Cassell, J. A. (1998) Against medical ethics: opening the can of worms. Journal of Medical Ethics, 24 (1). 8-12; discussion 13. ISSN 0306-6800Full text not available from this repository.
In a controversial paper, David Seedhouse argues that medical ethics is not and cannot be a distinct discipline with it own field of study. He derives this claim from a characterization of ethics, which he states but does not defend. He claims further that the project of medical ethics as it exists and of moral philosophy do not overlap. I show that Seedhouse's views on ethics have wide implications which he does not declare, and in the light of this argue that Seedhouse owes us a defence of his characterization of ethics. Further, I show that his characterization of ethics, which he uses to attack medical ethics, is a committed position within moral philosophy. As a consequence of this, it does not allow the relation between moral philosophy and medical ethics to be discussed without prejudice to its outcome. Finally, I explore the relation between Seedhouse's position and naturalism, and its implications for medical epistemology. I argue that this shows us that Seedhouse's position, if it can be defended, is likely to lead to a fruitful and important line of inquiry which reconnects philosophy and medical ethics.
|Additional Information:||Comment Journal Article|
|Keywords:||Ethical Theory Ethics, Medical Humans Morals Philosophy, Medical Specialism Bioethics and Professional Ethics Philosophical Approach|
|Schools and Departments:||Brighton and Sussex Medical School > Brighton and Sussex Medical School|
|Depositing User:||Jackie Cassell|
|Date Deposited:||30 Mar 2007|
|Last Modified:||30 Nov 2012 16:51|
|Google Scholar:||5 Citations|