can fail to be knowing. Theoria, 21 (2). pp. 185-194. ISSN 0495-4548

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This paper defends a simple, externalist account of knowledge, incorporating familiar conditions canvassed in the literature, and responds to Timothy Williamson's charge that any such analysis is futile because knowledge is semantically un-analyzable. The response, in short, is that even though such an account may not offer a reductive analysis--by way of more basic, non-circular concepts--it still has an explanatory advantage over Williamson's own position: it explains how belief can fail to be knowledge.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Depositing User: Murali Ramachandran
Date Deposited: 06 Feb 2012 18:55
Last Modified: 04 Jul 2012 08:43
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